tv CSIS Forum on Japans Role as a Global Leader CSPAN January 15, 2020 8:10am-10:09am EST
captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2008 with the recognition u.s. leadership might not really return in the way it has been in the past. this is where i think it would be interesting to see where japan would head. >> i'll collect a question or two and let the panel respond and turn over to matt. if you have questions for the panel, now is your chance. you'll get another shot with matt's panel and then over coffee. we have mics. >> i teach at american university and used to be an american diplomat. listening to the presentation of
japan's interests and objectives in this situation, one can't help thinking that there is tremendous value to japan in having a close, cooperative relationship with south korea in the region and in these multilateral organizations and yet there's some obvious tensions in that relationship. i would love to hear from our japanese intellects why you think the japanese elite are prioritizing other issues instead of getting long with south korea and what you think might be done? >> we'll take one more. yes, ma'am. right here. >> my name is amanda, i'm the founder at the institute of world politics and also a doctoral candidate at the school. my question for you is that how
can the u.s. and japanese alliance better counter china's belt and road initiative as well as their soft power at an institutional level? >> how to counter? >> thank you for your questions. with regard to the japan relation with south korea it is sometimes very sensitive. it's influenced by more like the domestic politics rather than the sort of objective strategic environment. that's why sometimes we see weakness sort of seemingly not really reasonable sort of phenomena may happen. however, at the strategic level,
relations with south korea are always salient for japan, i think, particularly with regard to how to form a cooperative framework across the region. south korea is a big economic power to have a lot of influence and south korea has its own initiative towards southeast asia. in this regard, even when japan strongly promotes cooperation with southeast asia, sort of how to cooperate with south korea, is also entering sort of the scope of japan. and also with regard to the u.s./japan alliance, i think one of the key issues is how much japan and the united states can
cooperate in developing infrastructure, in implementing specific projects regarding infrastructure in relevant regions in korea and southeast asia. my sense is from a viewpoint of a researcher, japanese researcher of southeast asia, southeast asia needs a huge amount of money and china cannot afford to sort of finance that southeast asia needs. in this regard, the southeast asia also seeks other sources of support. in this regard, japan and the united states have great potential to fully, effectively sort of promote infrastructure development in the region.
>> thank you for the question. as for the south korea issue, both countries, japan and south korea, the politization over the history has a very big power to shape the attitude of each other. i think so this is beyond the regional cooperation. it's a very big obstacle to cooperate with other, but on the other hand, now japan, china and south korea are trying to promote the free trade agreement among three countries in the total cooperation scheme. this is very interesting.
so now japan, south korea and china already have a total cooperation scheme and the secondary actor is located in seoul. among the three countries now the more pragmatic cooperation are considered to be promoted. it's a very important point. for the u.s./japan alliance, yes, i totally agree with shoji. so now japan and the united states have to put substantial substance to the free and open indo-pacific by promoting the cooperation as well as
infrastructure development. the substance of the free and open indo-pacific is a key point po not manage or divert the lives of china's influence in the region. that's my opinion. >> we're going to turn now to the global g-7, g-20 and united nations. you had a nice display of the challenges, but also the really proactive thinking going on in japan about how to strengthenenutional structure and how to strengthen the alliance at the same time. they are intertwined as matt like to point out with article 2 and we're grateful we had this chance. let's thank this panel and while clapping invite the next one up.
