tv Declassified CIA Documents on the Cold War Soviet Navy CSPAN September 24, 2017 2:59pm-4:01pm EDT
>> there is definitely that question of are we exceptional, but the very question of why had i never thought that this was a form of propaganda -- why had i not thought to question where was this concept coming from? what was the job that it was doing for individual americans? -- thing i was realizing this took a long time to realize, in fact -- the very language we use when we talk about foreign countries has been determined for us a very long time ago, because we tend to look at foreigners, especially muslim countries and countries in the east as where they catching up with us, or were they behind us? what that does is being able to see the country on its own terms . >> watch afterwards, tonight at 9:00 p.m., on c-span2's book tv.
up next we discuss declassified navy.ents by the so far titled red ent is navy revealed. soviet navy intelligence and war.sis during the cold >> good morning and thanks for coming to the national press world's oldest and largest organization of professional journalists. retired u.s. navy captain nd member of the headliner committee. on behalf of the board of directors we want to welcome you c-span and ence on other media. thank you very much. for ve a special program you today. first i want to introduce claire historical the naval foundation the executive director. she wanted to say word about and weartnership on this
will get into the statements and q q&a's. >> i know you want to hear from and not me se here so i will only take a minute. e are delighted to be able to work with the c.i.a. to bring ou this, we think, exciting briefing this morning. want to thank kevin and the national press club for hosting us this morning. for those who don't know the historical foundation we are a nonprofit membership organizati organization. on preserving and commemorating naval heritage and naval history to help educate the american people on navy, sea nce of our power and maritime domain. navy at the washington yard very historic and we work closely with the naval history and heritage command. our board and members three of here - four of whom are
today -- david, kevin and norman here. our board and members are a wealth of knowledge on naval and providing historical that arento activities happening today. we hope you will use us a you are doing research and writing articles. the briefing. >> thank you, claire. the list of ough speakers david rosen park for analysis of defense and retired captain. tillia mansfield. welcome. pulmar tphaefrpl and intelligence historian and wealth of knowledge all things and marine corps. ear admiral thomas brooks
retired navy. nd eugene sullivan retired c.i.a. senior officer. everyone, thank you for being here today. avid, i would like to maybe -- cilia, if you would like to start off and tell us about the documents that were released. then we will go with q&a everybody has a chance to say a words and i ask you to stand up and identify your name you are source or who with. and make it a real precise question if you can. very much. >> good morning and welcome. i have some remarks that i prepared. from 4:00 to 6:00 p.m. at the navalgymposium yard. that will be a two-hour session in which we will give more .etail on the documents
i want to thank our navy panelists. and it has been wonderful working .ith everyone it has been a real learning experience for myself. let me say that i have the absolute best job not only do i to tell the central intelligence agency story i work diverse talented and workforce including the expert reviewers and researchers who making this to collection and others like it available to the public. be s a great privilege to here today, to discuss the and ts of their hard work as the historical program the review i managed and release of classified c.i.a. department of the state foreign relations of the united states and discretionary elease of historically significant documents which included over the last couple of years the release of the briefs.t's daily
our goal is to declassify what we can while protecting what we mullins. with this in mind we try to transparencyrnment with academia, historians and he public and when possible correct a level record on what c.i.a. has been involved with in the past. for today we produced a booklet which many much you picked up on the way in. it provides an overview of the history of soviet navy and u.s. posture during that time and catalogue in the back of the ook describing the documents recent lly released. c.i. n be found on our c.i.a..gov website under collections. since this is about history years o back some 2500 ago and almost 2500 years ago hat chinese military theorist stressed the importance of intelligence in his book the art of war. same book he noted to
within 100 battles is not the acme of skill. stressed to subdue the enemy without fighting is indeed the acme of skill. the cold war was won without a hot being fired between the superpowers and a nuclear holocaust was averted. collection of documents is our story of the soviet navy and cold war. with previously released more broadlyocused on the warsaw pact and soviet issues h. rategic the documents provide a fast tphaeulgt peek into the soviet in a critical time of development where they were analysis served on national security policy issues well. in this group are intelligence assessments, memoranda and research reports as clan dose continue ly from behind rting
the iron curtain. he analytic products were written by analysts in a direct driven ophthalmologist of research and constitute about 30% of the collection with the remainder clandestinely e acquired intelligence used as products. the finished these products were prepared for our policy makers and community partners and in total there are 82 ocuments, newly released and amounts to about 2,000 pages. our analysis of soviet military thinking and war soviety the cold navy with its evolving strategy and development of nuclear force was derived from a special collection of soviet and ary thought articles related classified soviet and warsaw pact documents written by leaders and y strategists. they greatly influenced our united in how the
