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tv   Book TV  CSPAN  September 14, 2013 9:00am-10:01am EDT

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programming at 11:00 eastern with rocket girl, the story of mary sherman morgan, america's first female rocket scientist. visit for more of this weekend's television schedule. .. >> this is an honor and a pleasure to be here, truly a wonderful store. thank you for having us. when kevin and i first started this book, i'll be honest, i really didn't know much about
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che guevara. i knew the image on the t-shirts, growing up in new york city in the late 1970s. a lot of people wore che t-shirts. is image was spray painted on walls all over new york city with expression che lives. he was a handsome figure. a scraggly. and piercing eyes and the black beret that was tilted a little bit, and the star on the beret. he looked like a revolutionary, and his message seemed to be to somebody who just looked at the t-shirt and look at the same, somebody who was, you know, for power for the people. everyone read members that expression from the '70s. fast forward to 2010, kevin and i became friends because we both worked at "the associated press," and kevin and i both
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have a love for military affairs and military stories. we supported -- reported extensively about the military. one day kevin says, you know, there was a mission back in 1967 in which the green berets when down to bolivia to train bolivians to go hunt che guevara. and i said, yeah, okay, but who is che guevara? you know, easy relevant? i was being a little sarcastic, but he said no match, really, why don't we just take a look at? why do we do our due diligence and see what's been written about it, see what they did. because over the years there's been so many rumors about che, what happened to che, who he was, how he died. and we decided that let's at least look at what has been written about the green berets role in the nation in 1967 in
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bolivia. so we started doing our due diligence, which is reading books, going online, and guessing what had been written. and what we found was there have been dozens and dozens of books written about che and about castro and about politics. but every time the bolivia nation, che is bolivia nation was mentioned, the green beret were maybe a paragraph or two in every book. there's been some commits books written about che including john anderson's book and a whole host of others. but again, always been kind of a footnote in those books. we decided at that point, let's at least look at records, army records, going to the archives and see what exactly was their role. because again with the rumors, there were some people he
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believed that the green berets actual in in there and kill him. they believed the cia was in bolivia and actually went into the jungles and killed che. so let's separate fact from fiction, and that's what kevin and i really do best as journalists, uncovering the truth, exposing wrongdoing. so at that point we win and we look at all the documents and records and started talking to some of the guys who are actually on the mission in 1967, and we quickly discovered that they played a pivotal role, but not like most people thought. they actually went down to bolivia, a small team, and they took basically these bolivians who were farmers, who are presence, many have never even held a gun before, and they actually trained them, turned them into this fighting unit that went into the jungles and hundred che, and eventually
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captured him. and at that point we realized that we had a story, one that hadn't been told. as you know, being in this store, historical figures, there are dozens of books about historical figures. how many books come out every year about lincoln and washington and teddy roosevelt, and military leaders? the one thing you want to do as a journalist, as a writer, is advance that story, take it in a different direction, take that small piece and show readers what really happened in a given time period. and that's what kevin and i decided to do with it. we decided that we're going to drop her readers in bolivia in 1967. we weren't going to start the story with che on his motorcycle trip in 1952 going throughout latin america where he discovers horrific poverty and changes his course from being a doctor to a
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revolutionary. we weren't going to take you into the mountains where he's fighting alongside castro to overthrow batista. what we want to do is drop you in bolivia in 1967, show you what the lady was like, what the united states policy was like, why we feared che so much at that particular point. and i think, kevin, you can fill us in from here applaudmac. applaudmac. >> one thing before kevin starts is in time anybody has a question, please, feel free to interrupt us. don't wait to the end. just pepper us with questions. >> we initially started this narrative we were going to look at che as a point of view character. we thought it might be an interesting way we were picking up people to sort of drive the story and we thought, che has to be one. and that was a struggle because there's so much written about in the the che reading this i had
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about him was in all 15 books. the books we have initially on the green berets and intelligence guys was three, two or three. and essentially what we did, and my wife, i have to give her credit, she said why don't you leave them out and focus on everybody else? what we realized was the story was, this is a story about guys forgotten about by history. they're forgotten in the narrative that's been written but also even in bolivia. it's the che trail when you go to bolivia. che guevara came to believe it to overthrow the government and its is true. none of the bolivians get any credit. obviously, the green beret, they are not a part of this, but so that struck us initially as maybe he isn't the point of view. because if you know a thing about a mission and i hope you do read the book, as you learn more about the mission, it didn't go so well. he really wasn't what the legend had him.
