country. the overlying goal is to change the incentives of the people running for office because you just appeal to your narrow partisan extreme in an open primary or ranked-choice voting met, you are going to lose because you are going to need the support of the rest of your party and people in the middle and even people -- >> we will leave this segment of "washington journal." you can watch all of our program online at c-span.org. take you live now to the hudson institute for discussion about how the u.s. can counter china's influence in the pacific region. >> we would like to thank japan foundation, global partnership for the support of this publication. the opinion check in the report belong to the authors. today after introduced the report in ten minutes, and other

contributors of this report will talk on u.s. approach to counter china based on this report. so now introductions. this is picture i took. the rise of china and its attitude towards the world, challenged by china's ambition. vice president mike pence spoke at hudson institute, and this is very important, and said beijing -- government approach using political economic and military tools as propaganda to advance its interest and benefit its interest in the united states. so given that the united states need to win the competition, cooperation will arise in like-minded countries is key because historically number of

political partners has been a deciding factor in the geopolitical struggle. for example, the wild, wild west the winning side comprise -- but the losing side was composed of just four. during the u.s.-soviet cold war, 54 versus 26 eric so these facts indicate that the number of supporters correlate to the likelihood of winning the competition. therefore, maintaining improving collaboration with like-minded countries will be key for the united states. it is of increasingly importance to identify and understand those

cooperating. this is table of content of this report. this report includes the view studying the united states, the vietnam -- australia, india, sri lanka, british, france, eu, canada and japan. the view from the analysis indicates that all countries in the indo-pacific realizes a problem created by rising china. however, there are different types of opinion about how to tackle the situation with china. the united states, india, australia and japan have chosen a very strong stance towards

china. the british, france, eu and canada are trying to cooperate with united states effort as u.s. as another hand -- sri lanka are worrying about china of the u.s.-china competition. how can parties fill this gap? that is my policy recommendatio recommendation. there are three policy recommendations, security, economic, and power. the first with a security. use this case scenario to demonstrate various kind of u.s. intervention in a variety of situations. these countries like vietnam, singapore or sri lanka are worrying about one situation.

even if these countries choose a strong stance towards china, these countries are concerned that u.s. and other like-minded countries will not support an enough. thus, the u.s. should demonstrate this case a a to indicate what kind of intervention the u.s. might do in various situations. economy, good new economic development system is not dependent only on china. the u.s. need to assure it arrives in like-minded countries, -- will not stop the economic development of those siding with the u.s. the economic structure still needs to change. the u.s. and its allies and like-minded countries should relocate their factory from

china, and find new market elsewhere. transpacific partnership, japan, eu joint infrastructure products, japan africa close quarter and use japan australia -- using these projects, u.s. like-minded countries need to create new economic development systems. third one, power. accept a new approach that combines security and economics. the problem of china is caused in part by the image that china is rising power in the u.s. is declining power. however, if the u.s. had both security and economic, however, it is still very, very powerful.

for example, when we talk about safeguarding -- against -- he could try to build stronger naval power, but under the current budget it is not feasible to prepare to safeguard -- communications. from 2000-2017 china acquired at least 40 new submarines while the u.s. acquired 15. even though u.s. is far better that china wants. number sometimes very important. so case in point, india, uae cooperation demonstrates this new idea. in 2018 indy and uae side agreement allowing the uae to set up strategic oil storage facilities in india. this agreement benefit both parties. india can use storage oil

emergency. uae even if china cannot go through the strait of hormuz. uae can get order from the storage. this economic effort helped communication. u.s. side, this method to do with china threat to the communications. countries siding with u.s. could set of strategic facilities in like-minded countries throughout the indo-pacific and the shared oil storage in emergencies. [inaudible] it would be hard to threaten -- country siding with the u.s. this could assure strong image of the u.s. security system.

thus, u.s. side will wait competition with china and corroboration with u.s. allies and like-minded countries including singapore, australia, india, sri lanka, , uk, france, eu, canada and japan will be key. of course other like-minded countries also will be key. so now is the time, make america great leader again. thank thank you very much. introduction is finished and a panel discussion will start. the chair at hudson institute dr. patrick cronin will lead the panel discussion. would you please help me. [applause]

>> let me congratulate doctor trinity forum actual presentation. you can read the report and there's lot of material and a lot of brett to the discussion about these like-minded countries and how they're they e pursuing security in the indo-pacific probably. i'm patrick cronin, asian-pacific chair here at the house is a too. we have a distinguished panel to discuss a variety of views so i'm going to dig right in by just offering a few initial con ed's from a u.s. perspective, my own perspective. and let me try to avalon on the larger questions rather than give you talking points here. the first point is simply to say that strategy is something that is an overused word. i overuse it. it's overused in this town.

it's not often actually meant literally in terms of providing a real strategy. there's been questions about the coheres of china strategic approach. does china really have a coherent strategy next my colleague and i written pretty hard-hitting report last month called total competition in which we certainly imply they have a coherent strategy but even with questions about how coherent it is progressing to try to to look at the different facets of what is a very broad based strategy that is trying to allow china to get its way by only short of war. there's no doubt that unfortunately over the last decade or so china especially under xi jinping has been more assertive in the region. i i think there's been an absene of significant cost imposition on beijing, and the lack of

concerted push back but i think this panel, this report effect is an indicator that times are changing. there's a gathering reaction slows to china's assertiveness and one that the chinese can't blame solely on the narrative propaganda point that americans try to contain china and prevent its rise, it's rightful centerstage on the global set of stage. the reality is no, there's a lot of concern about the region and around the world about china's actions and china will fit in. now of course china and xi jinping are both on the back foot. we're not wishing that chinese people feel a special time when they're fighting the shared epidemic in the coronavirus. but there's no doubt this point of economy in china and mismanagement of information in particular about that spread of the virus is really calling questions about is china really the big power that it even aims

