tv German Social Scientists U.S. Foreign Policy CSPAN January 27, 2019 2:34pm-4:01pm EST
she teaches at the university of boston. prof. bsumek: thank you. >> interested in american history tv? .isit our website you can view our tv schedule, preview upcoming programs, and what column lectures, archival films, and more. american history tv at c-span.org/history. , the consumer technology association president on the major issues facing the $398 billion technology industry in the u.s. >> because i see where the future is going with technology, we know robots, artificial intelligence, self-driving cars, individual oriented medical treatments. certainly biotech in a way we have never experienced before. blockchain technology. all of these are coming. how do you succeed?
being flexible knowing part of the feature is not clear but part of it is clear, have you benefit from that with you are a government, business, or individual? monday at 8:00 eastern on c-span2. was a germanr social scientist among the many european intellectuals who immigrated to america in the 1930's. next, university of washington american foreign-policy professor daniel bessner talks about the influence of hans speier and other exiled social service -- scientists during the cold war to provide research and analysis to the u.s. military. mr. bessner is the author of "democracy in exile: hans speier and the rise of the defense intellectual." the national history center and wilson center in washington, d.c., co-hosted this 90-minute event. >> a warm welcome to all of you
to the wilson center. one ofed to introduce the rising stars in the field and someone i have been in touch with for many months now. it is great to finally meet in person. professor daniel bessner is the assistant professor in american the school of of international studies at the university of washington. he is the author of "democracy in exile: hans speier and the rise of the defense intellectual." published by cornell university press this year. that is what he will be talking about today. thelso co-edited forthcoming volume, "the decisionist imagination."
, the randook corporation history is under contract. we have reached out to the rand folks. some are here. we will have a discussion of these issues. dan has written for "the new york times," the washington post," and journals. i very much look forward to our discussion with him today. professor bessner: thank you very much. thank you for helping to arrange this talk. i really do appreciate it. also, thank you all for taking the time to come today on what is the doubt a busy monday. the talk i'm about to give comes from my book manuscript, "democracy in exile: hans speier and the rise of the defense intellectual." the book examines the impact of german exiles from national
socialism on the culture, institutions, and foreign policies of the cold war national security state. several of the most important policy and thinkers of the cold war u.s. were german exiles, most famously henry kissinger. while scholars have noted a culture that values expertise has permeated the institutions of american foreign-policy making, no one has yet identified the significant german contributions to this culture. my research reveals in the early cold war, a number of german born academics played cripple roles in creating the expert-centered culture and institutions of the national security state. immigrates helped establish some of the most prominent and influential organizations of the military --flicts the less complex military complex that brought expertise to bear on american foreign relations.
include common of these the less the most prominent of these -- the most prominent of these include the rand corporation. these institutions provided intellectuals with the training an opportunity to pursue the research largely free of government interference while affording them access to the highest level policymakers. it was from bases in these institutions that intellectuals built policy careers. indeed, several of the most influential ideas of postwar american foreign-policy making were developed by intellectuals working within these institutions. we have game theory, first applied to questions of war systematically at the rand corporation starting around 1947-1940, modernization theory
for which m.i.t. was the hub. assuredtegy of mutually instruction, the idea of where to place our bases. all of these were developed at institutions like rand or m.i.t. center in various other organizations. taken together, these ideas reshape how academics and policy makers understood american foreign relations during the united states' rise to globalism in the 20th century's second-half. my book emerged from this central question. how and why did social scientists come to exert influence on u.s. foreign-policy during the cold war? i would like to answer this question by examining the influence of hans speier, a german exile from national socialism, one of the founders of the rand corporation, and a policymaker in the executive branch. represents speier the community of german foreign-policy experts that
during the cold war found themselves and institutions that had little accountability to the public and congress. he also served as a bridge connecting the german tradition with the american tradition of pragmatic intellectual engagement in political affairs. in particular, i would like to argue his career demonstrates two things. first, the transatlantic ideas about democracy, intellectual responsibility, and the public witharose in dialogue nazism's emergence are critical in understanding the rise of the defense intellectual and certain u.s. foreign policies. second, i believe examining his influence causes us to look at the cold war beginning in the 1930's. i argue many of the ideas of the cold war could be found in the
1930's as opposed to the 1940's. we could talk more about that in the question and answer session if people are interested. this research on speier contributes to the world literature in two distinct ways. this, like most of literature, it examines the united states' role in the world, the mistreating the ways in which american foreign policies affected the politics, societies, and cultures of people all over the globe. but second, and in my opinion unlike most of the literature, it shows how far in experiences how alves reshaped transatlantic generation of german and american intellectuals understood their own role in the united states which came to affect how the united states interacted in the world. my book emphasizes the importance of bidirectional flows to the history of u.s.
foreign affairs, contributing to a post-exceptional list understanding of american history. the remainder of my talk will be divided into three parts. the first part, the ideological origins of social science-based policymaking, examines the expenses that compelled a generation of exiled social scientists to leave the university to become part of the u.s. foreign-policy establishment. the second part, the rise of the defense intellectual, examines the contingencies that allowed exiles to occupy positions of foreign policy a 30. and finally, a third part demonstrates the influence exiles had on specific foreign policies, highlighting the importance of ideas and the policymaking process. to put the last point into context, many historians have argued intellectuals have provided little bit ad hoc justifications to already determined decisions.
