the national governors association is holding its annual winter meeting this weekend in washington. c-span will be live on saturday beginning at 9:15 regarding the future. and is followed by discussion on criminal justice reform. we will also hear from the j.p. morgan chairman. up next on c-span three a conversation with pentagon officials on the 2019 missile defense review. from the center for strategic and international daddies this is about 90 minutes. thanks to everyone for coming today, we are excited to be her and talk about the new review. were glad it's out and we're having a national conversation that we need to have about these issues and how to adapt in our error of missile defense

posture to the strategic environment described the strategy. i might ask the people in the back to turn down the block volume i heard a little echo on my mike if you would, thank you very much. so also just before we begin i always have to say just in case we have a reason that we have to depart the building, look to me, i'll give you directions down the stairs, out the back. we don't expect any such problems but please do look to me in case we need to depart. so first of all i want to welcome my good friend david trachtenberg who since october 2017 has been the deputy undersecretary of policy he has got more than 35 years of public policy experience in the private sector in the executive and legislative branches, he served for instance from 2001- 2003 for the decking deputy of security policy. both jobs at the same time,

that's pretty good. >> he has headed numerous interagency groups and was previously a professional staff member with house and secure decembers also i want to welcome back to csis samuel greaves, who is listed with the department of defense. he was director of strategic defense command, deputy director and as commander of space, for the system set up for air force space command. so i'm going to jump right into a comment i think i'm going to turn to mr. trachtenberg for couple of questions. first and to just get started and situate this review, what's the big new idea, what's the big idea and, it's logic, especially with respect to the national defense strategy that

is going on. >> sure, tom let me to start by thanking you and csis for the invitation to come here and have a conversation about this issue today. it's always a pleasure to be here with general greaves as well. so my sincere appreciation to folks and i appreciate everybody coming out under the circumstances on a very snowy day here in the nation's capital. so thank you for coming to this conversation. in terms of big ideas, there are probably several, let me to say that i think what we have done in this missile defense review is essentially revitalized and re-energize our missile defense posture and our programs. and our activities. and what i mean by that basically is that we have sort of taken a holistic view. it's been a good what, nine years almost since the last ballistic missile defense review came out.

and missile defense if you drop the word ballistic from it because we are now recognizing that the nature of missile threats to both the united states homeland as well as to friends and allies abroad go just beyond ballistic missiles. and so very involved cruise missiles, cyber hypersonic missiles, missiles that are soft faster and more difficult to track and defend against so the big message here is that we are going to do a number of things, we are going to build on our existing missile capabilities but we are also going to explore advanced technologies to move forward with things that will help us defeat missile challenges from wherever they arise. as best technology will allow us to do. so, for any number of reasons, this is a more expansive and necessary look at in some cases

relook at some of the capabilities that we think are important to defend the nation. >> thank you, let me follow up on that. you emphasize the spectrum, of not just ballistics but of everything else. i wonder if you could talk a little bit about, not really be first type of missiles, but how this diversity is being used in concert. in other words, how they are being woven into and integrated in the to the overall abilities of our adversaries and the mixing and matching of these things?? how this has changed, tom certainly in the last decade or so, just in terms of the sort of threat picture that's out there. there are now over 20 states that possess opens of missile capabilities. and what we are seeing is we are seeing other countries approach their offensive developments from an integrated, as you sit from an an integrated perspective. they are leaving their various

capabilities into ways to deny us access to certain areas where we believe are in our national interest where we need to be. our missile defense approaches reflected in the mdr that we released last month. basically it says for the defense of perspective, we need to take an integrated approach as well. i prefer to call it the holistic approach. so we are confronted with ballistic defense and glide missiles and approach. we need active defenses with passive defenses and with attack operations as well. into one sort of holistic package where we can provide the best defense for the nation and the best defense of our friends and allies abroad.? let me follow up one more kind of big question and that is just explained to us the

strategic logic by which active defenses generally, how do they contribute to our overall goals? always because there can be finite, there can be limited. sometimes you hear you built 10 interceptors with 11 strike capabilities. how is this strategic logic? >> everything we do has limits on it. we don't have unlimited resources for everything. but when we are talking about deterrence which is really the nature of the game here, we have to start with a fundamental understanding what it is we're trying to do. when we talk about deterrence we are trying to repent and adversary or potential adversary from taking an aggressive or hostile action against us or our allies that we don't want them to take. how does missile defense factor into that? missile defense factors into in several ways. first of all, if we have the

ability to defend our people, our country from missile threats, we create additional uncertainty in the minds of an adversary or potential adversary as to whether or not it really makes sense for them to engage us or to launch a missile attack against us in the first place, because they can't be certain that any such attack will actually accomplish the objectives they think it might accomplish. so from a deterrence standpoint, being able to dissuade them or prevent them launching an attack is critically important and in that respect, missile defense plays a key role. missile defense also plays a key role in assuring our allies it helps them secure them and assure that we are serious about defending our own people and our own country. so, there's an assurance aspect also that's useful. also, i would say by being able to defend against missile

threats, it gives our decision- makers more decision time and space to make decisions. they are not forced into a reaction quickly, because if we can defend ourselves, we have the ability to wait it gives our diplomats an opportunity to try and negotiate an end a potential crisis. it just adds time and space to decision-makers calculus. which in a way, is incredibly stabilizing. so, for in a variety of ways our missile defenses contribute to deterrence by providing those additional characteristics and capabilities.? okay, and let me say the way this kind of works into a bit of a culture shift in the sense that back in the early days to try to get up treaties, sometimes folks would say this is purely defensive and only reactive in somebody else would say that the perspective here

is one of integration. it's a little bit of a demystifying capability and we weave and everything that it is that the united states has its military force, is that fair? >> i think that's fair, it's different. what this argues for is a fully integrated capability, which includes as i said the active defensive component which traditionally when we talk about missile defense, we have tended in the fast pass to focus on passive measures. hardening dispersion, even deception, i it also talks about attack operations, should deterrence fail we want to be able to defeat missiles before they are launched against us. so looking at it again as a sort of a complete package, integration is here, we also want to be able to integrate our capabilities with the capabilities of allies abroad.

