tv Charlie Rose Bloomberg August 14, 2016 7:00am-8:01am EDT
>> from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. charlie: the cyber attack targeting the dnc appears to be more extensive than officials first believed. the original leak in july forced dnc chairwoman debbie wasserman schultz to resign. the question remains, whether t is part of a larger effort to influence american presidential election. my guest served as the general counsel at the national security agency. he currently leads a global
cyber security practice. michael riley covers cyber security for bloomberg news. david sanger of "the new york times." i'm pleased to have all of them here. david, tell me where we are. david: we are at a protectable place in the course of this. what we knew a year ago, although the government did not announce it as such, the russians have got inside the state department's unclassified e-mail system, part of the systems in the joint chiefs of staff. then we discovered the successor to the kgb, more than a year ago, got into the democratic national committee systems, followed by another russian intelligence agency which did not even know the fsb was there.
when you go into the systems, you follow the breadcrumbs out. it would not be surprising if one of those hacked e-mails or individuals was either the one ho led these agencies into the dnc or from the dnc, they went out to them. you follow the string as it proceeds in and out of these etworks. charlie: tell me what role wikileaks plays in this. david: wikileaks was the recipient of a number of the documents. they were not the primary recipient. initially after the dnc hack was discovered, and the report pointing back to two russian actors, after that, we began to see some of these documents surface on the web from somebody who we talked about a
few weeks ago who identified imself with the name after another hacker actually in ail. it looks like that was a construct. probably there was no individual, but a committee of russian hackers. whoever it is, they published this material themselves and they did not get much news bounce out of it. after that, it ended up in the hands of wikileaks. we do not understand about the transmission belt of how it got from the people who hacked this to the people who published it. charlie: is julian assange saying that he has a lot more? that he is going to dribble out like he did the snowden stuff?
david: he has hinted he has more. he has hinted he has no particular love for hillary clinton. in an odd way, the contents of what was in these lakes, apart from the fact the dnc was favoring hillary clinton over bernie sanders, which was not the best kept secret in ashington. the fact of the hack in the concept the russians may be inserting themselves into an american election is far more newsworthy than what we have seen out of these e-mails. charlie: any doubt the russians did this? >> i do not think there is any doubt the russians did his. given publicly revealed information and the reports hat we have seen with a high degree of confidence that russians are behind this. i think the big question still is, was this directed at espionage? the russians have been interested in u.s. government agency servers and
networks. the chinese have been nterested. or did they, in fact, intend to insert themselves into the lection? or did they make the decision after they were caught? charlie: have we seen the tip of the iceberg? >> i would expect there is much more. this appears to be much more than espionage. something like an information warfare operation. on some level that shouldn't surprise us. the russians have been running these types of operations in europe for a couple of years. they have done it in ukraine, eastern europe, they hacked a television station in paris. they claimed to be the islamic state. where they have changed tactics
or upped the game, they decided to intervene in a very contentious election in the u.s. and there is no doubt they have a lot of information with which to do that. the attacks have come out, the victims are part of a small subset of a larger set of eople who were targeted. security firms tracked 4000 spearfishing e-mails from the gre intelligence unit and they crossed a whole bunch of categories. there are lawyers, lobbyists, foundations. they go into every corner of the washington power structure. nato officers, military stuff, defense contractors, personal e-mails. it combines very gossipy stuff with things they managed to get that people talked about. my guess is that there is a lot of stuff out there and the question is --
two things, how much have they already given to wikileaks or other people to release? do they plan to do this all the way up to the election? is there any response the u.s. can make that might change the calculus? >> i am sure senior officials are debating that exact question and the complexity involves a host of factors. first of course, attributing something to a nationstate is far different than privately doing so. we saw the u.s. government make significant strides when the sony hack was attributed to the government of north korea. officials are seeing the public benefit for attribution, to hold hostile actors accountable. charlie: how do we hold north korea accountable? how might we hold russia accountable? >> there is a range of tools at the government's disposal. everything from diplomatic
action. we have seen diplomatic approachment with the chinese. to criminal indictments as we saw with several pla actors. to economic sanctions, as we saw in the case of north korea. there is a host of options, all of which have various advantages and disadvantages in terms of practical impact and public messaging to thes a ver air is. -- adversary. charlie: the question comes up with regards to hillary clinton server, do we assume the people who did the hackings wanted to hack her server or would it be much more difficult to penetrate? david: it is a question we have been asking a lot about. what we heavy heard from from the f.b.i. director so far, is that there is no direct
evidence that anybody who had gotten inside the server, but he went on to say the actors are usually so good, they might not leave any evidence. that raises the obvious question, if they are so good why was it so easy in the case offense dnc hack? the answer to that is it could be that there was r more than one hacker. in cyber, it is not uncommon, once somebody gets caught, for them to leave the door open to other hackers so the crime scene gets polluted. there are all those different elements and it may be a long time and we may never figure out whether her server was hacked. i want to pick up on one thing, here is a growing sense that naming and shaming has some utility. the justice department indicted some iranians.
