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tv   House Homeland Security Committee Hearing on Facial Recognition Other...  CSPAN  December 30, 2019 2:02pm-4:22pm EST

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oversight the intelligence committee needs. >> in dubai you compare it to being on the jetsons. >> it is not there yet but that the vision. the vision is to have flying airships early in this coming decade and not just a few of them carrying around rich people to golf courses and luxury hotels but they want to have these flying airships carrying all kinds of people and they want to have flying network like eight metro system with little stops all over dubai with little blind machines curing people back and forth. >> steven baker whose latest book, hop, skip and go look at how technology is changing transportation. watch "the communicators" tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span2. now, the government use of facial recognition over the next two hours customs and border
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protection, transportation security administration, and a secret service answer questions from the house homeland security committee. >> the committee on homeland security will come to order. the committee is meeting today to receive testimony on a department of homeland security use of a facial recognition and other biometric technologies. without objection the chair is authorized to declare the committee in recess at any point. i now recognize myself for an opening statement. good morning. the committee on homeland security is meeting to examine department of homeland security use of facial recognition and other biometric technologies. the government use of biometrics is not entirely new. for example, finger prints have been used as an identification tool for many decades.
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other biometrics includes dna, voice pattern and palm prints. in recent years facial recognition has become the new chosen forum of biometric technology as facial recognition technology has advanced it is used by the government and the private sector has also increased. currently, dhs is collecting and storing several different kinds of biometric information and is using this information for multiple purposes. tsa are using biometrics to conform the identities of travelers, for example. secret service is piloting a surveillance system using facial recognition. i am not opposed to biometric technology and recognize it can be valuable to homeland security and [inaudible] but its proliferation a crossed dhs raises serious questions about
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privacy, data security, transparency and accuracy. the american people deserve answers to those questions before the federal government rushes to deploy biometrics further. last month the committee held roundtable discussions with both industry and privacy and civil liberty stakeholders about the debarment of homeland security increasing use of biometric technology. stakeholders have sufficient concerns that the data dhs is collecting and whether the department is safeguarding rights appropriately. they have good reasons to be concerned. as standards, america may not know where, when and why the department is collecting their biometrics. people also may not know that they have a right to opt out or how to do so. worse yet, they may not know the biometric technology is in use
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as it is the case when face recognition is used to passively survey a crowd like under the secret service pilot program. recent reports also indicate ice has been scanning through millions of americans drivers licenses photos without their knowledge or consent. these troubling reports are a stark reminder that biometric technology should only be used for authorized purposes in a fully transparent manner. data security is another important concern should be friendly, the federal government does not have a great track record securing america's personal data and biometric data in the particular reason and sensitive. , earlier this year cdp subcontractor experienced a significant data breach, including travelers images,
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raising important questions about data security. americans want to know that if the government collects their biometric data they are going to keep it secure from hackers and other bad actors. moreover, the accuracy of certain biometric technology is in question. despite advancement in recent years studies by highly regarded academic institutions have found facial recognition systems, in particular, are not as accurate for women and darker skinned individuals. last july the american civil's universities conducted a test using amazon's facial recognition to facial call recognition, aclu built a database of 25000 publicly available arrest photos recognition. aclu searched the database using
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pictures of every current member of congress and that software incorrectly matched 20 members, 28 members with individuals who had criminal records. although the misidentified members included both democrats and republicans, men and women in a wide range of ages nearly 40% of the false matches were people of color. this is unacceptable. it is not fair to expect certain people in our society to show shoulder a disproportionate burden of the technologies shortcomings. before the government deploys these technologies they must be scrutinized and the american public needs to be given a chance to weigh in and biometrics and facial recognition technology may be a useful homeland security and facilitation tool but as with any tool and has the potential to be misused, especially if it
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falls into the wrong hands. today the committee will hear from federal witnesses on this important topic. i am pleased we have witnesses from customs and border protection, transportation security administration, secret service and the national institute of standards and technology before us. they represent just a few of the agencies involved in a government increasing use of biometric technologies. i look forward to hearing from them about how they are using biometric technology currently in their future plans and what they are doing to address these concerns. as congress, it is our job to ensure they protect the rights of the american people before they move forward. i expect a good conversation toward that end today. and continued oversight by the committee in the future. i ask unanimous consent to enter
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the following news articles and letters into the hearings record. june 10 washington post article entitled u.s. customs and border protection has photos of travelers taken in a data breach. july 7 washington post article entitled fbi, ice find a state driver's license photos a gold mine of facial recognition searches and a july 9 letter from american association of airport executives in a national biometric identity association and a coalition of privacy and civil liberties groups, many of whom were represented in our meeting and briefings last month. without objection, so ordered. the chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full committee the gentleman from alabama, mr. rogers or an opening statement. >> thank you, mr. chairman. biometric technologies have the potential to improve security
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and better enforce our immigration laws. these technologies range from facial recognition to finger prints dna. each of these methods present unique privacy considerations but also clear security benefits. not only does federal law authorize dhs to use biometrics to verify identities but requires cbp to collect biometric entry and exit data for all foreign nationals. this agreement is been long-standing bipartisan mandate. recent technology advancements have finally made a possible dhs primary focus is facial recognition at tsa and cbp checkpoints. travelers are already providing ids to government employees. tso and cbp agents can resume view of several hundred ids in a single shift. as a result fatigue and human error allow people to fake id to slip into our country every day. automating this process with biometric technology will improve transportation security. cbp and tsa have done a number
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on these checkpoint pilots and are working to build accurate, effective and secure systems. dhs should continue to collaborate with its [inaudible] to ensure they are using accurate algorithms to power these systems. biometric systems advance dhs mission beyond transportation security. ice reason conducted a rapid dna pilot program to verify family ties on its up a selfless border. ninety minute test can replace hours of interviews and document reviews. this short pilot found a disturbing number of cases where men who claim to be the biological parent of a child quickly changed their story when asked to sum it dna. the technology does not store dna in a central database in each machine can be purged daily. amid the humanitarian crisis on our border we should be looking at things like rapid dna to protect children from abuse by smugglers who rent to them as a ticket into our country. additionally we should be using
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biometrics to enforce our immigration laws. recent reports have emphasized ice and fbi use of dmv photos to identify criminals. i do not believe anyone has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a government id pho photo. these have long lied on photo abuse to edify suspects known as fugitives. unknown fugitives. effective facial recognition technologies can improve on foresman by reading this process of bias and human error. each of these examples use biometrics as a part of the process and technology cannot and should not replace the final judgment but can speed up the identification verification for millions of people every year. [inaudible] halting biometric programs is an easy way to avoid hard questions. in taking the easy way will not increase the gap between technology and our ability to understand it. dhs should continue to consult
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with experts to develop clear public standards for government biometric systems. dhs leadership should ensure this biometric database are secure and have clear privacy guidelines and congress should continue to educate itself as we are today about the weight we can exploit this technology responsibly. thank you and i yield back. >> thank you. other murmurs of the committee are reminded that on under committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the record. i now work on my panel of witnesses and our first witness is mr. john wegner, deputy secretary commissioner at the u.s. customs and border protection. next we have pfister austin gold, assistant administrator for requirements and capabilities of analysis at the transportation security administration and next we have joseph r, chief technology officer of u.s. secret service
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but finally, we have doctor charles romain, director of the information technology laboratory at the commerce department of national institute of standards and technology. i look forward to hearing from you all today. without objection the witnesses for statement will be inserted into the record and an out ask each witness to summarize his a statement for five minutes beginning with mr. wagoner. >> chairman thompson, ranking member rogers, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the border protection but i like to begin with the 911 commission report were people when people travel internationally they move through channels or portals and may seek to acquire a passport and it may apply for a visa and stop the ticket counters, no one upon arrival they pass through this action points and may transit to navigate to get on an airplane in each of these checkpoints or portals is a screening and a chance to establish people are who they
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say they are and seeking access for their stated purpose. the job protection is shared amongst these many defined checkpoints and by taking advantage of them all we need not depend on any one point in the system to do the whole job but the challenge to see the common problem across agencies and functions and develop a conceptual framework has an effective screening system. their government and indeed in private enterprise agencies, firms at these portals confront [inaudible] and his problems should be addressed systemically, not in an ad hoc fragmented way. these are experts for the 9911 commission report and for cbp reported our current strategy airlines, airports and private vendors and government agencies including dhs were developing their own independent biometric -based games. in other words, exactly what the 911 commission warned against doing. an ad hoc fragmented approach. cbp is develop a plan that includes other authorities and
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response bullies and our mission is set beyond just the biometric entry exit mandate for foreign nationals. we's -- it had to encompass the entire travel solution and that would comport with airports, airlines and cruise lines. why? we don't have a transportation system that allows easy and segmentation of only foreign visitors on international departures and dhs efforts failed on the because they tried to create a standalone stovepipe unintegrated process and as we all know of those plans were cost prohibitive and create massive conduction and significant opposition from the airlines and travel industry. as a result, cbp developed a result that automates the manual facial recognition process that goes on today when a traveler presents a passport to establish their identity. to be clear, it's only comparing the picture taken against photos of previously provided by the u.s. government for international travel.
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this is not a surveillance program. since airlines and good lines are already required by statute to provide the biographic passport details all travelers in the international itineraries cbp simply assembles a small gallery of photos of these expected travelers and these gallery photos are primarily from passports, visas and previously international arrivals. the photo is taken and quickly searched against these distinct galleries validating the biographic data that has already been vetted financial security and law-enforcement concerns and corresponds to the traveler we all expect it to. we do not run the photo take at the airport against any other database or sources of information if it matches that pre- stage gallery photo. of traveler matches a u.s. passport than the new photo taken is deleted so there's no need for us to keep it u.s. citizens are not part of the diametric exit entry tracking system. recognizing the concern rates cbp had existing authorities to determine the citizenship and
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identity of all people traveling internationally and this is a u.s. government responsibility, not the private sector. it's also unlawful for u.s. citizen to travel internationally without a u.s. passport. generally determination of u.s. citizenship is done by comparing the traveler against their passports. again we are civilly automating and using a computer algorithm to enhance this manual facial recognition existing process. as we sat at dulles airport we had to travelers presenting his passwords going to be u.s. citizens but it was found they were foreign nationals and imposters to these documents. as far as our partnerships with the industry holders, cbp developed the standards business were garments that are partners of all agreed to a sunday -- business requirements clearly stipulate they cannot keep the photos. and going back to the ad hoc fragmented approach mentioned earlier are partners are voluntarily agreed to the cbp business requirements. this makes a single simple consistent transfer approach to the use of this technology for international travel.
