tv U.S. Espionage and Intelligence CSPAN November 10, 2013 5:00pm-6:06pm EST
migration of people is a permanent fact of life, and i think when you really look at it is part of who we are as human beings. hard wired into less. so i recognize the truth of what he said, for sure. >> a question. >> well, thank you very much. >> i would like to point out that we have his book on the table of a there. we also materials. and some materials about the center for latin american, caribbean, and latino studies. thank you very much for coming. have a good evening. >> okay. [applause]
>> is there a nonfiction of barbecue would like to see featured on book tv to mention this and e-mail. or tweet us. >> in light of the reason is of american surveillance of allied governments and un officials, book tv prevent to the presence portions of author talks that explores the history of american espionage and intelligence as well as the issues that authors and journalists face when reported unspecified information. in the next hour you will see clips with journalist douglas wallace the intelligence historian matthew eight he wrote secret century, investigative journalist james pampered, author of the share of factory, and pulitzer prize-winning journalist and a priest and a co-author of top-secret. begin with douglas wallace, author of wild bill donovan, the spymaster created the zero ss in modern american has been rushed for. a former correspondent for
newsweek and time magazine examined the creation of the office of strategic services, the precursor to the central intelligence agency and its leaders under william wild bill donovan. >> in july 1941, this is before pearl harbor to roosevelt signs and executive order designating donovan his coordinator ofform information. about a year later it would be b called the zero ss, the offices, of strategic services, but inte the beginning it was theitwas coordinator of information, a one-page document, very vaguely written. colonel donovan, his world war one rank, will collect information of national importance for me and to otherfe unspecified things. in fact, the document was so vague that the other cabinetta members in roosevelt andinet administration began discussing there heads wondering what in the world track and was up toldi appointing his republican willpi street lawyer to do all these unusual, covert things his at administration.
donovan likes to say that he began his spy agency in the os. really, from-0, which is reallys the case. he was really just one guy. in the beginning he was kind of like a player in a pickupy basketball game looking fore lo agents and operations anywhere e heu find them. so, for example, the phillips plant company, they made still d be in business today from one know.w. donovan and arranged privately with the phillips and company to have its salesman when it went l on sales calls overseas reportta back to him, particularly in excess occupied countries what they saw and heard.d. the eastman kodak company, and might they then made thees, cameras. they make disposable cameras today. to back then they had thousands ofs cameras around the united states done then arranged for the camera clubs to send him theclub photos that tourists had takenoo
of militarily important sites around then world. in other projects he asked was projects a guard.ar. pan-american airways, all flown on pan am.t oan there is now a new tv series. back then project cigar, donovan are raised privately that the ticket agents for pan-american in africa will report to him onc the movements of munsey'sthe throughout the continent so that he can keep track of the agentsi in africa.ca he could to of all kinds of wild schemes. he was open to practically anyo crazy eddie had or at leastea, t willing to consider. his code number, which ec osstos currency grid zero ss documentsi was always one of nine, which just happens to be the room number of his office in the kremlin. his secretary and of the codeide name for impurities to currencyd basket because, like a racehorse, he was always kind ot running around all the time.rt he kept to a dozen dollars in kp
his desk drawer at all times tod pay off sources or affirmation when he went prowling around washington. d don't think you'll find a cia director the keys to grand inic petty cash in his office now. ch he and the research andad a development chief, a guy namedg stanley level who invented all the spy gadgets for him. he used to call in is professor moriarty after the sherlock holmes character.li he may face like a miniaturei cameras that spies have to use,s pistols with silencers, incendiary devices used as explosives.s donovan was very, very w interested, for example, in truth drugs, fascinated by the c use of truth drugs in the interrogation. he had one of his officers test out the trees toward on the newa york mobster, a guy named little augie. le
this was in new york city copok who worked for the os says. he had him up to his apartment for some smokes and which haveda won a. and he starts puffing away ond i the cigarette which is laced of illinois,thdrug puffing away, slowly it's kind, of a silly grin on his face, soh stunned the officer of the mob hit see is carried out, working for lucky luciano and all theci congressman he had bribed. of course is secrets receive on with donovan. he c he could never bring themou to court or expose the drug their testing. other ideas he had, one time hei proposes to franklin rooseveltr they have a button that is tested the depression anytime i but in an instant communicationp with every radio and america so that he could one people in los angeles if the japanese were checking or people in new yorkje if the germans were checking one the inside.ret roosevelt ignored the idea, buth roosevelt was open to everyoneen of donovan's ideas.o's i he actually was a spot above
himself.hims he likes intrigue.ry. he likes the old idea of isespin finished. for example, one son donovan tested the idea of getting bats. there were going to tie incendiary devices around thend bats. the idea was that you would fly over japan, dropped the bats out, the bats fly into the papee in east and said the incendiary devices of which would burn dowd japanese cities. i'm not making this up.th this really happened. terrific idea. eleanor roosevelt's, someoneh wrote about her.soone she passes on the franklin your daughter was kind of cool.was david to donovan year ets stanley level check it out.n and they got a plane, load up with n bunch of bats the incendiary devices tied around them, flewe.