there is the chinese indictment, the naming of the north koreans. one interesting question may be, did the obama administration make a mistake by not naming the russians for the state department and white house and joint chiefs of staff and had they done so, would it have created some kind of deterrent for them to act against the dnc? or would it have made no difference? we will never know the nswer. i think one thing in the way for naming the russians in this case, it will raise the question, what about these previous hacks the u.s. government knew about and never discussed publicly? charlie: they named the north koreans after sony, correct? >> it was a very quick attribution. in other words, the president had gotten briefed on it and named them in december just before he went to
hawaii. you may remember that immediately after that, a lot of people came out and said, the evidence is no good. it is not the north koreans. the u.s. government did not want to reveal its evidence because it did not want to reveal how much it was up inside north korea's own computer systems. and had evidence from inside north korea. that could be going on in the russian case. you could have intelligence agencies, i do not know if this is the case, it could be the intelligence agencies know more about this case from our own implants inside russian systems and the intelligence community may have decided they could not risk revealing the depth of that penetration and thus cannot talk about what evidence they have. charlie: does that make sense to you? >> generally, it does. generally in these situations what will happen is something called a gain-loss analysis, they will weigh the benefits of doing so
publicly versus the potential loss of an intelligence source. >> it is also important to point out we are trying to create certain behavior in cyberspace. we're trying to distinguish what would be considered a good espionage and a bad espionage. i think we want to draw a line between what type of espionage the u.s. itself conducts. charlie: the u.s. government would not try to influence elections? i think we would want to draw a line between what inside of espionage the u.s. itself conducts and interference operations that we would see beyond the payoff. >> the russians said, we discovered this malware in our own server. we all know who it is really rom. we all know who it is really from. charlie: we do know there have been certain kinds of
agreements. president obama and the chinese had to -- the chinese claimed they would stop supporting industrial espionage. >> so far, the evidence seems to be the cyber economic espionage is going down. charlie: what does this open up in terms of where hacking may e going in a larger sense? in terms of access to everything. medical records, for example. >> i think the problem is we have often described the threat as a kind of live free or die hackers are going to cause massive destructions and explosions, and what we have seen is cyber is used below the threshold for an armed attack. there is a whole range of ways to use cyber, influence operations, espionage.
it is very difficult to figure out who the targets are. sony is a private company. dnc is a political rganization. the target is constantly shifting. it is a whole range of private actors that gives states the bility to influence and coerce in ways we had not thought about before. charlie: where is this on the priority of the nsa? >> cyber security can be as much about protecting the confidentiality of communications as it can be protecting assets. if you are the head of a party or the ceo the company, the hack and leak of e-mails can have just as important real-world impact. charlie: do we know who in
russia might have ordered his? >> it is very possible the intelligence agency were rooting around and once they got into the dnc and got this material, they may have brought it to their political masters and said, see what we have got. either because they were looking for bureaucratic approval or because they hought it was actually useful. it is hard to imagine sitting around at the table saying, we have all this great stuff about how the dnc was favoring hillary clinton over bernie sanders. it doesn't strike me that they would think that is that fascinating. if they see a moment to disrupt an american election, they may see it as payback for what vladimir putin views is an effort by secretary clinton,
when she was still secretary of tate to denounce a rigged or partly fraudulent parliamentary election in russia where she said some things vladimir putin views as having encouraged protests. adam got at a very important point. we have spent the past few years thinking about the cyber pearl harbor extreme, that is bringing down the power grid. that is something to worry about. what we are seeing here in sony and the dnc hack is more common and below the threshold of an act of war. that may be the future of where yber war is going.
