tv Experts Discuss Arms Control Policy CSPAN February 9, 2022 2:24pm-3:25pm EST
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>> now to a conversation on the 20th anniversary of u.s. withdrawal from antiballistic missile treaty with russia, from the carnegie endowment for international peace. this lasts about an hour. >> welcome i'm george perkovich at the carnegie summit for international peace, i welcome you to the session we're honored to have today which is knowing to be looking at the historical development since 20 years ago, december 13th, the u.s. withdrew from the antiballistic missile treaty. we're going to be led in this discussion by the new president of the carnegie endowment,
justice who was moes recently a supreme court justice in the state of california, prior to that was a director of the freeman spogeley institute at stanford which among other functions does cutting edge research and other work related to nuclear weapons-related issues and in that capacity, worked with dr. hecker from los alamos lab and developing programming from stanton foundation so quite versed in nuclear policy and therefore quite eager to, as one of his first public outings as the new president of carnegie to address this topic and lead us through discussion with the honorable steve hadley and honorable rose, so i'll get out of the way and turn it over to justice kelar. >> it's my pleasure as president
of carnegie endowment to host this event, lucky to have two giants in the field, steve hadley former adviser and rose, one of the greatest negotiators in the u.s. i must say, i'm very glad you have come. just to give context, for our audience, it's not unusual to find us engaged deeply with nuclear issues, when i had a opportunity to work with heckler and sagan on these issues, the difficulties ultimately facing up to the nuclear risks and threats in the world have not only to do with geopolitics and must be practical as well as principled but also these issues were heavily technological, extremely complex, utterly, sometimes, far away from public perception of scrutiny and depend as much on any issue
affecting peace and security on the perspective of senior policy makers, not only the u.s., of course, who ideally steer us through a period of great risk and do so in a way that protects the concerns and interests of american people, for example, but also bears in mind that we would like to live in a world where every generation hands off to the next generation a world a bit safer than it is today. with that as backdrop, i would note, as a lawyer, who was taught international law for years, the treaty is a scary interesting treaty, an example of how countries come together and understand their needs for security might take them in directions they might not have expected at first. for 30 years that treaty was enforced through 2002 and as some of you in our audience know, limits ballistic missile systems, delivering nuclear weapons. it was negotiated as part of all the strategic arms negotiation talks, hailed at the time from
both u.s. and soviet union as a strategic factor in curbing the race in arms. did so after consideration of a variety of factors that may affect american security and our goal today is really two-fold, it's to understand that context, why did that happen? what was driving u.s. policy at that moment. second, how did that affect the world? what lessons might be draw, how might that inform our own ability to delegate the nuclear securities affecting the world. so what we'll do is start with our guests and ask them to give some context from their perspective, steve hadley was there at the time the discussion and decision was made, he'll give you say the context on his perspective, insights on what was driving u.s. concerns at the time, then we'll hear from rose guttemueller who was in moscow at the time and had the chance
to observe up close the russian-soviet interaction, ask questions then how the world might have been different if the world did something distinct, and then get to your questions in the audience. with that, steve, rose, thank you for working with carnegie in the past and now and steve, you have the floor. >> well, thank you very much and it's a pleasure to be here and, you know, congratulations on your assuming the leadership of the carnegie endowment, it's a wonderful opportunity for the endowment, they're lucky to have you. let me provide a little context. the bush administration got out of the avm treaty, as you say, because even though it was directed at abm systems to counter strategic ballistic missiles, it constrained our abilities to develop defenses against theater or tactical ballistic missiles from what we used to call rogue states, countries like iran or north korea, these states were
developing nuclear weapons, they could be delivered by those ballistic missiles and ballistic missile defense was viewed as a hedge in the event diplomatic efforts to constrain or eliminate those nuclear missile programs failed. those efforts did fail, leaving us with traditional deterrents or threat retaliation and missile defense so called ability to deny as tools to those posed by the u.s. and friends and allies, in retrosuspect i argue it was good we got out of the abm treaty able to develop those tools but let me provide context for that decision. first, there were efforts over almost two decades within the u.s. strategic community to find a way to develop ballistic missile defenses against theater and tactical ballistic missiles even within the terms of the abm treaty, this was the very famous broad versus narrow interpretation of the treaty.
