tv Allied Strategy in the Pacific CSPAN August 15, 2015 12:00pm-1:01pm EDT
5000 soldiers. by 1942, 15,000 soldiers. passengers,umber of 16,683. that still stands as the largest number of human beings ever transported on the vessel in the history of the world. >> coming up next, james perry examines diplomatic relations among the allies in world war ii, and the impact on military strategy in the pacific. this program is part of a symposium that marked the 70th anniversary of the end of the pacific war in august 1945. perry is the vice president of the institute of the study of strategy and politics, which hosted the event. it is about one hour. >> let me begin by introducing
dr. james perry, one of our eminent strategist, codirector of the institute, and will discourse, opening setting the stage for the remarks that most of us will be making for the rest the day. jim, the stage is yours. [applause] thisy: i realize morning that i probably made too many slides, but we will get through as many as we can. what i want to do is discuss the endgame that almost was, because as we will see, by the end of differentre was a august 1945 and vision by roosevelt and truman. i am going to describe the
strategy that roosevelt wanted to achieve, and leave it at that, and at the end of the day, we will discuss what truman wanted to achieve. i will discuss geography and logistics, roosevelt's global strategy, the balance between the european and pacific theaters, and the opportunity theatermitments and one imposed on the other, discuss specific planning from 1942 to 1945, thinking about the warking, invasion as the developed. logistics.nd in the pacific, it's tough. the pacific theater, the fighting area here is about one third of earth
s surface. anything you want, you have to bring with you are built. moves forward, what you have already built it comes useless. at the end of the war, they had to decide whether they moved everything out of new guinea into the philippines. very often, it was more useful to just bring more stuff. other actors in the game were soviets, who were logistically constrained and focused on germany. china, obviously logistically and accessible for the united states because you have to sell a long way, drive across the burma road. the british, very far away, lacking resources, and focused on germany. in thes the basic factor
two front war, from our perspective, is that it was a lot easier to get stuff to europe they get stuff from the top with pacific. you can see from this that the vessel turnaround time, to go out, comeback, and reload is a factor of one for europe, and two or three in the pacific. 200he end of the war, versus maybe 60 84 europe. pacific is very big. i thought i would contest the western european theater with the pacific. you can see that normandy to berlin does not look very impressive in the pacific. [laughter] moreover, most of our rb is in germany, very far away. result, invasions were typically much further in
distance in the pacific, compared with the atlantic theater. most divisions were under 500 miles, whereas in the pacific theater, invasions occurred over 1500 miles or a lot more. by the time they were teaming up olympic -- n probably the shortest range invasion they did. symmetry, the requirement to bring sea-based airpower against continental power. those circles there, that is the same distance roughly as london to berlin. you can see that within the theater, there are very few bases available to us to go up
against lots of bases in japan. bases in the soviet union, but inaccessible. most of the central pacific action, we can bring barriers with just a few planes on them. if you're going to invade japan, you are bringing your sea-based power up against land power. not a recipe for happiness. overall, the requirement for invasion of japan was overwhelmingly air and inhibious, which we had 1944-1945. that is one of the reasons why the pacific drive did not get started until 1945-1945, we were building rocket ships. roosevelt's global strategy. although we're talking about was the pacific war, it obvious that it was a two front
war. a lot of historians like to cut .- like to compartmentalize it the key to roosevelt global strategy was to anticipate postwar relationships with the soviet union. 's strategy, they're different interpretations. some say he had no strategy, others say he was a prisoner of public opinion, others say the strategy was to ignore internal and postwar politics, just focus on winning the war. some postwar critics would say that you have the verge is to focus on winning the war against british.us i don't think that is true. of course, there is the cold war argument that roosevelt should have contained soviet expansion, while at the same time fight germany and japan. finally, if you authors, and i
agree with them, and say that he had a definite vision for the post world world. was aestion was if he appeasest?d app roosevelt was a secretive. he didn't like diaries. he didn't like people taking notes in his meetings. there a lot of meetings where there were no transcripts. he made incompatible promises to different people. after the war, you have the outbreak of the cold war, which made wartime politics and the relationship with the soviet union a hot potato. a lot of people covered up their tracks. the official strategy of the allied strategy was germany first, which they thought about before the war started. and, they agreed to on the very first wartime conference, december, 1941.