to be in the 2020s? it's not starting up a decade on a high point. i do want to say from a u.s. policy perspective, the trump administration deserves credit for a couple of things on indo-pacific strategy. first, simply trying to codify indo-pacific strategy and bring india and bring the two oceans, the two great oceans as prime minister abe and india and japan talked about years ago into a more strategic focus. i think this has been a very helpful enlargement of the playing field including when you bring indo-pacific and it just came back from paris having rich discussion but europeans on this, message make indian ocean part of the broader strategic playing field it allows europe to it in that discussion and so anyways because europeans see the direct interest. yes, france huge equity inside

asia-pacific, but all of europe and see the wide path we think about indo-pacific about the equities and it's very important. i think the other thing the trump administration did although they didn't always give the obama administration credit but the pivot, the balance of asia which was underresourced by conceptual framework of the rebels have given credit to process on this issue. i think this is an evolution of american thinking in this entry about the enlargement of the indo-pacific and why this is going to matter so much in a 21st century. so i think that's very important. the free and open indo-pacific of the indo-pacific strategy report that was issued by the pentagon last may which was followed up by a state department report to show a certain whole of government sort of approach, these of the right principles in that report, in my view. sovereignty is suspected to matter a countries size.

that should be a principle we should all rally around. international law and norms respected and upheld we should all uphold that norm. trade is free, fair and reciprocal. a little more contentious because you get into the definis of what exactly is fair, what is reciprocal. but it's the right basic principle about which we can have a discussion. and disputes are resolved peacefully. the u.s. has been very heavy on the defensive side of our approach to the region. it was randy schriver last week said america basically did repeal without replacement came to the transpacific partnership. that is, we walked away from the big trade economic package with that come up with a quick substitute for it. we didn't follow up with bilateral free trade agreements and we've had trouble building the kind of architecture and

finance that we actually start to see accumulated terms of things like the finance corporation. that may be about to change but it's taken us three years as a country to kind of fill in that economic basket of engagement in the region. that's critically important all the countries here. but the three lines of effort and indo-pacific strategy report from dod, increasing flow felt of the joint force great power competition, that's something the united states needs to do to reassert itself to make sure presence has credibility and can deter but it's not also with the region wants to hear from us. yes officials wanted of the united states have that capability to what you're about economic engagement, how we're going to manage the china relationship and that's why being too successful on the aspect without also marrying it up with some of the economic shows you the strategic challenges the u.s. faces to have balanced strategy that sustainable and compelling.

the of the facets of the dot report on building relations with emerging partners and strengthening alliances, yes, absolutely we need to be doing that but america messaging on that as you know is not always consistent. the third point encouraging us allies and partners and like-minded countries to cooperate with one another, this panel underscores exactly that point. the doctor gets credit for organizing, hurting the cats of the region to try to talk about why we do share some interest. there's ample room for improvement. i do want to just say briefly that i can three things the u.s. needs to do better. we need to define our approach to china a more compelling fashion. by that, a more holistic fashion. all of our country's rely on chart as part of the global economy, even though we're all at risk to predatory procedures by china, not constrained by the

rules that we are constrained by. so strategic competition, yes, the trump administration gets that right. that is a priority because the united states woke up after a decade of sleeping on this job, and we were cooperating as john lee says industry report, while they were competing. as exact right. there was a natural backlash of the trump administration pursued here in terms of needing to put a part of strategic competition. by strategic competition is not the whole of the is china relationship. we know that from the trade deal deal. we know that from ongoing talks with china. so we need to be a a little moe surgical about what we're talking about when we're talking but competition with china. talking about competition at the same time we have a cooperative relationship. they both coexist and it will continue to both coexist, that's part of this bound competition. the same thing with decoupling. as soon as people want to say we will decouple with china, what

exactly are we talking about? if we're talking about 5g, talked about artificial intelligence, talking about the high-tech sectors in the made in china 2025 strategy, 2015 continue strategy to put together, yes, we do need to disentangle from that and make sure we're protecting our national security in the digital age but at the same time we are not decoupling and divorcing our economies wholly the way that some want to jump to that conclusion. first point is to make sure the u.s. going forward better jeffrey h what we're trying to achieve with china. what we are not trying to achieve. that would make it for a more compelling strategy to rally others about because that's what we share. we should not total decouple. wisher protecting our national security and our sovereignty and rules, you know, while trying to figure out a way to cooperate with the china. secondly, we need to bring to the table more trade and investment to develop as i tald

about. again i think we are seeing some boob it here with the development finance corporation, the private sector, alex cord 82 unprecedented degree of, we'll talk about them more in future. third point is we need to better answer to where southeast asia fits, over korea fits it. there are good answers to this. we're about to hear from richard heydarian, but it do think the original fear here is we're so successful in growing this u.s.-india relationship. i have seen the dial-up dialogh is a big annual regional strategic dialogues now. there's a good article this last week in sorted chronologically maps, annual dialogue about how we went from trilateral cooperation to quadrilateral cooperation. it's been a map of the growing expanded like-minded cooperatio cooperation. unfortunately from his southeast asia perspective, that looks

menacing because all idea of southeast asia is these are smaller countries that fear big powers fighting over them or fighting in the area. and if they quadrilateral sort strategic dialogue or relationship is too successful, it may jeopardize the sovereignty, i thought of southeast asian countries. so that's the concern. it doesn't have to and, in fact, most southeast asian -- all maritime southeast asian country leaders except for one, richard, right now, want more u.s. engagement. will talk about which one that is. but i think i'm hopeful, i'm hopeful. although although your present dozens of americans, we love filipinas and filipinos love americans i think a lot in common there. i think though like i did countries bring a certain not