what i would like to show here is that is not the case. intellectuals working on government contracts or institutions have a significant degree of intellectual freedom. now on to the first part of my ofk, the ideological origins policymaking. speier was born in berlin to lutheran parents. adolescent, he lined -- aligned with the newly established german state established in 1919. he believe marxist theory predicted germany's workers would normally align to engender a socialist transformation. after completing his phd in political economy in 1928, speier volunteered at several spd labor organizations and became a lecturer at the college
for politics. to teachingated german workers to operate in the new institutions. his experiences there were profoundly disillusioning for him. for example, while researching for a seminar on unemployment in 1932, the years the nazis continued to gain more popular support, he wrote that i saw many families that were noa zis today and became socialists. independent partly on chance -- it depended partly on chance and partly on where there was more beer. i determined there was not much difference between support for nazis and communists. worker supportd for extreme ist indicated
they were anti-political. when hitler came to power in 1933, speier attributed the nazis success to working-class support and rejected marxism and expressed to doubt that ordinary people would ever have the capacity to make wise political decisions. immigrated tor new york city with the aid of a prominent socialist economist who served as his advisor at the university of heidelberg. in new york, speier became the youngest founding member of the so-called university in exile at the new school for social research. you can see speier in the upper left. he is about 10 years younger than the next person closest and age. he was significantly younger. the university of exile saved over 180 european intellectuals .rom nazism
and was thus responsible for transforming american intellectual life. but in terms of his later influence on the cold war united importanteier: most intellectual move in the 1930's with his creation of a program of activist intellectual engagement. in the wake of his immigration, hader concluded why mark failed because intellectuals have participated too heavily in theoretical discussions divorced from practical concerns. while the left-wing debated marxism, he argued, the nazis did all they could to manipulate people to support their cause. in his 1937 essay, he rebuked his fellow immigrants. he took particular aim at the frankfurt school.
you may have heard people associated with that school. was this group with which -- at which he took particular aim. he criticized them for continuing to write in german in the united states and examining aesthetic theory instead of developing tools to destroy hitler. he argued they had the moral duty to do all they could to defeat the nazi's. in what specific ways should they contribute to nazism's demise? this was the central question he asked himself throughout the 1930's. for him, the collapse of the weimer republic exposed a weakness in democratic theory. namely, what do you do if ordinary vote for dictatorship? in asking this question, he inserted himself into an american debate that permeated
intellectual circles since the end of world war i. in the 1920's, a group of so-called democratic realists led by walter lippman asserted that the wartime expressed a mistreated new mass media techniques like propaganda had the capacity to easily manipulate the public. for this reason, he maintained ordinary people could not serve as the guys for decision-makers. instead, lippman argued policymakers, directed by a nonelected cohort of social scientists, must use tools like propaganda to manipulate the public to serve their own ends. against lippman, a group of so-called democratic optimists maintained that a democratic state relied on an informed public and that instead of manipulating voters, the elite must dedicate themselves to enlightening them. experiences
witnessing's workers supporting led him to embrace lippman's theory. conclusionniversal from a contingent historical experience. he said, ordinary people create the atmosphere in which trickeries prosper. it was important to recognize because in the coming war with statesrmany, the united and all democratic countries needed to adopt totalitarian methods of social control. if they did not, totalitarian states like nazi germany would have an advantage that would allow them to easily defeat democrats. for this reason, speier asserted propaganda cannot remain an exclusive concern of
dictatorships. that is to say that the united states needed to use propaganda which speier in german and american liberals understood to be an anti-democratic tool to manipulate the public to serve the greater end of defeating the nazis. throughout his writing, he maintained propaganda would not need to be used permanently. for example, he argued democratic propaganda, unlike totalitarian propaganda, this not aim and subjugating the individual and controlling them permanently. while he further stated that democracies would be forced to use propaganda in the 1930's and 1940's, but must do so only for a time during the world's greatest crisis. these phrases indicated speier found it acceptable only in certain moments of crisis to use antidemocratic methods.
in normal political times, he affirmed, the use of such anti-democratic tools like propaganda was unnecessary and in fact immoral. speier and exiles became prominent or comments of lippman's position. over the 1930's, american intellectuals, intrigued by the influx of european scholars, regularly invited speier and others to lecture at their universities. it was through these lectures and their writings that speier and his cohort presented themselves of the literal embodiments of what happened when democrats did not confront totalitarians on their own terms. the exiles helped convince a generation of social scientists of the need to adopt anti-democratic tools in moments of international crisis and used the research skills in the
service of the american state. this was the consensus position endorsed by both german and american liberals on the eve of world war ii. now, let's turn to the second part of my talk, the rise of the defense intellectual. after world war ii erupted in the, speier was convinced united states would soon enter the conflict. as a devoted democrat committed to the idea that exiled i intellectuals must contribute to fascism's defeat, he set about making himself useful to u.s. policymakers. initiated a research project on totalitarian communication funded by the rockefeller foundation. between 1940 and 1943, speier and those who worked under him developed methods of top again to content analysis -- propaganda content analysis. nazi propaganda, he
argued, one could predict nazi strategy. he also envisioned his research project is a contribution of science to defense which you can is the entrance of social scientists into the establishment. he acted as an intellectual entrepreneur, sending the reports to the foreign broadcast intelligence service which was in charge of analyzing all enemy propaganda sent to the united states. after the u.s. entered the war in 1941, they quickly invited speier to become head of the division that analyzed all nazi propaganda. speier moved to washington or he worked at the fbis until 1944 when he moved to the office of war information. he became a policy maker writing all of the directives that guided all propaganda after the
d-day invasion. what you have is a german exile becoming kind of the american joseph goebbels, guiding the propaganda sent back to his country of origin. you can see the importance of the bidirectional flows i was talking about in the introduction to u.s. foreign policy. orortunately, the scope -- perhaps fortunately, the scope of his wartime work remains outside the boundaries of this talk. what is important to note is speier's enter into government service reflected a broader trend in which thousands of social scientists joined the world war ii government. the expense of academics in the war administration laid the foundations of the postwar military intellectual complex which i mentioned at the beginning. institutionally, world war ii