we failed to achieve a consensus. it was really a partisan split, democrats argued it could be could be done, republicans argued it could not. second of all, there were efforts over three administrations, bush 41, clinton, and bush 43, before getting out of the abm treaty to develop ballistic missile defenses cooperatively with first the soviet union and then russia under agreed determinations or obligations of the treaty that would be agreed by both sides and would permit such joint developments. all three efforts failed. bush wanted the united states and russia to agree with withdraw from the abm treaty together. putin refused, but he agreed to offer only a moderate response and he did. he said he disagreed with the decision, but the u.s. withdrawal was not a threat to russia's security. critics claimed at the time this
was a huge mistake, it undermined strategic stability and made further nuclear defense of forces impossible, you have six months after the announce withdrawal in december 13th of 2001 when we announced a withdrawal, just in may of 24, the treaty entered into by the two sides which they agreed to reach the number of strategic nuclear warheads to a range of 1,700 to 2,200, significant reductions from the existing start two letter. at the same time, the moscow treaty pledged further work on ballistic missile cooperation and the bush administration pursued those efforts until the last month of which it was opt and they failed. over the years, putin had buyer's remorse over acceptance of it and now argues that they
reflect ballistic missiles reflecting a threat to russia and deterioration in our relationship. in pair with these efforts, a cooperative roech to defense with russia, efforts over four administrations start, try to eliminate the nuclear ballistic missile, nuclear-armed ballistic missile threat from iran and north korea, again, good faith efforts over four administrations. we can talk about that. they, unfortunately, failed. and withdrawal from the abm treaty and ballistic missile defenses as a hedge were regrettably in many ways, became a hedge against and a consequence of the failure of that diplomacy and i would argue it's good that we had that hedge. that's a view. there are a lot of folks in the audience who will have a different view than the one i've described, but that's really how
we see it, how we saw it from the bush administration. >> thank you, steve. just to quickly follow up, those of us who worked inside executive branch agencies inside administrations, know the interagency process is often quite thorough, intense, and conveys a great deal of disagreement at times and i just wonder if at the time, you sensed from that process, there were differing voices or perspectives internally before a decision was reached or whether there was early consensus about this? >> within the bush bush administration, it was pretty early consensus. it been an issue in a run-up to the campaign and president bush then candidate bush made clear that addressing the abm treaty was something that needed to be done and that he was committed to moving forward with ballistic missile defense and in the republican view, would require getting out of the abm treaty. so within the administration, there wasn't a whole lot of disagreement, but that of course, drew on a debate that
the country had been having for 20 to 30 years. and so was not the issue was not debated and the two sides of the argument were not clear, but the bush administration came in with the president elect and then president having a firm view about where he wanted to go and really, there was very little dissent within the administration on that view, is my recollection. >> thank you, steve. rose, your perspective of the context at the time and what was it like to be in moscow, i gather, as this decision was being taken. >> thank you so much, tino, and thank you for this great opportunity, it's an honor to be with you and to be on this podium with steve hadley who i had the privilege of working very, well, i would say, extensively in the last year on a project for the u.s. institute of peace so thank you steve for your remarks this morning. i can confirm, at least one aspect of them. and that is due to the fact that on december 13, 2001, the date
when the u.s. notified russia of its intent to withdraw from the abm treaty, i happened to be in moscow at the carnegie center on a research trip from washington, scheduled to have a conversation "former chief of general staff and strategic rocket forces but at the time he was putin's senior military adviser and the kremlin so when the news broke in the morning in moscow time, i have to say i panicked slightly. this decision had nothing to do with me, and i would be yet the first american, as far as i knew, to encounter a senior kremlin official, one who knew the issues inside and out so the carnegie driver drove me up to the kremlin as far as you can go, i had to trudge across that, you know, many of you have been
there, across that giant expanse of court yard you have to get through to get to the kremlin palace, it was snowing and freezing cold so i trudged up the stairs of the palace, got to security and up to the office and i was surprised when sir gaev came into the room with his aide and see started talking about the decision out of washington, he criticized the u.s. decision of course, but he generally responded with equinimity so i very much want to confirm that initially, president putin and his administration in moscow agreed to offer only a moderate response, that is exactly what they did at the outset, also, steve said, he since had buyers remorse and we hear about it all the time, but i did want to say at the outset, to me, at the end of the day, this was no surprise, it is very much in line with a decision made at the time the ronald reagan star wars
