tv Former Government Officials Assess Afghanistan Withdrawal CSPAN October 9, 2021 1:59am-5:49am EDT
policies in the past 20 years that led to the offense of august 2021. hard to think our panelists for joining us for this virtual hearing. his series of exploring less policy in afghanistan. thanks to all of you for your service to our country. for the past most 20 years american first deployed to afghanistan the allies have to perform and i want to recognize the contributions and sacrifice diplomats and in afghanistan. i'm holding this hearing as part of the committee's oversight growth, exploring policy decisions related that led to the events that unfolded this past. the evaluation starting off on
this what we saw in kabul august 2021 was simply about to face. the culmination decades of policymaking. that includes changing from defeating al qaeda two nations are linked with caltrans offer. devoting resources and effectively for safe haven in our country or amount surge based on strategy and the afghan government is not allow serious decisions to continue drone
strikes the taliban altering the political landscape of the country all in. there are 20 years of decisions and choices dating back to 2001 that led to the event of august 2021. in 2002, then president george w. bush set the history of military conflict in afghanistan has been of success followed by years of ultimate. it's become the story of america's 20 year war effort in afghanistan. ultimately, we've repeated that. president obama in afghanistan was quote the good work. at 30,000 additional troops in afghanistan policy.
formulation and recognize link between policy and afghanistan and pakistan failed to address that. president trump and secretary pompeo signed the pep taliban contribute to the destabilization that led to this. the committee oversight determine whether bush, obama or trump or biden administration, the committee seeks to understand and learn what went right and what went wrong in 20 years to repeat the mistakes of the past. what was initially focused on al qaeda turned into a 20 year nation you exercise that ended
ultimately to build afghan nation. the administration failed to recognize was hiding in plain sight. the progress we were told we were making for the corners we were told for attorney was based not on facts but on help. the hope that $20 billy military, physically present education system, irreversible process in the hopes did not and the cost of our mistakes by 2461 u.s. service members and more than 100,000 afghans including for the 47000 afghan civilians killed. this is 1000 americans, afghans and families affected by the war. i want to thank the witnesses
were taking a look at some of the policies that got us here and what we could have done different" ever again repeat the mistakes of the past. i recognize ranking member now for opening statement. >> picu, it's what i hope will be public hearings and briefings as we begin the investigation into president biden's withdrawal from afghanistan. president biden the administration push the notion from the two options were available in afghanistan. tens of thousands of troops on the ground indefinitely. i believe it's a false premise. president biden could have listened top generals and advised to counterterrorism behind. this also could have enabled us to keep thousands no matter what
the president claimed in the media, it's abundantly clear they all advised against a full withdrawal fee for evacuation began. on the committee who begged for months to take necessary steps to mitigate the fallout our withdrawal would cause. as a witness and i wrote in our new york times op-ed may 1 -- i'm sorry, may 4. for the united states continued, it was vital resident biden set up agreement with neighboring countries to provide capabilities, develop a clear strategy protecting embassy staff aid workers to continue humanitarian assistance programs
or promises we made to afghan partners that fought alongside troops putting interpreters special immigrant visa programs but he did not about. instead president biden lot politics and bad judgment to dictate national security and conditions on the ground. the response about his commander-in-chief refusing to take responsibly from a static decisions and blame everyone but himself he buried his head in the sand while we watched afghanistan crumble before our very eyes. as a result, president biden failed leadership, 13 american service members killed with 18400. we abandon hundreds of american citizens involve permanent residence behind. all of the bulls eye on her back in the taliban.
there will surely be executed. general billy said recently i withdrawal from afghanistan was a strategic failure. the disaster has created real long-term threats to national security. intelligence committed intelligence capabilities have been diminished. deputy director of the cia defense intelligence agency said al qaeda could develop capabilities to strike u.s. home and within one to two years. general mackenzie said before congress last week that it can't prevent al qaeda entice us from using afghanistan to watch terror attacks into the united states and allies. on top of that, we have endangered allies, abandon partners and embolden adversaries. general milley said last week our credibility has been
intensely reviewed by both allies and adversaries. they damaged, one work that could be used. so much is left to be uncovered and many lessons we've learned from this the last 20 years as you pointed out. you and i met during the search when we had 100,000 troops on the ground. omar was hiding in pakistan, you and i created a footprint of 2500 americans plus nato forces a small price to pay for stability. any withdrawal from should have been conditions based. i appreciate you and other witnesses for appearing here today provide us with your insight thank you for having this hearing and i look forward to many more in the future.
>> the gentleman yields back. turn to the subcommittee on asia and proliferation for one minute. >> thank you and i want to thank the witnesses to be here in front of the committee. obviously the wealth of knowledge the past 20 years, there will be lots of plate on how it was executed but with the expertise on panel, it's important to understand why afghan security forces collapsed after 20 years of investment. by the government collapse and the reason is we are where we are and we have to think about from a counterterrorism perspective the best way to approach afghanistan and the region, how we work with the
countries central asia and working with pakistan to hold some semblance together so it doesn't become that state. in harbor terrorists and etc. i look forward to that and i yield back. >> thank you, ranking member for one minute are you there? >> yeah, i had some technical difficulties here. sorry, mr. chairman. there's a lot of blame to go around why the united states didn't ultimately succeed in afghanistan but the missteps of the previous administration pale in comparison to the biden administration disregard for the resulting human suffering.
it's one of the worst foreign affairs disasters in american history. the biden administration has had a number of excuses and pointing fingers at everyone but the facts are the facts. the taliban are in charge and women in a state of slavery. afghanistan is a haven for terrorists. the terrace now are against us and our allies. allies don't trust us as much and enemies don't fear us as much. as we look back on the last 20 years, it's important to remember while past presidents have talked about leaving, president biden actually did it. he owns the consequences and i get back. >> thank you, ranking member. i introduce our distinguished panel of witnesses. deputy secretary of state 2001
in february 2005 under president george w. bush. lieutenant general mcmaster, national security advisor february 2017 to april 2018 under president donald trump a former career officer, six times as an american iraq, pakistan, urea, kuwait, lebanon and afghanistan. in 2009 under president barack obama -- [inaudible] national security council and the u.s. ambassador nato. they are honored to have you
testified before the foreign affairs committee, you have five minutes to deliver opening remarks your prepared statement is made part of the record. i now recognize witnesses for their testimony and you are now recognized. do we have -- you are on mute. >> can you hear me now? >> now i hear you. >> i apologize.
briefly, thank you for submitting opening statements along with my colleagues this is not my first rodeo show. with your permission, asking questions and i'll do the best i can to answer your questions. thank you very much. >> thank you. mr. mcmaster, you are recognized for five minutes. >> distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be with you and friends on this panel. i focused my statement for the record describing the process of self defeat in afghanistan based on strategic narcissism and self-delusion but i hope we might also discuss long-term consequences associated with the catastrophe there and what we might do to mitigate the consequences begin to recover. military and security political disasters and afghanistan are just beginning. we imposing sharia, more afghans
will suffer. the numbers of refugees will grow. the hostage places that resulted from leaving american and allied citizens behind as well as afghanistan to fought to preserve freedom will continue. jihadist terrorists gaining psychological financial and physical strength as a victory for the taliban is a fervid victory for jihadist terrorists everywhere but especially for those in south and central asia. al qaeda are completely intertwined with the taliban. they and other terrorist organizations are celebrating jihadist victory over the world superpower. they are using our surrender and withdrawal as isis used the establishment of the islamic state in 2014 after complete withdrawal from iraq december 2011 to recruit more to the cost
far beyond their emirate in afghanistan. islamic emirate of afghanistan jihadist access to the lucrative trade and other enterprises, state revenue diverted international assistance but these organizations are not only growing larger in numbers, they are richer and also becoming more destructive humiliating withdrawal terrace with billions of dollars of weapons that will be shared among over 20 u.s. designated organizations in the terrorist echo system across afghanistan pakistan some of the groups have already turned against nuclear armed pakistani army and government. it's not difficult to imagine terrace gaining access to the most destructive weapons on earth. for these reasons i believe are self defeat and afghanistan
broader disengagement from the fight because jihadist terrorists internationally in recent months has made jihadist terrorists more dangerous today than they were on ten september, 2001. finally, we are witnessing political dimension of our lost war tyrone to moscow to beijing, adversaries are imposing and our friends and allies.we are trustworthy. thank you for the privilege of being with you, i believe committee's role may be more important than ever because of humanitarian security and political disaster in afghanistan as a result of incompetence across multiple administrations promise the american people and representatives in congress demand more leaders, the prospect of learning from our experience in south asia
rebuilding strategic confidence and facing the state of 2021 will remain dim. thank you. >> thank you, i recognize ambassador proper for five minutes you are on mute. ambassador you are on cute. >> can you hear me? >> now i hear you. >> i apologize. i've had the privilege post 9/11 afghanistan from different perspectives in different years. i reopened our embassy in kabul in the first week of january, 2002. as it happens, it was secretary there to do that.
we never had a doubt about why we were there with embassy. it was about from america's security's in that never again so any kind of ultimately able to perform in afghanistan to strike us as we were struck on 9/11. that was the case then was the case i returned x ambassador 2011 -- 12. i don't think there was ever a question as to why we were there, what was, what were the means? when i arrived, 800,000 students were. when i left in 2012 it was roughly 8 million from a 35%.
was that a means to our and yes. both genders growing up on the coming of age in an environment of free speech and media these things a long time fruition and here i jump ahead, our ultimate cause of failure here and elsewhere lack of strategic basis. we are not good at long-haul, that is not how we built our country. we want results, we want them now and if we don't get them, then move on to something else and i think afghanistan has emerged as the poster child for that failure. i don't see it as gross incompetence, i don't see it as
confused appreciation of why we were there to defend american security trimming forward in afghanistan. this has doubled more than once most of the colder on the international. our enemies have come because you and that's what we are doing with but as we look forward or attempt to look forward, we have to understand there are dangerous. pakistan next door, i was there for three years in the pakistani are a safe haven. some various elements why?
as they said to me, we know you are going to work out. he went on us again and we will not be left with taliban as our mortal enemy so we had as events proved them right with only 15 minutes because they are scared. the taliban is one of extremist in the pakistani taliban and i understand there's already a conversation underway, greatly enhanced threat to their own security as the taliban increases the message going through the entire islamic world where extremist or important so
how we got there isn't important, what we do not is more important. >> i now recognize ambassador. >> thank you, members of the committee. we are discussing an important topic in this brief statement, not for your work and committees work going forward in several lessons and takeaways on the on tragic events, especially the collapse of the government, including the suicide event, it killed 13 americans and 150 afghan civilians.