at the conference, they said they would stay on the defensive in the pacific and go on the offense of in europe. almost immediately, they deviated from that strategy. since then, there has been historical debate over why was there and who is to blame. a lot of people like to lay it at the feet of the british. who deviated from germany first and why? i would say that the traditional criticisms of mediterranean strategies applied to the pacific. the mediterranean strategy was described as being a divergence from the second front. in fact, it was deployment to the pacific theater that made the second front impossible. the pacific theater hindered the buildup of troops in the united kingdom. as we shall see, i strengthen the pacific doubled from june to december 1942 after we defeated
japan halfway. the question was why was this? i will make the argument that it was a product of roosevelt strategy for post war. what was that? what did he want to achieve? his overriding goal was have a war that would be known as detente. deployed the second front. and until he met stalin, he reached an agreement with stalin, and in the process written on prior deals with the british and chinese. it is worthy to note that the strategy and vision was diametrically opposed to churchill. roosevelt's post world war order
would be based on soviet journey . he wanted to appease the them,s, satisfies do away with colonial powers. churchill wanted to create federations. weak france versus strong france. roosevelt wanted to defy japan. churchill preferred a week japan. roosevelt wanted to build up china to be a force and the world. churchill excepted that china was weak and would stay week for a long time. if we were going to fight an anti-soviet world war ii, we would be fighting the war on the right. that was not the war we fight. before the war on the left. unconditional surrender. annunciate it
in casablanca, it has obvious importance for the end of the war that we will be discussing today. planning for invasion, blockade., and it has created a postwar controversy over whether we should have modified it, rather than dropping the atomic bombs. in 1943, the goal was to keep the big three alliance together. stalin had refused to meet roosevelt. he was exploring a separate peace with the germans. wish to signal that we would not conclude a separate peace with germany and japan that would permit the resurgence of their militarism. at the cairo conference, and i see that yellow font is probably
not all that good. the declaration there, roosevelt wanted to make china a major power and launched a big campaign in burma. china would play a leading role in occupied japan. china would get japanese industry. china would receive an american guarantee against external aggressions. que saido communi japan would return territories that they stole from china, and in due course, korea would become free and independent. germanyt's vision for was to divide we germany. i mention this primarily because there is not a specific analog to this. this was never fully realized after world war ii. the japanese, even less so.
at the tehran conference, that promised to enter the pacific war after germany was defeated. roosevelt promised to give to the soviets a strong position in manchuria. they already had a strong position within china. somethingive them that they already indicated they wanted. conferencend cairo in december 1943, churchill said the soviets entering the war was unnecessary, and he wanted to cancel that. roosevelt agreed to this, but that meant the chinese army would not i'll be them. at the end of the war, china would face the soviets alone, without any american commitment. then, the world order was finalized. germany and japan would be divided. soviet interest would be
safeguarded. the soviets would have effective control over korea, and no american troops would be there. the idea was that japan would be soviets -- both the the soviets would have a role in the occupation of japan. idea was still in play in august 1945, and it is worth mentioning that the soviets ,ould not get their by invasion which they lacked the capability to do for the most part. they would be invited to occupy this. this would be similar in effect to our withdrawal from the territories for the soviet occupation in germany. asiall, soviet gains in
were actually looking pretty awesome. looking at this map, if you know ,bout the past 50 years american efforts to ensure the freedom and independence of japanesed expel influence from china, which is a big reason why we started the war, this is kind of ironic. in effect, it is walking back one of the reasons we went to war in the first place. from the pacific theater perspective, there is a consistent threat from 1943 to 1945 that we wanted the soviets to come in. not -- wet -- this is wanted them to come in. we believed russia would have inacked japan after the war europe was over, and we knew russia wanted a week japan. none of this was a surprise.