only capacity, but also speed and pace at which southeast asia's institutions, central as they remain, asean cannot move very quickly when you're the lowest common denominator approach. so in cambodia can undermine the communiqué that talks about the south china sea or secretly sign a deal to allow china access to the sea of thailand, that's not a very fast-paced cooperation were talking about, to keep a favorable balance of power. but with india, europe, australia, japan, others, we can do a lot toward southeast asia strategic autonomy and growth and prosperity so i will leave it there. i will now begin thank of this great panel because my last thought here is our shared aim should be not to contain china. that is beijing's propaganda point. a lot of chinese believe it now

because they've been selling themselves on this. we are not trying to contain china, no, that shouldn't be our aim. we are trying to deny any single power exclusive control over the south china sea, over the indo-pacific, and china has a shared interest in that actually. they won't see at now but eventually maybe it will. without any further do i want to introduce richard heydarian who is a resident analyst among many other things at gma network which if you don't know is a large commercial tv radio network in the philippines. use author of many things including the recent book the indo-pacific of , trump, china,e new struggle. richard has some powerpoint slides. he will go up to the podium here. richard. >> thank you very much, patrick. it's a pleasure to be here again and thank you very much for arranging this and the publication. i would like to also add that we

filipinos love the united states but we also love our president. that's where the problem is. i have ten countries and more than ten colorful people to cover within ten minutes, but i'll try my best. let me make it very clear that asean is not necessarily -- paper talk that asean as an organization it's more like a small and medium enterprise with no human rights. it's quite different from key countries that i will try to focus on today. hopefully one day we will have more people -- i left my clicker -- you got me excited too much, patrick. so today i'm going to talk about asean and china relations. of course we'll talk about china we're talking a certain policies of the ruling regime in china, not the great chinese people and we hope the best for them amid the current epidemic. i think if you want to understand how specific country

across indo-pacific deal with china i think this is very important ironically it seems countries outside the asean would be more in the acceptance stage meeting the challenge in china to respond accordingly all the talk about -- with hosted al within the spectrum between bargaining literally in the case of malaysia trying to negotiate deals with china and in the case of the philippines were somewhere between denial on the part of the president an anchor on the part of the people. even internally the arson diversities there. the fact of the matter is the situation has been considerably worse in the south china sea over the past few years, the militarization that's happening. you have deployment of surface-to-air missiles and all source of different military equipment confidential admiral davidson properly talks about the great wall of sand, surface-to-air missiles.

it's also warning for us to see that china now is brazing and openly treating the coast guard of china as part of the pla navy. we no longer this kind of blurry distinction between great hall and whitehall. more worryingly in recent time for also seen what i call the militarization whereby china is more aggressively using militia to harass supply lines of other countries and some cases even engage in aggressive actions against the vessels of other countries of the saw in the case of the philippines last june. the good thing is there's an element of pushback because there's an element of acceptance of this strategic that that is put by china's policy specifically in south china sea. in the case of compensation we see more regularize freedom of navigation operations more flexible, more aggressive. they are also expanded in scope covering new geographic areas. we see our european friends also

joining, not exactly some way. not exactly conducting freedom of navigation exercises. this is that just but u.s. and china competition. this is about the concerns of international community, certain as frexit china are not with international law. our australian friends have been doing great things, among other things i'm sure the next big will talk about it. the fact of the matter though is when it comes to asean, specifically certain countries within asean i can philippines, i'm not sure were still a a u.. ally of whether how like-minded we are but was very clear under residue today we see significant recalibration that is the contact nation of those people factors including president duterte campaign. his landslide electoral victory given that during his election

he was not only question the philippines liberal democratic institutions and value he was also question the alliance with america. when he won the election handily he felt vindicated ricky felt the philippine people standby if you want to change foreign policy of the country. the second is colonization of multiple branches of government, we sit over the past few years with the present facing less and less resistant and more

complaints from different parts of the state and outside the state mechanisms. third under the obama administration in particular solid strategic ambivalence. we thought ambivalence not much a strategy. very

it's very hard to see the lines with the cooperation all anywhere where it should be. the vfa is software of the alliance. provides legal framework for entry. this is a significant problem we have in our lives. nonetheless, president duterte is clued out of step with public

sentiment. china's approval rating the latest one is -33. you've got you got 100 points difference between the two. when you look at service of people what they want the government to do in south china sea, night at a ten philippines what the government to take a stronger stance. president duterte can get away with what he wants because more and more filipinos are practical. they pragmatically welcome engagement with china. this expense why president duterte can get away what he's doing because the public is embracing some elements of his pragmatic approach. that's not the at the view. president duterte himself made it clear they're certain red lines in the south china sea, one of them is -- might be in it china reclaims or milk prices to take advantage of the vfa backing right now, that will force president duterte hands.

