tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN January 11, 2016 5:26pm-7:01pm EST
and that dispositions in the region should reflect that change. well, i think maybe they're going to find that they are not without economic difficulties as well. and i worry that, instead of making them rethink and say, okay, it's time to negotiate as equals or as the existing power and the rising power, it may actually increase their sense of grievance. that's a big worry. but things are changing and they are going to be affected by the fact that the u.s. is recovering and china may be in some difficulties. >> may i add one point to harold's point? the united states of america has seven treaty obligations in the world. five of those seven are in the
asia pacific area. so we've had those treaty obligations for a long time. a long, long time. >> secretary cohen? >> if i can follow-up on secretary brown's answer. i think we have to be concerned what china thinks. we are up to, and also be concerned about what the asian countries believe is necessary. as seen, china is number one trading partner replacing the united states, we're number four. to say the u.s. is trying to contain china would be to sea all of the members of asean are trying to contain china, which is not the case. they want to continue to do business with china. but they don't want to be dominated, as secretary brown said. and that is a reason why this strategy on the part of the united states makes sense in the sense of how it's being pursued. to say we have 2500 marines in
darwin, australia, is not a containment strategy against china although the marines think so. to say we're going to rotate four combat ships through singapore is not exactly a change in the balance of power. as you look at steps that have been taken, they've been pretty modest. but they've also sent a signal to say we understand china's power is rising, it's inevitable. this is something talked about years ago saying the fourth reform would be that of the military. it's inevitable. it's going to get bigger and stronger. what the united states is saying with our allies in the seven treaty relationships we have, yes, china's going to be a power in the region and onbut we want that power to be exercised consistent with international norms. so these steps that are taken shouldn't be seen by the chinese, notwithstanding their feelings, this is a containment
strategy. but rather saying, use your power in a way that benefits all of us. use the power in a way that does contain the prosperity that's been generated. and when i first was in the pentagon i had to go to their national academy of sciences and speak to young officers coming up, there were papers saying time for asia to take care of asian ands for the united states to get out. i asked the question, do you really want that to take place? if we were to get out now, who replaces us? is it going to be you? is it going to be japan? is it going to be india? who replaces a stabilizing force we have been and will continue to be. we have to persuade them we're taking modest steps to make sure their power is fully integrated into the international regime and not seen as the united states trying to in any way to prodescribe, constrict, inhibit their growth, which is inev vitt
ibl. >> bill perry, anything no add. >> i would associate with with what my cloegs have said on the issue. we have had almost 50 years of peace in the asia pacific region which is historically unusual. and that 50 year of peace, two comments. first of all a key contributor the american military force in the region. secondly, that 50 years of police has more than anything, china to have economic growth. so in a way which may seem insane to the chinese, the american military presence in the region has been indispensable to them achieving this remarkable economic growth.
some chinese sense that. few chinese are willing to say out loud their economic well-being has been a direct function of america's military presence. i think you can say it sort of pox americana in the asia pacific region in the last few decades. >> fair to conclude from the comments you think the existing architecture with the five alliances in asia, is something which should survive for the next few decades? >> chinese will not like it. >> exactly. that was going to be my point. and i think they believe that we're pushing the envelope. i believe, during each of you opined, for instance, when you were secretary on article v of the mutual defense treaty with japan, applying to japan's
administration of the islands and secretary's defense owe fined and the chinese say we never hat a president who opined on that. now the president goes to japan and opines on that. when you were secretaries, the philippines and the vietnamese built stuff on islands in the south china sea. we department make a big deal of it. but now that the chinese are doing it, it's a big deal. so one can understand where kind of their views are coming from. >> well, from their point of view, that's a reasonable argument to make. on the other hand, what they are doing is completely disproportionate to what the others did. the others didn't build islands and then put elaborate construction on them and start flying airplanes into them. the chinese would say, well,
that's them. we're different and bigger and we were always in charge there. >> there's also the point of the world order that the united states helped build and led during that ten-year period after world war ii. and that world order was all about coalitions of common interests that established international law. and what the chinese are doing here is they refuse to acknowledge international law to resolve these disputes international bodies that were set up to do this. and that's another dimension of this. that i think very important because if we see a world that now starts to unravel international law, then where are we going? the world has done pretty well the last 70 years, no world war
iii, no nuclear exchange, conflict, problem, disasters, yes. but when you consider that over a 30-year period we had the two most horrible wars in the world and we've had nothing like that because of this world order, it's impmic it needs to be adjusted and adapt to reals of a rising china and all of 0 the other issues. but when you start disregarding international law, then we're running into some real difficulty. i think, in my opinion, the real issue here is much as anything else on these disputes and east and south china seas. >> of course the chinese can say, well, we weren't part of the making of those laws. and i think that's a reasonable point to which we could invite them to help us and the rest of the world bring them up to date. i'm not clear that that's
happened. >> well, that, too. but i also would say, harold, the chinese took a seat on the u.n. security council a long, long time ago and had -- did have a role in helping build a world order that was much to their benefit which all three of you have noted, and bill perry talked about it, as to our u.s. military has done an awful lot to help the chinese in this regard. >> speaking of disregarding international law, let talk about one of the headlines in the last few days, which is north korea. if each of you could talk about your experience with north korea during your tenure, what lessons you learned and what you would tell ash carter about what we -- or i guess president obama -- it's not fair to pin that on ash -- what we should be doing by north korea today. >> i think bill perry should answer that question first. >> i think, bill, you won on
this one. >> well we had in -- fi first year as secretary, we came very close to a military conflict with north korea. now that was happily resolved without conflict by the agreed framework. but the agreed framework, which by way the north koreans agreed to freeze their activities at the nuclear facility and did freeze them. but that agreed framework was terminated early in the administration of george w. bush. and there's been nothing constraining, no such constraints on the nor koreans since then. i think it was a mistake to give that up, but that's history now.
