tv Strategies for the Invasion and Defense of Japan CSPAN August 22, 2015 9:00am-10:01am EDT
programming on american history every weekend on c-span3. follow us on twitter @cs panhistory to keep up with the latest history news. author d. m. giangreco talks directed atfensive japan's most northern island. he discusses the soviet union's involvement including the use of just six and -- logistics. focuses on the 70th anniversary of the end of world war ii. posted by the institute for the study of strategy and politics, it is about an hour. have d. m. giangreco who is the editor of the military review for a long time up at fort leavenworth and has written a very excellent book "health pay." "hell to pay your cap --
"hell to pay." we are very appreciative of that. for agoing to talk to you little bit. [applause] d. m. giangreco: great to be here. start off to test -- with some interesting quotes i have heard recently. navy mind of the waters off of northern japan to keep the russians from invading first. quote, still and prepared to seize the northern end of hia nshu, from their his armored divisions would sweep down towards tokyo leaving postwar japan a divided nation like germany. was nothing to stop the soviets from invading before the americans and seizing all of northern japan. well ok.
much like fantasy football alternate history can be an enjoyable diversion from trotting and read trotting the same old ground. what is interesting about these overheard quotes is that they were all uttered as statements of fact by educators and serious historians, and while they and similar ideas have bubbled up for decades, virtually all of these comments were made within the last year during the run-up to the 70th anniversary of the war's end. it is clear that both the soviet capabilities are blownsingly being pro--- out of proportion by individuals have not bothered to read works of u.s. or russian scholars who have written on the subject,
some of whom are we with us here today. read the relevant wartime planning documents and operational summaries. compensating matters somewhat is the fact that two powers eyeing northern japan, each conceived or at least considered a variety of options that differed in both scale and objective. yet they are regularly mashed together as if they are single proposed operations. this afternoon i will be giving you a brief overview of the plans of the united states from the soviet union and imperial japan for the seizure, and ultimately -- alternately, the defense of the northernmost island. give a littlell rundown of where these plans fit within the context of the endgame against japan.
on october 3, 1944 the u.s. army chief of staff, general george c marshall rejected a proposal to strategy inrition the pacific and slowdown operations while awaiting russian entry into the war. believed that this path would arouse stalin's suspicions maneuvering we are to get them into the fight in such a manner that they will suffer major losses. plans had been for the u.s. forces to invade japan sometime in 1947 or 1948, but this had since been pushed up to the fall of 1945. what'srshall desired -- ok, what marshall
desired was a 12 punch. an invasion of manchuria to tie up the massive armies on the asian mainland. let's see if i can find the laser pointer. this is manchuria. they have armies really all throughout this. area,l throughout this massive and scale. to have manchuria tying up the japanese forces there, followed by the beginning of u.s. operations in the islands in the fall. on october 16,, 1944, there was a meeting in moscow with ambassador averill herrmann and the u.s. military mission chief major general john r dean, where he renewed his pledge to join the war against japan, and added that the soviet
offensive operations could begin within two and a half to three months after the defeat of germany. with theperfectly strategic thinking of the u.s. joint chief of staff, and though it would not be formally codified until the altar conference the following year this timetable would serve as the basis for all military to military coordination between , and an immediate jump in lend lease deliveries of the soviet union. to launch an offensive so quickly after their forces defeated the nazis in europe, , thust tip off japanese prompting a primitive strike against the highly vulnerable to read siberian railroad, the red army would have to depend to a large degree on americans to secretly supply much of the
food, fuel, war supplies, and even the trucks to move them both before and during the offensive. 18,days later, on october stalin presented a breathtakingly huge wishlist of supplies which the united states moved immediately to fill under a secret expansion codenamed leaseost of the lend program. waret participation in the was now linked to our vision of the endgames attrition phase, and the first ships with mile post cargoes arriving for eastern ports before the end of 1944. often frustrating military to military coordination was conducted in moscow and both sides agreed that if the campaign is manchuria was not quickly one of the japanese -- quickly won, that the japanese
make every effort to disrupt the flow of supplies. at the guilty conference in 1945 the soviet chief admiral nikolai asked his american counterpart, admiral ernest j king, if we would provide convoy protection. king's response was that u.s. naval forces were already fully committed to supporting our own operation far to the south, and that no escorts could be provided. he maintained that the soviets themselves would need to do the anti-air, anti-mine, anti-submarine effort industry , which iskkaido busily right to hear. -- basically right through here. that is the only route but remained ice free throughout the winter.