natural to focus on the near terms the last several weeks and ask ourselves, how did we come to this? i believe a more powerful inducement assessment would entail a deeper and broader peace but this defeat afghanistan filter for the last 20 years over the last 20 and cumulative effect of the last three euros despite all efforts in nato allies and partners afghan people able to help insulate himself sustainable and able for we do mostly among afghan people. we need to understand why. afghanistan itself. the full story is a broader picture. the capability and mindset military intelligence community
and state department as well as the policy making processes across the administration here in washington. this will render a better understanding of how involvement in afghanistan as it gets. an offer for the committee coming out of your examination histories that follow. let me offer primarily with executing strategy for the purposes of this conversation, i find strategy as the alignment in means overtime. the alignment of what we aim to achieve how we intend to do that ultimately resources required to do that work. if there are disconnects between means of grace, we do not have an effective strategy and they
were often between these. when we sent national goals, we must have a realistic picture of what's possible in a specific sense of deep understanding in fact, emotions, hope or aspiration. we should apply healthy dose of immunity as to what's possible and complex as afghanistan. in 2001 when we initially intervened, afghanistan was a failed state, the worst in the world had virtually no state of institution, deeply fragmented politically and largely from the outside world. setting ambitious goals to both state with a strong sense of government it may be beyond cap buddies from the outset 2001 from 2002. second, once we set realistic goals, who must assemble resources required so the first
seven or eight years, under resourced the effort especially the work in iraq beginning in 2003. the same initial seven or eight years, there's a strong government and present. here's past between article and resources we apply persistent significantly decreased profits for success. we tend to over rely on military means providing too few for discounting importance of political diplomatic development resources. we seldom achieve balanced of government approach. we talked about whole of government but seldom achieve it. it proved to be a political
collapse as military and get a political arm in my view is counted over time. it just happens to be in nato and others but nato allies the nato tree. the day after 9/11, 20 years on the battlefield losing over 1000 killed in action. resources came from the un, the world bank and countless nongovernmental organizations. where the most powerful country in the world that we cannot take interventions like afghanistan alone. the lesson is clear. it cannot do all it needs and all that needs doing cannot be done alone.
one final lesson, the military culture or state department culture we constantly try to harvest lessons and my fellow panelists may agree but between lessons and lessons learned, it's important to define pleasant your committee is doing but even more to actually learn that. i learned, i mean adapting organizations processes and structures and project so the lessons actually mean something. thank you. >> i want to thank you all for your testimony and i recognize members for five minutes each pursuant to the hospital.
the purpose of brushing our witness and recognize of members by committee seniority and democrat and republican. please note i'll be fairly strict in forcing the five minute time limit for questioning so everybody gets the playing a central role on the ending and president trump's taliban whether it was 5 pounds of prisoners, afghan government negotiations, a clear commitment from al qaeda so i guess i could ask first mr. mcmaster, how do you think
things might have been different had the deal agreed to secretary pompeo donald trump happen? >> i think we have to call it what it is, it was an agreement based on concession after concession that not only served the overall purpose which is the priority from afghanistan anthony tolerant and weakening the security forces on the way out there talking about strategic competence and this is an extreme example of incompetence that's essentially doubling down on the mistakes that began in the obama administration. remember president obama in 2010, he announced withdraw troops at the same time and said
negotiate with the taliban, how does that work negotiate with your enemy and give them a timeline for your withdrawal? trump ministration and corrective to the approach in the august 2017 policy abandoned. doubling down on the fundamental flaw of a disconnect between what we are doing militarily and trying to achieve politically so i think it shouldn't be surprising, it was set up for the tremendous failure we've witnessed. of course the bike i ministration has agency over this, could have reversed it provided that but chose not to. i see it as a fundamental flaw across multiple administrations not integrating the limits of power to achieve the objectives. >> let me go to ambassador now in the obama ministration during the time of the bin laden rate which was another opportunity to find a way to leave afghanistan.
we understand the way to open the taliban that predated, tell us how the obama administration killing but modern ending the fighting in afghanistan and negotiation established during the obama administration. >> you are right, obama approved the search of troops other than u.s. troops so it was in december of 2009 is hr laid out. he did that at west point. the next month inside the white house what we consider possible for mother or rumors and possibility the taliban might want to talk to the united states that process developed 2010 and by november 2010,
administration officials authorized by president obama in the head of the political office based in cutter and germany assisted by german intelligence so parallel to the troops surge, there wasn't to explore, there was nothing certain about this or even likely about this but in terms of success for the conservative effort consummate and bring into alignment military and vertical dimensions with the killing of bin laden in 2011 followed a couple of months later and at the beginning of the search itself and they began to taper off in the summer and fall of 2011 so there was a link
although it is abated to get the lot but there was a link between getting bin laden to play to follow. in your testimony, hugh criticized the administration testified to. it was the wrong move. when exactly do you think it would have been the right time to withdrawal? >> thank you, mr. chairman. as i tried to convey in these contingencies overseas. we talk about absolutes, winning and losing.
we don't use those terms, never have. conflicts that cannot be one possible sense and that's i think my we were in afghanistan. when i left kabul in 2012, we had 100,000 u.s. troops on the ground. it tells not of a 34 c-uppercase-letter and afghanistan by the time president obama left office, summer over 10% of what was in the numbers continued to drop still the taliban held no capitals. it seemed to me we were in a position where it was a modest force, nato partners, i think it
could have that security problem indefinitely. that simply tells your adversary or enemy how long. that is the irony of course, as general master alluded to the trump administration thing august 2017th not the calendar, it's condition so i think we threw away a chance for security apartment much of america's power is symbolic and the symbol of u.s. military presence was no longer engaged in combat.
that itself is a powerful weapon and we just gave it up. >> thank you, my time has expired. >> my conversations with national security secretary pompeo, the fabric agreement was always conditions based that's been mentioned. hard to fathom unconditional in the telegram. but having said that, i know there is a lot of blame to go around but i want to thank you for the service and hotspots in the region. the state department is responsible for evacuation. they did not take our advice york times op-ed they left american citizens behind still somewhat today and pretty much all afghan partners will
certainly face execution. based on your long-term experience, how would you rate this evacuation? >> it would be hard to recall, i can't recall one that was more chaotic than the one experienced in afghanistan clearly anticipate the takeover, certainly not -- i assume not our boots on the ground. obviously this would be the subject of the hearings so having been through an evacuation or two the fact that we did not end up with the situation with our embassies without diplomats just to ensure
it couldn't get any worse than it already was so yes, are on the board as no one left behind in the rest of the special visa program. but we left literally thousands behind putting their family. it's obviously our first priority, we left a lot of others behind, we left behind afghan women and girls who heated our call once they drink military, strike a business. you take those steps, we've got your back.
>> we all have visited so many times but there is talk telegram normalizing relationships and legitimize governments. when i look at the makeups of the leadership same old cast of characters strong ties of terrorism and al qaeda, or peak your advice to the administration in terms of normalization and relationship with the taliban? >> first, for comparison, the taliban takeover in the mid- 90s is not what we are looking at now. i think they closer parallel would be the iranian revolution of 1979 in which we were told by rance similarly your ship in the fall 79, now is the time to come back as u.s. they missed read it because they
had no idea what was going on in the inner circles. i think that is what we are looking at now. we are probably going to see something of revolution within the taliban so we cannot predict with the taliban will do next in large part because they can't predict. >> my final question, the capability talking about that, that is the capability, i've been talking about this for a while. i don't see how you can effectively do that eight hours away we could even do a proper drone strike while on the ground in afghanistan. now they are talking about partnering with russia central asia is the counterterrorism on this capability.
>> thank you, these are rates to be conducted against obvious targets but of course now you have the taliban control of large urban areas in these populations which the likelihood of collateral damage a big risk as we saw the strike after the mass murder attack afghans at the airport. it's almost impossible to gain visibility of a terrorist network without partners on the ground, helping with human intelligence to map the networks so i think it can be a band-aid, we could go after the most egregious jihadist terrorist leaders with this capability but the idea, effective counterterrorism against organizations like al qaeda is a
pipe dream. the other thing to remember our capitulation agreement to the taliban, we still recognizing the airspace as well, reluctant to take actions we should be taking now against terrorizing afghan civilians or even forcing safe zones for refugees and those still resisting the taliban. i think over horizon capability has only a limited knowledge of what it takes to conduct counterterrorism. >> i totally agree and i seek my time has expired. >> i now recognize the gentleman from california for five minutes. >> i won't disagree with the ranking member, he said we'd leave by may 1 of this year.
he's committed to doing so, he did so in negotiations where he excluded the afghan government. in world war ii, we want a complete victory for we were able to rebuild adversaries in our own image and we came away perhaps then with the idea we should solve problems rather than manage problems and i think he correctly identified the fact that there are total victories and the problems need to be managed. the american people have strategic inpatients. part of that may be our culture and part of it is our leaders don't level with us. no one told us we are going to go to afghanistan and be there 50 years and remake afghanistan
and incur 20 casualties a year for the latter 40 of the 50 years. they told us we were winning and creating something so i don't know whether american is incapable of doing what they did maintain offensive force along the river for hundreds of years. i don't know whether we are incapable of doing that because of our people or our leaders. there should have been a better plan for withdrawal in response to my questions demonstrating there was no trump plan. he's had the administration currently inherited a deadline, it did not inherit a plan. now the general testified as if they had a plan for an effective withdrawal but has pointed out, it wasn't there withdrawal plan, it was a plan to stay there with
at least 2500 of our forces released -- but perhaps 25 years. when you leave the 500, that means they get in trouble you have to be prepared to deploy more. historians will argue perhaps we should have stayed in afghanistan. the last ten years we were there, the cost of casualties or 1% of what we incurred earlier of the american people were never consulted about long-term engagement. they were like to about what was happening and that brings me to believe without question -- the american people we are being told after osama bin laden was killed, creating an afghan way to exclude terrorists from afghan territory and then
withdrawal. we are making progress towards that goal in 2003 and four and five and six and seven. mr. mcmaster, did the people running our policy believe that in which case they were totally out of touch with what was going on in the country or did they just figure that mislead the american people into believing that for whatever reason? >> i think they were under the assumption progress is linear and they didn't acknowledge over the future that our enemies have and figures you mentioned in 2003, four, five talents generate pakistan help of the isi and al qaeda so it's never linear acted as if it was.
