tv Hearing on Government Investigation of UF Os CSPAN July 20, 2022 1:31pm-3:04pm EDT
before we get started i want to recognize a motor silence for the victims of the white supremacist hate crime in buffalo new york. the committee has focused intently on that threaten post open and closed hearings. it is utterly devastating to see more victims of this violence. buffalo, our heart breaks for you. with that, i asked my colleagues to join. pardon me, we will not turn the business of this hearing. more than 50 years ago the u.s.
government ended a project, you put, an effort to catalog and understand the sightings of objects in the air. they cannot otherwise be explained. for more than 20 years, that project had treated unidentified anomalies in our airspace as a national security threat to be monitored and investigated. in 2017, we learned for the first time that the department of defense had quietly restarted a similar organization what we call now call unidentified aerial phenomena, or uap's. last year congress re-wrote the charter for that organization, now called the airborne objects identification certification group. or aim smog for short. today will be that organization out of the shadows. this hearing, and oversight work, have a simple idea at its core. ida unidentified aerial
phenomena are a potential national security threat. and they need to be through to that way. for too long the signal associated with the appease has gotten in the way of good intelligence analysis. pilots avoided reporting or were left at when they did. all the doj is relegated the issue to the back room, or sorted under the rug entirely. filter of a skeptical national security community. today, we know better. they are unexplained, it is true, but they are real. they need to be investigated, and any threats that they pose a need to be mitigated. undersecretary moultrie, mr. bray, thank you for coming today. first, we need you to update us on the status of aoimsg, the legislation creating that was passed in december, and the deadline fragmentation that is fast approaching. but the group does not even have a main director. we need to know, serve, the status of the organization and the obstacle to getting it up
and running. secondly, you have to convince the audience today, and most especially, our military and civilian aviators. . you show us, congress, and the american public who's american imaginations you've captured, that you are willing to follow facts with the lead. you know, we fear sometimes that the d.o.d. has focused more on emphasizing what it can't explain, not investigating what it can't. i am looking for you to assure us today that all conclusions are on the table. one final note, we are mindful today that aoimsg is not starting from scratch. this is the third version of this task force in d.o.d., and civil society groups like the mutual ufo network.
mr. covalent others, have been collecting data on this issue for years. i hope you will explain how you can leverage the knowledge and experience of our firework on this matter to move the aoimsg along. the last time congress had a hearing on uaps, less half a century ago. i hope that it does not take 50 more years for congress old another, because transparency is desperately need it. i now turn to our ranking member crawford for comments that he would like to make. >> thank you, mister chairman. honorable moultrie, mr. -- thank you for coming here today. we appreciate it, to begin the open dialogue between congress and the executive branch on this important topic. while this topic evokes creative imaginations of many, aside from all the hype and speculation, there are important underlying issues posed by uaps. despite the serious nature of this topic, i have to say i'm aim more interested in our understanding of chinese and russian hypersonic weapons development and understanding why this administration was so slow to share actionable intelligence with ukrainians. however, as much as this topic may help us better understand
and operational activities of russia and china, i am on board. the intelligence community has a serious to detour taxpayers to prevent potential adversaries such as china and russia from surprising us with unforeseen new technologies. as overseers of the intelligence community, this committee has an obligation to understand what you are doing to determine whether any uaps, our new technologies are not. and if they are, where they're coming from. the in general the ioc spends much of the time and resources trying to understand what we call known unknown's. when it comes to foreign weapons systems and sensors, known unknowns are those features that we don't fully understand. yet the challenges associated with you a pr that they are completely unknown and require more expensive analysis effort. the intelligence committee must balance addressing no threats or national security, with preventing spectacle surprise. we must continue to follow facts where they lead us and ensure that there are no tactical surprises. the icy will take it seriously when our critical observations phenomena that seem to perform in ways that pose a threat to
safe flight operations, or they besides before an adversaries attempt to develop a strategic technological surprise against the united states. it is also essential that our pilots, and others, feel that they can report a piece that they report without any signal for doing so. this is the open unclassified portion of our hearing. we will have a close classified party leader. it is important for the public to know that the classification of information exists to protect national security, not to judge had the truth. when we are trying to determine if any uaps or new technologies are being developed by foreign governments, we are inevitably going to run into classified information about what needs systems and technologies we do know are in the works here or abroad. but, where information does not risk national security, it should be shared with our allies and the public when these full. i hope we can have your assurance to this and, today. it is my hope that the intelligence committee will try to determine the nature of earpiece that we have observed, i will keep congress fully abreast of all developments. i look forward to this hearing, and continue dialogue on
oversight with the intelligence community on this topic. i yield back. >> the gentleman yields back, and i will turn to our distinguished chairman, adam schiff, for any comments that he wishes to make. >> thank, you chairman carr. some for holding this open hearing on unidentified aerial phenomena and for your leadership on this issue. holding portion of our discussion today in open session is critical to the cause of transparency and openness of which congress's intent in authorizing this new task force. the larger effort that is being undertaken to study and characterize uap reports is an important step towards understanding these phenomenon. but we know, and don't know. and i look for to hearing more during about the open session, and a close setting, about how d.o.d. and the icc are undertaking that task. ufc reports have been around for decades, and it we haven't had an orderly way for them to rip reported without stigma and to be investigated. that needs to change. uap reports need to be understood as a national
security matter, and that message needs to go out across the d.o.d., the icy, and hold the u.s. government. when we thought something we don't understand, or can identify in our airspace, it is a job with those we interest with our national security to escape and report back. that is why it is important that we hold this open hearing for the public to hear directly from the department of defense on the steps it is taking to track, analyze, and transparently communicate the work is being done on this issue. it is also the responsibility of our government and this panel to share as much as we can with the american people, since excessive secrecy only breeds distrust and speculation. i look forward to hearing how the ap task force is being set up, which is a still face, and house committee can make sure the task force is able to shed light on one of the world's most enduring mysteries. i thank you gentlemen for your work and will be very interested to hear what you have to say, to me, among the most fascinating questions are
these phenomenon that we can measure. that is, instruments reports, there is something. there it is not the human eye confusing objects in the sky, there is something there, measurable by multiple instruments. and yet it seems to move in directions that are inconsistent with what we know of physics or science more broadly. and that to me poses questions of tremendous interest, as well as potential national security significance. so we look forward to hearing what you are able to report to us today, in open session, and i want to thank chairman carson again for his extraordinary leadership on this issue. and i yield back. >> the chairman yields back. thank you, with that we will start a hearing undersecretary mulch in the floors were sir. >> thank you. chairman staff, committee chairman carson, ranking member crawford, distinguish members of the subcommittee. it is a privilege to be here with you today to address questions regarding unidentified aerial phenomenon,
or uap. i am pleased to be joined by mr. scott, great director of naval intelligence, who speak to the navy's unidentified aerial task force which laid the foundation for the efforts will discuss today. first, i'd like to thank congress for supporting the departments uap efforts. the nda for fiscal year 2022, has all the established dedicated office to oversee processes and procedures for the time the collection, processing, analysis, and reporting of uap data. what are uap? put simply, yuppie are airborne objects that an encountered cannot be immediately identified. however, it is a department contingent that by combining appropriately structured collected data, with rigorous scientific analysis, any objects that we encounter, can likely be isolated, characterized, identified, and if necessary, mitigated. we know there are service
members who have encountered unidentified aerial phenomenon. and because uaps post potentials flight safety internal security risks, we are committed to a focused effort to determine their origins. our effort will include the thorough examination of adversarial platforms, and potential breakthrough technologies, u.s. government or commercial platforms, allied or partnered systems, and other natural phenomenon. we also understand that there is been a cultural stigma surrounding uap. our goal is to eliminate the stigma by fully incorporating our operators, and mission personnel, into a standardized data gathering process. we believe that making uap reporting emission imperative, will be instrumental to the efforts success. the defense intelligence and security enterprise provides realtime support to our war fighters, and missile personnel across holden means.