welcoming you all here to this strategic japan panel or event. we're the global panel so we're going to look at japan as a leader in global institutions. i think you're going to hear a lot of themes that are echoed as cross the regional and global and differences in how to think about japan's role institutionally in the world. i think you will get new perspectives here and certainly we have two terrific japanese scholars to help us through that and then my colleague. let me introduce them briefly. sara is next to stephanie, is professor of kansei, currently a visiting researcher in cologne, germany. she received her ph.d. from the
johns hopkins school of advanced international studies. her research focuses on international political economy, politics of financial regulation and european integration. she has been looking in the context of this event in japan's role in the g7 and g-20, the global economic governance organizations of which the united states and japan are members and how japan can play a role as a leader or at least a mediator within those groups. delighted to have her with us. next to me is miechanica miki h. previously she was associate professor at wasada and a staff writer at japan times and her research interests include traditional and nontraditional security studies and united nations studies and her
contribution to the collection that mike is assembling is hon japan's role in the united nations. i think she's going to address that today. at the end of the table is stephanie segal who is my colleague here at csas, senior fellow in the simon share. previously served as codirector of the east asia office at the u.s. department of the treasury where she worked for many years and also was at the international monetary fund for five years or so and she also earned a masters degree from johns hopkins. by the way, we do put a heavy premium on diversity at csas and i'm somewhat apologetic that three of the four people up here, including myself, went to csas. we'll try to remedy that. thank you honda for giving us a different perspective. with that we're going to ask -- i think we're going to start
with kanoi, a brief introduction and then we'll go from there. >> thank you very much for your kind introduction. dr. goodman, i would like to thank the japan chair and dr. green to invite me for this very important conference and i look forward to discussions very much. for japan's economic diplomacy at the g7 and g-20, i would like to draw your attention to the following three points. the first one is the g7 was an important forum for japan to ensure the fair treatment in the context of the post-world liberal order. it was a place for japan to make its rapid growth with other g7 partners, other big powers and being accommodated by them.
secondly, i think japan provided a useful mediating role as the only known western member of g7 to convey a view of emerging economies and also aging economies in particular. third, g7 could be used as a stepping stone to find common ground and lay out alternative options for the discussion of the g-20, which includes various supervising powers and more diverse views. this strategy could be used especially for contentious issues such as payment imbalances, macro imbalances and additional governance. to elaborate a little bit these points i would like to briefly look back at japan's key experiences with g7 and economic
governors. g7 handles the economic and financial challenges in the 1970s. current market after the collapse of the system and also all the crises to be tackled with. japan promoted the agenda of the development that issues like human security and global health and various issues and took leadership and initiative in those issues. but japan also struggled with the international pressures that came through g7. for example, to mitigate trade tensions, trade conflicts especially with the u.s. and to some extent also with the european partners, japan had to learn like the accommodative
policies, some policies helped japan to make its economy more competitive, for example, like macro policies did not help in a good way but when it was made in a reactive manner. so the results are mixed for the benefits of the japanese economy but japan is absolutely able to strengthen its relationship with the u.s. and european partners through g7 engagement, despite all the trade conflicts that stems from its rising economic growth in the 1970s and '80s, like towards the mid 1990s. after the 1990s, japan's role declined to some extent because of economic decline but now like after abe came to power japan
started to take initiative in various issues as you can -- as the former panel has discussed. japan's proactive role was very prominent in asian financial crisis after the 1997 asian financial crisis as the former panel discussed. japan proposed a fund and g7 was at first very slow to react but japan kept calling for financial support in the g7 and garnered financial support. like the example shows, some of japan's proactive engagement with g7 and asian issue, so to take a role as a mediator between aging and imagined economies and the g7 partners.
japanese government invited asian leaders in the pre-summit meetings of the g7 pre-summit meetings and also its reported to the asian countries after the summit to report what happened and what was discussed. that's japan's role that we could see from the g7 experiences, but also japan had -- japan's case can be a lesson and provide lessons for how to balance the rising economic powers between rising economic powers and the more powers of stabilized growth because some like macro economic coordination process that did not really correct the imbalances, but it was helpful
to mitigate the trade conflict. maybe more technical knowledge or discussion should be combined, like not only in the financial ministry meeting but also to the top level. lastly, i would like to emphasize the potential role of g7 to be used as a stepping stone to bring the discussion that the g-20 because of the more institutionalized -- because g-20 has the institutionalized network, especially in the financial stability issue with close coordination with like the financial stability board and also the expert committees such as the committee for banking supervisor, sort of dealing with the issues and also including some assessment of the results.
