>> japanese prime minister abe

is heading to the middle east. a look at japan's role as global and regional leader. we will hear from japanese academics at the center for strategic and international studies. >> good afternoon. thanks for joining us. i am mike green and a professor at georgetown, we are delighted to have all of you join us in discussion over the next two hours with four of japan's rising academic thinkers about foreign policy and economic affairs. this is the seventh cohort that we have invited under a program called strategic japan. eight years

ago, we discussed with the prime minister's office how to expand strategic thinking dialogue, planning between the us and japan. one thing to think about, which was new for japan was the need to go beyond the traditional bureaucratic sources in japan and to tap into the growing expertise among japan's academic experts on issues that affect foreign-policy and to bring more academics into the tent in japan and expand the dialogue with the us and to make sure japanese scholars who are coming up and making an impact in japan are sharing their ideas with the us, getting reactions and responses so we have had seven cohorts come, 25 in total scholars from japan. every year each of the scholars

does an essay of history and analytical social science research and policy recommendations and we publish them as a collective edited volume and the theme changes each year. this year the theme we chose center on the question of multilateral institutions in asia and globally. what is the japanese thinking about the future of these institutions, what is the thinking about japan's role and what can the us and japan do as allies to strengthen institutions and make sure institutions are working for our common values and interests? it is a timely topic because washington is not thinking much about the institutions right now. we are

distracted, confused, polarized. personally i have faith over the medium to long-term the public supports engagements but the trump administration pulled out of the transpacific partnership. our attendance was pretty weak in terms of rank. our role in the world trade organization has diminished. we are fighting with the united nations. we are not stepping up. japan on the other hand is playing quite a significant role. prime minister abe pushed for continuation of the transpacific partnership in new form in the g7 which we hear about. he is the bridge between donald trump and europe and canada. one of the things we

will talk about is japan bridging the us institutions or setting the agenda or actually just responding? all of the above is true to some extent but the us right now is lucky to have a japanese government that is active in multilateral institutions and people in the lucky to have a rich group of japanese thinking about the future of multilateral institutions in that context. we go with two panels, the first panel i will moderate. the second panel, simon share will moderate and after going global we will deal with papers on the g7, g 20, and united nations. and asia. we have two speakers who have written papers who we will hear from. the first is shoji is the head

of the america, europe and russia division in the national institute of defense studies. a phd from the university of tokyo and studied at technical university of singapore and particularly an expert on indochina and southeast asia. his paper focuses on the association of southeast asian nations, evolution of japan strategy and what the us and japan can do to work better for southeast asia and us. officer obam from tokyo university of science received a degree from the university of japan and the university of tokyo. she received the incentive award, you will have to tell us what it is, and the develop of east asian regionalism. ozzie and political institutions, with economic institutions in the region and we will hear from my colleague, doctor amy seawright, publishing a scholar from stanford which focused on japan's role in the wto and

regionalism and we will connect those two in her comments. the secretary of defense in southeast asia in the pentagon in 2014 and 2016 and taught at george washington, also served in the usaid and state department. i will ask each of the scholars from japan to get a couple key points and have a bit of a dialogue. our program has a break after 45 minutes, we made a command decision. we will muscle through. we will go about an hour and 50 minutes

and instead of taking a break we will end a bit early and we have coffee back there and speakers will hang around so you can ask individual questions. we will end a bit early. shoji is on the dance card. >> thank you, doctor green. first of all, let me thank doctor green and the members for inviting me to this exciting program. i am from the institute of advanced studies. this is the strategic think tank of the minister of defense of japan and meets my expertise. therefore for this

program, my assigned topic is to explore how japan has been in the regional or security institutions, entering the security institutions. in my research i explore three cases which are the regional forum, the east asia summit and the defense minister. in my research let me mention briefly four key findings in the security institutions japan, concern about china, in particular has been steadily empowering and in this regard participating in these institutions in terms of embracing the challenge with

major powers including the united states. the second point is the power station in the institutions, us prisons has not been consistent. it has been more sporadic. one of japanès major roles in the institutions has been to supplement us absence. and with regard to the pacific, by japan and also the united states it is more like the indochina, a recent release. with regard to that, japan is trying to play a breeding ground to connect the

us authority about the indo pacific view. it has recently been releasing the report about the indo pacific which was titled the outlook on the indo pacific. it is more thorough economy oriented rather than security oriented and pursuing a middle way to connect the security corporation and

economic corportation. regarding the point of the third point. one of the most important points for japan and the united states to garner support to the political leverage in the security institutions, strikes a balance between economy and security. too much security oriented approach is not welcomed by us here. and related to the third point, it is a good balance between economy and security. in this regard, to the united states in developing in southeast asia in other regions. in this regard the cooperation is quite

significant if it is materialized and also the final cooperation in terms of engaging pro-china and southeast asia in the continent of southeast asia in particular, cambodia, laos and vietnam. >> thank you and all the people who are in for this excellent program. i am so happy to be here to have an opportunity to give a presentation and enjoy the talk with you. my major is specific and i want to focus on the development especially now

at the end of the cold war era. from my point of view japan or the japanese political elite, there regionalism, three main things, the one is tokyo policy, tokyo policy after the desire for autonomous diplomacy so not just in the united states. the second one is japanese political elite after la 2000, always and rare over the light of china and the power shift in east asia and the third one is the japanese political elite maintain a regional order based

on the norms and values following the cold war end, vital diplomacy or the freedom of other cases. so now the pursuit of the three things but the big difference between past and present is it has taken stronger leadership to promote regionalism done before and the example is cpp negotiation in both cases, japan has taken strong leadership to finalize them and it is ongoing. japan's government has strongly finalized. so japan began to

show strong leadership done before. from my point of view, into that order is in between. so japan now took an important role to sustain the process such an order in the region by using regionalism so in the past the regional order is given, was given from the japanese perspective but now japan has to take innocence to sustain the regional order so in this sense japan is a very active player, not a passive and reactive player in east asia and the indo pacific now so it can be said that china is

