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tv   The Presidency  CSPAN  December 24, 2016 11:45am-1:31pm EST

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how trump and the new congress might change immigration policy. on friday, december 30 we take a look at the future. administration will bring peel and replace the aca in the key players to watch in the months ahead. be sure to watch washington journal. >> up next on the presidency, a professor talks about the persuasive rhetoric of eight of -- adolf hitler and franklin d roosevelt in the 1930's and 40's. he argues that both men led nations that had to be convinced to go to war. the new york military symposium hosted this hour and 45 minute event. >> tonight's speaker is randall bytwerk, who did his phd at northwestern university, has taught at the university of
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mines, calvin college in michigan, and lcc international university in lithuania. he has written three books and several dozen scholarly articles on aspects of german propaganda and maintains -- if you are a history buff and want to therience going online, german propaganda archive which is both nazi and east german. a fascinating world about that. i will just say, just google or east germanda propaganda that would be one of the first things. propaganda archive bit large collection of translations and images of propaganda from the nazi in the
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east german periods. now i am happy to introduce our speaker tonight. [applause] mr. bytwerk: shortly after noon on april 24, 1939, herman goering introduced adolf hitler to the german reichstag. kittler was about to give what i -- hitler was about to give what i think is the most widely anticipated and widely heard
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speech of the 20th century. that is a bit of a claim. and the back of your minds as i'm speaking you may see if you can come up with a counter example. there are certainly a number of things one might consider. we are going to look at that speech this evening. before that, we are going to look at the background of relations between adolf hitler and franklin roosevelt. then we will consider the beginning of a rhetorical battle between the two which began with roosevelt's famous quarantine speech in september 1937. we will spend a fair amount of time looking at the critical months of march and april 1939, when the rhetorical war between hitler and roosevelt intensified and then we will spend a little bit of time looking at what happened afterwards. some things to keep in mind -- first, both people were far more
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persuasive heard than read. if you have listened and i , suspect many of this audience has -- listened to roosevelt's fireside chats and heard that voice coming over, and then read the transcripts, something gets lost. the same is true of hitler. the man spoke at inordinate length. 2.5 hours was not unusual. if you read the transcripts, the text of the speech, you shake your head. but in front of an audience, he was a spellbinder. second, fdr had much greater rhetorical challenges than hitler did. hitler had a controlled system. anytime he gave a speech it was claimed to be a rhetorical masterpiece. nobody ever dared tell hitler he was not doing well. he had a press which did what he wanted.
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if they didn't, they got in a lot of trouble quickly. roosevelt had a much greater set of problems. he had a democracy. a lot of people did not like him and were not afraid to say so. he had to deal with press. reporters liked roosevelt. he gave great press conferences. if you have ever read those, boy i wish i had been there. he joked. he knew them by name. they played games, if you will, and he usually gave them a great story. but editors and owners did not like roosevelt nearly as much. and he got a lot of negative publicity. and the republicans it make much of him either. roosevelt had a much tougher set of challenges to face. third, hitler could reach the united states much more easily than fdr could reach germany. the american system is relatively open.
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hitler's speeches were sometimes printed at full length in american newspapers. the germans saw in their press only what the propaganda leadership wanted them to see. they could sometimes listen to shortwave, but that was not the easier way to do it. finally, we're looking at the rhetoric of the period. of course, there is diplomacy there was all kinds of activity. , lots of things were going on we are not looking at. you can't do everything. with that they said, let's turn to the initial relations between the two. they both took power within a month of each other in 1933. they both had similar problems. the economy was a catastrophe. both spent the first few years working to straighten out as much as they could.
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they didn't entirely ignore each other, but they did not have a lot to say about each other. when the germans talked about roosevelt, they were relatively friendly. for example, the german press was told to treat the reelection in 1936 in a friendly way. when i say the german press was told to say this. i mean the german press was told to say this. there was a press conference, sometimes two in berlin each day, which gave detailed instructions to the press about what to say. there are something like 15,000 of these things. if you weren't there, they were sent by teletype to newspapers all over germany. they did not have sensors that -- censorship before publication, they just gave there a clear instructions. journalists knew if they did not do it the right way, their careers were going to be short. they were told to treat roosevelt election and a friendly way. they were told not to discuss the fact that he was a freemason -- although he was.
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that was part of the international jewish conspiracy and was not something you could say about a foreign head of state regardless of the fact it , was true. editorial cartoons presented roosevelt in a relatively friendly way. we have a 1934 cartoon in which roosevelt is sweeping congress out the door telling them to take a vacation so he can get some work done. i don't know about that. our expert back there can see if he can do something about that. in any event, low and behold, roosevelt is presented in a somewhat friendly way. here is another cartoon from 1935. it says roosevelt and communism. you can't only grab the bull by the horns, you have to twist its neck. the interesting thing about these two cartoons is that roosevelt is not handicapped.
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right? he is a strong, sturdy, relatively handsome guy. as a footnote, this changed. here is a cartoon from 1940. first of all the doesn't look nearly as pleasant. and it says that roosevelt's new deal has failed so he asked a -- find new ways to support himself. now he has crutches and is supported where he wanted to build military bases. into the 30's, roosevelt was being treated in a friendly way. the other thing that is interesting about the two gentlemen, is that they had very similar rhetorical problem. both were in charge of nathan's -- nations that did not want war. both wanted to prepare those nations to wage war.