it was completely predictable what the russians wanted. the war department recommended preparing for that. 1944, as we were approaching japan, we wanted the soviets to , but we knewchuria the soviets needed a lot of logistical support to do that. we kept asking the soviets for airbases in siberia that we could use against japan. we also suggested that the occupationld supply forces for japan. however, all of these negotiations with the soviets did not proceed smoothly. in 1944, they had not told as much about what they fled to do, or what they needed from us to help them. basically their attitude was
give us stuff, and we will do what we will do. we expedited soviet intervention, actively promoted it, and in late 1944, they were requested a that we supplied -- requested aid that we supplied. bys was largely complete july 1945. we provided them also -- i guess you could call them a small navy that they would use in their invasions. was postwartrategy collaboration -- the war was not fought to contain or limit soviet expansion, far from
it. soviet intervention in the pacific was not really desired, but actively wanted and promoted, and paid for. sovietsd the participate in occupation of japan, but as you will see later today, truman decided that was kind of too much. balancing the war in europe and the pacific. throughout the war, we had to decide where to send our forces, how much to send to europe and to the pacific. a very points in the war, admiral king -- we had about a 50% effort in the pacific, most -- a 15%uff in europe effort in the pacific, most of the stuff in europe. if you look more closely, the
pacific effort never fell below 45%, depending on how you want to count it, and king never described how he arrived at 15%. always question is this is inconsistent with germany. what is going on with that? if you look at the manpower strength in the pacific and europe, and the combat divisions deployed, it is roughly even until 1944, which would surprise you if you are aware of efforts in june of 1944. he will also note that the number of combat aircraft deployed in both theaters was actually quite favorable to the 1942, balanced out in 1944, but even by june-december 1944 when we are fighting the belgium,n france and 15% of our aircraft are in the pacific. highlight january-june 1944 as
we prepare for amphibious assaults in france, we are also preparing for amphibious assaults in the pacific. think this great deployment of manpower and aircraft to the to 1943 from june 1942 -- there really was not that much payoff. we recovered aleutian islands and made some progress in the solomons, but the point here is that we should not have expected a big payoff because we did not have naval security superiorit, but the fact that we sent so much stuff there -- i won't say it sat around and did nothing, but did not achieve as much as you would have hoped.
big gains in 1944, but as i will subsequently argue, i think we were from a standpoint of germany first, over invested. it is arguable that the southwest pacific drive was not militarily necessary. side, 1944 was the year that the japanese navay was crushed. what was the opportunity cost of the pacific commitment? clearly, it is a weaker effort i then europe. operation torch was weakened by the campaign and the solomons. weaker italian campaign from 1943 to 1945. obviously, no campaign in the
balkans, 1944-1945. a weaker campaign in france and germany. if you think about this, it is inconsistent with the germany first strategy, not saying that all of these operations were good ideas, but certainly inconsistent with germany first. overall, world war ii was a war of broad fronts. there was the global front, the united states effort was divided roughly equally between the europe and the pacific. in the pacific, we supported to drive in the central and south pacific. yes, the principle of concentration of force was understood by military officers -- that was part of their education in the 1920's and 1930's. yes, at the time, they did not know where the ideal main effort should be.
it is arguable that a failure to concentrate on the global main effort that had been agreed to in december 1941, and the theater made efforts, slow down progress in each theater, and the war as a whole. it is difficult to find a nonpolitical reason for this. in 1942, thenning goal was to defeat the japanese offensive and secure the sea lanes. as we talked about earlier, that went by the wayside with cairo ehran.to 1943 -- bombardment in we assumed, for planning purposes, that bombardment and blockades might cause japan to quit, but might not, so we had to prepare for invasion. that is a principle that went
through 1944. in 1944, we studied phase options for direct assaults. we also studied by passing the philippines and going straight to formosa. ultimately, we decided on incremental broad front approach. as you can see, and early 1944, we agreed to attack in the philippines, the marianas, and the carolinas later in the year. was should be bypassed some of those objectives down south and go straight for japan or formosa, or lose them? the ultimate decision was no. thathat is of interest is that predictability continued after we took the marianas, they fukushima.
before 1945,igured they had us figured in 1944. blockade, bombardment, and invasion considered in 1944 and when the5 considered european war would end. what intermediate objective to take. by early 1945, the intelligence studies were looking at how long will it take to make japan surrendered by blockade and bombardment. we don't know. it could take if you must, it could take a few years. it is worth noting that the theential behind -- assumption behind air attack is that we would destroy their transportation system, including food distribution. overall, the conclusion was that probably japan would not surrender through blockade and bombing until mid to late 1946.