so, we are opening the aperture i would say, the president has talked about our entering a new era for missile defense and he's absolutely right. what this does is that it basically establishes the parameters of what that new era looks like and how we as a nation are going to approach it.? perhaps you can kind of situate this on how we can build on our past activities. >>? thank you for having us there today. and i appreciate all the folks that are here and have shown a an interest in this mission. i got a few charts to set the stage on what the missile defense agency is all about, what the mission is and how we believe we fit in with the mission missile defense review. so if i can go to the control here, go to chart 2, first the

mission of the mission this fence agency is to develop and deploy a layer ballistic missile systems and we will talk about ballistic plus in a few minutes. but layer is extremely important and it's an overall acrid texture and the purpose is to defend the united states, deploy forces, our allies, our friends against a missile attack. so, it comes above the chart. visually portray some examples of the system from a ground- based interceptors and we swap assistance with standard missile number three, leads it to shore to space systems that we use to sense activity and ground radar. and it's a layered architecture which is extremely important.

hang on a second. the second chart here is a visual depiction of this architecture. and it's divided into three rows. the top one is probably the most important on that chart because it is the glue that ties together the entire ballistic missile defense system. it's the command and control, battle manage system. is the multi-demand, you have heard that phrase and other forms. and it ties together our sensors which is the middle lane, and balances with our shooters which are in the middle. and it's all in support of the combatant commanders who operate and patrol with these capabilities. and on the bottom you can see again that they are in space they are inground they are at sea and they are at a controlled battle management system to designate specific shooters to go against specific

targets. this chart is extremely important because it lays other priorities for the agency and the first thing that we need to think is that the priorities are in direct support of the national defense strategy and now they are also in direct support of the missile defense reviews outcome and guidance. the top priority is to ensure that we continue focusing on increasing system reliability to ensure that we build confidence in the combatant commanders mindset, and force that these systems will work when needed. and you will see how that translates into the budget in the second. the second priority is to increase our engagement capability capacity and that essentially buy more rounds for each of the systems to build out the quill that are out arrows are in and provide more capabilities for these deployed systems.

the third priority is to rapidly address the advanced threat. and there are some icons out there on the chart which is the hypersonic draft of the bottom line, bottom right side of the chart, which depict that advanced threat. so to keep our eye on all three of these areas of concern and addressing them in our budget and or capability. now as far as what the missile defense review means, mr. trachtenberg covered that it's an integrated approach and if it fails it restores infrastructure. now what it does is it brings focus to what we're doing at the agency and reinforces that effort and guidance and synchronization of effort and helps the department focus it synergies on meeting with the policy that's laid out in the mbr. and the last bullet specifically addresses the fact that what we are doing within the agency is completely in line with the missile-defense

review. let's skip that for second, here's some examples of if you take the priorities of the bins as we call them, that we've got the three priorities, you take a look at the activities with in the agency and the systems where we have on contract and also developing, you can see the first one decrease the systems reliability, we must sustain a missile defense system we got in the field. or the combatant commander will not have confidence that it will work. meeting the forty fort db eyes that we have out in the force today, we are working on a redesign kill vehicles to increase its liability, sustainability reliability to make it more effective and cyber security where paying significant in tension to to ensure the ballistic missile

defense and its architecture remains secure. it's secure today but as we all know, the cyber threat changes daily if not hourly and we are paying a lot of attention to that. the second stream lane is increasing our capability and capacity in things like the directionally approved and directed that 20 additional ground-based interceptors up at fort greeley. to make sure the long range radar that we are building up in alaska, the recent initiation of activity for their homeland defense radar on why the fm three cooperative development with the government of japan, that work is going on. additional interceptors and standard missile three interceptors, those all increase our engaging capacity. and then the bottom group is what we are spending a lot of time on, also. the threat is rapidly changing

and is becoming more prolific and dangerous. the hypersonic threat is something that we are paying keen focus to and the defense against that threat, it was designated in the fi 17 authorization act at the executive agent or hyper defense across to department. the working with the other surf uses and then doctor griffin's organization, we are pursuing the hypersonic defense. we are also working with darpa and the services primarily of the air force on a space sensor there and it's primarily to go after the hypersonic threat, unlike a ballistic threat where the trajectory is protectable. the maneuvering capability of the hypersonic writ drives us to an integrated architecture that not only begins on the green ground with ground radars but goes into space to use the vantage point of space to

ensure we have birth to death custody of the threat from the beginning to the end. so that we can optimize and direct our interceptors to interdict the threat that is most vulnerable. so space, combined with ground is where we need to be to ensure we know where the threat is, because as senior leaders have said, you can't see it, you can't shoot it. and so, that the big works within the missile defense agency. we are also looking at directed energy as lasers, microwaves other forces of directed energy as potential components of the missile defense system as we seriously look at the intercept and interdicting the target over the territory and we are looking seriously at scaling

its capabilities. kill assessment is also an area where we are spending a lot of time on. we need to know if we have successfully engaged, mitigated, killed the threat vehicle. if we can do that in time perio allows the combatant commanders to optimize usage of his resources and not waste them. so kill assess and is a key part to the overall optimization of assets. i will take any questions, i hope that was helpful to you. but the missile defense review is providing focus, synchronization, guidance, direction and the policy framework that allows us to help shape discussion with any administration and on the hill. to justify and rationalize the resources we need to justify the resources we have been given. in plain speak, in any large organization when they are

continuing on how to do any project and what we do not want is potentially the loudest or the person closest to the sled or the last person in the meeting making an an recommendation of what is best and that is what it agreed to have moved on with the missile defense review allows us to maintain that focus which is extremely report important in providing stability to not only the government entity but the industry. because they know what direction we have been given and they can marshal resources to support that. >> i think you're jumping. >> i was just going to say one thing. i think the general agrees. i think he is exactly right in the way he has characterized what we are doing with respect to the program. one particular thing, one thing in particular that kind of comes back to your initial question, and one is new and different. among the things that are new and different number one is the emphasis on base and the importance of this for the

missile defense mission. the other thing i think is important to focus on, is the focus in the rescue and in our effort on the development of advanced technologies. and new ways of doing things in connection with the missile defense mission. to include things like directed energy that he mentions. to include a relook at this phase intercept options, and capabilities. those are things that we have sort of looked at in the past but we sort of have not in more recent years focused a lot of attention or a lot of energy on those. says it is time to take a relook at that. as we all know, technology advances tremendously, at tremendous speed. and the technology that exists today is not the same as the technology that existed decades ago.