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cbp has already bound by and in compliance with existing privacy technology and data collection requirements found in the privacy act, e government act and home insecurity act. our private sector partners are basically signing onto the same requirements. we do recognize we can improve the public's understanding of these requirements and the opt out provisions. we published a copy is a privacy impact assessment that required system for databases and rulemaking as commenced but updates into the federal revelations currently circulate within the government. in conclusion, we are solving very difficult challenge bid biometric exit and solving it by focusing on improving the override travel experience in building a token less efficient, secure international travel experience. airlines and cruise lines have recorded reduced 40 times and increased passenger satisfaction using this system. the system will allow us to build a world-class travel system in the u.s. and will be the envy of the world as we try to keep pace with the record-breaking growth in international travel. thank you for the opportunity to
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be here today and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you for your testimony and organize mr. gold for summarize his statements for five minutes. >> good morning, chairman. thank you for inviting me before you today to discuss the future of biometric identities and at the transportation security administration. i'm austin gold, at tsa. i'd like to thank the committee for working with tsa to continue to improve the severity of transportation systems and particularly for your support of our officers in the field. the aviation and transportation security act of 2001 establish tsa and the requirement to screen all passengers who are boarding aircraft. this screening requirement includes passenger identity verification. the act mentions specifically biometrics for this purpose. recognizing the need to possibly identify passengers in an era one fraudulent needs to identification are becoming increasingly prevalent and
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sophisticated tsa is consistently sought new processes and technologies to improve performance while protecting a passengers privacy. biometrics represents such technology. in 2018 tsa released a biometric roadmap which i divide the steps that the agency is taking to test potentially expand biometric identification capability. the roadmap has four major goals. partner with customs and border protection on biometrics for international travelers. operationalize biometrics for tsa pre- check passengers and potentially expand biometrics to additional domestic travelers and develop the infrastructure to support these biometric efforts. consistent with the biometrics roadmap tsa is conducting pilots use facial metrics to ensure passenger identity at certain airports. they've limited scope and duration and are being used to be a valuate biometric technology for tsa use. these policies have been executed in conjecture with customs and border protection and have been supported by
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privacy impact assessments and passengers have the opportunity to not participate. in these cases the standard manual and dedication process is used. last month they observe the pilot currently underway in terminal f in atlanta for international passengers. the captured camera use was an active mode meaning it only captured a facial image after the passenger was in position and the officer activated it. after the committee on government oversight and reform hearing on june 4 tsa click to data in a land not to demonstrate over 99% of travelers chose to use biometric identification. also based on feedback from the hearing we've deployed signage in both spanish and english to ensure passengers who are aware that they are being used in the procedure for opting out. an example of that signage is currently displayed on the monitor. tsa is committed to addressing accuracy, privacy and cypress creek concerns associated with biometric capture and matching. in that regard and pursuant to
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section 1919 of the tsa modernization act dhs will cement a report that includes assessments by tsa and cbp were developed with the sport of the dhs science and technology directorate. the report will address accura accuracy, rates and privacy issues associated with biometric identification. we will also schedule a meeting with privacy groups later this summer to ensure they understand tsa's limited use of biometric identification and the opportunity to address any concerns and as a follow on to their participation tsa's earlier biometric industry day. looking ahead tsa plans to build upon the success of past pilots by conducting additional ones at select locations for limited durations to refine requirements for biometrics use. these pilots will continue to be supported by privacy impact assessments and clearly identified two bilingual airport signage and passengers will always have the opportunity to
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choose not to participate. biometrics represents a unique opportunity for tsa. this capability can increase a security effectiveness for the entire agent aviation system while also increasing checkpoints and enhancing the passengers experience. the ability to increase input while providing accurate i dedication will be essential as passenger lines continue to grow in a proximally 4% annually. in fact, we experience our busiest travel day ever last sunday of the fourth of july weekend when we screen approximate 2.8 million passengers and crew. to close, tsa is systematically assessing biometrics for tsa use and as i dedication process will enhance aviation security while also increasing passenger throughput and making air travel more enjoyable. tsa system will only be used for passenger identification and to direct the passenger to the appropriate level of screening. automating what is currently a manual process. it will not be used for any
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law-enforcement purposes and as always, passengers have the opportunity to not participate. the queue for the opportunity to address this important issue before the committee and i look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you for your testimony. i not recognize [inaudible] to summarize his statement for five minutes. >> good morning, chairman thompson, ranking member rogers and establish members of the committee. i'm joseph to petro, chief technology officer of the united states secret service. i want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and to discuss the secret service use of biometrics and performance of our integrated mission. as previously conveyed to your committee staff the secret service has no vacant concerns about testified in an open hearing on how we as facial recognition technology to enhance our protective mission. therefore my testimony today on that issue will focus on the current facial recognition technology pilot program we are conducting at the white house complex. secret service because he guards our means and methods as to how
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we execute protect the mission. we are aware artificers are causally watching and probing us it could potentially exploit information discussed in this open environment to use against us. it would not be wise or prudent to discuss in a public setting of certain assets, keep abilities and protocols used to carry out our protective mission. however, we would welcome the opportunity to provide this in a closed briefing. biometric tools such as finger print analysis and dna collection are used on a regular basis by the secret service to investigate, locate and sometimes arrest individuals have committed crimes to include offenses related to threats against secret service protect these. we understand the rapid expansion of biometric technology creates a need to balance capabilities with the need to preserve the public's expectation of privacy in the secret service committed to ensuring a balance that protects the rights of all individuals. with respect to finger prints and palm prints the secret service has a long-standing program the place an integral
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part in investigative and personal security processes. our ability to process, store, search and retrieve bigger print and palm print images is an operational necessity. during the course of investigations involving fingerprint and palm print evidence forensic examiners at the secret service utilize a variety of regional and national databases search latent prints for matches to known subjects. with respect to dna dna evidence is one of the most effective i dedication tools available to law enforcement today. advance related to dna technology have been rapid and the secret service remains dedicated to utilizing new allocations to enhance our integrated mission. the secret service collected dna samples along the subjects finger prints as though i dedication and rest process. samples are sent to the fbi and dna testing search and storage in the national dna database. with respect to facial recognition technology the secret service recognizes this technology has the potential to be a powerful tool that may assist and prevent attacks on
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our protect these and there must be an appropriate balance between security and any potential privacy or other constitutional concerns. in any 14 former secretary of home and saturday established an independent protective mission panel to conduct assessments to security at the white house complex. among other important recommendations the panel stated technology systems used on the conflict must always remain on the cutting edge in the secret service must invest in technology, including becoming a driver of research and of elements that may assist in its mission. [inaudible] the secret service is currently working on a facial recognition pilot. the goal of the pilot is to determine whether facial recognition technology could be effectively deployed to enhance or protect the mission. while the pilot started in december 2018 and scheduled to be completed by the end of august 2019 secret service began contemplating the pilot as far back as august 2014. the participants in the pilot or
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circuit service employees who volunteered to take part in this effort and designated white house cameras that are part of the video management system captured volunteers as they moved to various locations around the conflict. [inaudible] facial images are stored when associate with a matched one in the volunteers and at the conclusion of the pilot all images will be purged. the secret service commitment to maintain first amendment protections and other to address personal privacy considerations are central factors behind any future implantation of facial recognition technology. secret service will not adopt new technologies unless they been thoroughly vetted to ensure sufficient privacy protections and data safeguards are in place. in closing, the protection of our nation's leaders is paramount to this agency into the nation. partnerships represented here today both in congress and dhs
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are critical to the success of secret service operations. i thank you for the opportunity to testify concerning the agency's use of these evolving technologies and i look forward to working with you as we move forward. this concludes my testimony but i welcome any questions you have at this time. >> you for your testimony. i now reckon eyes the doctor to summarize his statement for five minutes. >> chairman thompson, ranking member rogers and members of the committee i am doctor chuck -- at the department of commerce national institute of standards and technology. thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the role and biometric standards and testing for facial recognition technology. in the area of biometrics and this working with public and private sectors since the 1960s. we work to prepare and improve the accuracy, quality, usability, interoperability and consistency of identity management systems and ensures
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that the united states interests are correct recognized in the international arena. this research has provided state-of-the-art technology benchmarks and guidance to industry and to u.s. government agencies that depend on biometrics recognition. nist leads national and international consensus standards activities in biometrics such as facial recognition technology but also in cryptography, electronic credentialing, secure network protocols, software and systems reliability and security conformance testing. all the essential to accelerate the involvement and opponent of information and can indication systems that are interruptible, reliable, secure and usable. nist biometric evaluations advanced the technology identifying and reporting gaps and limitations of current biometric petition technologies. this devaluation advanced measurement science providing scientific basis for what to measure and how to measure. this evaluation facilitate
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consensus -based standards by providing quantitative data for scientific sound fit for purpose standards. since 2000 nist face recognition vending system has a vast capabilities of facial recognition algorithms for one to many identification and one to one verification. they expanded the facial recognition evaluations in 2017. nist broaden the scope of his work in this area to understand the upper limits of human capabilities to recommend spaces and how these keep abilities fit into facial recognition applications. historically and currently nist biometric research has assisted the department of homeland security dhs and nist research was used by dhs in its transition from two-ten prints for the former u.s. visit
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program. currently nist is collaborating with dhs, op im on face quality standards and with dhs customs and border patrol on the evaluation of their traveler verification service. nist is working with dhs, customs and border patrol to analyze performance impacts due to image quality and traveler demographics and provide guidance and data that allows cbp to set a threshold given cbp security and facilitation goals are large-scale face recognition of travelers. nist face recognition vendor testing program was established in 2000 provide independent evaluations of both prototype and commercially available facial recognition algorithms. significant progress has been made in algorithm improvements since the program was created. nist is researching how to measure the accuracy of forensic examiners matching identity across different photographs and the study measures face identification accuracy for an international group of
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professional forensic facial examiners working under circumstances proximity real-world casework. the findings published in the proceedings of the national academy of sciences show that examiners and other human face specialists including forensically train facial reviewers and untrained super recognizers were more accurate than the control groups on a challenging test of face identification. it also presented data comparing state-of-the-art facial recognition algorithms with the best human face identifiers. optimal face identification was achieved only when humans and machines collaborated. as with all areas for face recognition rigorous testing and standards development can increase productivity and efficiency in government and industry, expand innovation and competition, broaden opportunities for international trade and serve resources provide consumer benefits and choice, improve the environment
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and promote health and safety. thank you for the testify on this facial recognition and i'm happy to answer any questions you may have. >> thank you very much for your testimony. i now recognize myself for five minutes for questioning. mr. wagoner, you talk a little bit about the biometric exit and entry program and those of us who have been around historically supported that system but in the beginning we talked about that system would only be used for foreigners and based on what i heard you talk about today you've expanded that to taken american citizens. can you explain the reasoning for that?