it remains to be seen a china will exploit the current gap in use military alliance. this situation is that the press is a look at the bigger picture, zoom out from the philippines, because if a look at the case of malaysia under the prime minister for sixpence usada graces pushback on china's infrastructure investment. you have four months recalibrate and sang things nice but china and then last december we saw surprise. he submitted but was to be submitted by the administration may 2177 the extended inter-continental shelf claim. by the way, this is may 2017 so it was corrupted if you much after the arbitration award came up which questioned the legal basis of the arbitration award. when militia was criticized by china, very clued and this is the language we hear, call the

language ridiculous and oakley talked about the possibility of an arbitration case against them. i'm not saying malaysia will go all the way but we see some significant and positive achievement at the direction. the non-, i was this point because we're expecting them to also do a parallel case when a philippines was forwarding our arbitration awards, their wait it out. now they are on and on. let's see what vietnam is going to do. if you look at initial statements is much more aggressive, much more asserted that we saw in the past and, of course, indonesia. even though there under developmental approach, to seek as much investment as possible from china, we thought he could not deny the public backlash in indonesia light of more and more aggressive intrusion by china. effectively because of the expansive nature of the language

which is not yet clarified, indonesia is a part of the south china sea indirectly. that's an important factor because indonesia is the biggest player in the region. i'm going to wrap up here. we have to give credit to the top administration because in addition to the regular -- with expansion of military aid to countries including to the philippines over the last three years a doubling of that. we see the u.s. coast guard more directly involved for the first instance cold war in these waters including the taiwan straits over the past few years. building infrastructure initiative is good so far but i think the public diplomacy part is missing. the chinese are generally better in terms of giving more bang out of imagine it back because investment they promised is not there while you using the couns including japan have significant investment in this part of the war. u.s. is still preferred country as the leader in asia-pacific. the way forward is very important for u.s. and other major powers to emphasize the discussion of the indo-pacific

discussion quadrilateral alliance is not come at the expense of austin. there's an entirety rather than -- i think it's very important come also important to pass building assistance to austin countries. european friends to be much more helpful in that front. not talking billions, , just millions of dollars at most. lastly, think we -- our good friend from stanford consistently talks about this. we all have to agree the matter what is our perception of china are what is our perception of u.s. role in the region, no civil country has to wrestle control in the south china sea which is an international water. it's interesting to hear the miniaturization of the air which should be more focus on china.

this is just in the realm of rhetoric but frame to say that for me is relevant because it's a recognition that there's a problem and that there should be an effort by other countries nonpayment countries to give the situation under control. lastly, we are now nearing towards the conclusion of the code of conduct in south china sea but in my opinion whatever the concrete will be because we have no idea i was just in china too much ago and it seems even they don't know what they want from the code of conduct and which is back and forth on that. which is congratulating have titles and outlined for the past 20 years but what's more important than a code of conduct a so-called triple freeze. the rest be freeze in the miniaturization and naval exercises. there is the point in negotiating a a diplomatic document in china is changing the facts on the ground on a daily basis. that is an unfair situation that we have. i will keep it there. thank you very much. >> thank you, richard. [applause]

>> richard has just flown in from the philippines. he moves very fast, , his brain and his body. if we do get quirky after debt you built right a book in 14 days or 28 days, absolute. we're delighted to have john lee from oesterle, senior fellow at hudson but before that he was a national security adviser to us children foreign minister bishop, prolific author including second of two great reports release of the hudson in the last couple of months on the chinese economy and what to do about it. i think we will stay seated for the rest of this panel. >> thank you patrick, and it's great to be on a panel colleagues, regional colleagues as well. thank you for inviting me to contribute a chapter on the publication. of course i'm no longer incumbent so i don't speak to the australian government. i do deal closely do with that government and these are my own thoughts. i thought i would spend five

minutes speaking that some of the australian views and concern, and we can dig deeper into some issues i raise. i think it's fair to say over the past two or three years, maybe four years, actually oesterle has shifted from a perdition where we were largely hedging, by hedging i mean we were just expanding or maximize our long-term strategic options. we moved from largely hedging and managing a relationship and alliance with the united states to a much more proactive countering role, a balancing role, particularly against china. in fact, just three days ago i think we announced a very significant upgrade to our base in the northern territory which is jointly shared with american forces.

now, the base we have really only holds 2000 troops. the significant significant thing is with upgrading the base to host american asset and particularly american heavy military assets such as commerce and f-35s, et cetera. gives you a clear indication as to what australia is going. more broadly and, of course, this trillion government would not use this language but i would, -- the anchor of the american alliance and we see japan as an more northeastern anchor on the american alliance system. on that basis is look at the geography, southeast asia is geographic and some sense strategic heart of the indo-pacific. and by the way the indo-pacific construct two years ago which has significance. it used to be east asia.

in our strategic thinking that it is pacific which widens the strategic maps in the way that i think favors us, brings in india and, of course, not completely and china but china is a relevant factor. southeast asia, we do see quite frankly as the soft underbelly in the region. for a number of reasons. one, from a pure capacity point of view southeast asia might be a region with almost a dozen states. but each of those states has a limited capability even of itself to engage in any significant balancing for accounting activity. as a result southeast asian states can hedge rather than balance against chinese activities. in my view, much of southeast asia, and i make exception in general terms of vietnam,

indonesia, and what hope will be a post president duterte philippines. i think southeast asia has know if he's falling a debilitating fatalism about the inability of chinese dominance both at an intellectual level at a practical level. much of southeast asian and it's reflected in somewhat thanks asean has done. much of southeast asian, has normalize chinese collusion in the sense it's baked in the notion of chinese coercion, interior expectation of its present and the future. it sees chinese assertiveness and coercion something that just occurs because that's the way china is and it must be managed rather than opposed. and i see this reflected even though this is a diplomatic

context, i think it's reflected in the hole as the approach to contact negotiations. everyone right from the beginning new it would not result in any binding prescriptions on any powers. yet, from my point of view what asean needs to do, , fell into e trap of trying to negotiate a code of conduct with china and this occurred what if he thinks rapid or one as richard mentioned the wood been fine if everyone -- china used diplomatic cover continue to extend its control and militarize the south china sea. so the code of conduct really just gave china o-matic cover to do what it wants to do.