and so we do believe, it is critically important to look at the advances that have been made with respect to technology that are applicable to the missile defense mission and to see where and how those can be integrated into improving our overall capabilities. >> a lot to cover, a lot has been put on the table, our appetites are wet. but let me stay high for a minute and talk kind of at the higher level of strategy. you know for so long, we have had a kind of a bifurcated missile defense effort that we have relied on deterrence for russian and china generally. we are going to focus on both regional and icbm from north korea and iran. and 2010 we put a special emphasis on regional missiles, especially about rogue states still. and this review begins to change it by saying we are going to rely on deterrence for

icbms specifically, for russia and china. but we are presumably going to aggressively defend against regional missiles from russia and china. we are also doing long-range white vehicle things, so what is kind of the exact line around the things we are not going to defend against? icbms and sl bms? what is not defended? the line begins to get a little fuzzy. >> i think that is the wrong way sort of to look at the question here. what review makes clear is that you are exactly correct. when it comes to the strategic arsenals of russia and china still remain reliant on deterrence as part of our strategy and again to prevent both russia and china from taking aggressive action against us and our allies. however the missile defense review also makes clear that we are not going to artificially

constrain the development and evolution of our missile defense capabilities, so that if we have the capability to go forward with the kinds of advanced technologies that we have been talking about, we are going to do that. and frankly i will tell you it, it, it is argued that any missile that is launched against the united states that anywhere at any time we are going to do our best to defend against, plain and simple. i represent the mission of the department of defense, and the mission of the department of defense is to defend and we are certainly going to defend the american people, we are going to do the best we can with the resources we have to make sure that the defense is not only credible and effect but contribute to our overall deterrence. and prevents add reference areas or potential adversaries from taking hostile action against us or from can bring any kind of attack against us or our interests. one other point i would make in terms of the regional context.

obviously when we talk about missile defense and when we talk about these capabilities, the ultimate goal is deterrence. and first and foremost we want to prevent any kind of conflict from escalating to nuclear conflict. both russia and china in particular are developing all kinds of missile capabilities, integrated into their strategy and doctrine that can be used in a regional context. well, regional conflicts occasionally run, run the risk of escalating into greater conflicts. and so we are, our approach is to be unconstrained in how we deal with the regional threats that we face from, from any actor, in the hope that we can bolster our overall deterrence and me, you know, conflict at any level less likely. >> okay. so another kind of, still high level conceptual way here, we are looking in the nda as the

lead on the life threat, a way to think about the counter hypersonic live system is something that is separate from the bn ds. is there going to be a single mds to rule them all, and in what way we think about the ballistic cruise missiles and live vehicles as a system, as opposed to just particular niche capabilities? no it starts with that top lane on that visual chart i showed that the man and the man of the control of the battle management system. it is being designed and we are testing it to deal with those threats. it will understand the difference between a ballistic threat or a hypersonic threat and will be able to designate the appropriate interceptor or, or capability to mitigate that threat. and that is an important distinction because we cannot

tell what the adversary will do. but once, once they have initiated whatever action they are taking, that command and control panel management system through a central network that we are, that we are requesting, ground, space, the air, will be able to designate the appropriate threat vector as well as response. >> if it is okay with you john reeves, the review talked about and bragged about the rtv pack three ms three. the sm three to a and upcoming icbm test with the two a. these have been in the program of record. there is not kind of a new block or incremental capability that was announced for really any of the four families of missile interceptors. the do you proceed continued

block or developmental and current across the board? the threat of advances to continue to evolve? no absolutely. the first thing we need to do is ensure before we ask for any new capability or resources to add to the resources we have today, we must look at the capability of the systems we have existing today, and what incremental and improvements could be added to those systems by additional capability. it is only one when we cannot incrementally add the capability that we ask for more. or if the threat is radically different. and technology allows us to pursue some, an alternate approach, then we go after that. the record of energy is a good example. >> you would include connecticut factors live evils within that, look for the block and incremental approach first?

no absolutely. >> and we're looking across both direct as well as connecticut capability and we are intercepting those with agency and industry. we intend to test spec capability and then make decisions, it most likely will not be either/or, it will be a mixture of both because both have, both have advantages and disadvantages. both have the ability to be deployed in various numbers and various ao ours, areas of responsibility. so it would be an integrated architect that is layered. i keep using that word because it is not one-size-fits-all. it is a graceful degradation sort of an approach to our capability. >> great, great. you mentioned, i am just glad you used the phrase hardening and disbursement. and of course the national defense strategy kind of points to the fact that the united states does not have a monopoly

on precision strike anymore. we have got these iron mountain. on our bases abroad and guess what? our adversaries are able to target that now. and the nds pointed to the need for agile and mobile basing to make it harder for the adversary to strike us. so how do you see hardening and dispersal playing into especially the elephant of the bmd is, to make it harder on the other guys to find them? no i can let general reeves talk through the specifics of the programmatic elements of that. from a strategic perspective i think it is critically important to make sure that we integrate those, those, those elements into what we are doing. you are exactly right, our adversaries have not stood still in terms of their ability to work to target us, our systems, our capabilities. and so, really what the review says is, is we need to look at the entire spectrum of

approaches here in terms of dealing with response. passive defenses is just one part of it but it is unimportant part. our job should be to make it harder, not easier, for others to target us and the important capabilities on which we rely for our security. part of that is the reliance on our offensive capability. part of that is reliance on our active defensive capability. part of that is integrating new concepts into what we do and how we do it. to include dispersion and hardening and things like that. but i will defer to the general in terms of the actual architectural issues there. >> what i will say is that each one of our systems and the overall architecture, is governed by a set of requirements that dictate their capability to operate within the environment that they are going to be tasked to operate within. if it is at sea, if it is on

land, if it is an end up your or something that operates within the atmosphere versus operating in space, those requirements are very different with respect to hardening as an example. it all begins with the requirement that each system, any architecture has to satisfy and that is what we work very close within industry to build capability to meet those requirements, and then test them to ensure they meet those requirements that would then allow the operational testers but more importantly the combatants commander to have the confidence that the systems will work when taxed. >> given the specter of complex integrated attack, hardening dispersal, deception, those are the kind of things that are going to contribute to the survivability and therefore the effectiveness of the bmd s, the counter hypersonic capability, all of that stuff. >> that is correct. >> okay so segueing from that, that is only passive defense,