to optimize the departments uap work, we are establishing an office within the office of the secretary of defense. that office says function is clear. to facilitate the identification of previously unknown, or identified airborne objects, and a methodical, logical, and standardize manner. the schools will ensure that we are working closely with operational personnel and training and reporting requirements, developing data, intelligence requirements, standardizing the integrating processes and procedures for collection, operational surveillance, analysis and reporting. leveraging a resource and development capabilities to improve the protection, characterization, and identification of uaps. developing mitigating solutions and procedures, and identifying strategy and policy solutions. this effort will maximize collaboration, and build upon already existing relationships, with the office and direction are of national intelligence, the faa, dhs, and the fda.
we are also committed to strong partnerships with the department of energy, no, the da, nasa, and the national labs. and just as importantly, our international partners and allies. with regards to the importance of transparency, the department is fully committed to the principle of openness and accountability to the american people. however, we are also mindful of our obligation to protect sensitive sources and methods. our goal is to strike a delicate balance. when that enables us to maintain the public's trust, while preserving those capabilities that are vital to the support of our service personnel. in closing, the department is committed to this effort, and welcomes the challenge. we thank you very committed supporter, and look forward to your questions. >> chairman schiff, chairman carson, ranking member crawford, committee members, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today to highlight
the ongoing work of the department of defense regarding unidentified aerial phenomenon. since the early 2000s, we have seen an increasing number of unauthorized and or unidentified aircraft or objects in military controlled training areas, and training ranges, another dozen needed airspace. reports of sightings are frequent, and continuing. we attribute this increase in reporting to a number of factors, including our work to do stigmatize reporting, an increase in reporting in identification of what we can classify as quote, or mylar balloons in other types of air trash, and improvement in the capability of our various sensors to detect things in our airspace. almost two years ago, and august of 2020, deputies secretary directly establish the stuck task force within department of the navy. they uap task force was built in the foundation of the navy's initial efforts to respond to that reports from her aviators
on unidentified objects observed in their training ranges. the basic issues then and now, are twofold. first, encouraging our training rangers by unidentified objects are for serious hazards to safety flight. every aspect of newly ba shun, safety of our crews is paramount. second, intrusions by unknown aircraft or objects pose potential threats to the security of our operations. our aviators chain as they would fight. so, any intrusions that we compromise the security of our operations by revealing our capabilities, our tactics, techniques, procedures, our great concern to the navy in the department of defense. from the very beginning, we took these reports very seriously. we instituted a data driven approach to the investigations, where we can collect as much that is possible, and use all available resources to analyze and make informed decisions on the best ways to address our findings. our main objective was to
transition uap efforts from an anecdotal, or narrative based approach, to a rigorous science and technology engineering focus that. this data driven approach requires input from a wide variety of sources. in the early stages, the task force worked to standardize the reporting mechanisms, and processes, to make it as easy as possible for personnel to report any engagement. so we are getting that wide range of reporting that we need it. we also spent considerable efforts engaging directly to your name full aviators and building relationships to help the stigmatize the actor reporting sightings or counters. and, we were to naval aviation leadership to provide additional equipment to report any encounter. navy and air force crews, now have step-by-step or seizures for reporting on uae, on their new board in their cockpit. and in their post flight brief procedures. the direct result of those
efforts has been increased reporting, with increased opportunities to focus a number of silencers on any objects. the message is not clear. if you see something, you need to report it. and the message has been received. in fact, recently i received a call from a senior naval aviator, with our 2000 flight hours. you got me personally from the flight line, after landing, to talk about an encounter that he just experienced. those are just initial steps. we also made a concerted effort to assemble subject matter experts across the intelligence community and other u.s. departments, we forged partnerships with research industry and academic labs, and brought many allies and partners into the discussions on uap. additionally, subject matter experts or why variety of fields including physics, optics, metallurgy, meteorology, just to name a few, have been brought in to expand our understanding in the areas where we may not have or
getting expertise. in short, we've endeavor to bring an all hands on deck approach to better understand this phenomenon. so we learned so far? any given observation, maybe fleeting, or longer. it may be recorded, or not. it may be observable by one or multiple assets. in short, there is really an easy answer. for example, let me share with you the first video that we have here today. it shows an observation in realtime. there it was. that is, in many cases, that is all that reporting include. and many other cases, we have far less than this. as we detailed in both the unclassified and classified versions of the preliminary assessment released by the office of the director of national intelligence last june,
this often limited amount of high quality data, and reporting, hampers our ability to draw for conclusions about the nature intent of the ap. as detailed in the odni report, if and when individual uap incidents are resolved, they likely vote into one of five potential athleisure categories. iran, clutter national atmospheric phenomenon, u.s. government or u.s. industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, or an other pin that allows for a holding kind of difficult and possibility of surprise inside of a discovery. we stand with those initial results. since released a preliminary report, you have the task force said the databases now grown to contain approximately 400 reports. the stigma has been reduced. we also made progress in changing the number of gop encounters. let me show you another video an image taken years apart in different areas. in this video, u.s. navy
personnel recorded what appears to be triangles, some flashing, reported several years ago off the coast of the united states. this was recorded while the u.s. navy ship observed a number of small unmanned aerial systems in the area. importantly, the video was taken through night vision goggles with a single lens reflex camera. these remain unresolved for several years. seven years later, a different coast, u.s. navy personnel again, in a swarm of unmanned aerial systems, and again through night vision goggles,