g-20 still has a lot of tensions and diverse view, more diverse view, so like in the g7, maybe like for the contentious issues in which like even experts cannot agree on, the g7 leaders can try to find some common ground like governors, tax issues and so on, try to bring their views and some like various options to the g-20 table and set this kind of strategic way of dealing with the institution could be useful. i think this is my view. thank you. >> thank you, chair. good afternoon, everyone. my name is honda from university tokyo. i am very pleased to have the opportunity to speak to you.
today i would like to speak on the japan laws and strategic objectives in the united nations and the united nations is the largest global institution. japan gained u.m. membership in 1956. since then, japan has made efforts as a stakeholder to achieves the u.n. missions, all the u.n. missions, maintaining the international peace and security, providing humanitarian assistance, promoting sustaining development and upholding law. so united nations policy has maintained a major component of japanese diplomacy. u.n. is the platform to enable japan to contribute pore to the
international community even if it has the constitutional limitation. now in the process of developing u.n. diplomacy, it has two major challenges. the first one happened in 1990 on the occasion of the gulf war. before that, the financial contribution is safer and most comfortable japan to show its presence in the international community, but on the occasion of the gulf war, japan couldn't send the sdf forces to the area because, of course, japan has the constitutional limitations. instead, it provided more than $130 billion to the u.s. multilateral forces. after the war, nobody evaluated
japan's financial contribution. therefore, this one, this event, traumatized the japanese government. then quite quickly, the next year in the 1992, japan enacted a so-called law and this became the legal business for dispatching the sdf to east timor, cambodia, south sudan. sdf has played a major role in nation building. the members made efforts to achieve mutual understanding with the local people and carry out their missions without firing a single shot. japan's soft power departing from the emphasis of military might was very welcomed byes the international community. another challenge for japan was
around 1999 in the field of international cooperation and development due to the phenomena of globalization, global issues like the economic disparity, displaced persons issues and environmental degradation, those issues emerged as common threads to the international community. now around the time asia experienced a financial crisis in 1997, so those changes in the situation gave an opportunity for japan to shift its contribution. then japan made a great contribution to formulate one important international norm, that is the human security. this is the concept securing
the -- all of the people from any threat, any kind of threat, so this became the accepted and became the international norm by the adoption of the general assembly in the united nations. this idea of the japanese diplomacy and it is -- and it became the very important component of japanese diplomacy. and in 1999, japan established a trust fund for the human security to translate the concept into the u.n. initiative project. then this idea is active. now let's -- let me talk about the laws and challenges in the major two -- two major biggest
organizations in the united states, they are the general assembly and security council. in a changing international environment, discussions in the general assembly is very important because general assembly is the most democratic organ in the u.n. because the 193 u.n. members hold the one voting right equally, so in the general assembly most general things, global issues, often are discussed. then on the occasion of the 74th meeting last year, prime minister abe addressed the importance of multilateralism and stressed japan's contribution to the united nations, especially on global
issues. so the general assembly heard of a multilateral approach by all nations. for example, a global issue, among the global issues, climate change. this issue is very important and at the top of the general assembly's agenda. in this field, japan, including its many kind of projects related to global warming, but in this field we cannot find the presence from the united states. now instead, china is taking an initiative and also russia is taking an initiative, so this field is becoming very much political issues today.