we have two, three administrations now have said they would not tolerate nuclear weapons in north korea but proceeded to tolerate them. and we are now faced with a societal, a modest, dangerous nuclear arsenal in north korea. i think the mechanism being used to deal with this is call the six-party talks which, in my judgment, again, spectacularly unsuccessful. not based on any subject on what they're doing, just based on the object of judgment of what the results have been. so the situation's very dangerous, i think in north korea today not only build the nuclear arsenal, making it bigger and stronger and farther reaching, making very aggressive comments about how they might
use this nuclear arsenal. i think it's urgent we get a serious, diplomatic effort trying to deal with that problem. six-party talks might be right mechanism for doing this but have not had the right strategy for dealing with it i think primarily the united states and china have had a different assessment of the threat and therefore never able to agree on what to do about the threat. perhaps when this latest development in north korea, the chinese may now come to believe as we do this is a serious problem and needs serious action. i think the next step in the united states would be to try to formulate a program on which we can base new negotiations and then try to get agreement with the chinese other members of the six-party talks to get agreement on that -- on those goals and
that strategy and proceed forward. the best basis i can think of for negotiating strategy with north korea now is what the professor, former director has called the three nos, which means no new nuclear weapons, no more nuclear weapons, and no transfer of nuclear weapons. that's not the same as what the goal has been in the past, to get north korea to give up their nuclear weapon, which is a pretty barrier to try to get over. if we could agree on that as a negotiating strategy, we might be able to make some progress with north korea, at least containing the danger we face now. if we succeed in that we might go farther and look at negotiation to actually
eliminate them. but i see a history of 15 years, i guess, complete failure in the so-called six-party negotiations. it's not because we don't have the right people at the table. they are the right people but we don't have the right strategy for trying to deal with north korea. we need to put serious attention on this problem because it's a danger to our proliferation problem, danger to the asia prafk region and a danger really of nuclear conflict or nuclear terrorist group ewing nuclear weapons. all of these dangers aring e ag by the developments in north korea going on today. by the way, i think the latest test, in my judgment, is a test to make the nuclear weapon they have smaller, more compact so they can fit on the warhead of a missile.
whether i, myself, i'm highly skeptical, it was a hydrogen test. even if it was not, that was not the main danger. the main danger is they're making it them compact enough to get on a warhead. >> dr. brown? >> i think bill perry's proposal is certainly a reasonable one, as an objective for us. the question is, what do the north koreans get in exchange? and that will be a very difficult negotiation. moreover, the chinese, i think, will always be very reluctant to put a lot of pressure on north korea because if north korea collapses, for whatever reason, the prospect of an extension northward of south korean
influence and prospectively u.s. influence will worry the chinese. so it's a good proposal. but it's not clear what the quid pro quo will be. >> secretary cohen? >> i agree with both secretary perry and brown. but secretary brown raises a question good, what do the north koreans get out of this? well, what have they been getting out of this? they've been engaged in nuclear extortion, blackmail. feed us, fuel us before we strike again or explode again. so one thing they've been getting is more food and fuel, certainly from the chinese, perhaps others. so i would hope that the chinese would look at what they are subsidizing and find ways to moderate that or modulate it in a way that sends a very strong signal that they're unhappy with what north korea's doing. i think that's something we
could do. or they could do. secondly, we should pursue, as bill perry has said, a multilateral, whether six-party talks or another forum, and try and get a multilateral agreement on what needs to be done long term in dealing with the north koreans. but we also should be prepared to act unilaterally. i think we should take action on the financial side putting a much tougher squeeze on some of the north korean elite and reimpose some of the sanctions that were imposed previously. i would hope also that we would consider and have the south koreans and japanese consider having on their territory. this should be a concern, i know a concern to the chinese, but nonetheless this is something that is important to us and to our allies to have a defensive capability that would be able to at least knock down that kind of missile technology that they're
trying to develop. and finally, i think that we should go back and insist that the inspection regime -- because what bill perry's been talking about is danger of proliferation, the danger of nuclear proliferation. north korea's one of the principal sources of the proliferation, working at times with pakistan, working at tiles with iran, and as iran now is in the agreement with the united states and others, there's still a danger that north korea could still be a source of some testing that otherwise would take place in iran or elsewhere. so i think we should look at ways of saying, no, no, shipments coming out of north korea that are suspect, going to various ports, we should insist our allies open those cargos for inspection and not make it optional but make it mandatory, make it mandatory. and those that don't would face sanctions from the united states.