the second reason why were so concerned about code of conduct is its terms of reference were on china's terms. rather than, for example, emphasize the role that international role in decision have to play in any future diplomatic agreement, it basically fell into china's trap. it doesn't mention international goal. it's more about some negotiated agreement with china which is precisely china wants. it wants to negate the relevance of the international law and come up with a negotiated agreement. the third thing i think the code of conduct did is that it inadvertently entrenched this notion that the south china sea, when cars like japan and china and australia have intrinsic interest in what happens in the south china sea. i remember i type in government,

not post government, often received pushback from a southeast asian friends but why should australia or china, japan have that more of a role in negotiating some kind of understanding. my response is, only four or five asean members -- five fivo six asean members are not claiming state. if every country has that in her interest in what happens to south china sea, why should we be in on -- issued on the asean china issue. i would feel lot more comfortable with that situation if i felt that asean was a fall into china trip. i do worry that my asean friends are falling into the chinese trap. this brings me to the point about our use of the trend,

particularly the trump administration. as many of you know, australia along with japan have been the most robust supporters of a more disruptive trump foreign policy and are part of the region. i use the word disruption deliberately because from our point of view, because china had incensed unless it's activities, if you can't handle disruption or you're not prepared for disruption, and there can be no countering with chinese activity. from the point of view it's not that we like destruction disrue felt that disruption was necessary. patrick mentioned a lot of the strategic thinking and operational thinking occurred before trump administration, i do think that is correct. i don't give the trumpet

vitiation all the credit but why do give it the credit is we have an administration that is prepared psychologically to tolerate action in countering china which at the very top, which i don't attribute to the previous administration. in my type incumbent with great devastation with the obama administration of the what to do about things, but when he to the very top, there was a appetite for disruption, for unintended consequences of pushing back against china. so having said that, we tend to support trump's approach to china but there are caveats. the first which richard -- patrick race as well, is that the trump administration has made is to just withdraw the tpp. because it eliminates the economic centerpiece of any pushback or shaping strategy. and if you look at one of the

weaknesses of the indo-pacific concept, if you ask particularly southeast asians do like the quality, sovereign rights, privileges, rule of law, free from coercion, that also of course we do. of course they like it. but if a look at the alternative chinese proposition, it's hey, you may not like us and yet we are hierarchical in our view. you sign-up to our hierarchical world or global order original order, we will offer you guaranteed special gains and access to opportunity. what i'm trying to say is that when you go around the region now, the chinese larger don't even deny that the view of the region is hierarchical. what they're saying is if and when we return to preeminence in the region, if you come up with a special relationship with us,

you will benefit and you will benefit specific material ways. so for a lot of southeast asia with exception of singapore which is still a developing middle in, region, it's very attractive for the short-term gains or the apparent shorten games china can offer. so it australia for example, we can talk toward why you should sign up to a particular agreement or particular aspect but the reality is oftentimes we don't have to -- had the capability of the framework to offer you some tangible material gain. what we find is the southeast asian countries are making sure decisions which is his tactical or pragmatic but have long-term consequences which favor china

rather than any other country. clear economic approach particularly southeast asian is probably one weakness of this administration. finally, i talked about the virtue of a more disruptive approach to the region by united states, but let me qualify that by saying australia is a medium-sized country. all the other small and medium-sized countries have an element of predictability, particularly allies. they also need to know what the institutional nanny spot of way this is going. one of the weakness the current administration is that they don't really tell us, allies and like-minded countries, where the institutional of what the intended institutional outcome of any kind of negotiation or

tension will be, or even the outcome. australia despite how robust we are, we do kind of need to know what is an enduring lantus but a very spacious look like him particularly the case we see economic tensions between united states and china. so patrick, i will end their. >> thank you very much. richard has just learned from manila. john just just flew in from sydney. the rest of us just walked down the hall. that's what we have gone down this order. liselotte odgaard, visiting senior fellow at the hudson institute from denmark has written extensively about europe's role in general and indo-pacific not to mention of the places like the arctic. so over to you. >> thank you, and thank you for inviting me to present my

chapter. i have been asked to write about europe, and i would argue that europe is faced with an ally that is increasingly skeptical of europe's contributions, its role in trade and its contributions to the transatlantic alliance. and it's also a u.s. ally that focuses increasingly on its asian partners, and not so much to europe. but actually think that is had a lot of positive consequences, because it has been a wake-up call for europe, a bit rough, but a wake-up call for europe to realize that they have to be able to operate more independently and do it through the existing european institutional framework. because one small country is not

able to exercise sovereignty in a world of u.s.-chinese sovereignty. so actually at this moment despite brexit, support for europeans working together to the institutions is greater than we have seen for many decades. and that is particularly a consequence of the u.s. pressures on europe. my main argument would be that it has also made europe realize that it is not wise to just think that we have common values with the americans because we have common liberal values economically and politically. we will always see you as friends. there are differences between europe and the united states, for example, in its preference

for working through multilateral institutional frameworks, and for prioritizing comprehensive multilateral free trade agreements that puts europe and the u.s. at odds at times. and that means that europe has realized it has to define what it is for narrowly in europe's interests and what isn't. this increasing focus on interest rather than merely relying on value i think is a healthy process but, because it will help clarify where can europe and the u.s. cooperate and where are there differences that means that maybe they have to look to other partners or at least there's something to talk about. that doesn't necessarily weaken the alliance. i think in a way it strengthens it because it will make it clear