program was rolled out in '83, with a rather calm reaction at the time saying the ussr would not match missile developments in the star wars program but rather, develop better methods to ensure icbm survivability. the counter-measures program associated with their icbm program, that has been so very successful in ensuring icbm survivability and penetratability over time. over many decisions, high level official reactions were rather calm, that is, we can handle this and russians have done so in my view, but the political discourse, steve is quite right, putin clearly had buyer's remorse not only about this but his initial calm reaction by the way to enlargement of nato so i see a parallel and we can discuss that but that is not the it up topic of our discussion today, political discourse of
withdrawal from the abm treaty has become very different. at the negotiating table and i hear this personally, we hear again and again about the dire threat of u.s. missile defense technology undermining the effectiveness of russian strategic offensive forces that u.s. national missile defense forces would be capable of undermining those forces and enabling a u.s. first strike against them. it's as if the ghost of ronald reagan star wars program continues to roam the halls of the kremlin and disturb the sleep of vladimir putin, or maybe it's just this is an alternative hypothesis well worth considering. it's just a rationale for spending money on strategic forces for political affect on the global stage. to be honest, that is how i read putin's roll-out of all the so called exotic systems of march, 2018, to pro claim these new system are no match for the
missile systems and therefore russian forces remain effective under any circumstances. in some ways i think that's good, it gives him the flexibility to negotiate about further reductions, without demanding limits on u.s. missile defenses that he knows he can't get. let's see what happens as preparations for the new negotiations unfold at the strategic stability talks, the working group discussions i understand are under way even now. the more important story in my view, and here is where steve and my view diverges a bit. the more important story, is that the demise of the treaty facilitated a great deal of infiltration, in the united states, but extensively in the russian federation, russia has done extensive work not only to modernize the moscow abm system which would of been allowed by the treaty but built increasingly long range and
highly capable series of missile defense systems including the s 300, s-400 and now s-500 entering into deployment which has considerable capability against intercontinental ballistic missiles, in effect, the treaty freed up the russians, permitted them to outrun us and franksly, nato in regional air and missile defense, a problem i felt acutely at nato and continue to feel today. so what now? i think that it will be important to make limits on missile defenses a two-sided issue at the strategic stability talks and the negotiations to replace new start. if the russians are going to insist our missile defenses should be on the table, then we should insist their modern systems, especially the s-500 be on the table. this is important as they seem minded to sell it abroad and could therefore spur regional missile defense proliferation. the implications, of which, we
do not understand. i'm wondering, for example, if there is any discussion of this. i don't know if for a fact, some of the audience may, but that president putin was visiting india this week and had meetings with modi in delhi so i wonder if discussion of the s-500 would been the table, a natural follow-on purchase to the s-400 system, only speculating, in any event this is a concern of mine, proliferation of regional missile defense capable against intercontinental ballistic missiles. >> thank you, rose, you make a good point that exchange with respect to the treaty and withdrawal from it, proliferation of antiballistic missile systems, i wonder though, let me zoom out and think 40,000 feet from over, ask a follow-up question. from a theoretic perspective,
the way rand rorpgz stuck with it and many u.s. policy makers have, the logic of mutually assured destruction and deterrence is very powerful and well-grounded but from a psychological human perspective, it's quite disconcerning and alarming, i guess, and i wonder, if that doesn't make it quite understandable in principle that u.s. policy makers wanted a more thorough way to respond to exit into nuclear launch or regime of some kind that got their hands on to weapons. >> well i have to be honest, given the reality of withdrawal from abm treaty come to peace with limited missile defenses and u.s. has put considerable investment into technologies of more and more effective intercepters. i think, frankly, this is a good insurance policy. it does ensure, as steve mentioned, we are able to cope
with and deter threats from limited threats from iran and dprk. it also ensures we have some capability against, as you put it, an accidental launch. so i think that is good. i think there's, in some strands of u.s. body politic, an urge to push back toward a more comprehensive national missile defense system with more and more investments in national missile defenses in the continental united states. here, i worry, and i worry a lot, about the implications for u.s. defense expenditure, in the end of the day, the star wars program stumbled over the expense of its implementation as well as technological challenges and i think we're in no different place today with regard to extensive missile defenses in the united states. >> thank you, steve, let me pick up the point about technology for a moment.