states viewed the soviet union. paint from several you have any of them heard about. one of these extraordinary eroes spoke for all of them when he wrote, and i quote consider that my place during on the ubled time is front line i must remain on this front line in order to be your and ears. bud grant said only my modest useful in the fight for our high ideals for man kind. lease believe me that your soldiers shall take a worthy position among his comrades who justice. they were ridden by a highly laced soviet intelligence officer. he was president kennedy's most berlin ource during the crisis in 1961 and 1962 as well cuban missile crisis in 1962. e provided together with
immarriagery from the u 2 critical intelligence on the readiness that president kennedy needed to go yeball to cry ball with kruschev and kruschev was the first to blink. as for the others. popov served from 1953 to late reported on soviet military organization policy and tactics tegy and the final one who served 2 to his immigration to the united states in 1981 on soviet actions leading to marshal law in poland same year. i want to talk a little bit analyst's point of view what the documents mean if you can give me a couple of about that. to talk the navy debated key issues about their own naval view s and practices and
of u.s. naval strength made the difference between knowing facts and gaining ding the intuitive edge to determine the other side's intentions. collected intelligence the analyst nalysts would know things but helps us understand things accurate s to making projections. understanding provides a context that allows the stitching disparate pieces of information and sorting through identify a more accurate picture. for example, we might have a picture that shows an increase the number of ships but understanding the why allows us for that intentions increase in ship numbers. clandestinely he acquired military articles and pieces were critical to the analysts' understanding of why. another important aspect of analysis and you will probably pick up on some much the we go ion today as
through questions is the debates nce community and had debates in the early years on the interpretation of intelligence on certain issues. community debates are a healthy the to arrive at understanding analysts sake of situation.k the n closing, i would like to thanks john and joan byrd who re responsible for this collection. they spent about a decade pulling together the documents allow ng the research to there collection as well as two other collections that were released. unfortunately john passed away a we are f months ago and deeply grateful to both john and work or all of their hard on the project and dedication. thank you. >> david do you want to make
remarks? rosenberg i'm representing myself in the naval historical foundation. training and n by worked at naval war college and u.s. navalersity and academy and doing history more than five decades. start being back in the 1960's. i have been in many of the also as a navy intelligence officer have been -- behind the scenes so i have interesting comments. wish i had an aircraft model or submarine model but i'm talking about documents. of me provide a little bit insight on how to understand what c.i.a. has released. the first thing i want to do is congratulate c.i.a. and thank them. hat they have been doing the last few decades has been remarkable in terms of releasing finished intelligence and in materials that you have seen collections of
human intelligence derived documents provided by linbehind the iron curtain. when you put it with material released under mandatory declassification review or tproeupld of requests what was also c.i.a. processed and get aigence community you remarkable picture of the other side of the story. important because very rarely this soon thereof get that kind of pictures. the other thing i need to thank c.i.a. on with an asterisk is they have patent of these online. collection has been available since earlier this summer online. in addition, if you look in the backlet you will find a list of other documents it that have been
declassified. it is a very fine collection the first and subsequent national intelligence estimates on soviet navy and so forth. the asterisk and something i have checked with cilia about is c.i.a. has on their what is c.i.a. research true previous to this year or i think last year it was only available at the national archives. now available online at the c.i.a. freedom of website.on that is remarkable. the problem is it has one of the search engines i have ever dealt with in which if you type search hs ago precise tools you will get something 1,500 to in one case webpages that you can search for something that might work. noted it is a pain and didn't mind me saying it but i i would tphroetd it
publicly. what do we have here on the web site? a collection of material covers the waterfront on a good bit of soviet navy. we have individual 1950's and intelligence derived documents some repetitive from material bar sed under the iron seri series. new in a number of cases are late 1960's and early 1970's formerly classified formal intelligence assessments of the oviet navy particularly understanding the soviet navy in its anticarrier role, role and other points that had not previously released. this fills a huge gap in terms of things to understand. this will be a focus of the discussion this afternoon, there
is a series of c.i.a. assessments on the role of interdict iing communications in the event of world war three. think about it, we are talking about it the third battle of the atlantic. this have occurred? would the soviet union with its of sub-marines come out and attempt to do what germans attempted in two world wars. that is an important issue and we can focus discussion. in addition there is remarkable c.i.a. coming out of collections of military thought, i was told cent but this was the right way to say it speaking a foreign language] that was the general staff journal that was our people and the