along with the kinds of attacks the u.s. and israel did against the iranian nuclear program, which is an act of sabotage. all of these are acts that are short of what could prompt an armed response. charlie: where are we in terms of the race between people who had and want to resist hacking? >> the people who hack are far ahead. it is much easier to play offense than defense. one of the things the dnc hacks have shown us, there are interesting tactics being used effectively. ou can hack personal e-mails by getting a decent malware on a computer at home, getting credentials to an e-mail and that can get you all sorts of information that can have surprising sensitivity.
one of the victims of this larger set of hacks is a general who, based on e-mails osted, the russians were reading his e-mail from 2012 on. it is a g mail account. he was talking to colin powell and wesley clark. just because of the way people use information and go back between secure e-mail accounts and personal accounts, we haven't figured out a way to counter that. charlie: that would have given the fbi some accountability if they wanted to find out more about those e-mails that were deleted. there was someone at the receiving end of those e-mails. or somebody at the sending on
the other hand emails that she was receiving. >> absolutely. the state department has released e-mails that have gone through and released them. the e-mails that were deleted, the fbi was able to reconstruct some part of that. in terms of the fragments and the data they had. they may have more information about that than we know. but the clinton campaign has been clear, that was a process. we had a very legal process where our lawyer sat down and went through everything that was in the account and the only thing that was left out were personal e-mails that didn't have anything to do with state department business. so far we have been stuck taking her word. donald trump suggested there may be another hand the russians could play if they did hack in the servers, they could present that themselves. it presents the possibility of an interesting surprise between now and november.
we know that cyber has risen in terms of the focus of the u.s. government and within the military. what do we need now? > i think there is a series of hard decisions president obama is going to have to confront. he doesn't have an investigation report to act first, upon. the fbi is still looking at this. as our story this morning continuing to spread. at the same time, i think the president is probably feeling some pressure and i know his staff are, to be able to send an official message to the russians before the election happens. there is always the possibility this could be the beginning of a broad and complex attempt to tinker with the election itself.
we have no evidence they are in the election systems that there are vulnerabilities in the systems of many of the tates. he would want to issue some kind of warning to the russians to keep their hands off of the american elections from the otes and the counts. >> can you set some norms for all of this, we have had success with that with the chinese. i've never seen any indication of success with that with the russians. charlie: because they are different? >> less interested in the commercial data and intellectual property the chinese have focused on. more interested in the espionage information warfare. and the traditional military secrets. the u.s. doesn't want to set any norms that would cut into
its ability to conduct espionage against the russian military, or some of the financial institutions and its political institutions. people are going to be saying before you cut that deal, think about what the u.s. espionage activities you may be affecting. >> we've had a little success with the russians with the group of government experts at the u.n., 20 experts. they agreed there are some basic rules of behavior in cyberspace that international law applies, that state should not attack the critical infrastructure of state during peacetime. how do you define critical nfrastructure? i think one of the things the obama administration is going to do is send a signal that we will consider critical infrastructures including the voting system, that there is a ine there.
charlie: so they should say to the russians, stop this because you know what we can do. >> i think we're going to send signal that there are certain behaviors that are going to be outside and some repercussions. charlie: what would be the repercussions? >> most of them we will not see. already we are engaged in some disruption in russia. are we disrupting whatever the russian spies are doing themselves? are we sending signals through our own cyber operations that we could respond if we need to? given the interests we have with the russians now in syria, we are unlikely to use sanctions or other punitive easures.
it may be worth noting they may have played some cards already that we haven't yet seen. there's a lot we don't know bout how this evolves. we don't know exactly how the dnc figured out it had been hacked by the russians. it is possible they could have ot a heads up. what's called an external notification saying you guys should look at that. they called in an ir firm that was quick to put out the message it was russia. they called in other firms to confirm that and quickly the narrative became what's in the e-mails but who is doing it and why. that may be an effective counter operation to influence t. there's a possibility it has come back, there is scrutiny on donald trump and connections to ussia. there are some complex things.
charlie: what do we know about donald trump and his connections to russia? >> people will point out a couple of things. he has some pretty strong business connections. paul manafort, his campaign manager spent several years in ukraine working for the president of the ukraine who once he was ejected from the country in the protests, went to russia and is there now. that is a close relationship between manafort and connections to the kremlin. people are like, what does this add up to if the russians are trying to interfere in the u.s. elections on one side and not the other? >> the "washington post" has done some pretty good work on this and looked at some money hat has flowed between russian oligarchs and some of trump's financial interest.