where do we have common interest that we can pursue? putting european interest first is one of the sort of developments that we see in europe, just as the u.s. has signaled it would put u.s. interest first, so europe is increasingly signaling that european interests comes first. that also means that europe is looking to diversify its partnership, not relying so much on the u.s. but these partners are by and large allies and strategic partners of the united states. so they would see a country such as japan, south korea, it would be the asean member states it would be australia, all of which have good relations with the u.s. but also have some reservations in recent years

about u.s. putting its own interests first. and i think that's a very healthy process again because for one thing it will prevent the u.s. and china from sort of determining the rules of the road so they can sort out their differences. they can decide how things should work globally. that cannot happen if the other partner without the great powers. powers. and also i think it will push the u.s. and china to take seriously these countries preference for comprehensive free trade agreement, tpp was mentioned for example, and for a multilateral institutional cooperation. then you can say does europe matter at all in the indo-pacific, and do they have any role to play? i think they have a lot of leverage and they're starting to use that leverage. mainly stems from the fact that

europe has a position as a trade heavyweight globally. it's a major trading partner both the united states and china. the u.s. is eu's largest trading partner and china as a second largest trading partner. once europe starts to use that leverage, it will make a difference not only in its own region but beyond that. europe continues to prefer transatlantic cooperation over other partnerships, and that is still because we hear, preference for loads of liberal principles that other countries do not to the same extent. so while this cannot be the sole basis for the transatlantic alliance, of course it continues to be important, provided that both sides acknowledge that

their policies may be more complementary at times so even if the u.s. has a preference or using hard power, and your is a preference for using diplomacy and institutions, sometimes more than the u.s., these can in many cases be seen as complementary efforts that can work towards the same objectives. .. transatlantic identity

aligns the usa and europe regarding fundamental objectives that we should not forget are important. for example, europe and the u.s. agree that economic prosperity must rely on competition rather than behavior and state support. they agree that social political culpability comes from information sharing and freedom of expression rather than surveillance and depression. it must be built through freedom of movement and mutual offense rather than fears of influence and coercion. i think that trans atlantic differences are mainly instrumental and there is a lot of low handed fruit to be picked if we focus on complementarity between the u.s. and europe.

european economic security and defense partnerships with asian powers can build a network across the pacific that will constitute quite a formidable force for a free and indo pacific and it can also open avenues for infrastructure projects to push back or deliver alternatives to the chinese golden road initiative. the establishment of independent european defense forces that is sometimes criticized by washington, i think is key to europe's ability to operate autonomously and independently from the u.s. this is precisely the sort of ally that the u.s. needs at a time where it wants to push more responsibility over onto its allies. europe is well positioned to do

this. it will take some time. maybe a decade or two. this is not something that you do overnight. practice taking the lead and slowly, but surely, this kind of force is developing and there is also a european military footprint in the india pacific which is supported by an increasing number of countries. this strengthens the trans atlantic alliance rather than weakens it. focusing on these complementarity issues, i think it will be key to strengthening transatlantic relationships. >> excellent points. we keep running over time. that is michael at the monitor. there is a lot to say. sailing through the indian ocean, the one resident big power is india. leading the doctor, director of

the initiative here at hudson, tom from her perspective. we have another important summit meeting coming up. president trump compared to go to india. another article in the national review today. >> thank you, patrick. i will try to keep my talk as brief as possible. i know i am the last speaker and we are doing q&a. five quick points. interestingly, if we could include philippines in europe, which is interesting. it sort of speaks to the fact as to how far we have come in the last five years. secondly, even though, i mean, population wise, india is the

largest, we are not an ally. in many ways i have changed what i was going to say after hearing the first three speakers. talking about how the u.s. has not done enough. therefore they need to maybe play a bigger role. india is very comfortable because we don't like institutional arrangements. we do not like security. we don't like being forced into something. where you don't have an option. forced to do something we don't want to deal. the happier we will remain. with that said, it helps us because it helps build a relationship, not just with the united states, but all like japan, and every speech the prime minister said it was key

to indo pacific. liking them to feel reassured that india's entry is not to try to overwhelm them. with a sort of come australia and europe as well. india used china as a rival right from the 1950s. that has not changed. india has lost a war with china. china has deepened its economic business and every country this year. it hurts india's interest. india does not want china as an enemy. it does not have the ability to stand up to china. with indo pacific, why india is a part of it and believes in everything, india has two concerns. for india's point of view, the middle east and sort of the area

to india's west is as important as the area to india's east. afghanistan, pakistan and the gulf which, under central command did not pacific command. something that india would like to be changing. they would like that region to be as important as east and south china. indo pacific is more -- india concerned with china are more land-based. india's concern is if something happens in that domain, a number of countries, what happens if the next india china conflict is on the land order. which has happened in the past. therefore, india is reluctant to sort of confront china when it knows it may be forced to confront china on its own.

and, finally, india sort of is the country, which, unlike most other american allies or western allies, does not want another country as a security belt. india does not need an american umbrella. what india would like to do is actually project its region. that is what india would like to deal. other countries like india as well. as of now, we do not have the economic capability to do it. we would like to build that in the next five to 10 years so that india can be an indian ocean part like it's always wanted to. i will stop there and answer any questions. >> great panel discussions. all of us are available for questions. what we will deal with the rest of the 22 minutes we have remaining on this program is to

take questions from audience. i will be happy to fill in and ask questions and talk. please raise your hand. there is a microphone over here. we have one right here. why don't we start over on the side right here. we have two microphones. [laughter] please. identify yourself quick and ask a question or make a comment. >> thank you. [inaudible] i have a question for doctor liselotte odgaard. right now the united states is very much concerned about the pacific vietnam. sharing this moving forward, is the eu concerned? thank you.