and nsl are camera, recorded this image. but this time, other u.s. navy assets also observed unmanned aerial systems nearby. and are now reasonably confident, that these triangles correlate to unmanned aerial systems in the area. the triangular periods, as a result of light passing through the night vision goggles, and then being recorded by nfl our camera. i don't mean to suggest that everything that we observe is identifiable. but this is a great example of how it takes considerable effort to understand what we are seeing in the examples that we are able to collect. in this example, we accumulated tradition data from two similar encounters, two different time periods, into different geographic areas. to help us draw these conclusions. that is not always the case, that. we recognize that that can be unsatisfying or insufficient in the eyes of many. this is a popular topic in our
nation, with various theories as to what these objects may be, and where they originally. by nature, we are all curious, and we see genders and the unknown. and, as a lifelong intelligence professional, i'm impatient. i want to mediate explanations for this as much as anyone else. however, understanding can take significant time and effort. it is why we have never to concentrate on this data driven process, to drive fact based results. given the nature of our business, natural defense, we've had to sometimes be less forthcoming with information and open forms than many would hope. if uap do indeed represent a potential threat to our security, and the capability systems, processes, sources, and systems that we reserve to record, study, or analyze these phenomena, need to be classified appropriate levels. we do not want, we do not want, potential adversaries to know exactly what we are able to see or understand, or how we come to the conclusions we make. therefore, public disclosures must be carefully considered on
a case by case basis. so what is next? we are concentrating on a seamless transition to the new organization. in future analysis, and complicated issues of uv issues, will greatly benefit from the infrastructure, process, and their procedures that we have developed today. i'm confident that the chest task force under navy leadership is able to forge forward and anger assessments inside an engineering with an anecdotal evidence. we humane committed to that goal, as i know the usda organization does as well. so, thank you very much for your interest in and continued support for the agency task force. the team is made a lot of progress, but we're really just establishing the foundation. the more detailed analysis is yet to be done, and with your continued support, we can sustain that necessary. well a 40 year. questions >> thank you mr. bray. this is their version of this task force, and to be frank, one of congress's concerns is that the executive branch, and
administration in both parties, has been sweeping concerns about uaps under the rug by focusing on events they can be explained, and avoiding events that cannot be explained. what can you say to give the american people confidence they are just focusing our attention on looking for with easy explanations? >> congressman, i will start, and mr. wray please feel free to weigh in. so, then we are approaching this is with a more thorough, standardize methodology that we have in the past. first and foremost, the secretary of defense is starting this effort. this is not someone lower in the department of defense. and he is a sign that has to the undersecretary for this second security, that is me,
because i'm responsible for looking at intelligence matters, are responsible for security matters. this is potentially both. so when you start concerning me, ourselves with the safety of our personnel, the safety of our installations and bases, there is no their higher priority than what we have. and as you've stated, we have been assigned that task to actually set up an office, the aoimsg, which i believe the names or will likely change. but we have moved forward in terms of moving to establish that office. we have, as of this week, picked the director for that effort. very established and accomplished individual. we have identified spaces, we worked with personnel across the department of defense, and the services, and we worked with the drc, which is on board in helping us work through this standardized methodology for now. bringing in data, analyze that
data, and reporting the data in the appropriate method, inappropriate means, so we can either get it to our service personnel, to ensure their safety, or get it to you in the congress and to the public, to ensure the of oversight into what we are doing. so, -- secretary, defense standardized, and really a methodical approach. that is something that we are doing that has not been a. >> can we get some kind of assurances that your analyst will follow the facts where they lead and assess all hypotheses? >> absolutely. so we are open to have these. we are open to many conclusions that we make our. >> quickly, before i pass it to the ranking member. and chairman schiff. i want to thank you both for taking the time. i had a good time with the last week, director moultrie, undersecretary moultrie. it is fair to say that you are a science fiction fan, is that correct? >> it is fair to say that i am
and it of an inquisitive mind, who spent 40 years in the intelligence field, and is focused on both science and science fiction. that is fair. >> could you tell us about that. >> well, look, my generation grew up looking at space saugus and the apollo program. so, all of us who grew up in the 60s were just thrilled about watching our first astronaut land on the moon. that was an momentous occasion to people who were of different generations. some of them don't believe that it can happen. or that it happened. i still have friends and relatives that believe it didn't happen. it is science fiction for them. but for us, it was no that is the progress we made. and so, i wasn't all that and i have taken that to hurt. i enjoy the challenge of what might be out there. i mention to you that yes i have followed science fiction. i've got the conventions, even i will say it on the record. i have to break the ice somehow.
but you know, i have done that, but there's nothing wrong with that. i don't necessarily dress up but, i do believe that it is important to show that the department of defense says, we have character. and we are people just like the american people. we have our inquisitive this, we have our questions, we want to know what is out there as much as you want to know what is out there. we get the questions, not just from you, we had every family members. and we get them today. not just in committee hearings. so anyone is out there is important. but first and foremost, it is important for us to do that so that we can ensure that our people, our personnel, our aviators, our bases installations are safe. and that curiosity factor is something else that we just want to know because that is the human race. we have an insatiable desire to know. >> thank you sir. ranking member crawford. >> mr. -- you said you don't necessarily
dress up, that wasn't a real strong statement. gentlemen, thank you for being here today. yeah we recreate it. and thank you mr. malts for breaking the ice, the way you. did we appreciate. that the ability to understand objects and are sensitive agencies asthana went to an intelligence failure that we certainly want to avoid. it is not about finding alien spacecraft, but about delivering dominant intelligence about the tactical operational and strategic spectrum. so my question is, how can aoimsg lead to the prevention of intelligence prices? >> sure, i will start with the. so, the goal of our effort is to integrate it into what we already do on a normal basis which is look for the unknown unknown's, congressman as you stated in your opening remarks, across all domains. so we've been doing this for decades. we've been looking at the space domain, look at space objects, land space weather, look at spacemen ahmed on. we've been looking at things in the air domain.