japan tried to invite the u.s. into the discussion especially about the global issues. let me move to the laws in the security council. up like the democratic organ of the general assembly, the security council is very exclusive and it's very political leaning. it has a conventional wisdom that p 5 decide and ten permanent members abide by the decisions. japan has served as non-permanent member on 11 occasions, which is most frequently left out, and despite a limited law, japan has cooperated with the u.s. in formulating the resolution against dprk's nuclear development. during the term of 2016-2017,
japan organized a meeting 18 times and japan and the u.s. cooperated in making a fixed resolution against dprk. as a form of the security council, the movement of the reform within the u.n. has been building for years. it is essential to reforms the security council to reflect the reality of the international community. this is very important. in the past, japan proposed a plan with india, germany, brazil, this discussion today is quite a bit -- is still active in the level committee in the united nations. the plan was proposed by a united consensus group including
italy, colombia and fashions. another plan was proposed by african nations, so those -- the three plans confronting asia. for japan, to gain a permanent seat in the security council is difficult because the p-5 obtained vetoes, veto is a privilege and a right. any of the -- any member of the p-5 that doesn't want to hand this privilege rights to other nations, and so there are many -- there are not many, three enemy clauses still alive. it's quite difficult to reform the u.n./china, this is a difficult thing and a challenge
for japan to obtain the permanent seat in the security council. but from the viewpoint of the discussion in the security council, and the size of japan's financial contribution ranking third in the world, japan needs to continue to argue for japan's admission to permanent seat in the security council. now, japan has the longest serving prime minister abe. if the prime minister changes, japan's u.n. policy won't change. japan is to be a part of the most inclusive decision making in the multilateral forum and japan has focused on three points, international peace and security, cooperation for development, and improving the human rights. the u.n. policy remains one of
the major components of japanese diplomacy because the unit nation has given japan many chances to contribute more to international community. so this year at the united nations we will celebrate its 75th anniversary of the foundation. toward that, japan is now preparing for a 2022 election for the security council, for a member seat. thank you for listening to my presentation. >> thank you, honda. more food for thought that i have questions on. stephanie. >> thank you. it's actually great to be here and part of this very important collection of essays. i would commend them, actually, to all of you. one of the things that i really
appreciated with this set of essays, they all start from a historical basis. these issues are clearly very pressing now, but i think they really only make sense when you provide the historical context, which gives us some lessons for today. professor kanoi's paper, you use the expression of embedded bilateralism, i think there's an aspect that explains some of the structural linkages that are in place between japan and the united states and the other members of these organizations and those structural linkages are sustained even when the current environment is challenging to them, so that historical perspective i think is important to keep in mind as we talk about the present. the evolution of japan's role, and we heard about it in the last panel, but the evolution of japan's role in the g-7, ultimately the g-20 and in the
united nations comes through very much in the papers, it is striking in particular in the g7 and g-20 paper, japan's role or maybe it's how japan is influencing those organizations or those organizations are influencing japan in an economic context and you go through a couple periods in the 1980s and 1990s where japan is being influenced and pressured by these organizations for reform, but if we think about the more recent period and in particular japan's role in leading the g-20, japan was very much in the role of setting the agenda and in particular on issues that are going to be very important going forward and when we think about some of the challenges that are facing the international system on issues of infrastructure and quality infrastructure, on data free flow with trust, these are issues that japan was very effective in prioritizing for
their g-20 year and really leading. i think you see a very clear evolution of japan's role in the g7 and g-20 setting. similarly in the united nations and as professor honda went through, japan really carved out a role and you call in your paper the transnational or the non-traditional issues of economic disparity, environmental degradation and infectious diseases, these issues unfortunately are as pressing as they were when japan really first prioritized them for its engagement in the united nations, but there again, i think you see japan playing a leadership role, despite a structure that is actually challenging for japan to play that role in the united nations. then we go next to you both actually highlight some tensions that are inherent in these multilateral mechanisms, tensions between the individual
members and the broader membership of these organizations. that point i mentioned before, the japan example in the '80s and '90s, the tension where japan is actually being pressured by these -- its membership in the g7 in particular. it goes to a point that membership has certain opportunities, provides opportunities to leave, but subjects the members to certain pressure. there's a matter of accepting some surrender of sovereignty by merit of membership in these organizations. professor honda in your paper, you actually make it incredibly relevant to the current times in speaking to washington audience, i think you talk about unless washington is prepared to occasionally compromise, it's unlikely other governments will sign on when their help is necessary for u.s. priorities. we haven't talked about the wto
in this panel, but i think, you know, when we talk about membership and multilateral organizations, that membership can bring pressure on a nation's priorities but can also subject the member to certain pressures and that in a way is the price of membership in these multilateral organizations. that actually goes back to the embedded bilateralism or multilateralism and the structural linkages that are created. at a minimum, membership means that you have agreed to discuss and try and find a way forward on some very difficult issues, which brings me to the last point of lessons for today and the environment that we're facing. in the g7 paper, as we mentioned, you said that there are some experiences that japan has that are relevant to a rising power. you never explicitly say china but when i read the paper and
you look at some of the parallels between the economic structures of japan or china i would agree there are some lessons for rising powers. one of the lessons that i took away is that when you're an economy of size as japan was and is, that there are spillovers then in a global sense and then you'll have the global community applying pressure for certain changes, those changes may also require, though, a domestic consensus and domestic reforms and so you kind of need those two pieces, the multilateral pressure maybe for change, but then the domestic change needs to have the political buy-in and the two need to go hand in hand because i think otherwise you end up with an incomplete reform that can maybe not be in the member's best interest.
