tv Capital News Today CSPAN April 6, 2011 11:00pm-2:00am EDT
i don't frequently asked analysts on a wide range of issues and that is what you are doing this branch of government to help make sure we get a more accurate census years down the road. it will get any more cost effectively. better results, less money. and we're going to introduce legislation. senator coburn and i will introduce legislation. tomorrow afternoon? tomorrow morning? who would like to have your advice on what ought to be in there. maybe on what odd not to be in there. we ask you to give us that for the record. what do we have two weeks for folks on the committee? folks on our subcommittee of two weeks to submit questions or
answers rather. one of the questions will be submitted in writing. so we go for the legislative is in the legislation that for the last time. we should be changed from what should be dropped and we appreciate your construct of criticism. msn, dr. groves if you are warming to your job and alexei deepened a good team around you. a friend of mines ask about coach has been coaching for about 25 years. i ran into him at the special olympics pasco alternative, which is hosted by the university of illinois. great day, great weekend. i walked into the bob carpenter center in the basque team is going to take place. we're talking about the lessons we learned for life from athletic competition. all sorts of things we learned by virtue of playing sports.
>> judgment, welcome. [speaking in native tongue] >> it to see you create. >> dr. cook, dr. thomas cook. right now the state of a governor -- delaware has the secretary of finance. guess what his name is? thomas cut. because and tommy. nice to see you, mr. castro. one doctor. should i call you dr. castro? the pay. how about mr. vargas? all right. i'm going to just give a short introduction for each of you. we are happy you are here. we appreciate your presence in testimony. daniel castro is a senior analyst with the information technology and innovation foundation specializing in information technology policy. his research interests include itt, that's one of mine,
privacy, the commerce, government, electronic voting information, security and accessibility. he has experience in private nonprofit and government sectors. before joining the information technology and innovation foundation mr. castro worked as an anti analyst at gao. is that correct? all right. and we studied and audited id security and management controls at various government agencies. he has a master's degree in foreign service from tourist town university and a master's degree in information security technology management from carnegie-mellon university, two very fine universities. dr. cook, thomas m. cook, co-chair of the national research panel to review the 2010 census. elected to the national academy of engineering in 1995 for advancing operations research within the transportation and served as president of the
institute of management sciences and the institute of operations research and the management sciences. that is an acronym which makes the word in forms. whatever. holds a master's degree in business administration from southern methodist university. does that make you a mustang? a mustang. and a ph.d. in operations research from the university of texas, of long one indeed. and finally, arturo vargas, the executive director of the national association of latino elected and appointed officials. the national organization of latino policymakers and supporters. prior to joining the national association of latino and elected and appointed officials mr. vargas was vice president for community education and public policy at the mexican american legal defense and education fund there he supervised and directed the
organization's committee education and development programs. mr. vargas is nationally recognized as an expert in latina demographic trends, electoral participation, voting rights, census and redistricting. a pretty good portfolio. to the men, we are glad you're here and appreciate your preparation for today's hearing. his statements will remain part of the record. if you would like to summarize, that would be fine. if you go over five minutes, that's all right. if you go way over, that's not all right. lead us off, mr. castro. again, welcome. >> thank you mr. chairman, i commend you for exploring ways to use information technology to improve the census. as we heard today, the 2002 census cost approximately $13 billion, more than any sentence before and in my view did not use piety efficiently or cost-effective the. this afternoon i would like to discuss a few specific recommendations for how the census bureau can better use 90
in 2020. congress should require the census bureau to allow individuals to visit their census form on line. more than 30 countries are providing or experimenting with an internet response option for census including canada, singapore, norway, and australia. allow individuals to submit their form on line would increase convenience, accessibility, and usability and improve accuracy, reduce cost command increase security. for citizens online forms can be made more user-friendly by providing contextual help and modeling will support. some people with disabilities find an online form easier to complete and return them to perform because of the accessibility features available on computers such as large text and screenwriters. collecting data on line can also improve data accuracy of your paper based methods by better handling a typical responses using automated error tracking and eliminating the errors that can occur during the standing
committee cutting, and transcribing process. perhaps most importantly using the internet to collect census data can help reduce the cost of collecting data collection by reducing the now back cost in the processing cost, and follow-up cost. in addition to allowing individuals to submit their census form on line the census bureau should incorporate current technology turns into its planning and operation. i want to briefly discuss three trends. first, cloud computing. a term that refers to the practice of selling information technology as a service. essentially it allows organizations to rest computing power on an ad needed basis. organizations can still up or down according to demand. organizations benefit from the flexibility that clout computing offers them as the don't have to make long-term commitments. government agencies, for example, can better align costs by only paying for their actual use of mighty rather than having to overbuild capacity based on
potential demand. the concept behind cloud computing, on demand, scalable, and paper used, make it ideal for applications such as the census which have very low demand for resources. the computing resources needed by the since spiro peak sharply during the rather short time when individuals and census workers are submitting responses to go and use. this means that at the census pyrrho or its contractor uses cloud computing it would not need to invest in a large amount of a i t infrastructure but would only pay for the extra resources used. this can, of course, help eliminate government waste. the second technology trend the census bureau should take into account is the proliferation of low-cost, high performance mobile devices such as smart phones and tablet pcs that access the internet. using a mobile device allows census workers to enter data more accurately and efficiently rather than developing proprietary and expensive hand-held devices as the bureau
just to do in 2010. in the future it should use low-cost off-the-shelf equipment. by developing platform neutral mobile applications that run in cloud the census bureau can build a collection tools for census workers that will work on tomorrow's mobile devices. in addition, the census bureau uses off-the-shelf products in 2010. for example, concern agreed tablet pc. it can donate these computers to low-income schools. third, the senses. should more actively engaged with individuals who use social network and mobile devices which is an increasingly large share of the u.s. population. this can help achieve higher response rates and reduce the need for non response follow-up, one of the most costly aspect. in 2020 individuals will increasingly access the internet on mobile devices. therefore the census bureau should be shortened corporate tools to make it easier for individuals to complete the census using these devices. for example, a technology like
cue our codes which are metrics bar codes to give individuals the ability to put the camera of a spark from at a census bureau and automatically be directed to their sense to cut personal census form. not only improve existing operations but find innovative ways to use technologies and deliver more value. for example, the census bureau in congress may eventually decide collecting data every decade no longer makes sense in a world that demands real-time intelligence and instead turn to population reduces or other source of information. given the rising cost of conducting the census the census bureau should welcome the opportunity to use 90. certainly technology is not a panacea, but can help organizations achieve their mission more efficiently and effectively. thank you. >> that was really good, one of the best explanations of clot computing i have heard. even i could understand. that is good.
please proceed. >> mr. chairman, thank you for asking me to testify before you today. i'm tom cook, co-chair of the national research council panel to the view the 2010 census. as such i am pleased to be able to summarize the panel's recently released interim report, a change in the 2020 census, not whether, but how. also speak in the capacity which i accepted the panel chairmanship in 2009. experience systems engineer nearing changes -- challenges. the decennial census. adjust to understand i speak on the panel's behalf, the national academies behalf when commenting on the panels and term report, but particularly when answering any questions you may have my opinions are strictly my on and should not be construed as formal guidance from the panel
or the academies. the panel reviewed the 2010 census charged with providing an independent evaluation of the 2010 census with an eye toward suggesting research and development for more cost-effective 2020 census. in support of that work the panel held five public meetings during the first year of operation. many of our panel's impressions were formed to the extensive series of 58 site visits conducted during 2010 to local offices, regional census centers, data capture sites, and other census support facilities. our panel is not yet in a position to provide a thorough evaluation of the 2010 census. much remains to be learned from the bureau's census coverage measurement system and its procedural evaluations. i think it's safe to say -- to note some broad outlines.
as a prelude to 2020 planning, through site visits we were uniformly impressed by the dedication on local and regional staff, work force of exceptional -- exceptionally high-quality. you have the great paradox of the 2010 census, this high-quality work force was made to execute plans and procedures that largely follow the scripts of the 1970 census. moreover, in several key respects including the failed attempt to fully develop the hand-held computers and the 2006 decision not to permit internet response, the 2010 census was arguably more hindered then enabled by technology. from our 18 months of work i think the panel is convinced that it is possible to make the 2020 census much more efficient and cost-effective than its
predecessors. however, the central premise of the report is that the significant efficiencies are possible if and only if there is a major transformation in the 40-year old paper-driven process these to processes that are facilitated using today's technology. it successfully executing that major transformation will require a senior management commitment to change that is publicly announced early in the process and continuously communicated throughout that transformation process. continued and frequent involvement and oversight in the planning process from senior management including key representing -- representing key departments including the field organization, not just headquarters. three, adequate early investment in research and planning phases of the transformation process. finally, external help for all phases of the transformation
process from research and planning to development, testing, and implementation. this last point is really important. in the report the panel's core recommendations are added. we suggest the census para dates to put some stakes in the ground that should not be subject to debate once agreed upon. as are not whether but how some titles suggest we think the census para should explore our possible changes as real, viable options, but not as purely hypothetical ideas. as has been observed in the past, increased use of administrative records data has been thought of as the next big thing for the next census or at least the past three disenables. until the question changes from simply whether a change can be made to precisely how and to what degree of change can be
made promising innovation will be remain merely hypothetical. in our report we explicitly recommend that the census pirro said clear, publicly announced goals. we argue the bureau should commit to significantly reducing , not just containing the per unit housing -- per housing unit cost of the census will limiting the extent of census there. our experience of successful re-engineering projects like the one we are anticipating in both the public and private sector is that setting bold goals is essential to underscore the need and the importance of every engineering. again, to avoid it being purely hypothetical exercise. the report highlights for a high priority topic areas for
research and development for 2020 planning. first, capitation of operations and engineering to census field data collection operations. second, emphasizing multiple modes of response to the census including response via the internet. third, the use of administrative records based information to supplement a variety of operations and forth, continuous improvement and updating of the purest geographic resources. a point to emphasize is that the census bureau should not reinvent the wheel, but should build on the work from an external experience. it should learn from other countries, like we discussed earlier. we spend a lot of time in canada. we spent a couple of days in canada, not a lot of time, but a couple of days. >> did it seem like a long time? >> it seemed like a long time. it was a very good time spent because they made huge progress with the internet, but not only
with the internet, but with the field automation as well. >> those canadians are clever, aren't they? >> this command week and learned a lot from them. use of administrative records is an area where not whether but how is particularly salient. as air report states the idea of records as a wholesale substitution for the senses is no longer the most interesting question. if it ever was. what is interesting or important to study is the extent to which records might be used throughout the census process. updating the address list and inventories of group or facilities and substitute to asking neighbors and landlords as a last resort or more critically for possible cost reduction as a possible supplement to non response
follow-up. to be sure there are thorny legal and practical issues that must be worked through regarding the use of records, but the existence of those challenges should not stymie active exploration of the cost quality trade-offs involved in using them. thank you again for the opportunity to testify. i'm out of time. >> your time has expired. all right. thanks so much for that testimony. mr. vargas, please proceed. >> good afternoon, and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you again. >> my pleasure. >> discuss the results of the 2010 census and planning for 2020. we are one of the leading organizations incenses policy development and public education. in 2010 will lead the largest and most publicly funded program targeting the nation's more than 50 million latinos. this effort includes the participation of thousands of elected officials, community
leaders, national organizations, schools, churches, businesses, and a partnership. we believe the 2010 census was generally a success in counting every single person living in the united states on april 1st 2010 as is constitutionally required. we commend the bill for its undertaking. however, we believe that there was not a full count of the latino population because of significant barriers, many of which are relevant to since 2020. we offer recommendations that we hope the census bill will take into account. first, as has been discussed, we support the independence of the census bureau director ship. we will support provisions introduced. there were several improvements in the 2010 census questionnaire. the bureau redesigned the format and wording on race and hispanic origin to obtain more accurate
in responses. confusion regarding the differences between the race and hispanic origin questions persist. we encourage the bill to continue testing these questions to secure better data. the bill mailed out bilingual english and spanish language forms directly to certain households for the first time. the bills on analysis shows this strategy led to higher mail response rates and cost savings. we experienced difficulties in obtaining information about dissemination of these questionnaires. where is the bill to consider information under the questionnaires more useful to partners and examining data in new centers of latino population to determine a registered with the bilingual form in the future. we have a plot of the bureau. the bureau provided information in real time on its website which is critical for local outreach efforts. the bureau's spanish-language website was not as comprehensive as it was an english. the bureau has significant
challenges. much of this was a result of miscommunication between since spiro personnel and local community. in essence, the local community did not -- was not adequately informed by the bureau of the strategies used to count. but would not be receiving the form in the mail. this resulted in extreme confusion and mistrust. as a result, local leaders lacked confidence that they're challenging. >> did you say 2020? >> 2010. i'm sorry. >> thank you. >> we commend the census bureau for seeking the input of stakeholders such as ourselves and acting on several of our recommendations with regard to this media plan. however, despite our urging the bill did not implement a significant communications strategy targeting native english language speaking latinos. the bureau and its contractors fail to recognize a communications strategy and only at spanish dominant latinos will
not reach all of the latino population. the bill must have a dual strategy of reaching english language dominant and spanish, and latinos. we believe that the -- we believe in a robust partnership program and making this census a success. there were numerous cases where the vitality of local partnerships played no role in the success of initial local of reach. we recommend the partnership specialists continue efforts throughout operations. many partner organizations had no otherwise contact with the bureau. the bureau should have enhanced its partnership program all senses activities and between. now, with regard to promoting trust and confidentiality, we recommend the federal government establish an interagency task force to educate all federal agencies about the importance of promoting the 2020 census and
provide guidance on activities that promote public interest in the confidentiality of the census. the task force should develop best practices for state and local governments so that the public receives a consistent message regarding confidentiality. before the census began there was a significant doubt among many whether the patriot act superseded other federal laws monitoring privacy. now, as the department of justice issued a letter a month before census stating the patriot act did not override 1013 of the u.s. code. if the patriot act is renewed by the congress the department of justice should reissue its fate in regarding the supremacy of census confidentiality well in advance of 2020. the bureau should actively publicize this fact we also found a need for better communication and coordination between the bills national office and regional and local operations. at times national politics were not communicated effectively to
local offices and national headquarters were not aware of problems in the field. often inconsistent implementation of practices between local offices. we believe that the census piro advisory committees played an important role in guiding and monitoring critical senses policies for 2010 and of the census operations. the charter of the senate advisory committee has expired, and we appreciate the director having worked at the committee silicides recommendations for future advisory committees. we urge the bill to implement the recommendations that a new advisory committee can provide input into the earlier stages of 2020 census planning, including such discussions as we are having today about internet response. finally, the congress is considering continuing resolution for fyi 2011. the house passed a version with appropriation for 15% less than the president's request. this proposed funding would have a detrimental impact on important senses activities
including planning for 2020. we urge the senate to reject the house-passed version and insure the census piro has the resources needed to conduct the a cf "thank you for the opportunity to present my views. >> rickie so much. i'm going to come right back to you, mr. vargas, if i could. i will ask each of you the same question, of very brief question. a very brief response. we will come back for a follow-up. mr. vargas, with respect to the census is it realistic to try to achieve 2020 better result for less money? >> absolutely, and some of the strategies we are discussing here are an important avenue to that. however -- >> you can stop right there. a comeback. some question. >> absolutely, but i think that you should guard against overly conservative budgets.