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>> yes, u.s. citizens are clearly outside the scope of the biometric entry tracking. the technology we are using for the entry exit program we are also using to validate the identity of the u.s. citizen. someone has to do that and someone has to determine who is in scope or out of scope and someone has to validate that the u.s. citizen is the person presenting that u.s. passport. once we take a picture and match it against the passport photo, which is what goes on right now but in a manual review, we use the algorithm to help make that decision and then the photo is discarded because is annoying for us to save it. >> well, what i'm trying to get at is this is a policy that cbp more or less expanded even though congress gave the authority to look at foreigners. >> it helps us in the airlines determine what is in scope and who is out because someone has
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to make that determination at the boarding area and it's unfair to ask airline to do that who is in or out of scope. >> but you see what i'm saying though? did cbp come back and say to congress that were looking at expanding this authority but we need to have a rational congressional approval? >> we don't see this as expanding biometric exit entry authority but is using the authorities we have two determine the citizenship of an individual and entering or departing the u.s. and if we are looking for u.s. citizens departing the u.s. right now because they have a warrant for their arrest we will stop travelers in the jetway and check their passports. >> i understand -- yes, i understand why you're doing it but what i'm getting at is part of this hearing is to make sure that we as members of congress give you the authority you need to do your job but part of what i'm hearing is you kind of take
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your own initiative to do some things beyond the scope of authority that congress gave you. what i'd like for you to do is provide the committee with the written policy by which you are doing this. >> yes, absolutely. >> thank you. doctor, i will try to get this right. you've been advising dhs a lot on some of these things. have you looked at this expansion of authority? >> no, sir. that would be out of nist mission space which is technical evaluation and standards of the algorithms. >> all right. have you looked at the
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collection of data and how the data management is controlled once it is collected? >> no, sir. >> 's director, i'm back to you then. explain to the committee this collection of data that you set this policy gives you. what do you do with it? >> when the picture is taken provided and comes into cbp and we match it against one of our pre- staged gallery photos that is comprised of visas and previous arrivals and it's if it's a foreign national subject to the biometric entry exit mandate that photograph will be sent over to dhs to be stored in the departments positive for a for that information. if it is a u.s. citizen and that photo matches a u.s. passport or permanent resident or someone
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outside of the scope of entry exit that photograph would be held for 12 hours and deleted or purged from our systems. the only reason we hold it for that short period of time is if the system crashes and we have to restore everything. >> are you aware recent subcontracted breach of data? >> yes. >> beg your pardon. >> yes. >> how does that consistent with what you explain to the us? >> what we were doing without subcontractor is we were testing their camera on the us-mexico land border in a standalone pilot system so it wasn't integrated into the main cbp network and we were testing the taking of the photographs and the license plates and ability to take a picture of a person in a vehicle and whether that would be manageable. in this case apparently as far as i understand the contractor physically removed those photographs from the camera
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itself and put it onto their own network which was in breach. cbp network was not hacked. the contractor and what we see is -- what i believe is we remove that in violation of the contract and that is why a relationship has been severed with them and we are conducting an investigation. >> you see my concern about how we control the data we collect. >> absolutely. >> i yield to the ranking member smack thank you, mr. chairman. i will pick up with what the chairman was talking about. my understanding of your response a few woman's go is that it's your belief that you have the existing statutory authority to do what you are doing but you're just exercising new technology in that process but is that an accurate representation? spirit yes. >> doctor, this is been an evolving technology and can you tell us what had been the big changes if anything over the last five years when it comes to facial recognition and
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biometrics in general? >> certainly. the advances have been dramatic according to our testing and the accuracy and capabilities of the newer systems that we have seen in the last few years -- >> what are examples of newer systems. >> the advent of neuro- networks is machine learning capability to do the image analysis or image matching. >> is that ai? >> it is machine learning and artificial intelligence, yes, sir. these are dramatically improved over previous technologies that relied specifically on particular characteristics of faces, for example. with suitable training these systems have dramatically improved the accuracy for the last facial recognition systems.
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now, i want to be clear that testing we've done there is still a very wide range of performance in the testing we've done in the algorithms we've tested but the best ones and we have no direct knowledge of the networks or machine learning because these are submitted to us as black boxes and we don't examine that but in conversations with vendors who have submitted testing that is the understanding we have is that that new machine learning capability that significant advances. >> is this development or advancement in machine learning alleviated in any way the concerns the chairman expressed about facial recognition being less accurate when it comes to females or darker skinned individuals? >> we see because of the
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significant increases in the accuracy across the board the effect of those demographic effects is diminishing and we have a report weird doing an analysis now a comprehensive analysis under the testing we have just done and that report should be out this fall. >> great. when you get these test results do share these with the public and business community? >> we do, sir. we do that through public reporting and also through dissemination with e-mail and other interested parties. >> to publish those guidelines? >> we do. >> excellent. i have a letter here from the security industry's of supporting the use of biometrics and facial recognition and i like to offer it for the record. >> without objection. >> with that i yield back.
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>> thank you. doctor, just so we are clear the report you referenced is not out. >> that is correct. it should be out this fall. >> the data right now is women and dark skinned people are misidentified more than anybody else. >> there are demographic effects that affect age so significant changes in age over time and age, race and sex there are demographic effects quantifying those in a statistically valid manner is what we are -- >> is that women and dark skinned people? >> yes. >> that's what i'm trying to -- thank you. the chair now recognizes [inaudible] for five minutes. >> thank you for bringing up this most important issue. this technology is very interesting because impaired to fingerprints, dna, you give it
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without essentially giving permission. you walk down the corridor and some camera picks you up and picks up your information and it is used without your authority in ways that we don't know about. doctor, you talk about false positives based on ethnicity and other factors that are still the technology has not gotten to the point where it can account for these factors. mr. wagoner, i have a question for you which is under the tha modernization act of last year it requires a public report on the deployment biometric technologies and tsa is a sensory of private accuracy in that report is now late. any thought about when that report can be presented to us spirit it is drafted but just -- >> so at any time.
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>> okay. will that be something that is compared to the doctors report as well that will be coming out very soon? >> moving forward from a tsa perspective we look at any scientific reports and data that we possibly can to ensure that biometric of identifications performing optimally for our cases. >> and so before we get that report let me nonetheless ask you, mr. wagoner, right now the way facial recognition is being used by your department, is this effecting unduly burdening foreign travelers, race, gender, nationality? smack no, we are not seen and review of our data we are not seen any significant error rates that are attributable to a specific demographic. that is why we have also partnered with nist to come in and review our data and help us make sure. >> but statistically you have
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mr. -- who is reviewing this data? [inaudible conversations] >> so that it's not inversely infecting, use and tourism and that's a big part of our economy. i want to make sure were not having false negatives. >> is having a beneficial effect because it's allowing airlines and cruise lines to board and onboard people quicker. >> excellent and i just want to make sure we see that. >> passenger experiences are being improved. were not just seen a noticeable discrepancies in that but we partner with nist throughout the summer and fall we will be examining our data very closely to make sure that we not unduly hurting people of a specific demographic. >> i'm glad to hear your enthusiastic positive answer that it is not unburdening unduly some of those travelers. >> exactly.