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the coverage, if you read the news clippings at the time, really had built him into a super grill with a 500 man army and he was poised to take over all the bolivia. in fact, it just really wasn't the case. the more we focus on the legend, the more we focus in 1967 what people believed what he was doing and about less what he was doing, the better it became. each of the urgency that a lot of the main characters you will need. you could understand why when they get to bolivia they are legitimately scared what che guevara will try to do. and really what made him such a threat to america policy makers and to bolivia, at the time was, his charisma. i think it's undeniable that he had a certain charisma about him. the fact that urban outfitters has posters featured up into the stake that people still buy. and i have a buddy of mine who showed up one day with a che
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guevara t-shirt on. and he said hey, do you know anything about che? at that time under very little about him. i knew about a thumbnail but i'm knew who he was. he said, man, he just looks cool. so it's undeniable that there is a certain sizzle to him. but what is trying to do when he got to bolivia was pretty simple. he wanted to great a thousand vietnam's. at the time the united states was involved in the vietnam war come in his goal was we can do this, you can do it in southeast asia and we can sure as heck ago in latin america as well. we're going to start it in bolivia because it's right in the middle of the neighborhood and we're going to export it. when he went and showed up in bolivia that's what he was trying to do. so what we tried to do was tap into that. as far as the cia was concerned, as far as american policymakers were concerned, as sure as the president of bolivia was concerned he was not only going to do that but do it well and who's going to be a big problem.
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as she read the book, you have to take the assumption that not only is he going to do this, but he's also doing a good job of it. what we found, what was funny was when you read, and we are reporters we understand what it's like on a breaking news event how many times you hear things and things come out. i'm sure all of you guys followed the boston bombings, right? that was a textbook modern breaking news story. obviously in 67 it was a little slower but you still had this idea of a lot of misinformation. i'm going to have -- talk about the main guy, the major who leads the green beret down here but when he gets the mission in panama, to bring in, we're sending down with a drink into a the bolivians, he's thinking, great, i won't spoil it too much but i'm a veteran, i'm getting towards the end you and i've got to take on this guide we may or may not be che guevara.
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he has how many guerrillas? that's what you're facing. >> applaudmac. >> kevin raises a great point to but a couple things. one is that this is really the untold story of some of the people involved who haven't gotten any credit in history. and one of our characters is major plata. he was the leader of the green beret unit that went down to bolivia to train the bolivians soldiers and to about six and 50 of them. they had to do this over a 19 week period. imagine you go down there and you're dealing with mostly people who can't read or write, having handled a gun and you're trying to teach them the intricacies of four. especially counterinsurgency. it was a very free difficult mission. pappy shelton wasn't for. this was a guy who was born in
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mississippi. he grew up on a farm, picked cotton, did a lot of different jobs through his life. he was tough as nails. he joined the military when he was 18. he joined as a private and went to korea and saw action right away, was wounded three times. he won the silver star. he came back and decided i love the military, i'm going to make this my career. the only time he left the military was back just before he got married. he decide he was going to try farming again. the military had a policy that you could leave the military 490 days and return them if you returned within 90 days you would get your previous rant it but after 90 days you could read up and go back to being a private and at the time he was sergeant. on the 87th they have returned because farming in mississippi was just too hard and he loved the army life and he missed it.
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so he decided since is going to make it his career he is going to do more than -- you want to run as much as he possibly could. and so at 28 years old, the call of age for becoming an officer he applied for officer candidate school, and he was accepted. and most of the people in his class were early '20s and he was the old man, so to speak. so that's how he got his neck name, happy. from there, he worked his way up, first lieutenant, single event but that's not enough. he wants to join the green beret and he does. he deploys in 1962. he comes back, still wants to stay in military even though his wife, he had five kids and his wife wants him to go back to tennessee and live there and leave the military life behind. and he decides if i'm going to stay in the military a little bit longer going to learn how to speak spanish, which he did.