the challenger to international order and it is not only caught up with economic ascendancy over the us but has provided its own model for the governance to which it is accomplished by state capitalism with consensus so the escalation of the final us confrontation deflects the competition between the two different systems, political, economic and social system so in these situations, japan recognizes its own role as an active players to sustain the regional order. however japan's leadership is facing several challenges, the first one is japan's leverage as an economic

power is declining because of the rise of china and the japanese economy. the second challenge demand interest of other regional powers and they are so diverse. they do not always share the region with japan. for example india. so the possibility of withdrawal from the house up negotiation. the japanese government is fixed so india is a good partner but india's behavior is opposite. and another example is malaysia. malaysia is a member of the cpt pp but malaysia is not ratified yet so took very cautious and

reluctant attitude to the cpt pp and the opposite direction of japanese expectation and third challenge is japan's council on china. because japan has to always consider what is going on with china and importance over china led or china centered production network in this region although japan's economy is still very large. the final challenge for japanese leadership is us policy is uncertain. this is a very big challenge for japan

because the united states is an important partner for japan to sustain this order in the region and in the global scene so the most important issue is whether the us joins or rejoins the cptpp. it depends on the result of the presidential election so if trump is not elected japan has a very good opportunity to persuade the us to rejoin and join the cptpp. >> excellent. or not a good choice. it depends. thank you. amy? >> thanks, mike. happy to be here talking about japan's role in multilateral institutions which takes quite a bit of my focus and attention. as you can tell from the presentation, the scholars

here in their papers did an excellent job looking at japan's role, interests, strategies, growing activism or leadership in regional architecture and regional institutions especially over the last decade, they have a very nuanced understanding of the dynamics of japan's choices and impact but what i wanted to do is actually take a step back in time. from the vantage point of 2020 it is very easy to look at japan and the united states and the kind of approach taken by both countries in trying to sustain a rules-based order to strengthen regional institutions and coordinating very much with each other and other like-minded countries to strengthen these institutions. it seems natural, it seems obvious but if you go back in

time, if we were to step into a time machine is go back 15 years or 30 years i think it would not be obvious at all that we would necessarily be where we are today in terms of japan at the merging leadership in the region and how closely it is tied, interest and approaches to the united states, which you heard in both presentations. i think the choices and impulses that japan has had over time and continues to have in some ways as well as choices by the united states have led to particular outcomes but looking back at some earlier examples you could easily have imagined if you stepped into a time machine a very different outcome from what we see today. talking about japan's impulses when it comes to multilateral institutions and regional frameworks, first as a very natural one, japan's economic power rose in the cold war period, japan had a natural tendency to look at the fact

that it was relatively shut out of a lot of global and regional institutions and wanted more voice in them and wanted to demonstrate it could play a real contributing role to regional prosperity. one of the earliest examples of japan stepping up in leadership, an asian development bank and coordinated with its ally the united states in the late 1960s, the us was reluctant to approve this idea. japan has a dominant role in the institution and it has evolved to become an important part of the development architecture over time, similar to the way china wanted to set up its own idea for the asia infrastructure investment bank, the united states and japan have different

reaction in that case. another impulse japan has long had, a high degree of comfort and support for multilateralism and diplomacy and especially in the past really focused, even to the present day, on economic diplomacy, what japan can bring in terms of the relevant assistance through regional frameworks that would contribute to mutual prosperity and stability but the other impulses, i think are somewhat contradictory and have led japan to have a split personality over time. the third impulse, japan has often sought to bind the united states more closely to the region. many of japan's steps in trying to promote, strengthen, create regional institutions have come at times when japan are not sure of the

international commitment to the region and us unilateralism and sought to engage the united states as a partner in building some institutions but the final impulses japan, going back to pre-world war ii history there has been an impulse to look at playing a role in creating asian framework where japan could play a prominent role and shape regional dynamics without the united states. when we look back we see the adbs successful case and back to the early post-cold war period in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the united states, we have to remember, under the first president bush and in the early clinton years there was a lot of talk about the peace dividend from the cold war. there was not a clear sense the united states was committed to maintaining its very large global footprint and very large

strategic presence the united states had in asia. a lot of talk about bringing the troops back home. the united states withdrew from bases in the philippines and there was a lot of concern about u.s. withdrawal of its naval and air force assets in the region, to play less of a security role and on the economic front japan was a big trade rival, we had a lot of conflict with japan and talk about reciprocity and the need to engage more bilateral or unilateral tactics to get fair trade with japan and japan was worried about this and that led to japan's in place embrace of the asia-pacific, a key driver and it was focused on trying to get the united states engaged in the region and we also can look at the arrival proposal for east asian

economic grouping. in the 1990s where he especially wanted japan to take leadership in a regional block that would exclude the united states and japan politely declined that offer to lead tha effort, and double down on the apack idea but go a few more years into the future to the late 1990s and early 2000s and the asian financial crisis the united states is relatively disengaged in the region in terms of a response to the devastating financial crisis that hit thailand and indonesia and other countries in the region and japan's response was to propose the asian monetary fund which was in japan providing leadership to create a rival institution to the international monetary fund which is failing these countries under american

leadership we should point out, led to a disagreement to the united states and japan, japan moved away from that idea but instead proposes an initiative that leads today. and the financial safety net in the region supplemental to the imf. there's a lot of momentum in the plus three mechanism, japan spent a lot of time talking to south korea and china about free-trade agreements and other initiatives they work on together which also included the chang line initiative. in this regional approach, and then go into the years where dpj led japan of the priming is to propose the east asian community in 2008-2009, early years of the obama administration and it was very vague, the united states would