i tonigdon't think we can affor have the north koreans trading in nuclear materials. not only nuclear weapons about you nuclear materials it self-. there are groups desperate to get hands on a nuclear device or nuclear experiences and explode it in an american city. that's what secretary perry has worried about, written about. he writes about it if a factual way. i write about it in fiction. but we're both concerned that is something that would be a terrible, terrible thing in the world, no matter where it takes place, that a nuclear bomb is exploded in an urban area causes hundreds of thousands of deaths. it something we need to take action. we haven't been taking action. do it multilaterally, unilaterally as well. >> secretary hagel? >> i would add a couple. i think my three predecessors covered most of the issues. but it was just a few days after i took office, in february of
2013, that the north koreans launched long-range missiles over the top of japan and other countries in the pacific. that obviously precipitated some new attention. and that within days had me out in a press conference announcing that we were going to build out another eight ground-based intercepters in alaska down the coast. now that alone was not going to deal with the problem. but i say that because, just a reminder, that wasn't very long ago. and then with the latest incident that bill perry mentioned, we all know is another reminder. but just a couple of other points i would make. harold's point about the chinese, i've always believed that there will be ultimately
very little progress made on north korea without the chinese. and it won't be because the chinese are supporting our policies or any benevolent reason, but it will be in their self-interests. it's very clear, as harold pointed out that when you look at chinese situation, the last thing they need is millions and millions of north core re. s fleeing across the border. more to the point the south koreans are hair triggered on this. and as joe and sam and others in this audience who know who have been to korea and had responsibilities, working with the south koreans on this to keep them from doing something here that you can't recalibrate, it's too late, that could start something, is a big deal.
the third part of this, i think, and just another point, i have heard from third party sources, credible sources in asia pacific when i was there, when i've been here in the united states and also from various chinese leaders, off the record, that this north korean problem continues to perpetuate american military presence in the region, even more and more, and we keep using it, the united states, as an excuse to keep more of our military, to protect our allies and alliances and treaty obligations with japan and south korea. so the interesting part of that is, it's -- if they say that, if the chinese believe that or some of them, then why wouldn't that incentivize them to some extent, plus their own self-interest to
resolve some of this? i think it's going to be a continued manage this process. but i do think we'll get a breakthrough and it's for the reasons in i think, again, my three predecessors noted, working internationally, whether it's six-party talks or another forum, working with the chinese, as close as we can, i think with the japanese are doing as they are changing some of their constitutional responsibilities for national security, the south koreans have been very good as the economy's build out in the asia pacific. more and more awareness and more and more interests share are becoming more and more acute for every country in that area. and it's going to take all of them. >> let's move from an incredibly frustrating subject, north cok a korea, to one where there has been extraordinary progress since the days of harold brown, which is taiwan where we have seen kind of peace across the
straits and away and kind of social and economic integration without political integration in a way that probably established diplomatic relations was not easy to predict yet we have the administration recently notified a $1.83 billion arms sale to taiwan. how does this play out from the perspective of our service? just maintain the status quo of continued arms sales, continued distrust with china created by this, or is there something else that can be done? nobody wants that one. [ laughter ] >> i think it falls in the realm of trying to diminish the strategic distrust that exists
between china and the united states. there are elections in taiwan, and a situation where it's maybe more pro-independent, but it was not an issue for me during the time i was there, because we were building better relations, getting closer economically, starting to talk militarily. and i was able to deal with this, as i'm sure that secretary hagel and perry have done over the years, is to say, there's a taiwan relations act. and we have something like that, and we're committed to providing defensive equipment, to make sure a reunification occurs
peacefully. can we maintain that for the next 20, 30 years? probably doubtful. can we reduce the amount of distrust between the united states and china? that's the challenge. i think there's been great progress, with straight flights, hundreds of thousands of taiwanese working in the mainland, and that's been a nonissue. so, it goes to strategic distrust of the goals of the united states. the chinese shouldn't find them
threatening in any way. so, verbalizing their objection to the relationship, which must continue. and others are watching how the united states handles this. >> i take it that these transfers, given, admittedly, they're part of a congressional mandate. but from the u.s. point of view, they are a signal to the p.r.c. that they can't count on us on the u.s. being passive if there's an attempt -- which might well be successful -- of
the p.r.c., to take over taiwan by force. in other words, the transfers might not affect the outcome of such an attempt, but the chinese can't be sure that that would not be a major, and perhaps a conflict-provoking reaction from the united states. so, it's a signal. >> bill, anything you want to add on that, since you ordered the aircraft carrier to the taiwan straits? >> i think at the time, it was the right thing to do. but it wasn't anything i was happy about.
when i left office, i spent quite a bit of time in track two meetings with china and taiwan, to try to find a way to avoid the need for something like that. the best i could come up with, i could think of no way to deal with the fundamental d disagreement about ownership, but i tried to find a way to reduce the likelihood of a military conflict, and i ended up working to promote a greater social, economic, travel interface between taiwan and the mainland. for whatever reason, it's been very successful. it serves the interest of both the taiwanese and the chinese.
and they opened up air travel between taiwan and china, that was a difficult agreement for the two to make, but they did make it. now, thousands travel between taiwan and china every day. and what has happened, as a consequence of that, if you think back to the days of the cold war between the united states and the soviet union, with mutually assured destruction, taiwan and china havemutually assured economic destruction. it's a very, very huge deterrent
to their taking over, much more important than sending battle groups to taiwan. >> and if secretary hagel and cohen are correct one of the seeds of mistrust is the u.s. policy of supporting the status q quo, or should we be more actively advocating for a peaceful resolution? not necessarily reunification, but a peaceful resolution? a gradual reduction of the arms? >> well, i think the current united states policy is the correct one.