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ronald reagan said we have to trust but verify, too. i look forward to seeing your data on that and make sure we it. in terms of the data, purging of the data once you are using it, what system do you have two audit to make sure the data is purged in a timely manner? you mentioned one of your subcontractors had a breach and that information is somewhere out there and you said that is the reason you terminated the contract and yet for me when that information gets out they are a contract is not enough of a -- it's not a deterrent to make sure that those breaches and that data is purged in a timely manner. is it doing anything to be shortly tying up that part of your system? >> the subcontractor makes a subsequent action depending on the result. >> [inaudible] >> potentially depending on what the investigation and our office a professional response bullies investigating this with the id
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is depending on circumstances and how the data was taken and the intentions and why and how it was used and it put ten chili could be criminal actions. >> any of those data breaches would you report those two and under what kind do you take to say this purged or this breach happened? >> they are supposed to report it to us almost immediately. we do report it to congress if it meets a certain threshold. and then internally -- >> what threshold would that be? >> i don't know offhand. >> i'd like to look at that closer if you could because clearly -- is that your threshold, size of the breach, what's the threshold? >> i believe it's 100,000 but i will have to get back to you on that spirit mr. chairman, i'm out of time but i think it's important these breaches be
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reported immediately to congress. >> i agree. mr. chairman i'm out of time so i yield. >> the chair and organizes the chairman from texas for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. we all want to protect civil liberties and privacy and when someone is in the public domain as i understood and law school there is no expectation of privacy in this technology in my judgment has really protected the nation from drug smugglers, gang members and potential terrorists. i induced bill which was a biometric transnational migration program and last congress passed unanimously out of this committee in the past on the house floor 272-119 and now it's being held up. i'd like to examine what the
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effect of not authorizing this program would have. mr. wagoner, could you tell me what successes that has had a particularly when it comes to individuals coming from other parts of the world that are known and basically countries of special interests, special interest aliens or suspected terrorists coming across up through latin america into the united states. >> it's administered by ice in a program we work with their foreign to parts to utilize finger print technology to take fingerprints of exactly those populations users reference as a transit through certain countries and central america making their way on up through mexico to the u.s. so if they show up in central american
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country the foreign authorities will use the bitmap program to collect the passport information and their fingerprints. when that person ultimately shows up at our southwest border and has mysteriously lost their passport we are able to take their fingerprints and match it back up with that previous encounter in central america to sufficiently identify who that person is. >> is it true that through that journey while the names and identities have been changed their biometrics do not change? >> correct. >> and that is the best way to identify through who this person is. >> correct. >> can you in the setting and i don't know if it's possible to give us some indication of a number of the special interest aliens that have been stopped in this program? and also, known or suspected terrorists. >> i'll have to get back to you
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on that. i don't have any today smack is it's in a vacant? >> it is significant. it's an absolute vulnerability that a terrorist can exploit and is a vulnerability we need to address. >> doctor, i guess from what i'm hearing from you is that we don't want to get this wrong and i think ms. watson: talked about herself being possibly in this pool of candidates that could get somehow mischaracterized. tell us where are we right now with this technology? >> how accurate is it? the very best algorithms we tested the most recently is false negative rates that are extremely low and the accuracy and range into for the best algorithms in a one to many match range into the 99.7 range.
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>> 99.7% accuracy. that is pretty good. >> i beg your pardon. >> that's a pretty good number. >> from a scientific standard we report the number and the judgment on what is a pretty good number is up to the policymakers but it's a high number for me. >> it's very hybrid you are a scientist and i am not but that sounds high for me. it's always a balance in this committee and when we deal with security issues and we deal with privacy and civil liberties and we always have to balance these as americans and it's important that we balance those factors but i would not want to throw the baby out with the bathwater. the bitmap program is externally successful and has stopped bad actors from coming into the united states and mr. chairman, ranking member, i hope this committee we can still advance that authorization and bill
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through this congress because it's important to protect the american people and one of the most important responsibilities we have as members of congress. with that, i yield back. >> thank you very much. the chair now recognizes the gentle lady from new mexico for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. last month they announced that is data breach with some of the subcontractors operating at ports of entry along the southern border and as a result thousands of license plate numbers and images of drivers were taken by facial recognition technology were compromised. i represent multiple border towns where they cross back and forth into mexico and jobs, shopping, tourism, medicine and i also with in the interior of the district there are border checkpoints and when they're operating that same information
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is being taken, license plates and facial and pictures of people's faces. we want to make sure that the citizens data is secure. where their audits into the subcontractors system prior to the hack? >> i'm not aware of that. i don't know. i will have to check. >> could you get back to us on that, please? that these private subcontractors have the authority to store those u.s. citizens data? >> they did not have the authority to have the pictures taken by the camera from what i understand. >> so not even to strike but did not have the authority to take any pictures of faces. >> they had the authority to take them but did not have the authority to take it off the camera and put it onto their own network which is apparently what happened. >> he did. okay. what protocol did cbp have in place to oversee contractor and subcontractor data security practices?
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>> i mean, they go through a background check, vetted, cleared and they are trained on use of the systems that they will work on. as far as having the audit control on -- this was a standalone pilot so outside of our normal network and we apparently did not have the same level of controls and audit capabilities on that because it was standalone closed system. those are things being put into place now on all those systems to make sure that you can't connect to a portable media drive on that and extract information. our main network is protocols on them but we do not have this system. >> did you say those are in place now and we corrected -- >> but into place now. >> could you follow-up and let us know when they are in place. >> absolutely. >> thank you. with all pilot programs because
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i remember going through the border checkpoints and being told this is a pilot so don't worry about it yet. but that is actually when we need to make sure that we are operating it correctly. >> agree. >> i want to switch now to congressional authorization. ... which allows us to consider any information or evidence pertaining to the person crossing the border and
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establishing their u.s. citizenship. so a person will present the use passport to us. we can look at it, annually review, as questioned how the data. >> i want to switch direction quickly. i do some of that was covered so appreciate it. but what to switch to the federal agencies that are scanning through u.s. citizens drivers licenses and i.c.e. is one of those potentially identified for scanning business databases. for what purposes are your components attempting to our successful accessing state drivers license databases in any way? >> so for the biometric program where discussing with not using drivers license information. we do use drivers license information from the states that it entered into agreements with us where their drivers license also substitutes for passport to cross the border. i think we have about five u.s.
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states and maybe four canadian provinces that it entered into written agreements with us to mark the citizenship of the drivers license holder on the document so they can cross the border without having to go to the passport that serves inlet of the passport. >> does the dmv require speedy when the person crosses the border our agreement allows us to verify with them that is a valid license and to retrieve the photo from that so we can see who it belongs to. we also have other law enforcement access into biographic drivers license we might use it along for the context. it's very common for law-enforcement agencies to access. >> thank you, mr. wagner. >> thank you very much. the chair recognizes the gentleman from new york mr. katko for five minutes. >> thank you all for being here today. just take a step back for a
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moment. as a federal prosecutor of 20 years routine again with homicides and matters of violent crime, some of the tools and little box that i had were fingerprints at first and later dna. when they both came online at first there were concerns about how they were to be used. now they are becoming more mainstream. i hope and pray the same with facial recognition. all three have the capability not only of helping us solve crimes but also making sure that crimes are not committed. but even something we don't think about enough is exonerating people or falsely accused. look what the dna system has done for people falsely accused in prisons. that's been a remarkable breath of fresh air. my concern is that with the efficacy of using it. my concern is that we get it right, like we've done with think fingerprints and doing with dna. my questions focus on the
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accuracy and the things we need to do to make it better. my colleagues have asked great questions about the use of it and extent of use and we will have to have more discussions about that. i'm very concerned about the accuracy. that was a big thing with dna starting out and now dna is the accuracy of the testing is amazing at its almost, it's dispositive almost all the time. i don't think we're there yet with facial recognition. i would like to get there. i'd like to ask mr. rowe mine a couple of questions. you talked about the fact you are charged with examining the gas and limitations of certain things including facial recognition. what do you see is the gaps and limitations right now? >> the principal gaps and limitations that we see involve a couple of things. one is image quality. it's still true garbage in garbage out for software systems. and so image quality has a huge
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impact. as i said i'll have a report on demographics and there are certain issues associated with demographic effects. that's particularly true when you're trying to identify someone when you have a reference image that's maybe ten, 20 years earlier than the person you are trying to identify. that can be a big challenge. similarly if someone has been injured or there's some obscuring of the face for other reasons, that can have a challenge. images that are taken non-cooperatively, and it don't mean uncooperative. i mean where someone is not standing still looking at the camera with the intent of registering an image. if you're taking an image through a windshield, for example, or if you are taking an image of someone who's walking and not facing the camera, those can have significant impacts on the accuracy and ability of these systems to do
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identification. >> what can we do to improve that portion of it? >> the industry continues to make advances. i mentioned the emergence of -- i think we don't know what we don't know coming down the pipe but i think there continue to be improvements that we see in our testing over time, so the industry is making great strides. >> you mentioned also when response to question from one of my colleagues that the demographic effects of facial recognition software diminishing. could you expound on that and what you mean by that? you say it's 99.7% accurate but is probably not 99.7% 99.7% ace for certain segments, for example, dark skinned females. i want to know what you doing to make the better and how we can make it stronger. >> that's correct. from nist perspective what we do
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to make things better is provide an evaluation capability. so we're not doing any training -- >> that's understood. >> however, i would say that any time the overall performance of the system improves as dramatically as facial recognition has improved over the last five to six years, the compression, the effect of differences in demographics shrinks as well. and the report later once we finish our analysis, the report the concept in the fall will speedy that sort of answers my question but you will admit certain demographics have disproportionate error rate. you say it's improved. how much has it improved? >> we haven't finished the analysis yet so i'm not able to answer the question currently. the report will come out in the fall. i will say that it is unlikely that we will ever achieve a
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point where every single demographic is identical in performance across the board, whether that's age, race or sex. but we want to know just exactly how much the difference is. >> this report will tito that when it comes. >> was yes, sir. >> i yield back. >> we all afford to the report, i assure you. chair now recognizes the gentleman from illinois, ms. underwood. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. mr. gould, of revenue repret illinois 14th district will be driving our two to get to major airport in chicago so our community is interested in learning more about the technologies that can potentially improve security at airports while still reducing the flyers wait time. before intimating any new technologies like biometric screening it's important crucial even to make sure they are proven to be effective, reliable and fair. can you run to the ways in which tsa is to employing i metric screening checkpoint? >> yes, ma'am. currently we only use biometrics
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technology in the international terminal terminal f and atlanta and that's on a pilot basis. our approach to biometrics implication tsa is extremely deliberative. we want to understand how the technology works, how it can improve identity verification for the traveling public and how it can approve the passenger experience. going back to the discussion on image quality that happened before, we were in a fortunate case at tsa in that we really control the environment at our checkpoint so we can ensure optimal lighting and optimal distance from the camera to look at the highest quality images possible for biometric matching. for the pilot and atlanta we are matched up with cbp using their tedious system and we extremely high match rates there. moving forward we will look to pilot one to one matching capability where a traveler will provide a credential. that credentials would be assessed by our cat machine and
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it will return a match rate on whether not the face that's been captured matches the face that's embedded in that credential. in that scenario no information even leads the checkpoint and nothing is written on the camera. so that some of the things were looking at, and i believe when we're through with these pilots that we're doing for biometric development, we will see we cannot only improve passenger security not also make it a much more positive expense for the traveling public by reducing wait times. >> how are the airports and airlines using the biometric security screening technology beyond tsa checkpoints, and what of the uses or plans for the future? >> right now i can comment on what we're doing in atlanta with delta airlines. in atlanta the delta airlines kiosk use our metric at unification when a passenger checks into make sure, if they choose to do so to make sure the person is the person who is ticketed on that particular
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flight. tsa has oversight of the backdrop to ensure passengers are possibly matched two bags in the international, for international travel. delta air lines has us to get a program amendment we have granted them to use biometric technology to do that matching at the backdrop. we use it at our checkpoint in atlanta. and then it's used at the exit point at the gate. >> and so is that the only specific agreement with an airport or a line that tsa has to govern the use of biometrics? >> right now the security program and then we have granted delta for the limited use only and atlanta is the only formal agreement we've entered into with the airlines. >> and so does tsa have any role in approving airport and airline uses of biometric technology? >> we have roles in approving the use of biometric technology where tsa has equities. and again i go back to say that would be the checkpoint and the
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backdrop. if an airline wanted to use biometrics at the backdrop to possibly match that traveler to that bag, they would have to request a security amendment and we would have to issue it. >> as use of biometric data continues to expand, illinoisans understand have a lot of questions about how such extensive personal data is used and stored as i'd like to open this question up to the panel. under what circumstances do your components collect biometric data on u.s. citizens? we can start with mr. wagner. >> that we collect in your citizens? >> yes, sir. >> we are temporarily holding it while we validate that it corresponds to the passport that person is presenting and then it is purged after 12 hours from our system. >> okay. >> from a tsa perspective we are leveraging photographs that travelers have provided to facilitate travel like passport photographs. when we captured image at the checkpoint it is not retained in the camera. once the image is encrypted and
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transmitted we only get back the match result. >> okay. >> secret service collects fingerprints, palma prince, mugshots, other identifying information on individual so we arrested as part of our criminal investigations. >> but not as part of regular screen? >> pardon. >> what you don't obtain the data as part of bigger screen? >> that's correct. >> you don't sort? >> no. we use metal detectors, x-rays and things like that. >> and finger prints. >> we do not use sentiments at the white house. we don't scan for that. >> great. >> the data that we have is sequestered in servers that are airgap. they are not connected to the internet, in a locked door that daschle and the director of the laboratory and i'm not permitted to go into the room without being escorted. so it's very tightly controlled. >> thank you so much.