legitimated research organizations. the idea was you could have intellectual freedom while still working on government contracts or directly for the government. socially, the personal relationships formed during the war proved crucial to the makeup of postwar groups like the rand corporation. when speier became head of the rand social science division, invited wartime colleagues -- invited wartime colleagues to join him at rand. intellectually, the war led academics to believe it could be used to change the world on a large scale and there was a place for them in the american foreign-policy establishment. the war also convinced policymakers themselves that they could use social science for their own ends. on a variety of levels, the world war ii experience helped transform the production and coproduction of u.s. foreign-policy and social science. so much so that i think it is fair to refer to it as a social
scientist's war. government and military officials were so impressed with the contributions intellectuals made during the war that they became concerned the cessation of hostilities would lead them to lose the bring power that migrated to washington. officers in the then officers n army-air forces with the douglas corporation founded the rand corporation which is short for research and development and was intended to bring intellectual'' research to policymakers' attention. in 1947, rand's leaders held a conference to recruit. they invited the nation's most prominent social scientists. you can see other examples of people invited to the conference on the screen. during the conference, rand's leaders were impressed with speier's ability to bring
theoretical concerns to bear on practical problems. they asked him to become the founding head of the social science division. .peier accepted many, including speier, were no longer satisfied with purely academic pursuits as the war had given them a taste of power and influence. however, they also did not want to remain in the government itself because they were frustrated with the bureaucratic squabbles that characterized government service. speier and others like him were attracted to interstitial organizations like rand which provided them with opportunities to effect -- affect real-world qualities -- policies while avoiding government employment. speier retained a marked ambivalence toward the emerging cold war. similar to many of his intellectual generation, speier
analogized nazi germany and the soviet union as totalitarian regimes. nevertheless, speier did not believe stalin was as dangerous a threat to democracy as hitler had been until the soviet detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1949. when the soviets detonated their atomic bomb, speier diagnosed an international crisis similar to the one he identified in the 1930's. became as dangerous a threat to humanity as hitler had been. before the detonation, speier argued speier the united states and soviet union should try to reach an agreement to end their enmity. after that, he framed the rivalry is a never-ending existential struggle. as he said in november of 1949, soon after americans learned about the soviet bomb, recent events indicated that as in the
1930's, peace and western civilization are in jeopardy. deep fear of soviet nuclear capabilities led him to return to the central problem he confronted in the 1930's. namely, what do you do if ordinary people support actions that threaten democracy? for example, what should you do if americans the cold war? in the new nuclear error of international politics, decision could not afford to be guided by in a great public unable to understand the complexities of geopolitics. as he declared in 1950, and this quote is very similar to things walter whitman -- whitman had , the complex structure of world politics in which the individual citizen finds himself involved, often beyond his understanding, in macy eights the effect of function of public opinion of foreign policy.
the 1930's, he had argued democratic governments misuse propaganda to manipulate ordinary people but his wartime experience demonstrated to him that propaganda was not a particularly effective tool when he was directed against rod, undifferentiated masses. he therefore sought a permanent solution to the problem of a look opinion. the 1950's, he dedicated himself to building policy oriented research institutions intended to be free of public meddling. he believed these institutions violated the democratic norms of clinical life but argued that the international crisis justified, as it did in the 1930's, the use of antidemocratic methods. unlike in the 1930's, he no longer use qualifiers to limit the amount of time in which it was except for for democratic governance to use them at --
antidemocratic methods. in the era of the cold war, forh he believes would last decades, previously restricted while object of crisis became permanent. forever acceptable to use antidemocratic methods to defeat the soviets. the first he helped to develop was a corporation where he directed the social science organization that you can see a picture in the upper left. that is actually the first building before the one that exists in santa monica for those who have in there now. this building was destroyed. research overseeing and produced resulted in a number of important ideas, perhaps most famously william kaufmann'counterforce nuclear strategy which rejected the notion of massive retaliation in favor of a series of graduate -- gradual responses. speier further leu's his connections to become a consultant for the foundation whose prominent administrator
was the president of the board of trustees. you can see foreign policy. the ford foundation funded mit's center for international studies, which became the center for modification theory in the 1950's. the center for advanced study in behavioral sciences, and number of the most important projects in political science such as the establishment of comparative politics in the field, were undertaken. each of these institutions was designed to allow social scientists -- to bring research without public interference. fromcompletely removed it public policy and moreover, they continue to provide institutional homes to intellectuals who desire to use it -- research to affect policymaking. they made the rise of the intellectual possible.
let's turn to the third and final part of my talk in the ideas of foreign policy. spire had a direct impact on several u.s. foreign policies. his influence reveals the important roles shaping american foreign relations. in 1950, state department -- aials invited him to group of intellectuals. by this time, one of the most prominent lecturers in international warfare became the primary author of the section on anti-soviet psychological strategy. strategist and psychological into twoere divided broad groups. harry truman advocated a strategy, messages to overthrow leaders. on the other side, they maintained psychological warfare
-- ability to govern. it was through participation in troy that spire brought his theory of psychological warfare to bear on psychological strategy. two german exiles, pollack was associated with the school i've mentioned earlier. argued the soviet union was a society in which only political union elites and the ordinary people had the capacity to make consequential decisions. spire inserted into the true report which declared that control of the power of the sodium union, a little group of soviet leaders, and for this reason, american psychological warfare must disrupt networks of trust that enable soviet elite to function.