it was examined, and ultimately they conclude that we should issue the invasion directive. the joint steve of staff -- chief of staff agreed. throughout those able discussions, the atomic bomb was not yet a factor. that from the standpoint of subsequent controversy, everything option we are looking at has a lot of negative indications for japan. blockade, will star people. vembardment will star people. no way around it. you can see, the japanese don't quit. they take 90% has a most of the guys who surrender, they were too injured to die in the process. the red numbers down there, those guys quit after the war
ended in september 1945. if the war continued, we might have to go kill them all to. our casualties vary depending on the operation, but you can see in the bottom right, 36%-30 7% 7%sualties -- 36%-30 casualties. we could not know how long it would take to make them quit by bombardment. we still don't know that. how do you course the country into a surrender? there was every reason to expect a very bloody fight. other option, having given a lot of thought until i looked at the issue, but this was studied at a very early
stage. in mid-1943, they were saying the best way to invade japan was -- they said it was the most promising step. they noted that this would surprise the japanese, the island is less populated, isolated, and harder to reinforce. on the minus side, it was a very long distance invasion, we had to build up our bases in the pacific, the weather and terrain, not great. we would be to clear the island quickly. here, a range of fighters, you would get coverage over the main industrial area of japan. again, this distance is equal to london to berlin, or further.
equal to berlin or further, so very advantageous base. i am going the wrong way. ok. is a feasible operation logistically. the beaches and ports, we can build airfields, it is doable. in late 1944, we started looking at two operations. interesting that they said an operation was -- [indiscernible] we obviously decided not to do that, but one worthwhile point was that if we take the southern portion, we are not going to take the northern portion because it is mountainous and there would be sort of -- it is not trench warfare, a continued engagement with the enemy. beover time, there would casualties on that front. is amoreover, al qaeda --
better airbase. so they recommended that invadingth in 1945. is guy is scary -- and from, again, recommended the invasion in 1945. but the ultimate decision was that as we had made so much progress in the southwest pacific by october 1944, we're already invading the philippines. we had built up a lot of bases by that southern route, so from that point of view, it is regarded as more advantageous to go after invading the philippines in early 45. so, however, they kept it on the table. they said if the japanese
reinforcement, then we might have to invade there instead. this issue would occur in the summer of 1945. was toy -- the decision retain it might be an option of the future. honshure going to invade , we need a lot of support. and the best place to do that from is there because we can invade it and may and build our air bases for three months in time to support an invasion in late 1945, whereas we cannot invade their inception -- we cannot invade there until september of 1945 and we were not have the air bases to launch effective tax for the invasion. the commanding general in the pacific theater noted that it was coming.
this is late 1944. let's attackys there instead, not go straight into the face of the japanese defenses. rejected and was the decision was to try. by early 1945, they were thinking about which we do if we had to postpone the invasion until 1946 for various regions -- reasons. they had it not divisions available, what should they do? they ultimately recommended going into china right here south of shanghai. this is a terrible place to invade. user get the impression we are doing this just to do it because all the reasons they had previously given for not landing on the coast of china still apply, as far as i can tell, which is that the big japanese army will start marching towards you.
and it doesn't really add much to your capabilities that you already have from the philippines. nevertheless, they said plantings would continue. , it wassummary is perceived as a critical objective in the military viable objective. wastheless, the decision heavily influenced by logistical commitments. the disadvantages where well-known, -- were well-known. and the window of opportunity to decide on an invasion in order 1945tack in the spring of and, i think, and read to spec it is arguable we should have done that. one wonders what the shock of an invasion of the homeland, specifically an early surrender, and thus avoid the atomic bombings and the soviet intervention.
one of the arguments they made was as soon as we land, that would make the japanese surrender. maybe, maybe not. in any event, planning continued. a cutter remained under -- it wouldn't have been as good to invaded in october as it would have been in may. so, my overall conclusion for today is that roosevelt did not just launch into the war, had a very definite idea. and for the future of asia. e proposed a-- h major role. stalin said, yeah, that is good. even though the soviets were off the stage until the very last few days of the war, it loomed large in roosevelt's thinking. he did not get to execute a strategy, but he laid the found work -- foundation.