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i yield back. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from north carolina, mr. walker. >> thank you, mr. chairman. 99.7%, that's pretty good, or about ironically the same on-base percentage the says -- cedric richmond has in baseball but that's another topic. a problem, not a topic. i do have a question for you, doctor wrote my. how do you ensure, as it mr. underwood was approaching this, how do you ensure the biometric data collected is a secured? let me unpack more. is the biometric identifier connected directly to other possibly sensitive or private information about the person? >> the data that we have on facial recognition is not connected to identifying information, and so i'll have to double check the exact features there. >> can you do that for us and report back?
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so you're saying the information you have collected is secured? >> the information we are collecting, we don't collect information. we obtain it from our partners for the purposes of evaluation only, and we secure that in, it's in a secure server. >> you use the word obtained as the click. collector have you ever had a breach? >> no. >> question for the panel. keep it about ten to 15 seconds. that way we can get everybody in. can you elaborate to more on these programs that of a a successful, specifically on the ones identifying facial recognition in any of the biometric technologies? if you can elaborate either of the success or adding security benefits or expediting, passenger. >> we will start with mr. wagne. >> sure. it gives us the ability to validate a persons biographical identity within two to three seconds with having to handle the physical passport.
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it allows us to link it up in a secure way so the person we did all her gnashed gertie checks against at tsa, checks against international flights corresponds to the person who is in front of us. >> mr. gould. >> we do data collection on the number of people that or choose not to buy biometric identification at a checkpoint and there it was less than 1%. he will seem to enjoy. the traveling public moves to the checkpoint very rapidly and the best part of his we enhance identity verification thereby enhancing security. >> mr. dipietro, is that true at all. >> was not quite happily we are piloting septic lg arena middle of the test of the we haven't compiled data. test will finish up at the end of august and will have a chance to go through and review the data and then we will draw some conclusions but at this point we are still in the middle of the test. >> dr. romine, anything there? >> no, sir. >> went on the pelican, based on the successes specifically, what
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you see the use biometric technologies expanding interspecific agency if it be on a roll of the pilot program? >> it will significantly transform the arrivals and departures on international travel and all our different environment, arid land and sea, and can really build -- air -- a secure process for us to do that. >> mr. gould? >> for us will build on the success over in russia partnership with cbp that we're doing in atlanta to other international travel locations. we will look to use the cbp system for our trusted travel population to do one to view i wanted many matching for biometrics purposes at our checkpoints. really the next step will look yet is the one-to-one matching i mentioned before where a traveler can approach the checkpoint, provider credential, have the cat machine credential
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authentication technology machine, assess the image embedded in that credential and then match it to photograph that's taken right there. >> mr. dipietro do you ever share your information with local or state governments? >> information with respect to think of it? >> let me back up and asked this question because i think i time to get it in. ms. underwood asked a couple of questions. there seems to be a touch of hesitancy someone to follow. the data that you collect, is it of a collective without subjects being aware? >> no, sir. >> so information you to collect, fingerprints, do you ever share that with state or local -- >> i have to check with our lab director and get back to you. >> are usually with any circumstances that you have in the past? >> i'm the secret service is chief technology officer. i work more on the internet a technical side. i would have to get with a forensic service division internet. >> yield back. >> just let me comment.
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in a classified setting we will ask the question again of the data collected that people don't know because i think there is information being collected in the pilot at the white house that is different from the answer, plan to be clarified on that issue. the chair recognizes the gentlelady from new york for five minutes, ms. clarke. >> thank you, mr. chairman. some would say let's not make when it comes to national security, let's not make the perfect be the enemy of the good. but, unfortunately, the good is not good enough when bias is baked into the algorithms that create false positives. the stakes are far too high but individuals and to call so, particularly for women and people of color.
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the widescale deployment of facial recognition technology will have profound implications on privacy. we must look before was midday. it is imperative that congress impose safeguards against mission creep and ensure algorithms did not make the way into widespread use. as a new yorker, one to list just miles away from ground zero, national security is crucially important, and i know that firsthand. i facial recognition technology that routinely miss identifies women and people of color don't make us safer. they make us less safe. using this technology up i.c.e. target immigrant for deportation doesn't protect us from terrorism. it terrorizes hard-working families. and when cbp uses these technologies on u.s. citizens traveling abroad without providing a transparent opt out process, that's potentially a lawsuit. we've seen what happens when
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technology is widely deployed before congress can't impose meaningful safeguards. let's not make the same mistake with facial recognition technology. we have a contractor who has a breach and we know that we are seeing more use of video, deep fakes if you will. that information gets in hand of an adversary overseas and they want to create a disruption in our nation. all you have to do is take that information, create a video from it and bam, we already into a really bad situation. i don't know if we're looking at the interconnectedness of all of these technologies, particularly because they are all evolving. i'm very concerned about the lack of specificity that we have at this stage. so my question is about accuracy, mr. wagner. cdt boasts that the financial recognition algorithm it uses is able to make a match of 98 or
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99% of the time, , but that statistic does not include instances were facial recognition technologies are able to capture a high-quality image due to human error, poor lighting or other environmental factors. recent testing by the dhs science and technology director has shown that when david capture factors are included, the rate increases to around 10% of errors. do you dispute the findings? >> no. >> okay. and why do cbp insist on tracking a bogus statistic ignores passengers who cannot be photographed well enough by the system to be matched? >> what we're accounting for is if we take a photograph that's of sufficient quality, , are we able to match it? >> if? >> that's great. do we need -- do we need to know
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where capturing 100% of those photographs that we can then match that the 90-90%, to accet statistics that are both valid to a. >> there's also the cost of the false positive. that individual that is detained for whatever reason because there is a false positive. the of that person health, the cost of that persons will become perhaps there's a commerce concern and fall. i'm concerned about the lack of accuracy. i'm very concerned about -- >> a person doesn't match the four industries, they present a passport passport as they are doing today. >> excuse me? >> if a person doesn't match a photograph, december present their speed is when you're trying to match them at the don't match what happens the individual? >> they present the boarding pass and the passport, and it's manually reviewed at the point in time, just as happens today. >> and those people are not eating anyway? they're not asked to step aside,
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the process did not delay the per. >> was no. they just show the passport. >> okay. i hope that's the case. will cbp commit to tracking a more meaningful statistic that captures usefulness and accuracy of the full facial recognition process, including the rate at which the system fails to capture a high-quality image? >> we do track those rates. we track what we call the gallery completion rate. we are never going to have 100% of account because not everybody needs a passport to travel. >> including the images that are not high-quality, those that fail to meet your standards? >> right. we want to build it so the camera will take a high-quality photographs. >> i know that's what you want to do but are you keeping statistics on what doesn't meet that standard? >> we are, quite. >> very well. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> the chair recognizes the ranking member. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i just want to clarify what the secret service, information that
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you collected in this pilot program you talked about earlier, is it my understanding that everybody that's in that are employees of the secret service and they volunteered to be in it? >> that's correct. maybe if i can ask point how we doing the pilot that might help. >> and also when went to the pt start? >> so we publish pih back in november, began in december, run through august. we did it on purpose. we wanted it to go from winter into the summer because of the different items people where so that we had a good at a time where are assessing it. maybe if i just explained a bit of how the pilots work and that might help explain this for you. the persistence of the pilot or secrets of the boys volunteered to take part in this effort. the facial images are stored when an associate match is recognized on individual, on one apologist. at the conclusion come all that information will be deleted.