as you know, and i will talk more about this in a classified session, but we have a very concerted effort to understand adversarial platforms and adversarial development programs. and we do that also on the ground domain. of course we are very interested in what happens in the underwater -- domain, subsurface domain. so there are objects that are aviators, our air crews, are encountering in this air domain, and their centers are discovering or detecting some of these objects, we want to just bring that into the normal process that we have for identifying unknown unknowns. we want to make sure that we have the intelligence requirements that allow us, not only to look at that event from the time that it occurs forward, but maybe retrospectively, we want to go back and receiving it to the left of that event to say, was there some developmental program that we, to get your tactical surprise issue, sir, that we should note about. and if so, how do we put that
intelligence requirement in place to make sure that we are following an adversarial development, or any other development, that may be out there. so, that is what we want to do in terms of normalizing this. to bring you into the normal process of how we identify unknown unknowns. >> so you mentioned fidelity, and i think it is important to talk about the relationship from the navy's elite agency on this. how do you interact with space for us, air force, degree that degree of fidelity. we are talking about sensors and so on. and i guess, where have some sick concerns is, many of the images that we see commonly in this committee, and even an open source, the resolution of the clarity that would allow a robust technical intelligence analysis is challenging. so, is aoimsg prepared to address the quality and quantity of data collected on uap to advance intelligence collection, and you have the adequate centers you need to collect that high quality data?
>> one of the lines of effort that we have is looking at our sensor capabilities and, to understand whether or not, as the video shows, that mr. bray displayed. sometimes it is very fleeting data that we have on some of these objects, and we want to make sure that one, our systems are calibrated. to actually be able to collect on the objects. our sensors today are calibrated for, specific things. we want to make sure that they are calibrated for things of this nature, things is the size, things of this velocity if i can use that term. we want to make sure that once we have that, that data is stored in some standardized method that we can then extract, and that we can feed into our system in realtime. so we don't have to take some prolonged period of time, of course to get the data. but our goal is absolutely to have that high fidelity information that we get from all sensors. and we want to build integrate that with what we may have off the ground based sensors. so whatever you might have a platform, whatever might have on the ground, when we might
have from other sensors we might have interpreted means, we want to really integrate that all and get this integrated picture as we would. as i said, as we with any other unidentified objects are things that we are tracking as part of our normal tellers responsibilities. >> thank you. last question, mr. bray, if you. would i am a navy pilot, i have encountered uap. walk me through the reporting protocol once i see something that i think needs reporting. >> the first thing that that aviator would you, after landing, as a part of the normal debriefing is they would contact their intelligence officer. their intelligence officer would then walk them through first filing, actually first data presentation to ensure that whatever sensor data may be on the aircraft that we preserve that. so that it is available for later nelson. this second, they would actually fill out a form that includes details like, where they were operating, altitudes
they're operating a, speeds, what they observed, whatever sensory data they may recorded from that, and then the report is filed. it goes to places, want to go through the operational chain of command so that operational units are aware of what is being observed. and also, through the uap task force so that they can take that data, databases and quite often have individuals from the task force contacted the aviator and asked them additional questions if there were things that were clear in that report. that thing goes into a database where we then compare it with other observations that we have. again, comparing for locations, comparing altitude, speeds, shapes, if any are if admissions were died on the platform, all of that. so that we can try to reach some conclusions on that. >> thank you, i yield back. >> gentleman yields back.
chairman shift. thanks, mister chairman. mr. brechin you run that first image. it looks like it was outside of a plane window. and if you would mind going up the screen and tell us what we are seeing. nothing can necessarily tell us what we are seeing, but explain what we should be looking at in a first image. >> absolutely, and alexei, when i will ask is that if you can stop it at a certain point. are we looking outside of a civilian aircraft window? is that what we are looking at?
>> okay, the laptop we are working with it's not as easy to stop that video in the frame. >> describe what we have seen. what are we observing? >> what you see here is an aircraft that is operating in a u.s. navy training range that has observed spherical object in that area. as they fly by, take a video you see a, it looks reflective in this video. somewhat reflective. it quickly passes by the cockpit of the aircraft. >> is this one of the phenomenon that we cannot explain. >> i do not have an explanation for what specific object is. >> is this one of the situations where it is, that is the object we are looking at right there? thank you. this is a situation where.
it was recorded by pilot also recorded by the aircrafts incidents. >> we can talk about the multi center part in a later session. -- [inaudible] in this case, and we have at least that. >> in the director of national intelligence, 2021 unclassified report. odni reported 144 uaps between 2004 in 2021. 80% of which were recorded on multiple instruments. i take it, with respect to some of those, you had a pilot seeing them, if it was observed by pilot. and you had multiple instruments recording. it you really have three sensors, the human sensor into technical sensors detecting the objects. is that it? >> for the majority of
incidents we've had in last year's report. the majority had multi sensor data. when we talk about the 400 ports we have now that number will certainly go down because a lot of those new reports that we have are actually historic reports that our narrative base because that percentage will go down the d signalization will go down across more reports -- >> that is it right there. >> okay. >> of that 144, 18 of them reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual flight characteristics. uprooted demonstrate unusual technology. and some of them appeared to remain stationary in winds aloft. move against the wind. maneuver abruptly or move at considerable speed without discernible means a propulsion. that is pretty intriguing.
if you are able to answer in this setting. are we aware of any foreign adversary capable of moving objects without any discernible means a propulsion? >> without discernible means of propulsion, i would say that we are not aware of any adversary that can move an object without discernible means a propulsion. the question then becomes, in many of these cases where we don't have a total mean when the data that we have there are likely center artifacts that could be hiding some of that it could be something that looks like signature management from what we have seen in some of these uap i would caution -- i would simply say that there are a number of events where we
do not have an explanation. there are a small handful in which there are flight characteristics, signature management that we cannot explain with the data that we have. we will continue -- those are obviously the ones that are of most interest to. us earlier when we asked how you avoid technological surprise, the biggest way you avoid technological surprises by collecting this type of data. importantly calibrating the assumptions that you go into with how you do that analysis. i will tell you within the uap tax fourth they have one basic assumption. generally speaking, generally speaking, our centers operate as designed we make that assumption because many times these are multi-sensor collections. we make no assumptions about the origin of this or how there may or may not be some sort of technology we do not understand. that is the key to avoiding technological surprises by calibrating those assumptions. and finally, with respect to the second two videos showing
the small triangles, the hypothesis is that those are commercial drones that, because we use a night vision, goggles appear like triangles. is that the operating assessment? >> some type of drone, so top of an material system. and it is simply that that light source resolves itself through the night vision goggles on to the slr camera as a triangle. >> and have we in order to prove that hypothesis flown a drone and observed it with that same technology to see whether we can reproduce the effect? >> the uap task force is aware of studies that have done that. >> thank you, mister chairman. i yield back. >> should reload so you get of a cabinet in the dictionary -- >> thank you, mister chairman.