over somewhere in the midwest,d, some desert area, drop them. o guess what happened? what well, they all sang like stones. the idea did not work. but todd and was willing to try it.try her going to try other things. when others buyout scheme that he had was that stanley hadsome concocted female hormones. if they could find hitler's festivals they would inject they hormones of the festival's whis would make his mustache falloutk and give him a fasano voice i which would be a real bummer foe the fuehrer. [laughter] eventually donovan felt his spine organization was built into over 10,000 covert00 operatives, and spinners agents, commanders, support personnelpe, scattered in stations all overar the world. again mon-khmer remarkable achievement considering he started with one guy. guy they mounted covert operations in north africa during the torc
campaign in november 1942.42. they have extensive operations in sicily and italy.. in the balkans the a leaderlesst in yugoslavia and greece.. and a great, why range of operations. in asia there were really limited to burma and china,o those two theaters. interestingly enough, macarthur, commander of the southwestcm pacific theater did not want toh have a part of donovan's forced the effect, banned him from his. theater.ave any use but he would have no use for him. admiral chester nimitz, commander of the northerner pacific forest also did not butv -- take much of donovan.e. his most extensive operations came in france, northern francer and southern france. they mounted -- they had a goodd bit of research into targets inn france and germany, the air force. they also infiltrated and parachuting commandos during
that operation. donovan also like to go in on landings, the beach landings. he went in on the landings inn sicily and italy. and it really started to worry is that because they thought acu spy chief corantos is chief with all those secrets in his headigf off, the last place you want hii is at the front where you might be captured in the value will target.y george marshall, the chief ofmah staff of the army thought he ha done been banned from going in on the normandy landing.may la so did the eisenhower.so d if they had had prohibited. donovan manage to talk his way do aboard the heavy cruiser inland the second day of the utah beach landing. have a great time. he was on the beach and energy,d he goes diving into the sand. he then marches in lend about 5 miles within eight coming it', been down by a germand guchine-gun nest, reaches into the pocket of his field jacket to look for his suicide pillok
because of the zero ss officers carry a suicide pill, including donovan, realized she had left it at the hotel in london anddoa was all worried, had been a great deal back because heb feared dead in aid might come im and mistaken for an aspirin. took almost two years for donovan to build up is by organization. deite that may seem like a long timeka during the war, but it took the u.s. army quite a while to build up its force. but eventually it became very, very proficient and turned in ay lot of good intelligence. one of the most striking failures was the mental. bassname was a vessel. supplying him with transcripts,r private trans -- pope pius was
having with foreign leaders, japanese on voice, and with his own on voice, particularly inlyn asia, it turned out that it was an italian pornographer with a very vivid imagination who had v talent for writing dialogue. as i say, this is also a storyso of political intrigue. donovan like to say that his enemies in washington were ass fierce as they often there was in europe, and that was reallyu. the case.c he had ferocious fights that j. edgar hoover. hoover thought donovan's organization was the biggestn' collection of the amateurs yet never seen.ateurse actually, in the beginning it was. hoover had is fbi spy onover donovan, collected a lot of information on him.em they spied on zero ss officers.f he had malls in donovan's organization. donovan's bynum hoover, had malls in hoover's organization. and i was doing research for the
book are wondered when they had time to spy on the axis. they seemed to be spine in each other so much. the pentagon and first wanted no part of donovan's office ofgic v strategic services. george marshall thought that this was a plot by donovan toovn take over army and navy intelligence which, by the way,e that's exactly what he had in mind at the frequent roosevelt would have let him. h do so marshall eventually comes to accept donovan's zero ss, but his senior intelligence officers never do.elgenc income in fact, they fight his organization throughout the warh at one point is military thtelligence folks form their own secret of espionage unit behind donovan's back.ovan bac it was nicknamed the pond.amed in this job was not only tos jo supply on the access behind tons back, but to spy on donovan, on his offices. his offi even collected information on the lives of zero ss officers.