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he went under this intense training and to learn how to speak spanish fluently. and then he was deployed to the dominican republic and then later this was his last mission. when he got the animosity gets called into the office and his commander tells them, look, i know you're getting ready to leave the military but this is really an important mission. we are worried, che guevara might be down there. we need to train the bolivians. there have been several ambushes down there, the bolivians have been routed. they have been taken prisoner. they been killed. we need to do something because we are afraid that this is going to spreadit, and bolivia was in danger of being overthrown. but he was the catch. he could go down there and he could train the bolivians, that he was ordered not to go in the field. and that was critical because there was an area of operations, a red zone where the guerrillas were operating. and he was told he cannot go
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there. you have to stay out. we do not want americans killed there. we don't want to be sucked into a war in our own hemisphere. we don't want another cuba. we just want you to train them. and for pappy, he understood it was tough being a soldier because he had seen combat. he knew what his men to do. but they had handcuffs on the their only to go down there to train the men and not fight. >> okay, so now you're stuck, right? you are training the bolivians that you want to get somebody out to actually find out what's going on. so the cia cooks up this idea that they're going to hire two cubans, exiles, to go down and represent the city. they get around the little ball at the embassy and they send it to children down there and the one we focus on a lot, felix
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rodriguez who lives in miami, we interviewed him here, and he's the workaround. but what you learn pretty quickly was felix is that it takes a guerrilla to catch a guerrilla. so he spent a lot of time on the opposite side. he had taken part, he was one of the advanced teams in the bay of pigs. after that he is part of all the other things that were going on in and out of miami here, anti-castro. but what i found most interesting about felix, talking to them, was he had his intimate knowledge of what it took to be a guerrilla. the stereotypical things, they carry everything with them. and when he gets to bolivia he's very good at making friends in the bolivia intelligence services. he is getting in with them and reuse their intelligence, and he's able to put together pretty
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much a profile of all the guerrillas that were with che. and find that there's a particular one that goes by the name of paco who he is a template is the main guy he wants to get. because paco is a student who was told by the communists, believing communist party, we will send you this go into havana or moscow, and when it -- when you get to the camp, they hand him the gun and are like, you are a guerrilla now. so felix decide this is my guide to if we catch this guy i think i can turn in, at least talk to them. i'm not going to give away the whole book out when paco finally surfaces, felix pretty much goes all in to make sure he doesn't get executed, which he almost does. and paco into being an important player. he sort of the final piece in the ministry. what helps is that paco is -- esa photogenic memory. he lays out the soap opera
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that's going on in these cans and our che has had struggles with the bolivian communist and with some of the other guerrillas, how some of them are deserting. for most of all he puts together exactly how the guerrillas move. so the next time that there's an ambush and they catch them, they're able to figure out exactly where che is, and that leads them to win the implement the rangers. after 19 weeks of training the rangers are ready. now they know where che district this is where the gentleman you're talking about, the officer, a guy named gary plot oh, he arrived on sugar trucks and mitch and i went in to get him an outlet niche tell you about him because he's a neat dude as well. >> yes. [inaudible] obviously the
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process went -- and it came out their useful. >> argued talking about the concession from paco? yes. paco, yes, he sang like a cana canary. >> [inaudible] felix had previously been in africa and che was previously in africa. >> correct. >> [inaudible] >> actually, felix wasn't in africa that the of the cia agent down there, go stoffel, was in africa. they were chasing che. and again, part of the problem was our intelligence, we think of the caa and we think of the way our intelligence works now. we know where everyone is moving. we can monitor people by tapping into the fold. we have drones. we know what everybody is at any
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moment. which is partly how we're able to track bin laden. it took a long time, but that was one of the ways. back then our intelligence, especially when it came to che, was pretty poor. we just didn't have the contact. in 1965 when you talk about when che, we find that he's in the republic of congo. we know that in hindsight. but in 1965 we weren't sure that he was actually there. in fact, some of the documents that we look at that the cia would write these reports once a week, they basically said che was dead. they believe that he died in the dominican republic in 1965 with the uprising. so they thought he was dead, you know, somewhere in the dominican republic. they weren't sure and that was part of the failure of our intelligence at the time but we just didn't have that network going. but you're right, we got che was in congo which it turned out he
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was, and we were tracking him. >> [inaudible] >> that was transported to the republic of congo for chasing che or whatever operation was going on. >> absolutely, but again, they weren't 100% sure. they believe che was there, and later teachers surface of che coming in, in the congo. but at that particular time in 1965 they board 100% sure, and that was part of the failure of intelligence at the time. so then in 1967 when we believed che might be in bolivia and allied it was really disagreement between the caa, state department. they produce reports that said is che still alive? and their answer, we're not sure. that's in the book. so yeah, the trai training was y
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concerned about che in part because he went from being someone who preached revolution for somebody was exporting revolution. and that was the real danger in 1965 in the congo and their invalidity, but he was taking action on some of his theories. one theory being that you could take a small group of men, place them in a rural area and you can overthrow and establish government. if you just have the focus to do it. that was one of his theories. but getting back to gary prado, and you are absolutely right to gary prado is one of the characters in the book and he was the leader, one of the leaders of a ranger company. we focus on gary prado who led the country because it was gary prado who actually captured che. and so we told the story of the bolivian military through his
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eyes. and gary prado came from a long history of military people in his family. his father was i believe in major general. he was a diplomat. and, you know, gary prado wanted to impress his father. that's what he went into the military, in the calvary. and when the first attacks happened in bolivia when the soldiers were ambushed and they had no idea who was behind the ambush, gary prado volunteered. in fact, there was a dinner with the president of bolivia, and he goes to the dinner because, in bolivia at the time there were 200 families were basically all well-connected and they all knew each other and they ran the country. and so he is at dinner with the president and to gary prado i should have some training in counterinsurgency. he was in panama, and at the dinner they start discussing the ambush, the soldiers who had been killed. and gary prado was really angry.