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hitler was trying to prepare his nation for war because he intended to start that war. roosevelt rightly discerned those intentions and was trying to prepare the united states to wage war, but had in or is -- enormous difficulty. in 1937 poll found 95% of the american public wanted nothing to do with foreign wars. hitler had the same problem. germans did not want a war. when he succeeded in taking over sudetenland, he was very disappointed. german people were much more pleased that war had been averted them that he had won a great foreign policy triumph. neither country wanted war. we have good contemporary evidence of this. in 1937, roosevelt wrote his old headmaster and he said i am
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fighting against a public psychology of long-standing, a psychology which comes very close to saying peace at any price. this was not a public message, and he would not have wanted it to be public, obviously. the point is roosevelt knew he did not have a nation very eager to fight. hitler has very much the same problem, although he was dictator and fuhrer, he always had to keep a good eye on public opinion. he knew he didn't have the public behind him in of the risk of war. we know this because of a fascinating speech he gave in munich in 1938 to a closed meeting of german journalists. he said for years, i spoke only of peace. now it has become necessary to slowly prepare the german folk psychology for the fact that there are things that cannot be achieved by peaceful means. some goals can only be achieved through the use of force. it was necessary to shed light on certain events abroad in such
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a manner that the and her voice -- inner voice of the german oak naturally cried out for the application of force. this was a closed speech that came to light only after the war was over. hitler was planning building public support of the war he intended to wage. this group will be familiar with the timescale. in march 1935, the occupation of the rhineland. october of 1935, italy invaded ethiopia, and spanish civil war. roosevelt in 1936 has won reelection. he is feeling a little more confident, and he knows he has to shift public opinion. roosevelt was something of a turtle.
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he had a fine sense of public opinion. he knew he could not make fast changes. he would try something and if it didn't work the head it would be back in. every now and then, he misjudged. in 1937, he misjudged. he began in a constitution day speech which is primarily aimed at his domestic opponents. but he touched on international affairs. he talked about governments that were maintained by fear at the expense of liberty and individual rights. he did not mention japan by name. he did not mention germany by name. the germans knew he was talking about them. the press was instructed to take careful note of this. the nazi party daily newspaper
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said the world's problems are big enough already such they should not be intensified by demagogue slogans and hostile statements. since roosevelt's own methods look rather like a dictatorship, he wants at least to prove to his democratic credentials and polemics against other dictators. this was much more direct an attack that had been made by the german press before. he really stuck his neck out a couple weeks later in chicago. bad time for a foreign-policy speech. this was a dedication of a bridge in chicago. that is the speech in which he made his famous quarantine metaphor. he said when an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community joins in a quarantine of the patient in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of disease. nobody knew what he meant by that.
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roosevelt probably did not know exactly what he meant by that. as cordell hull said, the reaction was quick and violent. as cordell hull said, the reaction was quick and violent. public opinion across the board was highly unhappy. it was mostly vehemently negative. roosevelt knew he had stuck his neck out too far and put back in. he refused to say anything. if you asked a comment he would say, no comment. he was only willing to make some very vague and loose comments absolutely free from being attributed to him. he realized he was ahead of public opinion. and the next year and a half, he does not say much except the journalists knew that he was a -- the germans knew now that he was a bad guy. they went after him with fervor. the press was instructed not to
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let this one pass. hitler himself commented to one of his aides this is a turning point. the united states was clearly coming out in his mind against germany. at the press conference in berlin that evening, the german press was given its marching orders. they were in his mind against germany. told they are hypocrites. roosevelt is suggesting that somehow we are wrong. if he were to look at the exports of his armaments industry, he would conclude there is a contradiction between his speech and the millions and armaments proper mitts -- profits. they went on in some detail. roosevelt realized he was ahead of public opinion. for the next nine months, he did not really say very much. the state of the union address
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into your 1938 -- january 1938 made a very passing mention. in april, he said he'd heard good things about german youth camps. he asked his ambassador to look into what was going on. the german press was told to say this -- since we do not want to suggest that the german public is satisfied by roosevelt, ignore it and don't mention it. we don't want to give any indication that we think there is some good thing about roosevelt. august 1938. roosevelt was willing to stick his neck out a little more again. slowly, public opinion was beginning to move. he gave a speech at queens university in canada. in that speech, he said i give to you assurance that the people of the united states will not stand by idly if the domination
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of the canadian union is threatened by any other empire. remember the monroe doctrine was specifically assigned to central and south america. canada was part of the british empire. the germans instantly reacted to this. they did not like this at all. a typical german newspaper headline said dangerous gains. the significance of results page. it is characterized by crude attacks against nondemocratic forms of government that accuse there were dreams -- regimes of unrestrained brutality against helpless people. across the board in german press, this is the kind of thing germans were reading.
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it was clear to any german who read the newspaper that roosevelt was not a friend. the next on september 1938, a fateful month. the month of munich. tensions were building. germans were accusing the czechs of threatening the germans in that part of czechoslovakia. they were building up a campaign in germany to suggest that awful things have to be matched by military force. those of us who remember the bay of pigs -- and i know this audience, a lot of us do. we will never the feeling of standing near the edge of the of this. war might break out at any point. that was how europe was feeling in september 1938. roosevelt at that point stuck his enterprising efforts into it
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again. he sent the first of five public messages indexed year, trying to secure peace. he said the message in september, just before munich, calling for international conferences. he could kind of be the postmaster getting information from one side to the other. he was on the side of public opinion on this. although the american public did not want to get involved in any military activities, they were willing to talk about it at least. domestically this work quite nicely. the germans were not at all. hitler was hoping for a nice war against czechoslovakia. the last thing he wanted was roosevelt getting in a way. the germans had to decide what to do.
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the german press was told not to say anything until the fuhrer speaks. hitler followed with a message. that message was to roosevelt. he says i fully appreciate the lofty attempt best intent on which your remarks are based. however, i canada must refuse all responsibility if further developments, contrary to all my efforts up to the present, should lead to the outbreak of hostilities. to arrive at a fair judgment regarding the sudeten german problem, it is indispensable to consider the incidents, in which, indian us analysis of the origin of this problem and it dangers has its cause. he is a he is doing everything i can, but it is not his fault. roosevelt responded the next day with another message. he said you typed but the past, but this is about the future, let's worry about that. the germans ignored that, because the other leaders in europe were flying to munich to give hitler what he wanted. since he got everything he
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wanted, he didn't have an exclusive for throwing his desk and excuse for throwing his military into the picture. the german people saw that a great dramatic triumph had been one. the next few months, roosevelt was 1 -- was relatively quiet. he did comment that he could not imagine if something happened in a civilized country. the good -- the germans kind of ignored it. they went to focus their propaganda on those things. roosevelt and his aides were also getting involved in -- involved. people at the secretary of interior were beginning to make
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nasty statements. germans were mad at him because he had banned exports. for instance, he criticized bloomberg and henry ford for accepting metals from germany. again, the germans started to go after him. germans by the end of 1938 decided that roosevelt is not their friend. furthermore, their information is pretty good. they have discovered that in the state of the union address for 1939, he is going to say that. they decide to beat him to the punch. on december 31, 1938, german newspapers print the heavens attacks on roosevelt and his administration.