at think he should have a bold budget. an aggressive budget. >> thank you. mr. castro. >> yes. >> pretty short. good. right to the point. mr. vargas, you're sitting on that side of the table. if you're sitting on the side of the table what would you be doing as a member of the legislative branch to try to ensure in 2020 that we achieve a better and more accurate results for less money? if you are sitting over here, senator vargas. >> i would -- >> the hon. >> what i would do is set up between now and 2015 when the bill the sides on the census. the one thing i was going to say with regard to internet response, is there any new way? we need to ensure we have the cooperation of the public. however the census is conducted, it must be done in a way that the public actually trust's account agility. >> thank you.
senator cook we had a senator cook for many years. >> what i would do is make sure that immediately or very soon you kicked a third party objective opinion, maybe another one on what the plan -- planning process is all about. that is one thing. second thing is, i would make sure that the planning process is adequately funded. that is where the cost will be driven, by the quality of that process. >> all right. thank you. >> and i would, again, suggest that it is a major overhaul. it is a blank sheet of paper approach. >> all right. thank you, sir. senator castro. >> i think the biggest challenge
i see in 2020 with the repeat of 2010 and 2000 is that the census bureau and many government organizations are rare. risk averse to apply new technology. >> why do you suppose that is? >> well, because they are judged mentally on performance and not cost savings. dr. teeseven alluded to this when he talked about overstaffing. people overstaffing technology. they use what they know that all kids in trouble for, not is what -- not what is new and innovative and exciting. >> that is a great point. back to you. similar kind of question, but put your hat on. you are the person who is the director. what would you be focusing on to make sure we get better results for less money? >> two things. one is, i would continue to promote the partnership program so that the relationship that the bureau established with
community organizations and leaders are kept warm, as you suggested, so that come the 2018-19 we are not investing large amounts of money to promote the 2020 census. number two, i would also make sure that i work with the congress to ensure every household has access to the internet and broadband. there is a disparity right now between african-american and latino households and white and asian households in terms of access to the internet. now, responding to the census the internet would be terrific if you have the kind of capacity and accessibility that everyone else has. >> give us an idea of what the differences between internet access between families of different ethnic origin. >> certainly it is a cost factor. >> i'm looking for percentages. 30 percent, 60%, 70 percent. do you know? >> we don't know. >> we will ask you to respond on record. >> be happy to.
>> doctor cut, some question. >> same question. if i were dr. groves i would immerse myself in this planning process, making it number one priority for the next several years. number two, i would try to get some external help because i don't think of the resources required exist in the census bureau. number three, i would make sure we have adequate funding for the planning process. >> all right. thank you. the same thing over and over again. that's good. mr. castro. >> i would like to using technology specifically the internet and mobile devices for the communications side. you know, we talk about the cost of the census. it is a fraction. send an e-mail or online notice. in ten years everyone is on line, even the distributions
within different demographics based on race. it is much higher when you have mobile phones and how they use different demographics. it's very easy to communicate and it's a lot cheaper. you might not get 100%, but you can get 90%. >> good. >> one other thought. >> get rid of that tie. >> i would put some states in the ground. we are going to use the internet, automat the field, and we are going to look at other census bureau's barbarous practices. >> let me just ask maybe a couple of follow-up questions and then we will call it an afternoon. come back if i could. much of this success of the 2000
and 2010 to send deal can be attributed to the partnerships. you alluded to that. can you just describe for us the value of the partnership program and a sense for us, if you will, its overall effectiveness in ensuring full a participation of parked account groups and what should the census bureau be doing in 2020? keeping stakeholders better informed. >> well, the partnership program, you have the staff of outreach workers developing relationships arrested messengers in local communities. individuals like myself are willing to stand up and tell the people who believe me telling them to believe the census bureau when they say that the census is safe and confidential. the partnership program is absolutely key, but another thing that also works extremely
well in both 2000 and 2010 was the paid advertising campaign, something that must continue investing in. what was important about the will of nonprofit organizations this time around was there were very the resources provided by state and local governments as the were in 2010 for organizations such as my own. >> say that again? >> there was less. for example, california spent $24 million to promote the census within california. >> in what year? >> 2000. at 2010 the amount was less than a million. >> anything to do with their financial situation? >> everything to do with the recession which is why the role of private foundations was so important. i also encourage the bureau to maintain relationships so that they are primed to be able to fund independent efforts come 2018 and 2019. >> they keep. one for dr. couric and
mr. castro. in your statements i believe you mentioned that other countries have used -- in fact, each of you mentioned other countries have used the internet to collect census data. we have heard that from other senators as well as witnesses. what has your experience been like to the extent that you can comment? any estimates of range? the magnitude of savings that could be expected, reasonably expected by using the internet? what steps should the bureau take to minimize security risks? >> as i said, we spent some time in canada. they did not go on the internet for the response because of a cost savings motivation. it was mostly because they basically thought it was the right thing to do. they didn't know what the cost consequences would be before they went.
they thought -- they found that -- well, what they say is 30% take up great is their break-even. if they get more than 30 percent they start making lots of money on the internet. but the interesting thing they found was that the quality of the response was significantly better therefore it did not have to redo them. when they calculated the cost savings of the internet i'm not sure they captured all the cost savings because some of the savings are probably hidden. for example, if you are on the internet you have real time information of who has responded and who hasn't. that would avoid the necessity of some been knocking on the door to a three times. the same thing is true with the operations being automated. if that information is real time
then you know -- and you can say, don't go to that because we've just received an internet form. those things, that real-time response, i don't think they have even tried to measure the cost effectiveness of that. >> that's a big one. mr. castor, do you want to take a shot? a couple of questions. to you want me to repeat them? >> i think i have them. and focus on what we can learn from other countries. canada, i think, very interesting. 2011 as they prepare to conduct their census. they are not sending a lot of money to rebuild the program. they're using what they did in 2006 with a small upgrade. that is a huge savings. as we see, once you do it for a cs or another survey program you don't have to reinvent the wheel every time. the second big savings, a
country like singapore the promoted the internet response as a cost-saving measure. you are given something in the mail that says to it on line. you're given the option to do it by telephone in an automated manner. and through mail and then -- said you get to the most expensive lawyers last, and that is another way of really driving cost and the right direction. >> okay. maybe one more if i could, for you, mr. castro. help us understand how the -- and you spoke in your testimony about cloud computing. want to come back and focus. help us understand how the census can use cloud computing and what specific applications you see the census confecting? at think you mentioned that the needs of technology for computer technologies goes up and down. variable over the life of the census. the census bureau seems to be an
ideal candidate for the sort of thing. help us a little bit understand better how the census can use computing? what specific applications do you see that the census contract in first? >> sure. so in 2000 -- i guess 2007i did a model looking at the numbers that we had for the 2010 census to look at the cost savings. one of the challenges that the census bureau cited at the time, reason that they said the internet response option might not have cost savings is because it's difficult for them to predict a response. one of the great things about using clout computing is you don't have to know this intelligence ahead of time about what the response will be. you don't need to know if everyone will go at 6:00 p.m. when they get home the day the forms arrive or if it take two weeks to respond. you can buy the capacity and the band width and surface space and processing power. you will pay a fixed cost. it does not matter how much you use or when you use it because
there is that much capacity available. it's important that we talk about the option to be different kinds of cut computing. public and private. right now most governments are operating on the private which is basically spending a lot of money and sharing among government people. you are sharing resources within government. a lot cheaper when you share resources among everyone, including private companies and public offerings. a very important when you look at cloud computing and how the census bureau can use it to drive savings, public clouds of dust nelly on the table. >> thank you very much. sometimes i like to at the end of a hearing just ask if you would like to -- ipod ask you to give a benediction, but i would like to just share with us a closing thought or two. then i will offer a thought or two, and we will call it a day. mr. vargas, would you like to lead us in a benediction? any closing thoughts? >> something that just popped up
given the discussion with this panel, maybe looking back at the earlier paddle or something that was triggered by virtue of the conversation. >> i guess my final thought would be about express my appreciation to the director who stepped into a role that i don't think many people would have really been delighted to do, but he did so in an admirable fashion, and i think he was critical at the time to make sure that the census was executed as well as it was given everything that he inherited. also express appreciation to the thousands and thousands and thousands of americans across the country who partnered with the census bureau to pull it off. >> thanks. director cooke. >> my one thought is that the of the census pyrrho ought to make the design of the 2020 census the number one priority.