>> okay. >> we will take a few questions. we will go right here and keep going down the line. >> thank you. >> this question is for doctor appeared yesterday at the u.s. security and commission, it wase clear that the u.s. has no consistent and clear policy in the south china sea. he also made it clear today that the u.s. and india has not yet come to agree on a relationship at the top especially in military protection in the indo pacific ocean. you point out a lot of recommended parties.

i heard from all the panelists that there are concerns because of policies inconsistent. tpp was withdrew and reservation from the eu and partners. the one who worked very long and hard on u.s. policy. what do you think we need to do? thank you. >> we will take these two other questions. we will take those two and then we will go back to the panel. >> thank you. the question for miss liselotte odgaard. what do you think about the difference between the united states in eu -- how will that impact? >> good question. yes, sir. >> voice of america. a question regarding the issue. as you know, different leaders

talking next monday between the united states and korea. what is the best conclusion for the extension of resuming including the saudis, possible. >> okay. the intelligence sharing agreement under the acronym that it exists between south korea and japan is vital for korean japanese and interest because without real-time sharing, there could be catastrophe. it was very important for seoul and tokyo do not rip up this agreement as they were on the cusp of doing a few weeks ago, but rather to reaffirm its need. not with great fanfare, but just

as a matter of technocratic, bureaucratic, operational cooperation between two countries that are not aligned with each other, have historical differences, but are america's key allies in northeast asia and share the interests, we all share these basic interests. but the politics of size and recognize the common interest. just as it would be imported across the indo pacific all the way to europe. kind of having the information sharing that will allow us to talk about strategy and policy on tough issues from 5 g to trade to security. this is a constant refrain we will have in the information age we live in. information sharing will be very important. admiral blair, i wonder if i asked admiral blair, when did we have this very pristine policy

in the south china sea. i don't remember that. the united states has been fumbling around, this was an issue that was used against us. you are not they are giving the defense. what would the philippines do? vietnam is in a similar boat. the u.s. perspective, wanting flexibility. no one wants to be locked in ahead of time to providing a guarantee without knowing what we are guaranteeing and what is the context. it is all about being able to, this is really about being able to appeared there is no guarantee that we go into the defense. there is a high probability that we deal. it is why you need constant

engagement and debate. what you really need is to understand the strategic priority of southeast asia. two short trips in this town too easily. whether you have maritime strategy and thinking about the straits and what they are trying to do, become the dominant land power and dominant seapower at the same time, writing over sovereign interest of even big states like indonesia. certainly middle size one might vietnam and the philippines. that is unacceptable. we share this common interest. the second thing as i suggested, i think richard suggested as well, a heavy economic component here. we are already very strong. we need to balance that military strength with the kind of foresight of looking ahead. we want to develop a digital

economy in this region, in the future. i think that you will be surprised, showing that we will be here for decades. we will be talking with vietnam. yes, we will even be working on the philippines. the opportunities with malaysia. australia, europe, india and other countries have huge opportunities to participate in this. if they are willing to abide by a set of rules that we can hold them accountable. i need to stay on the side here. let's answer a couple of the questions that were addressed. >> pointing to the differences between europe and the united states. europe has made it a preference in the past years to stress and

go ahead with free-trade agreements with asian countries. it has done that with a number of other countries, including japan. in later years. it does so following the wto rules. europe is using this to show america that this is a key point for europe pre-trade agreements with wto rules and it is not very bothered about trade. this is not in europe's view, the baseline of the relationship to look at it from that perspective. i think it is one of the issues where europe has been quite active in trying to show the u.s. that europe well, you know, go a slightly different way. that does not mean that we don't

both still support the basic economic rules of the road, but in the implementation of those rules, europe has a clear preference for institutions and free-trade agreements to stay in place. with regards to the 5 g, the response that the institutions have let or not interfered in this, partly because they do not have power to do that with regard to 5 g, the countries themselves have decided whether they should let huawei in or not. my own country denmark had decided to exclude and go for erickson and other countries have said, you know, they will not exclude, but they will make sure that they do not get vital information out of it. the u.s. disputes at that is possible. the end result i think will not

be that security corporations will inch, but the u.s. may add some reservations down the road on sharing information with countries that include. with that being said, i think we are in the early days of a western response to that challenge. europe in the u.s. agrees that it is a problematic, you know, china has used the communication infrastructure in problematic ways and there is a problem that needs to be dealt with and that is a challenge. i think, again, that is the important point here. something where the u.s. and europe agrees and they are trying to work out a response that can deliver an alternative in the end. a competitive and viable alternative.

again, you do not do that overnight. we have seen from other businesses, for example the ship building industry in europe which has had heavy competition from china which drew unfair market economic practices, that industry changed and it is still viable in europe. i think that the same will happen in many cases that, you know, the industries and the public sectors will find alternatives down the road that will mean we do not have to rely on that. >> i want to ask briefly the other three panelists a brief question. what may come out or what should come out. i want to ask richard about what is likely to happen on a joint development quest that china and the philippines are facing.

will that be a model or is that ever going to happen? the fine eyes nation australia, a concern on the 5 g and how the general is trying to strategically work through these challenges. >> this is of quite high importance in australia. the third country to explicitly ban from a 5 g rollout. anger from china. to be fair, australia could make a decision relatively easily. not just because of intelligence considerations. we really did not have it in our infrastructure. other like other countries like britain. explaining the infrastructure qualities to make that decision. it was based on the merits of intelligence.