meanwhile, as of april, may of 1945, preparations were in place for invasion in the autumn of 1945. at that point, roosevelt dies. >> [applause] mr. perry: ready to take questions. i don't think we have a microphone, but if you say the question, i will repeat the question. >> could you talk a little bit about what they were saying about the weather? mr. perry: the weather is -- it a question ofe summer fog and winter storms. so the optimum times are early spring, like may or june, or
perhaps october, november. and obviously, there is a lot of snow in the winter. so if you invaded later in the year, october, that would hold you back from building databases you want. clearly, the abdomen time to invade is the spring. -- the optimum time to invade is the spring. >> [indiscernible] fly in badtried to weather deck of mr. perry: the question is -- bad weather? mr. perry: these plans looked at that very carefully, in terms of the number of the flying days for different types of missions per month over the course of the year. and actually compared to that. and, yes, it was viable to conduct a strategic bombing campaign and ground support operations, even if you wanted
to invade in early 1946, the weather would be great. ok. i don't know how much time we have for questions. it is hard for me to see with the light shining, but way up there. >> [indiscernible] -- a lot of fascinating data. i the online or are you great to publish them somewhere? pdf ofry: i will post a the briefings on a website. after the event is over today. up top. >> [indiscernible] -- on roosevelt. what is your opinion? [indiscernible] mr. perry: well, you know, since at theoing to college
end of the cold war, i had a lot of professors who grumbled about soccer and -- sucker and what he wanted to do. i personally have my doubts about that strategy. i don't think he was a complete think this he -- i strategy would have been very challenging to execute in the manner he wanted. it is certainly true that the appetite grows and there is abundant historical examples of if you give someone everything they want, they just don't shut up and behave, they want more stuff. way back. >> i don't know how many people -- [indiscernible] can you hear me?
i am tied to raise my voice as much as possible. [indiscernible] mention of -- [indiscernible] i don't know if anybody -- [indiscernible] it happens to be a piece of land just north of tokyo. the japanese were preparing -- [indiscernible] -- an invasion there. mention of such a plan. from the extraordinary military's strategic point of view because if you landed there, the road straight to tokyo is wide open. [indiscernible] -- take you a couple of days.
>> japanese defenses were very strong in that area. there weretwo landing sites -- were two landing sites. that was a possible landing site. the work was started on, the site down below tokyo. and a site somewhat further south of what you are talking about. however, they were going to take that site essentially from the ground instead of going in -- [indiscernible] -- which are very extensive in that area. and that site was going to be one of the supply -- supply lines on the forces that were coming into -- [indiscernible] so it was thought of. they were not going to assaulted directly. it was the site for the south with a were going to be putting plumbingon horse harbor and so forth.
so they were aware of that site. they were not going to assaulted directly. >> [indiscernible] -- the rock beach. >> [indiscernible] they were not going to assaulted directly, but they were going to be using it for subsequent supply of forces. >> yes, [indiscernible] >> that is very open sea there. >> [indiscernible] again, the defenses are there, you still have -- [indiscernible] -- to the east. on the map, it certainly looks like it is the quicker route. and to the heart of what you want to get at. so, -- and you don't have that protected anchorage. [indiscernible] i lived there for six years of my life. it is much, much rougher over on the other side.
>> [indiscernible] >> [indiscernible] -- i write about contemporary issues and report on the whole -- [indiscernible] a fascinating discussion. thank you. i remember being taught very early in the 1950's even that the bounds were dropped in lieu of the evasion. -- the invasion. existence would just be mass slaughter. we could get into this later in the day, but -- was the decision to not invade predicated on let's try to bomb first and then see? is that what we are building up to hear? mr. perry: the question is -- what was the basis for a decision not to invade?