>> okay. thanks. any closing thoughts? >> i'll be a little more specific. at think it is interesting. the commerce department is releasing a national strategy for a density of sever. that is something that was not mentioned today. at think it has huge implications for how the census can be done. i encourage you to look at that as well. >> thank you. a couple of questions. i know that you worked at gao, the government accountability of this. member you there? >> 2006. >> one year? >> one year. >> a good year? >> to get your. >> what was your job? >> information security analyst. >> at that each of you did a very nice job with the testimony. i thought you did an especially nice job of taking such a complex topic. for guys like me, you make it understandable. the small gift.
dr. kuchar, and looking at your background, i think he went to graduate school, maybe get your ph.d. at the university of texas. they have great athletic teams. good academics. i am trying to remember was it last night, the women's ncaa? and them, but a&m and netted them. texas a&m won. i know from some of my friends that they don't always see eye to eye. a friendly rivalry, kind of like ohio state and michigan. is there still that rivalry? >> big time. >> when texas a&m, the aggie women take it all and when the n.c.a.a., how did they feel at the university of texas about this? >> i have no idea. i was in graduate school there and had no time for athletics. >> i understand. all right.
the last thing i want to mention here is sort of putting all this in context. at go back to where i started off. the budget deficits. we also have a growing population and a need to account us well, accurately, and the next time that we try to figure out how many u.s. representatives will get a particular state large and small, we want to be able to insure that when city councils or county councils are apportioned that it actually gets the numbers right and the apportionment right. one of the reasons is we want people to trust and believe in the political system. democracy is a hard enough system anyway. important we get the numbers and apportionment right. the right number of people get the right number of representation. a fair amount of money is
apportioned were distributed based upon population. want to ensure that it did the best job we can to be putting this in context, why is it important for us to have an accurate census? because there is a lot of money that flows from the census, the right places or, frankly, not the right places. the other thing is the basic bedrock of our democratic society. making sure that we know how many people are in a particular place so that they get the appropriate representation. at least the numbers of representation, hopefully the appropriate representation, too. lastly, to put it in context, we are having a battle not over the long-term budget. rehabing, i call it a skirmish. the spending plan for the next six months to fund the government through the end of this fiscal year. those are important issues, but really big issues of the ones, what are we going to do for the next six or 16 years to ratchet down our deficit and get it back in control?
we need to look at every nook and cranny of the federal government in order to find ways to do a lot of the judicial things that we need to do more accurately and cost effectively. some of the big things that come along for people to be able to put in place what i call a culture of thrift and all aspects of our government. very helpful in your testimony today in helping us to book through this lens just a little differently, maybe let fear of a different lens to get us to an outcome which we all seek, and that is a better result. >> less money. >> may be less. that is why we are shooting for. all right. again, members, a couple of weeks to submit questions, and we would ask that if you have any questions you respond promptly. one of the questions he will probably get from me is the
legislation that senator coburn and i sought to move last night, similar legislation this time. we welcome any thoughts you have as to how we might amend our earlier version from the last congress and add an aspect or two, maybe take something away were meant something. again, you have done a very nice job, and we are grateful for your time. with that, this hearing -- and i also want to say to our staff, the democratic staff and republican colleagues how much we appreciate the work they have done in preparing this and the follow-up that will flow from it. with that, having been said, this hearing is adjourned. taking some much. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
[inaudible conversations] about. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> en el few moments, a look at the gsa program where behavior detection officers look for unique facial expressions and body language to identify security threats. in two hours a panel of health care analysts on how the year old health care law is being implemented. after that, a discussion of u.s.
british relations. later, we will be air they hearing on preparations for the 2020 census. >> a couple of live events to tell you about tomorrow on our companion network, c-span three. the house foreign affairs committee hears from united nations ambassador susan rice on proposals to reform the you end at 10:00 a.m. eastern. at 1:00 p.m. eastern a hearing on the repeal of the don't ask don't tell policy regarding gays in the military the house armed services committee will hear from the commandant of the marine corps, the chief of naval operations, and the air force chief of staff. >> this weekend on book tv on c-span2, the co-authors of why obama care is right for america present their criticism of health care legislation it is jeff greenfield presents three alternate histories, the jfk administration that never was, robert kennedy's presidency, and the reelection of gerald ford
and subsequent defeat of ronald reagan to be interviewed by former nightline anchor ted koppel. also, live coverage from the annapolis boat festival with panels on war, citizen scientists, race, and more. for the complete schedule at book tv, and get our schedules in not directly to you. >> next, a hearing on evaluating the tsa passenger screening behavior detection program known as spa which began in 2003 funds behavior protection officers looking for unique facial expressions and body language to identify security threats. the government accountability office says the program needs across the board improvements. this is about two hours. >> the subcommittee on investigations and oversight will come to order. good morning. welcome to today's hearing entitled behavioral science and security.
evaluating tsa spot program. you will find in front of you packages containing our witness panels written testimony, biographies and treat and testimony disclosures. before we get started, this being the first meeting of the investigation and oversight subcommittee for the 112th congress, at like to ask the subcommittees' intelligence to introduce myself. an honor and a pleasure for me to share -- chaired the subcommittee for this congress and a position that i do not take lightly. all members of this subcommittee know that my door is always open. i endeavor to serve all members fairly and impartially. i will work to serve the best interest of congress and all americans to ensure that the agencies and programs under our jurisdiction are worthy of the public support. i recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. today the subcommittee meets to
evaluate the tsa spot program developed in the wake of september 11th, 2001. it was deployed on a limited basis in a small number of airports in 2003. in 2007 tsa created new behavioral detection positions whose goal was to use behavioral indicators to benefit -- identify persons who may pose a potential security risk to aviation. this bill expanded in recent years to include the identification of any criminal activity. tsa currently employs about 3,000 be guyots and 161 airports at a cost of over $200 million a year. the president fiscal year 12 budget request asked for an increase of nine and a half%. an additional 105. the spa program will cost roughly $1 billion.
outside of a few brief exchanges at appropriation committee hearings in congress is not evaluating this program. that is not to say that congress was not paying attention. gao conducted a comprehensive review that culminated in a report on the program last may. in that report gao identified several problems with the program, most notably that it was deployed without being scientifically validated. this is a common thing that this committee is increasingly forced to deal with. expensive programs were rolled out without conducting the necessary analysis. this has become a trend throughout the federal government, but particularly at the department of comment security. this committee has a long history with the development acquisition of advanced spectroscopic -- as a southerner it is our to say, spectroscopic program spirit of the technology such as backscatter advanced
imaging technology, explosive machines and the cargo advanced automated choreography system ran into problems because there rolled out before they're ready. dhs either fails to properly test and evaluate the technology , does not conduct a proper risk analysis or neglects to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. the crucial aspect that is oftentimes taken for granted by the hs is the nexus between those developing the technologies and those actually using it. in the case of spot it seems as the the operators got out ahead of the developers, but typically what we see is the opposite, scientists and engineers developing capabilities that do not appropriately fit into operational environments. unfortunately this is an issue that the committee is unable to address today because of tsa
refusal to attend. the goal of this hearing is to shed light on the processes by which d.a. -- bowles is created the spot program to better understand the foundation of the program, examine the methodologies by which the eight test is evaluating the program and identify any opportunities to improve how behavioral sciens are utilized in the security context. the goal is not to throw out the proverbial baby with the bathwater, but rather to ensure that the science being used is not oversold or undersold. spot is the first behavioral science program to stick its neck out for evaluation. this review is an opportunity to look at how behavioral sciences can be used appropriately across the security enterprise and to understand its limitations and strengths. to its credit, the hs, s and t is conducting an evaluation of the program. this report was to earlier this
year, february. at the end of march and now it is expected shortly and hopefully we will get it shortly. while this is a good first step i am eager to hear how independent this evaluation truly is. i look forward to understanding the reviews and methodology, assumptions, and what level of input and access t hs, s and t had in its design, formulation, and findings. as gao stated in its recent duplication report t h. as is response did not describe how the review currently planned to determine whether the study's methodology is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the spa program. if you understand that, i hope you do. bureaucratese. anyway, the use of behavioral sciences and the security setting is not just another layer to security. it is a clear opportunity cost that must be paid.
for every bdl employed there is one screener who is not looking at an extra baggage, one intelligent and on the -- intelligence analyst not employed. i realize this is not a 1-for-1 substitute, but clearly there are trade-offs that must be made in a very difficult fiscal environment. also, i've would be remiss if i did not address the clear privacy issues that this technology and other dhs technologies present. privacy along with the serious constitutional questions i have only compounds the complexity of the issue. while the focus of the hearing today is the science behind the program, i don't want these other important issues to be forgotten. now, the chair recognizes ms. edwards for an opening statement. ms. edwards. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and congratulations to you as you convene the first of what i hope
are many oversight hearings to make sure that we are paying attention to the kind of oversight that we need to engage in on the science and technology committee on behalf of the taxpayers. i would like to say that i, too, and disappointed that tsa is not here today, was not able to provide a witness. at think they've lost an important opportunity to inform the congress and public why they believe the spot program is worthy of our support, and i hope they will cooperate with this committee and the congress in the future. ..
what the transportation security administration has tried to to do is develop behavioral training for offices so they can quickly and accurately assess and screen passengers. can hunters be harnessed in service of identifying potential threats to their air to air safety? that is the key question that underlines today's hearing and i hope we will be old to dig deeply into those questions pick her up after richard reid's fails you belshe bombing summon the security commission decided we are spending much time and money in trying to stop stop the bomb and not enough to try to stop the bomber. the screening of passengers by observation techniques or s.p.o.t. was viewed by tsa as a way to get some officers eyes
off the scanning screens and on to the passengers. those credited with helping to develop a s.p.o.t. program some of them are testifying before us today intended the program to train behavior detection officers, bdo's to focus on an individual's demeanor. an ongoing concern with the bdo's in law enforcement as well is that they do not engage in racial profiling. if bdo's focus on a passengers ethnic religious or racial qualities they are violating the law and they're not acting to protect the flying public. terrace have come in all colors, shapes and sizes and the security personnel fixated on profiling approach to fighting annex mohammed ahca they would miss identifying the next john walker lindh, timothy mcveigh or richard reid. the s.p.o.t. program tries to and about and -- identify behaviors that will naturally emerge due to elevated levels of anxiety or stress. the hypothesis is that
terrorists would display those cues when attempting to enter a secure facility such as an airport. but behavioral scientist to not agree on these nonverbal cues and they don't agree on whether terrorists would exhibit them. because it is impossible to get a group of tears to participate in a black -- double-blind expanded its hard to validate the theory. dhs points to the program success in identifying people who violated the law and are caught but no one can be certain criminals and terrorists behave in a similar fashion. tsa relies on nonverbal cues to help sort through the more than 1 million passengers to fly into the u.s. each day. nonverbal cues provided filtering method to allow officers to determine who they should engage and discuss -- and discussion looking for verbal signs of deception. there is more agreement among social scientists that verbal interactions with individuals can help in detecting deception. we had hoped that it dhs funded validation report on the spot or graham would be available for this hearing today.
that report purportedly shows that spot train behavior detection officers are much more likely to identify what tsa deems as quote high-risk passengers against the purely random sample of passengers. we look forward to the reports completion and its findings but without it we are missing an important initial assessment of the program's performance. over the past 10 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks congress has allocated billions of dollars to the department of homeland security for the development of tools and technologies to keep our air travel secure. too often that investment has been wasted and too often we have relied on technology that is not adequately tested before it is deployed. it is not based on adequate scientific evidence and effectiveness and almost inevitably the technology has proven costly to acquire, deploy and service. so i look forward to today's hearing and asking the questions about the more than $200 million a year that we are spending to make sure we carefully evaluate
s.p.o.t.'s individual merit and with that i yield. >> thank you ms. edwards. if their members who wish to submit additional opening statements, though statements will be added to the record at this point. at this time i would like to introduce our panel of witnesses. mr. stephen lord is the gao responsible for directing numerous engagements on aviation and service transportation issues. before his appointment to the senior executive service in 2007, mr. lord worked on a couple -- number of trade issues mr. lord is received numerous gao boards for meritorious service, outstanding achievement and teamwork. congratulations. mr. larry willis is the program director for suspicious behavior detection within the human factors research projects agency
science and technology director at the department of homeland security. your business card must be a big one. [laughter] detective lieutenant peter -- how do you pronounce your name, sir? didomenica. minus pronounced broun. my family can't even pronounce it so i am very cognizant of people's pronunciation. detective lieutenant peter didomenica is employed by police where he commands the police detective division. prejudice he served as the massachusetts state police officers will is the director of security policy at boston logan international airport where he developed innovative antiterrorism programs. dr. paul ekman is professor emeritus of psychology at ucsf and currently the president of the paul ekman group. he has authored or edited 15 bucks. you have been busy, sir.
and has consulted with federal and local law enforcement and national security organizations. american psychological association identified dr. ekman is one of the most, the 100 most influential psychologist of the 20th century. quite an honor, sir. "time" magazine selected him as one of the 100 most influential people of 2009. he is also the scientific adviser to dramatic television service -- series on fox live tv which was inspired by his research. i hope you are getting rich with all of that. loved the market system. it is great. dr. maria hartley is an associate professor in the department of psychology. she is published research on deception and a number of scientific journals on the editorial board of human behavior. in 2008 dr. hartwig received an
early career award by the european association of psychology and law for her contributions to psychological research. congratulations. dr. philip rubin is a chief executive officer and a senior scientist at haskins laboratories, a private nonprofit research institute affiliated with gao university and the university of connecticut. in 2010 dr. rivlin received aba's meritorious research service accommodation. dr. rubin is the chair of the national academies board on behavioral cognitive and sensory scientist and most previously the chair of national research benge mack council on field evaluation of cognitive sciences based methods and tools for intelligence and counterintelligence and a member of the nrc committee on developing metrics for the department of homeland security science and technology research. noticeably absent from the
witness table is the transportation security administration. tsa was invited to the initial hearing on march 13 that was postponed. they were invited to this hearing several weeks ago. in response to these invitations, dhs has refused to send a tsa representative. on another committee hearing just yesterday, department of homeland security refused to have a witness said on a panel with other witnesses. dhs has staked out a claim that i think is intolerable. it is unconscionable that tsa will not send their representatives here today to this important hearing on this program.