be offered membership inhis vision. the office was much more on engaging asia and in asia framework. japan moved away from that and embraced under obama's rebalance, when the united states joined the east asia summit and was back, makes sense now the united states and japan coordinating policies, looking to strengthen them and strengthen centrality. clearly the rise of china and the strategic challenge that china proposes has led to a real solidification and commonality in the approach to asian regionalism and that probably will maintain this close coordination into the future and the security

alliance between the united states and japan, is much stronger after ten years of various initiatives that strengthened it compared to a couple of decades ago. we are locked in an embrace trying to mutually sustain a rule-based order but it was not preordained. it is interesting the choices japan has made over time and there are other shifts in the priority and focus, clear focus on economic diplomacy for security cooperation and defense diplomacy and asian partners, south korea and china, clear focus a decade or two ago and focusing honest really a, india and the leading southeast asian countries as close partners and

with the rise of china, real concerns around the east china sea and maritime disputes, the framework is useful not to bring the east china sea issues to the table per se but by focusing on the south china sea and the other area where there are maritime disputes, to emphasize the importance of maintaining access to the global commons and resolving disputes for international law and peacefully. with multilateral institutions. >> in the historical context, teases the underlying variables that shape japan and the us approach toward multilateralism. i want to come back to them before q and a.

what you heard from amy reinforces the idea that japan's approach to multilateral institutions in the asia context is about building institutions, all the things liberal institutions focus on and more enduring inclusive stable order rules-based order but it is also about managing other big powers, and for a country, japan has a limited military option, multilateral diplomatic tool becomes quite important and you could say the same about australia, canada and other us allies. japan for the reasons amy explainsed, and i wanted to ask in terms of managing powers and neighbors in the post-cold war context

especially 10 or 15 years ago there was a confidence in japan, the east asia summit, pooling china in. i remember the vice minister of trade told me in the white house that even though the us wasn't in, it was a cage, they were building a cage and were going to invite china into the cage. in a year you are going to call me and say we are stuck in a cage with china and he did. what are you going to do? going to bring australia, india and new zealand. and similarly,

australia and others, to try to shape chinese decision-making. it didn't really work. when the tribunal ruled against china beijing was able to block him from putting out a statement calling for dialogue because they basically got cambodia. in a way china broke the consensus which was required for any movement can be blocked by big power if they decide to. but my big question is is regional multilateralism, is it useful for shaping china as an instrument of china policy or has china become too powerful

and skillful at defying that cage they wanted to build? >> thank you doctor green for a very interesting question. listening to doctor green's comment, i want to talk about the parliament above the region and in terms of how japan should engage multi-efforts is changing, doctor green pointed out correctly japan tried to furnish china to manage growing

china's power and afterwords china is still growing and this power can be more dominant. in this regard, japan objective is changing. in place of managing china. and another objective is to raise our issue of counterbalance or counterargument. and china's authority initiative. the environment surrounding japan has been changing. the

objectives for japan to engage the powers that are also changing. >> thank you for the question. my point of view, having very important meaning. to not put china in the cage but rather china and japan and other regional countries have opportunity, this is very important so now, only the bilateral initiative cannot manage it. so we have to sit the common framework and those

things, put china in the cage so there are 20 other roles so such a mindset can be realized but now, on the other hand, it is very important. >> which is more important? one of the challenges with regionalism and regional institutions, tension between inclusiveness and high-quality for trade agreement and diplomacy in an institutional setting or region. what is the important of including china in common rulemaking versus high-quality

rules for trade for rule of law, good governance or even democracy. is the balance shifting, to compromise where it has to emphasize more high-quality. >> this is an important rule with japan and china. the new institutions and so of course japan and have to prioritize a high standard. out of the inclusiveness, may be japan will have to think of them. >> the core of regarding

this, actually is inclusive doesn't always matter. with regard to japan's approach by china is like this. if china's approach is more inclusive and more transparent, japan can parts of it take over with china more effectively. my sense is the important thing to understand, what japan regards as important as being protected. >> between inclusive and high-quality power matters,

japan doesn't have enough power of its own to demand high-quality rules whether it is our support cptpp your diplomacy, the us in an ambiguous position and in general the power structure in asia is moving to a different direction. when amy talked about the 1990's, compared to now it made sense to defend itself against us demand and now it is more ambiguous. a mix of multi-polarity, there are other big players in this, not just the us and japan but also india, australia, korea. for japan to make the right balance

between inclusive and high-quality you need more friends who share values. australian is an easy one. korea should be an easy one. india is very complicated. how do you think about the team that is going to maintain high quality while being inclusive? when we do surveys of elites we have a new one that will be out soon and we ask for 400 or 500 elites in asia what is the future of region in terms of norms and rules and institutions and power balance and the two countries where they are most identical interviews are japan and korea. that is what a rules-based order should look like but say a little bit about other players. australia is the easier one. maybe indonesia might help in this process. >>

tough question to answer. the very important partner, done before, because so now as you said and i said, very ambiguous but basically you as people in the government to support the order, i think so and in the future, a good partner to sustain the little bit in the region and back to the multilateral regional institutions in the cptpp. lithuania is important. japan and the other countries who share the same vision. many countries as much as any

country in associated countries, not only singapore but indonesia. does not like their china dominant world and indonesia, their interest is joining the cptpp and indonesia is a member and that is a very good partner and indonesia is a big power. >> vietnam is about as suspicious of china, more

suspicious of china than japan. you want a group that is suspicious of china or working with you that will advance democratic norms. how do you think of these neighboring countries? >> with japan and china, with china, yes, it turned out the countries share a similar political system but this means the two countries can cooperate. it depends on the issues. with regard to the gradation which appear, we should not take an idea on approach which is too

straightforward, the complexities not only of gradations of these countries but also issues or structures, has enough to cooperate with vietnam depending on these issues. >> and it reinforces the approach of japan and other countries to have a variety of institutions, some may be democracy, some economic, some may like china and some may not. looking at this, continuing your story to the future and looking at this