thank you all for being here. i first in question is, throughout this process where there's been sightings, have the sightings been stationary, or have they always been cited from a moving object? from a plane or a ship that may be moving? have these reports ever come from a stationary object being observed in the sky? >> the uap task force does have reports from stationary, from reports from a stationary observer. >> there is a difference in observing something would your moving as well. it's physics, right? that's why i asked that
question. oh we capable, why have we made any breakthroughs or anyone made any breakthroughs to be able to cite something and make some determination at all of its composition, whether it's a solid or a gas? is there any such capability? >> from some of the returns -- >> i'm not asking what -- >> it's clear not a majority, that many of the observations we have are physical objects from the center data that we have. >> physical well, gas is physical, it's a physical object, it can be. and so, if you see where i'm going with this? i'm trying to determine what it is we are looking at so we can decide if something is a solid or a gas. and if there have been any conclusions on its capabilities, it's capabilities of movement, of turning, going, you know, 180 degrees or 90 degree turn, anything along that line that we've been able to determine? >> within the -- and i should point out that you know, there's not a single explanation for uap. they make up, they're a lot of different things that are unidentified or -- >> basically, we really don't know much on it. that's all i'm
trying to get at. i'm pleased that you have particle right now for our military. but are there any nonmilitary reports coming forward of similar events? or is it all coming from military? >> the uap task force has a very good working relationship with the faa. they have a very good working relationship with other parts of the u.s. government, so that we can ingest reports from -- >> do we have any reports nonmilitary? >> yes. >> thank you. that's my question. and do we need to put out protocol for civilians that may be in that arena? like, through faa? do you think that would be appropriate and helpful? >> i think standardized reporting, without a doubt, is key to helping us get to, to ascertain what some of these are. >> i think it would be important as well. a do we -- there are, are the people besides the u.s. that have had these experiences and reported them? is that correct? >> there are, that's correct. >> is it all of our allies, or is it allies and adversaries? whatever we learned publicly? >> some of that i think, sir,
we will save for closed sessions. >> well, that goes to my next question. publicly, have -- made anything which would not have to be considered closed? i don't want you to answer what they've said, necessarily. >> allies have seen these, china has established its own version of a uap task force. so clearly, a number of countries have observations of things in the air space that they can't identify. >> and do we share data with some, with all? are they sharing with us? >> we share data with so much from some share data with us. >> but not necessarily all they? have publicly reported something that's correct. >> and i think that's an important thing for the other session, actually, that we don't discuss that now. because, you know, obviously something like this can be a national security challenge for us, no doubt about it. if they are developed by an adversary, through some breakthrough technology, it can be very
disruptive to our military actions, or at least serve as a destruction. so, my caution would be, be careful who we share our data with, and don't necessarily trust some of the data we may get from someone else. and with that, i yield back. gentleman yields back, mr. himes. >> thank you mister chairman. one of the objectives of this open hearing is to try to erode some of the stigma that attaches to, in particular, our military men and women reporting this it is really very serious because should one our adversaries have developed a technology that we don't know about and we need to know about it yesterday. obviously any sort of stigma that prevents our military almost two years ago august of 2020, they miss secretary the from reporting this data as comprehensively is it's a national security threat i
really just have two questions in the service of that goal the first is the first the chairman after we run that money again most people nec it you were all used to seeing things from a car seeing things from a sidewalk very few people have at the experience of observing something gets through night vision goggles at mach 1. 5. so just talk for a minute, if you would, whichever of you is most appropriate, how radically different observation is at high speed and three dimensions and it is for most of us who walk around and drive cars. >> so, the first thing i think that's important to note about this is there are lots of things, when you are moving very fast, and an object is between you and it is reference point like the ground, it gives a lot of different impressions about how quickly something is or isn't moving. and it
actually means that it is a challenge, especially with narrative based data, to get a lot of information on that. that's why the sensor data is so important. because things do happen very quickly, as you see there, and sometimes the things that happened very quickly, something may be moving very slow. that ever aircraft is moving very fast. how fast that object is moving that goes by is probably very slow. >> so i guess my point is that an observation either a visual observation, or a electronic observation, infrared or whatever, looks radically different than it does to most people. even instruments, instruments are on gimbles and that sort of thing, so that creates a very unusual few to -- used to seeing those things in two dimensions largely. second question, i think mr. bray, you said something i want to unpack a little bit, a number of uaps, you said we can't explain. again, in the service of sort of reducing speculation and conspiracy
theories, we can't explain, can range from a visual observation that was a distant on a foggy night we, don't know what it is, too we've found an organic material that we can't identify, right? those are radically different worlds. so when you say, we can't explain, give the public a little bit better sense of where on that spectrum off we can't explain we are. are we holding materials, organic or inorganic, that we don't know about? are we picking up emanations that or something other than light or infrared that could be deemed to be communications? give us a sense for what you mean when you say we can't explain? >> sure. when i say we can't explain, i mean exactly as you described their, that there's a lot of information like the video that we showed. -- simply too little data to create a reasonable explanation. there
are a small handful of cases in which we have more data that our analysis simply hasn't been able to fully pull together a picture of what happened. the -- and those are the cases where we talk about what we see, some indications of flight characteristics or signature management that are not what we expected. when it comes to material that we have we have no material, we have detected no emanations within the uap task force, and that is, that would suggest it's anything non-terrestrial in origin. so, there's when i say unexplained, i mean everything from too little data to we simply, the data that we have doesn't point as towards an explanation. but we will go wherever that data takes us we have made no assumptions about what this is or isn't we are committed to understanding these, and so, we'll move wherever that data takes us. >> thank you. that's very
helpful. and so i think it bears emphasis. when you say, we can't explain, everything that you can't explain is in a bucket called data, is that correct? and that could mean data collected by sensors, visual observations, everything that we can't explain, quote, unquote, is in a bucket called data. >> right. and narrative report from the early 2000s, if it just has a little bit of information on, it would be in our database and it would be unresolved. >> i would add to that, it's insufficient data. that's one of the challenges we have. insufficient data, either on the event itself, the object itself, or insufficient data or plug in with some other organization or agency that may have had something in that space at that time. so it's a data issue that we are facing in many of these instances, congressman. >> understood. thank you very, much yield back. >> the gentleman yields back. mr. gallagher. >> >> thank you, mister chairman, thank you for allowing me to join this hearing. i really appreciate these witnesses testimony. mr. multrey, as the