the joint report became the 31, the official strategy paper guiding anti-soviet psychological warfare. indeed, it endorsed all of .pires arguments first that the soviet union was a regime run by elites, and second that creating mistrust --ld in the early 1950's, and number of government programs, most loadable -- were paid to ideas developed in spire's section of the report. the talk by to end discussing one of the broader implications of intellectual development and career. first, to repeat my major the transatlantic ideas about democracy, intellectual, and responsibility in the public that rose in dialogue with nazi-ism's emergence, are crucial to understanding the military intellectual complex, the rise of the defense intellectual, and certain u.s. foreign policies.
what i hope to have demonstrated here is that his story suggests that many of the logix are not but theo the 1940's 1930's. at a broader level, the spireutional network that -- speier -- to move from the university and into the government, becoming important foreign-policy makers in their own right. institutionsof actually helped diversify the american foreign-policy establishment versus the majority of the state department for example, or of a particular ethnic or relation -- religious background. it was through these wereizations that jews
able to make their way in the foreign-policy establishment versus a couple or people are women like an brief slaughter and condoleezza rice, and african-american lit condoleezza rice, were able to make their way into foreign-policy establishment. weretutions like these reflections of the meritocracy. to bring to positions of authority. -- ideastory flow between governmental, nongovernmental, and semi government -- governmental -- to privateresource institutions. in all of these institutional spaces, research is often classified and not open to public certainty. a number of national security ideas, for example the doctrine of counterinsurgency, emerged from institutions before
migrating to the government. furthermore, speier's justification for use of antidemocratic methods signified a broader shift in u.s. national security culture in which the appeal to crisis became a means thehich elites vindicated use of methods they themselves understood to be antidemocratic. policy elites justified the support of oppressed governments with international struggle between western civilization and communism. even after the cold war, it continues to inform international security culture, most fans of the debate of international security agencies surveillance. statement by the former head of the nsa in october 2013 regarding domestic spying. alexander says, we are holding hornets nest of surveillance technologies. we would like to cast aside.
if we do, it is our fear that there will be a gap and the potential for another 9/11. here, alexander record sizes that surveillance technologies are dangerous. hence the term hornets nest, but he asserts they must be used to prevent another 9/11. similar to his justifications for propaganda and the institutions of the military intellectual complex, alexander invoked the war on terror to justify behavior that exists outside the boundaries of traditional democratic norms. finally, in many ways, our national security culture remains organized on the notion of united dates is and will forever be engaged in a war against existential enemies. attacks, this has been primarily reflected in the equation of radical islam with nazi-ism. woodward's's recent book about the donald j. trump administration, senator lindsey
graham is reported to have encouraged from to increase troop levels in afghanistan by specific analogizing radical islam with nancy germany. in lindsey graham passes opinion, the fight against the taliban was just like a fight against the nazis and therefore they needed to do whatever is was necessary to defeat the radical enemies. this view of international relations has led the united states to prosecute a permanent war that has little benefit and shows no signs of abating. andinfluence of speier these intellectuals endure. what they created and the culture they produce continue to structure how americans make foreign policy. the scum of the republic is not merely history. its memory shapes the united states interacting -- interaction with the world. it is pertinent to examine how on why exiles promoted and institutionalize an approach to foreign policymaking. wewe ignore the influence,
cannot understand why americans make foreign policy the way we do. moreover, the arguments about the need to circumvent democratic norms to the democracy foreshadow those made by decision-makers today. assumeand his colleagues with the soviet union's's defeat, the united nations would naturally reassert its democratic positions. era,he post-cold war defined by a war on terror that policy elites have used to justify the patriot act, torture, and executives still list, massive surveillance, and many german strikes, custom strata that appeal to crisis remain an effective means for power holders to increase authority. my research underscores the of justifying antidemocratic behavior appeared democratic freedoms, while easily suspended, even with the best and most noble attempt -- intentions, are less easily recovered. thank you. >> thank you. [applause]
there is a lot here to digest and a lot to do -- to be discussed. let me perhaps start out at the home of the cultural international history project to talk at the outset about some of your sources. what kinds of materials have you looked at an archived documents informed the book here is secondly, since you like to further the understanding of the post exceptional's understanding is thisforeign policy, a peculiarly american phenomenon? how does it compare internationally? >> thank you. it is act poll that you are asking this question because the fifth chapter of my book relies extensively on the documents christian himself has unearthed
in the various archives throughout the country. in that case, i used government documents by the cia. cia documents, state department documents, psychological strategy documents, i'm fairly traditional in that sense. what i wanted to add was using a true intellectual history source document, essays and letters to individuals discussing various and thef interest, responsibility in the intellectuals, documents from so, close document face on the united states like traditional ones i mentioned because i like to think myself -- -- what i like to think of myself as did -- foreign relations has traditionally been defined by what i like to turn ideological history, the history of ideology , u.s. foreign policy.