i say that because i think in this situation, not unlike most of these kinds of geopolitical dynamics, these things have to evolve on their own way, their own time, with the right environment. and i said something earlier about another part of the world. we being the most power. nation on earth. with many responsibilities, with our allies. it doesn't mean we dictate, we impose, but we lead. and we need to help everyone manage through this. without some conflict occurring through some miscalculation, some pushing, or accelerating of a dimension that the old
architect used to say, if it doesn't fit, don't force it. and i think it has to evolve, and i think what bill perry said was exactly right, it's imperfect, it's still dangerous, and i'm still hopeful, if there's a new government, with the elections this week, i hope that the new government doesn't start to unwind some of the right progress toward the right end, the right agreement that gets china and taiwan to where they need to be, also for that region, for that part of the world, and also it doesn't, as bill pointed out, it doesn't put the united states in a position where we have to take a tough
decision on whether or not we're going to support obligations or not. >> maybe because i'm an eternal optimist, i always think a d.p.p. election gives them the ability to compromise more than the k.m.t. would, because their flank is protected. that's one for the secretaries of state, i think. >> it's one for the fortune tellers. >> let's talk about the economic relationship. secretary brown, when you were there, it was almost nonexistent. now, it's massive. and apple, their last quarter, have sold somewhere in the neighbor of $17, $18 billion of
product in china. and people talking about how deeply the two economies are tied. and we've talked about the disruption in the chinese market has had an enormous effect. how did it affect your thinking when you were secretary, and how do you think it affects policy today? and going forward? >> in my case, when i was secretary, it really had almost no effect, as you said. now, each country depends substantially on the other. and of course, a lot of that apple sales consists of pieces that were made in the u.s., actually. >> yes. >> not the bulk of the mass of the product, but the value of
the product. a large portion, probably most of it, is made outside of china. so, it's part of a world trade system, in which trade with china by the u.s. is a very large part. that does not automatically produce peace. before the first world war, the trade between france and germany was massive. so, by itself, it does not ensure peace. it sure would make war more disruptive, and in that sense, it may act as a partial deterren
deterrend deterre deterrent. >> i would point out that our ambassadors were the business community. every business that was investing in china, and chinese investing in the united states, they become ambassadors of goodwill. jobs are at stake, here and there. and the business community in the united states is investing in china, and i serve on the u.s./china business council board, and this is what we discuss on a regular basis. how do we continue to promote better relations? most people are worried about yo their jobs.
and it doesn't mean you're going to always establish peace through economic prosperity, but you have a better chance of maintaining it than you would if there were no such strands of economic interaction. so, the economic issue, it's the butterfly effect. you saw what happened when there was a little bit of bad news, disruption in the chinese stock market, a big one, and then it affects all the markets globally. it's the consequence of globalization, and what happens on a remote place in a remote time, may seem instaignificant, but it has major consequences. >> it would be interesting to find out what chinese businessmen do in the way of
telling their government how important it is that there be peaceful relations between the u.s. and china. does that come up at some of these track two meetings? >> also addressed, is there is a negative side to this? the allegations that u.s. technology companies are selling out the united states in terms of our defense readinesreadines? >> i come at these things, steve, and i always have tried to, no matter what job i've had, as a businessman, or a government job, with as wide a scope, based on as wide a frame of reference as i can, and nair -- narrow it down.
there are violations everywhere, and that it's not new. people take advantage of technology, use it for the wrong reasons. is there some risk of high-technology companies doing business in the areas of totalitarian dictatorships? yes. but you have to keep in the wider scope of how you judge these things, and make the decisions that a president or secretary has to make. it's not theory, that you have to realize, and i think this was the iranian negotiation, the whole point, is any of this perfect? is any situation perfect? no, not that i've ever seen one. but is it overall moving the world economic development in
the right direction? we're not going to unwind what has started. an interconnected world is not going to be unwound. we're 7 billion global citizens in a global economy. we're not going to stop that. and interesting, at least it is to me, the very dimensions in dynamics that the united states and west has pushed since world war ii, economic prosperity, respect for human rights, dignity, those don't always come together. china is a good example of that, but isn't it interesting that as you're seeing the world build out, the world we've always pushed for, more trade,
development, opportunities for us and our trading partners and people in the world, if for no reason, it's not a guarantee of stability, but it's a platform of stability, the more interconnected we are. we get to a point where there's some debate in american politics, i know that's not the subject here, but it's part of our environment we live in, trying to push that back, saying that's bad. and of course, china is going to build their economy and try to prosper. and do things that are in their interest. i think overall, you have to look at it, is it in our long term interest? i think it is, and it's clear, the more you can gauge
commercially, business is as good an ambassador as we have in the world. >> bill perry, anything you can add briefly on this? >> on this specific question you asked, i would associate myself with the attitude that chuck gave. a slightly broader question, i am concerned that the chinese view of the south china sea is different from ours. we need to be there as part of our global trade efforts, but the chinese treat it almost as if it's an inland sea. and i think that different perception sets the stage, really, for major disagreements which could, if we're not
careful, lead to some kind of a conflict. that's a fundamental problem that we need to work hard to try to avoid. seems to me, that's more the focus of a potential security problem than as taiwan is. >> i want to get to the audience, at least three, four f stars i can see here. former ambassadors, former u.s. secretaries of commerce here. i want to open it to the audience, but first some short questions. should we be training young -- this is a policy question. i know you in washington don't like policy questions, but we want to -- should we be training young p.l.a. officers in annapolis and other
institutions? >> yes. >> yes. >> yes. >> yes. >> bill? >> yes. >> did you worry, american command and control systems are very sophisticated. did you worry, or would you worry today about the command and control systems in china, where we have incidents that beijing was not aware of and couldn't control? >> yes. >> yes. >> yes. >> bill? >> yes. yes. [ laughter ] >> this is double jeopardy, right? >> what surprise here. >> you guys just won a free trip to beijing. >> you've rigged these questions. >> do you think the greatest threat to security in the pacific is climate change?