when it comes to other lessons for today, i mentioned some of the transnational or nontraditional issues that were highlighted in professor honda's paper. just to say the issues that you identified in the 1990's context are still more relevant now than ever. you highlight the korean peninsula and you also highlight environment and climate change and also nuclear weapons. on all of those, it bears repeating there's no unilateral or bilateral solution to those issues. the most pressing issues of today require global responses and that just underscores i think the point you were making about the necessity of giving up sovereignty in facing global issues. implications for the u.s. and again i will refer to your paper, professor honda, you talk about two big clusters in the united nations and talk about a
china cluster and a european/japan cluster. then you mention the united states is largely isolated. for a u.s. audience, reading that and kind of what's the takeaway from that, one has to question how can that sort of isolation be in the u.s.' best interest. thank you for the papers. it was a pleasure to read them. >> great insights here at the table and when you see the papers you'll see there's more interesting detail on some of these points that i think will be, you know, further learnings for all of us. let me throw out a couple questions and then bring you in, audience, and we'll try to keep to mike's notion of stopping early to have time to have coffee and chat with the four professors. let me ask, in a way picking up
on stephanie's point about domestic buy-in to see -- to sort of understand how better sustainable this trend of japan stepping up and taking more of a leadership role in these international institutions is. certainly it's been over the time i've been following japan for 30 years, a dramatic, really i would say dramatic change of japan's posture from the days when, you know, the japanese prime minister in pictures in the g7 was kind of standing down at the end a little bit awkwardly and embarrassed, kind of threw the scarf on and stood near the middle, that was the exception that proved the rule, to today where prime minister abe is leading on initiatives like data free flow with trust and quality infrastructure principles and so forth, really dramatic change, but i guess the questions about sustainability, to honda, in your paper, i'm
sorry you all don't have the papers, but there are a couple polls you cite within japan that struck me. one was that you talk about the constraints of the constitution, article 9 constraints, and say when after the gulf war that you're talking about the first gulf war in the early 1990s when japan had this sort of awkward situation to put it mildly of giving huge amounts of money and getting not only no credit but huge criticism and then deciding to, you know, to ramp up its pko, peacekeeping operations, and you said that after some debate, 70% of people you cite data that 70% of the people supported the notion of japan stepping out with -- the japan self-defense force doing price keeping, i'm sorry, i'm an economist, peacekeeping operations, and so 70%, that's
quite a lot of support for that. it seems a little contrary to the notion that japan -- the japanese people are a little allergic to the notion of pushing out in a way that might be awkward constitutionally and you have another number saying today, 58% of people according to one poll are opposed to an amendment to the constitution that abe proposed to add more capability for japan in this area. how much buy-in is there from the japanese people to those specific issues, but i would say more generally to japan playing a more active and pro active role in some of these u.n. related efforts? >> thank you. in order to -- i think in order to take initiative in the multilateral institution, japan needs like-minded nations, like
the european nations and african nations, and as i told you about the difficulty to gain in the permanent seat in security council, actually, the african nations hold the key. today, the african nations are closing to the chinese government, but i think the relationship between the african nations and china relations are small. in order -- in order to take the initiative, japan needs like-minded nations and a need to gain the trust from the u.n. members as much as possible. let me a little bit talk about
the classes in the general assembly. yes. okay. dr. segal pointed out, now in general assembly, general assembly can be divided into the two big clusters. one cluster is formulated by china. russia is closing to china cluster. african nations are absorbed by the china cluster. in the other big cluster is made by -- initiated by european nations and japan is one of the cluster members. you asked, isolated, not excluded from the historic perspective, this tendency hasn't changed. the united states has isolated itself from any other cluster.