chairman mentioned, -- a mission to study ufos in the 1960s called project bluebook. it's also been well reported. in a briefing in other places that we have more recent projects, specifically a tip, could you describe any other initiatives that the d. o. d. or d. o. d. contact tractors have managed after project blue book and didn't try to atip beginning. did it include anything including project blue book? >> i can't speak to anything that predated tragically to look. that of course as water all and other things people have talked about overdoses. i'm familiar with blue book, i'm familiar with -- i haven't seen other documented studies that have been done by d. o. d. in that regard. >> so you're not aware of anything in between project book and atip? not aware of >> not aware of anything that official, that was done in between those two, brought my attention. >> okay. additionally are you aware of any other d. o. d. or d. o. d. contract programs focused on uaps from a
technological engineering perspective? by that i mean are you aware of any -- looked on this topic other than the initiative space focused on the initial case investigations? >> i'm not aware of any contractual programs that are focused on any thing related to this other than that we are doing in the navy task force and what we are about to launch in terms of our effort. >> same question for you, mister bray. >> senator. i'm not aware of anything else we're doing other than in the white house was. >> so they're not aware of any technology or engineering resources that have been focused on these efforts besides what we've mentioned today? >> once again, i'll take no contractual or pragmatic efforts that are involved. the reason why i qualify, i didn't qualify that, way, i can speak to what people may be looking
at in the department. somebody says i'm looking at something, i'm looking at something that may or may not be identified. and i can't speak to that. to speak to official programs we have on the record. >> it's also been reported that there have been uap observed in interacting with and flying over sensitive military facilities, not just ranges, but some facilities housing our strategic nuclear forces. one such incident allegedly occurred at malstrum air force base in which ten if nuclear icbms were rendered in operable at the same time. a glowing red or brewers observed overhead. i'm not commenting on the accuracy of this, and simply asking you whether you are aware of it and whether you may have any comment on the accuracy of it. >>. >> that data is not in the holdings of the uap task force. >> okay. but are you aware of the report, that the data exists somewhere? >> i have heard stories i, have not seen the official data. >> so you've just seen informal stories, no official assessment that you've done or exists
within dod that you are aware of regarding the malstrum incident? >> all i can think is, what's within my cognizance, the would-be task force, and we've not looked at that incident. >> why, it's a pretty high profile incident. i don't tend to be an expert on this, but this is out there, isn't it?. you are the guys -- investigating it. i mean who else is doing it? >> if something was officially brought to our tension, we would look at it. there are many things that are out there that aren't officially broadway tension. >> how would it have to be officially point to it? i'm bringing it your attention. that's pretty official! >> so we'll go back and take a
look at it. but generally there is authoritative figure that says there is an incident that occurred we, like you look at this. but in terms of just tracking what maybe in the media, that says that something occurred at this time at this place, there probably a lot of leaves and we can follow up on, i don't think we have the resources to do that right now >> i don't claim to be an authoritative figure but, for what it's worth, i'd like you to look into it. for another reason you could dismiss it and say this is not worth wasting resources on. finally, are you aware of a document that appeared around 2019, sometimes called the wilson memo, or you w notes memo? >> i am not. >> you're not? >> i'm not personally aware of that. >> okay. is the document in which, again, i'm not commenting on, veracity i was hoping you would help me with that. in which a former head of dia claims to have had a conversation with doctor eric wilson, claims to have been aware of certain contractors or d. o. d. programs that he tried to get fuller access to and was denied access to. so, you're not aware of that? >> i'm not aware, congressman. >> in my ten seconds remaining then, i would just ask the chairman unanimous consent to enter that into the record? >> without objection. >> thank you mister chairman, appreciate it. >> mr. krishnamoorthi. >> and, you mister chair. thank you to both of you for appearing today and for your public service. my first question is, there have been no collisions between any u.s. assets and one of these uaps?
11 near misses or any place where there's close proximity. i assume, tell me if i'm wrong, there's been no attempt, there's >> we have not had a collision, we have had at least 11 near misses though. >> maybe we'll talk about those 11 near misses or any place where there is close proximity. i assume, tell me if i'm wrong, that there's been no attempt, no communications or any kind of communication signals that emanate from those objects that we have detected, correct? >> that is correct. >> we attempted to communicate with those objects? >> no. >> so, we don't even put out an alert saying u.s., identify or self, you are within our flight path or something like that. we haven't said anything like that? >> we have not put anything
like that. generally speaking, for example in the video we showed earlier, it appears to be something that is on may and. appears to be something that may or may not be an uncontrolled flight. and so, we have not attempted any communication with that. >> okay. i assume we have never discharged any are immense against a uap, is that correct? >> that is correct. >> how about wreckage, have we come across any wreckage of any kind of object that has now been examined by you? >> the uap task force doesn't have any wreckage that isn't unexplainable, that is a consistent with being of terrestrial origin. >> you have any sensors underwater to detect on submerged uaps? anything that is in the ocean or in the seas? >> i think that be more appropriately addressed in close session, sir. >> okay. i think one of the biggest questions that i have is, we say with a lot of
probability that they quote unquote probably do represent physical objects, close quote. when we say probably, is that because we cannot conclusively say that they are physical objects? >> in a task force report, when i say probably to represent physical objects, most of them represent physical objects. there could be some that are more of a meteorological phenomena, something like that. it may not be a physical object in the sense that most people would think of so that you go up and touch. >> but the ones where you say most of them represent physical objects, can you say that they are definitely, with 100 percent certainty, that they are physical objects? >> i could say with certainty that a number of these are physical objects. >> okay. so, we can't rule out that some of them may not be physical objects? >> some of them certainly could be a sensor anomaly or
something like that, some could be. >> now, how about with regard to uaps, we've talked about uaps on training areas but obviously there is some sensor bias, i would think. you put centers and training areas. how about with their guards to non training areas? do we track what is in open source and what's civilians and others have tracked? have we found similarities to what they have observed, in terms of uaps in non training areas to the ones that are in training areas? >> the uap task force has worked very hard to make sure the data set that we working with is a data set that we have very good control over, that data. so, we have some partnerships with faa so we get that reporting in. if it comes to open source reports where someone says that they saw something, that generally does not make it a door database. >> basically, it sounds like we
have a good partnership with faa but, apart from faa we don't have partnerships with other agencies or other entities that might be tracking. so that we could enlarge our data set to make comparisons. >> we will, that is the goal. this next effort will be to expand that relationship with the rest of government and the inter agency. so we can understand what they're, seeing and we're seeing, we can correlate on each other's holdings -- >> i think, sorry to interrupt, but i think that we may have a bias going on right now with regards to just reporting on uaps being in training areas. when we don't really track what is happening elsewhere. last question, have our encounters with uaps altered the development of either our offensive or defensive capabilities or even our sensor capabilities? >> i would say that for the closed session. >> okay, great, thank you. >> mr. lahood? >> and, you mister chairman, i want to thank the witnesses for