i wonder how contingent the case for withdraw from the entry was for the extent of technological progress, that is to say, today, the u.s. antiballistic missile defense system focused, for example, on north korea, has a track record in testing that is not perfect. certainly, and for its efficacy, we might expect we want one missile fired at a time and, you know, optimal conditions and so on, so i guess, you know, what would be a reflection on the extent to which the benefits of withdrawal really are contingent on the extent of technological progress? >> i think it's, it's extended technological progress, but also a change in the mission. so the star wars, my recollection is that the star wars vision that ronald reagan propagated and interpreted and applied by the defense
department was to use sdi, it was called, strategic defense initiative to mitigate the leading edge of a soviet ballistic missile attack. it was an antisoviet conception and an effort by ronald reagan to sort of say we ought to, we should not base on our security on threatening to obliterate each other, but we should agree that we will defend against each other's systems, that's a more humane and moral way as a base for deterrent but after the end of the cold war and i want to come back to this, the bush 41 administration had a different conception of the mission of ballistic missile defense. it was initially, senator nun pushed this hard at the time, as we called it, g pals, global protection against limited strikes and protection against accidental or unauthorized launch of a russian, soviet,
then russian strategic system but increasingly the focus of the bush 41 administration was developing capability against emerging capabilities by north korea and iran. and on that, it seemed that the united states and russia had common interests. in fact, iran and north korea who were developing ballistic missiles and, we felt, nuclear weapons, are closer to russia than they are to the united states. and rose's point, yes, there has been a proliferation of ballistic missile defenses but that's because there's a proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities. lots of nations are developing those ballistic missile capabilities and lots of nations feel vulnerable to them and want defenses as a way to protect themselves against it. and remember, it's not ballistic missile defenses that kill people, it's ballistic missiles that kill people. so i think you had a transition
of the mission and also at the same time, the technologies were coming so we had capabilities against limited attacks, particularly by tactical and theater ballistic missiles and if you look at what the israelis have done to develop capabilities against those kinds of missiles as well as our owns, it's a pretty good story, not perfect, but a pretty good story. we should come back later, tino, to this issue about the russian and chinese threats and what is the role of ballistic missile prevention in that, but i think to answer your question, the mission changed and it became clear that we had a good shot at developing the technologies that were able to deal with that reduced mission. and i think we've done pretty well. not perfect, but pretty well. and it's been demonstrated in
combat situations. >> thank you, steve, i hear you saying in no small measure that while the technical challenges are enormous, even with a more focused mission, we have to bear in mind that if we size the mission a particular particular are having a very different technical conversation than if we are dealing with a vision like what ronald reagan had in effect. >> exactly right. >> rose, let me follow up with you on that point, if you mention starting from the point that steve is making in terms of let's talk about had this in terms of a more limited mission, and this is hypothetical, but maybe not entirely impossible to imagine, particularly for somebody like me who has been sitting in silicon valley for many years. we have a series of break tlous, maybe quantum computing, maybe ways of using conventional machine learning, maybe something about the way we think about sensing that really drastically increases the advocacy a more limited mission
missile defense framework. so much so that at least with respect to a regime like north korea there is a pretty sizable possibility that one, two, three missiles could be dealt with fairly effectively. would that really change your perspective? or would you still think that in the grand scheme of things the degree of destabiliation of the call bream we were in? >> what technology can bring to bear on this problem i think is important for us both to pay attention to, but also to do our best to then deploy in our missile defense systems that are focused on iran and north korea, et cetera. what concerns me, i take steve's point about the proliferation of missile systems around different regions.
this is an important thing. what i am questioning a bit, steve is your notion that perhaps it is not so bad to have then a proliferation of missile defense capability, whether it is iron dome like systems which the israelis developed to great effect. what i am worried about is the situation we see in europe with the russians developing offensive missiles of shorter ranges. theis canneder family is a good example, which they are deploying in the heart of europe, in -- and crimea as well. at the same time deploying regional defenses as well, the s 500, s 400, i will throw the s 300 in there, too. all very capable. it means that the challenge to nato both for deterring their missile deployments, but also then defending against them is
extraordinary. frankly, as i mentioned in my opening remarks, nato is trying very hard to get its arms around the problem of integrated air and missile defense now given the enhancement of the russian threat to europe, missile threat to europe. in this sense, i think we still need to try to work the offensive side of the problem in terms of limiting offensive missile deployments as well, and then think what value limited missile defense brings. i am a great proponient of nato developing its imd capabilities in a way it really hasn't invested in in a long, long time. i think we also have to consider what the threats to our allies are and how this improvement in limited missile defense capabilities in the hands of the russians and perhaps proliferation of them as they sell them to others. the chinese are a good example, and i agree we should come to that, what does that mean for