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he believed at the time that the tactics the bolivians were using just wouldn't work. they were using conventional tactics. their military wasn't trained. they needed to be trained in counterinsurgency and not in traditional military tactics where you have a front line and a rare and you're battling, think world war ii, where you have the front lines and the rear. this is different. this is a guerrilla war. so at this dinner party, he approaches the subject and says, look, what we're doing is wrong. he slammed his face on the table and said what we're doing is wrong. we need to train our men in counterinsurgency. and i want to be part of it. and even though he knew the president, it would be like going to dinner with the head of your company, with the president of the estates into slammed her fist. no, mr. president, you're doing this wrong. it just wasn't heard a. so he thought his career was over, but a few days later he
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heard that he was actually part of this new ranger battalion that was being created. and i again, just going back to the training, there was 19 weeks of intense training. things that our soldiers would do in boot camp, but, you know, our soldiers have the strength and the education. they didn't have it. they didn't even have the body strength to perform some of the basic functions because of the food. so when the green berets go down there, they have to change their diet. they have to change their sanitary have the. so it's just not about learning how to shoot guns, it's about learning how to be a soldier. and what gary prado does for it is -- for our book, he's really an untold story in the che chapter because everything that's been written about gary prado, may he played a role in che's death or maybe is barely
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mentioned at all to look at the dodgers, we want to bring his role to life because history a fascinating character. >> [inaudible] spent so basically, the rico, 1967. it's a good story. but alone, is that enough? i argue that, and this is part of the page i give mitch in the beginning what about this sort of. why does it matter now? why should we care about what pappy was able to do in 1967? arguably it's one of the first successes of the green berets. you've got to remember, when che was in bolivia, the green berets are fairly new. it worth a branch. you didn't join the military to be a green beret. you went in there and get a look at but mostly officers were trying to get out of the green beret once they got there because they couldn't advance. the guys who stayed in a too long with a you got to get back to the regular army you could
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advance. so the fact that this is the green berets and their infancy as well, and what they did in bolivia is what they have done in colombia, if you guys out of fort bragg, what they've done in iraq, what they've done in afghanistan, what they've done in the philippines. so in some ways we are getting to see green berets doing exactly what they do best, which is working by, with and through indigenous soldiers but in this case believe in soldiers but in some case iraqis, in some cases afghans. honestly, let me be blunt, to carry out american policy. to me, being someone who spent a lot of time covering in and working with them and writing about them, i was so fascinated by this aspect of the mission, that this was really, there are statues around fort bragg. i was at the last month with some friends and this green beret guy, he writes the afterword of the book, an afghan war veteran, and he said, look,
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we look at all these statues around fort bragg and it's a shame that pappy shelton isn't out there. they look at this mission as one of their first big touch points that they can look back and say this is what it is supposed to look like. it has a legacy to it, but honestly, it's a pretty good story, too. we tried to bite like a thriller, a good james bond summer history book. if you're looking for analysis on politics, if you're looking for a really good look at government and what did wrong with policy, you might want to hit some of the book. this book, if you want a page turn to get you into characters, bolivia in 1967 and runs you through it, in a kind of fast-paced i think you guys like this. if there's any questions now, but thank you all for coming out. we appreciate you coming. let's get some questions now. i like discussions.