but staying with the theme of survivability for a moment. it is still very much a bmd s centric focus here understandably. one of the first questions i had when i looked at the review was, where is the air defense. you may be down to survey in south korea. they brag about using uavs to target patriot radars. russian shows the potential for integrating uavs and artillery ballistic attacks in syria and ukraine and things like that. so as we look at the need for survivability, are we going to need air defense for our ballistic missile defense elements to protect them against crude missile attack or anything else? >> the answer is yes , and as with any high-value asset, the combatants commander wherever the asset was stationed, that is one of the responsibilities

that comes with that geographical commander and they assess and assign for them to perform that function were designated. so yes. >> i would agree, certainly agree with that. take an unarmed uav or arial system, put a weapon on it, you essentially have a version of a cruise missile. and the difficulty of course is as these platforms get smaller, faster, more maneuverable and agile, they become more difficult to counter which is why part of what we are advocating here is sort of a reinvigorated effort to look at ways to do that. using not just existing technology, we've got some limited capability today, both airbase, sea bass, and land- based to deal with smaller

types of cruise missile threats. but this is also where the development of more advanced technologies comes in to play. and it is very important because you are absolutely right, that is part and parcel of the evolving that we are facing as a nation that is equally important to deal with. >> take for instance the combat system. right? it is designed to do multiple things but also a lot of other missions including air defense. so maybe let's talk about a particular instance of this and that is the epa a european phase adapted approach. the first letter a stands for adaptive. i was struck however by the fact that the program for the epaa was a lot of continuity. curious about kind of why there was not any adaptation for that, and if you, given the threats, might we not need to change or adapt the epaa program in the future?

>> i think the letter a for adaptive is particularly relevant, you are absolutely right. the epaa represents an element of continuity that this missile defense review says we need to continue with. but we are not simply standing still as we go forward here. we are always seeking to develop and improve the capabilities of existing systems. general greaves talked about some of them certainly the home defense context. we always want to improve and get better. i talked about technology and the evolution of technology. what general greaves and the missile defense agency have done, really when you think about it, is nothing short of remarkable. you know, there were points in time when we thought we could not hit the proverbial bullet with a bullet. we demonstrated we can do that. and we can do more, and we will be able to do more, by going forward and investing the

necessary resources in these kinds of advanced technologies, to include directed energy systems and they can have applicability, things like boost phase, defense can have applicability both in a sort of a future context as well as an and homeland defense context. so i am relatively optimistic. i think it is critically important from a strategic and policy perspective that we focus on these kinds, because these are, these are the kinds of threats that are growing. the threat is not standing still, and our ability to counter it cannot stands will also. while we do rely on deterrence to deal with the larger more sophisticated strategic nuclear forces of china and russia, we are absolutely committed to making sure that we are not just pacing the threat from rogue states like north korea and iran, but we are outpacing the threat.

we have to be on the front end, not on the backend, to account for this. >> as an example of adapting and changing and improving , taking just a short example. just last night at our test facility at pure specific test facility on hawaii, there was a fairly challenging test done last night were a challenging target was launched and both of the navy program of record, spy six radar, as well as the current spy one radar that we have with eastern shore both were part of that test. and both are being evaluated performance against that very challenging target. so it is in the navy's program of record, but we are assessing capability on our side for, the stress example, to integrate that future ability at some point in time. those are the sorts of things that are going on routinely to

both demonstrate capability as well as integrate future capability and make things make it better in the future. >> in terms of the agility of the agency to do those things, what you think of the threat upgrade to the esso 31b? some folks have said that it would were not for the mda's focus on this mission, and acquisition authorities, the idea that a threat upgrade to the 1b would have ever been done by say the navy if it would have transferred to them, it might have taken a lot longer. do you think that is? >> i would say that the advantage that the agency has is in fact the unique responsibilities and authorities given to the agency to essentially allow rapid decision-making. by any complex organization if you have got multiple stovepipes or multiple individual organizations with very varying responsibilities and authorities, someone has got to integrate that and the integration time is what slows things down relative to an

organization like the missile defense agency or the national reconnaissance office. where in one single position in the agency, you not only have the agency director but you have got the head of the contracting authority with full contracting authority. you've got the program manager. you've got the acquisition executive, all in one lot. things were able to be done a whole lot faster than having to coordinate among 50 or 60 different people. and that results in time saved and credible decision-making to expand precious resources provided by the congress. so it could have been done in the navy, i spent my time in the air force and, and was under the 5000 process. i spent time in the missile defense agency and that is the difference. the fact that it is a smaller number of authorized individuals and it is people, it is people that are allowed to make those decisions. now with that responsibility

and authority becomes accountability. so you need experienced people making those decisions that make the best possible outcomes. >> if i could add just briefly to that. if anyone is familiar with that big defense acquisition process slides that looks like a bunch of spaghetti, you understand the complexity of the overall, the acquisition process. one of the things that the missile defense review calls for is to look for ways where applicable to streamline that acquisition process to introduce more capability into the system in a shorter period of time. we will continue to look for ways to accelerate that process were appropriate. in order to deliver capabilities to the war fighter as necessary to deal with the threats as a whole. >> i am an engineer but i am also an acquisition officer. i have worked under both systems, both sis's work.

but the 5000 system is slowed down when everyone believes they have a role to play in the decision or the opportunity to say no. and i'm just trying to be very blunt with you. some folks say that all the mda really needs is a sport or return to that 5000 series and that will improve the reliability of your acquisition. notwithstanding the fact that s and three and others were developed under this process. what is your answer to that? >> i absolutely oppose that. it is wrong. as i mentioned i have stayed quite a bit of time in the air force under the 5000 principles and processes. i have spent time equally within the national reconnaissance office and the missile defense agency, and it is, having qualified people in responsible positions with the authority to make those decisions. that is what, that is the

secret sauce i think with the missile defense agency the and an organization like the national reconnaissance office. it is when you have got multiple separate organizations each having the opportunity to follow their process, and say no, or slow it down, or not do the coordination, that, that is when things really slow down. i get the missile defense agency gets its requirements from strategic command. we work with a joint staff through the j rock if we need to but most of the requirements come directly in a. he capabilities list from us track comp. it is very clean and distinct and streamlined and that is what we execute against. there are other challenges working with him, since i was in the service at one point, working within the services to get to those decision points because the process is so complex. it will work, it just takes longer and is a lot more complicated.