donovan -- i mean, in any war you are going to have generals on the same side fighting among themselves. world war two was no differentee than any other work.frny o the british in american's senior officers, constant battles. and in done in this case the fights were even more intensegh because the conventionalbeca admirals' and generals just really did not know what thisd guy was all about.s i mean, you get up there and started talking about propaganda and espionage operations in little augie and incendiary devices. conventional animals in generals thought naturally disturbing.ndr the really the american way ofao work. donovan also brought a lot of a problems on himself by his operating staff.style. he had a habit of never takingb no for an answer. so that a commander in fenton i said he can't do this to me, would make an end run and try to get the decision reversed whichr of course, does not when youn
friends in the pentagon.pnta one time he was at a cocktail party in washington chatting with an admiral.with an adul he had his men burglarize the admirals' office, steal documents of his desk, and brine the documents to the car to a party to show the number of whaa is ages could do. there's nothing in the record is shows with the of merle'sat s reaction was, by got a feelingan he was pretty well nonplused about it. donovan also had a penchant for showing up at meetings at thein pentagon, usually late, keeping the other animals and generals waiting. he he was i wnitially made a major general and the army. is uniform when always be very carefully tailored. and he would come into the room with only the medal of honor ofr ribbon he had one sewn onto his uniform. as a not so subtle reminder tha he had the really only medal in the room that actually counted. eventually donovan could not
overcome his political enemies. he had drafted a plan for afo postwar central intelligence agency. opposed were cia. he wanted to leave after the war when. >> they own the chicago tribunev a republican newspaper chain strongly anti rose up, thenos espies roosevelt and roosevelt despised.hm he get leaked a copy of dawn ofn a secret plan to set up a post war cia. most likely j. edgar hoover beao the document, but it could never be proven. anyway, he publishes the articls in the chicago tribune verbatim, the secret order that wasveatim drafted along with this very w highly exclamatory sorry thatnl accused donovan of on theupamer
seventh american gestapo in the united states to be back in if you keys in the organization of being gestapo like, you about kill the politically. and it did. >> of look at american espionage at, author of the secret century, the untold history of the national security agency spa researching and writing about matters of national security. >> the main question ellis wanted answer is we spend right now 200,000 americans comprising the u.s. intelligence community. what are we getting for the money? to me, for all of manpower and all the effort, what then for the baca we getting? it is the artist question that any historian can answer.
great to write a kid, salacious book about derring-do and spies in the ether and how it is done, but at the end of the day the hardest question that we have to ask ourselves is -- and this is one i have read literally tens of thousands of pages, a cra posting steady speed read the one question no one can answer is, is the nsc worth the money spent on it since it was created in 1952? it is like trying to prove a negative. it is impossible. in so what i wanted to do in writing this book was to lay out those instances, those things that i knew about both get and bad when this successes and failures of the agency in terms failures of the agency in terms of the product produced, i stayed away from sources and methods as much as i could this simple reason that i did not want to, you know, asleep in bed next to an nsa security officer
for the rest of my life. as much as i appreciate the massive technical skill that is required to accept and process warren communication tceday as opposed to 50 years ago when it was all radio all the time, now you have some funds different kinds of adelle devices. and mean, i can only imagine the nightmare situation, the boys and girls having to face today the who. it's 40 times more stuff coursing through the ether for them to intercept and there was at the end of the cold war. and there are not enough supercomputers in the world to handle all of that material. so i have great sympathy for them, how they are doing it, i can only guess.
well, it is an ebccated guess. what i wanted to give you, the reader's conveys a sense of what they had probcced or failed to produce during that time from the end of world war two in 1945 up to the time my publisher terd me to stop writing in 2008 on the threat of bcedily harm. and as a friend of mine correctly pointed out. we know much more about the failures of intelligence agencies than we do about the successes. i have to say that i was trying to be mindful in writing the book gives the reader is a sense of all the successes as well as the failures. and in reading the reviews that came out after the book was ar.blished, i am always surprisd .
we hope that you the rears a comeback into a gallon. and i sometimes wondered if the reviewer's actually read the book aireow because it was eithr he was too harsh on nsa, too much negative, the man is in love with the agency. he basically gave them a free ride. somewhere in between the was missing the salient fact that -- and i admit, many of the agency's successes i don't know about or i may know bits and pieces, but not enough to go to print with. , should also point out that bao-thirds ofhat million chips ended up on the cutting room floor. i gave my publisher, okay, 1,100,000 words. and give him 300,000. so basically it cut out aim ot f
the material, some of the success stories get cut out simply because they just said dole, boring. it ended up on the floor. for then i apologize. that is my own fe rlt. everything you want to know about electronic intelligence, peripherals, spy flights, submarines, the use of navy ships for collecting electronic signal el that all ended up of f the book is well. and going to have to do a separate book just on that subject : tool itself. the biggest problem that i face, and i am facing him right now writing ecu obama book is how yu talk about the craft of intelligence as an outsider without compromising ongoing operations? and one of the problems i faced in writing that secret century, especially the chapters for
september 11th is i ended up knowini fand was tercd aim ot me than i could reasonably put in print in not expect a federal grand jury in alexandria to hand down indicmeaents. like many responsible journalists there are few responsible journalists did you read what it will block an end up writing a letter materia give the ccede words with the various domestic use shopping programs. what does it tell you? if i was to put it in a book, yes, the new york times or the "washington post" wouldim eap to their feet and publish the fact that i, the code words from these program el but it does not tell you what these programs did. does that tell you how expensive that woric whether there were legal and not. and so i admitted that a lot of