in fact, there was a decision to invade. in may of 1945 to prepare to november., i think, so, that was entrained. logistical forces were moving. so we didn't stop doing that because we decided to drop the atomic bomb. the preparations for invasion continued. >> [indiscernible] >> [laughter] >> your number that you had about, you know, who got the priority of efforts, did you factor in the shipping of materials both for the united kingdom and the soviets? [indiscernible] -- one of the most important decisions made, but had huge consequences for mobilization. mr. perry: the question is, i
guess, what -- >> [indiscernible] -- shipping and material. [indiscernible] mr. perry: those numbers are just what the u.s. is doing, not what -- although, obviously, we are sending a lot of stuff to the british and to the soviets and lesser amounts to the chinese. >> the following question would be have you looked at -- work? -- [indiscernible] and there estimates to fdr and to marshal about organization and reality? mr. perry: the question concerns a book about mobilization. and my sort of quick reaction to has --ook is that he ishas has got it backwards. we did not back way from the invasion because we lacked mobilization capacities, we turned off mobilization because
we decided not to invade in 1943 and push it out to 1944. >> given your description of roosevelt's postwar order and knowing what was actually signed off on in delta, the actual pertaininghemselves to germany and occupation zones and so on, why was the issue -- why was the issue of occupation in japan that raised by roosevelt? had he abandoned it by then or did he consider it to preliminary teco -- preliminary? mr. perry: the question is why was the occupation of japan that formalized. >> as a means to get further soviet agreement to join the war. mr. perry: on the face of it, he had given the soviets everything they need to get it. the questionhe -- would be, was there an agreement
that stalin knew about? in a 1945? ask for -- he must've had some reason to think we might do that. >> [indiscernible] stalin whenc with stalin looked at the possibility of, like, pushing some forces really almost on an administrative landing just to have a presence before the signing on the missouri on which the soviets were going to be taking part in. no,as a real specific that, we don't have an agreement and there are going to see it as a violation of the agreement. he was pretty blunt that we do not have, you know, any -- it is going to be if two men says, yeah, come on in because there is no agreement to do it and
that is why he was very blunt. mr. perry: noting that truman abided by the written agreements. >> [indiscernible] so, i don't know how much time have are questions. what? [indiscernible] >> what do think prompted roosevelt to change his mind about the role of china? mr. perry: well, i think that -- the question was why did was about change his mind about the role of china. first and foremost, i think he ideals withis stalin. factor acrosse a the world. the u.s. and the pacific. and once he reached an agreement
with stalin, the other -- he felt free to discard the chinese. and secondly, in the nature of you don't have to be too much of a genius to realize the red army is going to be a lot more effective against the japanese and asia than the chinese army is. >> [indiscernible] i am a little confused about some of the numbers that you had on the pacific in 1942. they seemed very large for u.s. forces. does that include prisoners of war? , andk on prisoners of war just as an aside, the gentleman who talked about tokyo would be a good resource. he was in japan's imperial army. mr. perry: [indiscernible] our talking specifically about
the u.s. army in the pacific? yes, ok. [indiscernible] mr. perry: these forces here do not include the guys that surrendered in the philippines. forces from the united states did not go to the united kingdom. they went to secure the supply lines to australia and to defend hawaii. just the pacific. >> [indiscernible] mr. perry: sorry? >> you are including hawaii? mr. perry: yes. and alaska. >> that was quite a large force. mr. perry: it was indeed. >> [indiscernible] you mentioned that both arnold,on and -- and yes, supported the invasion. obviously, it never happened. do you know exactly what caused
the nimitz and macarthur thought about the plan teco -- plan? mr. perry: i don't know what they thought about the plan, i just other comments about it, but it is pretty clear that the was not verynavy enthusiastic at all, both from the standpoint of dividing the efforto support the there as well as in the central pacific and the navy was not -- i keep doing that -- so that is bad and i think probably most important for king and marshall so that we had built up much, invested so much in the central pacific and the philippines that it seemed natural to persist in that direction rather than their big -- take a big leap off to the
side. not to mention that if you wanted to do this north pacific, you have to back up a long way and start building bases in the aleutians and alaska very soon. do if you subsequently don't that, then all the effort is wasted. bases build up forces and in the central pacific, are useful for a lot more contingencies. >> [indiscernible] statistics that you are talking about how there was approximately 50-50 between the two theaters of war and that it didn't agree with -- but it seems to me that the size and vast distances of the pacific theater would naturally numberst the equal