several steps removed from saying he has direct financial interest that coincide with the russian oligarchs or vladimir putin that would explain why they are doing what they are doing. a better explanation might be that the russians looked at the field and don't have any love for hillary clinton and may have just decided and information operation like this is a way to confront the west, specifically the west without much the u.s. can do about t. >> that is an important point. a lot of russians operations are not a specific outcome. as long as you can create distrust, you can undermine people's trust in information, that is a positive outcome. it may be enough to throw the election into chaos. they would see that as a
ositive outcome. charlie: do you believe the russians are trying to influence the result of the american presidential lection? >> the one big open question, the relationship between the hack and the leak. intelligence officials are trying to think through hat. that is an important step in policy consequences and is there a direct attempt to influence an election? clearly this highlights for the american public importance of preserving the integrity of our electoral process from cyber adversaries, i think now they all have the spotlight. charlie: we just don't now. i do not think we know publicly that critical link. in line with the other comments
made, it would not be unusual in the tradition of russian information operations for this activity to be undertaken but i think the jury is still out on this and you shouldn't leap to that conclusion until we know ore. charlie: david? >> i agree. the evidence that there were russian actors and almost certainly linked to or part of the intelligence agencies who did the hack is very strong. the transmission belt of that, making it public, who made that decision, who was in control, whether they may have been others who leaked the material, that is unclear, at least to me and the people i have talked to. on the broader question, this is something the u.s. government is going to have to act on pretty quickly in the next 90 days. it's a very decentralized system. every state does it differently.
some are going to be more ulnerable than others. the good news is it is not as if some hacker could sit around and come up with a way to manipulate the vote in the united states. they would have to go state-by-state and locality by locality. that would be difficult. charlie: thank you so much. thank you. pleasure to have you here. thank you. we'll be right back. stay with us. ♪
charlie: on september 11, 2001, 19 terrorists use four jetliners as guided missiles to kill 2977 people. that act immediately changed this country's approach to national security. since 9/11, the u.s. has spent $1 trillion to protect itself against terrorist attacks. a new article by steven brill answers the question -- are we any safer? it is the cover story for the september issue of "the atlantic." welcome. >> thanks, charlie. charlie: what made you pursue this? of all the questions you could
be asking and pursuing? steven: i was curious to document and see how we had done. i did a book in 2003 about the immediate aftermath and the standing up of the department of homeland security. as a citizen i had not paid uch attention to it. i had this vague sense that intercept a tounch money and that there were a lot of dedicated people doing a lot of very good things, but that the record might be really interesting and really mixed. it turned out the record is mixed. charlie: but it is clear we are safer. steven: we are stronger. we have more defenses because of the men and women who work at it every day. charlie: why doesn't that make us stronger? >> there are two things in the equation. one is our defense, which is stronger. the other is the offense. the offense has multiplied. it is much more diffused.
in part because we went into iraq and caused turmoil in that part of the world. we face many more threats, different kinds of threats and we haven't even completely responded to the threats we faced on 9/11. you'll recall right after the attacks, there were the anthrax attacks. we haven't made progress we need in dealing with bioterrorism. charlie: but what happened in iraq was not the reason saddam -- osama bin laden attacked on us. > that is the point. hat was a gratuitous raising of the threats against us. not only was it not justified as a response to 9/11 but it was counterproductive. charlie: because? >> it unleashed destabilizing forces in the region.
e faced them in paris. we faced them in san bernardino and orlando. individual lone wolfes get inspired. charlie: let's stay with that idea. i want to understand it. are you saying, take 9/11, osama bin laden wanted to lash out. a planned attack by him. one of the principal people in captivity. the question in terms of iraq, destabilize the region, because that war had the destabilizing effect it had, it allowed terrorism to grow. and provided a bigger series of people who wished us bad as well as what else? steven: they also had a
target. suddenly the americans were invading an islamic country. the terrorist's greatest dream is to be able to have the ultimate war with the western civilization. charlie: would that have happened if we had not gone into iraq? steven: i don't know. the goal of the terrorists is he same. to lure us into a war with western civilization and the muslim religion. charlie: which is the argument used by many people as to how we have to respond to this. if we engage them in a land warfare, we would play into their hands. >> if we even say we are at war with a religion, that is what they want us to say. president bush didn't take the bait. president obama didn't take the ait.