today, close to some pacific nations. in this way, today japan's like-minded countries are european nations. for the time being, this tendency doesn't change. therefore, japan tried to keep the french close to the japanese policy an also tried to invite u.s. which is very influential and very important nation alliance partner, tried to invite it to the european cluster. >> kanoi, let me ask you, the previous panel talked about this notion of japan wanting or mike was talking about the tension between japan's instinct to have more inclusive institutional
arrangements where everybody is in, including countries like china, but on the other hand wanting high-quality rules and norms and standards, and i want to sort of ask a variation on that theme in the global context because it seems that there is some sense in the global arena that japan has some preference for somewhat more exclusive groupings. it was i think visibly pained at the notion of the obama administration's decision to make the g-20 the kind of global economic steering group -- i know the g-20 was created before that but it was a proactive decision by the obama administration to say it's no longer the g7, now it's the g-20 -- and i think japan was quite uncomfortable about that because you liked the idea of the smaller, like-minded group. also it was alluded to before, i think by amy searight, that
during the asian financial crisis, japan proposed an asian monetary fund and there have been other times at which japan has had a preference in a global context for a kind of asian solution to certain problems, a little more exclusive as it were arrangement. is that a fair way to look at it? i mean, is there any tension there? is that even the right way to characterize japan's way of thinking about these organizations that it's good to get a smaller group or a more like-minded group together and not have necessarily a broader, more inclusive grouping? >> maybe like sometimes japan like in my view, personal view, like japan may feel the japanese government may feel uncomfortable like when all the tensions in asia may have brought, like if the membership expanded like so in that sense,
like japan has to negotiate. so japan's hess tance may come from that and also some like historical issues that japan has like when the g7 expanded to g-8, the japanese government resisted because of the historic territorial issue with russia. that impacts the japanese government's attitude. but on the other hand, japan now realized that it's exclusive arm is not enough to secure order or like stability in the world economy. that's a big realization i think. so maybe in the past japan was more hesitant about bringing things more global like -- an confronting with all the
sensitive issues, but in such a public forum, but engagement with all the emerging markets of the public forum has become more important for japan so that i think japan's attitude somewhat can't change like in the future more maybe. in exclusive group, japan had some privilege to somewhat like talk on behalf of asian powers so that prevented japan from showing willingness. as she talked about structural linkages, it's very important to have structural linkages between multilateral forums not only at the summit level but at the ministerial and also mid--ranking official level, technical group and so on, that
kind of structural linkage needs to be built not only among the advanced economies but the emerging economies. when we look at all the trade arrangements arrangements, building up an interpacific and also in the pacific region, it's more like japan needs -- is more trying to bring more the friends or, like, more, building more corporate networks with various partners. so that's my view. >> okay. let me ask one more quick question and then i'll prepare a couple questions if you have them from the audience. for both of you, china didn't come up as much. it was touched on but it didn't come up quite as much on this conversation as you might expect. let me put it on the table by saying what sort of single thing
do you worry about most whether it's in the u.n. or in the g7, g-20 context about the prospect of a united states that is not as committed to its engagement or its role in these institutions, and a china that is more assertive in trying to push its interests in these institutions? what's the single thing that you think is most worry somein your respective areas about that world? >> okay. so changing international environment, the united nations, so with china it's started and united nations too. the most worrying about the china i need to follow the international laws and norms,
and so other members strongly request china to follow the international norms and the laws, and also i need to share the universal values like democracy. human rights. norms. free trade system. so the other members try to ask china to share these kind of things. >> single point. that's a difficult question, but i think, like, bilateralism over the coordination that's worrysome for the g7 and g-20.