>> one particular capability that you both mentioned was some interest a couple of minutes go in that energy in different forms. i often think politically as well as technologically, it is kind of a desert storm that captured the imagination about the missile defense mission. we are seeing energy out there on the navy ships, on army trucks. you know, what is the, when is it going to be getting out in the field to begin to see and capture the imagination more, and when is it going to kind of be here for even the lower regional missile defense mission? what kind of, what is in our near future? >> i would hope sooner rather than later but one thing is clear, in order to bring the capability to like that to fruition, you have to invest in the development of that capability. we do not invest, we do not develop the necessary resource development capability, one thing i can tell you with certainty as we will never get

there. and i think one of the things you're trying to do with this particular review is shift the focus a little bit. to make sure that we sort of rebalance our efforts in a way that allows us to invest the time and the energy and resources necessary to move that needle forward as soon as possible, sooner rather than later. >> i will answer in two different manners. one is power level. so the power level requirements are very different between what is on a humvee or what is on a ship or what is required to interdict either a liquid threat missile or a solid missile. and then, in the other one, is stabilized funding and support over time. if you look at the history of direct funding across the department over the years, it has been cyclic. and that has slowed down the development of directed energy for the higher power levels,

the lower power levels are now in work. the missile defense agency, the missile defense mission is on a higher end of the delivered power spectrum. you can just, we're into the hundreds of kilowatts to megawatt range. we've got the brightest minds across the nation working on this and i will tell you that it is feasible with sustained resourcing, it is feasible and we are seeing rapid progress in increasing the demonstrated power levels for the example. >> one of the new things in the review was , talk about the f3 five, which is of course the biggest program in the department. i think they were confused by this. they have a limited gas tank, is the persistence is not quite there. but what is the right way to think about weaving in other pressboard and said assets like

f 35? >> i will start with as i mentioned before any sensor connected to in the shooter might be command-and-control management system. that is how i would look at it. and if you think about the f 35 as an example and where and when those platforms will be deployed, they will be deployed in numbers and areas where we have concern. so those platforms will be there. you take a look at the f 35, by itself, and the powerful fencer suite, it is inherent on the platform. the question we had is, why are we not thinking outside the box and taking advantage of that existing capability with them a minimum at a sensor to integrate that into the ballistic missile defense system. not to move the entire mission but to do certain key portions

of the mission because those assets are going to be there in the first place. it is a redesignation of mission as an example and of course the operations community will have to decide what portion and to what extent that it goes. then you flip it on the other side as a simplistically speaking, unloading, that are inside the jet, and the development of a fast intercept is an example. it could be a significant addition to the ballistic missile defense within the architecture so it is a question of, why are we not looking at it, and why are we trying to invent something new, and the capability would be there and exist? so that is what we are investigating. >> i could not agree with that more. i think thinking outside the box is something that we certainly need to do more of. and looking at the f 35 or even a similar platform, generally considered to be on the offensive side of the ledger,

looking at that to contribute to the defensive side of the ledger is one example of sort of the integration of capabilities between offensive and defense. whether we use an f 35 and a particular missile defense role or not, the fact that it might have a capability, a sensor capability, or other capability that makes it applicable to missile defense mission to, does not mean that all f 35's are going to be exclusively devoted missile defense mission. anymore than giving all of our agents ships in missile defense capability which is where we are seeking to hear. means that they are all going to be exclusively devoted to a missile defense mission. but this is part of sort of the holistic approach and the integration of capabilities that we are trying to call out and we are trying to emphasize as a result of this review. >> it is also a cultural shift right? from just relying on dedicated asset within the bm ds, to again, rather than its capability, something that is

fully woven into everything and vice versa. it is opportunistic, right? as opposed to being dedicated. and it is bringing and everything else. but it is a cultural shift, right? >> absolutely, but why shouldn't we, why shouldn't we make that shift? or why shouldn't we try to go there? are all the reasons the world to try to exploit the capabilities that we have, to try to see how we can bring them all together in a coherent whole. in order to deal with the anti- access and area denial strategy that our potential adversaries are developing. >> it is a fantastic vision of integration. the desire for integrated air and missile defense has been out there for a long time. i think it was the national defense strategy commission actually recommended when it delivered its report a couple months ago, they recommended the defensive line official, kind of a integration czar, who

could you know, dyestuffs, or tell the services, no kidding, you actually need to integrate. there is always those service equities and everyone is doing their own mission and the idea that the integration has been out there, how is it going to be different this time? and how are we going to get to to forcing that integration to realize that vision? >> it has already begun. if you take a look at the european command , that is a major focus of general skipper roddy and the folks in you, as an example. it is also a focus of the other combatant commanders, but they are, if not leading the discussion, a major player in that discussion. but it will begin and continue to be influenced by the combatant commanders added the fighters. but within the department it is something that we need to continue pursuing because it is beneficial to integrate as you mentioned the capabilities

across the services to produce the mental missile defense capability that we are hoping for integrating. so it is something that has got to keep this happening. >> one last question and we will kind of open it up to the audience. that is kind of the role of allies. that is again kind of emphasized in the review, there is a lot more demand signal out there for active defenses, you know whether it is the savvy's and mri in the least post, romanians and sweden's and europe, japan, south korea, and the asian- pacific. your comments on the importance of that and kind of a vision for what new avenues of cooperation are of interest there? >> let me just start from a policy perspective. i would say it is critically important to roll allies into this. number one. what we are proposing is entirely consistent as general greaves noted at the outset with the strategy reflected in, in the national defense

strategy, where it is very clear that strengthening our alliances, building partnerships, is a key element of that overall strategy. that applies to our approach on missile defense as well as other things as well. there are capabilities that allies can bring to the table beyond that, we want to make sure that we are integrated with what allies are doing. the general also referred to join developing program with the japanese government in terms of the fm three. that is one example. they are a cooperative development programs that the united states engages with israel for example. if you want an example, sort of a real-world example of how missile defense saves lives is the israelis. they can give you any number of examples there. definitely we want to strengthen those relationships and we want to partner with our allies. we wanted to make sure that our allies can bring things to the