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the jews are behind it all, they are controlling it, so forth. the typical sort of nazi propaganda kind of material. they put a lot of energy into it. and it turns out that they were right. he gave a speech -- state of the unit address said that in reporting the state of the union in the past, he had occasion to advise congress of disturbances abroad . the germans were prepared, and they've responded with indoor miss energy -- indoor miss energy -- enormous energy. new art time -- the neutrality act got a lot of attention in the domestic press. the press was told to save the jews were behind it.
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they were told to say he is trying to deal with domestic opposition. he is trying to prepare for a third term. this is an argument that was repeatedly made, it is the new 14 points of wilson. just like woodrow wilson. so rosales trying to drew up -- to draw up a new 14 points to deceive germany with provinces of peace. and then they have to promises of peace. and what a doing talking about us anyway? we solved unemployment. people are starving in the streets of the u.s.. he has his own problems. all of this went on at some
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length. a week later, fdr asked congress for $525 million for american armament. the germans responded that this was a nation ablated invasions from mars. hitler made two references to the war on the world's show and how gullible the americans were. the germans said to relatively little in the press after that because hitler was going to speak shortly. there was a firm rule in germany that you could not comment on foreign policy until he had made that policy clear. on january 30 1938 -- january 30, 1939, hitler gave one of his
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more significant ages. -- significant speeches. he said if international financial jews succeed once again and plunging the people's into a world war, it will not be a victory of the jews but a destruction of the jewish race in europe. what is interesting is that in january 19 39, nobody thought he meant the holocaust. this did not get much attention as other parts of the speech. later hitler said that europe would solve the problem of jews the same way germany had -- five propaganda. tens of thousands of posters all over germany. this came out august 1941 after the invasion. this was when the holocaust was gearing up to it meant something different.
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there was that. hitler also spoke about how germany needed its colonies. they figured if he was worried about colonies, he would not invade his neighbors in the future. these are journalists and statesmen around the world are saying nasty things about germany. something must be done about it. it is necessary for our press to immediately respond. we must know who these men are who so desperately seek to provoke war. he did not mention roosevelt, but he did mention some of his aides. it set a propaganda directive. february 1939, roosevelt testifies to a closed session of the senate military affairs committee. it is leaked that he says america's borders are on the
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line. roosevelt vehemently denies he says that. however, he apparently said something relatively close. the germans responded as you would expect. here he was apparently giving military guarantees to france and england. the response was absolutely enthusiastic. he was called world peace enemy number one. and one of the benefits of controlling press is that you can control what gets printed
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where. one of the standard features of press was what the press in berlin and london were saying. you can pick it up the street corner. propaganda ministries conference, the press were told that to berlin papers were supposed to give for collins on the front page for this. -- four columns on the front page this. they put it in the papers they new form correspondents would read and get the message across -- foreign correspondents would read and get the message across to the rest of the world. another aspect of the nazi system which was relatively invisible -- the foreign correspondent. the propaganda with the state ministry in berlin. they also have the party
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propaganda department raised in munich. goebbels was also the head of that. the only difference was that berlin, the government handled things like press, culture, major issues. the party propaganda office dealt with the speaker system, person-to-person propaganda, organization of meetings all over the country, things like that. they had thousands of speakers. they did major meetings with tens of thousands of people. they also have speakers which went to every corner of germany speaking to an audience of 10 people in a small village. this is largely in -- largely
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invisible to foreign correspondents. in early april 1949 -- 1939, the propaganda speakers get detailed instruction on what to say about the united states and about roosevelt. him today, a man stands at the head of the nation to be called wilson the second. again, it went on in considerable detail. this is the kind of thing people would read, study and use to give hour-long talks. sometimes a community of the press. a lot of the kind of thing was going on in visible to foreign correspondents. this is the period of a country that only has access to what the newspapers are saying. in early march 1938, hitler
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takes over the rest of czechoslovakia. in the end of march coming he gives the ultimatum to lithuania to returning district which had been given over as part of the treaty of versailles. in early april, mussolini decides to invade albania. it seems like a country a week was falling. at this stage, roosevelt was thinking he had to do more. he first of all gave a speech which was lunch or than the past. it was an annual event. in it he spoke about huns and vandals. the germans had a good idea he was talking about them.
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they responded in ways i don't need to repeat here. that night, roosevelt said something which caught everybody by surprise, largely on his own initiative, without consulting hardly anybody,. in that message to hitler -- actually it wasn't directed to muesli me a, it was directed to the king of italy. the king of italy was the head of state as was hitler. both of them got the message. in that message, he said he realize i'm sure throughout the world, hundreds of millions of human beings are living in constant fear of a new war or even a series of wars. he then urged international conference. he offered to help. and then he asked the access to promise not to attack a list of 31 named countries.
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there are some odd inclusions and omissions. he did not include islands. specifically -- did not include iron land -- ireland. he added the message by saying leaders cannot fail to hear the prayers of peoples to avoid war. history will hold them accountable for the happiness and lives of all even unto the least. in any event, this caught everybody by surprise. nobody knew this was coming. it was greeted in the non-axis
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world with tremendous enthusiasm. this is a period in which the world felt it was standing on the abyss. newspapers called roosevelt the greatest man of the world. tremendous enthusiasm for what he said. the germans had a problem, because his message seems to give hitler what he already had. it did say give czechoslovakia back. he seemed to grant. and to the german public, this was a wonderful thing. peace might in fact be assured. they didn't do gallup poll's, but they did in turtle pulls. -- internal. the social democrats had a good system of internal communication. they had informants all over the
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place. they reported to prague headquarters that germans like this. what you do about that? the germans had to think hard. the press conference said he can print this that -- if this. but respond to it with the greatest possible vehemence. it says another 14 points. roosevelt was trying to reduce the risk of war for which he was responsible. it was his fault, not adolf hitler's. he was trying to divert world opinion from the fact that england and france were trying to encircle germany. one paper said it is astounding that the head of a major nation would lower themselves to sending such a shabby propaganda pamphlet disguised as a note to him another head of state. a shabby propaganda pamphlet.