the u.s. alternative was to help the soviets established a modest amphibious capability before they entered the war by setting up a base at cold bay, alaska. up -- s literally way actually, here is cold bay. it is way the heck up here. no, i'm sorry. it is right here. it is a little difficult see the pointer from my angle. cold bay, their sailors could quickly learn to operate the hundreds of u.s. ships then believed to be coming to them under mile post. knetsof cannot solve -- readily agreed and they trained some 1200 naval personnel who manned the made in usa minesweepers, such aces, assault
craft, and large floating workshop. here soviet we're admiral boris rear admiral boris popoff addresses a crowd in 1945. with this as background we can proposals look at the and plans of the united states, soviet russia, and imperial japan. first the american. -- fornning for all the invasion of japan was begun in 1944. an early scheme of operation was released for, on the very day i fought- allied forces
their way onshore on normandy and was presented to the chief of staff on june 3, 1944. it offered for possible areas that might be seized and subsequently serve as the required steppingstone that would bring ground-based fighter aircraft within striking distance of quote, the industrial part of japan, which was tokyo and the surrounding canto playing. the 12 division chosen sinceuickly it was in line with the central pacific drive of admiral chester nimitz and general was macarthur's swing from new guinea and the philippines. one of the areas that had been
briefly considered as a civic center tokyo -- steppingstone to tokyo was the northernmost island of hokkaido. i am buzzing through here too fast. it is right here. even though it was recognized early on by the planners that its remote location was not favorably located with respect to supporting bases offered numerous liabilities. in seizure with simplified and protect communications with our new pacific allies.
pentagon planners originally believed that the division operation in the southeast portion of the mountainous island would provide quote, excellent- potentialities for the installation of land-based aircraft. by 1945 however a more full examination of the region's brutal weather had convince him otherwise. the invasion of timetable had been refined and now called for the tokyo area to be invaded in march, 1946. which meant that the new supporting bases in the initial invasion operation had to be constructed and made fully operational during the worst of the winter months. ,he annual snowfall in hokkaido and more specifically in the plae right here -- in the
allight here which is where the airfield construction would have been, not only averaged more than 25 feet, but it's high mean temperature hovered at the freezing mark, resulting in a continual process of partial melting and re-freezing. with this rather fundamental problem now well understood, d. m. giangreco -- with this rather fundamental problem now well understood ankaido was a switched to option that might be launched at japan's resistance continued after the capital had fallen. planners in the spring of 19 45 envision scenarios calling for land-based as early as july 1946. depending on objectives that would have either for infantry infantry and one
armored division or eight infantry and no armored division . naval force requirements for whichever is either operation was chosen centered around support and bombardment groups 18, both of the new midway class characters which were envisioned to be deployed by that time, seven light characters. -- seven light carriers, 19 battleships. 61 cruises of all types. 18 of which were part of the group to provide direct air support, and 215 destroyer type ships as well as the normal armadas, minesweepers, in short it was a standard invasion and
amphibious operation. the a division operation would seek five of the formations employed on the honshu side of againstight and three heavily mined and strongly fortified areas across the way and hokkaido. the five division strike against hokkaido would have the same coastal positions but would also target the sapporo plane -- plain. this by the way is why one of the two armored divisions that had earlier fought on tokyo's waso playing was -- plain slated to take part in its operation. even this larger commitment on hokkaido would result in only
the southern third of the west virginia site island -- west virginia site island being captured. after quote, a difficult operation involving numerous assaults and the reduction of fortified areas, as well as the seizure of narrow corridors between the lowland air in bank, the -- areas, the offensive line would be forming a narrow neck just above sapporo, which a very heavyy industrialized city. of 1946, any fall imperial forces making a last-ditch fight attempt on honshu would be cut off from yet another resource area, and the remaining troops on hokkaido would be left to their own devices. it was planned that a core of three divisions would hold the .aptured territory
as for the soviets, no invasion has come of hokkaido as part of the soviet war planning until the run-up to the pot stem conference. turning a june 26 and june 27 meeting that david had mentioned earlier, high-level meetings in premier joseph stalin expressed interest in seizing the island and asked his most senior field marshal, cost -- casse -- zero zukoff how much he would need to compress the task. he stressed an average of six combat divisions which meant that so many troops would have to be siphoned off for such an adventurous move that the long
planned invasion of manchuria would itself be put at risk. question ofso the how the men and equipment would actually get there, since the u.s. effort to help the soviets developed and amphibious capability, project select -- had only been in operation for a few months. zukoff did not need to go into detail. the chief of the general staff immediately stated the reservation of mainland japan was extremely dangerous and utterly impractical. who served as both deputy premier and minister of foreign affairs, pictured here, made it plain that the u.s. and britain would see this as a flagrant violation of the still
secret agreement made at the yalta conference -- conference. the following day, june 28, cell and approved only the existing plans for operations in the crile islands, and southern socko and. least as the target of a full-scale invasion, was off the table. itsr japan announced acceptance of the pot stem declarations terms in august 1945, it was immediately apparent to the soviets who had invaded manchuria almost a week earlier, that much of the imperial army was indeed following emperor here of euros hito's orders to lay down their arms. for the first time in history many japanese divisions were
agreeing to surrender and the soviets were harvesting, i'm presidentially, large numbers of prisoners instead of having to fight them literally to the death. situation opened the possibility of a largely administrative landing of a light occupational force to create a presence on hokkaido that might be used as a bargaining tool in negotiations to obtain and occupation zone in the islands and perhaps even a sector into -- in tokyo itself. on august 18, orders were issued for the piecemeal insertion of 342nd andifle corps's 345th rifle divisions, supported by a naval infantry battalion and as many as two construction battalions. their target was the target -- was the small remote port located about there.