$1.2 billion of taxpayers money to talk to us about it and i find that totally reprehensible. dhs sought to detail is subcommittees interest presumably quoting from rule 10 of the house of representatives that delineates jurisdiction. in this letter they stay quote, given the subcommittees interest in scientific research development and demonstration of projects, larry willis, project manager for hostile validation project it dhs in science and technology director of s&t will represent dhs at the before mentioned hearing. i finally, highly presumptuous that dhs thinks it knows our jurisdiction better than we do. it shows their arrogance. and i've blinded appalling. considering this committee was formed in 1958 and played an active role in creating this partner of homeland security,
dhs surprisingly sites letter jurisdiction on royalton correctly. they must have stopped reading there. under raleigh levin, the committee on science-based technology is passed with tasked with the responsibilities to quote review and study on the continuing basis laws, programs and government activities relating to nonmilitary research and development. tsa and dhs's -- unless tsa and the is the h dia chase -- dhs plays no role in the development of the s.p.o.t. program i see compelling reason to their attendance here today. the nexus between science and operations is vitally important to understanding how programs were developed, why there are problems, while there are problems and how they can improve.
if tsa and dhs are in fact making a claim that science and research plays no role in the formation of the program whatsoever, in this program should be shut down immediately for lacking any scientific races and deems little more than snake oil. if dhs does not value this committee's role in overseeing the agency, and if tsa does not value absentee's scientific advice, there are a number of legislative options to this committee -- that this committee could employ to change that impression. i will also note that dhs is an agency official to testify before this committee from customs and border protection and the coast guard. i find it odd that in this instance, tsa would not want to talk about this program. it makes me wonder what they are trying to hide. when dhs is asking for 9.5% increase in the fy2011 budget
request for spies, you would think that they could justify that increase. let me be clear, the administration does not tell congress how to run its hearings. we will like it returned to this issue once again after the validation report is delivered. at that point, we may seek tsa's input once again. if that is decided, this committee may seek more aggressive measures to compel tsa's attendance, including the issuance of a subpoena. this committee has not needed to issue a subpoena and almost two decades. it has been successful in reaching accommodations with republicans and democrats administrations. i'm hopeful that tsa will
determine that they have valuable contribution to make to this topic in the future so that we did not find it necessary to go down that road. now as our witnesses should no spoken testimony is limited to five minutes each and if you at all please try to hold it to the five minutes. if you go over a few seconds, that would be okay but if you just go on and on and then i may have to tap the gavel so you know to please wrap up very quickly. your written testimony will be included in the record of the hearing. it is the practice of is the skinny on investigations oversight to and oversight to receive testimony under oath. do any of you have any objections to taking an oath? any of you? let the record reflect that all witnesses are willing to take an oath. they all showed that by nodding their heads from side to side, indicating no.
you also may be represented by counsel. doing if you have counsel here with you today? no. okay. at the record reflect that none of the witnesses have counsel. now if you would please stand and raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear to affirm to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you god? let the record reflect that all witnesses participating have taken the oath. thank you. you own a sitdown. i recognize their first witness, mr. stephen lord director of homeland security and justice issues government accountability office. mr. lord. five minutes. >> chairman broun ranking member and other members of the committee thank you brenda writing me here today to discuss tsa's behavior detection program also known as spot. today i would like to discuss two issues. first, dhs's ongoing effort to
validate the program and second, tsa's efforts to make better use of the information collected or this program. this is an important issue as the department is currently seeking $254 million in fiscal year 2012 funds, including 350 additional behavior officer positions. as reported in may of 2010, tsa deployed s.p.o.t. to 161 airports across the nation before completing ongoing validation efforts. it is still unclear whether behavior and appearance indicators can be relied upon -- be used to reliably identify individuals who may pose a threat to the u.s. aviation system. according to tsa, the program is deployed before these efforts were completed to help address potential security threats. to help ensure the program is based on sound science, report recommended that tsa and dhs can
be an independent panel of experts to review the methodology and results of the ongoing validation effort you mentioned in your opening comments. the good news is, dhs agreed with its recommendation. however as other panel members will note in their statements today, a scientific consensus does not yet exist on whether behavior detection principles can be reliably used for counterterrorism purposes in an airport environment. it is also important to note that the current dhs validation effort will not answer several important questions. for example, how long can behavior detection officers observe passengers without becoming fatigued? what is the optical number of officers needed to ensure adequate coverage? to what extent are the behavior and appearance indicators the right mix of indicators, should the list of indicators be larger or should the list be smaller?
also while mr. willis will report s.p.o.t. is nine times more effective in identifying so-called high-risk individuals the result of this analysis is yet to be shared with gao or independent review. our review highlighted difficultly fit dsa based in capturing and analyzing the rich information that was collecting at airports. does we recommended that tsa better collect and analyze s.p.o.t. and information to help connect the dots on passengers who may pose a threat to the u.s. aviation system. for example, we recommended that tsa clarify its guidance to bdo's for inputting information into the database used to track suspicious activities. we also recommended that they expand access to the state -- this database across all s.p.o.t. airports. the good news is tsa agreed with the recommendations and has revised its procedures
accordingly. tsa also expanded access to this database to all s.p.o.t. airports as of march of this year. are 2010 report also recommended that tsa make that her use of information collected through airport video systems. we noted that 16 individuals who were later charged with four pleaded guilty to terrorism related offenses transited through eight s.p.o.t. airports and 23 different occasions. does, we recommended that tsa examine the feasibility of using airport video systems to refine the current number of behaviors currently assessed and also to use this information to help refine the program going forward. we believe such recordings could help identify behaviors that may be common among terrorists or could demonstrate terris did not generally display and the identifying behaviors. again, tsa agreed with our recommendation and is now exploring ways to better use
these video recordings. in closing, behavior and appearances monitoring might be able to play useful role in an airport counterterrorism efforts. however it is still an open question whether these tech makes can be successfully applied on a large scale in airport environment and while i'm encouraged that diaz -- dsh is taking steps i'm still surprised that the department will seek additional funding for its program before the issue is solely address. hopefully today's hearing will help clarify s&t's future plans for validating the program. chairman broun, ranking member edwards and other members of the committee this concludes my statement and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you mr. lord. now i recognize her next witness, dr. paul ekman professor emeritus. i skipped over and i apologize.
now i recognize mr. willis. our next witness, mr. very witness program manager homeland security bans research projects agency and technology director of the department of homeland security. you mr. willis you have five minutes. >> good afternoon chairman six six -- broun distinguish members of the subcommittee. i'm honored to appear before you today on behalf of the department of homeland security science and technology to discuss her evaluation of the transportation administration screening passenger observation technique which is a checklist of checklist of predefined behavior, indicators used by tsa to identify potentially high-risk travelers. for the purpose of s&t's studies irish travelers are defined as those passengers in possession of serious prohibited and/or illegal items or individuals engaging in conduct leading to arrest. for background purposes the s.p.o.t. effort began in 2007 as
a result of the component lead s&p managed people screening cap down team process that identified and prioritized dhs operational customers. as an active participant in this ipt process, tsa identified the spot -- s.p.o.t. reporting associated indicators as a candidate for the validation study. the s.p.o.t. referral report contains a discrete list of observer will indicators which have been designated by tsa is sensitive security information or ssi. tsa's neighbor detection officers were bdo's are trying to identify these indicators and use them to make screening decisions such as referral for additional screening at the tsa checkpoint. is important to note the behavioral screening isn't limited to aviation security and is conducted formerly or informally by dhs agencies, the department of defense, the intelligence committee and law enforcement worldwide.
s.p.o.t. validation research is a rigorous evaluation of tsa spot referral report that supports are better understanding of the threat, the screening accuracy of the existing indicators and advances of science and behavior of a screening. s&t incorporation with the american institute for research designed to base rate study to compare tsa's spot referral for process with a random screening process. a r. r. is one of the largest behavioral sciences organizations in north america has performed numerous validation studies. two databases were used for the study. the first was designed to include case information from randomly selected travelers subjected to the s.p.o.t. referral process during the study conducted from 2009 through october 2010 and included a total of 71,589 referrals from 43 airports. to make direct comparisons between the base rate database on the operational referrals, a second dataset was created before the 23,000 to one at 65
spot referral's. collected during the same time in the same locations of the base rate study. together these two data sets allow a r. r. two x. -- assess the spot referral report of observer will indicators will lead to correct screening decisions. kimber findings emerge from analysis of the spot referral report including the following which i would like to share with you. one, operational spot identifies high-risk travelers at a significantly higher rate than random screening. a study data indicate the high-risk traveler is nine times more like the to be identified using operational s.p.o.t. versus random screening. moreover to achieve this outcome is bdo's with the study were able to engage 50,000 fewer travelers using operational s.p.o.t. than with random selection methods. the second result is a population-based rate for
s.p.o.t. indicators is low. among those selected for random screening in the base rate study the most frequently observed indicator was displayed in 2.8% of the randomly selected travelers. all of the indicators were observed her goal of the other indicators were observed in fewer than 2% of the traveler selected during the base rate study. in conclusion, these results indicate that the s.p.o.t. program is significantly more accurate than random screening and identifying high-risk travelers, the use of the metrics we employ, our validation process which included an independent conference a review of the spot referral report as a key example of how s&t works to enhance the effect is of the departments and operational activities. chairman broun ranking member edwards i thank you for this opportunity to discuss a research to validate the screening of passengers by observation technique referral report and i'm happy to answer the questions the subcommittee may have. >> thank you mr. willis.