donald trump spends 100% of his time declaring that war. charlie: and other people as well. steven: but he is running for president. charlie: there's been a divide between republicans and democrats. >> not national security epublicans per se. charlie: my point is to understand whether you can make a distinction between not saying it is a war against islam and recognizing that you are fighting in most cases a radical extremist islam. steven: that is the exactly the distinction we have to make, that you just made. that is not the distinction the terrorists want us to make. they want us to declare war. hat is what inspires people in
their basement somewhere on their laptop. the great satan west is declaring war on this religion. i am going to show i am joining the battle and i am going to shoot up a nightclub or a shopping mall. the answer to your first question, are we safer, no. we have done a lot, we are stronger, we are tougher. ou can't hijack airplanes. charlie: we have learned some of thewe have learned a lot of the lessons. >> lessons. there are now these new lessons to learn and some we can't prevent. we can't prevent them if we let anyone who wants to walk into a gun store and buy an assault rifle. that would help if we would do something about that. n the world in which our enemy, the soviet union was deterred. we had missiles, they had missiles. we decided not to kill each other. if your enemy is the people trying to kill you don't care
if they die and can't be deterred and take glory in the notion they might die, and if they have access to assault weapons, we are going to have more of the attacks we have seen lately. one of the things the president has tried to do is get the country to adjust to that, to understand that and say it is not the end of the world. it is awful. we are doing everything we can to prevent it, but in this world that we live in today, that is going to happen. never che after 9/11 was again. president bush used to say the terrorists only have to be right once. we have to be right 100% of the time. you can't be right 100% of the time. this stuff is going to happen. charlie: most are surprised there hasn't been an attack. against united states. they point out there have been
a number of times in which they stopped possible attacks. steven: i'm less surprise now that i'm looking at this and seeing everything this administration and the bush administration have done to fortify our defenses. they have done a good job. charlie: you talked to james comey. you talked to a range of eople. the ultimate threat, terrorist organizations having weapons of mass destruction. steven: correct. lots of different weapons. if you're talking terrorism, you can have a weapon that doesn't destroy masses of people but scares masses of people. that is what the dirty bomb i wrote about is. charlie: explain the dirty bomb. >> it is a standard explosive you lace with enough radiological material, which you can get at any hospital in this city. it's not well secured.
you mix it with a standard explosive. when police show up after a bomb goes off, in the middle of midtown or the middle of washington, the radiation levels are going to show that here is contamination. what is your definition of lethal? what it would show, in the example i write about is in washington, d.c., they did a test, unless you evacuated all of downtown washington from the library of congress to the smithsonian, one person for every 10,000 people would would die of cancer over the next five or 10 years.
hat sounds pretty awful. charlie: like chernobyl? >> that sounds terrible except that if you do the math, if you have half a million people living around washington, d.c., that adds up to 50 extra eaths. i could prevent those deaths if i went into an office building and got people to quit smoking. the essence of a dirty bomb is everybody gets scared and say this is as dangerous as a superfund site. we have to evacuate all of do you want washington until we knock down all the buildings and rebuild them. that would be the natural impulse. but the fact is, if you look at it rationally, we should not be that scared of it. one of the places i fault the administrations, they have never had that discussion with
the american people. if the first time you try to have that discussion -- the isn't as bad as it seems discussion -- is the afternoon after a dirty bomb goes off, that is not going to be very credible. if you do it beforehand and get experts out there explaining it, that takes the weapon away from the terrorists. i'm worried about that. you have an october surprise -- if you take it that the errorists would like to have a trump presidency because again, he is willing to declare war on em, which is what they want, the next logical step is they want to disrupt the election. the way to do that is to scare more and more people. that is what the pundits seem to say. you should be scared and vote
for me because secretary clinton is weak. obama is weak. he hasn't gone after terrorism the way i will. the moment i take office, isis is gone. charlie: did you see today, president obama is a founder of sis? steven: who could explain that? i can't wait to hear him asked about it. if he ever goes on television any place other than fox news. charlie: my assumption is we withdrew from iraq, isis grew out of what we used to be al qaeda, iraq. steven: that is true. if we had never gone in there in the first place, it would not have started. charlie: that would be his rgument. that would be his response. a lot of things happen. let me stay with two notions. why do you think they haven't
been able to explode a dirty bomb? explain to me how difficult it is to do it. steven: it's not that hard. it takes more expertise than getting an assault weapon and shooting up a nightclub. that is the one thing in all the reporting i did, what is the thing that hasn't happened you you cannot understand why it has not happened, the dirty bomb was the first thing everybody brought up. the answer is, i do not know either, but i do not feel comfortable that the past is prologue here. charlie: they would make arguments about intelligence, more vigilant in terms of trying to understand who it s. steven: but we are not vigilant when it comes to protecting radiological material. here are two agencies in the
energy department in the obama administration. the nuclear regulatory commission regulates anyone who has any radiological material. you have to have a license for it. they prescribed a security requirement. the other agency suggests counter proliferation methods for people with this material ought to use. their suggestions are 10 times as strong as the nrc regulations. they go around trying to persuade hospitals and logging companies, put locks on your doors, have alarms, but the nrc doesn't require any of it. charlie: why not? steven: because they are a captive of the industry. one agency saying you ought to do this and the agency that
could make them says, literally quoted in the article as saying we like to make suggestions, we don't like to be prescriptive. he's a regulatory authority. we just like to make suggestions. charlie: so we should be more safe and secure with respect to radioactive materials. we have not done that. that's one of the failures since 9/11. let me go back to the central concern. therefore they are not as secure. people who wish us ill can get their hands on it. number one. the other thing, is it easy to learn how to make a dirty bomb? is it on the internet? steven: it is really not complicated. i'm oversimplifying this a little bit but not much.