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but they know roosevelt had the initiative. hitler had had centerstage. everybody was looking at hitler trying to figure out what to do. suddenly roosevelt had grabbed centerstage and the germans did not like that. they had to figure out a way to get the spotlight of history focused back on them and on health hitler. does on adolf hitler. you had curtains like this. this one says a peculiar plant. you have roosevelt growing out of a bubbling swap. one phase is spewing out armaments, planks, -- tanks, planes. they had to do more than that. germans liked what they heard. a couple days later, hitler got together with his foreign minister and came up with a brilliant propaganda strategy. hitler announced he would answer roosevelt message in 10 days. there are reasons for that.
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first, hitler's birthday was coming up. april 20. that was a major holiday in germany. this was big in germany. furthermore, it was his 50th birthday. nothing could be allowed to get in the way of that. what happened was by saying he was going to answer but it would take about 10 days, suddenly everybody found themselves speculating what hitler was going to say. he had the state back again.
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an american newspaper got it exactly right. the milwaukee journal wrote the head of the greatest democracy of the world has put up to hitler the question of war and peace. the world is to have 10 days guessing what the answer will be. for wheel orwell, president roosevelt has given adolf hitler the spotlight of history. for a couple days, roosevelt had held centerstage. now, everybody throughout the world was wondering what was hitler going to say. he had a lot of help. in the united states, you had a variety of people giving him advice. hugh johnson was a syndicated correspondent, widely publicized. he actually gave hitler advice. the german embassy in washington
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reported they were getting a flood of comments, letters, telegrams from american, mostly well-meaning, with suggestions about what hitler could say. everybody was saying what would happen? and nobody could say anything, because who could predict? and so, on april 28, at noon, the reichstag gathered. it wasn't very significant, but it made a great backdrop. hermann goering introduced hitler. the world stopped. in germany, streets were empty. loudspeakers were set up all over the place. not only in germany. the speech was broadcast live to 50 countries around the world, including the united states. i can't think of another's bache that was -- another speech that was as anticipated and broadcast
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live to 50 countries around the planet. everybody was curious. except franklin roosevelt, who knew enough german to follow it, but he slept through it. he read the text eventually. he was not as impressed about adolf hitler apparently has the rest of the world. what happened to the united states and other countries was they did something that does not work well called interpolated translation.
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let's listen to the american introduction to what americans heard about six brca and eastern time coming of the airwaves -- 6:00 a.m. eastern time coming over the airwaves. >> by shortwave, direct from germany, we now bring you the address delivered by chancellor adolf hitler before a special session of the reichstag. the chancellor's address will be a reply to the message of peace sent racy to other countries by president roosevelt. while the chancellor is speaking, there will be a running translation in english. at the conclusion of the event, if time permits, a famous for correspondent and news corp. -- news commentator. mr. bytwerk: how did hitler begin? this will be does this will give you an idea of the interpolated you translation as well. this will be the translation. you will hear hitler's voice and then the translation. >> your now listened to the voice of chancellor hitler.
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[speaking german]
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>> chancellor hitler has just referred to present hitler's that president roosevelt's message, which he describes as a clever piece of work. mr. bytwerk: sorry about that. you hear the voice. what happens is you get a brief summary with all the nuance and all of the sarcasm taken out. for example, the audience chuckles. he gets in the end. what he says at the tail end is he will present his response. the audience burst out into laughter.
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the reichstag rejecting the furor -- fuhrer? it was ludicrous to them and they laughed. that was lost in the enter belated translation. -- interpolated translation. they missed the sarcasm. him and it sounded more a reasonable than in fact was. what does hitler do? this is a two-hour 20 minute speech he gets. not unusual for hitler. we have heard the introduction. he spends about 18 minutes making the standard german objection to the treaty of versailles. then he spends half an hour on austria, bohemia, and arabia. is the darting in our, and nothing new has that he has been talking for an hour and nothing
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has been said. now something interesting comes along. after an hour, he surprises everybody and says england has been say nasty things about is lately, and they don't seem to trust us very much. out of courtesy to them, i will annul these anglo german naval pacts that we have. you can't expect england to follow them if they do not believe us. he had already broken them. the british did not know that yet. he abolishes them. then he goes on to talk about the glorious return of the baltic states area. the poland, he says there is little to be said on the topic
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of german polish relation. except there was. he says we have this nonaggression pact with poland. they have gotten guarantees to england and france. this seems to be in violation of the pact. since i do it as unilaterally, null and void. roosevelt had asked him not to attack 31 countries. he so far canceled three international treaties and has not even gotten to roosevelt yet. now he gets to roosevelt. 90 minutes into the speech. he turns to roosevelt. he spent the next hour or so going after that. we can go to the speech in an ornate detail, but we will not do that to. first, he went back to that argument of the 14 points, the treated of -- the treaty of versailles that germans objected
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to. by dividing results messaging to 21 points. roosevelt had not divided his message into points. this suggested that roosevelt was even worse than wilson. wilson only had 14 points. this new wilson has 21 points. 14 of those 21 points that he divides the speech into, he raises the issue of wilson and versailles. over and over again. second, and agent is points, he makes the point that roosevelt is a hypocrite. he says he is encouraging negotiation and is including international agreements and so forth. what about the league of nations?
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the united states got going and had nothing to do with it. what about the civil war? was that solved around the negotiating table? what about all the wars? germany has not been involved in any wars since 1918. the united states has been involved in a bunch of them. he went on in a norma's detail into this. -- in enormous detail. one said that no one spoke more eloquently of peace than adolf hitler. he was great at declaring his great and tremendous love of peace. he did that repeatedly in this section. there was a tremendous amount of sarcasm. again, lost in translation. throughout the speech, the
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reichstag laughed enthusiastically at a number of points. particularly good digs that roosevelt. then there was the fact of the fundamental mendacity of the speech. hitler was good at propaganda. he realized that blatant lies, unless they are too big to be discovered, did not work very well. half-truths were much more effective. a great deal of what hitler set of the surface sounded possible. it is only when you look beneath himit is only when you look beneath -- and most people can't do that because they're are listening to the speech or don't know the details -- but he included all kinds of fascinating details.