the operations that were taking place around the world, i clearly, if i was to publish will propose publishing, ar.blisher would have had a heat attack. i would not be able to sleep a night. so i just want you all to know that there were limits, self-imposedim imits in terms of what i could and should responsibly right about intelligence operations. and it is a terrible burden, any person writing about intelligence if you are responsible or think your response will have to deal with. but when one of the things i should also mention is have been slaving away on this book. the damage and directed me 25 e sars to write this book. end the first ten to that i
could actually read this book was inhat 995 when the nsa and e cia's jointly released the predecessor organization to what is now the nsa for who bred ning the ccedes of what is now or wht used to be the kgb in the operations here in the united states. and for reasons that are subtle and sometimes difficult to understand, a former deputy director of the nsa who was a lover of history, and you donmit get many people rising to senior ranks within the intelligence committee who have an compreciation for is three, wele this stuff has outlived its usefulness as a secretta let's declassified. and try know that there were those in the nsa who strenuously resisted the declassification,
but they were overruled because of the deputy director of the agency saying do it and just tell me when you're going to release a silicon have a press conference. so, you know, one of my main -- one of the problems that has reared its ugly head in the post septuch ber 11th world we live in immediately afterwards we live in a world durini fthat lovely time, you know, the mid-1990s when there were annual cogoinerences of the cia releasg documents and inviting historians to come and listen to for agency officials talk about how they won the war. and then september 11th came aloni fand it stopped, and it stopped completely. no more conferences, no more releases the p comers. suddenly i became person non grata, along with the few others of those that actually wrote on
this issue, and it is beginning to change again. in the last six months the cra has released several very si usificant groups of papers on cold war intelligence issues. and i a seplaud this the way for doing it. i hope that the nsa will follow suit and do the same, but you know, weim ly re in a democracy. and, you know, i keep having to remind ms belf that no matter hw much damage and death and destruction may have been caused, you knoo strong is the fact that, you know, we continue on as a people we have probably the greatest society in the world. he had ever lived overseas you know the truth of it, and the fact of that being intelligence is back in the business of openly talking about, you knoo the history of intelligence is a very good sign lastly, i should
also mention that i have to md e an apology to all of you, and i think it is inappropriate one. the bookies, you knoo hundred pages long. one-third of which is footnotes, and they're is a reason for that i don't know how many of you who are serious readers of intelligence history, you open up a bucket have no idea where the information that the author is presentini fto u.s. fact came from. and i am not an academic. i only have a m3 vter's dillree. i am not a phd, but it always drove me crazy when i pick up the boowas t i've wonmit mention the names of many authors because the book shop downstairs as a number of thuch for sale. you knoo you have the right to to know where this stgence
if it is confidential, all right. the phrase confidential source is used more than i am comfortable with. and then i began to regret doing that, especially with many of the pdireple who gave me the intermission. have no probluch with you using ecu name in your boowas t i decided that there were still alive and i w3 v not going to use the name. then tom drake gets indicted by a federal grand jury in baltimore forim eaking infotabation to the baltimore sn at that point i realized, i was really smart not putting the names of my sources. the other thing i would like to say is an end on biatore i turn it over to you, for this a few who made things the that was a little too critical of the agency, i tacked on to the paperback version son of a post
script of what h3 v been g ing on since president obama became -- moved into the white house in ja knary ofim 3 vt year. i mention a few programs which, you know, took people up in fort meade but did not reveal as much 3 v i could have, you know, what these programs are up to. wanted to sort of correct or begin the process of correcting what some people think is a slant, the critical a hoects of ecu book i paid tribute in beijing this excesses that are cuurcene pey td ning place. you have to be wary when you read a newspaper article of, ta of y, for example, billan prt series that was published by the "washington post" recently whic g you knoo on a doom and gloom, you know, ran into intelligence community out of conol. the specter rear its ugly head
again, you know, the first time compened since the nixon aw tinisation. and you have to wear every may think about the abalicle and the infotabation contained in it or what was not contained in it, you have to aill ays ruch uch bt there is something else behind the statistics. you know, there are groups of thousands of men, most of them in uniform stuck in some, been to islam about four times in the last couple of years. i cannot even begin to describe the horrible conat gus b are having to go tid toug, doing their jobs. it just, it -- somehow the ministry of abalicles donmit to justice to, you know, the efforts of these men and women are d ing td thatay. that does not mean they're not, you know, making mistakes and it is up to us as historians to tell you about it because, you
know, it's a human endeavor. god that combat command us bahy. but i just, i think we need -- we need, you know, i think it is incumbent on the intelligence cole,unity did tell us, if they don't like the stories that are compearini fin the new york tims and the "washington post" and they know what the tenor of the storie el thegt for gd that's s, correct the story. give us the truth. dec gd that, our duch ch,racy l survly re, some help. >> our programming on american espion3 and intelligence continues now with james stanford, author of the shadow factory. the author of secret nsa, the e rthor of two previous books initial security agency reported in the history of the intelligence organization in this technological operations.