most recently in the work of two wonderful chapters on ideology. i think this is a useful , and intellectual history from 40,000 feet. transistor of ideologies, like race, something along those lines, liberty, that is all true. i think it is useful -- we are examining ideas in specificity and seeing what that approach to bring to the study of u.s. foreign relations. that is what i tried to do here. the united states is seen not only as the world's greatest nation, not much history is written from that perspective these days, but really, it is embedded in global processes and events. i wanted to demonstrate how
experiencea european , the resident there, became so important for american thinkers. one venue for that were the exiles. i would like to emphasize it is not the only venue. , had theeorge cannon experience with the rise of nazis. some at marcy, a young girl in the early 1930's, also had this experience with the nazi-ism arise -- rise. see this competition with nazism informed how americans themselves both through the exiles and also independently, understood their own role in the world. it is striking. but to me, it is striking that the two most important metaphors of american politics, comparing everything to history at -- to hitler's and appeasement, experiences in which americans have little say or impact. you can see how the united states is growing -- drawing on global metaphors and analyses --
analogies to understand his role in the world. >> thank you. .. to ask two related questions. that come from the end of your book. i think on your third to last page, you invoke mills and his critique of intellectuals who serve government and power. basically, he excoriates them and says they can't live up to the job description because they are serving power and not critiquing it. i want to put that aside and say makerelated way, one could the case that by cutting themselves off with classified research and talking to themselves, they also impoverish their own intellectual work. thecould make a case that insurgencyn and
doctrine, game. , modernization theory, and area studies, hasn't exactly withstood the test of time. even at the moment in which they were developing and implementing these, you know, one could make a case for it somewhat being back left intellectually. and this connecting part on your last page, you talk about accountability. disparage secrecy and make a case that those intellectuals who participated in or were responsible for what you call ruinous policies, keep them from securing in or comfortable or lucrative government, nongovernmental, or private positions. there are consequences for but wouldn'tgs up, applying that actually wipe out the employment of most of the people or many of the people that you are writing about here?
those who continue to encounter insurgency theory or modernization theory or who helped to underwrite the intellectual justifications for the vietnam war, one could make a case that those were ruinous policies. >> a fantastic question. answer i would like to by first stating i believe expertise is important and one knowledge in the search for truth is vilified, that is generally a negative thing and that knowing more about a subject is a good thing. who wrote anrian, excellent book called blind oracle on this subject, had a line where he means expertise as a means to guide affairs, we leave decisions to habit of authority and chance. i do not think we should leave decisions to habit, authority, or chance. i do believe expertise p how heldone develop a -- accountable for port vice and poor thinking.
i think there are two answers. an institutional answer which i think is less powerful in the second answer, the cultural answer. if you contribute to the iraq war, you should not become the head of the bank and then go to jeb bush's foreign policy. profound lack of consequences and i do not see expertiseem x -- of could function when it happens. you have things along those lines. more portly's to have a culture of solution where people who exist in the foreign-policy establishment, but really associate with institutions like television stations like cnn or nbc, shouldn't invite people who constantly make terrible choices , as foreign-policy experts. there needs to be some sort of cultural accountability to the system otherwise, the system will not change. it is very difficult. expire assume the experts would naturally police themselves.
movewere closest, you between various institutions in and out of government. it prevents expertise from functioning independently. to take on mills critique, i disagree with mills. my major criticism with a generation of intellectuals, perhaps in the essay the responsibility of the intellectuals, we essentially adopted a perspective and argue that intellectuals must always critique and can never associate with the state or state bodies because it is profamily and feeling -- and intellectual. there is no platonic form of what it means to be an intellectual p changes over time. i do nothing one could ever make an appeal to authority in that regard. second and most important, if you grow agree with chauncey or mills on particular policy -- perspectives, what have you done by removing yourself entirely? i think that is the new york times op-ed, i made that
critique of the american left, the rising democratic-socialist and with bernie sanders potassium cortez, -- alexandra tassimo cortez, they have nothing left to draw from. pull -- the full policy does not offer a positive vision of where to go going forward. cannot bee intellectual and work for a , but or foreign power there's a lot of pitfalls of how one must be aware. >> thank you. tutees his speaker history out of him. >> wait for the microphone. >> yes. and please introduce yourself for our audience here and on c-span. >> johnson wilson center.
relevant to my comment, veteran of social science division of the corporation and one of the u.s. foreign information programs. i am puzzled. perhaps you can help me the terminology of antidemocratic methods in the service of democracy, i heard two examples, one propaganda, always a loaded world -- word that needs to be defined. wondering, and no doubt you have this in the book, what did -- onpier understood -- hans speier
understand and is a think tank was antidemocratic in the way you cite, what would be the democratic think tank response to democracy? one that does what? side, he rather early got through the push principle, anything research, notract true of many other organizations. the use of antidemocratic in this particular context. thank you. >> thank you. those are two a good and important questions. does spier think about propaganda question mark anything that was not inviting debate and rational inquiry, anything supposed to for someone by appealing to their motions --
emotions. it emerges from the dissertation essentially. it wasn't intended to have to invite discussion. the p rent to their motions without rational inquiry, he understood propaganda to be that. in terms of democracy, i think this relates to the rise of procedural democracy, the deal of the 1930's in the 1940's. it meant a lot of things beyond voting. it meant economic democracy, cultural democracy, social democracy in a real sense not a political democracy defined primarily as the act of voting essentially determine which elite governs you. the creation of these institutions relate to the emergence of procedural democracy were voting becomes the center of the democratic experience in a real way.