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he said germany has not been involved in any wars since 1918. literally speaking, that was true. however, how did he get austria? he basically said invite me in or i am coming in any way. how did he get sudetenland? he said give it to me rl's -- or else. you give us the district in him lithuania or a member what happened to czechoslovakia. he is using half-truths. the best thing about half-truths that they can be very credible on the surface. the problem with half-truths is that they do not add up. to half-truths do not make a full truth. the point is, what hitler set on the surface and to a german audience sounded absolutely persuasive. let's look at a more detailed
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part of one section of the speech. that is a response to roosevelt's request not to attack those 31 countries. this is a clip that most of you will have seen. [speaking german] [laughter] mr. bytwerk: again, the audience response with uproarious laughter he goes through the list.
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he actually invaded quite a few of those 31. this seemed at the time ridiculous. let's look to be extended argument referring to roosevelt's message. he says first after he has gone through this message that he would ask whether roosevelt angry was initiated by them or whether there is further consent in this. the responses obtained were negative throughout, in part even marked by outright indignation. again, this is a great example for how truths -- for half-truths. if you asked if you are afraid of hitler in 1938? of course not. anyway, the point is he does that. then he says however, a number
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of the states could not afford the response to us, because like syria, they are not currently in possession of their liberty since their territories are occupied by the military forces of the democratic states which have robbed them of all their rights. a possible half-truths. syria was in fact under french occupation. they do not have freedom of action. third, far beyond this, the states have received many binding assurances that mr. roosevelt requested in his peculiar telegram. this is true. he had made all kinds of wonderful statements. he did not mean them, but he had made them. he goes on to say that he had done this, but should there be a question as to the value of these general and specific statements which he repeatedly
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made, even if made to president roosevelt, the equally worthless? in other words, if you do not believe everything i have said so far, what is the point of saying anything further? there is a sufficient possibility to what he is saying there. also some of the rest of the world. then we get to this. fifth, he gives some lessons to roosevelt. i must get point out to mr. roosevelt a few additional mistaken notions of history. for instance, he mentions island and request a statement that germany not attack island. now i have just read a speech by the irish prime minister in which contrary to the opinion of mr. roosevelt, he oddly enough does not accuse germany of a pressing ireland and instead reproaches england. he continues equally, palestine
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is not occupied by german troops, but english ones who are robbing the palestinians of their freedom in favor of jewish intruders. it was a fairly extended response. a lot of people did not know enough to raise questions. it sounded convincing. as he goes along, he finishes the speech speaking eloquently of peace. he says the vastness of your country allows you to have the time and leisure to attend to the problems of universal nature. you could conceive of the world is so small a place that you can intervene beneficially and effectively wherever this might be required.
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in this sense, your concerns and suggestions can be far more sweeping than mine. for my world is a world in which providence has put me, and in which i am responsible. it is a much smaller world. i do believe i am thereby in a better position to serve the and closer to the hearts of all of us -- justice, welfare, progress, and peace for the entire community of mankind. the reichstag broke out in convulsions of clause -- applause. when he is finished, the world breathes a collective sigh of relief. nobody had known what hitler was going to say. maybe he was going to declare war.
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maybe he was going to make an ultimatum. a typical response is what americans heard from a -- nbc broadcasting from berlin. you will hear what max jordan told americans. we will get there. >> made here by observers and commentators on the scene. they all seem to confirm that one main point that hitler's speech was ace beach that -- was a speech that helps carry on from the german angle.
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mr. bytwerk: this response was widespread. at least there wasn't going to be a war. in the united states, coverage varied. most newspapers figured out what was up. hitler taunts roosevelt. most newspapers were over critical -- were not ever critical and work sympathetic to roosevelt. but someone who was not a great friend of the new deal printed this cartoon.
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playing catch with a hand grenade. there is hitler sitting in the trenches and both sides are accusing each other of war. you know, there were some newspapers that responded that way. even some friendly newspapers thought hitler got the better part of the deal. hitler probably one -- probably won. there was an initial expectation that roosevelt with respond -- would respond. he thought about it and concluded there is no point. he had other things to do and most americans had drawn a conclusion about hitler after
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this. as hitler said, as the issue becomes clear, the public opinion in your country and mine will be helped. in germany, the germans in the united states wanted to ensure everyone got a copy. they printed a huge addition of this. in germany, the speak -- the speech was viewed -- well, in germany every speech by hitler was a masterpiece. they said it was really, really the best speech he ever gave.
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this is the fun cover of the weekly newsmagazine. newspaper headline, fuhrer warns about chatter. germany threatens no one newspapers after that were told, ok, the fuhrer dispatched roosevelt, don't desecrate his corpse. drop the issue. and they did for a while. they printed cartoons like this suggesting the rest of the world was impressed. this is in april, these diplomats are saying, what do you say when someone speaks reasonably.
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apparently the british were impressed. roosevelt got some negative cartoons. eleanor roosevelt is holding on to roosevelt who is beating the antifascist drum, bring back the 14 points. he was the comparison of the hitler to the dwarf in the west. it says the democracies and little viewpoint. it is saying, you're measuring stick is too small. there were more cartoons like this. the propaganda system got directed to keep it up. this was a cover to a monthly magazine of propaganda. in 1939 it printed a discussion called the evils of roosevelt.
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the message is that american president roosevelt burdened both adolph hitler and mussolini with was the of the time of insolence. roosevelt seems possessed by the same acai a complex -- same messiah complex that his predecessor mr. woodrow wilson had. mr. roosevelt -- germans hold this all over the place -- germans heard this all over the place. roosevelt decided there wasn't much point in preparing for battle. the germans didn't entirely stop, they were gearing up for the battle with france and england. they kind of ignored roosevelt. roosevelt made two more attempts. the first one said basically, don't attack poland.