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[applause] >> i read the book after he spent 30 years in cash was jailed that there were three people that castro feared besides himself, one of them was the man who disappeared, you know, a plane trip that never landed anywhere. the second one was a man who was arrested because castro didn't have the guts to do it himself. and then the third one was che guevara, who was out of control, and from what i understood from the book, he was very clear in saying that he basically turned in over and sent into bolivia to his death. actually tipping off the american cia that, you know, basically where he was and what he was doing. have you run across any of that
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to confirm what he wrote? >> no. and let me give you a little background. right now i'm working on another book that will be published next year, and to develop william morgan. william morgan was an american who went to cuba and fought with the second front, and so the research i've had to do or not only che, but also for this new book that's coming out about william morgan, which really touches on relationship with castro and che and morgan and the leaders of the second front in and the conflict with the 26th of july movement, the historians can disagree about a lot of things, but reading the documents, talking to the people who were there, there's no evidence that castro sent che to the death. they were as close as brothers. there were certain ties that are forged in combat. and just remember that when
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castro lands in 1956, they are almost wiped out by matisse does mean. the rate handful of the choices of july movement who fled to the mound. and che and raul and castro, fidel, were among those. the ties they forged with a revolution. were unbreakable. unbreakable. i don't think, i mean, che and castro could disagree on things, for example, what kind of revolution in -- the soviet style was more coming up to wait for conditions to be right before your wage revolution whereas che was more, ma you don't wait for the conditions to be right. to this injustice you go ahead and you create, you make that revolution. but just from my perspective, from my opinion, i don't think castro sent into bolivia to his death. i think it cast wa was a blessig
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wherewith to bolivia and he was exporting a cuban style revolution to the country, which he hoped would spread to bolivia's neighbors. >> by the local population had no understanding of the government. some of them didn't even know what country they belong to really. the level of education of this area that che chose to start his operation, the people there were surviving. they were very, very suspicious of strangers. they gave him virtually no support. this doctrine of revolution, yeah, it just fell on deaf is to a great extent. >> you are absolutely right. there are a lot of good points. one is he picked the wrong area of the country to go to. this was an isolated area with indians who spoke a different
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dialect. so when che was there trying to recruit people for the revolution, another theory is you have a haven in rural area. he would go into towns and give speeches and it would be silence. because they didn't understand a word he said. seriously, he spoke a different dialect altogether. also it was a sparsely populated area. he had picked another part of the country near the copper and tin mines where the reunions and students, it may have been different because there was unrest in bolivia in 1967. but he picked an area of, i'm trying to think of the united states where the equipment would be. maybe like a mojave desert. it was just isolated and they were not very really many people there and they were suspicious. he also disconnected about one thing. bolivia went through, he went to bolivia in part because it may byrd five other countries and he thought that he could spread
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revolution to those countries. but he also went to bolivia because he thought they had the weakest military and south america, which they did it. but he also thought that people would be receptive to the revolutionary ideas. the problem was that bolivia underwent a revolution in 1952, which gave rights, land rights to indians, which gave rights to miners. they disbanded the military in 1952 after that revolution, and it was as if che ignored what happened in bolivia. you're absolutely right about the people. there was no support. in fact, towards the very end, almost from the very beginning che was more of a fugitive than a guerrilla. because everywhere he went, the people he is trying to help, went to the army. and they tracked him down. is like being on an episode of america's most wanted. truly, i mean, wherever he went into a village, and he even notes that in his diaries. che was a prolific writer, and
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he is a very clear, concise, almost eight anyway as this topic so if you read the diaries, he says, he's been sarcastic sometimes. we went into the village. i know they're probably at the police right now. so while che was great at promoting revolution, writing how-to books and revolution, when you look at his record as a military leader, as a tactician, my conclusion, total failure. >> [inaudible] he now lives in paris and is written a lot about it. he seems to agree with what the judge was saying that he wanted to dumped che. there are reasons to believe
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that that could have been the case. i'm not an authority like you are, but that could've been the case because he had traveled around the world and he had visited people, who were neither with the soviets or the chinese. he visited the chinese. castro was more soviet union than to the other communists leaders. and when he returned from his worldwide trip, you know, he was lost. castro receives met airport and nothing else because he showed up in bolivia. >> che was like the pain aspect kid to castro. it really was. he really pissed off the soviet union. one of the last speeches che makes is in algeria, public speeches, where he accuses the soviet union of being known better than the dogs of the united states. for exploiting, those were his words.