i do not in any way mean to vilify rant. i think they did a lot of good work exposing or basically publishing contact research. that isn't classified and we can talk about the importance of what isn't classified. i go most everyone agrees there is overclassification and has been for decades, national security information. you have a culture of secrecy. there are problematic in the question is what would the democratic think tank look like? in 1942, i think it is, they release a big statement proposing 10 different options for what the united states could do in the world peace they weren't just proposing one simple solution. the what they were actually doing was inviting democratic debate in a real way by proposing a bunch of alternative solutions that could presumably
then examine, discuss, think about, and determine here that is one mechanism, not preventing conclusions, but essentially presenting them in ways that it -- that invite debate. another way to interact with these town hall forms is to actually argue against this and promote transparency and various ways. if they got together and say we think the government is over classifying information, we could do a lot of good in the world by getting rid of secrecy and promoting transparency. i do not have all of the solutions that could make the system more democratic. i believe in expertise and i believe the foreign-policy establishment and the public, there are significant gaps between the two. somewhat uncontroversial he expressed in the fact, who invade against the american foreign-policy establishment.
i think people do not trust the experts. they have messed up again and again since the beginning of the cold war. the problem is i believe in knowledge. but the experts have proven not to always get things right. , we have all fallen and we will never get things right, not to use a religious metaphor from a religion that is not my own but i think it is important to recognize the experts do not always get it right and the people do not always get it right but we need to bring them together in meaningful ways in a democracy. >> thank you. >> i am also a veteran of the social science department and also spent five years at m.i.t. and international studies. i wanted to ask you about spier's views of ideology. he talked about two different views of power in the soviet union.
about the think ideology, he very big issue in those days. remember when i started i worked a little bit with nathan, and he was, he loved operational cold -- code stuff. so, and other people thought it was just nonsense. think aboutou ideology? >> it is a great question, easy to answer. he was karl mannheim's graduate student. sociologists, he linked ideology to one's particular position within the social order and like his advisor, i talk about this in the book, he argued intellectuals were uniquely able to be above ideology and uniquely evil to his social
position and they used pseudo-marxist terms. one of the reasons they were perfectly situated to give good advice is because they were not hammered by social position in the class structure. they were able to literally rise above it and see everything a man provide good advice. >> thank you. >> it seems to me there is another way of telling the story you tell and an older tradition of antidemocratic foreign-policy, rooted in the european tradition that foreign-policy is it -- inherently in the lead activity. given the fact that you are a group of exiles from europe, i'm wondering to the older tradition
may have informed and shaped their views and to turn it around given the fact that they responded to your argument, to the domestic crisis in democracy, in germany, and increased doubts about it, to what degree do they in the united states talk about the limits of democracy, not just in terms of foreign-policy but in terms of domestic affairs? to any of them in fact address for elite the need activities within the domestic realm? >> is are two great question spear to take the first one, this is a generation that debt created the tradition you are referring to. work, they at this turn the machiavelli pavilion in twin realist. hertz,ns morgan, john and spier, are basically developing international relations in the late 1940's and early 19th to's, they
historically construct a tradition in which they nominate themselves the heirs. though we have viewed this through this lens, historically, i think this situation is a bit more complicated. a great article about how he made a realist and created this tradition about power politics. i think that tradition is not reflective of historical reality but is created by the people who have become the founders, particularly is popular -- i would say in regards the first question, and the reminder with the second question was? to mystic, right. tradition, german theyar in the 1920's, focused exclusively on foreign-policy and domestically, many, not all of them, identified as social democrats
and thought domestic politics would have to be different than foreign-policy. that you could have a basically pseudo-aristocratic governing paired he see that in hans where he refers to 18th-century aristocratic diplomacy is the best positive model for american foreign relations and doesn't really make the argument in relation to domestic politics in any meaningful loop -- meaningful way. spier has a quote where he says after 1933, struggle of the age transformed. it was no longer essentially between communists and capitalism but between terror and democracy are for them, this was primarily an international struggle from questions of political economy. important but secondary. >> thank you. first, p or. you --
up here. thank you. talk about experts making policy. isn't that sort of the equivalent to having witnesses determining guilt and innocence and trial posted providing knowledge to which could then take all of this knowledge and come up with a reasonable policy as a result? spier'swo, you know if views changed as he got older? did he publish anything in the 1980's or so? daniel: in regards to the first question, i am not quite sure what the question is. >> it seems you are advocating experts making policy. i'm questioning whether that is a good idea. >> i am not quite advocating that. think there is a role for
expertise in a democracy to we can talk about the mechanisms of that. what was ituestion, again? always -- he compares vietnam war protesters to the nazis. think it made him skeptical for the remainder of his life. fundament of you remained relatively stable even the particular relations with the soviet union waxed and waned over time. >> thank you. all the way in the back. >> hello. david, princeton university. spier made,what building on your comments now, but domestic politics and vietnam war protesters, what he made of joseph mccarthy -- mccarthy and the second round scare after world war ii and the united states to mystic a.
it leads me to a broader question. i understand he was a social democrat and a marxist. it was highlighted very well in the talk to the distinction between fascism and, as in, which i think is common among intellectuals at the time, collapsed into totalitarianism, peopler, did he or other , make decisions between the right and the left in the united states? , butunds perhaps he didn't i do not know if you could talk more about that. >> absolutely appeared in relation to mccarthy, he is unmentioned in the early documents from the 1950's. they refer to him as a reactionary essentially doing things outside traditions of democratic norms.