our ability to deter and prevent also on behalf of our allies. >> it is a really -- >> it is helpful -- >> it is a real problem. sorry. go ahead. i beg your pardon. >> i was just going to note. i mean, what i take you to be say, rose, maybe this is partly why, steve, you think it is a real problem, at a national level you are acknowledging rose that the prospective of an individual country might be there is great benefit to the technologies they developed at the right level. the system-wide effects is what you are worried about, the degree of proliferation, the competitive pressures for developing more sophisticated ballistic missiles, and that does become harder to see, like, what is the end game there. >> and the pressures against our allies expand, and in a way that sometimes, you know, ends up them having to think through and make the investments themselves, and how to deter and defend. and of course working together
with us. but i know for example, in the nato context that, again, getting sufficient capability in place for integrated air and missile defense has been -- well, it's been a steep climb. of course we are all encouraging the nato allies to share their burden of their defense. but it is a difficult situation now given the very capable russian missile systems being deployed in the heart of europe. >> steve, your thoughts about this, before we turn to china. >> sure. you know, you have to make a judgment, in some sense. is it ballistic missile defense that is provoking the proliferation of ballistic missiles? or is it ballistic missile proliferation that is provoking the proliferation of ballistic missile defenses? i think it is pretty -- the issue here is pretty clear. it is the proliferation of ballistic missiles that is the problem. the intermediate range missiles for example, that china is using to threaten taiwan and is in a
position to use to threaten japan and seoul, they of course were never limited. china, because the inf treaty, which limited intermediate range missiles only apply to russia and the united states. so china was under no constraints. and china was prelive rating its deployment of intermediate and shorter range ballistic missiles really long before there was much missile defense capability in japan, korea, or in the region. and the efforts to help work with the japanese with the south koreans to develop ballistic missile defense capability i think is clearly in response to what the chinese are doing. russia is a harder case. but, remember, there was an inf treaty that would have limited these -- the deployments in russia. inf treaty eliminated a whole category of intermediate range systems. russia was clearly viewed by
first the united states and then ultimately by nato as violating that treaty. the question is what do you do when you have a treaty, you are abiding by it and the other side is not finally, the trump administration decided to get out of the treaty. again, i would say that the need then to deploy defenses and to get nato into this game is the result of the proliferation push by the russians to enhance their missile capability to threaten europe. and it's a good thing we have those technologies around that offer our nato allies an opportunity to be able to provide some defense against those systems. so that's how -- that's how it looks to me. people can disagree. but i think -- i think it's the better -- i think i have got the better argument. >> coy just add a quick comment? -- could i just add a quick comment here? in many ways i could not agree more.
the only point i am making is do we want now to contemplate the notion of a new set of constraints on intermediatiate launched ground range missile systems. >> i don't want to call it a new inf treaty because i don't think anybody to think i am promoting a return to the inf treaty as it existed. but i think regional existence. frankly, the chinese are concerned about the advent of new u.s. ground launched crews missiles in asia. although they will never admit it i think we are concerned about the russians as well, including the missile that was in violation of the inf treaty. i think it may be possible to draw both russia and china to the table at that talk about regional inf constraints and i think that's worth talking about
as opposed to doing down the line of thinking only about missile defenses. >> i agree. and under my narrative, we have always over 30 years, over three and four administrations trying to get a handle on the threat. i would certain think this is the kind of issue that we ought to pursue in the strategic dialogue that the administration has started with russia, and the kind of strategic dialogue that jake sullivan suggested at least even was beginning to be discussed between president biden and president xi. so rose and i are in agreement. of course, we ought to try to see if we can get some kind of negotiated limits on those thing. but i think, as -- once again, ballistic missile defense capability is the hedge against the failure of those efforts. >> we are going to turn to questions from the audience in just a minute. let me ask you to -- just picking up on some of the things in your discussion just now,
china and russia in particular. how might this whole conversation have been different if we do the counter-factual and try to imagine the u.s. never be drawing from the abm treaty, trying to focus what limited activity it did on missile defense within the confines of the one abm complex you could have and the limits of 100 missile limit and all that. how might that conversation be different? maybe not different at all? or maybe quite different. what do you think, rose? >> well, i think, frankly, steve is right, that we had so many efforts over multiple administrations to try to -- try to develop for one thing, cooperation with the russians. and i do think -- i think those efforts would have continued with the abm treaty still in force. and i refer for example, to the efforts at one point to even consider using russian radar systems in regional missile defenses in your asia.