it was far off the island west coast and supposedly well removed from hokkaido's heavily defended population centers in the south. a third division laboriously mopping up the crile islands, would eventually be made available. the operation was to take place so soviet troops to be on the ground ahead of the scheduled surrender of all imperial forces in tokyo bay, an event in which the soviets would be a signatory. so why here? the soviets had to secure immediate control of an adequate port that was as far as possible from the base islands to imperial divisions. two, there landing force was limited to a small amount of activity and supplies a could be
offloaded only on a dock by a crane. they had no way to on load and , and they would have woefully inadequate gunfire theirt and -- at disposal. shortcomings would be at all a problem if the -- noe put up note resistance, but it was a fact that a large number of imperial troops were, against orders from tokyo, still engaging in the fanatical combat that they were well-known for. in light of this, the soviets wisely planned to play it safe and what they perceived to be far off. even this modern operation had to be called off for reasons that were both military and
political. message to5 president harry truman -- stalin asked in it, he called for the establishment of a soviet -- occupation zone in northern hokkaido above a demarcation line, running from i 20, which is basically straight across the island. basically this here. which they would have to occupy strategically. he stated that russian public opinion would be seriously offended if he did not get his way. channels stalin
the groundwork for demanding a slice of tokyo. they talked about that. the only thing going on at the time. he was demanding a slice of tokyo as had already been achieved in both berlin and vienna through the direct presence of soviet field armies. flatly rejected the proposal since it was contrary to what his predecessor had agreed to at yalta. , andlincher may have been some speculate likely might have basicsimply a very tactical and operational realities. on the same day that the 87th umoi, corps, landing at r
soviet forces conducted an ushu,lt on the island of sh located across the southern tip peninsula. its garrison of a brigade of 91st division troops put up a fair resistance until ordered to cease fire by higher headquarters into qaeda. tokyo jumping up and down on its back at the time. the resistance was so fierce that the japanese inflicted far more casualties than they received. soviet 1567,he which some sources -- with some
sources stating nearly 3000, 30 whom were killed. killed.ird of whom were here is a soviet painting of a heroic officer being shot in the second before he destroys a japanese machine gun position. yet, win16 made in america lci assault ships and their a tryingom project hul to bring in the second wave, five of them were shot by shore batteries. this lci is one of the 11 survivors and was returned to the u.s. underwent lease provisions of 1955. essentially losing a third of the second wave in one stroke had a sobering effect, although you would not know that reading the soviet reports afterward. amphibious operations were not
so easy. shocken there was the which did show up in paperwork later on, that the japanese troops, whom it was assumed would be disheartened by their government's decision to surrender, instead put up a murderous defense. if this occurred at the farthest reaches of the japanese empire, what might happen if -- on japan itself. idea behind what was to be basically an administrative landing at rumoi was the creation of conditions favorable to establishing soviet interest in postwar japan, any military setback to the operations would have political ramifications far out of proportion to the small number of troops committed.
stalin pulled the plug on preparations for the hokkaido on august 22, 1945. now the japanese. 1946he war continued into the two imperial divisions that u.s. intelligence was monitoring on hokkaido in mid-1945, the seventh and 40 seconds, would 42nd,nd4 -- the would have been long gone. was invaded,area as the u.s. plans to do, in march of 1946, imperial japanese headquarters intended to spirits intended to spirit them down here.