>> the american people in 2017 and said we are in worse position now for 2007 have not made progress. the american people were being told every year we are making progress towards this goal. they may not be new jersey but it excludes -- who want in a better position in 2017 and 50007. why were the insiders lying to us or did they not? >> i think you're right, across multiple administrations our leadership including president did not tell the immigrant people they deserve to know, why do they care? what's at stake and what is the strategy to deliver a favorable outcome? >> we will have to have our nation as a people and in order to do that, we need a leadership
that levels with us and says sometimes you have to stay on the front lines hopefully with minimal casualties over decades. >> gentlemen time has expired. i now recognize the representative of new jersey to the ranking member on the subcommittee, for five minutes. >> thank you for calling this important hearing thank you for your insights and leadership. perhaps you could speak to the issue of how many americans and afghan allies were left behind in what's happening to them right now. is there any hope for rescue exports happening day today marks general mcmaster in your testimony, confidence is shaken, jihadist terrorists world superpowers and the previous
hearing secretary blinken, i asked about the response of china, how are they internalizing what happened here as it relates to taiwan an uptick by the chinese military against taiwan's very bad things, we don't know yet but positive and negative china has taken a somehow less engaged, we left this matter, does that make it more likely? i would remind my colleagues, i've been here since 1980, i phrase human rights issue in china entire 41 years. i am on their hit list right now according to their newspapers. genocide is going on all of us
spoke out boldly but it's not good iota of what xi jinping and what they are doing to the care. hong kong obviously has lost seriously democracy, what is xi jinping doing? i asked secretary blinken the other day whether or not the july 23 phone call when stated that we need to show a better position whether true or not, it seems to me true or not, whatever is true is true and whatever is not, we should not proceed as true. his answer is, he does not respond to elite transfer from phone calls and that was reported, perhaps you would like to speak to that as well because that is troubling to me. we looking at perception rather
than reality and i'll start afghanistan need to get out my understanding hundreds my complete understanding is thousands of individuals eligible for special recess and their families ministration in humanitarian parole to cover thousands of other afghans. how do you get them out? here i think the administration has done one thing i do applaud, they've reorganized their structures for dealing with the issue of folks coming out of afghanistan so there is an element focus on free settlement in this country, there is an element focused on afghans in
third countries and u.s. process oversees an element within afghanistan who need to get out ambassador my colleague is heading that and they need to get out cannot think of a more capable and experienced individual he created to head up the effort. she is well known secretary so i hope with these here distinctions that are focused and people who know how to do stuff that we may now start to see something move more effectively getting the people out. >> thank you. >> i think what is important is to agree to which it reveals the reversal of morality associated with engagement with the afghans the degree to which we are
harboring the tolerant against the afghan government. i think that is what we are for doing. urging to do more for peace. the taliban were accelerating at that moment, would asked to go to do more for peace in connection with encouragement of the chinese communist party, they've been really clear about it. the fall of kabul, the message was you really think america has your back? massive numbers threatening taiwan now much like i think you can make the connection between unenforced redline into syria 2013 and 14 russia's annexation of crimea area as well as china's weapon icing in the south china sea.
deterrence capability times will and i think what makes this time dangerous as many of our adversaries are will is down to about zero so it's extremely dangerous time we are entering into your committee has an important role waking us up to that danger. >> thank you, the gentlemen's time has expired and i reppert recognize inter- gentlemen of florida. you have five minutes. >> thank you for your leadership and making sure the committee provides oversight on afghans withdrawal. i think our witnesses, it's a distinguished panel. i have to follow-up on your last comment write a straight line from your withdrawal from afghanistan the way it was handled to the actions today this week by china over taiwan.
what would you suggest there were appropriate response should be your suggestion i gather is since a deterrent has been lost? >> it is to destroy terms by convincing taiwan through coercion or military force a lot of the actions the administration undertakes are positive in that to strengthen and applaud the august agreement and especially the arms and encouragement of the taiwan forces in leadership to make taiwan indigestible to the people's liberation army and there are a range of actions china can take below the threshold for concerted literary responses from the u.s. and our allies and partners in the region. ...
administrations and with the idea and when someone side the gauges it's worth reflecting that these jihadists are waging endless jihadist against us. so can you speak to that coordination and consultation and to, that the steps that we can take to approve and reaffirm our commitment going forward under nato? >> i spent the last two days
at nato headquarters. and i have asked repeatedly needed nine —- nato officials and allies that suggest the insufficient consultation with us withdrawal and frankly inside headquarters is to the us withdrawal and on one occasion the foreign ministers of defense that most often over the last two days but not this summer but the consultation leading up to the lack of consultation with the trump ordeal february 2020.
from the media and there was a period of time with the trump administration had the agreement the taliban with the nato allies. that is the source point with regard to consultation. >> i. >> the ranking member on the subcommittee is now recognized for five minutes. >> i will begin an admission on operation iraqi freedom is over. and at the time and the iraq withdrawal that exactly three
whites out curtains over and that is what we have seen in iraq and fortunately and now we are seeing in afghanistan. you have to start charging the sorts of things to the second part of your question i would just refer you to the force that came in with the airborne troopers and they did a fabulous job with a horrific situation we lost folks there the marina maybe korman and the trooper for me in the real in 1983 i was there and then to growth in april and i was
there and i have to say that i exceedingly that in the after action reports how the marines and others were lost meant to be put on the shoulders of the airborne commander they did a brilliant job. >> and then the responsibility to not place any hilar on the commander at the time. i just want to put that on the record. thank you. >> my general mcmaster how do you think tehran and beijing and moscow how the withdrawal
eurasian landmass. and have weapons to that taliban have much better information than that but i did so they are in a rush to accommodate with the taliban so the idea to disengage from afghanistan makes us more competitive and it makes no sense at all. because the other regions are arenas of competition with russia and china and the last that they had in our state power and you see this in particular with iranians thank you are right and are emboldened by this message to the parliamentarian of iraq
afghanistan without sufficient background. we had a history to rebuild nations at your overall opinion not just afghanistan but elsewhere. >> but it does play out with the other scenarios. them not really understanding what was going on. >> and in the last 50 years? >> you have to give me a few minutes. >> maybe some of the other witnesses can respond to that? but they are examples of where we still are we are still in bosnia and cozumel they prefer
the situations they are in now have the intervention of panama in a long-term support through columbia to be an utterly failed stay in 1999 how about south korea from 1953? it looked pretty bleak on a path to be successful and then govern reforms in the eighties. no short-term solutions to long-term problems but in afghanistan we understood well enough i was just asking enough afghans and figured it out. that they were based on fantasy in washington instead of reality on the ground. think of what leaders told us.
and it is delusional. and with that sharia. and it would be laughable if not so devastating. >> but after the 20 year experience in afghanistan is there any development or security component of what we tried to do that is readable? >> it was because we sustained our commitment to bear the brunt of the fight to maintain and preserving those freedoms the feet will be accomplished based on asked watching the taliban take it away. >> now that fade it is there anything left. >> i think in the hearts of afghans that when we keep saying what's engage the taliban on the future afghanistan how about engaging the 90 percent of afghans who don't want to live under
taliban rule and giving them a voice that is something your committee can do as well. >> and i had one thing. >> that because over time between 2005 and 2006 with our ambassador all the cables are coming in saying we are not coming in so we are changing but yet we never change really was a group of blind were asked to describe so then they describe these women's issues
but how about the one strike that was never made and we have at the end of the day i have started the speed with which things fell because afghan soldiers just the government was not worth the sacrifice of their life saw that before and vietnam the exact same thing. >> thank you mr. chair i believe my time is expired. >> i now recognize the senator from pennsylvania for five minutes spent thinking mr. thank you thank you mr. chairman for holding hearings. have to say the american people want accountability especially with the circumstances from the
lieutenant colonel. i will not defend his actions as a guy who is been privilege is wearing the uniform for a long time but the irony that he is being punished this horrific astounding failure and maybe the administration wants it to work out this way there is a lot of conjecture but the american people didn't want it this way and another people on the panel today with their responsibility for what just happened in my good friend from sherman oaks to say that administration left no plan i get it but to say with the paris climate accord go down to the mexico city
policy but we couldn't find it in their heart to get us out of afghanistan in a responsible and laced —- life-saving way and then to suggest we have present i will turn to general mcmaster the designation of non- major allies but why you think this administration has refused to tell the congress of its intent to terminate that for afghanistan and with the context of american tax dollars the lives have just been going there and in many people's minds it is wasted they feel like they don't want to continue to pay the corrupt government of afghanistan and that terrace superstate. >> you mean pakistan.
>> no i mean afghanistan then i get to pakistan. >> anything is delusional to think any of the money that goes to the taliban for humanitarian purposes would for them to solidify their power to become an even greater threat we are in a situation where things it's tough for us to mitigate without empowering the taliban. i think we should give any assistance to pakistan we have two great experts here but pakistan should be confronted with behavior over the years that has resulted in the
selection we spend a dime to pakistan under any conditions and then to be confronted with international isolation because of the support but the her connie network. >> wire that not moving forward with a pakistan status as a major nato ally. what is the premise quick. >> i think they should move forward that's a good idea. >> there is some question for you to answer. >> the only time we have ever laid out a very clear or realistic assessment and as president trump speech august 2017. he abandoned it and he double down on the flaws of the administration for quite a how that happened but if you go back to the august 27 speech
that was pakistan as well. with the fundamental changes behavior. >> . >> and you can answer for the biden administration but secretary brian can accepted a speaking fee in the prime minister of pakistan praises the taliban every day should we care about that? is that a nonissue does that point to a relationship issue. >> i don't know anything about it but i cannot imagine for a speaking fee and i hope that's the case better person asks the next question ambassador crocker spent a lot more time there than i did. >> i yield the balance. >> the gentle man yelled back.
>> i now recognize representative feel keating from massachusetts for five minutes. >> it's a perfect segue to my question that i wanted just want to remind the gentle man that just spoke secretary blinken was in front of this committee and i questioned him about our relationship now with pakistan and he did say clearly we have to reassess that relationship just to remind the gentle man who just spoke before me. but pakistan remains a problem it is long-standing activities by many accounts and that puts it mildly for decades with you go back to 96 when the taliban to control when you go to the
change in 2001 in afghanistan and then the reconstruction of the taliban in 2005. they were there giving assistance by all accounts. but indeed right up to this current change of the government, pakistan suggest they are intelligence was indebted with them and clearly the relationship with the her connie network is a grave concern for you to go back to the branding pakistan was involved in brand testing of the actual name. i could go on and on. we definitely have to reassess
that may affect our relations with india can you comment on that? is not just recently in the few months of this administration but from decades and with many administrations republican and democratic alike. i would like your comments on pakistan. >> i don't think we have time. [laughter] right now one of my colleagues said to have the strategic depth and desires by having afghanistan on their side but it's not as if the pakistani taliban with their government particularly well and in kashmir and when kashmir blows up which it very well might india china pakistan i don't
was being facetious i just don't think we have a proper way. >> reclaiming my time. >> they are not worried about her connie network by my own reflections connie network ambassador crocker would you like to chime in back. >> on the reassessment. >> i would agree with the points that my colleagues just made that pakistani worked against us at those fundamental aspects with the support of the taliban and earlier i tried to present the narrative as to why they waited walkout not be left as a mortal enemy.
as satisfying as it would be to a lot of us to punish pakistan i don't have the luxury they are already worried of the repercussions inside their own country of the taliban so-called victory in afghanistan we can say they deserve whatever they get but again, says secretary armitage said the blowup in kashmir will bring us regional war. so reassessment is always good but let's reassess for a clear eye on the taliban takeover of the afghanistan is created throughout the region. we do not need a completely destabilized pakistani state. >> i know i cut you off the
quickly. >> i have ten seconds left i will yield back. >> the gentle man yield back now the gentleman from california for five. >> thank you mr. chairman and secretary armitage, you and i have some history. but it is a little closer to a lot of examples they want to use today in the opening statement you submitted for the record, you said just outside on the correct —- corrupt government of kabul was not worth sacrifice of the afghan people they saw this and we did not. sure you stand by that statement that you put out.