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0the germans responded and then ignored the second. from their point of view, they didn't have to pay roosevelt much attention. they focused to their propaganda on the real enemy. of course, roosevelt in the next month attempted to shift public opinion. but the war of words was pretty much over except hitler could not resist. remember that germany declared war on the united states on december 11. the did not have to. the treaty obligated them to attack only if they were attacked. but hitler thought hey, why not. in middle of his long speech to
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the reigtstag, he said, you remember, my deputies, that i gave this impertinent determine a response that was as polite as it was definite and which stop to the torrent of words from this worthy warmonger for a few months at least. of course, by then, not too many in america were interested in what adolph hitler had to say. the war of words was replaced by the work of weapons. in brief, i think -- this is an audience that would the familiar with strategy and tactics. i think that hillary was often
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hitler was often the better rhetorical technician. he won the rhetorical battle. even a variety of americans thought he did a better job. but roosevelt was thinking long-term. he was thinking strategically. he was shifting gradually the american opinion and there was still a long way together. he was making progress. tactics win the battle but strategy wins the war. i think on the whole roosevelt's rhetoric has proven to be rather accurate. thank you. [applause] >> thank you for an excellent
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talk. i wanted to take your last point and wonder if it isn't the actions of both roosevelt and hitler that ultimately decided things and not the rhetoric? once hitler invades poland, but once his actions in the sudetenland and taking temples bockius -- tickle for the -- isn't that what drove america to fight the axis. >> we are looking at one part of a larger tradition. roosevelt didn't know what the years would bring. what he was trying to do was shift american opinion. it was a lot easier after pearl harbor and he did not have to declare war on hiller because
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hitler saved him the trouble. this speech was looking at one part of the broader issue. >> i thought you made a pretty good case regarding that speech being most anticipated of the 20th century. i brought up some counterexamples. i decided not to forward them to my question and put them to you. it occurred to me that you talked about alternatives. what do you think would have ite in second and what made come in second, not be in the >> that is not nice of you at all. else has if anybody
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gone another example. a piece those more widely anticipated and hurt? i rest my case. i think that certainly had a -- i did a little checking. i asked him if he could think of a speech. he didn't think that one had the reach either. if anything came close that may have been it. us that fascinating for much of the rest of the world quite an interest as we did. >> how would anybody, how would any of the states or leaders countered this, what was going
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on with what hitler's was doing? how could it have encountered? -- thinkou think it should have been done? >> it is always easy to speak with the benefit of historical hindsight. think it is widely agreed that hitler's could have been stopped at a number of points along the way. his staff said look, if they resist we are going to have to withdraw. certainly if there had been more .ortitude look back in hindsight and said they should have done this or should have done that. i think the only solution would have been a lot more back down. did not have a lot of
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respect for the european leaders. when he was planning the campaign against poland and they said look, traditionally the french will have to react, which they did but hitler's didn't think so. he said, i've met our armies at munich and they are worms. it's not a very good it's her to the question. >> thank you very much. who were theus advisors that roosevelt relied on? i'm not just talking about speechwriters but the various people he consulted. >> of course it will depend on what he was doing. this piece the message called
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caught everyone by surprise. roosevelt was pretty good at talking to people and giving advice. most of this stuff. if you know anything about roosevelt as a speechwriter, you could give him advice and give him help. waswhen it was done it roosevelt rather than speechwriter. >> thank you. as you know, the germans like to are veryrs and they faithful in their oath of office. the elephant that seems to be missing from the rim is the british empire. in 1935, both france and poland wanted to jump on germany for trying to break the treaty. in the united states, we take an oath to a constitution.
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in the british empire, if you want to be a citizen you have to take an oath to the queen. they didn't appreciate the importance of the constitution. it seems that roosevelt could that you germans had taken an oath at versailles to the republic. why did you buy that your oath? that could've been a very powerful counter to what hitler was doing and that have to support: in france -- have to support poland and france. it could've been a turning point. what is your view? professor bytwerk: i would say that roosevelt have to be very,
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very careful. 95% of the american public what nothing to do with european conflict. i think, i think, and there may be people here who can correct my understanding, my guess is if roosevelt would have been too explicit in 1935, he would've taken that hit enter the turtle shell really quickly because he would not have had public opinion behind him. [indiscernible] that would not have worked because hitler is in charles -- given is in charge. the jewish-dominated in position , and the constitution was disreputable and disgusting. that would not have worked with the german audience.
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they would've laughed. countriesf all, some in the, love to have a constitution. besides that, could not this had been a legal maneuver rather --more legal in the realm of public opinion the public opinion itself? not going toy i am invade such and such a country, but when you ask a jury a direct question, which attorneys due to make a point --when you ask them and direct question and you say, ok, you have said this, are you going to do it are not? in it puts them in a situation that they have to be evasive, answer the question directly. if they break any of those things, we can say, we asked him directly and he answered directly, therefore, there are no more questions. he is broken his oath and broken
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his pledge. could it be roosevelt saying, look, let's put a direct question to him and ask the things against of he can answer directly and he can be held responsible? prof. bytwerk: when would he have done that? this, ine put forth other words, when he communicates with hitler's? and he is saying this and then the world can say, roosevelt, in other words, hitler answered him and basically said, no, i have given my assurance. -- roosevelt, it does not care at this point. he doesn't care about national opinion. and now ifated out he breaks his pledges, it is black and white, no gray area. prof. bytwerk: the prime
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if it isof canada -- rejected, at least it will verify public opinion. you have to realize hitler was very worried about public opinion. you remember his famous line -- my last territorial ambition in , until, until. he was very good at saying the right things. as hitler oneis, , at in a different context one point he is talking about what is going on in russia and he says, who today speaks of the armenians? meant was look, guess what?
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, it will bed forgotten. quite -- as i said, tactically, it was really quite good. he could say what he had to to get the right reaction that he wanted. people would not question it. is a list of 31 countries, promise not to attack them. gave their response. he was hard to pin down when he did not want to be penned down. >> when you listen to roosevelt's words and posturing rhetoric, like he is speaking as itostwar president instead was a great military world power. don'tlity, most people
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think of it that way. the air force was in its infancy. no nuclear arsenal. is, how seriously the european governments of future allies in the germans understand the potential of the united states to rapidly become a great world power? -- and why did they take roosevelt so seriously? prof. bytwerk: their member world war i. and a short periods time, the european forces were tired. equipment toped europe. the germans are member that well. u.s. was ahat the military power in 1938.