>> no. short-term. yes, long term, without defining long term. >> i agree with secretary brown. [ laughter ] >> well, very, both have given political answers, so i will. the only thing i would say, the reason i agree with what harold brown has said, i think it is a threat. i wouldn't rate it as the most immediate threat, but it's clearly a threat. >> a security threat. >> that's what i mean. >> bill? >> always. >> perry? >> well, climate change, and the catastrophe that could occur from a climate change, and from a nuclear exchange, are both being existential.
they need direct and immediate attention to keep them from happening, 10, 20, 30 years from now. >> mm-hmm. >> this one just for secretary hagel, since you set foot on lao ning, the chinese have announced the construction of an aircraft carrier. what are the implications, and should we be worried? >> i don't think we should be worried. i'm not surprised that they would make that decision. i think an aircraft carrier, not only strategically, tactically for them, is important. but i think the symbolism is particularly important for them. i was told, when i was there,
when i visited that aircraft carrier, the retrofitted ukrainian aircraft carrier, which is not much of an aircraft carrier, looking at our modern standards. but the reality is, as the chinese reminded me, the weapons systems that they have, the technology they have, to attack aircraft carriers, is rather significant. and i don't think any of them said to me they're outdated. but i received a pretty clear implication that they are more vulnerable aircraft carriers than they've ever been. so, my opinion, i don't think the chinese see this as any particularly new tactical strategic weapon that's going to
give them any more significant dimension to their defense capabilities, but i think it is important to them for other reasons, symbolic reasons as well. >> and i think it's probably good for us, for the u.s., if they want to spend their money on that. >> secretary cohen? >> the aircraft carrier has always been important from a united states perspective as a sign of our commitment to the security of other countries. they want to feel us but not see us on their territory, but we'd be over the horizon as a presence. which i think is reassuring. the chinese aircraft carrier is for a different reason, so we can see them as well as feel them, and it's important for the
south china sea, but i think it would be different than ours. >> let me open this illustrious audience, let me open the floor to questions. still have a few more minutes. the lights are bright enough. right, are you media? right here. okay. the chinese woman right here. she's not chinese. >> i'm the president of the -- institute. there are many experts internationally that are saying we're closer to nuclear war than at the height of the cold war period due to a variety of reasons. if that would happen, by
accident or otherwise, it would lead to the annihilation of manki mankind. there are other stabilizing factors, the world bank said we're in front of the perfect financial storm. the uae, isis -- >> where's your question? >> so, my question is, why can we not make a new paradigm where we answer to the chinese president's offer he made in 2014 that the united states would cooperate in a win-win strategy, and in his new year's address, he again said, we must build a community of the common destiny of mankind. why can we not build a new architecture based on common economic cooperation? >> i think to some extent, we
have. >> mam-hmm. >> i think things would be much worse out economic cooperation. but to say you're in favor of peace and cooperation is a question, is just the very first step. the mechanics and details are everything. >> can i just add one quick comment, because i want secretary curry to talk about this. i think we've become too lax in our concern about nuclear weapons. i go back to churchill, saying we may one day return to the stone age on the gleaming wings of science. pakistan, north korea, iran certainly may be building more.
so, i think the existential threat has to cause us to really think or rethink about how we're going to survive on this planet. i believe the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons is much greater today, because more and more individuals and groups are trying to get their hands on them. we had rational governments at one point dealing with this issue, even coming to the edge of brinksmanship. >> and terrorism, are we working with the chinese just right, too much, too little in our counterterrorism effort? >> well, since i'm the most
recent secretary of defense, and i think the real terrorist threats have really been defined since 9/11 in ways we've not seen before. i would say that we are working with the chinese, with all nations of the world, in the areas where we can. to assure our own self-interest, the chinese, russians have self-interest. that this scourge of terrorism is a plague on all of us. and it's a threat to all of us, and it's real for all of us. it varies with the area, the dimension of the threat, and all the variables in this. and there are different views by
each nation as to how to handle that. which is not easy to resolve either. but yes, we are working with the chinese on this, and we've had, i think we've had some success with working with the chinese. >> it depends on where you sit. from a chinese point of view, one big terrorist threat is from the -- it's not clear that we want to cooperate with them in suppressing that terrorism. >> it's a different issue, another issue involved. and that is the reconciliation between privacy and protecting the rights to privacy. china may have a different idea.