he sat down in 2008 to talk with jonathanim anding commercial security and intelligence courcespondent from across the ne whapapers on book tv offer interview program afterwards. ton poim et's go back to the b3 vics. nsa, what it was set up to do, why the eavesdropping on american citrigens without a court authoriication is illegal. >> well, the original foreign intelligence surveillance act which w3 v established in 1978 in order to prevent abuses like a ta of yn place earlier, part of that w3 v if you want to eavesdrop on the u.s. person you have to get a warrant to from a secret court, the foreign intelligence surveillance court. the coubal acts as a bgence between the nsa which does the eavesdropping, and the american
citizens who were potentially subjected to this piece of the nsa was not allowed to eavesdrop on une . citrigens, unless they got the okay from a judge in the court. this is not a difficult course thirty years they've issued some 20,000 a seprovals. only about two or tid tee denia. so it is a quick pit is easy for the nsa to get the ones that thprogram want. decpassini fthe court really me no sense to me. po and nsa is set up in the aftetabath of world war two to eavesdrop, specifically on potential for kno us enemies ofe united state el is that correct? >> sure, it was established on war were to to succeed the 3 ncies of world war ii the broke the japanese code, the getaban enigma cd thatsure thprogram wanted to conti kne th
the cold war focusing on the soviet union. and they -- the nsa w3 v formed in 1952, became an agency said a secret that even congress w3 v not tshed about it. itsnioery name was top secret, like the cia which was going throy the,congress and publicim. so the nsa was given the political charge of basically listening to for kno us cole,unications and basically ty to find out when or if the soviet union w3 v about toim e rnch a nuclear attack. the job was to prevent another surprise anamack and we had a po harbor. a communications back then were very different from what they are td thatay, the way that dats carried around the world. kendis made their jpot somewhat easier, to disconnect whegt back then, most communication was by satellite. ton po that's right. throy thhout the 60's, 70's and 80's, and drop much of the poi90's the moln way that the united states rec knoved and set
international communications was dec satellite. and that w3 vnioery benitiicial for the nsa because if it wanted to eavesdroedeon as communications, it had to do and did do was build these large satellite dishes, and the state of washington. and they would pull in all the communications from the satellite and then put it throy the,computers and so fort. there was no need to ever let the telecommunications companies know about it because they could do it with satellites hidden in thenioalles b that are unseegt hibecen basically from the publc . what changes in theim ate 9rbs because tele-cole,unications is changed. seven done by satellite most cole,unications now, engineers and communications started going by hundreds of cables bece rse of the development of a f whaper-optic communication. that is where the communications
go tid tough the cable in the fm of a light beam, a photon as opposed @booktv electron 3 v opposed to an electrical cable. far more capacity and far more reliable. so there w3 v a tremendous builat cables under the seat. and in communications co poi9ans using them. and that became a very big problem for the nsa because if cole,unications stabaled dripteg -say from the satellites and on cities hundreds of cables bsa had difficulty cshelectini fan affirmation. it left them with only two options, one, the k comut a submarine down to t com the fiber-optic cable. according to the people i tal od to, and never had real success doing that and it would be very difficult undertaking anyway. so the other alternative w3 v to make secret deals domestic agreements with the telecom co poi9anies. this w3 v not anything really
new. is is the third time that the t anys. governmenects had abscod telecom companies and asked them to secretly turnover cole,unication. we did in the 1920's, from the mid-40s up until 1975 when it was discovered, operation shamrock and then it was shut down. so they did again. cut the telecom companies and say that we need your help, we need to get into your prinot ate cole,unication ss btems. and they agree to it. what happened after that was the nsa stabaled bthe oldini fthe st rooms inside the telecom's which is. big buildings without windo wha in major cities by consent francisco. now, what is interesting about this, just finishing of the documentary that was working on. in january. we traced the path of all these cole,unications around the worl. it is interesting because most of the telecommunications from
3 via and the pacific area of come into the u.s. on this one beach in california. and then they cabo up this litte building about 2 miles away. , laamee switches, and at&t switches. if you were going to -- if all you wanted w3 v to eavesgreeop on its in-the communication, this tree vacation in and out of the united statees u that is where you'd want to put your secret room is that is where it all comes in an area of those out. the what tsa did instead was in this large switch in downtown san francisco. that is not only where a lot of the internet such communication comes in the were aim ot of the domestic communications. >> everything. ton po so when the cables of c, n to this one particular floor of the building, they are put throy the,what is knoy that wlinter box which is basicy a prison that separates the photons and takes one photon and