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they knew the capacity. the german economist, i forget the name -- yeah, yeah. i listen to that speech and he talked about the german generals were petrified by what they knew the united states could do if it were motivated. it was not going to be instead. hitler talked about it. the plan was that they had to win the war before they ran out of resources. just a postscript to that. it was admirable yamamoto who talked about how japan would be running wild until america was able to mobilize. my question is really about -- what you are referencing is this
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megaphone interaction between hitler and roosevelt. was there any attempt to speak directly to german people for the american people? for the germans through torogates and united states be americans in some other way? prof. bytwerk: i may not answer the question that you are asking. if so, try again. realized that, he did not have direct access to germany unless the germans gave it to him. bbc's broadcasted a number of roosevelt messages. but beyond that, roosevelt couldn't claim the state in germany, where as hitler could get his printed in american
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newspapers and someone. roosevelt talked about this. he said that wilson was able to speak to the germans. he said, i cannot do that anymore. there is more control than there was back then. he would have had difficulty getting that access. germans would not give it to them unless it was to their advantage. >> thank you. this is a very interesting talk. first of all, we have to -- it was owned by ford. thank you, thank you. >> a classic mistake. in 1937, roosevelt was concerned about hitler.
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he certainly did not know what he was going to do. that is very important. that even churchill knew what hillary was going to do. not even churchill knew what hitler was going to do. prof. bytwerk: statements are not gifted to see accurately the future. yep. >> i think we ought to consider the great difference in the audience to which the speakers spoke. withvelt was confronted vitriolic -- with a vitriolic group of people. walter windchill, the whole midwest. if you mentioned eleanor to hitler, he went
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into a swoon. it was like obama and hillary. hitler had to be very circumspect on how he spoken to whom he spoke. he indulge in a half-truth that would have taken him apart. that was my only observation. prof. bytwerk: i would say that heather did not have an entirely had hand because he knew he to let the masses with him. he was distressed that the germans were not nearly as interested in war as he was. the nazis had a very detailed system of gathering systems. -- had a very detail system of gathering information. had a sensible public opinion was. even during the war, the germans measures for fear
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of getting public distress. hitler could say anything he wanted and it will be reported in the way he wanted it. but he knew there was still undercurrents in the german population that were nervous and not totally on his side. of course, you realize the standards of the two wars. in 1914, the germans are cheering in berlin. and in 1939, they are not sharing in berlin. there was tremendous distress. well, as gribble said in his famous 1934 lecture, it may be good to have power based
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on bayonets, but it is better and happier to profess hearts of the people. and nazis really were doing their best to build that populace support. they had much more flexibility, but hitler cannot ignore public opinion. >> thank you. you spoke about how hitler and the german press initially favorably, andlt how hitler and his administration suede the press in its reporting of roosevelt. but you did not talk about how the american press initially treated hitler, and whether the wayedvelt administration s the american press in his treatment of hitler. can you talk a little bit about that? and also, you talked about hitler thinking tactically,
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whether roosevelt thought strategically. it is almost as if you intimate that hitler is strategically looking to go to war with hitler . can you talk about when that will happen? prof. bytwerk: the first question i am going to duck because i think they don't know the answer. my specialty is the german propaganda end of things. ,o i simply do not know enough and i suspect other people in the group that could say something. that is because of sheer ignorance. it is hard to know anybody's mind. feeling thing i am willing to say it is clear by 1937, you know, when he starts making those speeches in september, that roosevelt was out to shift public opinion. i am sure he made that decision earlier because he was watching
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china and spain and watching europe. was said before, i think he out to shift public opinion because he figured he was going to have to lead a nation to war probably. but the exact date, i don't know. and the second question, i'm just ducking. >> ok. view theid the soviets patient between roosevelt and hitler? they ended up doing the heavy lifting in world war ii. what lessons did they take away from what they said? prof. bytwerk: i don't know. again, it's something i simply don't know enough to comment intelligently on. >> professor, thank you for this fascinating talk. since you are an expert on the german press during this time
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, and the german propaganda organ, have you ever been consulted by filmmakers in germany? has anybody ever put together a film focusing on just that, the propaganda effort as opposed to the military effort and its effect on civilians, which is what they normally do? prof. bytwerk: there's a bunch of it out there. the germans have done a variety of documentaries. the canadian broadcasting corporation did a multipart series on propaganda during the period. you may be able to look it up on youtube, i don't know. there are a fair amount of films on it. i fairly regularly -- if you look over my propaganda archive which you won't have , trouble finding, i get a lot of requests from filmmakers and so forth who need this image or that image or whatever. i'm kind of a one-stop shop. because there are thousands of images. there is a fair amount on the
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in film.a aspects and there are a whole series of books on it as well. if you are curious, i have got a list of my website. you can safely go to amazon and do a search for "not the propaganda." there will be a bunch of books -- and do a search for "not see nazi propaganda." >> [inaudible] they are always about the military. prof. bytwerk: >> i don't know of any feature films. i've seen a lot of documentaries, but not feature films. my favorite story on films -- this is irrelevant to the discussion, but i like it. the classic american film was showed to the propaganda ministry staff in charge of film. then he looked at him and said, "why can't you do anything that good?" and if you've seen the film, you will know why.
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i don't think there was a dry eye in any theater in the united states after seeing that film. "i'm not trying to ignore you. i'm told to follow the mic. >> there are a number of german historians that hitler was an autodidact. you are saying that he wrote these very subtle -- >> yeah. >> and also he was a trained demagogue, apparently. whether or not he was a master demagogue is another question. -- you get to the point buses is written by him, or was this a creation of the propaganda department because the way you are pressing it is that he did this entirely on his own and that he is a genius at counter roosevelt? on the other hand if you , actually pass this speech
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odd that, at it is the same time he is negotiating for a nonaggressive pact with the soviet union, none of that is -- prof. bytwerk: of course not. >> wait a minute. you would prepare your people for this pro-bolshevik thing in this kind of a speech, and it's not there at all. so there's two questions here. , do you honestly believe that hitler wrote this entirely by himself? and why is it so unsubtle and -- and why is it so unsubtle about what's going on? prof. bytwerk: ok. first: nobody could write for hitler. his closest aide did not know what he was going to say until he said it. it was his stuff. he did not use speechwriters.