you have an explosive. a standard explosive. you put this material in the same box. when it goes off, it will disperse. it is not hard. it is hard to make a nuclear eapon. charlie: has anyone used a dirty bomb anywhere? steven: it has been tried. i don't know what the result was. ut there have been tests done, tabletop exercises where they have mapped out contamination. how far it would be dispersed. contamination, the headline would be we are living on the superfund site. the reality would be, there is more radiation out there but it's not lethal to any significant number of people. charlie: the point you were
making, the president was sensitive to this, this idea of not making this a war against islam. the president does this by not using the word war against islam. steven: correct. charlie: he also has said to a range of people we have a mindset here that you can't go out and explain more people are killed in other areas than terrorism. you can't do that and political dialogue. steven: he addresses that the article. there's a different sense of fear about this kind of anger. i asked, why is there a difference between someone who
is mentally ill and goes to a gun store and buys an assault rifle and shoots up a school, that is one kind of tragic event. the people against gun control seem to accept that as a fact of life in the united states. if the same person gets an assault rifle and as he is shooting yells out something in arabic, it becomes this apocalyptic event. the president says it is irrational but true. charlie: he also said you have to worry about the marginal stupid people. they motivate you. there are people trying to kill s. they are trying to develop chemical weapons. you have to worry about that. balancing those threats is the challenge today. steven: that comes back to my answer to your first
question. are we safer? you put those two things together, you get the answer -- we are not safer. as well as we have done, as much as we should credit all of those who are doing it, the kinds of threats have multiplied. on 9/11, we were not thinking about someone shooting up a community service center in san bernardino and claiming he was part of a terrorist group. charlie: some may or may not ave had contact. they may have simply been inspired from a trip to the middle east or whatever it might have been. steven: the person who shot president reagan was inspired y a movie. by jodie foster. these people were inspired, hey say, by terrorism.
at the end of the day, it is hard to tell the difference. charlie: how long did it take you to write this? steven: i started just about a year ago, reading reports and testimony. charlie: you talked to the president. steven: i exchanged e-mails with the president. i talked to everybody. charlie: a whole range of people. is there a consensus? steven: the consensus is twofold. one is there are certain things we haven't done enough to deal with and people are surprised we have not suffered from it. in particular the dirty bomb. the dramatic consensus is the threats have multiplied because somebody acting alone who is inspired by online communication or reading
propaganda online, that is stuff you cannot prevent and potential to scare us multiplies because when you do it in a random place, like a ommunity service center, nightclub, the intent or the result of that is to send the message nobody is safe, it can happen anywhere. ray kelly is quoted saying he thought san bernardino was the game changer because it was such a random place. it was not the statue of liberty or something. it was an any place. ♪
lisa: welcome to "bloomberg businessweek." i'm lisa abramowicz in for carol massar and david gura. in this week's special interview issue we talk to some of the top people in business. head of i.b.m. talks about where she sees the company positioning itself in the a.i. revolution. we talked to century nadella the head of microsoft about where this company will go in its middle age and we talk to the beatles great ringo star and why that band benefited by not being part of the digital revolution. that and more ahead on "bloomberg businessweek."