pact journal and that is the way much of the military questions were debated and naval strategy was talked about. essentially ave nine documents that represent he 13 chapters of the combat regulations of the soviet navy, were published in 1986 aluminum dereferred but very -- dereferred but very important to delve into how they would fit. two book link studies. one a study with a number of kruschev's n miscalculation in the cuban risis and the trail of soviet disasters. as i said, you have to look at the value again of this marvelous booklet. hype t know if there is a are link. is it going on line? >> yes. website with the the documents above. we did a short summary paragraph
so there will be a p.d.f. that beauty of this is you can go to the website and ind this now and in addition you can at least copy and paste he title of some of these and that would be the way to find some of them. the documents that were released still hold stuff that the c.i.a. as been releasing over time that i think john and joan byrd made the decision they needed to fill in. so, this is actually a celebration of that act, but came before it. because if you really want to understand this you have to and look at the other documents, particularly to mention and that is the issue of the ational intelligence estimate on the soviet navy that came out 1982, national intelligence 11-15-82 d.
a t is the estimate that was game changing assessment of the oviet navy that while not part of this you can see things leading up to it. note the at least importance from the key udgments that i think is very critical because it represented such a departure for american on one hand and to understand the soviet navy and how it worked. quote, within the soviet overall wartime strategy for theary initial task navy remained to deploy and provide protection of ballistics submarines in preparation for and conduct of strategic and theater nuclear the us and to defend guest: r and allies by enemy submarines issile and aircraft care years ago years -- carriers. is something that took a while to get the united states navy leadership to understand.
the united states navy leadership was worried about soviet navy and coming out and how did there work. the final point that i want to is that you need to the way the at united states went about ollecting information on the soviet union was all source. there were all sorts of things effect contributed to these assessments. technical es the collection that was undertaken imagery ites, overhead and electronic intelligence as well as signals and communications intelligence. there were a range of other sources that contributed to t s this. united states navy itself redid. ay it did intelligence capitalizing on what it did in the second world war and in the created the ocean surveillance information system hat provided tailored
information to fleet commanders on the doings of the soviet navy. of this was a remarkable system that brought us a lot of very important information and o if you want to understand this, the good news is realize hat there is a very large iceberg linbehind what you are d being. that kevin i will turn it over. > we will open up to q&a now -- sorry. you want to make a statement? please, go ahead. >> as the only press club member kevin, of l -- course. he is an officer. i'm just a member for 60 years or whatever. these documents are within fascinati some i have had a privilege of seeing related to so i have done in the past
i consider myself a consumer of all of this. a dozen trips to the soviet union, russia and some of the issues in here in these papers with senior officers and submarine designers couple books on russian somebody marines knees are eye opening documents. the problem is, as dave rowsberg pointed out -- rosenberg pouted ut prior to 1982 a lot of our perceptions of what the soviets would do, how they would do it, pretty bad.o be this evening i will speak about sea lines of communication i understand diction. interdiction. how the navy in the first 30 war the missions were nuclear strike against the oviet union with aircraft
carrie arriers, cruise missiles, with polaris, poseiden. that was the number one mission. the ar strike against soviet union. the number two was protecting lanes because a we knew the germans had tried in to cut off europe from the united states and world war ii in with submarines and will failed. but with the numbers of soviets were producing in one kwraoyear 60 o they could probably do it. so, we spent a lot of time, resources in the concept of protecting the convoys, which it turns out the soviets were not phrafpbing to go after. planning to go after. that was a secondary mission for them. i will close by saying there evening i will go into much more etail with some of the
documents. also, i must take issue with my panel members. i often take issues with organizations and some of you me on tv and read my books and articles. totallyay the c.i.a. is wrong, incorrects and just unbelievably bad during the cold war lots of shots were fired and several score americans and score russians were kill killed. i will be happy to go into afterwards. thank you. >> i think he would like to make statement, too. the references have been made to disagreements that sometimes -- exist in the community and it will focus on sloc interdiction. to point out one document the 1978 paper by jerry sparks strategic ce of
research on the role of interdiction at sea in soviet and operations. as an analyst for the past 27 ears i have had the experience of writings a paper and you .ever know what happened to it i launched them and i don't know where they landed. sparks's paper produced a virtz wall firestorm of ed a miles anom the hour and shapiro and wickland holloway. a lot of opposition in the navy to jerry's message. what you see in these papers are not only the finished products but you see a lots of how the sausage is made. there was a lot of the e and anger within community in discussing this issue. would the office of strategic research care what the admirals felt? work for the admirals.