being here today. obviously, this topic of uaps has attracted a lot of interest in people that are curious about this hearing today. as we talk about it, i would say there's a lot of what i would call amature interest groups that are involved in the uap field. my question is, when there are unsubstantiated claims or manufactured claims of uaps or false information that is put out there, what are the consequences for people that are involved with that or groups that are involved with that? >> one of the concerns that we have is that there are a lot of individuals and groups that are putting information out there that could be considered to be somewhat self serving. we are
trying to do what is in the best interest of, one, the department of defense and, two, what is in the best interest of the public. to ensure that we can put factual based information back into the mainstream, back into the bloodstream of the reporting media that we have. so that people can understand what's there. it's important, because we are attempting, as this hearing has drawn out, to understand, one, one may just be natural phenomenon, two, maybe sensory phenomenalogy things that are happening on sensors, three, what may be legitimate counter intelligence threats to places that we have our bases our installations. or security threats to our platforms. anything that diverts us off of what we have with the resources that have been allocated to us, it sends us off in these chases and hunts that are just not helpful. they also contribute to the undermining of the
confidence that congress and the american people have, that we are trying to get to the root cause of what is happening here and report on that. and then feed that back into our national security apparatus, so that we are able to protect the american people and our allies. it is harmful, it is hurtful but, hopefully, if we get more information out there it will start to lessen the impact of some of those more spurious reports. >> so, taking got a step further. that misinformation, false narratives, manufactured. what are the consequences? are there legal consequences? are there examples you can give us where people have been held accountable by this misinformation or disinformation? >> i can't give you any examples where someone has been legally held liable for putting something out there -- >> i, guess what's the deterrent from people engaging in this activity? >> i don't know, i don't have that answer. that is something where i welcome a dialogue with congress to talk about that.
with the members who helped legislate those laws. to say, when should be the legal ramifications that we can use to potentially hold individuals accountable? whether it be citizens or information that may be injected into our media by other forces or other countries, if you will. >> in terms of d. o. d. ease and review and analysis in this field, is there a standard in place when it comes to uaps? is there any guidance you look to that is codified and law or otherwise within d. o. d., that sets out the standards for uaps and what to look for? >> i think that is part of the group that we are setting up now will be charted to do. for my organization, we'll be looking at policy and standards and we have to come to you and work with you to actually put them in place and promulgated across our government. >> thank, you i yield back. >> gentlemen yields back. mr. welch? >> thank you, you i'm going to follow on the line of questions
from mr. lahood. chairman, it seems incredibly difficult for you is that there are two competing but different narratives. one is, no one knows whether there is extraterrestrial life, it's a big universe. it would be pretty presumptuous to have a hard and fast conclusion. and then, if there is, it's not beyond the realm of possibility that there is some exploration coming here. that underlies a lot of the reports you get. i think mr. lahood was asking about, that people think there must be extra terrestrial life and it's not at all beyond the pale that there would be a visit here. on the other hand, as the d. o. d., you have the responsibility to make sure and our national security is protected and that, if there are surveillance drones or active drones that can disable our systems, that has to be analyzed, it has to be stopped.
so, how do you divide these? how do you separate your responsibilities where you get all these reports from folks who may be in good faith, maybe not, but believe that you should be investigating every possible report of an extra terrestrial incident? i'll start with you, mister moultrie. >> sure, indeed, congressman. thank you for the question. it is important that we, as a part of this effort, really build at the relationship that we have with others, including nasa. for the reason that you just pointed out. so, there are elements in our government that are engaged in looking for life in other places, they have been doing that for decades. they've been searching for extraterrestrial life. there
are astro biologist who have been doing this too, we are part of that same government. our goal is not to potentially cover up something if we are to find something, it is to understand what may be out there, examine what it may mean for us from a defensive perspective, if there are any national security implications or ramifications. but then, to work with organizations as appropriate, if it's weather phenomena g with noah, if it is potential for extraterrestrial life, in the case of extraterrestrial life, with someone like nasa. >> so, the transparency is actually important for public consumption. >> completely. >> we're going to have a classified briefing. without going into the details of what kind of secrets that we can't share here,, what are we protecting? i don't know if you can answer this question in this open forum. but, in fact, your perception of what it is we have to, quote, unpack. >> right now, when i think it
is important for us to protect is how we know certain things. they're lot of things we know. whether it be about the thinking of other leaders around the world, the weapon systems that are being developed or how we detect things that may be threats to us. many of those things are the result of some of our most sensitive sources and methods. we will use as things, not just for this effort but those same sources and methods are used to help protect use from adversaries and from others who might mean to do us harm. there aren't separate uap sensors, there's not a separate uap processing computer, there's not a separate uap dissemination chain or whatever. so, it's the same process, the same system that we have that helps us to do all that. we need to protect that. because this is something that we are looking at but we are sure that there will be other things to look at in the future that only the same sensors, will need those same sources and methods to help us to it. so, we're protecting the fact that this nation has developed capabilities that enable us to
know what maybe threats to us and to counter those threats before they become something of a national issue. >> thank you very much, i want to thank both of you, mr. bray and mr. moultrie, for your appearance today. i yield back. >> gentleman yields back. gentlemen, beyond videos, is there a range of other information that the executive branch has that would be valuable to the american people, while protecting sources and methods, obviously? the details of individual encounters, including the time, place and details of an encounter. and as the aoimsg have a clear and repeatable process for considering public release as part of the process? >> chairman carson -- >> and you commit to building that process if it isn't in place? >> the uap task force, the
security fabrication guide that the uap task force has been operating under that i approved really was meant to protect those sources and methods. really was meant to protect any knowledge that an adversary intelligence entity may gain from understanding what we're tracking, how we track it or when we are tracking it or if or it we're not. and so, that has been an important piece in the balance between transparency and preserving our war fighting advantage. because the u.s. military does train as it would fight. what i will commit to is, at least for that material that is under my authority as the deputy director of naval intelligence, for information that we have when it does not involve sources and methods or and when we can, with a reasonable degree of confidence, determined that it does not pose a foreign intelligence or national security threat. and it is within my authority to do so, i commit to declassifying that. so i believe very much of the transparency of this, and