they intended to take them across the street in wooden craft -- straight in wooden vulnerable.ly to be they would move at night to the plane as fast as the average speed could carry them. they would leave behind on the onda the hundred first -- st brigade.e 101 and the best people volunteer corps, element organized the previous summer and fall. remember thatt to both divisions would still be on hand and prepared for battle during any soviet effort in 1945. the people volunteer corps on
hokkaido, as throughout japan, 15 tode up of males aged 60, and females aged 17 to 40. essentially all but the children and aged of the island. also known as the volunteer combat core, they received training in the use of spears, swords, firearms, explosives, and so forth from retired officers, it would be at the ofposal -- literally -- the imperial army when called to duty for any needed task. digging tunnels, serving as cannon fodder. whether it was americans coming ashore in the summer of 1946, or russians in august 1945, these willing and heavily indoctrinated masses would be a significant factor during any invasion.
and then there was a expensive navy and for structure and personnel commitment to hokkaido. it was tasked for far more than maintenance and expense of the islands to major ports. naval personnel and imperial imperial marines, the united states had some familiarity with from manila. they were responsible for virtually all of the very expensive shore defenses covering nearly 200 miles of coastline in the critical southern region. they manned not only all of the shore batteries lining the various areas of the straight to the straightt also separating the island from socko and, far on the very tip of the screen. mannedthese strong, well
positional forces who are invisible in virtually all historical accounts freed of the army for mobile operations, and will also become a priceless source of trained personnel against a soviet incursion now that free surrender agreements had been worked out at douglas macarthur's headquarters in manila. yet this was not all the military manpower that could be drawn upon. an expansion of the air force commitment on hokkaido, both by the navy and army, was initiated after u.s. forces invaded the mariana islands in 1944. there was a very large assortment of combat and logistical support elements from all the services on hand, non-divisional antiaircraft. artillery supply. etc..
the number of military personnel ultimately demobilized by the u.s. ninth court and 77 infantry division on the island totaled a men291= 290 1000, 947 291,947 men. this did not include the 416 police. how about some what if's. events in progress were proving juneorst of the marshals morning, and any move against japan itself would not take place in a political article medic wave. what would've happened if stalin
in a fit of rob otto -- bravado went ahead with the operation and the japanese refused to be captured. had notrial government actually surrendered yet, and although a truth and successful military to military negotiation had been carried out with the americans, many of its troops continued to try to fight their way to safety and protect the roughly million and a half japanese civilians in manchuria and the northern islands. could the japanese military -- whatever orders might come from tokyo -- be expected to do any less if the home islands themselves were suddenly subject to what it would be perceived as a sneak attack after the had already agreed to surrender? is imperial forces subsequently put up even modest opposition
and it was somewhat likely that it would be more modest -- somewhat more than modest, the soviets would have had no ability to force and then exploit either politically or militarily and incursion on hokkaido. look at the soviet air and naval plans. it was intended that air elements to support the hastily conceived operation be equally hastily employed. basically you are talking from here to appear. to up here.e from their air operations would be conducted little difficulty unless the situation suddenly boiled up into something more than a show of force.
the soviet navy's requirements for considerable. you can't go by what they should have had. the soviet navy's requirements were considerably larger, yet the operations naval component was, by necessity, so small that the second rifle division to land would have had to wait until the six available project and ani's and it -- oddball variety of the vessels used in shipping -- these of each roller torpedo cutters, sub chasers, and of course the american-made minesweepers and other american supplied vessels, would have to wait until they plodded 300 miles back to the recently secured port. incidentally you will notice
this is the u.s. invasion area, and of course here we are talking northern hokkaido. this distance is roughly new orleans to vermont, just for you to keep that in mind. youngunately for the russian soldiers, sailors, and hadnes, the crile fighting put forces in northern japan on full alert. worse yet, japanese air activity had increased all along the very the very the pain -- route of the painfully slow invasion course. they were moving at a pitiful eight knots. the area was also alive with civilian vessels of all sizes and types, grandpa refugees -- crammed with refugees fleeing the barbarian russians. of mostlywouldn't --
wooden construction they did not set off the magnetic mines. the defense put up by the imperial troops enabled more than a quarter of the 375 -- 300,000 japanese on the island to dunkirk their way out. the bottom line is that the japanese would have known early on that the soviets were coming, and ponderous movement would not go unmolested. when the articles of surrender were signed on the battleship missouri, there were just 80 to 90 operational aircraft in the nordic -- northern region, 38 of them on hokkaido, with most belonging to reconnaissance units. this however, is no indication of the amount of aerial combat power that the imperial army and navy could immediately hurl from the massive concentration of,
cozzi and conventional -- ka mikazi and conventional aircraft based to the south. after the 1944 invasion of the accelerated when macarthur returned to the philippines, the japanese initiated an expansion of the airbase infrastructure and hokkaido andin northern honshu. it's a great airbase construction was right through here -- basically the airbase construction was right through here in the sapporo plains and extend itself somewhat. the idea of the japanese was to pincers.quote, aerial thesend -- sendai