patchwork of team multilateralism in asia, some democratic, some not, some suspicious of china, some not. what do we see japan's role in the next 5 to 10 years and a lot depends on november. >> a lot depends where the united states is hitting with multilateralism. if we were back a few years ago when several administrations were putting more emphasis financial multilateralism starting with clinton and george w. bush and obama, more extensive of a clear understanding of engagement in these institutions, supporting them is really important, then it would be easy to predict that we are on a glide path towards continuing the partnership and dual emphasis on regionalism

into the future but given the unknowns with the trump administration, will there be a second term? the polls show strong support for engagement in asia and multilateralism and trade liberalization a bunch of things you would think would be agreements ingredients to a policy that we consider more normal in terms of our

engagement in the region, support for strengthening our institutions but maybe that won't happen. maybe there are undercurrents in american politics that will continue to drive us off course and make us or internally focused and distracted and if that happens, if donald trump is reelected, and seven more years doesn't show up to the east asia summit and a whole lot of other things that give a sense the united states is disengaged, it will be interesting to see what choices japan and other countries make. i expect japan would stand by doing things like it did in tpp continuing to engage and get over the finish line to pull the united states back in but what we have seen in the past, a growing sense of hedging against us leadership and stepping up to create frameworks and support institutions with other countries with the recognition that us leadership might not return the way it has been in the past. this is where it will be interesting to see where japan would head. >> a question or two, let the panel respond and turn the helm over to matt. if you have questions for the panel now is your chance. with matt's panel, any questions? we have mike's. >> i teach at american university. listening to the presentation of japan's objectives in the situation, one can't help thinking there is tremendous value to japan, having a closed cooperative

relationship with south korea in the region and in multilateral organizations and obvious tension in that relationship. i would love to hear from japanese interlocutors why you think the japanese police are prioritizing other issues instead of getting along with south korea and what you think might be done? >> we have to answer that one. we will take one more. >> my name is amanda, i am the founder of asian issues of world politics and also doctoral candidate at the school. my question for you is how can the us and japanese alliance better counter china's

initiative and soft power at an institutional level? >> thank you for your question. it is sometimes very sensitive. domestic politics rather than the objective of the strategic environment. that is why we see weakness seemingly, not really phenomena may happen. however, in south korea, always sailing for japan i think. how to form the cooperative framework across our region. south korea is a big economic power over

southeast asia and south korea has its own initiative towards southeast asia. in this regard even when japan strongly promotes cooperation with southeast asia, how to cooperate with south korea also entering japan's storage and also with regard to the us-japan alliance, i think one of the key issues is how much you can cooperate in developing in implementing specific projects regarding infrastructure in relevant regions. my sense from a

viewpoint of a japanese researcher, southeast asia needs a huge amount of money. india and china cannot afford the finance that southeast asia needs. in this regard, southeast asia also seeks sources of support. in this regard japan and the united states have great potential to effectively promote development in the region. >> for the south korea issue, japan and south korea, politicization has a very big power to shape the attitude toward each other and so this is beyond a very big obstacle to coverage with others and on the other hand

japan, china and south korea are trying to promote free trade agreement among free countries. this is a very interesting now japan, china and south korea have a scheme and the secretary is located there and and so it is something to consider to be promoted. .. so by promoting the energy corporation as well as development. the free and open pacific is a key point to not money or divert wise with china in the region, in my

opinion. >> we're going to turn out to the global g7, g20 and united nations but you had a nice display of the challenges but also the really very proactive thinking going on japan about how to strengthen institutional structure and how to strengthen the u.s.-china light of the the time of the gentleman has expired. they are intertwined well as development. the free and open pacific is a key point to not

manage or divert wise with china in the region, in my opinion. >> we're going to turn out to the global g7, g20 and united nations but you had a nice display of the challenges but also the really very proactive thinking going on japan about how to strengthen institutional structure and how to strengthen the u.s.-japan alliance of the the time of the gentleman has expired. they are intertwined as matt likes to point out, and we are grateful that we had this chance. so let's think this panel and while were clapping and invite the (applause) next one up. okay. we're back. good afternoon. my

name is matthew goodman. i'm senior vice president and hold the sign which are in political economy. csis, delighted to join mike in welcome you all here. to this strategic japan panel or event. we are the global panel so we will look at

japan as a leader in global institutions. i think you'll hear a lot of themes that are echoed across both the regional global but there are some differences in sort of how to think about japan's role institution in the world versus in the asia-pacific region. i think you'll get some new perspective here and certainly

we have two terrific japanese scholars to help us through that and then my colleague stephanie segal as as a discussants let me introduce been briefly. sara konoe is next, professor of faculty of economics in japan, currently visiting researcher at your lab in cologne germany. she received her phd from the johns hopkins school of advanced international studies. her research focuses on international political economy, , politics of financial regulation and european integration. she has been looking in the context of this event, japan's role in the g7 and the g20, the two big global economic government

organizations of which the united states and japan are members, and how japan can play a role as the leader or at least mediator within those groups. so delighted to have her with us. next to me is miki honda, professor at hosei university in japan. she received her ma and phd international relations. previously she was associate professor at a staff writer for the japan times. her research interests include traditional and nontraditional security studies in east asia and united nations studies and her contribution to the collection that mike is assembling is on japan's role in united nations i think she will address that today. down at the end of the table is stephanie segal who is my colleague here at csis,, senior fellow in the simon chair. previously stephanie served as codirector of east asia office at the u.s. department of the treasury where she worked for many years. she also was at the international monetary fund for five years or so. she also earned a masters degree from johns hopkins. by the way we do put a heavy premium on diversity at csis and i'm somewhat apologetic that three of the four people up here and clean myself went to sais, we will try to remedy that. thank you for giving us a different perspective. so with that were going to ask, i think we'll start with sara konoe first. brief introduction to reviews on g7, g7, g20 and then we'll go >> thank you very much for