but in fact we did because our intelligenceentral substance fields turner. so you see not only the finished insight intoget an the arguments about what the finished product would look like. you get fascinating anecdotal material of, for example, turner having a meeting with secretary of defense harold talking about the slocs nd adds miller turner said we did a paper. brown said i loved that paper not too r said i was crazy about it myself. so there was a lot of stuff here really points to the difficulties sometimes of getting the message out. they do in the long mark recognition for the excellent work of jerry parks as the author and even
more so for john byrd who was jerry's branch manager at the of the first line combatant in what was at times a pretty nasty in the of views intelligence communities but truth prevailed. or the scholar it is a great trove of evidence to see how the intelligence community system simply the final products. >> admiral brooks wants to make a quick comment. to repeat congratulating c.i.a. on the huge project of getting the released and previous documents to this as well. like to leave a thought with the audience. you go through this and read to stop to think
there still are some things that collected by human beings from human beings. antenna could information d the that is compiled in the back of this document. the value of the world's oldest intelligence remains as important today as it has been throughout history. thank you everybody on panel. questions.n it up to it is interesting this comes out right now considering the world situation. gentleman in the back. >> thank you. i'm a member of the press club and bloomberg. e hear a lot today about
putin's navy and his admirals sea and the black sea c threats and black from a base in the crimea and mediterranean from a base in syria. what has putin and his admirals that yourom the period were discussing? with thewe stand today new russian threat and how to it?ter and for the benefit of the audio answered reintroduce yourself. with you want to start that? >> no. today the soviet navy has an interesting dichotomy. in big ace navy is trouble. they have one aircraft carrier ours.mall are than the one is now in the yard for two, three, possibly four years
be rebuilt and modernized. they probably cannot add another to the fleet for another seven, eight, nine, possibly 10 years. surface ship construction of destroyers and cruisers has come stop ost a complete because these were ships powered turbine jinx -- engines. factory that was producing them is ukraine and turbines. sell gas they are billing lots of small turbines cants gas power and diesels. frigates ettes and fortunately from their viewpoint have trick win systems. frigates and three sea ttes in the caspian launched missiles 900 miles into syria. , the surface navy is small
ships with increasingly potent capability. still believeat i is on the submarine sides. here they are building very slowly, very advanced submarines. ballistics arines, missile for the strategic role our hat we would call in navy torpedo attack and cruise missile submarines. soviet union disintegrated in december of the surface shipyards were lost. they were in other countries rimarily ukraine but other countries. all five of the submarine they have rds, changed the order of them, all russia and most of components suppliers remained in russia. whereas the surface ship contribution to syr opinion the area
hat is going to be i dislike using there word it is a journalist journalist his particular term the threat is from the submarine side. >> dave, would you reintroduce yourself. we can't see the little blue front of you. is naval and .ntelligence historian to talkot in a position about current affairs given that do on current affairs has nothing to do with it or, if you.oes i can't tell so i will note as follows. there is the interesting and ion that as we look at interpret how russia is going about its use of its navy an remember is son to startlinglized by the
statement in the national intelligence estimate of 1982, that things the u.s. navy thought the soviet union was for 30 some odd years were things they were sown he -- shown that they were not going to do. issue is, to talk about what norman just noted, the are building very capable submarines. at are advanced and given least the things i have heard from norman, given his relationship with some of so far submarine designers, they are a system.ather remarkable but the fundamental question is how would they be used in war time. i think we can venture one thing and that is that it is not russians would in fact be using their subphraeurp marines to s interdict north atlantic saoefr lines of communication. he question is how and where
would they use them. i can venture one thing which is vailable when you look at in these documents that is also important to look at. the use ans pioneered f antislip cruise missiles -- an antiship cruise missiles and back to the 1950's and if you want to understand them for the future start with the cruise missile. >> do you have a question? history.waback to i wonder if you can relate on the statement that you made i would like to take the statement and reverse how it works ee outs.