as -- they believed it could have been a stepping even thea or perhaps main invasion site. but critically they thought of this as being a site that we could go into, and indeed that wasn't -- that was one of the sites that we had looked at. it was discarded because it could be very easily reinforced by the japanese. againere looking at this ncers whereial pi they would be coming down on the fleet from the north as well as having struck on the basis in this region. bases were never used for that purpose, but they pointed like a dagger at any soviet landing on hokkaido. air cover with a gaggle of soviet votes was to consist --
was an utterly insufficient and vulnerable force that would have to spend much of its time defending its self and its captured airfields instead of the fleet off of rum oi. the soviets could push reinforcements into the fight, the first of the rear -- reinforcements would not make their appearance for as much as a weak because they are having to do it hard when it comes to going through the expansion of the facilities of there. not for as much as a week after the crisis that erected, although they would steadily gained more as time went on. in the meantime the imperial air
ostess withd be the h the mostest, so to speak, from a well-established ace system. -- base system. itself, a division of the soviets 87 rifle corps, plus the separate naval infantry battalion would initially faced only a single, but ready for battle, imperial battalion. that is assuming of course that the japanese somehow had not figured out where the force was headed, and quickly moved to reinforce the port. for our purposes we will just assume that the japanese went brain-dead and did not know where the force was headed. the -- although the area had no coastal defense, it could be expected that the
battalion would make appropriate use of its light artillery against the invaders both. it seems likely that the russians, who made -- that the russians would succeed in saving in taking the small port that they would have no tanks, and little if any artillery. newly appointed commander, a highly experienced is picturedeneral here as a division commander shortly before the nazis invaded russia. he would immediately find that the road in length as well as the ones on the coast were, as u.s. intelligence analysts had dryly noted, subject to blocking. imperial fifth army was
the control of a combat hardened lieutenant general and very interesting character. 33 infantry 32 to battalions and 37 238 artillery 2 -- 37 to 27 to 38 artillery batteries. he would detach and send it rumoii what -- to whatever battalions he deemed prudent. battalions from principallyons -- where one days- of rail and road march from rumo
i. stalin's force of would quickly come under direct siege, a situation that would not provide a useful basis for soviet occupation demands. having stalingrad, a wide but somewhat broken river, aey would be confined to gallipoli like enclave andounded by hostile hills several miles of open ocean separating them from support. that is, if stalin had not of his chiefrnings of staff and human -- and truman. any questions? [applause]
d. m. giangreco: yes? [indiscernible] >> i recall it you said there was a directive to do the hokkaido operations, that that was a much lesser scale than the bombings? : that was theo second one which was basically two divisions, basically a marine force. a small marine force. some construction battalions. their navalet infantry and they could get a division there. then i have to go back 300 miles , get another division, bring it
forward, and then there is another division in the car cariles. it would eventually be made available to the lodgment. that is the later one that got the plug pulled. >> the so-called detail meeting -- gkl meeting. they based it on another source seen nohave got, i have archival evidence, no archival citation that explains it. volumes -- two d. m. giangreco: which is what i think sliwinski is referring to in his notes. earlier, we are
going to be able to see a lot of lord knowsg -- when, but that actually is what sliwinski/tes -- >> it was supposed to be cleared by the 22nd of august. because of that any military , evenions were feasible had stalin decided to challenge it, but he didn't. russians -- i guess i should say soviet -- d. m. giangreco: he is saying a lot of good stuff here. is there a microphone he can get? this is good. why don't you jump up here. >> he is right. are one or maybe three or four more rounds. that's lewinsky has,
slieinski has, it is the declassified far east. it is a little suspect because it does not have the notes they are supposed to have. and the documents books, the best ones, do not show those gq l meetings. goingtwo volumes, it is to be expensive because it is about 60 back to volume. they are raising the prices. they have a private -- applied sanctions to their books. i am not putting any way on that yet. there is one other interesting bit. the division commander was supposed to take a city and he did not take it on time. he is the one who got released from command although his
division was included in the potential force for hokkaido. they could not do much more than what a small element -- then put a small element in there before the 25th. it had to be done several days between each division. it's not really clear, as you have been saying. d. m. giangreco: there was senior command -- ok. there were all kinds of people who were advising against this. on the military side you have like zukoff, on the political side you have people like molotov, saying this is not what we agreed to. then you have people like truman. there were so many people on both sides of the pacific who were against this. it is amazing when i come across
these broad things that people say, who obviously have not read dave's book, and also have apparently not look at things and terrain maps -- things like terrain maps. this idea that the soviet union -- soviet forces are going to be sleeping down honshu is absolutely amazing. i'm sure you have been reading this kind of stuff for years. www.c-span.org -- [indiscernible] >> was there other support available? : no. giangreco the soviets were making the best use of what they had, which was almost nothing. they were using it as effectively as they could, but they just did not have it.