your kind introduction. i would like to thank the chair from there. thank so much. and dr. green to invite me to the certain important conference and i look forward to have discussions very much. for the past economic diplomacy at g7 and g20, i'd like to draw your attention to the following three points. the first one is the g7 was an important forum for japan to ensure the fair treatment, fair treatment in the context of the post liberal order. a place for japan to make its rapid growth compatible with other g7 partners, other big powers and being accommodated by them. and secondly, i think japan provided useful mediating role

as the only non-western member of the g7 to convey view of emerging economies and also in particular. third, g7 could be used as a stepping stone to find common ground and lay out alternative options for the discussion of the g20, which includes various writing powers and more diverse views. so this strategy could be used especially for contentious issues such as macro imbalances and distant governance, i think. to elaborate these points i would like to briefly look back at japan's experiences and economic establishment. g7 responds to handle economic challenges in

the 1970s. current market after the collapse of the regular system and also japan promoted the agenda of the development that issues and also lay down more global health and various issues and leadership and initiatives in those issues. but japan also traveled with international pressures that came through g7. for example, to mitigate trade conflicts, special with the u.s. and to some extent also with european partners, japan had to learn like poverty. some properties helps japan to make its economy are competitive. for example,

expansionary macroeconomic policies to get help in a good way, that when it was made in a very reactive manner to bring some like the result of mixed incomes of the benefits for japanese economy but japan absolutely able to strength its relationship with u.s. and european partners through g7 engagement. despite all the trade conflicts that stem from its rising economic growth in the 1970s and'80s, and like in the mid-1990s. but after the 1990s, japan, like but now like after abe came to power, take initiative in various issues as the former panel discussed. japan proactive role was very

financial crisis after the 1997 crisis as former panel discussed. so japan propsed the fun and also g7 was first very slow to react but japan kept calling for financial support. like the example shows some japan drafted engagement with g7 as an issue. also to take a role as mediator between the g7 partners. japanese government also invited asian leaders, like the g7 pre summit meetings

and also it reported after the summit to report what happened. that's japan's role that we could see from the g7 experiences, but also japan's case can provide lessons for how to balance the rising economic powers, and the powers of stabilizing role. because macroeconomic coordination process that did not really correct the imbalance, but it was helpful to mitigate. maybe there's more technical knowledge or discussion should

be combined, not only but also to the top level. lastly, i would like to emphasize the potential role of g7 to be used as a stepping stone to bring the discussion that the g20, because of the more institutionalized, because g20 has institutionalized network especially close coordination with like the expert communities, such as banking supervision, sort of develop the way of institutionally dealing with the issues. so also including some assessments of the results. but g20 still has a lot of, more diverse

view. so like g7, maybe like for the condition issues, in which experts cannot agree on, the g7 leaders can try to find some common ground like tax issues and so on. try to bring their views and some various options to the g20 table. this way and dealing with could be useful. i think this is my view. thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you, good afternoon, everyone. my name is honda from

hosei university tokyo. i'm very pleased to have the opportunity to speak to you all. today i would like to speak on japan's laws and strategies and united nations. the united nations is the largest global institutions. japan gained membership in 1956. since then japan has made efforts as stakeholders to achieve the u.n. missions, maintaining international peace and security, providing humanitarian assistance, emoting sustainable development and protecting, upholding so united nations policy has maintained a major component of japanese diplomacy. and you in is the platform to enable japan to contribute more to the community. even if it has

constitutional limitation. now, in the process of developing human diplomacy, japan has two challenges, major two challenges. challenges. the first one habit in 1990 on the location of the gulf war. before that, the contribution is safer and most comfortable. japan to show its present in the asian community. but on occasion of the gulf war, japan couldn't stand forces to the area. of course japan has constitutional limitations. then instead provided more than $130 billion to u.s. multilateral operations. but after the war nobody evaluated

japan's financial contribution. therefore, this event traumatize the japanese government. then quite quickly, next year in 1992, japan this became the business for dispatching sdf. sdf has played a major role in nationbuilding. the members made efforts to obtain mitchell anderson with the local people, and carry out the missions without firing a single shot. so japan departing from the emphasis of military mind was very welcomed at the international community and another challenge for japan was around 1999, and international cooperation and development,

due to the phenomenon globalization, global issues like economic disparity, displaced institution issues and of our mental degradation. those issues emerged as common threats to the international community. around that time asia experienced a financial crisis in 1997. so those changes in the international situation gave an opportunity to japan to shift its contribution to a military one. then japan made a great contribution to formulate one important international norm. that is this is constant, this is a concept securing all of the people from any threat, any kind of threat. so it became accepted and became the international norm by the

general assembly and united nations. this idea fits japanese diplomacy and it is, and it became a very important component of japanese diplomacy. and in 1999, japan establish a trust fund for the to translate a concept into the human initiative project. then this idea is active. now, let me talk about the roles and challenges in the major two, two major gift organs and united nations, the general assembly. and security council. in the change of the international environment, discussions in the general assembly is very important

because general assembly is the most democratic in the u.n. because 193 u.n. members call the voting right equally. so in the general assembly, most generally, i mean, the global interest are discussed. the 74th meeting last year, the prime minister address the importance of multilateralism and discussed japan's contribution to the united nations, especially on global issues. so the general assembly and bald and multilateral by all nations, cannot be over emphasized. for example, global issues, among the global issues,

climate change. this is very important issue, and at the top of general assemblies agenda. in this field japan coordinates many kind of projects related to global warming. but in this field we cannot find the presence from united states. instead, chinese take initiative. initiative. and also russia has taken initiative. so this, the field is becoming very much political issues today. and japan trying to invite the u.s. to the discussion about non-traditional especially global issues. okay, let me move to the roles and security

counsel. unlike the democratic oregon general assembly, security council is the exclusive, and it's a very political. it has invented a wisdom as p5 decided no permanent members abide by their decisions. so japan has served as nonpermanent members, no permanent member, on 11 locations, which is most frequently. and despite a limited law, japan has cooperated with the u.s. in formulating the resolution against dprk's nuclear development. during the term of japan organize urgent meeting 18 times, and japan and u.s. cooperated in making six resolution against dprk. the