>> let alone the europeans. >> and chuck was saying, this will present a real challenge, how do you reconcile the different view points in a way that doesn't turn you into basically a stalinist state. and you start worrying about and listening to conversations and looking at individuals for their signs of misconduct, et cetera. we have to be careful, deal with terrorism and identifiable groups that are promoting terrorism, and about protecting what's left of privacy in this digital world. >> let me recognize the woman here. >> thank you very much. very nice, secretaries, to meet you here.
i would like to know what will be the most challenging decision you made as secretary of defense regarding to the south china sea, and how would you comment on the current situation, and what are your solutions? >> i didn't have an issue. it did not exist at that time. there were no reasons for the chinese, at that point, to be concerned about the u.s. presence in terms of posing any kind of a threat to its sovereignty. i think over time, china has grown as an economic power, and they're now growing as a military power, the claim of jurisdiction over the south or east china sea, parts of it, has become much more of a prominent issue. and i think we're going to have
to really insist that, we see the chinese rising as a military power. we've recently had the foreign minister of singapore say -- we're not going to be able to stop that. india may have some issues about freedom of navigation in the south china sea. they have a lot of traffic going through. i think what's most important, we be very clear about what we're saying, and not send mixed signals. on the one hand, we can't say, well, it's innocent passage we're requesting. it's freedom of navigation of seas. if we say it with ambiguity,
we're confusing our own allies, and angering the chinese. and sun tzu said be prudent but not hesitant. so, we have to be clear about the issues for us in the region. >> and in my days as secretary of defense, the seven-dash line was an unknown document in the archives of the regime. >> one quick question, and then we'll go to a final question. are we doing enough, that we should be doing that we're not to improve the military to military relationship? or are we doing everything we possibly can? >> we mentioned before --
>> you mentioned sending cadets to annapolis. >> i think we could do more to encourage military to military relationships at the senior level. you wacan't have a one-sided pu for that, and so far, i think it's the chinese that have limited that. but i would push again. >> bill perry? anything? >> i would continue to promote minister to minister dialogue. and we should continue to support the chinese cadets at our academies. and beyond that, i think perhaps the single most significant relationship would be that which i think back and think the pacific forces can make with
china. they're very close to military issues in that part of the world, they can make an excellent ambassador, and perhaps the single most important relationship we could continue is with the sinc pac. >> and make it so it doesn't just look like the united states, australia, japanese, conducting exercises. to the extent that we can find ways in which they can become more integrated. and they can see pretty much what we're doing. but i think that's a way of trying to build more trust, even though it raises some questions about security.
>> admiral locklear, if he was called up here, he would have a lot to say about this issue. because he recently came out of the job of pacific commander. he knows how much our military has invested in military to military relationships. and there is so much we have done and are doing to build that, that most people never see. which i said earlier in my comments tonight, much of what i inherited was the result of their continued good work on this. but i think it is a continuation of reaching out, and by the way, we are doing more and more military exercises, training, with the chinese. and as harold pointed out, it's a two-way street.
and all of our chiefs in china the last two years, i think this is critically important, that isn't going to fix the issue. but the other part of it is, i would say, as someone who has walked on both sides of the street, on the political side, on the administration side, our politicians have to listen more to our military. and i don't mean changing the constitution, i mean listen to the military. they get it better than most politicians on things like this. some the finest statesmen i've ever seen in my life are military people. this is not a paid
advertisement, but i mean, as you know what i mean, across the board. but it is a yuniversal use of al of our assets and resources and leadership that i think is the biggest part of this answer, to use them all more effectively, with a broader policy and strategy, what is it we want to accomplish? >> final question. it's january 20th, 201:00th, 200 a.m. in the morning. and president-elect trump -- no, the president has given you one minute to give her advice -- give the person advice on the u.s./china relationship. the security aspect. in 60 seconds, what do you tell her? [ laughter ] 60 seconds. your time is running.
>> remember every promise you've made. >> i would say, re-run this program. and -- >> let me be serious about this for a second. i think what's happening in our political system, we're witnessing the polarization of our system, and when we make promises in order to appeal to our respective bases. and when you're in office, you have to think about the consequences of your promises. i think we have to be careful, i urge this to all presidential candidates, don't make promises, or else you'll have to break them. president carter made a pledge to pull troops out of korea, and he came to the decision that it
was a mistake. but on the chinese side, they are much more mature than before about our political system. bill perry, 15 years ago, the chinese may have reacted much more differently than today. and second thing, mr. president, get a fiscal policy in place. and by the way, consult with congress once in a while. it's a coequal branch of government. >> i think specifically, with respect to china, the advice i'd give is, this is in the long run, the most important bilateral relationship. take it easy. don't take big steps, certainly
don't take big steps, without thinking it through much more than most of your predecessors have most of the time. >> bill perry? >> a presence that's much more important that you realize, get the u.s./china relationship right. and it's much more difficult than you realize to get it right. >> okay. >> secretary hagel? last word. >> one word, listen. >> to the chinese, too. >> listen. >> i want to thank everyone on behalf of the national committee on u.s./china relationship for joining in on the beginning of our 50-year history. tell the next president, take 90 minutes out of your day, watch
communicators, john lansing discusses how u.s. media organizations like voice of america and radio marty are operating and how he'd like these agencies to retool in order to address propaganda. he's joined by ron nixon. >> the reality is, we started 70 years ago as a radio enterprise. we still do some radio. but our ability to shift to mobile and social is certainly there, and we're no different than any other media company that you and i know about that has had to do the same thing. "new york times," done a fantastic job. and that's our mission, shift to be more in the peer to peer
conversations, shifting away from the stodgy, old media. >> tonight, 8:00 p.m. eastern, on c-span 2. as president obama prepares for his state of the union address on tuesday, he released this video. >> it's my last state of the union address. and i keep thinking about the road we've traveled in the last seven years. that's what makes america great, our ability to come together as one american family, and pull ourselves closer to the america we want to be. it's hard to see sometimes, but it is who we are, and that's what i want to focus on. >> c-span's coverage starts at 8:0 8:00 p.m. eastern, looking back at the history and tradition of
the president's annual message, and what to expect this year. and 9:00 p.m., live coverage of the president's speech followed by the republican response and your phone calls, tweets, and e-mails on c-span, c-span radio. and on c-span 2, after the speech, we'll hear live from members of congress. next, ed royce talks about u.s. national security threats. topics include isis, north korea and other security threats. >> good morning, everybody.