>> i not only stand by that statement. >> i will give you some rhetorical is because i think it is a good statement but also have to be nuanced. during the time for example when we were finally taking our bases out of the philippines the philippine government could be considered to be corrupt by any standards
say we start? and we could go on and look at the shaw of iran and those successes and failures that including saigon, the question is if that is the case then are we basing our support for government if they are worthy or if our strategic interest in the long run against evil such as iran and china are worth fighting? and i take you back to our early careers when we were fighting the cold war against
the soviet union and trying to give an opportunity for dozens of countries behind the iron curtain to become free. something that became a reality during our lifetime. >> we make cold calculations of our national security that for instance in the philippines president marcos was taking us down the new people's army we were afraid
we would lose our position in the philippines. so we flipped amassing we have to like the leaders. we have to understand their weak points we are not doing anything to overcome the weak points. >> and from the beginning but the minute i have remaining for each witness if the secretary is to be understood our interest is in a freer and more for ourselves in which human beings have a better opportunity to have very defective governments by kings or educators of all sorts, if that is our goal than don't we
have to look at remaining with the military and with those 37 million people of afghanistan. >> me very definitely failed in that endeavor and it is ironic that with afghanistan we have a rare intersection of our values of our national security interest we have a generation of afghans of the media environment who had an open curriculum that was a huge investment toward a more stable afghanistan that would enhance our values from the world at large and then we walk away from it. >> thank you i yield back.
>> . >> thank you mr. chairman are calling this hearing. it's an opportunity we can discuss that remain engage with our stakeholders on the ground. with the lgbtq and other vulnerable populations that the shadow of america's longest war will serve as an opportunity to scrutinize and then to raise war in the future and then to take stock of our responsibility for military action. so secretary armitage i would like to begin with you you referenced the deeply corrupt nature of afghanistan and the inability of the afghan army
to repel the taliban advance what lessons are there to learn and how we respond to the open secret that was mired in corruption and how can us military and the congress address this issue more proactively and effectively? >> see events are part of the question. we could have used that with a lot more congressional oversight and we could have used and that all wars must and and it's hard to get out. so if the definition of insanity is the same thing over and over expecting a different result we were doing some insanity. we can train the afghan army again. we have done it many times before. we can equip them again they
any much help shooting weapons so that we do in my statement the willingness to die for that government i like the understand that. some of them were terrifically large. >> and if it is the lieutenant general eikenberry with afghanistan they have blind off the city well in afghanistan they have a company commander and if they have that commander that is not good. >> so there are a ten of questions that lieutenant general said so if we altogether learn the lessons?
>> ambassador one of the other issues that is important with the intelligence community based on the emulating how we can better promote information exchanges between the national security community and state department in congress the information is given to congress is genuinely up-to-date and authentic even if they promote consternation among some members and there are some existing models to help ensure that information so i thought every time i was in afghanistan we had a description of just a little more time a little more true presence and resources and to highly improve the situation of conducting oversight based on accurate and reliable information. >> it is a very interesting
composition to require a complete overhaul of the way the administrations think of congress and think of their agenda and how they are promoting. clearly as a serving member of the administration to call to testify it is representing the administration there is nothing realistic to expect you will get the objective testimony from someone who is currently inside the administration so a more appointed and sustain conversation between congress and the administration any administration toward that end would be helpful. >> and ambassador did you say the prior administration did not dispel to our allies when
president trump negotiates surrender they learned about it by reading in the newspaper? if that is correct then and is different but the biden administration had deep consultation so describe that conduct on the relationship with our allies. >> yes. but about the intelligence here at nato? it is a lasting effect of the february 2020 when allies first learned of the agreement with the taliban and beyond that to get the test to include those that were stonewalled. so let me get this straight we have been there for 20 years
and the taliban agreement? that will have a lasting stain on our relationship. now it is imperative take a lot of effort. >> i yield back. >> the gentleman's time is expired i now recognize the gentleman from illinois for five minutes. >> thank you everybody for being here. this is important we will face us again someday. if history is a guide and it always is. but that the understand what the average american does that joe biden bungled the execution of the pullout and donald trump set it up to fail. you cannot negotiate with the ends data allegiance about it daily and expect to get any kind of a good deal.
i want to be clear about that. also hearing about the surrender of the afghan military it's important to keep in mind that is what they don't in afghan military think there is a lot of forces in this world to consult from the taliban without logistics for air support. i thank you will see the military in this breakdown i think it's clear we surrender necessarily in this fight we can have the peace tomorrow that in a few days you may not have that piece anymore but general mcmaster i did read your book it's very good and recommended that first, you discuss corruption and i want to ask you and the taliban with a full government that is
where the endless war come down to corrupt so talk about the role of corruption and how we could have done a better quick. >> thank you for the opportunity. we had counter corruption and the task force once we realized it was a fatal threat to the state too little too late in any of the recommendations is not make it past washington dc because we continue to turn a blind eye but it's poorly understood where the corruption came from with a short term approach to long-term for afghanistan we kept telling them now we are really leaving so who has her back? nobody so the return of the civil war from 92 to 96 we need to build up the warchest and the so this incentivize
those we empowered as the main defeat mechanism with the special forces and their power to then more into those networks who captured the institutions and functions to be rebuilt of the taliban destruction of those institutions and with those organizations did is they stole from the state and weekend the state and high made karzai who has is that? nobody he began to cut deals so he gave these groups license to steal in exchange for that protocol so that's why they hobble out and will weaken the state institution we try to build and the political drivers and then to
address it in the fundamental way and backing the reforms that were not necessary so again did need to be denmark with a political settlement and political structure in place anti- jihadist terrorist and that is what we have the reason why afghan forces collapsed we delivered psychological blow to the capitulation which you mentioned to not allow afghans to be part of that negotiation to force the afghan government to release 5000 of the most heinous people on earth to go back to terrorizing the afghan people and then announcing our straw giving them the truth limits. that is capitulation is what that is and then they went
around to the afghan units and said this is how this will go with the backing to be intertwined with connie network and al qaeda you can accommodate with us where we kill your family. how does that sound? that's why they collapsed and the withdrawal of our airpower which was the afghan forces advantage the differential advantage was documented by the groups but it was their unscrupulous and the willingness to terrorize. they didn't give up their differential advantage i don't think it is a mystery at all and it should be unacceptable i think to disparage the afghans and those that made
the ultimate sacrifice to preserve the freedoms of those taken away from the afghan people. >> your time is expired. with the subcommittee on asia here recognized for five minutes. >> it surprises me knowing that each of the witnesses have perspectives i think all of you present the real complexity of building a successful government there if afghanistan falls into my jurisdiction of the subcommittee i would like to focus my time on the current situation that we have and how we are to think about maybe i will start with ambassador proctor i have had direct
conversations say that while our relationship is at the all-time low, this is a point in time they have to step back and certainly with a government that is fording forming in afghanistan like in terms of the coalition that it is in pakistan's interest not to have a failed state of the civil war of the base of operations where these terrorist networks can operate the that pakistan is a nuclear armed country that we will see i don't trust pakistan they have state actors but from your assessment how do we work with that conversation and has been much more helpful and with afghanistan and how do we avoid a full civil war?
>> the short answer is we probably cannot avoid a full civil war but what we do need to do is talk to the region starting with pakistan that is the greatest danger they face these internal threats and it doesn't change the fact that the post taliban takeover in afghanistan is under greater threat than it has ever been so analyze a threat what is real and what is not how they can be mitigated and expand that to the region as you know use that to start and to take a stand and all of those north the afghanistan need to be part of the conversation. and i think in a ironic kind
of way the american withdrawal and the chaos that surrounded it has gotten everybody's attention that this may not be the outcome that we want what will he do about it? so to see if we can broker a set of conversations to act like a leader going back to the statements of the colleagues they tried to make today to see how collectively we can deal. >> with the taliban administration to be put in place maybe this is the taliban of the 19 nineties that afghanistan is not the
afghanistan of the 1980s but it is investment education it has changed the people of afghanistan i hope that people just don't rollover even with the brutality of the taliban what can we do to support the people of afghanistan to come up with a better option? >> i think we will see in the next year the most immediate challenges a humanitarian crisis which would have happened with the taliban taking power but in combination of financial resources are largely on vaccination and the health concerns with the drought playing out with food security at the all-time low coupled with the fact we now have a government in the transition government they know how to
fight but they are not a government. so now large-scale in confidence with lack of incompetence across the government that's a recipe for humanitarian disasters the one thing we have to do that we don't want to empower the taliban in the process but a humanitarian disaster if this plays out is forecasted will also be a continuing reflection on us and how we left afghanistan this is not over and will be played out especially going into the winter months with the harsh conditions have winter and how that plays out on the doorstep. >> my time is expired. >> device rig raking member
for five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman this committee has a duty to provide oversight of the administration disasters withdrawal from afghanistan. i certainly appreciate your attention to this critical issue. over the forest the 20 long difficult years in afghanistan us service members restore the safety of the american homeland even if they want remarkable progress for respect for human rights and prosperity and limited quality of drive. the biden administration is disorganized and dishonorable from afghanistan to threaten to wipe away our progress it has made america less safe and it has created a human tragedy
of unimaginable proportions in afghanistan. the harrowing day following the 9/11 attacks when president bush declared war on terrorism and on august 31st not long after they robbed us of 13 young more servicemembers president biden declared a war over. president biden's unilateral announcement ignores the intentions of our adversaries as long as they are bent on attacking the united states their people and their interest the war on terrorism must continue. makes it much more difficult for the united states to effectively prosecute that war. general mcmaster, how will the
administration's failure to secure intelligence and strike capability agreements with third countries bordering afghanistan affect our counterterrorism posture and how do we best make up for lost time? >> thank you. it is not a theoretical academic case plan terrace key gain control they become orders of magnitude more dangerous. we know this from september 11 and we know it from the rise of isis after we declare the war in iraq over and disengage from iraq as well as politically the policies and then it became isis. and then 195 attacks
internationally and then to just inspire attacking san bernardino so we have to do is redouble our efforts by integrating all power all like-minded partners to look at sources of strength and support but financially and ideologically. >> i get a sense we are disengaging. >> in my concern is we have no one in the region afghanistan not being a reliable us partner we need to develop those relationships let me ask you again general mcmaster what should we expect to see from the peoples republic of china and its approach to pakistan moving forward post us withdrawal how they seek to
advance their interest on the ground in afghanistan and what does that for the us and our partners, especially india. >> it is dangerous situation that investor crocker said take on much more ably but that two things in china's interest that the pakistani government go after the jihadist groups is also in the interest of security and stability across south asia one of the greatest dangers is india suffering the sectarian violence you see across the greater middle east that is incited like al qaeda. >> ambassador crocker.