with documents in the public dough plain i think you said blink v was the first to during the cuban missile crisis. publicly available documents the united states also quietly its nuclear pointed at the soviet union at that time from turkey. statement?vital >> i'm not an expert on the cuban missile crisis so i can't that.nt on there is, however, and i believe that david mentioned, there's an analytic document from 1964 that a lot of analytic detail knew at the time. so, it is a very in-depth study definitive the study that i have ever seen and it is released and part of this
collection. so, i would commend that to you a look. maybe somebody else can talk to was urkey issue if that brought up. back re was an excellent which operation anandare was russian code for sending cube.les to it is written and co-authored first half by an american was involved and back second half by a soviet involved.ho was and i think you will find if not specifics at least indications question.answer your there is also a book by tkpwrerb r defcom 2 lmar did to that time we went
level which was everything but war. verything was primed to start attacking. but the operation anandere is published e best resource on that issue. removed ny missiles from turkey either during or after the cuban crisis? one think there were only or two missiles operational in turkey at that time. were removed after the crisis. not during, but after. but i'm pretty sure, and the book goes into there as i of ll, there were maybe two the nned 16, 24, that was orders of magnitude of missiles it were being installed. 16 or 24. or two were operational at the time of the crisis.
>> what norma said is true -- thereaid was true i think were more operational because it as decided by the eisenhower part of process to provide itsaly. in turkey and hey remain a points of controversy because of the difficulty on the part of the u.s. government and department f energy to admit even though they have b out for years whether they were in turkey with nuclear weapons on them. they continue to redact some of information about that. ut there's enough material on government websites and air force history. he key points is that the jupiters in turkey were really pretty horrible weapons that disabled by a rifle bullet and were in range of ordered and kennedys their removal because of vulnerability and the fact was was a the end there kinds of secret quid pro quo hat the kennedy separation
didn't admit they would remove hem but they were leaving anyway. it was not in the missile crisis ed -- ey were discussion ed discussed in a private set of egotiations between robert dobrynin nd ambassador o it was back channel diplomacy. it had nothing to do with the key ade which was another part. we have other questions? >> i'm with national public radio. could you tell us more about what the u.s. navy was doing to in the decades when they believed the soviets might try block sea lanes? and after that realization came changed or what was done differently?