table as well. this is not just united states looking to defend everyone else , but we want to be able to engage collaboratively and build upon the relationships that we currently have with existing partners as well as look for opportunities with new partners where we had to draw them in to this. because we are talking about a global capability here. >> i would say it is absolutely essential and it is a major part of our outreach , our interface with the allies. one quick example, this exercise called for a minimal shield 17 and we are about to work with our allies and partners again in a few months in the middle of the field 19. integrated air missile defense, activity off the coast of scotland, and 17 with ships from various nations, various capabilities, radars, cot ups, test procedures, demonstrating

the ability to properly work together to interject both air and missile targets. huge success within the yukon ior two years ago. and it is a, it is an increase in capabilities. so as far as the tests we are going to do this year. to demonstrate not only with what we are saying but to show in fact that it does work and the allies stepped up in 17 and they are really on board again for the tests we are going to run in the 19. that is all the other activities we are having across the world. >> are great, all right. why don't we open up the questions? i have a number of hands already in line. i saw sydney first and we will go over here to force voice of america. so get the microphone to state your name and affiliation and keep it in the interrogative sense. >> the sydney friedberg, breaking defense and professional loud person. i'll cc mike anyway.

tomorrow the administration is initiating the formal, final withdrawal from the inf treaty. now, obviously you guys created that before that has happened but you know presumably that was in your mind. it creates at least potential for proliferation both of incoming threats, ground-based systems but also for the attack systems for a whole new class of ground-based service attack systems take out the threats left of launch. so you know what, how does the end of inf, which seems to be inevitable, affect the mdr and how does the mdr print will sort of apply to a post inf world? >> let me do and deal with that question sydney. i do not think the demise of the inf treaty really affects the approach that we have taken in the mdr at all.

because the mdr essentially says we need to defend a growing proliferation of missile threats,. period. the denies of the inf treaty is because the russians have violated it and have repeatedly violated it for years. the russians really have no one else to blame but themselves for not complying with the terms of that particular treaty . and our announced intention to remove ourselves from the constraints of the treaty is directly attributable to what the russians had done over time, despite the fact that we have tried repeatedly to get them back into compliance by removing and destroying their prohibited cruise missile system, what we designated as the ssc a refuses to do it or acknowledge it is a violation. so that is indicative of part

of the problem. but is in general terms captured within the mdr. that is the proliferation of missile capabilities that we need to be prepared to defend against >> can i redirect that a little bit? in a sense we have woken up to the fact that we have a russia problem. but one way in which inf connects your is a greater rush the realization that we have a russia missile problem. the mdr to its credit i think endorses cruise missile defense. does it matter whether it is lost from a ground platform or ac platform. if you are the target of the cruise missile you do not really care where it comes from. so can you talk a little bit about the desire to have some kind of active defense against cruise missiles, just say like the fsc eight, for our foreign forces and what we are doing about that? >> it is important, it is important to be able to address

those kinds of threats which are likely to pull the file. remember the inf treaty essentially constrained the united states and the soviet union, then russia. we are the only party that has been constrained by that particular, by that particular treaty. but again, it is a reflection of the fact that missile technology is advancing. and we need to be able, we need to be able to keep up with it and stay ahead of the threat as it evolves which is why there is so much emphasis in the report in terms of russian and chinese regional missile develop, capability development. and the need for us, the need for us to be able to counter it. >> okay, got a lot of questions, i think voice of america and then john ? we can keep it up here. get just about everybody in the front well, has a question. >> thank you very much. voice of america culley, anton. my question is, i will try.

first question is, what do you expect from europe and allies of the united states when us world start fulfilling inf treaty? do you expect them to have, i don't know, new to be based there in europe, or? what reaction? what development? will be for europe with this? >> what you expect from russia? >> from europe and allies. because this treaty actually was signed years ago because of europe. mostly. and now there will be more. and a question to john greer. maybe expected sensors in missile defense. but some of them were surprised with interceptors.

so long-term plans, short-term plans, when you think we will be, how it will go and when it will be developed? in space? >> i would be happy to start with the first question although i do not want to divert too much from the missile defense focus here. with respect to our european allies and our decision on the inf treaty. what i can tell you is that we have been in constant consultation with our european allies. they fully understand the rationale for the us decision to move away from the inf treaty. they are fully on board with an understanding that that decision was predicated on the fact that the russians have failed to comply with the treaty. and so, i would expect that they know that they not only understand what we will be

supportive of our decision. that said there are no plans that we have similar to what the situation that led to the inf treaty in the 1980s, to go forward and deploy missiles in europe for nuclear armed systems in europe. obviously united states would not even consider taking a step like that without, without consulting with allies first, but we have no plans to do that. what we are planning to do and have been doing has been engaged in the research and department unconventionally armed systems within the range that is currently limited by the inf treaty 500 to 250 500 kilometers. but in fact the congress a year or so ago, specifically directed that we engage in that program, set aside, i think was $48 million for us to begin the

process of doing that. so what we are doing is entirely consistent i think with congressional direction, and it is entirely understood by our friends and allies abroad who have been very much a partner with us in the consultant process. >> second part of that was about space-based interceptors. i wonder if you could speak to that it in terms of especially what we might expect with the city six months from now. >> the first thing i will mention is if you look at the testing, the 12 tasks that are in the missile defense review, what you should notice is a crawl, walk, run approach, as in under promising and over delivering. so not jumping to the ultimate capability of the system but ensuring that we have the technology we need to pursue whatever the requirement is that we adequately work within this treat to develop it, we test it, demonstrate it in the lab, demonstrated on the ground and demonstrated where it needs to be. so that is the underlying theme

of each of the task, if you read them very carefully within the missile defense review. as tom missions mentioned, but is the first thing we need to review. to study the potential for space-based interceptors and what it would take to deliver that capability. then have the discussion and debate within the department administration and with the congress on what we do next with it. and that study is due in six months, the day of that missile defense review review released to both, the sector of secretary of defense and policy and the secretary of defense and engineering. that is when the discussion will take place on what happened next. >> job john hoppers next? >> a thank you john harper with national defense magazine. you gentlemen talked about incrementally improving an existing interceptors over time. but to get after this emerging

hypersonic strut, does the us need a new interceptor that is faster and more maneuverable than legacy systems and if so, what are your plans for pursuing that and what would you hope to feel that new capability? >> i think it is a good question, do we need a new interceptor to deal with that capability? i would prefer to leave that to the technical experts, of which i am not one. in terms of what the best approach for dealing with that, with that capability is. is it a new kinetic interceptor? is that the application directed energy which we have talked about to a different system, delivery system? i don't, i don't fully profess to know what the best approach is, perhaps general greaves has a better understanding based on the state of the various technologies or what have you. i think that is one of the reasons we're looking at and