>> i would agree the chinese have created their own vulnerability with their populations of the west so they have a strong incentive to use on pressure on pakistan to bring about a better result we have seen so far. >> the representative from nevada is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you to the panelist in so many questions so many have been asked and answered that one other thing i would like to hear about from secretary army ties without written statement there are several periods in the time of that are potential points of departure the first is with the bond agreement to say
there is little opposition to president karzai and animist to the united states and afghanistan was at peace plan was there ever an exit strategy when we got into afghanistan? and why did we consider leaving after with these points you mentioned? >> . >> there was no real exit strategy we run automatic pilot. and that someone that is absolutely correct and then to leave little animus towards us. and then to be a karzai government. and then to with us now in the
mountain alongside pakistan and that would have been a perfect time for them to pull out and then there are several others in an me take advantage. the administration started to turn in succession and second once you do that there wasn't enough center of gravity in the administration left of afghanistan. it is difficult for the us government to have major issues simultaneously. >> . >> that i lead ask that we keep hearing about their nation building to get al
qaeda to the nation building may have all this usaid money and personnel and resources that some are in response to the military. but they seem so disjointed if they have been more coordinated and efforts instead of one off across the spectrum. >> i will take a crack at that. congresswoman the heart of the issue is that my colleagues have spoken of the corruption is certainly true so the hard truth is an those institutions and their body of law that goes with. . . . .
it has got to be broader than the inspector general focused and significant as they may have been they get to technicals in a strategic level since the inspector general report to congress located use of the about this. in terms of coordination within the administration we also brought this forward that the military operation base for activities. lots of money right now for immediate results, very small fraction for something available
and tries to operate on longer terms we will have to find a way how the military starts funding. >> i lost you, i'm sorry. >> we caught the last 15 seconds ambassador. >> ray able to hear me now? >> yes we are can you sum up the last 15 seconds, we did not hear the answer. >> we better find a better way to synchronize funding which are for results right now into a longer-term focus on development
strategies. an early important task for congress to consider undertaking. >> thank you very much ambassador. >> thank you, mr. chairman i yield back. >> the gentleman's time expires in the gentlelady yields back i recognized brian massa florida for five minutes. spring entered. >> think ambassador for giving me the time some of you have answered some questions and some have answered other questions and some of you have repeated a few of the old questions and get a survey because not everybody has answered the same question about how you feel about the different occurrences. >> we lost you mr. mayor. mr. mayor we lost you.
>> can you hear me now? >> now we hear you. >> perfect i'm glad i'm back. >> thank you, mr. chair i'm going to go down the line in alphabetical order so we don't step on each other for doing on alphabetical order. >> we lost you again. >> we lost you. >> i wish i knew why is is a helpful internet here. >> let's try it again. >> i appreciate it mr. chairman.
i wanted to ask president biden said on inauguration and going to make mistakes, when i make them i will acknowledge them and i will tell you do you believe who's acknowledged his mistakes with afghanistan? >> no, i don't i think he has acknowledged his decision to get out which took courage but the toll evacuation was suddenly toolbar and not many people have owned up to that yet. >> think ambassador. >> i agree completely. >> thank you. >> the president has said a couple times the buck stops here but it's not clear what happens to the buck after it stops of the president i have not seen corrective action that would indicate good moves. >> general? >> i don't think so i don't
think i've ever seen such a disconnect between what our leaders tell us what is happening in afghanistan during this crisis and what is actually happening on the ground. the hypocrisy has reached unprecedented levels in the same speech to the adherence of the timeline that we gave to the taliban of our agreement saying the human rights were an important part of our policy and the list goes on i think it's a tremendously disappointing. >> thank you general i want to move to a different date, april 9 office of director of national intelligence, they said the taliban is likely to gain on the battlefield and afghan government will struggle to hold the taliban if the coalition would draw support, do you believe that president biden received that report? >> it would be hard for me too believe that he yet received it
we have been seeing things of that nature as a bureaucracy since 2005 - 2006. >> ambassador crocker? >> i know how washington works i wish i knew less, it's hard for me too believe that he would not be aware of that. >> thank you, sir. >> it would be my assumption that he knew as well. >> thank you general? >> i just know the process giving the president the best analysis and multiple options with an assessment of the disadvantage of those options i do not know. >> thank you general. >> i want to move to another date april 14 president biden announced that he would withdraw from afghanistan from september 11, the anniversary do you believe that choosing that day was about optics. that's arbitrage.
>> i think september 11 was waving a red flag in front of a bull. >> investor crocker? >> i received a physical blow the horns of 9/11 we all witnessed he would choose that day all over others for the evacuation i think he realized it and changed. >> i have no basis to judge why that date was picked is certainly did not make sense. general. >> i think it was a front to all those who served in making that announcement in area 60 of arlington cemetery really reveals an astonishing misunderstanding of what it means to serve in our military and the fact that airmen and
marines are going to be pitied and what they want is leaders who are dedicated to achieving an outcome and worthy of the sacrifices that they make in war it is worth pointing out september 11 is the anniversary of the taliban wanted for anybody who misted the taliban ran on television station in kabul in a blamed the united states for 9/11 for bringing the attacks on themselves and denied the fact that al-qaeda had any role. >> i thank you all for your answers, mr. chairman i believe my time is expired. >> the time has expired. i recognize joaquin castro of texas of the subcommittee on international development and organization in the corporate social impact. >> taking for your testimony in being here with us today deputy secretary, it is great to see you again we talked a few years ago about japan i have a
question that is a little bit involved but i want to ask it in your opening statement you mentioned then secretary of state, defendants did not carry through on the elimination of the taliban in afghanistan and they were allowed to escape to pakistan following the campaign. why do you suspect the secretary did not follow through on this campaign there was reported at the time that discussed the airlift claiming that the bush administration approved of the plan to allow the pakistanis to evacuate officers embedded with the taliban back to safety along with the taliban and al-qaeda fighters what can you tell us about the airlift andrew thinking at the time and the role that pakistan played keeping the taliban alive during those years. >> the latter part that pakistan
provided food and everything else to the taliban and speaking specifically, needing the fact that osama bin laden was living for so long not patentable that the pakistanis did not know about it i would be extraordinarily disappointed if i knew there was an agreement that the pakistan embedded would be allowed to escape, however, it is not saying that there weren't pakistanis embedded in the chief trainer of the taliban and i've known him for a number of years he has been killed by a group and as to why he did not prosecute, i don't know but i would invite you to have them testify. >> thank you deputy secretary, anyone on the panel a question on afghanistan as you look back
over the course of the two decade shift experience afghanistan, what do you think that we accomplished and what opportunities were missed and what do you think the main lessons learned from the intervention of afghanistan on nation building and development assistance on civil military operations and how they apply to other situations i know we only have to have minutes left of my time but i pose that whoever would like to take a shot any of those pieces to that question. >> our longest term impact with through the support of education for female education and we have a generation that has grown up in a free immediate environment and a curriculum that is not dictated by an autocrat, again an entire generation in their 20s an early 30s for whom
the norm is an open society we just quit on them too soon before they were in a position to undertake major societal change. >> if i can weigh in on that i think we used 20 years to accomplish a great deal in terms of making a country more safe we have counterterrorism capabilities in terms of detecting terrorists and doing something about them that really stretches across the globe and at home a much harder target than we were on 9/11 we have a network of counterterrorism partners that did not exist on 9/11 and frankly we have very heavy attrition decimated for al-qaeda the leadership on 9/11 was in afghanistan and pakistan, that part of al-qaeda has been decimated it is not eliminated it is not 0 but a fraction of what it was we would use the last 20 years to make herself
safe. >> i would agree with that from the beginning i said were in a more dangerous situation than september 10, 2001 the reason were not seen attack like 9/11 or defensive capabilities that we develop but the groups are growing stronger and to get to your question were learning the wrong lessons in a lot of the conventional wisdom about afghanistan is completely wrong and in connection with the idea that the nation building is a dirty word and in consolidation of gains to get the political outcomes has never been an optional phase in war it is if you're doing a military raid which is in operation of military purpose and short duration of plan withdrawal but as conrad has said we have never been able to never do it again and i think it was our desire to not do it to disengage quickly that set us up for failure in the long-term. >> thank you.
>> i now recognize tim for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman can you hear me now? there is reports that the isis came over the killed the 13 americans including one of my constituents the one member of the united states army over 150 afghans at the international airport from the bagram air base when the taliban took control. in transferred to another location, i think the administration needs to answer for the reckless decisions in the middle the night why do you think there is no plan to secure and transfer these prisoners.