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we're using our current cctv system video management system we have at the white house. you could imagine you got a similar system appear on capitol hill you use for cctv surveillance. we are using those video feeds and we're trying to match the individuals that are in the pilot, the volunteers, to the people we are seeing in the scammers. if there's no match, there's no record or if it is a match addenda is a record. that will be retained until the end of the pilot and then that information would be deleted at the conclusion of the pilot. >> thank you. but i think the question was, if you are collecting data, caption data, and you said no. my question is whether it's a volunteer or a person walking the street, you are collecting data? >> that is correct. >> the chair now recognizes the gentleman from louisiana,
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mr. higgins. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director romine, would you describe biotech biometric technology and facial recognition technology as designed to work with trained agents? in other words, man and machine working together just as nist is working towards? >> we're agnostic as to whether that is they use case or not but our testing has verified that indicates official recognition, the best algorithms and the best human face recognizers, the trained face recognizes -- >> i think of a point that out in your testimony. >> yes. >> nist has researched endeavor to measure the accuracy of forensics examiners including forensically trained racial reviewers. >> that's correct. >> your statement stated that
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presented data comparing state-of-the-art facial recognition algorithms with the best human face identifiers, the best machines performed in the range of the best performing humans. >> that's correct. >> who were professional they shall examiners. but you went on to state that optimal face identification was achieved only when humans and machines collaborated. is that an accurate assessment? >> that is correct. >> let me ask commissioner wagner, , is or ever an arrest made or denial to travel based solely on facial recognition technology? >> no. >> thank you. the facial recognition technology gets let's call it a hit, a high probability based on algorithms that a particular traveler is a person of interest. then an agent looks into the documentation further and has personal interaction with that
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individual, which either clears the individual for travel or prompts further and deeper investigation, is that >> yes, that is correct. >> just to clarify for america watching, this technology is being used to enhance the efficiency and the speed by which the trained agents can move travelers through screening points, is that correct? >> yes. >> thank you for clarifying that. is the general consensus amongst travelers and airlines that this technology is a good idea, it's working well? >> i believe so, yes. >> thank you for clarifying that. let me jump into your data breach, a concern for all of us regardless of which side of the aisle we're on. who reported that breach? did they self-report or was it discovered? how was it discovered? who reported it?
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>> i believe we asked them about it. >> and how much time went by? >> a significant amount of time. i need to verify this but my recollection seems to be that we asked them if in of our data was included in it, and they came back and said yes. >> and not to put you on the spot here, my brother, but i'm going to. when you say an amount of time, a pretty cynical about a time, are you talking days, weeks, months? >> i have that answer. let me look for that and i will come back to you. >> okay. we would like to know that because the contract was referred to subsequently terminated and we would like very much to know what the course of events were regarding, what was the timeline here with this contractor from the time
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the breach happened to the time it was discovered and inquired about an reported and verified? and then how much time before that contract was terminated? and i believe i'd like to know and perhaps my colleagues would like to know if that contractor is to on a contracting list. if that contract was terminated with that contractor, but are they still at the bidding on of the contracts? i believe we would like to know that. commissioner wagner, you have a tremendous job to do, you gentlemen. thank you for your service, all of you. it's important to the members of this committee to get things right. many ports of entry particularly land ports face unique challenges in limiting the biometric entry-exit system. can you just share with us, this is my final question, what are the primary challenges and how
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can we help. >> was the primary challenge was finding a way to intimate this into a travel system that wasn't designed to support the collection biometrics on only a segment of the traveling public. and unlike europe and asia and other places, we don't have departure controls. you don't see see a cbp officeo get your passport stamped to leave the trend. we've never restricted departure like that. with each individual flight you your citizens and permanent residents and visitors, so how do you sift and sort and differentiate between who's in scope out the scope of the biometric exit requirement? what technology do used to collect that biometric, and how to ensure a way that is not going to create gridlock when we get to it on how to do that? >> that's exactly what you're working to right now, correct? >> we found a way to use facial recognition to compare people against data they've already provide any convenient, quick and accurate way that we can't
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apply to all travelers using different authorities and healthy airlines board the planes even faster. >> thank you for the answer. my time has expired, mr. chairan. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from new jersey for five minutes, ms. watson coleman. >> into mr. chairman. thank you, gentlemen for your testimony. this is really very important issue for us. we want to be safe and secure but we also want to recognize that our privacy is a private and we have guarantees under the constitution and we are not in any way infringing upon that. mr. wagner, i'd like to ask you a question. i understand the department has sent an interim final rule to omb that would expand cbp's election of biometric data, something we obviously express d tremendous interest in. the committee is eager to learn as much as possible about what you intend with this one wife you haven't pursued a more transparent and deliberative process.
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what does this interim final rule entail? how does it address cbp's collection of biometric data on your citizens? and why did you choose this closed process rather than providing notice and allowing public comment? >> there several pieces of rulemaking under way. there's an interim final rule that's drafted and a circulating through the government for comment. there's also a notice of proposed rulemaking on other parts of what we like to propose to do. we are evaluating all of those right now based on a lot of comments we've received back from within the government. we may take a different approach. there are regulations in place already know concerning biometric exit that it been in place that we're utilizing today. through the privacy impact assessments, we have explained in great detail come in greater detail than would be in the regulation probably how the
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program operates and what exactly happens with it. that's publicly available. >> are you having conversation with stakeholders? >> absolutely. i personally done meetings with two contributed to the east coast and west coast with the privacy community and all the privacy representatives. we are talk with all of our travel and tourism stakeholders. there's vehement support behind this in the travel and tourism arena. of course we are talking with the airlines and airports and our government partners as well. >> why is it that i'm asking you this question about why the committee doesn't have the information it needs if these discussions have been in the public realm? why am i asking you about this process? what part of this process its discretion about why you've chosen to do it in a more closed way as opposed to more transparent way? or am i i just misunderstanding and just misstating?
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what part of your consideration, your rulemaking request, your request to omb don't fit this sort of public sharing? >> i'm not sure i understand the question. >> well, according to the information that i was given, the department has sent an interim final report to omb, and this interim report has to do with expanding your collection of biometric data and that the process that you all are using in keeping with omb has been a close process. what does that mean? >> so there's certain provisions that would be in the interim final rule that if omb were to approve it, we could publish that in the federal registry and still except comments i believe
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on that. but the rule goes into effect. really that -- >> what is the problem with there being a a more open procs now? >> we are doing that, too, for the other provisions. >> what about the provisions -- i specifically ask about the provisions that you're not doing it on. what is the reason for that? >> enough. >> all right. so we have a number of proposals, rulemaking proposals, right? >> correct. >> part of this, the department has sent a file, an interim final rule to omb, and in this particular rule it deals with the expansion of cbp's collection of biometric data. the understanding that i been given is that the process that you are engaging in is a close
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process. and we don't have, the committee doesn't have the benefit of what is being considered, what you're asking for. instead, you've used another process that forecloses that opportunity pixel on asking why would you choose to do that? what is it that you're asking for that you can't share in the asking, not after the fact? >> well -- >> or is or not such a thing and we're just completely uninformed? >> no, it's just different portion of the rulemaking process, and before the rule is even finalize it would be premature to talk about what's in it or what's not in it because that is going to change race on the feedback and our discussions. it is going to change. >> but you do that on other rulemaking request but not on this specific area. >> we will be publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking with anything that would fall within those parameters.
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>> i think the point is, is at this point the public has no input in this process as far as we understand. >> yeah. >> the rulemaking process. normally, the notice rulemaking, you push it out and you receive comment. >> we will do notice of proposed rulemaking was to solicit that feedback. >> you will? >> we will. >> okay. >> we finally got to where -- okay. >> me i just have 30 seconds since you so generously used -- >> make it an additional 30 seconds. >> i'm sort of curious about the secret service pilot project and want to understand. i understand that using this this pilot project now with volunteer service agents so that when they are walking, you collect information, if it matches it works. are you incidentally collecting
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other information on people who are not part of this voluntary effort? at it so, what are you doing with those sort of pictures that you capture? >> the cameras that we're using as part of this plan are part of the white house video management system. that's the cctv system that records videos from all the cameras around the complex. we retain the data for 30 days as part of cctv process. as were going through and identifying those volunteers that are in there, that record is saved and we say that and we're going to value with that until the end of the process. >> but you do have the opportunity to review other faces that you're capturing that are in the vicinity, torres, demonstrators, whatever? >> it would be like false positive, , some who was in her pilot. that image would be retained. >> we are concerned what happens -- >> part of, we will have briefing and we will have a lot of those questions. >> thank you, thank you for extension of time and thank you
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very much. >> thank you. the chair recognizes the gentlelady from arizona, , ms. lesko, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first if you don't mind i would like to you a few seconds to my colleague mr. higgins. >> five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i ask unanimous consent to him into the record two op-ed articles in support of law enforcement application of biometric technology. the first is from new york city police commissioner james o'neill and the second is a managing director of the chertoff group, lee care. >> without objection. >> the gentle it is recognized for the additional time. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i, too, ask unanimous consent to enter into the record three letters expressing support for the effective and responsible use of biometrics i.t. is the ncbd. these letters are from airlines for america, the international air transport association, and the global business travel association. >> without objection. >> thank you.