wouldn't mean equal effort. itt if you have to supply, you have all these vast distances for the navy to do and other stuff in the pacific that the same amount of people would an equal the same amount of war effort. i am not exactly sure the measure i am trying to say, but it is much more concentrated in the europe theaters so that the numbers don't exactly equate, even though they are equal. i guessry: i -- the -- the one observation you would make about that is what you have described is a reason to send more stuff to europe rather than an equal balance. but the -- i guess you are saying -- tell me if you agree -- that is sending stuff to the pacific front doesn't necessarily pay off as big in
terms of numbers, or -- >> yeah, i guess. i'm not exactly sure. it is, like, if you have two people in a room doing a very concentrated job and to people in a building -- two people in a building trying to do the same job, you're going to get less work done. you still have two on both sides, but you are not putting as much effort to the people that have the bigger responsibility, or, i guess, not bigger responsibility in terms of, you know, the whole vast theater part. a lot of the stuff -- a lot of these people were just moving things from place to place or flying over vast distances of a long periods of time. >> i wish i remembered the quotes now, but the only thing i
can -- although john or franco here might have this immediately -- frank over here might have this immediately a severe tongue, but one thing he put into public release later on was that the invasion of japan as planned was going to be -- and this was when japan was going to involve something on the order of 5 million american personnel, but i don't think that actual as what- i think as far was going to be forward in the two invasion sites and immediately supporting this was going to be only something like, and again, immediate support was going to be in the neighborhood of a, what, 3, 3 .5 million in immediate support and on the ground if everything played out, which means you have got a million and a half people
somewhere else where in the and are who are doing -- doing other supply and other support. and i think john has a comment down there. >> it is a tale of two things to you are right, because of the vast distances in the pacific theater, you are going to have a much larger component for what support.ombat service in terms of the navy. -- [indiscernible] -- because he was doing logistics, helping set up logistics and the pacific. so there is this huge ratio in the pacific. and it starts before the war. roosevelt in 1940, we renew the draft, all that stuff happens. roosevelt realized you have to play catch-up, so there is already a lot in the pacific as
we build up the bases through, some of it, maintain leverage against china. there is this huge long average -- leverage that goes down and around. so there is this huge logistical effort. i think the guys name is -- the guy's name is -- [indiscernible] -- before the war even starts. so, when the war starts, yeah, germany first, but you've already got a lot of these and most of them are logistics. from hawaii and san diego all the way to australia and those places. so it is a huge effort and the numbers of people that are in support bases and on ships is inapt. that is what the numbers show. my point was -- [indiscernible]
i really think you should factor that in. mr. perry: i think at this point we have to move on to our next presentation. if you have any additional questions -- >> [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> first lady helen had made several changes to the white house. the most obvious was replacing the white male ushers with african-american staff. she also led an effort to great funds to greater memorial for victims of the titanic, but her greatest legacy was bringing thousands of japanese cherry blossom trees to the capital. helen taft, the senate at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span's original series, "first ladies," examining the public and private lives of the women who fill the position of first lady and their influence on the presidency. from martha washington to michelle obama, sundays at 8:00 p.m. eastern on "american history tv" on c-span3.
>> in 1935, franklin d roosevelt put his signature on the social security act. >> this social security measure gives at least some protection to 50 million of our citizens who will reap direct benefits through unemployment compensation, through old age pensions, and services for the protection of children and the prevention of their health. >> 15 years later, congress passed a new social security law. a law designed to meet today's needs. signed by president truman in 1950, this act gives social security a new meaning. this is the, blueprint of the future. a fixture which social security helps makes possible.
most american families are now able to enjoy for themselves in income that is guaranteed for life. it is an income provided not by charity or belief, but by federal, old age, and survivors insurance. insurance that is bought and paid for. >> coming up next, to mark the 70th anniversary of victory in europe day, the pioneer institute in boston hosted a three-hour forum on teaching world war ii in schools. keynote speakers and historians david kennedy and rick atkinson discuss how world war ii has shaped the world we live in today. a panel of educators, a historian, and a holocaust survivor speak on the value and importance of teaching world war ii history in schools and they offer ideas for improving the way the subject is presented. >> good morning.
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