when i say that they were going to be using trawlers as amphibious vehicles, that is not just something that i am kidding . he is shaking his head yes. i think you had -- i think frank at the truman library just a few weeks ago, he had this -- i can't ever what it was, but i was trying so hard not to bust out laughing. the soviets would have conducted an effective invasion of japan if they could have walked underwater pulling heavy tanks. that is their capability. : so i guess that i'm trying to say and what a couple of other dental and here are whose books people apparently don't bother to read .s that it ain't happening it is tossed out as a matter of something that like, well,
obviously. yes sir. >> when we invaded in november of 46, whaten march are the soviets doing at that time? the soviets are consolidating. they have a lot of consolidating to do. they are pushing. it is almost like fingers on a hand. forces thatlot of they are having to move forward, and they are already running all kinds of issues getting stuff moving forward. they are consolidating. .anchuria is a huge place maybe some japanese are going to have to have -- are going to start having second thoughts. they have got to consolidate. the soviets, quite rightly, are .ery busy guys they have a lot of work to do. they are not sitting on their butts.
yes sir? >> question. let's say that stalin had just said, dam the torpedoes. full speed ahead. we are going to go ahead with this plan. and they went forward. first off, how do you think that would have affected u.s. plans, etc., with the u.s. have decided well, they are our allies, we send the u.s. fleet in two support them? : that would have been such a bizarre decision on in's partrt -- on stal that i can't imagine that he would. john made a funny clip about that at one time. macarthur would probably say to them.panese, spank what was it that you said? i were a member if you don't. -- remember it. correctionke a minor
of the unit nomenclature? you talked about japanese marines. : i tried toeco catch myself. there were various japanese ground troops with a variety of missions. they were neither organized nor equipped like our marines. they were special naval landing forces and a variety of base forces. they were part of the navy, not like the marines. : what i wouldo draw people's attention to in they are the- units that were in manila, they were very much along the lines of what you are talking about. damageflicted in or miss -- enormous damage. then of course people are
it is a different structure from the marines. marinesthe average joe, -- rather than explaining the whole cable connection and all the idiosyncrasies, i thought about that even as i was saying it. you would be seeing a summit next -- necks turning red. one more question if there is one. i think they are done with me. [applause] >> this weekend on the c-span network. politics, books, and american history on c-span today, live coverage of presidential candidates at the iowa state fair continues. we would hear from republican noonnors chris christie at
and bobby jindal at 1:00. 6:30,nday evening at republican candidate scott walker hold a meeting in new hampshire. on c-span2 today, book tv is live at the inaugural mississippi book festival beginning at 11:00 a.m.. coverage features and haley barbour as well as panel discussions on civil rights, history, and biography. and the literary lives of harper lee and eudora wealthy. keeperumnist katie shares her thoughts on the obamas administration the obama administration with millennial. and columbia university's professor on new york's architectural landmarks and the history of the commission created to protect them. it is sunday at 5:00 p.m. on c-span. a program created by the johnson administration to help improve relations between the police and the community in
washington dc after the martin luther king if it -- assassination and subsequent riots. q&a.sunday night on kurtar-old college student has been visiting the graves of u.s. presidents and vice president since he was nine and documenting his adventures on his website. he talks about those visits and his interest in american history. >> the one great site that everyone has trouble -- grave site that everyone has trouble getting to is the nelson rockefeller one. >> how did you get to a? >> we were able to get to it by what my father describes as an act of god. my father saw that this gigantic tree had fallen. he went in and actually sought nelson rockefeller's grade and decided that he would have to get me there fairly quickly after that. >>kurt
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