we worked very hard to balance that with our national security needs. >> i'll just add, colin, that just over the last three, four months, i think that the intelligence community and the national defense apparatus have disclosed more information on various events agitates, and probably, i think, the previous ten years. you have our commitment to work closely with the director of national intelligence and others in the declassification and downgrading of intel apparatus to jump and whatever information we can get to the american people and the public read large. >> i really appreciated, so. ranking member crawford. >> thank you, mister chairman. representative stefanik is on route i believe, just really quickly, but in the interim if, i could, if you'll indulge me, i have just a couple of real small questions. one is do we
have an example, can you cite a specific example of an object that can't be explained as having been human-made or natural? >> i mean the example that we would say is still unresolved, that i think everyone understands quite well is the 2004 incident from nimitz. we have data on that and it's simply remains unresolved. does not mean it resolved to being something, right, that is easily explainable or difficult. obviously it resulted to something that is difficult to explain. but i can't point to something that definitively was not man-made. but i can point to a number of examples which remain unresolved. >> gotcha. with regard to videos that have appeared in oprah resource generals, for example they take that video, does aoimsg maintaining control of the videos and how do -- these up potentially classified videos and other appeals? >> so the aoimsg s we established an organization, we will have a process for classified compartmental holings and we will find a way
of getting positive control over those. we have sensitive access program, the special access programs, that the law was to put what we call saps around things and control access programs allow us to put caps iran things. so our goal will be ensuring that we are sharing that with the appropriate analyst and the appropriate exporters if, you will, who can look at that data. but what we don't want to do his job put something into a dod beta base or directly holding in something photograph surrounded so it's not available to those who really need to look at it and you exploited. that's one of the regions we're establishing relationships with the inner agency and the -- but we'll do our best to maintain positive control of the materials that we have in our holdings. >> thank you. >> chairman schiff. >> thank you, mister chairman. just going back to the 2021 report you, know, under the category of uap appear to
demonstrators trans technology and those 18 incidents in which some of the uap appeared to remain stationary, winds aloft, moving against one, moon ring abruptly, wondering when us consider of peace without testimony so pours propulsion. it goes on to say that in the small number of cases, military systems processed radio frequency energy associated with uap sightings. i couldn't tell from that whether that small number of cases was a part of the subset of 18, that is among the 18 which appeared to move with unusual pattern of flight characteristics. there's some of those also humid radio frequency energy? >> i would have to check with our uap task force on that. i believe without getting into specifics that we can do in the close session, at least some that we have detected our our f
emissions from, we're not behaving oddly otherwise. >> and the significance of measuring the radio frequency energy is what? that we suspect that this was some form of aircraft in which there were radio transmissions? >> the biggest thing that you're looking for there is any indication of an effort to jam whatever fencers that we may have looking at it. >> i would also add to that that the radio frequency, as you, know congressman, seems to control various platforms too. so the fact of emanations coming off of any platform with epa uav or other platform could be radio frequency activity related to that and to the transmitting out, or something transmitting to that platform. and of course, we have a sensitivity with our airborne
platforms of picking up, that's one of the reasons that we try to prevent people from using their cell phones on airplanes and things like that. it's very sensitive to rf emanations. so that's a part of what will be looking back in the aoimsg. one of the things is something we can collect on, we can start to characterize the signaling environment around the nominations at me becoming off some of those uaps. >> so that energy, then, that was recorded could be either an effort to jam or it could be an effort to control a uav. or any other communication with the craft. >> i would say that's accurate. >> right. thank you, mister chairman. >> thank you, chairman. at as the odni report makes clear, one possible explanation for uaps is that we are detecting u.s. aircraft either secret or programs, or even test prototypes. i would ask you in this setting, obviously, to
describe any secret d. o. d. programs. at that said, i do want to make sure the u.s. government isn't chasing its own tale. firstly, do you have a clear and reputable process to check with cup compartmented programs about whether any uaps that is attributable to a u.s. aircraft? secondly, does the aoimsg staff have the clearances and read on that thing need to investigate all these incidents and? thirdly, when your staff cannot be --, brett on, are your questions to those that are being read on being answered? >> i'll start and then i'll pass that to mr.. so, we are very conscious of the potential blue on blue issue or u.s. on u.s.. and so, we've established relationships with organizations connected to these that are potentially flying or developing platforms for their own interests, if you will. and our goal is to
continue. and we have a reputable process, i think we've had that process for sometime, to deconflict activities that we may have to ensure that we are not potentially reporting on something that may be a developmental platform or a u. s. operational platform that is performing, either testing or performing missions. so we will have that in place. we've already had those discussions with organizations and entities. we want to ensure that we are protecting their equities, we want to ensure that we are protecting their sources and also -- getting out what we want to have here. wanted to confidants absolutely. the uap task forces had a process in place to work with other elements of the department of the department of defense and other elements of government to ensure that there is a simpler way as possible to deconflict those. and when we reference that in the report, i should say that we were simply accounting for the fact that there could be possibly be one
or two data points that had leaked through. but we were quite confident that that was not the explanation. >> how are you all liaison-ing with space command? specifically, how are you partnering with the parts of the u.s. of the u.s. space command responsible for its airspace domain awareness, and how, if at all, are you partnering with the space force to analyze uaps? >> uap top force has a very good relationship with the space force as it does with the rest of the department of defense. we have pulled analysts in from space for us to ensure that we're availing ourselves off that expertise, as well as any other material they may have that would be helpful. >> and congressman, as you know, space force and space command, they have a responsibility for space -- awareness. so what
we've done, we've coordinate with space force, we coordinated with -- and she is on board with helping us plug into what they have and for us to have this interactive exchange of information and data and. we're doing that with all the services, not just with space for, just recently. >> thank you, sir. >> ranking member, you have any additional questions? all right, chairman schiff. >> all right. with that i want to thank you all for taking the time at. i also want to thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for participating in this very historical and important hearing. i think it's one of the few times we can demonstrate some degree of partnership about uaps and your phones so, i love it. i appreciate it. so we will recess this hearing for the moment and return in a closed session at noon.
[inaudible conversations] president biden has really nominate david because skate to serve again as administrator of the transportation security administration. watch live coverage of the confirmation hearing thursday at 10:15 eastern on c-span 3. also, on our free video app ceased my nap or online at c-span.org.