you kept your remarks under five minutes and sometimes that is not done here. the next witness is mr. peter didomenica of the austin university police. thank you lieutenent. appreciate it. you have five minutes. >> good morning chairman broun ranking member edwards and members of the committee i thank you are the opportunities to address you today regarding the future of the tsa spot that program originally developed by additional background. they trained over 2000 security officials in over 100 satan local agencies in the u.s. and u.k. and behavior assessment. defense department criminal investigation task force and the national science foundation. ip are today representing only myself and not any of the organizations i have been employed by. on december 22, 2001, while
assigned to logan international airport, i was part of a large team of public safety officials who responded to the american airlines flight 63 diverted to boston from a flight from paris france to miami. onboard was a passenger named richard reid who attempted to detonate an improvised explosive device ask that if successful would have killed all passengers and crewmembers aboard. as i stood only a few feet from reid who is now securing custody in the back of the state police cruiser it hit me that this man was the real thing and the threat of another terrorist attack by al qaeda was nonstop and we need to do more, much more to properly screen passengers than merely focusing on weapons. thus began development of what would become the behavior assessment screening system in the s.p.o.t. program. began to explore the scientific literature in an effort to quantify the human capacity to do detect dangers people. my research included disciplines including physiology psychology neuroscience as well as specific
research into suicide bombers. specific behaviors were selected they were both supported and scientific literature and consistent with law enforcement experience. the best for graham went on to be delivered to numerous agencies including the entire washington d.c. metro transit police amtrak police and the atlanta police officers assigned to the world's busiest airport jackson international airport. in 2006, two trainers and i spent two weeks in london where we set up a british version of the program for the british transport police as a response to the july 7, 2005 terrorist attacks on the london underground. during the course of training police officers run the nation estate police instructors discovered for individuals with suspected ties. in 2004 while conducting training with the new jersey transit police at newark and station i observed three males and serving swiss dishes behavior. one of the subjects was the united states on a religious visa from a middle eastern
country and was being escorted from an amtrak train for claimed weeklong trip with no luggage and it was later confirmed the subject with us list on the visa was on a terror watchlist. i intercepted a dh dhs inspector on a covert tests at a checkpoint at logan airport in late 2003 with the concealed weapon through bass techniques. although i believe the s.p.o.t.. program is effective at identifying high-risk passengers its effectiveness is limited because proper resolution of highly suspicious people discovered by the tsa bdo requires the law enforcement response by police officers trained at the same behavior detection and interview skills. i designed the program so the more dangerous people would be removed from the critical infrastructure or arrested by trained police officer. i do not believe the current tsa airport s.p.o.t. training program is enough. the airport police in my opinion need to be trained in the same techniques and skill sets which would engender confidence in the program and their own ability to detect terrorist behavior and prevent devastating attacks. another issue i see with the
s.p.o.t. program is the psc is created too high an expectation for what it is able to shia. the original s.p.o.t. program i designed was not primarily for their branch of suspects but a means to deny access to critical infrastructure of high-risk persons who could be involved in terrorism or other dangerous activities. it was to be the last and most importantly the best chance to prevent a tragedy when other events have failed. catching a terrorist a random encounter a public place without prior intelligence is extremely difficult. by way of example if we use the known number of terrorists suspects who boarded commercial flights at airports bdo's and approximately 4 billion passenger commercial airports from 2004 to 2009, the base rate of terrorist passengers is about one and 173 million. the expectation that the s.p.o.t. program will result in the rest of all terrorists attempting to board a domestic flight in the united states is unrealistic and threatens its continued support. if however it is seen as part of a multilayered approach with the
primary goal of preventing terrorist taxes to critical infrastructure in conjunction with properly trained law enforcement the program sets reasonable goals and should be, should have the support of this congress. thank you for this opportunity to adjust the program and i'm prepared to answer any questions you may have. >> thank you lieutenent. you did not exceed your five minutes are are there. congratulations and i thank you for being here. >> two seconds. [laughter] >> are next witness is paul ekman, university of california press and founder of the paul ekman group. doctor you have five minutes for a testimony. >> thank you chairman broun ranking member edwards. i really appreciate this opportunity to testify on this very important issue. i've been working the tsa on s.p.o.t. for eight years based on 40 years of research on how
demeanor, facial expression, gesture, voice, speech and posture can help in identifying harmful intel. my research has examined for very different kinds of law. loss conceal a strong emotion felt at that moment. claiming to hold a social political opinion the exact opposite of your truly charlie held opinion. deadline that you have taken money that isn't yours. and lies and which members of extremist political groups attempt to block an opposing political group from receiving money. our research focuses on real-world lies that matter to society in which each person decides for him or herself whether to lie or to tell the truth, just as we do in the real
world. no scientists, out of the clouds and tells us you are supposed to lie. you are supposed to tell the truth except in published journals. the person who tells the truth knows that if he or she is mistakenly judged to be lying, they will receive the same punishment of the liar who is caught. this makes the truthful person apprehensive and harder to distinguish from the liar just as it is in the real world. and the punishment threatened is as severe and highly credible to those who participate in the research as we can make it. tass by the university i orr v -- i should mention i work in a medical school. i would never get past the berkeley but at the medical school it is considered trivial. unlike any other research team
we have performed the most precise, conference of measurements of face, gesture, voice, speech and and those measurements have yielded between 80 and 90% identification of who is lying and who is telling the truth. the clues we have found are not specific to what the liar is about. as long as the stakes are very high, especially to the threat of punishment, the behavioral clues to lying will be the same. it is this finding that suggested there would be no clues specific to the terrorist hiding harmful intent than the money smuggler, the drug smuggler or the wanted person. in my written testimony i raised three questions. first, what is the basis for this spot check list? i've explained why i believe our findings on four different kinds of lies provided a solid basis for reviewing what was on the
s.p.o.t. check was. question two what is the evidence of the effectiveness of s.p.o.t.? dr. dr. was has already covered that. i won't attempt to repeat it. question three, can s.p.o.t. be improved? that is a dangerous question to ask a scientist. we can always say that more research is necessary, but is it a wise investment compared to other things that the government can invest in regarding airport security? that is your decision, not mine. in my testimony, i have outlined a couple of types of research that i think could be useful if you decide you want to do more research, but we do not need to do more research now to feel confident in this layer of security provided to the american people. in my written testimony i attempted to answer questions by
critics of s.p.o.t.. would have not have been better to base it on how terrorists behave? wasn't s.p.o.t. based on people people -- why wasn't s.p.o.t. de son people's roles? why s.p.o.t. -- s.p.o.t. catching terrorists? aren't people with middle eastern names or appearance more likely to be identified by s.p.o.t.? i would be glad to respond to any question to provide answers to each of these better in my written testimony. again my to the committee and a staff of the committee for the opportunity to talk to you and to the men and women at tsa to make flying a safer path without their dedicated efforts. thank you. >> thank you doctor. appreciate your testimony. our next witness, dr. maria hartwig associate professor at john jay college.
>> good morning. is honored to be here. thank you for allowing me the opportunity. the s.p.o.t. program is based on the idea that credibility can be made on the basis of observing facial cues and nonverbal cues that indicate stress, fear or deception and i've been asked to address the scientific support for this. first of all, there are more than 30 years of research on deception showing that people are quite poor at detecting deception on the basis of observing behavior. in a recent meta-analysis of statistical overview of all the research, people obtain a hit rate of 54% and you should have course keep in mind that 50% is obtained by chance alone. so why are people detecting deception on the basis of observation? one answer is that there are very few nonverbal
demeanor-based cues of detection and -- deception and these tend to be weak. simply put there may not be much to observe and contrary to what laypeople lie experts such as law enforcement belief, lies mack don't display more signs of stress, fear and arousal. and critics of this research very often say that the findings are due to the laboratory experience that most research relies on, and the claim is that when the stakes are sufficiently high these cues of deception will appear. research has addressed these concerns by studying high-stakes lies such as lies told i people suspected of serious crimes like murder and rape, and these studies don't show any evidence
that cues to stress and anxiety appear as the stakes increase. and let me turn to the issue of detecting deception am facial cues to a motion. this is based on the idea that liars experience the emotion of fear detection and observing the spatial cues can help you detect lies. i don't have time to go into details about the theoretical problems with that assumption but in brief, it is both misses and false alarms. it may miss travelers with hostile intentions who don't experience these emotions or who successfully conceal them, and it may generate false alarms for travelers who don't have hostile intention but experience these feelings for other reasons. most people are quite surprised to hear that there is very little evidence on the issue of the so-called microexpressions, brief displays of underlying
emotions that are revealed automatically. i am aware of only one study published in the peer-reviewed literature, conducted by porter and his colleague in general psychological science. they examined the microexpression and genuine displays of emotion. they found no complete microexpression in any of the 697 facial expressions they analyze. they found 14 partial microexpressions occurring are there in the lower or the upper half of the face, but these microexpressions occurred with similar frequency in true and falsified expressions. so this study shows that microexpressions will occur very rarely and to the extent that they do occur they occur and genuine displays of wealth. this concluded date concurrence of microexpression and churn expressions make airline
settings questionable. and they also state the current training that relies heavily on the identification of fullface microexpressions may be misleading. and finally, and would like to address the a point of view expressed by dr. ackman and a recent article in nature on the s.p.o.t. per-gram. he stated that he no longer publishes all of the details of his work in the peer-reviewed literature because those papers are closely followed by scientists in countries such as syria iran and china which the united states uses united states uses as a potential threat. i object to deliberate strategy, not to publish research for three reasons. first, if the enemy whoever they are the potential terrorist or criminal may be aware of results and research applies to all deception research so if we took this argument seriously, we shouldn't publish any lie detection research because it may ultimately help the enemy.
and, second it is my understanding of the theory of microexpression that these are automatic, involuntary displays and if that is the case, i fail to see how now lets about these behaviors further research on these behaviors could help a person. and third and most importantly, these claims, microexpressions or the cues included in the s.p.o.t. program are empirical questions that should be addressed with data subjected to scientific peer review. and given the amount of resources that a party being spent on this program i think such validation is absolutely necessary. so in summary, my view is that the s.p.o.t. program is out of step with the scientific research. it relies on an outdated view of deception and there is very little support in the peer-reviewed literature. and if i had more time i would say a few words about what i
think maybe may be a more productive approach to assessing credibility but i believe i'm out of time. >> thank you dr. hartwig. do you want to add some suggestions, we would be glad to enter those into the record and entertain the suggestions you have. now i'd like to recognize their final witness and that is dr. philip irvin chief executive officer of the haskins laboratories. dr. ruben you have five minutes for your oral testimony. >> chairman broun ranking member edwards and distinguished members of the committee -- subcommittee thank you for their pretenders to speak. i'm here as a citizen however i currently serve or have served in nam number of roles both inside and outside of government that might be relevant to today's hearing. in addition to the activities briefly mentioned by chairman broun i'm a member of a technical advisory committee that was formed to provide critical and since related to analysis and methodologies used
in the s.p.o.t. program. i was invited here today described the describe the current state of research in behavioral sciences related to laboratory studies and field evaluations affairs tools techniques and technologies used in security and the detection of deception. my original testimony provides historical background of selected activities in the behavioral sciences related to secede -- documents and reports some of which i have here include many produced by the national academy of national research council such as consensus reports and other documents at the written testimony focuses on to that i was involved with a workshop on field evaluations and the intelligence and counterintelligence context in a short set of papers on threatening communications and behaviors. because of time limitations i've will not be able to describe these in detail and there were for you free to my written testimony. regarding the field evaluations workshop summary however a number of the participants spoke
about various obstacles to field evaluations. obstacles they believe must be overcome up techniques and devices derived from the behavioral sciences to become more common and excessive. perhaps the most basic obstacle simply a lack of a per sheesh and among many for the value of objective field evaluations that have inaccurate lessons learned approaches can be to feel the valuation. number of people throughout the process developing this summary spoke about the pressure to use new techniques once they become available because lives are at stake. the sense of urgency can lead to pressure to use available tools before they are evaluated. and he can ignore the results of it i wish and said they disagree with the user's conviction that the tools are useful. as indicated, i am a member of the technical advisory committee for s.p.o.t..