form of the security council, the movement of the form within the u.n. has been building for years. it is essential to reform security council to affect reality of to reflect reality. in the past japan propose a cheaper plan with india, germany, brazil. this discussion is today quiet, but it still active. so it was proposed by united professes group, including korea, italy, colombia, other nations. and under the plan was proposed by

african nations. so those are the three plans that confronting each other. for japan, gaining security seat is technically difficult because the p5 obtained leaders veto is very privilege and a right. any member of the p5 that doesn't want to hand privilege rights to other nations. and also the our many, not many, three, in any still alive in u.n. charter. it's quite difficult to reform the u.n. charter. this is very difficult things and challenge for japan to

obtain the permanency to end the considered a the security counsel. japan's economic conservation ranking third. japan is to continue to argue for japan's admission to permanent seat in security council. okay, now japan has the longest serving i minister. if the prime minister changes, japan's u.n. policy won't change. japan is to be a part of most inclusive decision-making in the multilateral forum. japan has focused on three points, international peace and

stability, cooperation for development, and improving the human rights. the u.n. policy remains one of the major components of japanese diplomacy. because the united nations has given japan many chances to contribute more to international community. so this year the united nations will celebrate its 75th anniversary of foundation. then, towards that, japan is now preparing for a 2022 election board security council seeking for permanent membership. thank you very much for listening to my presentation. >> thank you, konoe. stephanie. >> thank you. and it's actually great to be here and part of this very important collection of essays. and i would commend them actually to all of you. one of the things that are really appreciated with this set of essays,, they all start from a historical basis. these issues are clearly very pressing now

but but i think they really only makes sense when you provide the historical context which gives us some lessons for today. professor konoe paper in particular use the expression of embedded bilateralism. i think there's an aspect of embedded multilateralism that explain some of the structural linkages that are in place between japan and the united states and other members of these organizations and the structural linkages are sustained even when the current environment is challenging to them. so that historical perspective i think is

important to keep in mind as we talk about the presence, the evolution of japan's role, and we heard about it in the last panel, but the evolution of japan's role in the g7 ultimately the g20 and also in the united nations comes through very much in the papers. it is striking in particular in the g7 and g20 paper, japan's role or maybe it's how japan is influencing those organizations or how those organizations are influencing japan and an economic context, and you go through a couple of periods in the 1980s and the 1990s where japan is being influenced and pressured by the organizations for reform. but if we think about the more recent three and a particular particular japan's role in leading the g20, japan was very much in the role of setting the agenda and in particular on issues that are going to be very important going forward. and what we think about some of the challenges that if they see the international system on issues of infrastructure and quality infrastructure, on data free flow with trust, these are issues japan was are effective in prioritizing for their g20

year and really leaving. use a very clear evolution of japan's role in the g7 and g20 setting. similarly, in the united nations and as professor honda just went through, japan really carve out a roll and you called your paper the transnational or the nontraditional issues of

economic disparity, if i mental degradation, infectious diseases. diseases. these issues unfortunately are as depressing as they were when japan first prioritize them for its engagement and united nations, but there again i think is he japan play a leadership role despite a structure that is challenging for japan to play the role in united nations. so then we go next to come to both actually highlight some tensions that are inherent in this multilateral mechanisms, tensions between the individual members and the broader membership of these organizations. that point i mentioned before the japan's example in the'80s and'90s, the tensionwhich event is being pressured by these come its membership in the g7 in particular. it goes to a point that membership has certain opportunities, provides opportunities within subjects the members to certain pressure. so there's a matter of accepting some surrender of sovereignty by merit of membership in these organizations. professor honda come in your paper, you actually make it incredibly relevant to the current times in speaking to a washington audience. i think you talk about unless washington is prepared to occasion compromise, it's unlikely that other governments will cite on with their help is necessary for u.s. priorities. and so we have talked about the wto in this panel but i think when we talk about membership a multilateral

organizations, that membership can bring pressure on a nation's priority but can also subject the member to certain pressures. and that in the weight is the price of membership in this multilateral organizations. that goes back to the embedded bilateralism or multilateralism and in the structural linkages that are created. at a minimum, membership means that you have agreed to discuss and try to find a way forward on some very difficult issues which reads me to the last point of lessons for today in the environment that we are facing. in the g7 paper, as we mentioned,, you said there are some experiences that japan has that are relevant to a rising power. you never explicitly say china but certainly when i read the paper and you look at some of that parallels between the economic structures of japan or a china, i would wholeheartedly agree

there's some lessons for rising powers. one of the lessons i took a weight is when you're an economy of size, as japan was and is, that there is still at a global sense annual of the global community then applying pressure for certain changes, those changes may also require though a domestic consensus and domestic reform. and so you kind of need those pieces, the multilateral pressure maybe for change but the domestic change happen to need to have the political buy-in and the two need to go hand in hand because i think otherwise you end up with an incomplete reform that can maybe not be in the members

best interest. so when it comes to other lessons for today, i already mention that some the transnational or nontraditional issues that were highlighted, just to say the issue that you identified in the 1990scontext are still more relevant now than ever. you highlight the korean peninsula. you also highlight environment and climate change and also nuclear weapons. i think all of those an obvious point but it bears repeating that there is no unilateral or bilateral solution to those issues. the most pressing issues of today require global responses, and that just underscores the point you are making about the necessity of baby giving up some sovereignty in a sense we are facing global issues. and then finally implications for the u.s. and again i will refer to your paper, professor honda. you talk about two big clusters in the united nations. you talk about a china cluster and you talk about a european/japan