>> called the center quickly the mission given to the military maybe it's a question to ask our senior military people and secretary austin the mission was not to get every american out it was not to get every allied citizen out that was helping us or to get afghans out that were brutalized and departed in the mission was not to mitigate that we knew was going to be a disaster of a complete withdrawal the mission was to get the hell out and withdraw on this timeline and adhere to these troop levels once that becomes your mission and the end we should not be surprised by any of us we should not have been surprised by that attack on the airport that killed 13 over servicemen and women and over 100 afghans the haqqani's, haqqani was in charge of security at the airport they are running the cobble attack network for over a decade, we
think of these as distinct but they have logic communication and cooperate with even isis ki think this is a deliberate effort, i do not have evidence for this but that was a deliberate effort to humiliate us on our way out and what we heard our leaders saying we are cooperated with the taliban on security that should be stomach turning to all of us we seeded our agency because we stock with a surrender agreement and guess what happens when you surrender to terrorists this is what happened. >> i agree with you that leads me too my next question you might've answered it, the thoughts of the biden administration to rely on the taliban for security, that is pretty much in mind of what you just said, any others like to comment on that? >> it's a question of mission and if the mission was to get
out under extremely dire circumstances american citizens and others who help the american effort if that is the mission in your gonna have to talk to the taliban. >> was the taliban instrumental in getting out were they helping us all along? >> i would be skeptical if that were the case but that would have to be a question or those involved in the operation. i will point out my phone is full of whatsapp messages from afghans, u.s. residents in u.s. citizens brutalized at the taliban checkpoint on the way to the airport and could not get out and many are still stranded about a thousand that we are tracking or stranded there now the picture that you heard and painted in press conferences in washington was completely the opposite of what was going on and cobble i'm sure there's many others besides me that had the same experience communicating
with afghans on the ground under the dire conditions during the evacuation. >> congressman let me weigh in the sab program has underperformed for more than a decade we have never reached the quotas or paid attention and a lot of red tape and bureaucracy we have underperformed i am curious after the doha agreement was signed to the taliban february 2020 we did not accelerate the evacuation in scaled-down or embassy because we had a president of the united states who said we are getting out on may 1 and we extended in the successor on the evacuations and so forth and diminish it under an american citizen, to this day, this is the day that recently reached my phone ahr
there are 35 afghans who are active duty service members and the american military and their families are still in afghanistan, there are hundreds of afghan commandos, a fraction of the army that did fight until the last day also not covered by the siv program and they're still in afghanistan these programs are bigger than currently advertised. >> we have 17 votes. >> i now recognize representative of pennsylvania for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chair and thank you for joining us i want to reiterate, this is been an enlightening conversation and i really appreciate all the feedback in the conversation from decades worth of experience in afghanistan, ambassador you mentioned in your testimony and highlighted specific areas in
the biden administration where we should develop plans at this point in time to address protecting humanitarian workers and you also mentioned this is the time where we have the opportunity to get people who have been left behind a voice and specifically in your testimony in 2001 on the 800,000 people people were in school all whom were boys but in 2,128,000,000 in school 35% whom were girls in august the taliban has stated that girls would be allowed to attend schools and since then no inclination to honor those rights while secondary schools have opened to the taliban and they've not made the announcement of when girls will be allowed back to secondary schools, what recommendations do you have to offer ways to continue to support afghan women and minority groups in the country and what steps can we make to effectively engage the taliban and principal humanitarian
access particularly with regards to access to education. >> thank you congresswoman, we need to start and acknowledge, we created the situation, we did not lose military in afghanistan we were not forced out we just decided we were tired and thus we compare to accept that responsibility, that said you have to look forward, this is where we have to orchestrate a multilateral effort this is to the taliban if you do not do x, y, z you will get nothing from us there only getting
humanitarian aid to step stiffen that this would be one of the most rare occasions we returned the united nations to press them to bring in a release form special representative of the secretary-general someone whom i've had the pleasure of working with in iraq and afghanistan i don't often have nice things to say about the united nations but someone himself to step in to run the operations on the ground in the taliban overreach, that is what i would pose at this point. >> if it is okay if i ask a second question unrelated to the first i am curious what remains of my time how well prepared and willing to afghan forces for various point time in the last 20 years of the conflict what remains of my time, just how well prepared during the time
that you served in afghanistan, was there any point during that time were the afghan forces could've held against the taliban takeover and all-star if it's okay. >> i don't think they could've stood up on their own completely we have never completed supply systems where they were in charge, much of made other aviation activity so noteworthy, i don't think they were able to stand up. >> mr. mcmaster on that question would you point when you thought during your service in the region. >> in the state institutions because of the weakness gave impunity to steal and build up
the power base in the u.s. afghanistan that did not remain static, there was progress made especially in the defense after that especially in the special operations forces, no time that i am aware of could afghan forces have withstood the orchestrated isi which you mentioned, the isi plan against afghan government and security forces have about during your time. >> we got off to a very slow start we didn't begin to invest in the national security forces until the end of the bush administration in the first several years. >> my time is expired, i appreciate your time and i yield back. >> the gentlelady yields back i recognize mark green of the western hemisphere of security migration and economic policy
for five minutes. >> thank you chairman and ranking member thank you to our witnesses for being here and testifying but more importantly in the execution to withdraw has left us wounded and most important he left american citizens behind enemy lines, 20 years of mistakes are not an excuse for about withdraw and certainly does not justify the materials $85 billion worth given to a terrorist organization today i would like to focus on the future, my question is for you i would like to ask a satellite view question and i enjoyed your book, one of the points that you made the u.s. has had 21 year-long strategies throughout the war, also the past ten years the party seems to be dividing
etiologically there is overlap then there was ten years ago given her history in our division which by the way of strategic partners are zeroing in on how do we draft long-term strategy not just specific to this region although this region is critical, how is the nation to become together and look at having a long-term strategy. >> thank you started leadership at the presidential level in the national security structure run by the national security advisor to coordinate efforts to first understand the complex challenges we are facing internationally this is a step that is skipped i think it was skipped too often in afghanistan we contradict the enemy rather than actual enemy we were providing and much worse strategy was based on that also based on unrealistic assumptions
what drove the pakistani leadership in this behavior. i think the complex challenges design thinking and what's really important for americans today across the political spectrum is to understand why in the hell do i care about this, viewing that challenge and clearly articulated goals and more specific objectives, the step that is skipped often times it comes back to bite us is assumptions assumptions about the degree to which we like-minded partners have agency and influences and of course identifying opportunities and obstacles to overcome and then you can frame out a strategy in a meaningful discussion about what the american people need to know more than anything what is at stake in what is a strategy that will deliver a favorable outcome of an acceptable cause at risk that has been missing
and that's a confidence i've been talking about and i allude to in the statement for record. >> thank you for the answer on that one of the things that myself and the colleague across the aisle, dean phillips were creating this thing called a general club were democrats and republicans sit down instead of getting to five minutes where we bomb questions we actually have a dialogue in my question to all of our witnesses we will have our first one coming up next month and richard haas has agreed to bring one of the articles that he written to that and discuss it i send all the invitations to my colleagues on the panel and i know dean does on the committee, my question to all of you would you consider joining us as a guest speaker on whatever future journal clubs? >> i would be honored. >> thank you for that, the goal
is dialogue, first to have an effective strategy of the nation we have to agree on some stuff and talk about what we do not agree on and then maybe we won't wind up like we have the last 20 years with a new strategy every year. do i have any time left? >> thank you, mr. chairman. [inaudible] >> i don't of you can understand that you broke up. >> i'll ask you again, real quickly how is the prc and pakistan going to change and how is the prc relationship going to change under the new reality?
would love to get your thoughts perhaps in writing to the idea of northwest india for over the horizon. >> and i now recognize the gentleman from minnesota for five minutes. >> speaking to my friend and colleague for extending that indic invitation i accept that i look forward to you joining us. want to thank all of our witnesses for your service to our great nation in my colleagues many of whom are on this call wearing the uniform making sacrifices for all of us want to remind all of us there are thousands of folks or families out there as we talked about afghanistan and secretary armitage on how
corruption undermines her efforts around the world and in afghanistan and other parts of the globe. i appreciate your earlier comments how we need to review and affirm our national interest and increase congressional oversight relative to corruption and how we distribute our financial resources around the world. most of you know the 2018 requires state dod and usaid has a joint strategy limit contingency operations a report in june 2018 over 3 years ago and has yet to receive it. had to receive it in with the special inspector general and is still awaiting that corruption is undermining the efforts of must be addressed. >> you also made an astute
observation one of the reasons we failed to leave afghanistan sooner was the result with political theater losing a war so that they can keep up the fight to critically review our interest in the effort would have benefited from more intense congressional oversight. i agree with you i think hearing congress so with that in mind what you think congress should have done ten or 15 years ago to address that political cost especially those who campaign to be tougher national security and what should congress be pursuing as we move forward? >> i might be a victim of my past and the chief of staff now. but i do want to mention if
not just a matter in my view but also the armed services committee it's a different kind of corruption most of us think of money hard to get the payout so that's another kind of corruption corruption in the armed forces how many armed leaders are there in afghanistan? but then to know that number scott miller that means i have to get my merit badge now so a lot of our activities which is
a corruption of armed forces. and that's what we needed to do so don't pigeonhole. >> just to go on the record to reject that for what they did for a merit badge? did you just say that? really quick. >> not only said i will repeat it again. >> i would like to reclaim my time mr. mcmaster i like to hear your perspective family have 40 seconds. >> so this idea of over optimism and biases clearly there that any senior commander is there to do anything but to accomplish the mission and is disparaging in reality because i do think
that there was a tendency to show progress is not a new phenomenon a word about this with the vietnam war but one of my jobs was to pull the curtain back on corruption of state institutions and functions in afghanistan network is available he can get it declassified and no effort to cover that up because washington again created the third evolution what they wanted that was because they are prioritizing getting the hell out so the danger is we will learn exactly the wrong lesson when the fact is we took a long-term approach to a short-term a problem. >> . >> i yield back.
>> thank you mr. chairman i do appreciate my colleagues. thank you very much for your testimony and i consider to be an honorable and response this year. that being said the biden administration so execution has been a disastrous situation with terrible consequences. those with deep terrorist ties are now beating afghanistan gives us great reason for a grave concern. ambassador crocker you and the ranking member of the op-ed in "the new york times" to say it is likely the taliban would take control of the country to urge the biden administration to can —- to protect the embassy based on the testimony last week general mckinsey
recommended leaving 2500 troops which would have been enough. >> so what did you know the biden administration did not know work knowledge? >> i cannot speak to what the administration did or did not know where did or did not do clearly but it seems to me that president was determined to get out of afghanistan. period. to get off his plate but then someone else can worry about it. and that blinded him to some of the obvious consequences. >> and then to be over by a
terrorist group and that's hard to digest. the general mcmaster you also wrote her op-ed with the biden administration's plan so why in your view to the biden administration proceed with withdrawal as planned? what is your thought? with a proceed with the information at hand? >> i do think it was because they prioritize the withdrawal as ambassador crocker said and what with a disastrous consequences. >> in the whole idea we had to
adhere to it they were breaking since february 2020. with the intimidation began and then we had to the taliban is just ludicrous. >> what about accountability? and then you see the colonel is receiving accountability that granted we know there were some violations in there and the treatises were overly harsh to say the least but but
what has occurred here in the aftermath and in the withdrawal in the depths of soldiers and then those who make decisions to continue to ec any accountability? >> what is military to keep the ball line with partisan politics and political issues or just political issues for the lieutenant colonel's to make policy. it's important for those who are serving in uniform to understand their role and what their role is it is to do the best they can to execute at the lower levels but also to give your chain of command the best advice. if you think is something is really screwed up you do at your chain of command.
because you're not accountable to the american people to do that to have a loud voice influences policy has a serving military officer undermine the constitution of the united states. some of the hearings in the senate and just trying to determine what is the best military advice? and how vietnam became an american war and during that period went and johnson got the military advice he wanted to structure what he wanted to get what he wanted to hear. was that the case of biden? i don't know and certainly congress will help determine better how these decisions are made and was given. >> i yield back. >> . >> .