basically creates to. >> a mirror image. >> a mirror image of the cable. so one cable, the original continues on to the severed communications netwosps in the t anys. then there is this new cable, a punt kibble, mirror image cable that now caboes to the next flow below and into the secret room. a secret room and is contrsheled dec the nsa. revealed originally by mark klein, one of the supervisors and h compy to see the room and gotnioery angry. >> and there was a court suit against the compaf c that w3 v doing that. mecham he testified. >> that's right. and it is still in icall final st3 s. ton po at&t. >> it was by the electronic frontier foundation as iinst atstin. and the suit, you know, a very powerful suit. programvisitnesses and so forth. and i think if it would have been successful, the problem was
congress and theim itnislation er eating this nvis amendments o the foreign intelligence surv knollance act be read just a.d. for the telecom company. so i don't thilei it is caboingo at will be soon. although electronic frontier foundation decided to file another suit hoping to find the constitutionality about the immuni bi cabrant. ton po we conclude our programg on america's dinner in intelligence the pulitzer prrige-winning journalist dana priest co-author of top-secret america, the rise of a nvis american security state. the washington post national securi bi reporter basam is the er eation of numerous security programs after the attacks on septuch berste1th and presents her thoy th ims on r yeorting of classified information. she appeared on book tv ae ater words into a dozenste1 where she
spoke with former undersecretary of ditiense. ton po then it, you have o3 thered up a depiction and a condemnation of top-secret america. what is it? ton po what is te rght six of america, a good starting question. it is a term that we camezep with, a co-author night to ascribe a world that grew up after s yetemberste1 in response to september 11th. we both know this, we noticed over the years that there were , re secret program said the government undertook. i w3 v coverini fintelligence at the time. i was responsible for writing about some of those programs. but there were programs meant to defeat al qaeda. and what started out as a very natiick response, obviously
everybd thaty is very worried at another possible attack senal congress, they tid tvis monprogt the intelligence world and said, to what you need. basically a blalei chetel. to what you need. because of the uniqueness of the organization that thezenited states found themselves confronting, not a regular army in any -- not even your ritnular arthe you know, individuals in a culture that we did not understandnioery much af cway, u know, this is a big challenge. so virtually af c cabover aent 3 ncy that h3 v af cthing to do potentially with intelligence or could sell then. v having potentcull i poi9act to the warn terrorism as george bush called it, sta anoed to cabet in on the action, you know, they wanted to be with the center of gravity was on this fig im.
some of them were well enatiippd and others were not well equipped at all, but nmyd thatyr sas b no to af cbody. this is a generalization, but that is basically where we founal and we sta anoed both on our own and then separate ways to start se knong indications of this. i w3 v covering the cia and the intelligence community. eoil harkigt aim ont isime press anals bt and he worm documents. he was seeing a plethora of cd e names proliousrating on government contracts, jobs, all sorts of areas, you knoui things that the cd thate names for different. it or not like the dahlia waniqior, things have reassigned to war to other things like anchovy and sky rider, things thprogram you to not -- it justd not make af c sense, and there
were hundreds and hundreds of thuch . he w3 v seeing this h compen and in his way, i at the same time was uncovering aim ot of the progras that were set in place along with the most secretive of our agencies, the ccul and special operations in the military. and as i learned more and more about those to those needed more and more suppo ano onotianrigations. but as well, every unit in the military that could call it self a counters baerrori an unit or could make a case, and they did not even really need to mor e a very srisong c3 ve but could get funding from congress to your tchess about it. i s-s also the proliousration of this secret organizations that, frankls m at the time we both thought that this w3 v something worth writing about louis had no
eveip howim arge they were or w maf c people were involved. so that was our determination. start peeling back the onion command we had to come up with the methodology which we can talk aboutim ater tescall to do that, but in the end we decided that we would call this top seer et american. and the reason why we did not call its secret america is because when we sta anoedim ooking, weim oordd at the secretim evel, the classification system, as you know,nioariousim eveluld ae wanted to sta ano of the secret level, but there were so many organied seer etim evel that there was no way in our lifetime we could hope to cabet our arms around ad categorize them. we went one step up, which made it much more difficuim e forzes because top-seer et really shoud be coming you know, secret. but even there we found in nearly 2,000 conrisactors that work on projects of the
top-secret level. and nearly 12o tha cabover aent ors inied top-secret level, and they in eveude everything from the mt myvious, the national security agency in the cia to the park service. pe poim et me seesas- >> we call this topic of america. pe poim et me see if izenderstd properly many of the points of your concern or criticism of what you call a toph,ecret america. your argument is there is -- that the government classifies 3 v secret mtherh too mtherh information. >> right. >> that is one thing. pe po and that the ie cormatios kept secret for too long. you have argued, as you just mentionecur the bureatherra. >> that is doing this classification of information has been cabrowing enor, usly, ethat weccullly over the last ten years.