they all wanted to avoid it because they were foreign-born and were socialist and communist. something they do not talk about except to expect -- disparage him as an example of american immigrants. they think they truly understand politics in a way americans don't and mccarthy is a reflection of western ignorance, effectively. ofterms of the conflation nazis and soviet communism, in -- conflate them early in the career. the stability really characterizes this generation in the 1940's in 1950's, where the orderthing was ensuring in the united states. they are always sympathetic broadly speaking to social democracy. it doesn't really have a base in the united states particularly
in the 1940's on the 1950's. they are critical of soviet monism -- come is a. communists in germany were antidemocrat. vanguard-ists on one hand and a revolutionary on the other hand and did not believe in democracy. is a focus on tamoxifen really leads to an interest and stability that becomes part of cold war the 1950's and 1960's. >>, me. noting thathelp but historians are conspicuously lacking from all this. what is going on? [laughter] daniel: i have noticed this as well. major historians, the head of rants watched in office, the only one who was there. it is difficult for me to determine exactly why this was
to the social science division was incredibly historically focused. they were anti-quantitative. randy is the most famous applying game theory but the social science division was much more getting into the details and contingent -- contingencies of the situation. two to the degree that there was a lot of -- a contribution of the political military game for simulation which many of you might have played at the department of defense, that was brought to the dod so very historically informed but i think a lot of historians have returned to the academy. most were americans. you have a part of the military forrnment, it seems whatever reason, social scientists are more interested in using their knowledge and research skills in the service of the american state. on, -- generally
speaking, my sense of the last 70 or so years of discussions and collaborations in the academy and the government, historians have basically taken a backseat it seems, broadly speaking. collects a student from george washington university history department, my first question is related to the last question. indeed, the main expertise engage with national security foreign-policy and political science departments, while in the history department, it is much less expertise. why do you think that is the case? theou think use of is onelogical methods reason that buried the public from getting to the expertise? to the contribute
democratic characteristic you are talking about? >> the second question, this very common perception about the american public buses ignorance of foreign-policy. we can see people referring to asking someone, midwest americans, nothing about asia, where is asia even, if that is true, if so, what is the impact on american foreign policy. and the intellectuals in making -- role in making that foreign-policy? people actually used particularly in the social science division were not particularly sophisticated. figure think it would be possible for ordinary people to understand, like if you read they've's the operational code, it is a document anyone could understand. i do not think that specifically led to the break between the public in the expert.
polly syverson's history at think is a question of who goes into which disciplines and why. the 1960's, there was a sense if you want to work for a government or a think tank, political science was a more fertile field to do so than history. that is related to personal choice. the question of whether the u.s. public is ignorant, in the early public, you get inspiration about the ignorance of the u.s. public, which i think helps leads -- helps to lead to a consensus. book, thomas writes a book, walter lippman writes two books. there is a consensus created in the foreign-policy establishment that you can never listen to the public that remains relatively coherent. it is a little bit of a chicken or in a question. knowledgeable of foreign affairs because they have been disconnected from the
because they have no interest and should be disconnected from the elite? i may be a bigot -- a bit of an optimist. i think the role is to help educate and enlighten people and get them interested and make them have stakes in the larger process which would hopefully lead to broader participation in political life. it is true the public, whether you like it or not, that it has they should be aware of the project and their participation in it as good democratic citizens. the way to do that would be, in my own experience growing up in homages glenn high school, i let the american presence abroad and theenormous amount of bases united states has had since early cold war. public education prospects are important and
something intellectuals could do concretely to help american citizens become aware of the position they occupy in the world and hopefully become more interested in managing the system they implicitly govern. >> thank you. anyone else? i am sorry. yes. >> thank you for the talk. martin collins from the smithsonian institution. an important context for rand's creation was the perception of the role of science and technology and life after world war ii. there was a fundamental deep dynamic of scientific and technical innovation that would totally affect the physical or going forward. they have completely emerged in and this trajectory certainly through the 1950's in 1960's anyway, and iran poses
andership during this time, led by an engineer, and engineer associates. ofhink there is a kind rotter context here in which one might kind of characterize his back not only that dates to the 1930's but the fundamental position of the united states after world war ii. >> that is right. martin collins wrote the book on the early years of rand p or i will not disagree with the comment. i do think it is less relevant to the social sciences division, which is cautiously not killing with nuclear weapons most the time and with strategic air command. they are much more focused on limited war and problem -- problems of psychological warfare in the decades of rand's existence here a hike is less relevant to this story. that is essential component of the next book and it has to be. himself wasesident
an engineer/donald douglas's assistant in the 1930's. the role of managing technology and weapons, were essential as a project. think it would be fair to say, what i tried to do was to tell another story in this type of institution at this moment. it is in some real sense about managing public and democracy. >> thank you p or do yes? >> ukrainian catholic university and project of the columbia university and the russian
institute. couldwondering if you relevant onent even the relation on german immigration with the various , and especially with eastern europeans who generally are german educated or at least under german influence, and whether this has any relevance in the 1960's in columbia, the prominent historians and to a lesser extent, political science and history as a means fastening public policy, it
and robinson. >> yes. james robinson. i think it is right. the sad fact is all of the archives from this institute,, they have been lost. it has been a lot more research done on the russian center of harvard. -- big book of russian studies had a section about how the archives on available. it is difficult to know. i have no doubt peter had some interest in influence and policy but my sense from a dissertation that is being written by a student in the netherlands is that they were much more on the particular policy. influenced --o is his first major -- major book in 1955 on totalitarianism. germans, very similar in