cluster, and then you mention that the united states is largely isolated. and so again for a u.s. audience reading that an kind of what's the take away from that, one has to question how can that sort of isolation be in the u.s. best interest. so again thank you for the papers. it was a pleasure to read them. >> great, terrific, great. again, great insights here at the table, and when you see the papers you'll see there's a lot more interesting detail on some of these points. i think will be further learnings for all of us. let me throw out a couple of questions have been bring you in, audience, and we will try to keep two mics. let me ask, in a way picking up on stephanie point about domestic buy-in to see, to sort of understand better how

sustainable this trend of japan stepping up and taking more of a leadership role in these international institutions is. certainly it's been over the time i've been following japan for 30 years, dramatic, really dramatic change of japan's posture from the days when the japanese prime minister and pictures of the g7 was standing down at the end all a bit awkwardly and embarrassed. that was the kind of exception that proves the rule, to today where prime minister abe is leading on initiative like data free flow with trust and quality infrastructure principles and so forth, really dramatic change. but i guess the question is about sustainability. the honda

sensei, in your paper again i'm sorry that you all don't have the papers but there's a a couple of bowls that you cite within japan that strike me. one was you talk about the constraint of the constitution article nine constraints and say that went after the gulf war, the first goal for an early 1990s when japan japan had the sort of awkward situation come to put it mildly, giving huge amounts of money and getting not only no credit for it but a huge criticism and then deciding to ramp up its pto, peacekeeping operations. and you said after some debate, 70% of people you cite, 70% of people supported the notion of japan stepping out, the japan self-defense forces that the

other doing peacekeeping operations. so 70%, that's quite a lot of support for that. seems a little contrary contrary to the notion that japanese people are a little allergic to the notion of pushing out in a way that might be awkward constitutionally. you have another number saying today, 58% of people according to one poll are opposed to an amendment to the constitution that abe proposed to add more capability for japan in this area. i just wonder kind of how much more buy-in is or from the japanese people to those specific issue but i would say more generally to japan playing a a more active and proactive role in some of these u.n. related efforts? >> thank you. i think in order to take initiative in multilateral institution, japan needs like-minded nations, unlike european nations and african nations. as i told you about the difficulty to gain in the

permanency insecurity council, actually the african nation hold the key. but today the african nations are closing to chinese government. but i think the relation between the african nations and china, like relation can. in order to take initiative, japan needs like-minded nation and the need to gain trust from the members as much as possible. let me a little bit talk about classes in the general assembly. yes, okay. now in general assembly, general assembly can be divided

into two big concert. one cluster is formulated by china, and russia is closing to china cluster. african nations are absorbed by the china cluster. other big cluster is made by, initiated i european nation. japan is one of the members. and u.s. u.s. isolate, not excluded from the historic perspective. this tendency hasn't changed. united states is isolated herself, itself from any other class. and today some pacific nation. in this way today japan's like-minded countries, european nations. so for the time being, this tendency doesn't change. and,

therefore, japan tried to keep their friends close to the japanese policy. and also try to invite u.s., their influential, very important as a nation ally, parker, and try to invite it to european cluster. >> konoe sensei, let me ask you, the previous panel talked about this notion of japan wanting or mike was talk about the tension between japan's instinct of more inclusive institutional arrangements where everybody is in including countries like china. but on the other hand, money, high-quality, high quality rules and norms and standards. i want to sort of ask a variation on on the

theme. in the global context because it seems that there is some sense in the global arena that japan has some preference for some more exclusive briefings. it was i think visibly pained at the notion of the obama administration's decision to make the g20 the kind of global economic steering group. i know the g20 was created before that but it was really a proactive decision by the obama administration to say it's the longer the g7, that which the g20 at a think japan was uncomfortable treasure like the idea of the small like-minded group. also alluded to before i think by amy searight that during the asian financial crisis japan propose a a monetary fund and there been other times and which japan has had a preference in the global

context for any kind of asian solution to certain problems, a little more exclusive as it were arrangement. is that a fair way to look at it? is there any tension there that even the right way to characterize japan's with thinking about these organizations that it's good to get a smaller group or a more like-minded group together and not to have necessarily a broader more inclusive grouping? >> may become like sometimes japan, like japan, japanese government made uncomfortable when like all the pictures they brought in, might have brought in like if membership expanded. so in that sense, japan has to negotiate, so

japan's hesitance may come from that and also some historical issues that japan has, like when the g7 expanded to the g8, to back pennies government resisted because of the issues with russia, so that impact the japanese governments attitude but on the other hand japan now realized that exclusive for them is not enough to secure liberal border or stability in the economy, that is a big realization i think so maybe in the past japan was more hesitant about bringing things -- like again confronting some sensitive issues like a public

forum, but engagement with all the emerging markets in the public forum has become more important for japan so i think that is japan's attitude can change in e future but, so so in the exclusive group japan had some privilege to talk on behalf of the powers so that prevented japan from showing -- but as she talked about structural issues it's very important to have structural in which is not only at the summit level but also at the ministerial and ranking official and so that kind of structure linkage needs to be built not only among the advanced economies but also

with the emerging economies, so when we look at all the trade arrangements building and asia-pacific and also in the pacific region it's more like japan is trying to bring more friends or like building more corporate networks with various partners, so that is my view, yes. >> let me just ask one more quick question and then prepare a couple of questions if you have them from the audience because alternate you next, but for both of you china didn't come up as much, it was touched on but it didn't come up as much as you might expect but let me put it explicitly on the table by saying what sort of single thing do you worry about most whether it's in the un or the g7 g20 context about the

prospect of a united states that is not as committed to its engagement or its role in the institutions and china that is more assertive in trying to push its interests in these institutions. what is the single thing you think is most worrisome in your respective areas in that world. >> so changing international environment mirrors in the united nation so alignment by the china has started in the united nation, most worrying that china only needs to follow the international rules and norms so other members start --

strongly want china to follow the international laws and also i need to share the universal values like democracy, human rights, norms, free trade system so other members try to ask indochina to share these kinds of things. >> so single point, worrisome point, it's a difficult question but i think if by lateral is a over a ways coronation that be very worrisome for the g7 and g20, if china's rivalry and