that would be a cooperative effort between the united states and russia and on behalf of, again, defense of the nato allies. maybe this was a bad idea, spectacularly bad idea. but i think with the abm treaty in place, providing a kind of stable background, perhaps we could have been ambitious in how we thought about cooperating with russia to better improve the regional missile defenses in your asia and perhaps even beyond and what effect that would have had on the developments in china i cannot safe. it is totally speculative. but i do think it's worth considering. in any event, that's where i see the main issue, is that we really interrupted what had been acourt toive attempts to cooperate with the russians. but it umt interrupted any further efforts to cooperate in this area. >> steve? >> you know, that's a very interesting point rose makes because those efforts to do
cooperation with russia continued quite seriously after we got out of the abm treaty under both the bush and the obama administrations. as i say, we pursued it. we got president putin to say when he was at kenny bunk port, 2007, i think it was, to say that missile defense cooperation is an area of strategic cooperation between the united states and russia. and we -- and basically opened the door. we tried to walk through that door. condi rice and bob gates went to moscow, sat down with putin, tried to work out an arrangement. we failed. the obama administration tried to do their own cooperation. i had a track two effort with former generals of the united states, russia, and in europe. we came up with a framework for cooperation. we gave to it the track one, said here it is, this is how you do it. but once again, the politics moved away from us. and that i think is the issue on
russia. if i might, let me give a little context. bush administration time, long time ago, bush 43. bush is making statements like, we are not threatened by the soviet, now russian knew dear deterrent. we are prepared to reduce our level of strategic nuclear war heads unilaterally if necessary. we don't do the sizing of our nuclear forces looking at the russian capability. you know, those statements seem, you know, hard to believe given where we are now. but that was the thinking at the time. and that was the opportunity. but the relationship between the united states and russia soured. and i would argue it soured for a lot of reasons that are much more decisive than missile defense. things like china's -- russia felt weakness, felt exploited in a lot of ways with their
weakness. they renewed their strength, partly because of the price of oil, partly because of some fiscal policies. they had grievances about not being treated appropriately. there was the view that the color revolutions on the border of russia were an effort by the effort by the united states to turn regimes against russia and dress rehearsal for destabilizing russia itself. putin has a long list of grievances. they have become -- they disagreed with what we did in iraq. they disagreed with what we did in kosovo. they disagreed with what we did in libya. long string of abuses that soured the relationship. and the challenge now -- tino, i would like your view -- i think it would be interesting to hear your view and rose's view now. but we have gone so far in our relations with russia from where it was in the bush administration, where we did not consider missile defense as directed against russian strategic central systems in any
way. maybe given that relationship we need to think about whether we want, in fact a capability against russian strategic nuclear weapons. and increasingly, with things like the sm 3 missile and the deployment. aegis ships and the like we are developing some limited capability. i still think it is not significant, and the russians can overwhelm of the by numbers if not by technology. but you know, you really, i think, have a different russia today. and you have to ask the question in terms of ballistic missile defense, do we really want to keep russian strategic central systems off limits in terms of ballistic missile defense? i don't have an answer. i think it's a very -- it's a very different question than what we faced in -- i think under any prior administration. but it's an issue that's front and center, i think, for the biden administration. >> rose your thoughts about this? >> well f we go down that track,
given the fact that we have this deterrence relationship which is related to first-strike deterrence as we call it and that we sustain our forces at a high level of readiness to launch on warning. if you proceed down the track of, say, well we also need missile defenses for some defense against this more maligned russia. and i absolutely agree, we are facing a more maligned and aggressive russia. but if you head down that track, then you do head down the track, i think, of what the russians say they are concerned about is that the united states is on the road of undermining their strategic defense structure and on the road to at least dreaming about a capable for strike backed up by defenses. i think there is a destabilization aspect this that we need to tread cautiously and think ahead very long and hard before we would make any major
changes of this kind. i continue to hold out the possibility, particularly now as i said in my own remarks that with these so-called exotic systems, some of which are already captured by the new stark treaty, the avant-garde hyper sonic glide vehicle, as well as the sar move heavy icm are captured by the new star treaty. but the other systems i think give flexibility for negotiations on both sides and for considering how in fact we will continue together to bolster the stability of our deterrence relationship as we move forward and try to grapple with these other questions. one thing i wanted to add, tino, was with regard to regional intermediate range constraints. i talked about asia. but, frankly, you know, putin has put an increasingly interesting offer on the table with regard to the missile --
intermediate range missile moratorium in europe. at first was horribly one-sided they essentially were trying to keep the new u.s. ground launched missile out of europe and not offering anybody you will on their side. last october the putin proposal was refreshed as i call it and putin started talking about moving the 9 m sim 2 out and replacing it with a modification regime. this is interesting. we mustn't discard it out of hand. we have to be concerned about russia propaganda tactics. this is interesting. it could increase the interest of china if threatening systems are appearing in asia on the russian side as well. i think there were all kinds of dynamics we are to consider but
i would look down the road of stability with offensive forces rather than tying with the notion of upping our missile defense game against russia. >> our discussion just now anticipated some of the questions that came in from the audience in comments. i know one issue that people wanted us to touch on was whether there was demarcation agreements especially those clik bill clinton in the '90s. you touched on that a little bit. the other coveted i wanted to address, was in my initial question to rose, sort of like when we are dealing with these issues like we are walking very close to the very edge of a huge chasm in the grand canyon. and we have no reason to believe we are not one or two inches away from precipice. we are not far from it.