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and the point is, there is a tendency -- the problem with a lot of americans, they've seen hitler -- [gibberish] and it looks like the guy is a raving lunatic. ok. but the point is, when he spoke for 2.5 hours, people listened with rapt attention. and he was quite capable of making careful, nicely worked out arguments. there is his famous speech, the duesseldorf industrial, before he takes power. speaking to these industrialists, he's giving them a very long and detailed argument about why national socialism is there sure defense against marxism, and it is an argument that is mendacious, fallacious, but sounds very good and helps to persuade some of those. so yeah he was an , extraordinarily gifted persuader.
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no doubt about that. that's not anything to say about his ethical practices, honesty, or truthfulness, but he was good. and in fact, again, there are all kinds of contemporary accounts of people meeting hitler and being blown away by him. i mean, person-to-person, too not only a mass audience. ,but person-to-person, he could take people and leave them tremendously impressed. is, yes, asnd point i said, all kinds of other things going on. he is planning an invasion of the soviet union. again, remember, he is speaking tactfully. he really didn't have to worry about what was down the pike. the propaganda system was very good. i mean, of course, the german
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public did a 180 degree switch. right? first, the russians and the marxists were the source of all evil. then they had a packed and a drop in the propaganda system. there are some advantages to having almost complete control over the mass media. abouttler was not worried six must on the pike. he was worried about immediate response. thank you. wonderful talk. you seem to have a formalist definition of propaganda in the past. is that true? i mean, you sort of to find it, i guess. today, isondering, there a sense of propagandizing? nothing like hitler, but i am just curious, do you have a sense of propaganda as being
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more subtle these days, or nonexistent? prof. bytwerk: we are in the middle of an election campaign. [laughter] me give you a better answer to that question. if you want to know what the best modern book on propaganda by a french writer, he also wrote stuff for the technological society. it's an absolutely brilliant book. i think it's the best book on propaganda. it would take me a long time to discuss it. his basic argument is that propaganda has become part and parcel of the whole modern system in a way in which we can't get rid of it anymore. very brief example. let's assume we want to get rid of silicon chips. could we do it? couldn't do it. we are stuck with them. propaganda is a kind of silicon chip. it's so much embedded in media, society, politics, so forth. but that's an argument i can't begin to get into now.
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that was published in france. published in english in the u.s. it is a book that scares me every time i read it. that is only part of it. it is part advertising. it is public relations, politics, a whole range of things. the best propaganda is propaganda that does not hit you over the head. wham, the big bump grows out of your head. the best propaganda is propaganda you don't even realize is propaganda. that is something that would take me much more time that we have. read it. it'll scare you. >> thank you, professor, for the presentation. you mentioned lindberg. talk about the german propaganda machine's ability to use western figures, allied figures in their propaganda, the former british king. and another topic that would
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take a long time. when we saw the topic, one of my colleagues last week said "oh, , he's going to talk about roosevelt and unconditional surrender." maybe you can talk about that sometime. there were other things that roosevelt said that were later used in the war. perhaps talk about allied propaganda figures used by the germans and later things said by allies that the german propaganda machine could also use. i know it's a broad topic. prof. bytwerk: ok. that's another lecture. in brief, i mean, they liked -- any society likes that likes to have friends on the other side. the germans liked henry ford particularly. they liked lindbergh. there were a variety of republicans who they cited at great length. the anti-roosevelt republicans quite often got cited. president hoover, ex-president hoover got cited a number of times. they were very happy to use -- it's much more credible.
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you figure the germans might say nasty things about roosevelt, but if americans say nasty things, it has much more credibility. your second question, there are all kinds of things. in fact there's a stack of that , stuff in my propaganda archive. if you're curious about one thing using allied statements in german propaganda, i have a variety of world war ii pamphlets translated, and my favorite is one called "never," published in fall of 1944, about 40 pages of detailed discussions, statements by roosevelt, churchill, newspapers, you name it, all threatening to absolutely destroyed in my cow germany. but that is another lecture. i could easily give a lecture on what happened during the war. but, you know, there's only so much we can talk about. but look up that. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the
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national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit] >> this week and on "american history tv" on c-span3, this afternoon before 5:00 eastern, historian barry lewis talks about construction of the brooklyn bridge, why manhattan need to the bridge, and how transportation in the city changed at the turn of the 20th century. >> when the brooklyn bridge was opened, it did not put the fairies out of business. they were running at capacity. mid-1890's, the city of brooklyn was next to kaine's
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county and rita million people. >> on "lectures in history -- >> that is the interesting thing on country music is it is the music of poor, white people. people who are privileged to be white. for underprivileged in terms of their class identity and economic opportunities. >> tickets in college professor of white nests in blackness in colonial america and how it impacted the origins of country music. then sunday afternoon at 4:00 on "real america" -- created evidence that this crusade against society's greatest enemies may be slowed, or worse, may level often fade. this was the climate, the land, and the task that face lyndon johnson on the first of
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december, 1966. >> this film documents the final month of the year of president lyndon b. johnson, his meeting ,ith mexico's president awarding the medal of honor to a marine who fought in vietnam, celebrating the holidays with his family at his texas ranch. presidency,on the the author of madam president, the secret presidency of a .icholson -- of edith wilson she buffered access to the president as he recovered from a massive stroke in 1919. for our complete schedule, go to releaseda recently over 2000 pages of previously classified material from the richard nixon and general ford administration. it they were part of the president -- they were part of the president's daily briefing.
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up next, a discussion with cia director john brennan and james clapper about the newly released documents. the richard nixon presidential library in nexen foundation hosted this event. it is an hour and a half. >> good afternoon, everyone. on behalf of all of my colleagues, i want to welcome you to today's event titled the president's daily brief. my name is joe lambert and i am the director at the cia and i'll be your agency for today's event. events like this take a lot of work, and i want to take a second technology efforts of the cia officers who reviewed and declassified these 28,000 pages over the last year. they were assisted by a number of intelligence agencies. but one in


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