escalations happened more also the trade tensions between the u.s. in the european countries got escalated more also with japan if these things are dealt with more bilaterally the forum may lose some weight in terms of ensuring free trade liberal order so that is the worrisome plate. >> i see, okay, let me ask the audience if they would like to ask questions if you do have a question wait for the microphone, state your name and then ask a short question if you would it all take a couple of them, this gentleman in the third row here, right there, yeah, thanks. >> thank you, i'm with the japanese newspaper, my question concerns the leadership role with the united states and global institutions i believe

that we will be in the interest of the united states to support leadership roles like g7 and g20 but it seems like much of the u.s. population has been so disillusioned by the outcome of globalization and they no longer believe it to be the case that it would be beneficial for the united states to support their leadership role going forward and also it's true that the current global institutions do not necessarily reflect any longer the balance of power or the changing global landscape like the rise of china where the relative decline of japan. so my question is what do you think, is there anything japan

could realistically do for change or influence these changing narratives, changing case against so-called globalize -- globalizing in the united states. >> all right all repeat the question leader but the gentleman there with the retiree come forward, forward if you will, the gentleman of the red tie, that's, right can you give him the mic, thank you. >> like question is a little bit for my colleague a asked why japan escape from the rise of populism or bilateral nationalism -- is happening in

many g7 and g20 countries, what do you think, is this a kind of japanese exceptionalism or sooner or later japan will be on the same page as other countries? >> so you're not asking me you're asking the japanese scholars, with the gentlemen right there in the sweater. >> hi i'm a grad student and international affairs, i have a question especially for the dprk, i think you mentioned how japan is engaged with -- like north korea nuclear issues to the un security council but it seems like prime minister abe has interest in talking to north korea directly as well but as we see north korea and the u.s. negotiation didn't go very well, what do you think is a possible rule of japanese government in the future? >> so we have had a change the narrative in the u.s. about globalization in a more positive way, i'm actually

gonna stephanie that question and then, why has japan been amuse -- immune from populism and will it last, and does japan have a rule in the nuclear negotiations? actually let's do it this way, go ahead, you go first. >> okay japan's laws in tackling the global issues this is the strong feel for japan to promote because as i repeated many times japan has -- so non traditional issues, japan shouldn't black strongly so in order to promote non-traditional issues and diplomacy, in order to advance diplomacy you need to invite

the united states in this is the key and it is very influential, the country, the united states that the united states is showing up for unilateralism so somehow any to pull the united states back and work together. so as i told you global change, global warming and the issues china and russia are taking initiative in this issue, this is good they, tackling global issues but to political things in this area so you need to pull the united states back, and japan need to coordinate laws by the major stakeholders and work on the issues together and this is my idea and as for -- japan is a

non permanent member today therefore it is quite difficult to show more commitment to the making a resolution against it, so prime minister abe has a stronger will to have a tight wreck talk with kim jong-un. but it takes more time to have it because japan is not, should not direct contact and need to wait for communication between kim jong-un and trump for the time being and wait and see for

the moment and then japan has another issue between korea that is projection issues that should be more carefully japanese government has to move on therefore we wait and see for the moment. >> thank you very much for your comment, for the matter of populism it's difficult for me to answer but for japan it can try to convey the right message to society level because rise of populism, wrong message misinformation is for the

political benefit so it's very important for japanese and not only for the government level but for various levels to convey what is right and convey the matter is based on the facts. so that kind of communication help to mitigate the populism movement like in other countries that also the financial role, populism and japan had the financial crisis in the 1990s but some scholars say that is -- although it had all the economic difficulties because japan didn't have the huge rights of populism even after the huge losses of wealth and change in economic power but, yeah, but if the situation

changes with as collation or if the issues came into japan so europe i'm not sure if the japanese government or japan has a tools to handle so i think japan has to be prepared for this and all the things that are more like now growing concerns at this point but if escalation happens japan has to be prepared for that, so that's my answer. >> chest on the question of what my change the narrative in the u.s. the anti globalization narrative i wonder sometimes how over stated that might be in the sense that polling shows americans actually are still supportive of free trade, we

have, i don't know the most current status but getting through democratic house and there i think the claim would be not anti trade but fair trade, so certain concessions you can change the narrative around trade as fair trade and get support and so similarly i think globalization itself, it's not that the u.s. is anti globalization but i think there is a tendency for politicians in the u.s. and elsewhere to look outside for something to vilify and i think that has been a problem, so it's probably the responsibility of leaders to avoid vilifying globalization. and if you want to use the usmca as an example of leveling the playing field or giving some concession on environment and labor i would

like to take that model and applied to other global issues like the environment and i don't think most americans would say that they are anti environmental standards are moving in the direction of whatever standards are here that are kind of the global standard zone away i think there is a call for -- wanting others to me what others dinners the u.s. is wanting to meet up to. >> so i'm gonna forego other questions in the interest of keeping the promise of leaving earlier. another terrific discussion we only skim the surface but what are the papers coming out at least in the next few months there will be a collection of these papers and i think you will enjoy them and learn something from that but for now if you could join me in thanking our panelists for participating today.

(applause) and there is coffee still entity up on that terrorists and the four professors will be up there, thank you so much.

>> up next, a seminar where college students discuss the upcoming presidential race with the political reporter and former presidential speechwriter. they talk about the current landscape and politics. we'll hear first from stephanie hamill, video columnist at "the daily caller." (applause) (applause) >> thank you for the introduction. i'm really excited to be here today. i'm a little sick. there's a horrible cold flu going around. hopefully i'm not contagious. if i hack up a lung, i apologize. i committed to this a few months ago, and you just never know when you're going to get sick will i'm here to share my journey from arizona to working in national news and politics here in the nation's capital. before i start rambling about myself, i'd like to get to know all of you a little better. how many for you is it your first time in whi