that's sobering. in a sense i take your question like ought we not to occasion we just revisit the question whether our technological innovation capacity did not help us deal with the underlying disturbing logic of mutually short destruction as the underpinning of russian newer clear capability, and to some extent maybe the chinese. this is my version maybe of rose's answer, if i try to be a game hear theist about this, i can imagine a world where a true technologically effective anti-ballistic missile defense framework would drastically reduce the risk of nuclear annihilation if it were completely reliable and if we shared it with our adversaries at precisely the right moment, right? and i just -- i am not foreclosing the 30b89 of discussion, but i find that
scenario a hard one to wrap my mind around. >> so let me respond to that. and i don't rule it out. i think it's not in sight any time soon. what's the way forward here? my thinking at this point is i agree with rose, the ought to in strategic stability discussions with russia see if we can -- and in similar discussions with the chinese see if we can put limitations on those systems threatening our friends and allies. let's see if we can do that. point one. point two, i think we should be willing to have a conversation with the russians about ballistic missile defense. the problem in the past was that any time you had a conversation with russians about ballistic missile defense their view was the united states should have no systems.
and we'll keep our moss caw abm system, but we just won't talk about it. now, as rose says, they are in the ballistic missile defense game bigtime, selling systems to countries who feel threatened by the ballistic missiles being deployed by their neighbors. that allows for a conversation that is different on missile defense. and we certainly should at least talk about transparency, confidence building measures, maybe limited cooperation on ballistic missile defense. we ought to be talking about that. there will be the question that george perkovich put us at the beginning, would you accept limits on missile defense deployments? that's harder because there it raises the other question, limits on our ballistic missile defense capability would constrain us not dealing with russia but also potentially dealing with china.
we have to be concerned with ballistic missile from russia and china. russia would tell you, i don't believe it, they are not concerned about chinese ballistic missiles at all. there is the new asymmetry in our strategy negotiations. if you start think about limiting ballistic missile defenses, that gets in -- in terms of numbers, that's a problem. but third lesion i would continue the kind of research and development and technological development to see whether we can get to the kind of outcome you are talking about and we wouldn't do that if we were still in the abm treaty. >> that's very interesting. let me put on the table a question from our audience which is about whether the u.s. maybe has systematically overestimated or how, you know, what some would call the systemic overestimate of the rogue state threat shapes out this question. no wmd, and other things, how
should we think about that angle? >> tino, if i may, i will come to that one in a second. but i wanted to pickly follow up. >> please. >> on steve's remarks which i think is an interesting ig vignette from recent tran two discussions with the russians. and i will answer one of the questions. my answer to that, judy and paul is no. but i think it is worthwhile taking out and looking at very thoroughly the transparency measures that were agreed as part of those so-called new york protocols because then there is a wealth of transparency and confidence building measures over time that have been developed again by both republican and democratic administrations. and we need to take them out and look at them because when i have said to russians, all right, we want your systems on the table
in the next negotiations, if you want to limit u.s. missile defenses, you need to put the s 500 on the table. then they quickly say well then maybe let's not talk about limits, let's talk about confidence building and transparency measures instead. so i think it is a ripe moment for going back to frankly the whole array developed across a number of administrations including the new york protocols and considering what is useful to put on the table now in terms of monitoring and transparency. you know, the other question is moot. i do understand -- greg tillman's question. i do understand that of course maybe we were overreacting at the time. but the fact is now there are very capable missile systems in the hands of the north koreans, iranians, increasingly so, iraqis well, not so much, of course. but i have no question in my mind that regional missile proliferation is a very serious problem now, not only because of indigenous production and
deployment, but also because these systems are fallen into various hands sometimes through sales, sometimes through donations. just ask the israelis about this problem. so i have no question that we are facing a serious theater and regional threat now. and from short range up to longer ranges. >> we have a question from james actin that asks us to consider how china's modernization of its nuclear capability appears in large part focused on ensuring its nuclear weapons can penetrate u.s. homeland defenses and should the u.s. penetrate defenses and how? >> i don't think that the chinese nuclear expansion is driven by the desire to penetrate u.s. ballistic missile defenses. i think the projections are that they would have a thousand
strategic nuclear war heads by 2030. that estimate is up from about 400 of just a year ago. why are they doing this? i think they are doing this because we have seen across the board a change in policy by xi jinping. china is asserting itself. it clearly believes it should be a dominant if not the dominant power in the decades ahead. and having a strategic nuclear program comparable to that in the united states and russia is i think part of that agenda. that's clearly where he's heading. and the capability they are developing is -- is -- could overwhelm any ballistic missile defense capabilities. we haven't -- could overwhelm any ballistic missile defense capabilities we have and i think the chinese and the russians know that. we are already in the business