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yeah, i mean, che was a loose cannon. he was a celebrity. he was an icon. but castro was behind the mission, gave his blessing to the congo mission and to bolivia. in fact, there were photos -- if you go online you can see them yourself. photos, for che to sneak into believing he couldn't go in with his scraggly beard. he went in as a business can. he shaped part of his head. he was wearing a suit and tie and it was a photo of them in our book of his passport photo to get into bolivia. and you look at him. kind of like a middle-aged businessman. but there's in -- there's another photo and they're laughing and smoking cigars. i think if castro was really worried, or wasn't behind this missiomission, i don't think it would've been as collegial to each other. sometimes a photo does say a
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thousand words. >> go ahead. >> did you interview -- two-part question or did you can be anybody from the cia? and the second part, did you do any research on the testimony of and what relevance their interrogation played in informing where the guerrillas were? >> start with the second question. they were important mostly because, and mitch -- the way when he was captured, he was a french philosopher, a communist philosopher, yeah, left philosopher who want to be a guerrilla, hooked up with che, lived out in a few little bit and he said he did want to be a grill in more and walked into a village and got arrested. when they arrested him, he flipped fast and he -- i think
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he got interrogated. at first he claimed that the cia safety. i think he backed off of the a little bit, but at some point the cia did give them. to make a long story short, charles de gaulle, the president of france, gets involved. they all write letters saying release him. and it was a big embarrassment. a lot of headaches for the bolivians as was the americans. i think that leads to the in game with che, to some extent. the bolivians when the capture che, if you think you have it bad when he got arrested, you have che now. how do you handle that? and the other problem, we talked to some of the bolivians about this, there wasn't a prison in bolivia. they had them, but they didn't have a prison at good old che to go there was also a fear that the cubans are going to come down and taking. so i think that testimony and that arrest i think lead you
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later to the way that che is treated. >> [inaudible] >> they help. when they are part of the cachet that felix immediately latches onto when he gets there and is able to piece it together. and i know gustav has a new book at mr. baca and the second. i haven't seen it. as her of the guys in the cia, we did talk to felix. as a trying to track them, we didn't we do that because like i said we tried to keep it from a soda straw view. and so we branched out as much as we could on as much as when you but really the focus was on what felix and gustavo were singing. -- were seeing. he want to talk about gustav? >> yes.
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after i think 45 years he broke his silence and he broke -- he wrote his memoirs. and in their community, he downplays that his voters had anything to do with, you know, che's capture. clearly those photos were pretty good. those drawings that he made. and once they had them the believing soldiers were able to distribute them all throughout the country. they had a better idea of who was in advance but it helped a lot. that he did it. they told him slowly because they didn't want to give away, there was a part of the people who did want to give away everything. but they told him generally where the safe house was, where they were hiding documents. and it came out slowly over a period of a few months. [inaudible] spent a little bit longer than that because they
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don't start stripping those photos into august the 67. that's when the government starts in the them out. >> -- starts handing them out. .net. >> exactly. we have to remember, it's not like toda to date we have seen d everything is instant. but what you did have were a lot of newspapers and international journalists from "new york times" and "washington post" and they were reporting every development. newspapers from all over the world. it became a nightmare for the bolivians. kevin raised the point, they didn't have the death penalty in bolivia. also, the prisons were more like, kind of like home arrest. they really didn't have that structure. so after they saw the nightmare when they capture che, the decision was made pretty quickly what to do. because they didn't want to have to go through that pain anymore.
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>> you just talk about when they finally captured in addition to made and that was piggybacking on my question, what was he doing, what was he doing? to get any operational skills? >> been pappy stuck commission. i know over the years there have been rumors that the green beret were after and they played a role in che's death. they were back in training different bolivians. there was an infantry unit that came in after the rangers and they were doing that thing. pappy didn't know anything about where the rangers work in what they were doing. he knew they were after hunting che, but that decision out what to do with che and the capture of che was strickland, you know, the bolivians. and the cia officers who were
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there. they knew what was going on. but pappy shelton didn't play any role in that. [inaudible] >> we didn't find anything that indicates that. i've heard that. i heard there was a navy frogman that shot him. i've heard -- i don't know. i mean, at this point i have no -- i've got -- no one has ever told me -- but i mean i will check it more but i mean i've heard the same things. we followed them in some respect we did follow the textbook but
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we didn't talk to a lot of guys were on the ground that gave no indication. at this point we're talking 1967. [inaudible] >> yeah, that works. i'll take that. >> the current believing government, have they made any comments? did they see things get really? >> no. i wish they would though. that would be great. [laughter] no, i do not heard anything from them. spent in the end, they are in charge. >> yeah, they are. like we said, it's a lot of history now is really focused on che and its che's trail. if you go with the chicken after they captured him and there's this huge bust your there's a museum for him. it's an interesting history mostly because of that fact that ultimately when you break it down, he failed and yet did he? is arguable. i don't know.