investigating a variety of options. whatever we do, we want to do in the most effective, least costly, and most, really most practical way. >> i will say the answer is yes to your question. the, the agency with the department has completed and announced some alternatives looking at hypersonic defense, of which fast interceptor is a part of that solution. they are one option. directed energy is another, and there are some other options in there. and it's essentially assessing the current suite of available interceptors and seeing if there are fast enough to get to the target and when the tell chase. as you might say. but that aoa is now in final coordination and review within the department and should be released sometime soon. >> -- >> absolutely. >> -- >> we work with industry to

assess available interceptors as well as potential new interceptors to execute that mission. i cannot say today definitively that we need a new interceptor. i will await the results of the , the announced alternatives. because it needs to be coordinated and vetted and agreed to within the department and if it is determined after that coordinated review that the current suite will not meet the need, the threat is there, so we will need to develop something else, if we decided to pursue a kinetic interceptor. >> let's move over in the middle, this gentleman right here. >> i thank you. i am major, i'm jerking from cq. could you talk about how the priorities reflect in the mdr are going to be a part of the budget submission -- jordan king from cq.

could you talk about how the priorities reflect in the mdr are going to be part of the budget submission? >> i wondered when i would get a budget question. >> they are all budget questions. >> ultimately yeah, it all comes down to funding, right? you know not, not to sort of deflect the question but i think we will have to wait and see when the budget rollout occurs. in the next couple of weeks or whenever it does. so i don't want to get ahead of the process here. what i would say is that clearly what we are calling for in the missile defense review is a, is a sort of series of focused efforts will require the investment of budgetary resources. there is no way around that. and what we are proposing to do, and what we have outlined here, is not something that is essentially one, one and done

kind of thing, you know? one year's funding and you know, next year what do you know? we are there. it will require the application of resources over time. much like what we said when we rolled out the nuclear posture review in terms of modernizing the nuclear deterrence. it is a longer-term effort. we are going to track it, we are going to look at what the studies produce. we will adapt accordingly. we will try to keep to the schedules that we, that we outline. but really, we are looking at a long-term effort here. so while i cannot talk about the specifics of this, the coming year's proposed budget submission, suffice it to say, what we are going to do it, we are going to do our best to try to align resources to strategy here. so more to follow on that. >> okay. we have got a question appear, actually two questions appear? and then over here.

yeah, rob. and peter. >> hi, i am bob from and tsa. i am going back to the arms- control concept. arms-control forcible has to have arms to control so it has to be a capability and with the abm treaty we had to walk away from that because of the proliferation of missile capabilities around the world. we are getting to the point with inf to step away is that start to proliferate. some treaties made sense when they were bilateral when the world was more bilateral. as we increase strength and capabilities and sensors, but look at space sensors and look at space perhaps, weapons capabilities as well as greater missile-defense capabilities, is there a mix here someplace that we get to a stronger position where we can bring people back to a negotiating table and have arms control sometime in the future? is there a future view of arms- control? >> i think that is a very good question and i would answer it this way. number one i would say the

purpose of arms-control is not necessarily to control arms, the purpose of arms-control is to reduce the risk of war and conflict. if arms-control can contribute to that, and there are ways that arms-control contribute to that, we should look for those ways. however, the prospect for arms- control, particularly between the united states and the russian federation today, does not look very bright and it does not look very bright because of russian behavior to this day. i would argue that one of the best ways of ensuring that arms- control does in fact have a future and can be useful is to make sure that we hold the parties to arms-control agreements to their obligations. which means, they must comply. there needs to be a penalty for noncompliance, otherwise, treaties are not worth any more than the paper on which they are written. so, from that standpoint, i do not see what, you know what is

happening currently with respect to arms-control as disadvantaging the prospects for arms-control going, going forth. i see it sort of from a, from an opposite perspective. i think we need to be serious about it and to be serious about arms-control means being serious about compliance. and making sure that parties to an agreement adhere to their obligations. >> let me follow up real quick on that. the trump, the 2019 missile defense committee continued the obama administration, and bush administrations policy that we would not have negotiated restraints on missile defense in terms of, in terms of arms- control. is there a sense, i wonder if i might ask, that is a long- standing policy right now, across three administrations.

what would have to change before missile defense could be a viable object of negotiated restraints? do you envision that being possible? >> this administration is not interested in resuscitating the abm treaty, or placing restrictions on the ability of ourselves to defend this country. so i don't see that as a part and parcel of what we are talking about here. we think missile defense has positive benefits across the board from a variety of perspectives, some of which we have talked about. deterrence, assurance of allies. stability. all of those factors. in and of itself i would argue, missile defense is a good thing. therefore, i am not necessarily enthralled with the idea that says, we need to constrain our ability to defend against threats which are noticeably growing and evolving and

becoming more challenging. i hope that addresses the question. >> got it. peter? >> thank you general greaves and thank you david contract. two questions. first one is, we have in israel with hamas and the hutus in yemen, real-world missile defenses that work. what are the lessons that we can learn from both of those conflicts in terms of how it helps us better tell a story. the second issue is, with respect to, whose phase, the critics response to the review was, you cannot do boost phase unless your lawyer, over the territory are of the bad guys and that will prompt them to start war. see you cannot do it. i would like you to address both of those issues. >> let me start with the first question peter. in terms of lessons learned, i think lessons learned can be

summed up varies distinctly and goes back to the example that i mentioned before in terms of the israeli experience for lessons learned, or that missile defenses were, and missile defenses save lives. we have seen that in operations, we have seen that in the real world. today. and so, we ought to, we ought to bank that, and we ought to develop that further. for those that say, missile defenses do not really work or cannot be effective, i think that argument has shown to be false. and i am reminded of so many, so many historic predictions made in the past by experts, quote unquote, that turned out to be not the case. one of the experts who advised harry truman on the atomic bomb back in 1945 said that atomic bomb will never work, and i speak as an expert on explosives. my other favorite historic predictions were, the prediction of, of one american,