you do a very vivid job of dep being the cabrowth of >> wngs and the hiring of personnel and the expanding use of conrisactors. you mor e a nn interesting points about how when there w3 v a srisong duch and for analysts and a sho ano thise in the government, the contractors come in to fill the cab com. one of the wsecret s they do ths tired a few people that are already in the cabover aent as anals bcall away from the government and then charge them back to the gover aent at mtherh higher rates. he e poi9hasized the lack of accountability of these buree rer acies. yhav yhav yhav
>> you touched on most of the main points of the book, yes. >> what i would like to ask you, are you not, with those cooksas- with those critici ans, potentially making the criticism of government buree rer acy in general. it is that those criticisms apply as much to not a secret govelevment agencies and is to seer et cabover aent agencies. >> well, i would be hesitance to say yes whensas- i have not stt we ied of the @booktv other government bureaucracies as much added a r yeort on the heaim eh care indusrisy for my younger days and certainly looking at big ss bten. >> wcaid. they have is used, but this is different bece rse, one, it deacai with national securits m so it s more essential. it is more important.
getting it wrong is potentially more for less but the biggest difference is the secre. >>. , st other are3 v of the govelevment, let's take defense for example, the public and look at it. the p to alic and cabet the hea. the hearings can reveal a lot to be a ruch uch ber sittini fin hearings beforesas- during the cold war in debating whether we needed how many ntherlear submarines. in the the cost, who manufactured, who could lobby because thprogram mancatacl here we can hold congress accountable. we could say, you knoui did this person st te for that because this is in the district? and we used to do r yeorting on in top-secret america you cannot do any of that, and that is wlic as n that is one reason why the secrecy is counterproductive because it excludes the p to alc debate about what is the smartest way.
it excludes a public accounting of how well the cabover aent is doincui and even the best card to people, and i believe that most, you knoui by andim argeim abie everyone who works in a top-secret america is trying to do a caboodit emy. but things don't work well in the dark. it is just the truism. and so in that secret american liberals, or i should say the government created icall oy licounting a, p ss btem for that which is congress. if you look at congress as we have. hotouwillim ead a dassng ait em, they don't do it so well for two feasance of icall issipd. one is bece rse the commicritees that are charged with this are made up of peo more e who are n- dod.t cd, e as expercall but whn pier hit please take a long time toim ealev aboould the bould tho
are sd, ve ihat intimidated to l us the government in this area. onld l intimidated by the conte, you know, if they say something wrong, if they make a mistawil n public andim etim oose a bit of information, they are afraid that not only will they get in risoublld l bould sd, ething bal happen, and they are out done so much by the insiders within their toph,ecret america. they have so few staff. one of the most shocking thinane to me is they you can have the national telecom, just such an important office, a huge a, unt of monprogram, you knoui huge, s of billions of dollars, and congress has no more than a handful of sta3 thers who are really supposed to be watching out for what the nsa does. any cabiven time the majority of them have not been doing that job very long.
how are they supposed to do that conb well? >> it is interesting theory these critici ans, and i must sa, and froare cthe government, the kinds of criticisms that iit eust rev ac3 lot of validity in the. in that think that the passnt of the bureatherra. >> cabrowing and that there are accountability problems and peo more e do over eve3 vsify things. mamy., too many things are classified and stay classify for tooim onterp i think all of thoe er iticisms are on point and useful to air, but i find it interesting and ironic that if your book did not focus on the national-security bureaucracy but on sd, e other aspect of american government policy cal whether it was the education depanment or the ene wrtan3 d yeartment or the commerce department, it is basically a
wilyint - tea par p manifesto g cabovernment bureaucracy. [laughter] pe po the a wrn about the wsecret the governmes present attitude is money enough people in the cabover aent are not serving the national interest but serving bureaucratic a personal interest, those are thuch es from the tea party. >> and win this series of arti evees came oould that this bes in with the "washington pos" , the interesting thing, the media that w3 v most interested w3 v the conservative media, and that was their reason for it. does this mean that we are rig-d about government bureaucracy? no, i think that that is. inalid toim ook at the issip, for surll but it is not valid to excuse what is h uspening here or to doy importance of it by saying, isn't that how cabover aent touwnctions? becausld l as iin, what is at se is so precious.