happy to make a couple everyone comments on that. navy, we are of the talking about the 1960's and 1970's as particularly as these documents, we sraoudz our missions as number strategic g and control, power projection and presence and diplomacy. that was roughly how we categorized our missions. the seek control mission a very getting set envisioned the convoys through to western nato before nforce and particularly after the war.nning of a again, having in mind and emember the admirals who were planning this all were world war .i admirals
zumwalt was class of 1941 and saw that despite hat the soviets' intentions might be to interdict sea lines of communication, that the the huge number of submarines they had, had the sea ility to interdict lines of communication. who hose had the audience were naval officers who served in the military you will know academy the naval through all the war colleges and education you are taught when enemy you the consider capabilities first, were ions are very secondary. ou can change intentions very quickly. you can't change capabilities very quickly. of that which was cited to me as a young officer do you remember
that -- of course i didn't it because i was five when pearl harbor happened. do you remember that five hours harbor handled secretary knox sent a message to saying commence unrestricted submarine warfare us was taboo. we denounced it and said it was never l and we would xecute unrestricted submarine warfare four or five hours after pearl harbor we executed it to surprise of the japanese i suppose but to the surprise of aval officers because we are tphrots trained for that. that was not our doctrine. intentions changed very quickly. when you look at the investment navy was making in those carrier force was far despite the fact sea
control was listed as our number mission the money was spent on power projection. three carriers all at vietnam conducting strikes. all the money we spent on asw submarine warfare mainly used in world war ii ships. 1970's it became to replace the asw sea control capability. a sea control ship that of day and e light high-low mix of ships. navy continued to train asw and invest but not in the program where the carrier warfare program. i hope that helps answer the
question. if there is anything more specific i can address let me know. just a footnote to what admiral brooks just said, in the 1950's as an example the soviets submarines of what we ou all the whisky has or nato calls them. 236. shipyards producing hese 60 to 70 some a year, we knew that had to be the mission f those submarines, to interdict the sea lanes. interestingly, the soviets never whisky class as going submarines. they built them with the idea of defense against our amphibiousrriers and landings. we looked at them as capable of they to sea so obviously
tried to do what the germans will tried. part of the reason they thought after the world war ii, the british and americans, and navies, hliterally got scoreless of german jennings and -- generals and admirals to write about fighting the soviets. of an example in my bag of how fight for the germans to the soviets. we were that influenced, our influenced by these papers and books that the german dmirals and in a few cases captains and colonels wrote. nd they all having fought a battle of atlantic said it is unquestion believe the soviets thing. the same what is fascinating to me as a naval and intelligence historian historian, it is fascinating to of hat the largest class
submarines builts sings world whiskys, were intended for coastal defense, operations.ge sullivan retired c.i.a. analyst. if you look at the parpls that papers that are ublished about soviet sloc interdiction they cover both capability.nd it is accompanied by a careful assessment of suppose they did do it.to and the papers that the agency published found they really were not capable of doing it. because we you looked at the factored numbers and in things like endurance, to edo loads and ability differentiate different types of argets, the finding of the agency papers were they were not capable of doing it unless abandoned y totally
every other mission including ssbn's and ion of even then it was doubtful if they could carry out a effort.ful but the papers are the way to look at this problem, see what arguments are and see what counterarchitects aguments and into.ailable for looking >> a quick follow-up, after that realization set in can you give concrete examples of how that changed way of thinking and deployment. let me address a couple of issues that did take place in the u.s. navy during this time. war was rine war serious after the advent of the missile submarine and from 1957 was a high priority for chief of operations who created army warfare executive.
more importantly, there is something as things were new london connect under submarine group two and this was theand 12 rise were the american submarine particularly nuclear attack with sonar in cooperation with a much large are system seeking understand where to find, that soviet submarines the creation of submarines as antisomebody antisomebody -- antisubmarine navy made a significant priority. i'm sure you have read the pwaobook seen the movie the hunt for red october and the trail of the october. the fact is the capability to do u.s. s something that the navy did work very hard at with building 100 nuclear attack submarines that in effects i think we achieved
90-something in the 1980's that as former to be commander called it the capital of world war three. for everything else you would staiurface ships. navydition, as i noted the built a remarkable system built on national intelligence track the soviet navy from home waters into and to find yments ways of figuring out where they were and what they were doing. at the risk of providing any note there is available one book called the advantage readed by christopher ford and edited and myself it was a navy reserve intelligence product and money never gotten any and pbd 2005 and reprinted with in 2014 and the cut