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>> they export revolution with doctors and aid. it's not necessarily a military endeavor. now it's more, you know, aid, doctors, knowledge. >> soft power. exacta which is the a lot of coming in, hezbollah, and these guys are doing it, too. it's good pr when you come in and it's a carrot and a stick. i know -- i don't know how close you called iraq but you saw that strategy migrate to the u.s. you see the whole counterinsurgency fight can be fought on two fronts. i don't disagree with you. there's a real balance there and it will be interesting to see, because i don't think we'll see any world war ii anytime soon. we are looking at, in some ways this fight in 67 is the fight josie in the next 10 years
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because special forces, they are not, 2014 may be the end of the at kenmore, but not for everyone. they will be busy. they are busy now. and i think what you're saying is exactly the kind of fight it's going to be, doctors. i was with a civil affairs team in africa where to put together a clinic and they're going out and fixing cattle and stuff in kenya just south of somalia. i've been in haiti after the earthquake. you're right, right now that in some ways is going to become we can bring the stuff if you want to be friends. and it's also, we can train your guys to fight the guys we both don't like. and i think that's going to be a big part of the fight in the future, especially for special forces unit. that's really used to fighting. if you talk to those guys now there really combat oriented because they spent a lot of time in afghanistan fighting. it will be interesting to watch this force migrate back to what pappy shelton have an out much
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to die who is been kicking in doors, now has to go in and train. >> that's what i heard. million-dollar missiles to blow up $14 tanks. >> right. you can't kill your way. >> do you find it unusual that on the heels of the commitment that cuban made with russia into africa, that they would go almost like a keystone cop approach going into bolivia and south america, which is a greater price, a price at less of a cost of? >> could you rephrase that again? ask that question one more time. >> in other words, they committed into after we're logistically and monetarily it was not as much of a game, you know, from a logistics standpoint. don't you find it unusual that
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castro sends, and he's not a dummy, that he sends his right hand person, let's say, as far as exporting revolution, to the middle of south america, almost like if there were a bunch of amateurs going into the in other words, it wasn't much of a commitment. you know, don't you find it unusual that they would make such a blatant mistake, miscalculation of all places in south american? >> no. you have to realize that at that point che was a celebrity, and you're talking about hubris. look at everything he had gone through, you know, both during the cuban revolution and then later in africa. he felt like he was untouchable at that point, that he wasn't going to die. and he felt that, i really believe that che felt that he could succeed, that history was right. remember, history was pretty simple. a small group going into a rural
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area could bring down an established government. that's what he did in both africa, it was proved wrong, and bolivia, which was proved wrong for a number of different reasons. so if the point you think that castro sent him to conquer and bolivia to fail, i don't think -- i think che went to the congo and to bolivia to succeed. i think he truly believed that he was going to win, that his theory was going to take hold and that he was going to, you know, start many vietnam's in the region. >> to what extent was there logistical failure in bolivia because of castro himself or castro's support of che on the logistical side? >> that's a good question. clearly, they believed that this
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was the right area to go into in bolivia. but one of the mistakes that che may, talk about logistics and where to go, was he had alienated, you know, the bolivian communist party. of leaking communist party was telling them you're going into -- one, we should be leading the revolution, not you. and, number two, you will need to be up where the mines are. and che again did not think he was wrong. he said, no. we are keeping. we know better. it's my theory, and you're going to follow me. and if you don't, goodbye. that was part of the problem in bolivia was he had no support from the bolivian commons party. so really -- time in -- the bolivian communist party.