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all my questions, mr. chairan, and members, are for mr. gould. my first question, mr. gould, is a pilot program that you have working with delta down in atlanta, where do you get the photos from? is it off in? do you share, get the database of passports from cbp? >> yes-men. we use cbp's tvs matching service for that. they have access to state department photos for the back in the matching and then it is an opt in program. passengers have the opportunity to choose whether to present biometric identification using facial capture or to present a credential. we see a very high rate of people choosing to provide the facial image. >> okay. and just so that i understand, where do you ask them if you want their photo taken? >> there are signs throughout the checkpoint area that say
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we're piloting this technology and that should you choose not to participate, please let the tso, the officer, no. as you approach the travel document checker position, there's an officer there and the officer will say, do you choose to provide biometric identity? in which case if the passenger says yes, they are directed to stand in in a specific locatior the facial capture. there's interaction with officer at that point. >> thank you. that's very informative. my next question is due to i i guess the success of cbp's use of biometrics, and i think this technology is going to happen. i do agree with other members of we need to make sure that we have privacy and security in it, of course, but are you going to use any of the -- is tsa planning at looking at how they can work i guess with cbp and
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their success in order to implement it in more airports? >> yes, absolutely. that's the reason we're doing the pilot and lad is to understand that interaction between us and cbp tvs system and what benefit that system brings to the tsa checkpoint in debt unification verification process. >> good. i'm glad you're working on it and hopefully we can get a fairly fast turnaround. i probably would be interested in going and seeing what you're doing in atlanta myself. also mr. gould, are you planning on using this or have you thought of using biometric technology, or did you come for the employees, the airport employees? >> yes, ma'am. we are considering using biometric identification processes for employees as well. >> thank you. the reason i ask that is because from some of our briefings,, hearings, i think we've been concerned about insider type threats. i think what happened then, what
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was a, washington airport? i can't remember where an employee took a plane and -- seattle, washington, and so with baggage handlers and those types of things, and so it seems to me that it would be logical that were used biometric screening for the employees themselves. >> yes, ma'am, that a certain something we will be looking at. >> thank you and i yield back my time. >> thank you. >> thank you. we now recognize the gentlelady from texas for five minutes for questioning. >> mr. chairan, thank you very much but i want to start off by asking unanimous consent to put into the record and op-ed like houston chronicle real abuses at the border, squalid conditions for detained migrants passing thence consent. >> without objection. >> asked in instance it views a day article acting dhs defense
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or condition. >> without objection assonance consent to put it to record the ig inspectors report dated july 2, 2019. >> without objection. >> and and i asked to put into e record two articles of put them together, found both in the nuke times and in the houston chronicle, "new york times," excuse me. "new york times", i i use facil recognition to my state driver's license and then article that says feds scan driver's license photo for facial recognition goldmine. that's monday july 8 and other is july 7. asking ends consent. >> without objection. >> first of all of me say to all of you let me thank you for your service to the nation. i have had the privilege of serving on this committee for a very, very long time.
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let me be very clear that i have to speak with great eye and dismay for the behavior of individual at the border and the refusal of the department, security to cooperate with members of congress. i want to indicate that the $4.6 billion that was given last week and the whining that went on for a period of time to blame congress was a misrepresentation to the american people, because we understand that reprogramming of dollars can happen at the drop of a hat. the reason i say that is that as a go into my question regarding these facial recognition, unless the answer change from the time i was here, i understand there is no statutory legislation only thing that is given that authority. if you look for it may go at that question deeply but i just quickly say that we will not be able to tolerate, we respect you as servants of the nation. it is unfortunate that very
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destructive policies of this administration has tainted very fine american servants of the people. and that's what happened because when you don't have toothpaste and a toothbrush and you have a truckload of that material on nonprofits like the conscience presence that i met at the border station one and also clint baking to be of help, and you're telling the american people there's no helping you, i think it's a sad commentary. so i just want to make sure you are aware of my dismay that we will not be tolerating it and in this benefit will not be tolerate and the accusations against members will not be tolerated if vice president heads can go in and look after it's cleaned up, spake in spain, the members with oversight responsibility should be able to go in and look. >> understood. >> i would appreciate if the report that back to the secretary. >> i will. >> let me say to the gentleman from tsa, i'm interested in you
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looking into the treatment of crystal lynette sonia and mohammed -- we will give you information about april 14 in the land airport. so let me start with mr. wagner. this is horrific, the information regarding the use of these, and my earlier information was that you know the people of color and women,, so i did it twice, are unfortunately targeted the most. in the article it says agents with the fbi and i.c.e. have turned state driver's license databases recognition into a goldmine scheme to hundreds of millions of american voters without their knowledge or consent. in addition it says that the state department motor vehicle databases into the bedrock of on president surveillance in infrastructure. i want to submit it to record an article on amazon that says
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amazon facial recognition -- facial recordation mistakenly confuse 28 congress presses with known criminals. i will not put the congressperson sang in the record but i think most of us would like not to be known as known criminals. my question -- >> without objection. >> to both of you is, and a little extra time for them to answer, the gentleman from tsa and cbp. how are you doing this with the protection of due process and noticed without those of the american people that the process even exist? what framework is very to have the firewalls that you are not turning congresspeople or children into convicted criminals? >> well, we are not seeing the same error rates that can be attributed to specific demographics in how we're doing this. and how would doing this cannot be compared to previous studies on this. there are different control factors in place.
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there's different -- we're taking a person that is standing in front of the camera when we can take a clear picture and were comparing it against a clear set of baseline photos from their passports passport r visas where they were also standstill in front of the camera to capture a clear picture. that's what if such i could rate. previous studies didn't quite take the same control factors into place. this is not us taking an image of a person and randomly running it against ical reset -- gallery set of indistinguishable quality photographs and lowering down the eye accuracy rate as to wht constitutes a match to make it match someone that it is that. you can do the same thing with fingerprint if you only take -- >> how do you secure that data? >> when the photo is taken at the airport it is encrypted and transmitted to cbp and to our cloud space. it's been template ties with my
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understanding of that is its turn into an mathematical formula. the unique identifier associate with that. there's no biographical data or peanut i associate with that. it's not step against our gallery of photos when there's a match a message goes back to the camera with just yes or no unique identifier. >> let me move quickly to mr. gould and let me thank tsa for the frontline services of protecting america. >> thank you, mr. chairman for your indulgence. >> same question as to how you utilize in a protect the data and avoiding this intrusion into privacy of the american public without them knowing. >> yes bed. we're using cbp's tedious system. so the answer mr. wagner applies to tsa is over perspective accuracy and the matching, one thing i like to add is the technology is evolving so quickly and it's improving so quickly we will continue to assess at every step for any
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additional pilots come when we consider employing this on a wider scale, we will assess the best way to get quality image capture and be sure to play the highest quality algorithms to ensure the highest match rate. >> okay, thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. thank you very much. >> the chair recognizes mr. green. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank the ranking member. thank the witnesses for appearing. my questions have to do with the surveillance, and my first question is, are all people who are traversing areas within an airport under some degree of suspicion? who would like to answer, please?
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>> well, i would say that when a person is traversing an airport, they are not necessarily under suspicion. airports utilize security cameras, closed-circuit television for security reasons. with respect to tsa, , the only reason we use cameras and capture images is solely for the purpose of identification. >> if i could just add -- >> please. >> what we're doing is absolutely not a surveillance program. this is -- the picture of an individual is taken with a complete knowledge because they are standing in front of the camera at a time and place would have to present their physical id in order to establish the identity to move forward. we're just replacing the value and scrutiny of the physical id with a computer algorithm. >> should i assume that persons who enter the airport and who are not within the secured area will not be subject of this technology? >> not by tsa. it solely occurs at the backdrop
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or the checkpoint. >> or a time of place we have to present an identification to establish identity to go through whatever process that -- >> in houston the backdrop occurs outside of the building before you enter the building. you drive up in your car. you have friends, neighbors which you perhaps and you go over to an agent and that person then recedes your bag and gives you a ticket. would it occur in this area? >> the only place the biometric identification at the backdrop is occurring is in terminal f in atlanta. and i went down there and observed the way -- >> time is of the essence. but we're talking about expanding, are we not? >> yes, sir. >> here's my concern. let me go to the point and i will be as peaty as i can, but one can only imagine what is the
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j. edgar hoover would've done with his technology. it was mr. hoover who surveilled dr. king. they went so far as to send a letter to dr. king encouraging him to take his life. one can only imagine. now, i'm not placing you under the eye of suspicion but it's my job to make sure that this kind of technology is not abused. i take my job seriously because i'm protecting you by doing my job. my concerns are do you all the people in some way so as to advise them there being surveilled? >> i wouldn't characterize it as surveillance. the way the alert happens, to use your term, is when you approach the backdrop, the agent was a would like use biometric edification to match you to back or something along those lines
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-- >> if you thought, if you believe that this was a form of surveillance, would you alert the people, the public if you thought this was some form of surveillance? >> we don't do surveillance. >> if you don't -- excuse me. if you thought, would you recommend, if we were of the opinion that this is surveillance, what you think we should do? should be indicate that person to be noticed that there being surveilled? >> we provide notice before the image is captured. it's purely with the consent of the traveler. >> what about consent of the person who happens to be with the traveler who is just a friend? >> we solely capture the picture of the traveler who is consented. the camera is only about two feet away. you step right in front of it and it solely captures that image. >> thank you. but we're considering expansion. my concern is suspicion less surveillance. suspicion less surveillance. surveilling persons who are not
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under suspicion, perhaps by accident. final question is is because time is running out. will there be any means by which persons who engage in litigation can acquire access to this intelligence that you have preserved for some length of time? meaning the photographs. would there be any means by which persons who engage in litigation can acquire it? >> the photographs we match against our in the cpt the system that passport photographs. the images that are captured are not retained in the camera in any respect. we solely get back a match, no match return. if that answers your question. >> it really does not because what i'm try trying to get yous this. if persons are engaged in some form of litigation, and one can only imagine what that might be, will they be able to acquire a
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photo so as to show that a person was at a given location on a given location? >> i understand. that photo is not retained at all by tsa. it is encrypted, it's transmitted to cbp and a match rate is return. >> okay. >> if it's a u.s. citizen the photo is deleted after 12 hours. if it's a foreign national, at the baggage shop the photo would also be deleted. we would keep on a foreign national is the boarding of the plate and the final the partridge surf at the biometric exit of their departure. >> thank you. i greatly appreciate this and not assure you that i want us to secure our airports and ports of entry but i'm also concerned about suspicionless surveillance. thank you. >> thank you. >> the gentleman, mr. guest, you'll recognize for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman.
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mr. wagner and other guests, thank you for being here today. i know at least three of our witnesses, your departments fall under the department of homeland security. your website reads as follows,, the department of romantic it has a vital mission, to secure the nation's from the many threats we face, this requires the dedication of more than 240,000 employees and jobs the range from aviation and for security to emergency response from cybersecurity, analysts come to chemical facility inspectors. ..