they have misunderstood the potential application of 5 g. what they call an edge which doing 4 g and 5 g. 5 g with the potential we believe if you are in any part of the network, no matter how minor, you can affect other parts. that is a technical reason why we disagree. marginally, with the five eyes, any agreement intelligence otherwise no matter how historical, it tends to degrade over time. a broader concern that is if the united kingdom, for example, takes a fundamentally different view of china's role in the region and world, invariably,

that will read hundred lead to problems. my first concern right now, i do not like the 5 g decision that boris johnson made. my particular concern is i hope london does not think now that you will try to forge a special relationship with china. we have all been through the experience where you try to afford a special relationship did it does not quite work out. my broader concern is this decision is not devised by the union knighted kingdom to forge that special relationship. >> i think that there will be a lot of respect. standing up for philippine nationalism. a lot of americans can

understand that. is he actually getting from china what he claims to be? or are the chinese pushing around the indonesians. how do you see this? who is going to jointly develop the resources. a rich hydrocarbon supply. it is a fundamental question about the rules for the road in the future for this region? how do you see this going? >> this is where they take issue with the so-called common wisdom sure, economics matter. what kind of engagements are we talking about? the first thing i take issue with, for instance, bp. it makes sense. on the grand topic of malaysia and other countries, giving multinational companies certain

powers that could violate sovereignty or welfare of people buying into some part of that argument. i think it was more important to replace for something that is more relevant. that is where infrastructure development comes to the picture taking issue with common wisdom. transforming the world. it is everywhere. in the philippines, for instance , where are the chinese projects? all sorts of dodging. where the big infrastructure projects? i can show you the japanese projects. looking at the measurement of the projects in places like vietnam. japan has more than two times. 7220 kind of breakdown. you only have eight. i think a lot of us buying to

the chinese propaganda that china is taking over because they have economic initiatives to put forward. never about matching china on a remedy to remedy basis. it's about bringing quality to create jobs for the people, creating sustainable development for the infrastructure development geared i think malaysia is a very interesting example of that. overwhelmed by actual chinese investments. we want a quality investments. not just any. especially this captive bull that undermines the economy. the second is when it comes to the code of conduct negotiations the nature of the problem has actually changed. you know, just playing along and everything like that. i think that that is a snapshot from the past. at the same time, the field is

shifting. if you look at the leak off the code of conduct, first draft, single draft of the code of conduct, suddenly making new proposals. what is the added value of this essentially? selling us what we already bought. suddenly, china is kind of finally legally binding. but whose law? which interpretation of international law. even more so, including, yes, we can have a legal binding of code of conduct. only us can exploit the resources in the south china sea. from now -- there could be no military exercise. u.s. in the south china sea. you don't want to legally

binding code of conduct if it will go in that direction. some more sensible. china is asking too much. philippines and china. even if it is just symbolic, it is important. supposed to be negotiating code of conduct. philippines is the coordinator. china would try to use whatever propaganda they can get out of it and say to the rest of the region, see, the philippines supported the ally. now open to join the development maybe they want the same thing. what is happened between the philippines and china has implications. locally or happily or whatever, so far, the joint development is it could violate not only philippine constitution but the arbitration. i don't know how they will essentially square a triangle.

it has to be consistent with the chinese constitution, philippine constitution and law. i can see only two outcomes here that could work for china. one is come up with an agreement. we never know about it. releasing some sort of an out play. the other one would be, the negotiations will go on and they will get the preliminary deal in they can use that to push on the agenda. what i'm saying here is just discussing the joint development agreement is good for china, no matter what they get out of it. what should be clear to the philippine people is we are negotiating this joint development agreement or whatever it is, essentially with the timebomb geared the timebomb is that the philippine will run out of its own indigenous resources. the chinese warships are there in the area.

i do not think you can never get a fair deal out of that. this is what should be clear to the philippine people. >> the vital voice of understanding this, getting the last word in trying to think through whether this vast promising growing india u.s. relationship has some effective -- we are actually making progress. will we start to see something specific and concrete out of this very promising corporation? what do you think? >> it will be a lot more about optics, as everybody knows about the hundreds of thousands of people, not necessarily millions of people that will line the streets. >> millions of people. there are a number. $5 billion worth, helicopters,

the u.s. is selling for integrated defense weapon system a couple of others. economic deal may not, as of right now. the partnership is now at this stage where it does really matter who the president or prime minister are. back to back going to the u.s. two democrats, two republicans. it does not matter who the prime minister is. prime minister in the last two decades welcoming u.s. presidents. it is a strong relationship. it is a strategic one. it needs a lot more effort from both sides. it is not going to be as easy for each country to navigate it as it used to be as it was for

the u.s. to do it with its allies. india is a difficult country to work with. [laughter] >> on that note, what a great panel discussion. we thank you for everything you've done to pull this together. please thank the panel. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> campaign 2020 is in nevada today. live at 3:00 p.m. eastern.

president trump speaks in las vegas. live coverage on c-span. watch on-demand at c-span.org. listed on the go with the free c-span radio app. showcasing what is available every weekend on c-span2. tonight starting at 8:00 p.m., cara westover recalls growing up in the idaho mountains. her introduction to formal education at age 17. holocaust survivor reflects on his life and imprisonment. followed by cassie chambers who looks back at her grandmother, aunt and mother who grew up in poverty in kentucky's appalachian mountain region. enjoy book tv this week and every weekend on c-span2. ♪ >> doing a saturday at 6:00 p.m.

eastern with the results of the nevada caucuses. precinct results. candidate speeches from joe biden. bernie sanders, elizabeth warren and tom stier. the calls about campaign 2020. live coverage on c-span on demand@c-span.org or listen live on the free c-span radio app. >> ryan mccarthy. chief of staff general james beard current operations and modernization efforts. held by the center for new american security. >> thank you for joining us today. here at my virtual fireside, we are graced with the presence of the 24 secretary of the army ryan mccarthy. thank you both so m