>> and then to discuss those 20 years in afghanistan so the easy reach here is to attack president biden and the withdrawal that the last seven or not but we should be talking about here in the siding. we need to learn some lessons to help us learn how not to get her cell stuck in another couple decades of nationbuilding or whatever we were trying to do in another region of the world. we do need to have level setting so we have to listen to people speak first so the american people watching this the last few months in context the president biden took office still in terms of men
and territory since the invasion. and added truth level that was know not to be sustainable in the previous president had talked about to be sustainable but difficult to reverse and their the afghan government as we have discussed with critical corruption to be broadly seen as a legitimate so a discussion and tries to educate the status quo but then they changed a few thousand americans as deeply disagree with. >> in 20 years is a long time to be patient. but it was time to end the longest conflict. want to talk about how we
ended up in such a long conflict. what do you think we were doing the last ten years in november 2019 was clear to me the military period any mission that we gave them. with a afghan special forces were very good at their job as well. but to degrade the taliban and more folks joining their side at times gaining strength and territory despite the fact they cannot compete with us any shape or form militarily.
that i went to a congressman i reason why, not to be committed to that outcome but seriously professing the priority withdrawal we are really just leaving because we are a contest of wills. have to convince the taliban they cannot accomplish their objectives through the use of force. there is no military solution but the taliban came up with one. >> we have to recognize that we lack the sustained commitment and in doing so we emboldened our enemies and created a crisis of confidence whether allies and partners. >> i have to disagree with you a little bit.
yes we shifted too many resources away under false pretenses and we had a yearly strategy you say it is a military victory but after 20 years spent the gentleman's time is expired. >> i yield back. >> representative young the vice ranking member for five thank you chairman it also ranking member i want to thank our witnesses for your candid responses to my colleagues excellent questions. and i appreciate.
but moving forward is the focus of the hearing today to maintain many vulnerable population especially women and girls. without protection and support in the face of threats from the taliban. so now that we are fully withdrawn what tools with us utilize to get the gains for women and girls in the taliban control afghanistan? >> sadly those are very few and far between we gave up agency in afghanistan the mere presence and that is enough to sustain the efforts that women were making on their behalf and enough to keep the taliban at bay. it's not really replaceable.
the best i can come up with is for the us to orchestrate the international effort that will have many voices speaking at the world is still watching. but again that's hard to sustain because the administration is a see it simply wants to change the subject if they are able to do that there is not much we can do. >> so focusing on the humanitarian side the biden administration says it will continue to serve the needs of the people so how can we provide humanitarian assistance with the the dire needs of the afghan people without benefiting or legitimizing the taliban control government. >> that word require a consultation with united nations. some parts of the human are affected one of the most
affected is the food program and the executive director is american and always has been. that is an agency involved in humanitarian efforts for the united nations that has a pretty good track record and for the top person is an american citizen we need to get a special representative into kabul with strength and integrity and someone we can work with so i think we can certainly help support that international effort on humanitarian relief that does not empower the taliban. >> that to focus on the needs of the afghan people or terrace fighters fighting into
afghanistan. >> yes. again that's very much the right person because that we have seen in the past with human operations left themselves they are likely to slow the flow then they are likely to do it so to get the right people. >> so let me ask you secretary the afghanistan province claimed the exclusivity is of the ccp so what is the stay in afghanistan and the taliban rule with respect to the leaders this is very important to me as i am a sponsor of the accident just got out of committee this week it's important issue.
the representatives of the vice chair of the subcommittee for five minutes. >> so 20 years ago congress passed the 2001 authorization use of military force as broadly written and since then the authorization has been used of both parties for many years to expand operations across country that really could not have been imagined in the wake of 9/11 building upon the conversation we had today and the answer that you have given if you occurred, and a little bit hasn't been more defined do you believe this would have helped congress and the executive branch to focus our strategy and my goal in asking this question as we continue
to talk about what's on the books for actively looking to the future there are things we could have done better that we do learn from the past. >> i like to say given my previous comments, yes it would be great to have oversight and i think honestly the success administration and energy describe this as a good war and it was a bad war. and it would be kind of hard for members of congress in the early teens to set a standard against it and then start from a different spot and second as members of congress to send a letter and they don't answer.
>> cell a little bit of follow-up so with that includes the reauthorization acquirement do you think that could have helped ensure that we were not running on autopilot and that was as a director energies towards iraq without authorization requirements to be a foreseeing mechanism what are your thoughts on that? >> my view congresswoman is congress and the followers will work there will if they will and i have been astonished watching people from congress say they told me an answer six months ago. so? do something about it. talk to your friends on the
appropriations committee i don't think necessarily that a reauthorization would have done the job i think it takes congress to say here is the power of the purse. >> how they did not properly assess the situation on the ground and what was more feasible and you noted there was humility factoring into these assessments and with what could be achieved contribute to the idea and then reflecting on what secretary are mattias said that congress could have and should have been doing how did they just cut through those
assessments. >> the general trend was after the quick fall into thousand one then the political success and the transition and then up until that time from iraq and left grounds for optimism so it looked possible but the problem is in my view we don't cater to those goals over time and the situation changed and we retain too long lofty goals where resources were diverted to iraq for corruption and so
forth and then we took our time so over time that i gap reverse with what we are trying to achieve and the resources we are mustering. the first fundamental the first six or eight years. >> thank you mr. ambassador. >> i'm sorry i didn't get to you but a greatly appreciate your feedback and your answers to my colleagues question i yield back. >> the lady from michigan is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you for holding the hearing today and all the witnesses that are gather that to follow up from the post 9/11 and aumf. obviously the power of the purse is a powerful and bundled with the ndaa and the gains around that even against
it and pay raises from the troops but specifically every congress has to have an up or down vote to continue the post 9/11 aumf so do you think that would've source the political courage to ask those difficult questions and then conversely at least having the dod sharpen the pencils and where things are going? >> my sense is there could have been a lot tougher questions i think most people in the executive branch after a while start to view hearings
because they think i know that about that subject matter and that's a good healthy attitude. i don't think the authorization itself would have brought forth the desired results because of what i said to the congresswoman. think the members of congress themselves felt that strongly about afghanistan but now iraq, yes. >> thank you secretary. i want to touch on the panelist as well. it strikes me that with general mcmaster to come to you on this, there is a belief that is more sustainable and if we look at it solely through the lens of american casualties and that is an appropriate understanding view to the
lands national security forces 2014 onward on a per capita basis to the us losses during the military that more critically to how it was is portrayed the civilian fatalities that were quite high even under the best circumstances conducting the majority of operations but that handed over to the afghan air force airstrikes that skyrocketed how do you look at civilian casualties especially considering the book and in the final days with the withdrawal of an aid worker and the applicant and seven young children that general
milley portrayed as a righteous strike how has the impact our perception. >> of course it has a negative effect and you can't go wrong with thomas aquinas it is about discrimination and proportionality and it's not important as how many troops we have a just wish we would stop talking about troop numbers who cares. it makes a difference if it was ecuador but we are not what is important is what the troops are doing and this is an important aspect of your question if they are integrated and embedded with forces to provide advice and bringing fires to bear in a precise manner with the capability to do that and then to sit across the table from those jackass while the
taliban continues to commit mass murder we were not even actively pursuing this. >> i apologize i am going on time but do you think is more culturally and lined with the afghan civilian the taliban or the former government. >> the government is full of faults but given what we have already seen as a courageous demonstration by women on the street against the taliban i would have to say the previous administration. >> i yield back.
>> i'm here to hear you call on me. thank you so much ambassador i will pick up where you left off so as we move to work forward with the secretary of has called the new diptych cat diplomatic mission what are the steps we can take in coordination with allies and partners with the importance of protecting human rights with the rights of women and girls? so what can we do to convey to them but also to insist upon it? >> coming from the earlier comments this is a multinational effort we have seen some promising progress at the when so the
international set of demands to actually hold the taliban to the things they said they would do but have not yet done. but and then to govern afghanistan but they recognize they cannot make it but to do what they say they are going to do. and then with the assistance of the humanitarian assistance through the un that will be very difficult.
>> and you said it would be very difficult but is it possible? >> it should be like the over the horizon strikes would be that it is absolutely worth doing because people will continue to suffer there will be a lot of casualties. and then to perceive globally and i think there is a responsibility by the administration to step up and lead the international effort to do it we can responsibly with humanitarian assistance. >> so to shift gears i want to reference the extraordinary levels of corruption that were reported through the media
with government and military officials with a particular interest december 2019 article by the "washington post" journal and the article outlines a matter policy it didn't come back but failed also to have a more reality which is responsible for healing the corruption by doling out those sums of money with regard to consequences. media reports from 2013 and covered following the overthrow the taliban president karzai would be on the cia payroll receiving millions of dollars in cash so were those compatible with building strong institutions and if not then what was the agenda being advanced?
even though the depth of those honest efforts. >> thank you very much mr. ambassador and i yield back. >> i now recognize. >> . >> and my friend mr. maccallum made when he suggested to come see taliban if it's conditions based and he never would have withdrawn our troops which i think is pretty shameless and those conditions for all of us here know you're pretty much limited to the taliban not shooting at her troops alongside the fairly vague and
unenforceable promises not to help al qaeda strike us homeland for afghan soil and we all know it has been widely reported and then try to withdraw even in the final days of the administration has been no evacuation and nine of the effort this administration made as an adequate as it was. in light of that and in many respects the dilemma that the president faced and i sympathize with the frustration he felt with the arguments that were most commonly made and from my experience those arguments over the three administrations that amounts to mr. president
gave us wine more year or division and we will turn the corner. president biden my is appropriately cynical those kinds of arguments. the far better argument essentially that ambassador crocker made today at what we lack is patience and what we needed is a recognition we can always fix everything that was wrong with afghanistan doesn't mean we have to sacrifice everything that is right. then that would have been the right argument so i wonder companies serve multiple administrations does it really make that we should just stay
because that's what interest demanded? >> . >> and to my direct knowledge and then when the president asked me to go to afghanistan before i left for kabul. and then one tactical and then to repair the relationship with president karzai that i had known from the beginning. and then with a long-term strategic with afghanistan. and they did so in may 202012. that clear impression i got from him doing those negotiations and then it came
out to sign was that the president was looking at this long-term that in the instruction on the agreement was the notion it is indefinitely so we came away from that to have a solid conditions -based approach and that was endorsed by the nato summit in chicago that nato commit itself to sustaining force never flee 225,000 afghan troops in the out years.