as the gal report indicates the committees -- -- not that tactical advisory committees role is extremely limited. focusing and determining whether not the research program successfully accompishing is the goals of evaluating whether s.p.o.t. can identify high-risk travelers defined as individuals were knowingly intentionally and tempting to defeat the airport security process. the advisory committee has not been asked to evaluate the overall s.p.o.t. program norris been asked to evaluate the listing of indicators used in the program, not asked to evaluate consistency, field conditions training issues, and scientific foundations of the program and for behavioral detection and methodologies. nor to appropriately assess scientific evaluate a program like s.p.o.t. all of these and more would be needed. to summarize my written testimony, i would like to mention a few points that highlight, so these are some
recommendations of how to move forward. so i'm just going to hit some bullets. first-grade arrival research basis that these examining many of the issues related to security and detection of deception. peer review where and when possible particularly important. shining light on the process then make informational methodologies result open as possible. it is necessary for determining if these technologies and devices are performing in a known and reliable manner. incorporate knowledge on the complexity subtleties irregularities and idiosyncrasies of human behavior. next understand the interplay and the differences between aspects emotion stress and other factors. make sure that we are not distracted or misled by the tools employed. pay serious attention to the ethical issues and regulations related to human subject research including -- were applicable and emerging areas
including privacy concerns their ethics and ethical implications of the deployment of agents and devices. reduce conflicts of interest to every extent possible including financial conflicts of interest. develop an understanding of how urgency organizational structures and institutional barriers can shape program development and assessment and support the importance of the need for independent evaluation of new and controversial projects and issues with appropriate scientific technical statistical and the thought -- methodological expertise. thanks. >> thanks dr. ruben and i want to express my appreciation for your being here. in enough that some recent challenges and i greatly appreciate your being here. so thank you very much. i want to thank all of the panel for your testimony. limit questioning to five minutes in the chair at this point will open the round of
questions and the chair recognizes himself for five minutes. mr. willis, when can we expect the s.p.o.t. validation report? >> the report was delivered to me by a ai our last night. it is being submitted through dhs's be a release or distribution process. i am not exactly sure what that time is or when it is ultimately disseminated. i can strictly get that information for you, sir. >> i would appreciate getting that report to us as quickly as possible. >> yes, sir. >> what initial steps have to be taken before we get the report? >> i don't know what's dhs's distribution russ is entails. i know that i will be submitting it this morning following my participation your. [inaudible] >> i don't know what dhs policy is on that but i'm happy to
provide whatever is consistent with dhs's s&t policy on release. >> i understand the results i would assume are still preliminary. there appears to be a discrepancy in the s.p.o.t. success rate. in your testimony you state quote the study indicated that they high-risk travelers to nine times more likely to be identified using operational s.p.o.t. versus random screening yet when he met with staff from the subcommittee on march 3, he said that the s.p.o.t. program was 50 times more effective than random screening. one of our other witnesses makes a similar claim in his testimony saying quote, malfeasance identified more than 50 times as often by those selected by s.p.o.t.. can you please explain the discrepancy?
>> well, there shouldn't be a discrepancy. wheeze for metrics by which to evaluate s.p.o.t.. the first one was the possession of illegal or prohibited items. the second one was possession of fraudulent documents. the third was legal arrest law enforcement arrest in and the fourth was a combination thereof the arrest has the higher number that you referred to in your question, sir. the possession of prohibited items and fraudulent documents is approximately 4.5 times and if one combines all of them it is nine times. >> those that were identified -- how many of those were actually convicted? >> sir i would have no idea. our efforts not said whether whether decision is recorded as being arrested or not and that
is the information that is available through the s.p.o.t. database. doesn't go beyond that. >> do you have any data about false negatives? >> i mean false positives. on the people that have been identified? is it 50 times or find times? >> are you talking about the false positive associated with the rest? >> no, with arrest or yes sir, with the rest and with prosecution, the ultimate prosecution etc.. >> yes sir we do have information available on that. so for example, if one looks at the false positive index which is for every person that you correctly classify as a high-risk traveler, what is the number of travelers you misclassified, we have that
information on any of the format tricks that we discussed and so for example, combined outcome, where every person that you correctly identified using operational s.p.o.t. 86 were misidentified for the base rate a random study. for every person that you correctly identify, 794 were misidentified. >> s.p.o.t. was initially developed intended to stop terrorism. that is the whole point of it. now we see that the probe rim has expanded to include criminal activity. >> you are asking a question about the mission. i am from science and technology, sir. i am unable to answer that. may i refer you to tsa? >> tsa should be here and the reason i'm extremely
disappointed they are not here. sba cuts are talking about why we use metrics that deal more with criminals and terrorism. >> i guess that would be sufficient and very help all. >> you my time is a. >> the reason we use those metrics that we have just listed sir was because they were available to us to this data in sufficient numbers even though they themselves are low base rate are extremely rare. and data directly dealing with terrorism is unavailable and thus can't be used as a metric. >> okay, my time is up. ms. edwards. >> thank you mr. chairman, and as i mentioned earlier, i am disappointed that tsa is in here because i think you are a number of questions that actually go to things like training protocols and other aspects of the s.p.o.t. or graham that they would have really useful information to share so i look forward to working with the
chairman and the committee on this question about who needs to appear or not is not a decision really for the administration. congress determines under its constitutional authority who appears before the committees and what the jurisdiction is, so i do share that concern. i want to go to this question though of profiling,. >> with a gentlelady yield? i appreciate your comment. you took up about a minute and i would like to give you next a minute on top of that. [laughter] i don't want to charge your. >> i appreciate that. >> if you want to start the clock you can. >> thank you again mr. chairman. i have a question really that goes to this issue of e-filing. as an african-american woman who sometimes because i have short hair and i get cold eye wear a scarf from my head and that is true in airports especially. i've had the experience of actually being pulled over and
question and it hasn't just happen once or twice. does actually happen multiple times, and i don't want to make any speculation about that but it does raise the question of who is identifying me and how and what i'm sending off. i'm also reminded and dr. hartwig's testimony that i remember when i broke a lamp and i tried to glue it together and my mother walked in and she said, what did you do? and i suspect that part of the reason she could say that and she knew, and then i proceeded to tell her a lie but i suspect that art of the reason that she knew i was lying is because she knew me and because she had experience with me and because she had read my both verbal and nonverbal cues many times over, which gave her a much better indication of when i was doing truth telling and when i was in. we don't have that experience in our airports, and so i have a question for lieutenant didomenica and that is,
whether it is possible to train officers of all kinds not to engage in profiling and i have done police training, law enforcement training as well and i think it is tough to train out culture, culture and the sense of a police culture and law enforcement culture where you have to train against types when it comes to these issues. and so i'm curious lieutenent didomenica if you have some, if you can share with us whether it is possible to train officers not to engage in profiling? >> i believe it is so and i've been training in policing in racial profiling for over a decade now. principally with this day please. i design state work -- statewide programs on racial profiling and biased policing and it is possible to make people aware of their own unconscious bias and a tendency to make snap decisions about people based on superficial things. we all have this hardware to survive and we look at somebody
we have automatically made an opinion about them and a lot has to do with our background and cultural influences and a lot of those are negative that this is about survival and it actually gets a jump on the conscious awareness. right away when i walked in here and you saw me and i saw you, we made its decision about one another before we'd were were consciously aware of who we were and what we are and that is going on all the time. this is a source of bias. now, knowing that, can't stop my feelings about someone based on how they book, that initial survival reaction about what the person might be dangerous or not, but i can take a few seconds, maybe minutes to think about what is going on photo i know objectively and maybe even do in some race transpositions. how would i feel about the situation? and i can make a decision so it takes self-awareness. it takes training. it takes the ability to be willing to change a monitor yourself but it can be done.
are the foundations of the behavior assessment training i have done and what i initially gave the tsa for the s.p.o.t. program is you have to address bias in racial profiling. in fact, it to me was an antidote to racial profiling. >> lieutenant didomenica i would love to hear but i have a minute and a half left and i wanted -- i appreciate your answer but i wanted to get to dr. ekman because i have to tell you yet been unnerving me the entire time i've been here and i'm sure we have been reading these cues and i wonder if you have something you can share with these issues on what can be negative instincts in one context to train them to be positive factors in recognizing behavior? >> yes, thanks for the opportunity to respond to that. i wanted to quickly put in that we did research years ago that shows that better you knew someone the worst you were in identifying whether they like to. ..
-- racial profiling. >> thank you for your indulgence, mr. chairman. >> you and i will always be friends. i will always give you some variances on the times. i'm not going to be worried about that at all. doc, you are up next for your questions. go ahead, sir. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank to the panel for being here. it's our job here to spend the money of the taxpayer the most efficacious way. listening to the testimony here, it's really difficult for me to determine whether it spot process is accurate or not. but i'd like to address mr. di
didomenica today. what is the process after that if there's someone there, it sounds as if you have some doubt as to the next step as to what's happening. those people are not trained in the same thing? i hate to see somebody getting missed. i'd like to know more about when the first getting taken out of the cue. are we missing people? >> i think it's effective. we maybe missing people. a high risk that should not get on to the airport or plane or
government building. whatever the critical infrastructure is. based on the evaluation, the spot scoring, which i can't go into it, that's sensitive information. so for the people deemed to be the most high risk, the protocol is to invite the law enforcement officer to do a follow-up interview. it's to address the false positives. a lot of people exhibit the behavior that indicate terrorist or criminal intent, are just upset, distracted, late for a funeral, whatever it is. it's also an opportunity to determine if you have the right thing. if the person is the high risk.
that's another interview skill which is part of the process. >> are those people skilled enough in your opinion? secondary people? >> the responsibility falls on police officers when there's a high risk person. i think they are capable and making decisions whether to arrest, not arrest somebody, use lethal force in some cases, deny people their freedoms. i don't think it's too much to ask them is this person high risk and do we need to slow down the process. i think they are capable of doing it, they are doing it whether the program gets funded or not. cops are making the decision every day. i would like to see them get more training and support to make them better at what they do. this program has that potential. >> all right. thank you. i don't know where we are with the time. but i'll yield back the remainder of my time, if any. >> thank you, doctor, i would to
say your questioning shows further why tsa should be here. whether they can be instructive to the whole committee and democrats alike can help us go forward. the next person on the agenda is my friend, mr. mcnerney. you are recognized for five minutes. >> thank you. i appreciate you calling the hearing. it's interesting. i watched you on occasion. i find it -- it's compelling. not too scientific in my opinion. but it's good fortous examine this issue and see how much utility there can be from it and how much money should be expended to find that utility. dr. hartwig, i think i heard you say, and you can correct me if i'm wrong, that you failed to see how knowledge of the indicators could be useful? >> well it -- i think that is
again an empirical question. there isn't enough research on -- well, there's a lot of research on, but as far as i know, there's no study that tests whether knowledge, for example, about the microexpressions help people not display them. that would be a second step. it could be a good first step to establish that these expressions occur reliability. >> okay . >> countermeasures come second. >> thank you. i was going to follow up. to basically say would you agree that knowledge of those indicators would also be useful to potential wrongdoers? >> we don't know. you are asking in polygraph terms, would you develop countermeasures?
a proposal that i put into the government to find out. i have reason to believe that the chinese know the answer, because they were sending me questions that you would want to prepare on if you were going to do a training study to see if you could inhibit people from showing not just microexpressions, but dozens of items on that checklist. the -- our government has not decided that it's worth finding out whether you can beat the system. other governments are finding out and maybe selecting people who can and training them so they can. we just don't know. we know about the polygraph. we know countermeasures are quite successful. we know about some verbal means. we know they are quite successful. if i could have a moment more, sir. >> go ahead. >> you've heard some complete contradictions between dr. hartwig and myself. i think if you look carefully at
the literature you would find that it comes out supporting me. i think what you need to know when you get a disagreement among scientists, you need a establish an advisory panel of experts who have no vested interest and no connections to hear from the people who disagree and look at the literature and resolve it because you are really being given in this testimony advice that's 190 degrees opposite in terms of is there a scientific basis for what's being done? but you could argue, and i don't know whether mr. wilson, dr. wilson would, if the validity study holds up to scientific scrutiny to everyone that has looked at it to this committee, if it's as successful as the report is, you got to be doing something right to get that kind
of success. scientific interest. >> thank you, dr. ekman. you are jumping in. go ahead. >> i'd like to respond to dr. ekman's point. in fact, that was the key recommendation of the 2010 report was to have an independent panel review the validation. we think it's very important for a panel to be established that has no tied to the current program, that's not an advocate of the current program, to help weigh in on this very issue. i think it's very interesting that the panel today shows a lack of consensus, which was the basic point that i made in the earlier statement. there's no scientific -- >> on a subject like that, you'd expect a broad range of disagreements. as the panel like what you are recommending been suggested on one the budgets lined out? >> dhs agreed to establish and
review the methodology of the a.i.r. validation, as to review the final results. as mr. willis indicated, the latest results have only recently been submitted, i believe he said, as of last night. >> i think i've run out of time. i'm going to yield back. >> mr. health care alken. >> i'm a new member. i have been traveling much more in the past three months than ever in my life. just on monday, i had the full experience. i didn't realize that it involved turning your head and coughing. i now know it's what it is. it's important for us to have the discussions, again, to protect our liberty and freedom
while at the same time making sure we have security. so i do thank you for your role. i think what i'm learning is that we have a lot more work to do and a lot more discussion that needs to take place. i just have a couple of questions. dr. rubin, if i can address my questions to you. if that would be all right. much has been made about the science and research behind the ability for an individual, or in this case, bdo, to detect a motion to see intent of another individual based on verbal and nonverbal and microfacial expressions. i wondered, speaking broadly and keeping it as simple as you can for those of you layman, could you tell us the state of the science as it relates to the detection of emotion, deceit, and intent by behavioral cues? >> yes. in general, i guess i would agree with dr. ekman that we are at the point where it -- there's two things going on. most of the studies if you look
at something like voice stress analysis and look at the -- there was a med analysis done by susan brandon coming out of the defense department. what you basically show in most of these studies, there's no different than chance. agreeing with both dr. hartwig and ekman, there's a lot of controversy here. and there's very little real science and validation. it's not just the field evaluation when you can't do it. again there has been a committee established on the spot regarding the report. i'm on the committee. we have not been asked to do any scientific validation over all of the program just to look one one thing. are the results different than chance. what's really needed on the issues before we continue to invest more money is to really establish without, you know, putting any information at risk and stuff like that, establish a baseline about what's doable, what's not doable, what's known,
and what's not. so this is the classic issue of do you test first and then field it, or field it and test? in this particular instance, considering the investment, considering the intrusion of people's privacy, i think it's absolutely time to be testing, validating, and scientifically exploring these things now before we continue to do significant invest many. i'm not saying we shouldn't continue the program. i think it has it's importance. right now we need to establish on some of the known kind of things that we are doing without giving anything away, is there good science behind it? otherwise we are throwing money down the drain? >> i think kind of following up on that, one the concerns that operators have is that behavioral science is not dismissed because there are issues validating. can you speak for a moment on the importance of behavior science in counterterrorism context? and then what it's limitations and strengths are as far as our work for counterterrorism?