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it includes fema as well as the customs and border protection's, secret service and tsa. i believe that if these agencies i just spoke of, if these agencies were abolished that our country would be substantially less safe . i'll begin with you mister wagner, could you tell me what impact it would have for the people of america for homeland security, if these agencies wereabolished by congress ? >> there would be no one to process people coming and going across the border, either us citizens or foreigners. there would be no one to look for harmful goods and products coming in, no one to collect taxes dueon those duties . the cdp collects $40 billion a year to the u.s. treasury through duties taxes and fees, therewould be no one to do that . >> would you agree with me that the different enforcement path of the department of homeland
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security, that it runs a gamut of different things. we just talked about everything from the secret service which provides protection for our dignitaries, tsa which is responsible for air traffic . border enforcement, those are very important functions of our government to make sure these agencies are functioning, would you agree with that? >> the origins go back to1789 in the beginning of the country . >> would you care to expound on that at all? >> i agree with what mister wagner said and if tsa were not there, the security and transportation systems would be in jeopardy . >> congressman, as you indicated we protect the president andvice president and others and also have criminal investigations . that iscritical work that we are doing .
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>> would you agree that it would be irresponsible to talk about on polishing these agencies that perform this important task on behalf of theamerican people ? >> yes. >> yes sir. >> i would agree with that. >> no further questions mister chairman, i yielded that. >> i know i was late to the hearing today but i don't really, maybe it happened before i got here but i don't really ever mention, here anyone mentioned that institutions should be abolished so just for the record . >> the gentleman from kansas city, mister cleaver. >> thank you mister chairman.
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>> do you know chas wilson, do you know whohe is ? probably one of the most important figures that we don't know much about . he signed the declaration of independence and eventually became a member of one of the first six members of the supreme court and he said that congress shall form a grand inquisition of the executive branch. and i think that my children, children's children and their children will study this era and say that's when it got started . i'm concerned, i was in the executive branch,
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municipality mayor of ken city so i know that you guys are busy,especially right now . a group of my colleagues and i found a letter addressed to you mister wagner that was to go 30 days ago and we haven't gotten an answer i didn't know if this was a part of the plan to ignore congress or if you're just consumed and i'm not stupid so i know i shouldn't expect you to write a personal letter to everybody who write you a letter, even members of congress but if you don't have enough staff we need to know because until it completely collapses, we are still the folks who provide oversight and i'm not going to be hostile, i'm not sure that i can do a good job of
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being hostile but i can certainly do a job of frustrated and so i appreciate your work. and what you do. but i just have to say that it is frustrating just seeing what's going on, refusal after refusal to allow congress to do its oversight and i hope that if i'm around at a time when my voice is important to say i'm not going to support nonresponsiveness to congress when i get that opportunity to say it even if my daddy is in thewhite house . having said that to some of the questions my colleagues and i asked because we thought they wereimportant , i'll ask a couple of them time is running out . but is there any statutory
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authority that would allow the whole process of special recognition or is that just an internal move? anybody? >> there are several pieces of statutory authority that authorize us to do and run this program. there's several pieces of legislation from congress requiring a biometric base entry exit system for certain foreign nationals . there's other statutes with authorized us to determine identity and citizenship including us citizens. there has to be a way for us to make that determination that a person is a us citizen and there are statutes that authorize us to consider evidence presented by that person , to make that determination and then if
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it's not to the examining officer's satisfaction, the regulations stipulate that person would be considered and suspectedas an alien . >> thank you. mister hu. >> from a tsa perspective, the security actrequires that we screen all passengers and crew boarding aircraft . we positively identify them, the act mentions use of biometrics for that purpose so that the authority that we're operating under . >> it's not a trick question, i just wanted to know. last week i participated in a demonstration in front of the treasury department, it was a number of other individuals, the refusal to put congressionally approved likeness of an african-american woman on the dollar . that's another whole issue but i was in front of a demonstration . should i and the other folks who got off that bus demonstrate with respect that
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we were somehow surveilled and put in the category of subjects of interest and since that is what currently takes place on the grounds of the white house, i don't want to suggest i'm as important as the president or patrick mahon or somebody but should i expect that? >> congressman, we do have a cctv video surveillance system in and around the white house but there's a eia by the department of homeland security alerting people to that and in addition to the cameras we have, many are on pennsylvaniaavenue in the building adjacent to the white house .>> what about other federaldepartments ? >> i can't what other federal
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departments are doing. >> thank you very much sir, i like yours to. >> i yielded back to mister chair. >> now we recognize thegentle lady from florida missed dennings . >> thank you mister chairman and thank you to ourwitnesses . let me just for the record say that i respect the job that you have to do. i understand how tough they are. i think that all of our jobs have gotten tougher in recent years. i'm not sure why my colleagues feel the need to talk about abolishing your agencies. as i know no one on this committee, neither side of the aisle has ever proposed
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such an idea. we are the committee on homeland security. and we are here to make sure that you have the tools and resources to effectively do your job. but i know that it's a little tougher when sometimes you receive unjust and improper orders that do not have the resources to effectively do your job. earlier i heard one of my colleagues talk about the reason for biometric technologies involving speed and efficiency. i was assigned to the orlando international airport as a police commander on the worst day in aviation history on 9/11. i know that's the number one responsibility for you is the safety of the traveling public and if you can ensure that or increase those odds and do it in an efficient and faster way, then that's just
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icing on the cake, but what sets up the bar as we work to keep our nation safe, what sets us apart in this country is that we can enforce the laws and write the laws but also protects an individual's civil rights. that's what sets us apart and i will not -- violating civil rights or the perception of violating civil rights is an issue that we cannot ignore. we have to deal with, when we are able to deploy new technology, that's a great and wonderful thing. i remember how exciting that was. your jobs as the head of your agency is to make sure that
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we can do it all and i believe in this nation we can. i know we have talked about every different thing that we possibly could. we thank you for your endurance. i want to go back just a minute to testing for accuracy and any biases area could you tell me who set the minimum standards for this particular program? who decides what testing is done for accuracy or bias is conducted before deploying the technology? how do you get at baseline and say that this technology, done the testing. we've spoken to the stakeholders. we are ready for prime time, understanding as i believe you said earlier that we're always fine-tuning and going back and checking up but who sets the original standards before deployment? what's acceptable and unacceptable and mister wagner, we start with you.
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>> we would do that internally, we woulddetermine what constitutes a match versus a non-match , evaluate this with our dhs science and technology department, do it in consultation with experts from the industry and the vendors of equipment area we have partnered and starting this summer into the fall we will be deeply analyzing the results of our data to make sure that we're not seeing those error rates that are attributable to a certain demographic. were not seeing it from our internal review but we want to make sure we will bring the experts in . >> you're saying it's the perception that there is an increased error rate among people of color or have we seen some data although not significant to show that? >> the studies that have shown there were these biases had different control factors in how we're using this program and no one has really studied the way that we are
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implementing this using those same control factors on how we're doing it. i would expect them to get the similar results as towhat we're seeing . >> from a tsa perspective we work closely with the dhs times and technology directors as well and they inform our test plans and how we collect data on domestic violence and how the well they're working, then they analyze that data on our behalf so we do rely on them for their semi-independent and accurate assessments of our capability and then like cdp, we rely on our friends as well to set the standards and say how well the algorithmsare working . >> mister chairman, when you decide that you're ready for deployment, this is based on the testing that we've done is ready for primetime , who makes that decision. is it a collective effort between the different people
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that you work with or did you decide that individually based on the feedback thatyou received ? >> we would decide that for our agency it's our responsibility, the officer's determination who matched your passport and if i use a tool or analgorithm to help me make that decision , at the end of the day it's still my judgment to do that so we would evaluate this essay is this helpful to the officer making that determination that this document corresponds to that person? >> one thing i would add to your original point, for us the main reason to do this is increase better identity verification and the secure enhancements that are associated with that. getting people to checkpoint more quickly is icing on the cake, but better security through using this technology is key to us. if algorithms and the match rates are not acceptable, if
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we are not enhancing security we will not deploy it but that decision decision would be made internally at tsa. >> thank you mister chairman and i yelled back. >> i just probably due to the time i will dispense with my questions but i just like to say that obviously based on questioning from the members of congress , you can get a feeling on where we are concerned about issues around privacy, around the quality and ensure that the american people and traveling public are safe and so we need to continue to evolve and we know that homeland security has been an evolving, living, breathing entity that continues to have to see and recognize issues, tried to
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curtail them and rectify matters that are important to the american people, so i'd just like to say that thank you for your service. psa, cpv. your jobs and all of you at secret service are doing a yeoman's job for this nation and we appreciate your service and your time here today. thank you. with that, the hearing is adjourned. >>.
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>> in dubai you compare it to being on the jetsons. >> it's not there yet but that's the vision. the vision is to have flying airships early in this coming decade. and not just a few of them
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carrying around rich people to golf courses and luxury hotels. they want to have these flying airships carrying all kinds of people and want to have a flyingnetwork . it's like a metro system little stops all over dubai with flying machines carrying people back and forth. >> even bigger whose latest book, skip go look at how technology is changing transportation to watch the communicatortonight at 8 pm eastern on cspan2 . tonight, we take a look at books on business. we begin with charles schwab and his book charles schwab invested, changing forever the wayand americans invest . then it's tyler collins big business and an stack on it how we play the game. enjoy tv in prime time this week and all day every weekend on cspan2. >> the british house of
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commons as advanced boris johnson's amended brexit deal. the vote came a weekend after the conservative party cured a majority government in the general election. the vote paves the way for the uk to leave the european union january 31. here's a look at some ofthe debate leading up to the final vote . >> i move that the bill be read a second time and that we come together as a new parliament to break the deadlock and finally to get brexit is done. now is the moment we reunite our country and allow the warmth and natural affection that we all share for our european neighbors to find renewed expression in one great new national project while building at the democratically accountable partnership with those nations we are proud to call ourclosest friends . but in this bill at this
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