>> and the ability to think long term. >> the failure of patients. and i wish we subjected to the test of any decision of american and foreign policy it doesn't make us better off that i could think of about 12 or 15 or 20 ways in which the withdraw and the collapse the troops are still in the region they're not coming home to visit counterterrorism partner to gain tens of thousands new americans and afghans would be great americans at such a thing we would have wished. >> i yield back. >> and now the vice chair the subcommittee of international
development and global corporate. >> thank you mr. chair. and what is incredibly important but i want to start with you ambassador crocker since your one of the folks and as time as short. it was greater than was in afghanistan. >> it is significant in both countries. >> syria or somalia? >> likewise i have no basis of knowledge. but what i would say is that it is theoretical and in
afghanistan we were hit on 9/11 then covered by the taliban. >> my analysis is the threats are emanating from anything we have seen from afghanistan for the last 15 years recognizing 20 years ago there was an attack. i sincerely hope nobody is suggesting a military intervention and then to understand why that indefinite continuation of the national interest. september 11 happened in middle school i was literally our entire life that we are winning and making gains on the military needs is more resources and time and all the losses were not be made despite multiple reports with the opposite.
but less civilians being killed and less of the military families but then it was determinative. so first in 2001 the bush administration has prospects for a negotiated settlement with the taliban. that it would not be acceptable. and since you were involved secretary do you believe it was the right decision? >> i don't know and hindsight but we did give the taliban an opportunity that he did and
then turned us down flat. and with that aforementioned bond process he did not even consider the taliban because it was over. so that's the reason we didn't even try to have a negotiated settlement and that was quite clear about the taliban themselves to come to that conclusion and the legs weren't long enough for the journey. >> i had my bat mitzvah in 2002 but for my information after 20 years of fighting we ended up with a stronger taliban than what we could have done in 2002 i know we have gone over many of her moments like this. and with the engagement in afghanistan it became clear those interest are a higher
priority other than other concerns i corruption in addition, we rely on those infections militarily but with the rights abuses and trading narcotics. we know in addition to the frustrating corruption failing to prevent casualties from us drone strikes after 20 years me and up with a stronger taliban were so we could've gotten before which is why we were there in the first place and in the entire time to pour money into the efforts actually believe the biden administration has a right to leave so with that i yield back. >> the gentle lady yield back the balance of her time i now recognize the vice chair of the subcommittee on the global
concert terrorism for five minutes. >> thank you for holding this very important hearing you missed think our witnesses for the service to our country for appearing here today and staying until those of us at the end can ask our question. general mcmaster you said administration makes fundamental mistakes leading to catastrophic results. in your opinion are there fundamental flaws in the system to allow these mistakes to be made and what changes do you think we need to make? >> part of it is a process that delivers best analysis and intelligence and advice to the president what we have seen is the evidence of the absence of fragmented strategies and consistent and fundamentally flawed you think
but then through 2018 that's why president trump made the decision he did for a sustainable long-term commitment and what he said in the speech he gave. >> but then he turned around. >> you write it turned out to be an sustainable. so ultimately i think it's not a process it is leadership also most americans don't sustain this support that sustained place in afghanistan is not worth it and we should prioritize withdrawal over a sustained commitment so to compare our withdrawal to what we were preventing representative jacobs as well, was it worth it? what we achieved a think it is from what we are achieving now
and then the jihadist terrace to afghanistan. >> you respond at the beginning of the hearing that the 2500 troops in afghanistan we could manage that situation indefinitely want to make sure i understand that leaving 2500 troops literally indefinitely would have been the best way to deal with afghanistan? cut us have been maintained with the status quo and what would have been the long-term of the us military spent the long-term duty were devolved over time and that commitment i was talking about i said 2500 is probably too small let you take general mcmaster's point will need to talk about
numbers but missions but over a year and a half we were doing special ops and then advise and assist that is what words indefinitely sustainable and as i said the taliban control not a single provincial capital and then they still didn't control the 2500. >> you stay in response we said we had the back of the limited girls and then instead we left them behind. are you suggesting we should allow our afghan women and girls to come to the us quick. >> certainly not. but it is something that nods away and he maybe it was just a mistake and not to encourage
the political process knowing that it was something of a guarantee and then not lose their lives. that is the burden i have to carry and then it benefited to see them women and face to face they may be sorry right now. >> my time is expired. >> i yield back. >> to you have a question? >> thank you mr. chairman and the ranking member for this important hearing. it is very significant for the american people and the committee that we provide the oversight on the 20 years he spent in afghanistan. listening to the testimony it is very clear that but we had
was inconsistencies on goals and expectations and the policies that were implemented to obtain those goals and your definition think is applicable here. >> the examples that we used previously successes in other parts of the world brother south korea or south america or others and to keep in the reason we stayed in the long haul the south korea as well as taiwan and the fact that america is a part going back
first mentioning pakistan in 2005 and then later in iraq and then to have multiple chips with that part of the world, clearly early on determined we cannot look at this through the lens of americanized to understand that part of the world to try and corruption is a constant how he would create institutions of democracy that patients of corruption his part of the world was a day of one —- a way of life which it is. so i remember in a meeting discussing the one —- discussing american elections with a republican and democrat a race i can only wish that
maybe someday to get elected president of afghanistan he gets back to family and tribe and as the constants of how we do with that. but as a proxy war for those to be sustain politically and mr. crocker. >> thank you congressman. i think i learned two important things in almost 40 years in foreign service in one is be careful what you get
into. because you will see the consequences because of the 30th and 40th order you cannot possibly forget but the second is the careful what you get out of the consequences that can be greater than the consequences of the original intervention. >> and then to have a get out strategy. >> so in short to generate the resources of those objectives that are required to over rely on them military alone the whole notion of counting troops it's good to be counterproductive and then to generate the alliance we are
not doing this by ourselves. >> the first my enemies enemy is not necessarily my friends. but if there's something others can provide in a given situation. >> and it seems to me and that american boys or it is as well as american boys and if the answer is yes then the answer is no down. >> ambassador mcmaster talk about inconsistencies how do you avoid that. >> your time is expired. >> i now recognize the
congress man from pennsylvania for five minutes. >> thank you to all the panelists for being here today. and then fairly attentive experience in the world. and what possible if any. but then but then how much time is to and from the targets and all of those areas bar ground. and then afghanistan. what is that capability to be diminished? >> because as you mentioned there's much less time on station and much fewer stories
you can launch to conduct a surveillance and intelligence collection but when we left afghanistan but i don't think anybody is talking about that at all. how can we repeatedly access that is face? so that even the practical what is this administration have the will to do so forcefully if necessary? i think we lost a great more access we admitted to not only the friends that we abandoned but also access to collect surveillance and communication intelligence as well. >> . >> what about the goal states and what percent is by travel time? think it's a and then to
launch those based on the type of aircraft of many different locations. >> what is the next best thing to a cooperative agreement. and part of the problem is the people and identify the long haul. and then whoever we partner with wavy abandoned afghanistan. scenic and with president trump put them is fundamentally sound know why
he was and omission of capitulation to the taliban february 2020. that was me that one of my two successors in the trump administration. >> president biden said nobody has been disappointed in our withdrawal then russia and china. >> do you share the assessment. >> this is been one of russia's talking points forever in their disinformation campaign posted it is dividing a server integration —- immigration and gun-control in the process of elections but there are policy related elements and then to
get us out of afghanistan and syria and it's an important point of the idea that it helps us so if you look at china's action they are trying to create the same exclusionary era as they are in the south china sea and this is what ambassador crocker would be qualified to comment. >> in my experience now dated in afghanistan and pakistan at that time is the attorneys were doing not too much but too little so the main contract and pakistan and committed to building rail and road links as part of the project to improve the ability
of the pakistani government to communicate with its own province so in afghanistan the stipulation was roads and railroads to bring people from the security forces when necessary. so while it may seem logical they tried to develop that exclusion actually they are not doing the kinds of projects. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> i now recognize the last question of the day from the gentleman from illinois. >> and then to your persistence and for sharing your insights and perspective
we have learned a lot. and then to appreciate the government extraordinary isolation. my office is not alone with usaid. and then to evacuate afghans and to get information off our government. to get these individuals to safety and as quickly and as urgently as possible. and then for what we can do more in congress. the limited time i have left. i appreciate your definition strategy of the ways and means overtime.
of the constitution of 1964 to be the basis of the constitution of the bottom conference. so i am talking decades. which often doesn't reside in the us government. but it does reside. and that resides elsewhere and among other allies in that breadth of expertise is what i would as a strategist in the future. and with those ethnic conflicts and that the west ignored the assignment of responsibilities for the military if you look back further to understand it at that level?
>> i thank you can pick any number starting points. one century ago from the afghan war and then to take power through the afghan leader and a modernizer and moved out very fast and got but a decade later was pushed out of power because he was moving too fast for deeply conservative afghan populations to understand some of these deep rooted beliefs and views of the population. >> if i flip my question 180 degrees with the opening remarks of some of those context is multiple decades of how long is not necessary for
the goal we are trying to achieve strategically how long was that required? decades? another century? >> as to the context of which i just spoke. and with the state of afghanistan they have always required outside support. better than american lives lost but it is a reality. >> i am out of time. but they will have to wait for another time. thank you to the witnesses alike forward to engage in
conversation. >> all time has expired. thank you to the extraordinary witnesses for their testimonies today. and then to offer an insight into the 20 years of decision policies shaped the afghanistan. of mistakes and hubris and naïve optimism but the ability to transform a nation that we do not fully understand. there is no one simple answer that they can explain on august 21st. the decision to withdraw which i believe is the right 15 years in our ten years from
now or 20 years from now comes at the risk of the afghan regime collapsing of chaos with the taliban victory. we will continue to conduct oversight but no oversight is complete listed evaluates the years apart in afghanistan. but then to be a counterinsurgency strategy and i want to make a final observation based on the testimony submitted today ambassador crocker talks about that there was no capital conquered by the taliban. but 70 percent of the country
was still being contest —- contested during that period of time. the end goal is always clear and then the security of the united states military so it is a clear demonstration of competing interest and then to deal with those interest and then to talk about terrorism for women's rights and our military came to address the al qaeda threat and never would have been in afghanistan
constitutional authority to declare war that it is time once again to take the weight of that responsibility. is now up to the president of the united states. we are a coequal branch of government and with the oversight so that we can learn the lessons and not repeat the mistake again because there are consequences of her actions in the halls of congress again thank you to our distinguished witnesses for your honesty impeach patients and time you gave us the death and diversity of