the tensions escalate more like also like the trade of tensions between u.s. and the european countries got escalated more like them, also with japan. if these things dealt with more bilaterally, it could -- the forum could -- may lose some weight in terms of ensuring the free trade liberal older. that's the worrysomepoint. >> let me ask the audience if they'd like to ask questions. if you do, wait for the microphone, state your name, and then ask a short question if you would, and i'll take a couple of them. this gentleman in the third row, here. thank you. i'm with a japanese newspaper.
my question concerns the leadership in the united states and global institutions. although i believe it will continue to be in the interest of the united states to support the leadership roles in global relationships, but it seems that much of the u.s. population has been disallusioned by the outcome of globalization, and they no longer believe it to be the case that it will be beneficial for the united states to support the leadership role going forward. and also it's true that the current global institutions do not necessarily reflect any longer the existing balance of power or the changing landscape like the rise of china or the relative decline of japan.
my question is what do you think would be -- is there anything japan could realistically do to change or influence these changing narrative, changing case against so-called globalism in the united states? >> all right. i'll repeat the question later, but this gentleman there with the red tie, come forward. all right. forward, if you would, and this gentleman there, yeah, with the red tie. that's right. could you give him the mic? >> my question is it's a little bit the question from my colleague. i'm quite often asked by my american friends that why japan is escaped from the alliance of -- rise of the nationalism or growing content against the
globalizing and then what's happening in many g7 and g-20 countries. is there a kind of japanese exceptionalism or sooner or later japan will be on the same page as other countries? >> you're not asking me. you're asking your japanese scholars. >> hi. i'm a grad student at the school of international affairs. i have a question especially about the dprk, you mentioned about how japan has engaged with dealing with nuclear issues, so the u.n. security council. it seems like prime minister abe has interests in talking to north korea, like directly as well. but as we see north korea and the u.s. and the negotiation didn't go really well. what do you think is the possible role of japanese government there in the future?
>> we have how to change the narrative in the u.s. about globalization in a more positive way. i'm going to ask stephanie that question, and then why has japan been immune from this populism and will it last, the trend around the world? and dprk, does japan have a role in the nuclear negotiations. we'll do it this way. that's fine. go ahead. you go first on this one. >> okay. japan's roles in tackling the global issues. this is the thing for japan to promote. japan should walk strongly. i noted to promote a long tradition of issues of
diplomacy, i added to demands, diplomacy. we need to invite the united states. this is the key, i think. and it's very influential, the country, the united states. but united states as you know, it is showing the appetite for united -- somehow i need to pull the united states back and work on together. so as i told you that global change, global warming, the issues, china and the russia are taking initiative in this issue. this is good things. tackling in the global issues, but too much political things in this area. so i need to pull the united states back. then on the japan, i need to coordinate the laws by the major stake holders, and work on the
issues together. this is my idea. and as for dprk, japan is not the permanent member today. therefore, it's quite difficult to more commit to show the more commitment to the making than the resolution against -- >> we will leave this discussion at this point. you can see the remainder on our website c-span.org. as we bring you now to a live picture from capitol hill this morning where house speaker nancy pelosi will be naming the impeachment managers who will prosecute the case against president trump. speaker pelosi delayed sending the articles today the house will vote to set the articles of impeachment to the senate. you'll be able to watch on c-span. it's expected tuesday in the third impeachment of a u.s.
pelosi. she'll name the impeachment managers who will prosecute the case against president trump. the two articles of impeachment delivered to the senate today against the president include obstruction of congress and abuse of power. speaker pelosi delayed sending the articles after the house approved them back in december. to learn more about how the trial will work. today the house will vote to send the articles of the senate. you can watch that on c-span.