their relation between the german jews who came in the , provide a9 century lot of sense and culture that to,r scholars reacted people operating within a world shaped by the germans in the 1930's and the 1940's. there are directly related in the same process of meritocracy, leading part of the establishment into the establishment and railways and pre-knowledge to bear on u.s. foreign relations. >> could i get another question and ask you to elaborate a bit on speier's work on and usegical warfare the example of each germany in 1953. it is a moment in which he to inspireis efforts the masses to rise up. eisenhower is not interested in
pursuing this, then he focuses on what you call the elite strategy. did he turn his ire on eisenhower? for letting him and presumably east germans down in this critical moment? how did he handle that political decision? to what extent would you say his subsequent efforts for sing on elites, proved to be successful? >> sure. basically, speier had two different ideas of psychological warfare can the soviet union that i talk about in the talk, based on a theory of elites that goes back to alfredo and the early night -- 20 -- 20th-century, the tradition about societies run by elites, this was brought into totalitarianism in the 1930's. some point at believes that wentz -- totalitarian societies were in
transition, there was a space for mass resistance to the developing totalitarian regime. in the early 1950's, documents uncovered by christian here, which i relied on in my book, in the state1950's, department to east germany to see what the psychological situation is on the ground, he decides a lot of east germans are not particularly happy with the governing party in the iniet union and he argues the report and psychological warfare in germany, that the united states could stir up mass rebellion. it is interesting to see here that he did not have just one theory of psychological warfare, but that it was profoundly historical and contingent on the examination and the situation happening. this report becomes the basis at least partially for the left -- the psychological strategy with regard to what they should do in
east germany. and the newly released documents demonstrate that beginning at least in january of 1953 and going until the rebellion in june, there was a psychological campaign prosecuted by the united states cia document, still under lock and key but we have enough to in east germany and soviet backers, undertaken by the united states. causes thatlot of help contribute to what to place in mid-june. ruskin --result in and lasts until june 21, eisenhower views is to arm the rebels and they are crushed by soviet-backed army. after this, the united states in east germany it didn't -- abandons the rollback policy and , or a veryis
attractive west germany would eventually bring the east to the western side, and the effective rollback ends. -- a talk ata tap the american political science association after the rebellion and says we should give up on the rollback and we should not arm people. but is interesting to me is speier in this sense starts to be a less of an effective entrepreneurial -- much better than earlier. he begins his career as a psychological warfare expert. by the end of 1950's, he is an expert on development of the cold war is switching from a center in europe and what was called the third world pit you had to adapt if you wanted to remain relevant in the halls of power. from -- to writing the passage of society, one of the first books of modernization
theory. speier seems to be much less adaptable and never becomes the expert on development or on the third world. he remains an expert in european politics, which becomes increasingly less relevant to in the course of the 50's on the 60's in the early 1960's. it is important to note the importance of intellectual entrepreneurship. we saw that a bunch of people trained as soviet study experts trained in their fields. , is long, and9/11 terrorism, it is a common pattern we see where people rebrand their expertise to remain relevant in washington. speier for a righty of personal and institutional reasons, was not really able to do so. >> thank you. >> my name is heather, and i had been thinking a bit about the, you made on the responsibility
of leaders and the intellectuals to educate when it comes to foreign policy. in particular, i'm curious about that these explanations might go or how policymakers and intellectuals can discuss foreign policy with the general public in a way that is not propaganda itself, not just appealing to our need for national security. >> it is a great point. , lease a lot more information so people have a better sense of what the country is doing in the world. a foundational principle going forward for every government agency in washington and elsewhere. that would be step one. and then i think it will be a trial and error process where you try different things and see what does and does not work. every american, of course, should not have to involve themselves in foreign policy affair not interested.
something tells me they would be enough members of the attentive public who want to involve themselves and want to be represented in the halls of power when the united states is making decisions about what it does and does not do abroad. related of course to the problem of the all volunteer force and certain segments of american society now fight these wars and the increasing privatization of war also, i think we might want to reconsider fundamental principles like we all volunteer force or do we want to have effectively a participation in foreign policy in a real way, and i think it is up to, and is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and avoid lies. but also to educate the public in a real way and engage them as professional teachers, which we do in university settings, but also public setting -- settings like this one, c-span or whatever the case may be.
i think it is important, and my generation of historians in particular have taken a more active role partially due to the fact that there is no academic job market that exists any longer appear people need to do something else with their skills. i think you will see a political economy, the fact that academic leader has been totally adjunct, and the destruction of the tenure-track lead to a lot more efforts by historians. it is not for nothing that a lot of young historians are energy -- editors of major magazines. lot think you will see a more engagement with the public on forward a most naturally. to make it more strategic think would only benefit most americans. i think textbooks are a critical intellectuals could work to help americans better understand their place in the world. , a provocative
and important outcome we will draw this seminar to a close. onemind you that next week november 5, josh will be speaking on his new book, bohemia, the history of the factory and the making of the modern world. thank you for joining us an elevated thank americane watching history tv, 40 eight hours of american history programming every weekend on c-span3. follow us on twitter for information on our schedule.
next on "reel america, the president january 1969." this is the final film in a monthly series to document the activities of president lyndon b. johnson between 1964 and 1969. in this 54-minute program, lbj reflects on his time in office in speeches, ceremonies and events. he honors the apollo eight astronauts, dedicates a museum of art. awards several medals of honor, holds his final cabinet meeting, delivers state-of-the-union address and witnesses the inauguration of richard nixon. the film also covers the first lady including a speech on her conservation and beautification efforts. [background noises] ♪