>> okay. we are changing the topic a little bit, because we are moving to counterterrorism. i think that the behavior work is broad in counterterrorism. i think it's extremely important, again, when we get to counterterrorism, we are broadening it out. there's been an excellent report on the committee chair by baruk. there's a lot that's known. again, we've touched on some of this, a number of the panelist did. you are starting to get involved in behavioral issues of attitude, of biases, you know, stemming from the original intelligence work of richard hoyer on cognitive biases. there's a lot that we know. the issue becomes structural and organizational. given what we know. two things, what do we know and what don't we know? with the stuff that we do know, how do we make sure it's being most effectively use by the intelligence and whatever needs
to use on the issues where we are not entirely clear. uncertain or controversy, how can we move ahead. and there's emerging technologies we are going to start to be seeing used. we see some of them in terms of the kind of device like x-ray, but neuroimages and sensing of other things. that's where i was speaking of the seduction of technology. i support that greatly. we need to make sure on stuff that's new and emerging, we get a handle on it. i think the behavioral stuff is growing rapidly and extremely important. i think we are not doing a comprehensive approach to essentially deploying it in the field before it's being properly evaluated. >> my time is up. thank you for being here. this is a start of the discussion that we need to continue. i appreciate so much all of you being here. i would also advise any advice
of microfacial expressions that i have. so i don't have to go through that examination again. that would be helpful. pass that along to me. thank you. >> thank you, mr. hultgren. i asked that michael be allowed to sit in. mr. micah, you are recognized for five minutes. >> thank you. first of all, thank you, mr. chairman, mr. borne, ranking member edwards, and others of the panel. i have great interest in the subject that. as you know, i was involved in the creation of tsa when i chaired the subcommittee in 2001 for some six years after that. and watched it's evolution. first i might say that i'm
absolutely distraught that you -- your subcommittee would be denied by tsa the opportunity for them to be here and possibly learn something or participate. i don't want you to feel like they are just ignoring you. they have ignored or committee and others. so they have a history of this. and well work with you and others. in fact, i think we need to convene a panel of chairs of various committees and somehow reign this agency in and it's a very -- it's a very important mission. i'm stunned again they would not have someone at least to hear from the excellent panel of witnesses that you've had here today. particularly when it comes and ask for more money.
let me just tell you my involvement with the spot program. again, as chair of the committee that created -- i followed tsa in it's successes and failures. we have deployed a lot of expensive technology out there. unfortunately, the technology does not do a very good job. the personnel, failure, performance rate is just off of the charts. if you haven't had the classified briefing on the latest technology, which are both the back skidder and milometer wave, i urge you at gao to review that. and the patdown which was the backup new procedure, which they put at the end of last year in place, i had that reviewed by gao in january. but the failure rate is totally
unacceptable. the way we got started on s.p.o.t. is i found the technology lacking in reporting of performance, both by screeners and the equipment that they used, leaving us vulnerable, particularly after the czechian bombers. i think we bought some puffer machines at the time. they didn't work, they promised me they work. they deployed them and they didn't work. so we needed something in place. we encouraged looking at the israeli model. and you can't really adopt israeli model because they have a much smaller amount of traffic. we have three 2/3 to 3/4 of all of the passenger traffic in the world. that's part of america. you know, you get on a plane, you go where you want, people just have a magic carpet through aviation in this country.
so that's how we started this. i've observed their operations and i can't -- i can't evaluate them. we at gar evaluate them and you have some representatives here to tell you that the failure is -- rate -- is unacceptable. it's almost a total failure. if it wasn't money and personnel, maybe it wouldn't matter. but they have 3,300 spot officers, i believe, in the program. and they've got a quarter of a billion dollars of expenditures and asking for more. what i heard today is that again it doesn't work. i didn't actually get to hear the suggestions, and i would look for them. i had to leave before i heard all of it. some of the suggestions on their amount of time to do a verbal
interview would improve it. but maybe finding some way to get us to a number that we could have some exchange. ms. edwards made some excellent points in her opening comments too. we've got to have some way to improve this, and that unless there is some verbal exchange, i think that we're with the stand off observation we're wasting time, money, and resources. i don't have a specific recommendation for the replacement. i do know what's in place does not work. but i can tell you how much i appreciate your subcommittee taking time to review this matter and try to seek a better approach, a better science, and better application of something that's so important. because we are at risk. these people are determined to
take us out. this game from -- came from another meeting from folks that developed a backscatter and milometer wave. two technologies that we are using. the scary thing there, we had witnesses in one the other hearings that said that both of those technologies will not -- will not be able to detect either body cavity, or surgical implants. and we already see that these guys are going -- they are always going one step ahead of whatever we put in place. so we've got a failed system, we are spending a lot of money on it, it's supposed to provide us with a backup. the information that we have and the review of the performance shows that it's not doing that, and it needs to be replaced or dramatically revised if it's going to be effective in keeping us from the next set of threats. so those are my comments.
i would ask that if you have suggestions, we do have an faa bill which we can include some positive suggestions. we couldn't do that on the house side because of jurisdiction. but we can do it in conference and the door has already been opened by the senate. and i would love to hear recommendations from you and from those who have participated today how we can do it better. thank you for allowing me to participate. >> thank you, chairman mica. i appreciate you being here and appreciate your comments. i can speak for ms. edwards, we both are very concerned about national security. we both are concerned about civil liberties. we both concerned about that we make sure that the flying public are safe and appreciate her input. i hope that you'll find some way
that maybe we'll have those subjects to put in the study so that maybe some kind of behavioral science can be developed to try to identify these folks. we'll go to the next round of questioning. i'll recognize myself for five minutes for questioning. even if the s.p.o.t. is more effective than random, we are still talking about low base rates. mr. lieutenant points out .00006. maybe i missed a zero. can your panelist help put that in perspective? anybody?
>> sure, as the terrorist implays that acts are terrorism are defense, that makes it hard to test the efficacy of the program and performance metics to allow you to better judge if the program works as beginned. we made that very important recommendation and tsa and dhs agreed to try to get, you know, develop the indicators. the one step that we think they could take to make it useful, they use a long number of behaviors in their list. the exact numbers are considered sensitive security information. we posed the question. how do you know this is the right number? they also assign point scores to each of the behaviors.
again the details are sensitive. that would be one way to make the program more useful in identifying potential acts of terrorism. validate the points system, scrub the list of behaviors, code the list, and try to come up with something that's more related to an event arrest, or hostile act. there's ways to do that statistically. >> thank you, mr. lord. anybody else? oh, mr. yes? >> thank you, mr. chairman. so first off, proxy measures are a standard part of research. especially in the area of terrorism, because there is no direct measures in sufficient quantities to use for terrorism. criminal activity is often used as a proxy measure. it's an accepted practice. mainly because when one is looking for terrorism, or acts
of terrorism, in a lot of transition areas, you are looking for somebody who's coming in to try to use false identification, or you are looking for somebody who is smuggling. both of these things are represented in higher numbers even though there's still low base rate numbers in criminal activity. that's why that's typically used and used by other organization as proxy measures. so i want to make sure that we were comfortable that we had given thought to that and used what is a best practice for proxy measures, sir? >> there are a number of organization. i work with airport security in england. i've seen the videos of bombers group before they bombed. i worked in israel where they do a lot of, of course, security. but even within our own government, the different parts of d.o.d. that deal with
counterterrorism and the attempts to identify terrorists in field military situations, there's no sharing of information. there's a lot of information out there that hasn't been brought together. it's sensitive. but it needs to be brought together and then with that database, take a look at what's on the spot list. i haven't seen what's on the spot list for four years. so i don't know how it's changed, and i don't know how it's been informed by research findings from our group and other groups and from observations by special forces, by our counterintelligence, n.y.p.d., there's a lot of information in this country in separate little pockets that haven't been brought together. >> thank you.
my time has expired. my question now recognized the ranking member, ms. edwards, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to go to a question that was raised by mr. mica's comments when he was here. i just want to be clear that from the perspective of gao and the report and analysis that you've done, mr. lord, we don't yet know if the spot program is quote, unquote, a fiasco. isn't that correct? >> that's absolutely correct. those were his words. that's not in our vocabulary. thank you. >> just to be clear again, what metrics again would you use to determine the success or failure as an operational program? >> well, one metrics, besides scrubbing the list of indicators, they are honing in on as well the associated point scores, we recommended since
there are -- we've identified several instanceses of terrorists transiting the u.s. system and studied the video tapes in the movement. are they exhibiting signs of stress, or they as some literature suggest, they believe they are going on to a more blissful state. it's unclear to us at this juncture if there were signs of fear. there's videotape evidence, we think that would be invaluable in fine tuning the program. >> yeah, i think i highlighted that in your testimony. because there are a number of examples that we have. and i wonder, mr. willis, has dhs made an attempt to put together not just video evidence not just here in the united states, but with the international partners to do some kind of assessment stacked up against the screening techniques that have been identified to see whether we are on target? it's an awful lot of money to
spend without putting it up against real time data. >> thank you. again, i represent dhs science, technology, not the operational commanding. >> this is a science question. >> yeah, from a science and technology perspective, we are attempting to locate video of terrorists threats. in other countries as well as within the u.s. and it is very difficult to try to get access to that information, or to successfully get access to that video. and so if -- >> although part of the reason that we pulled dhs together was because it's -- you know, it's, you know, a collection of all of our, you know, sort of security and investigative interests under one house to work with our international partners. and so it's a little staggering to me to know that you are not
had the capacity in now a decade to look at video and use it to make an analysis about whether the techniques that you seem to be employing are -- would be successful. that seems to me kind of a basic scientific question that dhs should be in a position with our partners nationally and here in the united states to get that video and, you know, conduct some real scientific analysis of that. so i would urge dhs to consider that. i want to go to dr. hartwig for a minute. because in your testimony, you indicated that there are some other recommendations that you might make. and i wonder if you could just describe very briefly those to us. because i don't think you had an opportunity here in your testimony. >> right. i think that it is roughly captured by what mr. mica said before he left.
that it's important to engage a person in conversation to elicit cues to deception. overall, the research shows that statements carry some cues to deception. also there's an emerge on how to elate and elicit cues to deception. there's such an abundance of research showing that people don't automatically leak. so my basic answer is that some form of questioning protocol, some kind of brief protocol that's based on the scientific research on how to earlies indicate cues to deception, how to ask questions so that the liars and truth tellers respond differently, that would be worst while. -- worthwhile. >> you are not necessarily saying scrap the program. but you are saying there are
areas where we need to significantly improve the techniques that we are using to take us down a track of really being able to identify potential terrorists? >> yes, i think if efforts would be spent on the questioning part on the scientific research. >> thank you. >> thank you, miss edwards, we have been joined by the congress woman from florida. you are recognized. >> thank you. earlier you said there are 21,000 referrals. you made the distinction between the behavior leading to arrest. how many of those were arrested? >> of the 71,000? >> yes. correct. >> that's the random selection. 71,000 were referred. nine arrests made? >> nine?