being edge of declassification how we tracked the society navy. you are not going to be able to vector the submarines in to find what you looking for. that was a big part of it. >> may i make a few comments the other side? ne of the problems in antisubmarine warfare we ncountered is the soviets did things with submarines that, one, we didn't think could be we couldn't do. the world's fastest submarines were soviet, not american. of a kind papa class was the knots. 44 po.7 the so far yet planned to build 30 of them. cruise missile antiship submarines. they alpha class which
built seven of as i recall, six operational. troublesome boat, could do or 42 knots. they built submarines that could 1,000 meters, 3,000 feet. that on published material is roughly three times as deep as our submarines go and were any of our got --marine weapons can go. their goal, according to russian publication, was 2,000 meters. the problem with a submarine perating there is you are not going to find it because of all the thermal changes between the even 1,000 feet let alone 3,000 or 6,000. they have also done a few other things that we didn't believe did, ould do or they automation. today ttack submarines
have less than half the craw of ours. hey are the only ones that builts nuclear submarines with scape pods or capsules for the entire crew. they have a number of things we said couldn't be done or us.rised i wanted to put in a plug for the other side. >> do you want to make a comment. > just to wrap up the question you asked, the discussion was issue on the larger issue of how do we go about understanding the navy.ns of the soviet dave as book the admirals' advantage goes into that and a number of sources some human surfaces, some imagery, a combination of many things. intelligence to us in the 1970's that enabled us the end of the 1970's to
the y well understand soviet naval missions. there there to mention some of them because we didn't think that way. soviet navy jor missions was to protect their force to provide huge numbers of forces to protect sspn's. we don't do that. sspn's losophy is the will go to sea and get lost in t isn't threatened by anything. a different ad problem particularly before they got long-range missiles and our coast.ff even after they did they wanted those.ect we didn't appreciate that until ery much later on in the
evaluation of all of in intelligence that became 1971.able in the >> we may have time for one last question. >> it is double barreled. for those of us who may not be able to stand this afternoon if you will say a the incidents in which you said there was an exchange of fire. it is not so as the c.i.a. put it, that there were never anger.ts fired in and follow-up. quickly, everyone here knows of gary powers being shot down. soviets also shot down eight, 10, 12 -- i don't recall -- a dozen u.s. reconnaissance aircrafts. was in 1946-47 a navy 12rol bomber loss of i think crewmen. there were a couple of incidents americans were
killed. badger one russian reconnaissance aircraft crashed over a u.s. low carrier. she did a turn, didn't quite of the wing tips hit the water. that aircraftt in as i recall. in vietnam, there were russians killed, technical advisors if you will. i believe we know of at least two or i have seen pilotsces to two russian who were killed in vietnam. were killed during the cold war on both sides. shots were fired and as i ay, probably a dozen u.s. and russian reconnaissance actor ere lost, not counting the u-2 where there was no casualty onto u.s. side. that e of the missiles
were fired as i recall did hit a fighter that was trying flown by pt the u-2 gary powers so there were real hots fired and casualties on both sides. >> you mentioned vietnam and i anted to ask about the, what the documents show about u.s. soviet access ut tamron bay in of starting in 1980 and the mportance of camron bay as a launch pad for possible future ..s. operations launch point but -- >> i don't believe there documents covers that aspect at all.
i don't think that was part of t the documents. >> i don't recall anything. >> there is some mention of that national er 11-15-82 and and 11-15-84 and some of the later ntelligence information memoranda and portion of those eclassified but nothing in great detail. with respect to the future, that is the future. >> ladies and gentlemen, i want you on behalf of the national press club for being meetingsthis important and i think our panelists will be around if you have follow-on quells. tha -- questions. being here at the national press club. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017]
at 7:00 unday join us and 11:00 even as we continue our series featuring oral interviews with photos journalists. and you can watch the programs at time on our website c-span.org/history. you are watching american tv all weekend of c-span 3. > monday on the communicators come consist senior executive vice president david cohen talks telecommunication development, competition and regulations. rahm.interviewed by tony >> what is your take on the rump administration and competition? >> i feel compelled to there and out roberts pointed there last week we love our company. at&t and wraeupbt
and we view ourselves as strategically complete so we there saying my god to survive we have to find something else to buy. to make that clear. on the other hand, we have never as being selves foreclosed from the acquisition arketplace domestically or international internationally. it has to be the right deal and enhances the quality of the company, enhances has -- to shareholders, will enhance shareholder value no secret there's that overall this president and is likely less horizon growth or ven vertical growth in the telecom space. >> watch the communicators onday night at 8:00 eastern on
c-span 2. >> in 2011 the c.i.a.'s information management services eclassified over 200 documents regarding intelligence on the soviet union that they provided administration. included were video briefings created by the director of makers.enceor policy up next on real america one of media's efings soviet portrait of the united states. a nine minute >> [speaking russian] the people don't have power in your country. what you have is crime, sadism and unemployment. and don't think you're young people do anything but harm to their country. ♪ >> "beat it" was an unprecedented hit. >> the americans are preparing for war. we don't want more, we ar