of deploying defenses to counter those missiles as we talked about earlier they have medium range and intermediate range missiles targeted against friends and allies in asia. and we are helping them against those systems. the real question is, you know we were -- we faced an existential challenge and threat in the cold war with the soviet nuclear systems. near the end of the cold war we actually thought for a period of time that that threat had gone away. real question whether that's the case given where russian policy is headed. do we now want to be vulnerable in an existential to another country as well, china? if not, what do we do about it? and that's a real question. and you have to decide whether ballistic missile defense of the homeland in the same way we are providing ballistic missile defense to our friends and
allies in the region is ballistic missile of the homeland a piece of dealing with the china challenge? recognizing that for the foreseeable future, until the technology breakthroughs you are talking about come through, we are going to only have very limited capability. is it -- is it something we should have? i think the jury is out. i think this is a new question, and it's one of the things that i am sure you and carnegie are going to take on because a lot of hard thinking is required. >> with the help of the two of you. rose, your thoughts on this? >> oh, i've really am in line very much now with what steve has to say. i will always continue to place an emphasis -- and frankly, i think that has to be our first priority now. we don't understand what china's objectives are with their nuclear modernization, with their digging up to 300 silos in the areas northwest of beijing. they are continuing to modernize
their forces in a way that seems like they are intent on developing a fully integrated triad of nuclear forces at the strategic level. and there is some indication of course that they are building up further war head capability. so in that sense, we really need to focus. i think we need to keep our eye on the prize of finding out in the first instance what their objectives are. and that is one reason i was very glad that biden and xi, evidently, agreed that there would be an early attempt to sit down and have strategic stability talks between our two countries. i also think that the russians should contribute here. i am not arguing for trilateral strategic ability talks but i think russians too should be asking the chinese what their objectives are and somehow we need to be communicating together among the three of us as we develop a further understanding. interestingly enough, the p 5 is
preparing, as some of you know the p 5 process, they are preparing for the npt review conference to start on the 4th of january. they had a meeting in paris just last week where evidently they talked about having a concerted effort to have an understanding of nuclear concepts and nuclear terminology. i think it is beneficial. i think of it as kinds of a stealth strategic dialogue among the p 56 and that this should be encouraged. but we really need to understand what the chinese are up to. at the same time we should not be panicking to remember what we are up to and consider that we have considerable force structure above and beyond what they will deploy even in the necks ten years. >> we are out of time. i know we could talk another hour or two. i want to tell you why i am grateful to the two of you. i think our challenge of asking
the question 20 years from now, how did we get there? what steps did we have to take? what had to go right not only in moscow and beijing, and certainly in washington. i think this die log log has advanced that kinds of analysis helpfully. i am grateful to you for the work that you do and also for working with us. i look forward to more of that in the future. thank you both. >> thank you. it was true tles pleasure. >> glad to be with you. and glad to be with you, rose. washington unfiltered. c-span in your pocket. download c-span now today. american history tv, saturdays on krrks span 2, exploring the people and events that tell the american story. at 2:00 p.m. eastern on presidency, abraham lincoln scholars talk about the 16th
president's speeches and what they revealed about his views on the constitution. and at 3:00 p.m. eastern, we will feature the annual lincoln forum in gettysburg pennsylvania with discussions on abraham lincoln and the civil war with lucas morrow, author of "lincoln and american founfounding" and r authors. exploring the american story. watch american history tv saturday on c-span2. and find a full schedule in your program guide or watch online any time at c spat.org/history. at least six president recorded conversations while in office. hear many of those conversations on c-span's new podcast, presidential recordings. >> season one focuses on the presidency of lyndon johnson. you will hear about the 1964 civil rights act, 1964
presidential campaign. the gulf of torchingans incident, the march on selma, and the war in vietnam. not everyone knew they were being recorded. >> certainly johnson's secretaries knew because they were tasked with transcribing many of those conversation. in fact, they were the ones who made sure the conversations were taped as johnson would signal to them through an open door between his office and theirs. >> you will also hear some blunt talk. >> jim. >> yes, sir. >> i want a report of the number of people assigned to kennedy when he -- the day he died, and the number assigned to me now. and if mine are not less i want them less right quick. >> yes, sir. >> if i can't ever go to the bathroom, i won't go, i promise i won't go anywhere, i will stay behind these black gates. >> presidential recordings, c-span now, wherever you get your potd podcasts. militar
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