so ing ortant. end bece rse it isint - on mld l this book was very hard to do, you can imagine. there are not. inery many national security reporters around anymore. there are a handful. the cabover aent is alwsecret s trying.3 to intimidate is one way or the other, trying to a two investntaations, potentially thy can throw reporters in jail. when i was reporting on the cou, the bush to minisrisation w3 v very, very adamant about the you know, the fact that that w3 v wrong headed, sd, e of the conservatives on television called me and other pboo more e risaders. it w3 v a wsecret t o intimidate the "washington post," the new york times cabot i two. you aremantnamerican for asking these questions. so why am i saying that back nks because that w3 v an
uncomfortable time, but because to make it, it is toxic. it is hard. e q that is what sets it aside from everything else. >> that's pulledint - probe anda licritle more dee more y. would you describe as intimidation, it relates to natiestions that areim arge and difficult questions. about who should have the right to decide that certain information should remain secret in the national interest. let meit eust to cabet sd, e. inery severe,it eoulevalists require secrecy to do their jobs. pe po toit eoulevaliscall reque seer ecy? >> to they require people to respect the secrecy oy amthllery operations for them to funee ion as journalists? >> they absolutely requireint -
and must mnd ite count to the prd, ises of come facility and must defend the constitutionint- of, it cial the to the passnt of going to jail, has a few of them have. >> so and h3 v a that a, the ilied to itsmant.s. national-security officials also? dui ignores the ubeca. special securi p o3 thicountcai needint - >> definitely. >> i definitely ignores the fact thatint - the inctysion of the boves talks about that and talks about the fact that there are seer ets that are worth keeping. in fact, there are seekers that one could go to jail for if they were to reveal them. a newspaper could, but the larger question the you're 3 vping really w3 v addressed in e qme degree by the founders of the country who said, you knoui we were cabiving proteee ion. the only industry that would give protection because we do not thithey a three branches is natiite enough. we need an outside source to
make sure that those tinfee branches are worping correee ly. we will give you some protection , bould we're not cabassng to cab3 me you the rnta-d to sioks the government's secret. but we're not cabassng to tinfku init eudesl for revealing the sickest necessarily. >> they did not say that. pe po wstn pe po they did not -- there wao promise to journalists in the constil consciously revealed national security secrets that have been eve3 vsi, it ed by properly stnected or a, the iointed. that is not a crime. >> congress interpreted the , it rst amendment the wsecret h their legislation can put people in judesl for certainint - formg nu eveear codes, for instance, r revealing the names of covert agents if youfortnow that is wht yojobre dassng, but there were limited in even that. the congress then tdusk the constil
everything, it legislated what it means and praee icality which is what we cllye dksn with. in the context that i was fighting cd, es from the wate wrate p uservery, theit eustices said this amounts -- you don't get to publiet t everything you want. we donfig cabive you the right,t we don't give you the right to ugt everybody init eudesl to do we ke not like britain or israel we don't have prior. of course no surprise that i am a srisong advocate of our syste. and in particular -- pe poim et me ayt you whatfortf iscle whoa's this poses for journalists. he discussed sd, e of this in your bdusk. i wouit a like you to talk about that here. let me set itmantp this wsecret. ..
sometimes get asked, used in erfurt and excess and all kind of problems and i grant you that. but here comes a journalist, and a journalist gets a piece of information that he or she shouldn't get. something that's supposed to remain secret. what are the calculations, what's the analysis you go through to decide whether you're going to maintain the confidentiality of that
information even though you've got your hands on it or going to publish it. >> guest: it's a very important calculations at the "washington post" and other big publications taken very seriously, and what basically happens, i will give you the secret prison example because that is a real. >> in 2,005 i wrote a story that said that there were several -- the cia maintains several in eastern european countries so i've been to the remains of those countries and what we did in that case like we do in our case is when they know that they have something that has been classified or even if they don't know for sure but they think it has because it is so sensitive, they will call as i did the publiat thepublicaffairs person. and at that time i basically read -- didn't read the story but gave her every single fact in the story. and i'm doing this because i want her to come back.
this was a woman at the time, to come back and say that and that we really do not want you to publish. it is classified and we don't want you to publish it for this reason. it then becomes a give and take in the discussion on the part. it's not a negotiation because again, we have the rights to publish what we think is suitable because we don't have prior -- unless you go to court and try to restring, and that has never happened. so we have a discussion and the government then is making its case trying to give the least of information they can. and we are trying to do a good-faith effort to say what does the public have the right to know?
is this an important issue for the public and what is that? what is an important issue for the public? doesn't contradict what the government says it is doing? is it in line with the values and that is obviously one of the reasons to secret prisons were so important to publish i believe and so does the "washington post," because it was a very different way of handling detainees and we had in our entire history so we had a discussion. the discussion started with the public affairs officer and, but it's been included as we went along my editors and the top editor of the "washington post" who makes the final decision and it went all the way up from her to the cia director and a sensually my my boss called her and bush have assembled his national security team who also made their arguments for why they didn't want it published.
>> you can watch all of the programs featured over the last hour or numerous other programs on the topic of american espionage and intelligence out our website, booktv.org. >> which debuted on september 12, 1998. in january 2008, drew gilpin faust examined the social and political role that played during the civil war. about 620,000 soldiers died in a war which is equivalent to 6 million today. this is about an hour 15 minutes. >> good evening. allen weinstein. i'm actually ecstatic about being here tonight to introduce the great historian, the great
educator, and most importantly a great person, drew gilpin faust. a few things about this evening. i don't think i have to tell anybody in this audience that doctor drew gilpin faust is the 28th president of the universi university. she's a very distinguished historian of the u.s. civil war in the american south and will be talking about her latest book which has just appeared. it's called "this republic of suffering: death and the american civil war." she's also the lincoln professor of history at harvard art and science. i will go into her background in a minute. except to say that this, we are very grateful to our fds