we're starting on time for once, and i'm very pleased to welcome congressman ed royce, republican, of california. we have an hour to talk about national security, the plans ahead, all of the challenges we face, all of the solutions you have in mind, and the president's state of the union next week. so, i'm not going to take another second, but i would like to welcome mrs. royce, because i'm delighted to have her here. over to you. >> thank you, the state of the union is coming up here, the seventh state of the union. and we've had seven years now of policies that have frankly been focused on befriending our enemies and distancing ourselves from our allies, ignoring our
allies. and the consequences of -- there was an historic opportunity in iran to have a -- a chance at reaching out to the people of that country who had gone to the streets after a stolen election, and many of you remember the early broadcasting, you see the young woman on the street that was shot by the authorities. and the consequences of a society which according to gallup polling, had been robbed of an election, and the president made a decision to decide that the engagement would be a long term engagement with
the ayatollah, and subsequently, the decision was made to embrace the muslim brotherhood, that had been funded partially by iran, but distance us from the people of egypt. and the consequences of these strategies was to leave us in the middle east in a position, in my opinion, where it was the jord jordanians, the israelis, the gulf states, people no longer trusted the judgment of the administration. and that's important, because it means people no longer necessarily take our counsel, take things in their own hands, and adopt a new calculus based upon the assumption that we've now tilted towards iran.
and the reason this takes a new urgency, in the last few weeks, we've seen a series of steps by the iranian regime with violations of the u.n. reside resolutions with two missile tests, in which you see the firing of a rocket near the coast of the uss truman, our carrier. we have seen another american hostage taken hostage. we have discovered recently of attempts to hack into a dam outside of new york city. i remember when we discovered the efforts here by the iranians to attempt to assassinate at cafe milano with a bomb, the ambassador from saudi arabia,
and now, iran openingly speaking of toppling the government of saudi arabia. so, the question is, who is watching this? not just our allies, but all over the world, people are watching our failure to respond to these provocative actions. and given that, i think it explains a lot in terms of our position around the world. on the foreign affairs committee, we're attempting to reach back to the old bipartisan commitment in terms of strong engagement overseas. we need u.s. leadership. we con nan not be in a position where our policy is one of
constantly backing down. we need more backbone in our policy, not backing down. and that's the crux of the problem today. >> so you have a lot on your plate for the committee. i know you've been talking about what to do about iran, working with mr. engel, and you introduced a bill on north korea, that's post a nuclear deal at the time touted by bill clinton as the model for how to come to a nuclear agreement with a country. now, another agreement with the iranians. what are you thinking about what congress can do? >> i remember debating wendy
sherman, and i would just make the point that we had an example of what could deter north korea. in 2005, we had a situation where you had banco delta asia. >> in macao. >> $100 bank notes were being counterfeited, and they moved forward, and gave a choice to the bank in macao and ten other banks that served as a conduit,
they could get cut off, and bank with north korea, or freeze the accounts. what were the results? afterwards, we discovered that the missile production line, north korea could no longer get the hard currency they needed, it came to a complete halt. more importantly, not only was the dictator not able to pay his army or his secret police, wasn't able to pay his generals. that's not a good position for a dictator to be in. as a consequence, every meeting after that started with one question, when do we get our money? unfortunately, treasury was not
left in the position of making the key decision on this. unfortunately, that decision was made by the state department, and they lifted, as part of a negotiation, that north korea would come back to the table. the legislation i've offered would bring that back into law, we'll put it on the president's desk with strong bipartisan support, and this is the approach that will work because you need consequences. the idea of strategic patience, means patience while north korea goes forward with test after test, until it fully develops its icbm program, and its delivery capability. right now, the icbms can hit the
united states. we don't want them to succeed in miniaturizing the weapons. >> has the united states taken a position on the legislation? >> i have not heard a position, but i'm hoping the strength of the vote behind it changes their c calculus behind the decision. >> and now, we've had several nuclear tests. we're about to open the financial spigot in records to iran. how do you address the threats that iran is posing in the region? >> i'm going to try to move
legislation that will address those issues. but i'd like to revisit a conversation i had with the secretary of state, in which we were advancing legislation based on stewart levy's work, which will give the ayatollah a choice between agreement or economic collapse. and i go back to the world war ii thesis for the united states, for a strong showing, we put the bill together, and we passed it out of the house of representatives with a vote of 400-20. and our request of the administration was that we had a bill come up in the senate. but instead the administration did the calculus and felt they had to extend an olive branch.