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and they had a number of setbacks from the very beginning, almost from the moment they got their to this little farmhouse in this remote area, he was discovered. they were doing troop movements. they were sending guys into rural villages with a ton of money to buy supplies. and again, the people that were out there for turning him in. they were going straight to the military. so i think it was mostly che, you know, doing the planning. [inaudible] >> che? in argentina. any other questions? one more. >> would either of you care to fast-forward that to where we are today? and where we need to go and what we need to think about based on what you have seen and
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understood? [laughter] >> in general? >> macro. >> where we -- i mean, let's go back to this idea. i mean, obviously from a military standpoint i think in the next 10 years, i think you're going to see all branches of military have to rethink the way that they fight. i think that you're seeing now lots of, they call them remote -- well, we call them drones. because i should operate them call them remotely piloted vehicles. because they get angry with the drone term. that isn't going anywhere. and i think you're going to see not only in the air force but in the navy, it's going to increase. i think the navy just once to go off an aircraft very that is far better than what they put a
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human in. but then it's always going to go back to the people, even though we're going to autumn everything so in 10 years from now, what we have learned from this, the hardest one for the last, i will give you that. what do you think -- spent the military knows what they are doing most of the time based on the current train. i'm thinking, are you willing to project what the policies need to be? >> well, i mean, all right, here. simple policy terms going forward. civilian leadership for the military needs to understand the military better. when they tell them to do something, they better be very clear about what they want them to do, and make sure they want them to do. because the military is going to die try to do. so that's number one. no more of this mission creep we get wars that change objectives. depend on who the general is.
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so there. i'm not even going to touch domestic policy. so good try though. it's a good try. [inaudible] >> but i think you're going to see, i mean, we have lots of questions. i'm going -- this is terrible. we were joking that this looks like a presidential press conference some going to dodge this question. [laughter] and watch how we dodge it. ready? i'm going to say this. i think as the american people with ask ourselves tough questions about what our constitution looks like tenures going for in the modern time. once we as a people need to figure that that answer, there you go. [applause] >> visit to watch any of the programs you see here online. i the author or book title in the search bar on the upper left side of the page and click
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search. you can also get anything you see on easily by clicking share on the upper left side of the page and selecting the format. booktv streamed live online for 48 hours every weekend with top nonfiction books and authors. >> this fall booktv is marking our 15th anniversary. this weekend we look back at 1999. our second year on c-span2. and some of the best sellers that year included mitch albom's tuesday with morrie. tom brokaw's the greatest generation. >> i know i've written two books and i know is a beyond my wildest expectation. that they printed 27,000 copies, first edition. if you have one of those now, it's worth $650 i believe. i'll take it off her hands for
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25. life but i didn't expect this at all. nobody did. and i'm often asked, well, how do you account for the success of that book? i don't know because i'm a newcomer. i just wrote one book. now protested when. people in the business should know better than i. there experts ever. even in the publishing business, which seems to be a big gamble because nobody expects you deficit since it did. they printed 27,000 copies in a couple of weeks of "the new york times" bestseller list at number 15, though some and then began to rise until it reached number one. that took a few weeks. "tis" then was published in september. and when it appeared on the bestseller list, many times it was number one. right up to number one. that's because i have some --
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i'm a big shot now. [laughter] i will have a good everything to the day after i won the pulitzer prize, i was thinking my wife, i'm a husband, you know. i talk to her. [laughter] but the morning after a one -- i won the pulitzer prize, i said to her, well, how does it feel to have your head in the same bill as a pulitzer prize winner? [laughter] she said, i feel much better issued get up and make coffee. [laughter] because i always make the coff coffee. but i thought because i won the pulitzer prize i was excused from making the coffee forever, so i just have to wait until i get the nobel. [laughter] which will be a cold day in hell. [laughter] nobel, cold day in hell. >> we look back at our first 15 years on c-span2.
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>> let me focus on something called advanced persistent threat which is something that is discussed both domestically and internationally. it relates to what stewart was talking about. there are footprints that are left regarding behaviors that go on out there that are indications of something is going to occur. one of the reasons, continue to be looked at a in the executive order and instead and everything else is fat we need to move to continuous monitoring, and after that we need to move to continually be able to look at the precursor of the context as being set for an attack we do know what those are. a lot of it has to do with basic and why social media. >> you're never going to defeat the cyber enemy, whether it's a nationstate, organized crime, any organization by having the private sector check the compliance box to we did all
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that congress wanted us to be. that's not enough. it's grossly ineffective. there has to be timely and continual information sharing horizontally within the federal government, particularly the dhs and then vertically down to the state, locals and particularly the private sector. the federal government relies on the private sector. >> this weekend on c-span, the senate homeland security committee looks at where the next homeland threats may come from. ..


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