i think was probably the last century, or earlier, talking about high-speed rail travel. said highs field raid rail travel is impossible, because the passengers are not able to breathe and would die of asphyxia. okay, history is replete with those kinds of predictions of things that aren't and cannot work and i would say, probably you know, most if not all cases, we have proven those predictions, those predictions to be wrong. and i'm sorry your second question was? >> have to be on top of the target. >> i think there are probably a number of options for dealing with that, and a number of capabilities that we are going to look at in terms of how, how boost phase might work, or might be useful. but again you know, from a programmatic perspective, i will defer to general greaves on that. >> let me say that i may have

mentioned before that no one solution will , will meet all the threats and all the requirements. so we needed to look within the complete set of capabilities that we've got, to apply boost phase intercept. for instance, if it is limited by range in the example and current technology to the area where it will have the most effect. so by saying it cannot work, mr. trachtenberg said you know, a few decades ago, you could never hit a bullet with a bullet. the discussion does not take place anymore. the discussion is, well how effective can you do, how many times can you do it, how defendable is it? that is a very different discussion then, it will never happen. as far as the second question, the lessons learned from looking at, i will take israel as an example. we need to look at the fact that they have got a layered system. so iron dome does not go after the same targets as david sling or the air weapons system will go after. the confidence that that provides to the population is,

you can't describe it. it is tremendous. command and control, that adds that as another lessons learned that we are benefiting from. how do you orchestrate and optimize usage of those assets? so you've got the right intercept type on the right sort of target? integration is another one. how do you, and they are doing it real time to defend their nation. it is not part of a test sequence. recently it has been in the news, the usage of that system to protect against attack. so it is real time. we are working very closely with them, we are learning, we are adapting, and we are benefiting from those lessons learned. >> i think we had a gentleman over here, waiting as well? front row. >> how you doing eyes? my name is andrew debtors, i am a student from worcester state. the question is simple. united states as a superpower nation, how can we defend our

allies specifically israel, from threats such as iran, without conflicts with great nations such as china and russia? defending our allies is also part of defending ourselves. we rely on our allies for a lot

of things. and defensive israel, i would consider critical from a standpoint of our own security. defending our allies is not a burden that the united states should absorb unilaterally. which is why we have codevelopment projects and we rely on allies to step up to the plate as well. and we need to look for opportunities for allies to share more of that burden and do more of that with us in order to help us deal with the resource constraints that we face. i am reasonably optimistic that we can do that. not only with israel but the other allies as well that are looking for protection against missile threats from iran and other places. >> following up on the israel question. over the past decade, the

funding for procurement, missile defenses, has been cyclical. up and down from the u.s. taxpayer. sometimes, as high as 9.5% of the budget has gone to this program. a couple years ago, it was -- an agreement wasn't reached to keep that flat and stay at $500 million a year. from a policy position, do you see that remaining in place going forward? or any possible changes there? >> adaptive is the key word here. there is always the prospect that things will change based on circumstances changing. what i would say simply is that, we continue to work with the israelis on this. we want to be supportive to their needs. we want them to continue to work with us as they have been

collaboratively. we mentioned any number of layered systems that the israelis have. i don't see that as an issue. between the two of us, the alliance -- the relationship we have with israel is so close and so collaborative that, i am optimistic that we can make it work. we can find the resources we need. we can adapt as necessary to the changing threat environment. and we can do what we need to do both our security and for the israelis. is that fair? >> as stated in the missile- defense review, the understanding between the united states and israel, stabilizing the funding overton years and it provides a predictable resource base to make decisions on resources and development versus procurement. and it allows us to work closely with them. because they are living that environment every single day. they are facing that threat every day. we are learning quite a bit

about risk acceptance and risk decision-making and where to shape -- shepherd or place resources. it is mutually beneficial to both. >> one more question. >> thank you, gentlemen. i am with a company called spiral global. we currently have a constellation of 72 small satellites in orbit and generating revenue for a number of government commercial customers. my question is about the space center. something you asked before. we have the ability to crank out about one finished spacecraft per week. as part of this -- a new space economy, we are getting to the point where we are responsive. and some of the colleagues and the audience who operate responsive launch. we have the ability to put things in lower orbit at scale. we think that we have the ability of play, the ability to

put a large number of nodes that would help short-circuit that tipping and jane going directly from the sensor to the shooter. i know that the space sensor layer is moving into phase 2 right now and down to potentially three players. what our fear is that we will go again with an exquisite solution whereas we have a lot of players that can offer something fast. the question is, how do we leverage and further catalyze these space capabilities? >> is there anything about mike griffin that doesn't say, go faster? >> you took the words out of my mouth. doctor griffin will not allow this exquisite solution to dominate the end solution. i will just say that.

i told that. the first thing i would say is, being a space guy, it is not the spacecraft. it is about the architecture and how the space platforms -- the space sensor there, you will note the research and development activity is being led by darpa. the business is agility and looking for solutions, potentially out-of-the-box solutions to the questions and requirements out there. that is where it starts. within the organizational construct in the department of defense. delta works and the missile- defense agency. we are in the same staff meetings. we are working together cooperatively through the space and missile centers. that was not by accident. that was deliberate. the fact that the responses we request from the administrate has gone up in both

organizations. not by accident. deliberate. what we intend to do is not end up with the exquisite solution. to leverage the capabilities to produce the architecture secretary griffin is pursuing. and to do that using dedicated -- integrated for multiple missions. not only missile-defense. communications mission. or doing some other mission out there. i would encourage you to ensure that you maintain your best capabilities and make sure we get them. i will guarantee you that. and i will be talking about that when we get back. playing -- paying close attention to that. i see great potential. >> i want to make sure you get on to that meeting. we look forward to continuing

the conversation. >> thank you. this weekend, c-span has live coverage of the national governors association winter meeting beginning saturday at 9:15 a.m. eastern with montana governor and nga chair steve bullock on how to build a workforce of the

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, the white house, the supreme court and public-policy events in washington dc and around the country. c-span is brought to you buy your cable or satellite provider. >> christmas eve, 1968, extranets became the -- astronauts became the first humans to orbit the moon and took turns reading passages from genesis to millions of listeners on earth. next on american history tv, a ceremony commemorates the 50th anniversary of the mission with remarks from religious leaders, the nasa administrator and the director of the national air and space museum. this is one hour. >> that evening. my name is randy holleran and i am the dean of washington national cathedral. on behalf of marianne buddy,