>> yes. >> and in the other? >> using spot, 23,000, and a little bit referred, and 151 were arrested. >> and the type of arrest? >> i don't have the nature of the arrest in the data that we looked at, ma'am? >> it could have been data or any other matter? >> some of them were prohibited items on them at the time. others could have been throughout standing warrants or something of that nature, ma'am? >> do you think that i have an appearance, or would i be a target for spot? i mean every time that i go through the airport, i get pulled aside and searched. and the reason that i ask that is because being a past law enforcement officer and trained, i have some concerns about the way you are identifying and pulling people aside. dr. hartwig, you said you wanted
, or better tools to be available. would it be safe to use a validated program? >> first of all, i didn't say the program would work. i would talking about where i think more emphasis should be spent or put? >> even with the more emphasis, do you believe that it would work? >> i don't know. i think we would need a properly conducted study to find that out. and i think it would be important to go beyond examining the rest rates and to look at what are the actual behaviors that are displayed by the people that are arrested. to compare those behaviors with those that are in the list of cues. i don't know what those cues are. because it's not available. and to look at the spot criteria. are they indicators? so i think that's -- it's definitely we need to know whether it works on not.
>> mr. didomencia, you are a past law enforcement officer, i'm a past law enforcement officer, do you believe that the tsa employees have enough training and the skillset based on the training that they are receiving to employ or, you know, provide this type of screening at this level? >> i think with a proper followup by trained law enforcement that they do. but if we don't have the proper followup by the police officers to figure out what's going on because this is just like an alarm. it's like going through the magnetometer. why did this beep? if you have the level of followup by training law enforcement, i'm comfortable. without that level of followup, i'm not comfortable. >> so would it be your opinion
that there needs to be more training? >> yes. >> thank you, ms. adams. mr. willis, you have another question. does tsa tend to use r&d to improve the program? or do they believe it cannot improved upon? >> we have -- [laughter] >> we do have some ongoing research with them. and if i may say, this is one of the beginning research l.es that -- research elements that we have with tsa, sir. it was started in 2007, prior to gao's interest. it's focus is specific to not to evaluate everything going on with spot. that's a huge tasking of which we are not tasked or resourced
to do. this is looking at the indicator. the checklist itself, the existing checklist. the first question that needs to be asked from a scientific perspective is does the checklist as it's currently put together and as it's currently deployed accomplish it's mission? you would like to be able to compare that against random and against something else that's been shown to be out there and valid. the fact is there isn't another behavioral-based screening out there employed by any other group that we're aware of, either in the u.s., or abroad that has been statistically validated, so we have not been able to address that. we compared that against random which is the first scientific basis. >> so tsa is doing research? >> we are doing research that supports tsa. >> ms. edwards, do you have another question? >> i do, thank you, mr.
chairman. i just want to follow up with you, mr. willis, i'm confused. my understanding is that you shared with our staff that there is a pool video available of suicide bombers and the like that could be used to study. and i mean i would expect that if tsa were operating in the right kind of way, that would also be used for training. and so i'm a little confused by your answer. i just want to be clear. do we have video both from ourselves and perhaps from our international partners that we could use to assess the techniques that have been developed and the questions -- the assessment questions that have been developed to make sure we have a program that's been working as effectively as can
work. >> we don't have a number of videos to conduct scientific analysis on. f & t is attempting to work with our partners in the u.s. and internationally to gather these. being a research organization, we do not have the ability to compel operational, much less international ones to provide with us the video. what we are doing is attempting to continue to collect that at the best that we can as well as to conduct other kinds of supporting things such as interviews of direct eyewitnesses to suicide bombings, international subject matter experts in the area, to go beyond what the current validation study was, which is of the existing indicators, to try to help establish from a scientific perspective what is being used operationally abroad and, in fact, what is being witnessed by, again, eyewitnesses and subject matter experts so that we maybe able to
then bring that information back and test it. >> is s & t doing that? or research? >> that's s & t. >> okay. for doctors hartwig and ekman, it would be useful to have a real data pool to be able to assess that and develop a data recall that enables us to stack our assessment against that. my question for mr. willis though is whether or not -- what agency do you think is -- would be the response one to get the pool together? is it dhs? is it tsa? >> in our report, we made 11 recommendations. one the recommendations was to use and study available video recording to help refine the spot program in their formal
agency comment, the department indicated they agreed and they were taken steps to do that. i think the department is already on record for saying they agreed. it's a good idea. we're going to do it. so they bought into the idea. to the extent they actually complement -- actually implement it, we'll have to follow up. just to clarify, dhs has bought into the idea. they have agreed to do it. >> thank you. finally, mr. lord, since you already have the microphone. dhs hasn't done a cost effective analysis or a risk assessment. it's my understanding that they don't do a great job, actually, and i apologize for the critique of either conducting cost benefit or analysis for many of the programs. how do we know if we even need the program? >> typically as part of our analysis, we would look at the
cost-benefit analysis, or risk assessment, number one, to study how they decided you need a risk assessment we would assume to show where you needed to deploy the program. it's at 161 airports. the question is how did you establish the number? a risk assessment and the answer was no? they are in the process of ramping up the program now? every year, funding has increased. we assume that would be justified by a cost-benefit analysis. they don't have one yet. although to their credit, they have agreed to complete both risk assessment and a cost-benefit analysis. but traditionally, we would expect to find that early at program inception, not four or five years after you deployed the program. >> well, thank you all for your testimony. mr. chairman, i would just say for the record, it'd be good to get a cost-benefit analysis, and risk assessment before we spent another, you know, $20 million, $2 million, or $2 on the program. thank you very much.
>> i agree with you, ms. edwards. mrs. adams, you are recognized. >> thank you. the program has been ongoing since 2007, is that what i heard? >> the validation research has been ongoing since 2007. >> validation research study since 2007. i heard you say there was no system out there that you could use that was validated or available? is that correct? >> we are unaware of any behavior-based screening program that's used -- that has been rigorously validated, yes. >> what about israel's program? >> we have not located any study that rigorously tests that. >> did they study it? >> we are not provided any information -- >> did you ask? >> yes. >> and they said they would not
provide it? >> they didn't say they wouldn't provide it. >> okay. so it's maybe the way you asked for it, maybe. i'm trying to determine since '07, you can't give up a cost-benefit analysis. we are four years out. when you say there is no other programs out there. there are some out there, i believe, mr. didomencia, is there programs out there? >> there are similar programs -- excuse me. there are similar programs for behavioral assessment. principal for law enforcement. i've been teaching b.a.s.s., there's a dhs called patriot, i have another training course called h.i.d.e., hostile intent
evaluation. there's no follow up. i think people getting good ideas and techniques. but it's not done in a way where it can be measured and followed up on. that needs to be done. >> these programs are all from dhs also? >> there's one that's approved, in other words, it's approved for funding. and -- but they are not dhs programs. >> okay. so they are funded, but they are trained and kind of sent out and there's no true follow up? is that what you are saying? >> yeah, there's no collection about data about success or failuresser effectiveness. it's like a lot of law enforcement training, you are probably aware of this. you go for a class, you sit there for a week, you get a certificate, you walk out the door, that's the end of it. i think unfortunately, that falls in line with a lot of training that's done. for this program, for what's at stake, we need to be better at how we follow up on this? >> i know in my certificate, we
had to go back for training or else we lost our certificate. i can relate to having to keep your training and skills honed. i appreciate that. no more questions, mr. chair. >> thank you, ms. adams. i want to thank the witnesses for being here today. i appreciate y'alls testimony, and i appreciate the members and all of the questions that we've had. this is a very interesting topic i'm again very disappointed that tsa has refused to come. because there are a lot of questions that i know ms. edwards and i both would like to have asked tsa if it graced us with their presence. hopefully we don't have to go down the road of requiring them. we looked into that, they will be here at some point, i hope you'll pass that along to the folks that are in the position to make that decision.
members of the subcommittee may have additional questions for the witnesses. we ask that y'all will respond to to -- respond to those in writing. the witnesses are excused, and the hearing is now adjourned. [gavel] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] @inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations_[inaud] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> this is one the top winners from the c-span student cam video competition. this year's theme asked them to
produce on an issue, event, or topic that helped them better understand the role of the federal government. today we go to wisconsin where we meet jake berg. hello, jake. >> hi. >> why did you choose to focus on health care for your documentary? >> well, i felt as though the general population really didn't understand what the bill will meant and what it really said. and i really wanted to make it so that it was an easier -- easily accessible, rather than how -- how many pages it was. nobody is going to really go and read that. i wanted to make it so that people would understand it and it was just a little bit easier to understand. >> tell us, how have you personally been affected by the cost of health care? >> my dad recently had a few surgeries because he had chron's
disease and talking with him, it's not that it's hurting us that much. he see that is in the future it will. if it doesn't take affect as it should, it's going to really hurt. >> tell us, how are people in wisconsin reacting to the health care reform act? >> the majority of people that i've talked to are pretty negative about it. but i think it's due to the lack of knowledge of what it really means. a lot of people don't understand. then they just kind of push it aside and say it's not good. >> what are some of the strengths? >> some the strengths would be right now children are the excluded because of preexisting conditions for coverage on their insurance. you -- there's no medical loss
ratio. we're eliminating the donut hole right now. those are some of the pros. the weaknesses would be this is going to take a while. by 2014, we'll start to see it really starting to be better and take more people and help everyone. as of right now, there's not too much that you can really hold on to as excellent, if you know what i mean. there's just a lot of little things. but then there'll become bigger towards 2014. >> what did you learn from doing this documentary? >> oh, i learned so much during the documentary. i mean talking to all -- everybody in my community, talking to people out of my community, sharing this video with family that lives not only in wisconsin, but other states as well.
it's a just learning experience to take an issue that not many people know about and to make it an initiative to learn about it. >> all right. let's watch a portion of jake's winning rid -- winning video. affordable health care act. >> i believe it was one of the doctors that said all you need is one hospitalization, your file is as thick of the phone books. certainly the bills are just as thick. >> my dad is a teacher. his insurance is excellent. he knows that could change. wisconsin is a long way from washington, d.c. where president john f. kennedy once observed there are risk and programs to an action, but there are uncomfortable in inaction. >> you can see this video and all of the other winning ones at
>> throughout the month, we'll feature the c-span competition. middle and high school students submit washington, d.c. through my lens. watch the videos every morning at 6:50 a.m. just before "washington journal." stream them online at studentcam.org. >> now a panel on the cost of implementing the federal health care law. from the world health care congress, this is a little less than an hour. >> we are going to get to it. each of the speakers and
panelist are going to give a few remarks to start. we'll start with george and seize up. george halvorson, we also have jonathan perlin, chief medical officer of hca, and president of edna. george, please? >> thank you. good morning. how are you doing? scary. it's great pleasure to be here. at the world health congress. i'm going to talk a little bit about health care reform issues and the issues that were facing in this country today. starting with the fact that health care in this country is consuming a massive amount of resources. u.s. health care consumed $2.7 trillion in revenue last year. it's the fastest growing part of
the economy. and to put it into perspective by itself, the american health care economy is larger than the total economy of every other country in the world expect china, japan, india, and germany. we spent more money in health care than all of the other countries spent on everything that they do. to put it in different perspective, the average premium right now for the family, kaiser family research is $1400. a full-time worker who earned the minimum wage in this country makes $14,000. we've hit the point a full time worker spending all of their money on health care will not be able to pay their premium next year. to put it in another perspective, the complete salary and benefits for a system engineer in banglor is $12,000