our argument was, let's at least have this in reserve. for which there will be consequences if they don't follow through. so, allow us to bring the bill up in the senate. we had more than enough votes for a veto in the house, and we had 65 senators that had shown an interest in the approach we were taking. the bill was blocked by the administration, as a matter of fact, as i recall, that session, no foreign policy initiatives came up in the senate, because the senate leader at the time, reid, was concerned that this would be attached to it, and would get to conference or could get to the president's desk. i think this was an absolute blunder, and i think we've got to get back to the issue of
whether or not there are going to be consequences. one of the things we were assured of, if it went to agreement, it would be enforcede on the floor of the house of representatives, was look, there are u.n. sanctions in place. we'll enforce those if we see a violation. of either the issue of icbm testing. we've now had two violations and what happened? the administration began to move forward with some very di min mouse sanctions. informed us in congress and as soon as there was push back from iran, they pulled it back. also, we were assured that there would be no liflt lifting of sanctions against those who were involved in terrorism. you know, the irgv is going to
be a main beneficiary. there are several banks in iran that have funded with the iranian run as well as -- so, our point is why aren't we sticking to the letter? why do we consider to, when we continue to fall back. we put lels out yesterday to the committee to address some of these issues and we will continue to push forward, but it is incumbent among the commander in chief in this country to lead. in this nation. >> i want to turn to the question of that leadership and an authorization for the use of force, but before we leave iran, i want to ask you for a second what your tase is on the flare up between saudi arabia and various other gulf states and the iranian over -- >> so, here is one of the unfortunate consequences. of the calculus that is made in foreign capitals.
that we have tilted. or the administration has tilted towards iran. what that means is that they are less likely to take our counsel. so, when we give advice you, for example, the iranian forces were involved in helping orchestrate the takeover in yemen. of the shia militia there and a decision was made to put together an arab force to go into yemen and try to push the iranian out. and you'll yoel notice we were not included in those discussions. egypt, saudi arabia, other countries in the region are increasingly making decisions. on their own. without our counsel and i think
part of that is they now lack the trust in the judgment of the administration. with respect to anything dealing with iran and the other con quenss of this, by the way, is it makes it harder for us to get solutions to other problems when this sectarian, when sunni and shia begin to separate. because of the consequences again. of actions where had the administration originally in 2008,i in guess it was, 2008, w the iranian green revolution. had we led then, we might have a different situation right now on the ground. when two-thirds of the people feel strongly that an election has been stolen and you don't speak out and you don't help increase the passions to 86%, which is what you could have
done with radio free europe, radio liberty, if you don't take reagan's view on this, that it's our responsibility to lead with public diplomacy, which we could have done effectively by broadcasting into iran in support of those efforts in an effective way and now, we're in this situation. it is very hard to untangle the lost opportunities. hard to get the confidence back in egypt when they've seen the embrace of the muslim brotherhood and this is the challenge we face. in this theatre. >> with you just brought up a whole series of things that i want to talk to you about, which is our public diplomacy, which brings in russia and all these other questions. i don't want to leave the middle east until we talk about the authorization for the use of military force. i know you support the notion of an u authorization. there was a lot of back and forth between the administration, which didn't want to get language to the
congress and the result is that we've been operating in what amount to a military -- >> we're operating under the 2001 and 2002 authorizations. what i support is an authorization to the use of military force that will give your commanders the flexibility they need in the field. one of the things we need though in all of this is the commander in chief to be a commander in chief. one of the things we need is as we move forward is a commander in chief willing not to tie his own hands of whoever follows him in office, but instead not to be dedicated to a containment policy, but destroying isis and let me just speak to that issue for a moment. because when isis came out of
raqqah and began its assault across northern syria and then across the border into iraq, there were call frs the pentagon, calls from us in congress to use u.s. air power in the same way we used it in the first gulf war when kuwait was invaded. when kuwait was invaded, the united states took a position that those 42 divisions were going to be obliterated and we did that with 118,000. took out those armored divisions and the question we had at the time to the white house was, they're moving with toyota pick up trucks. you can see them from the air. why not use that strategy and remove isis before they ever
take falluja. or before they ever take mosul. town by town, city by city, this argument was made month after month after month after month. as we held hearings on this. and somehow, the administration set in a state of paralysis when isis could have been destroyed before they were embedded, before they were recruiting on the internet from all over the world. before they were selling the concept that they were indestructible. we could have taken them out from the air. let's take to the next stage. then they finally on yezidi mountain, that's when the administration final ly decided to take some kind of action. after mouz l had fallen. after they had taken the central bank. and what action did we take? well, we had a young yazeezidi captive speak before our congress. and before our committee. and explain to us what happened
to her. she said, in my village, all of the men were killed. the women, the girls and the women were sold. she said i was bought by an american. i was a concubine to an american who had been recruited into isis a few years ago on the internet. and he explained to me that as a yezidi, i was an apostic, and therefore, that was what happens under a just system. if you're not a believer in the isis you know, strat -- cause, you're an aposttate. she said, why won't you arm the yezidi men? why won't you arm the curd isku men and women? 30% of the batallions and they are fighting with 40-year-old weapons. all right?
they are fighting isis and when you ask the question is well, baghdad, well, yeah, the shia area-led government in baghdad does have a problem with us arming the kurds or yezidis or others in the region. but that's because of the influence of iran that doesn't want to see anything except shia militias operating across the region. why should we care about the pressure from iran on baghdad? why shouldn't we and i've got bipartisan legislation to arm the kurdish forces. you have 180,000 peshmerga. 180,000. you have what, 30,000 isis fighters. but as the, as the kurdish soldiers tell us, we don't have artillery. we don't have long range
mortars. we don't have antitank weapons. that is why it is so hard for us to stop isis. another question i had. besides arming the christians and yezidis and kurds an the sunni tribes who want the take their towns back and live now in dp camps. maybe 7 million people now have been displaced with syria and we have no safe zone this administration has set up to protect them. they would like to go back. they would like to have weaponry and some training from the u.s. to take their villages back. but as long as we're going to defer to shia militia or to baghdad and iran, how is this going to happen? and as long as we're not going to forward deploy our forward observers in order to call in those air strikes, how are we going