tv Today in Washington CSPAN February 26, 2010 6:00am-7:00am EST
process that we expect to be effect i, yet to involve minimal burden for the vast majority of banks. this committee's efforts in developing and passing hh-4173 will promote the uniform application of sound principles across large financial firms as well as those supervised by the federal reserve. in this way, hr 7141 could aid them in developing compensation practices that are more effectively balanced. we appreciate the committee's efforts in this area and thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important topic. i would be happy to answer any questions. .
gm, gmac, chrysler, chrysler financial, and a.i.g.. if one of those exceptional assistance recipients has repaid all of what they owe the tax payer, they're automatically removed from my jurisdiction. as a result, bank of america and citigroup arnold subject to my 2010 compensation determinations. it is but statute, a very limited role. i am also responsible under the statute for those five companies for determining compensation structures for officials 26-100 in those five companies only. just those five. again, we did that in 2009.
we are moving forward, doing the same for the five companies, 1- 25, 26-100 for 2010. the second point i want to emphasize -- under the statute there are some principles laid out that i am obliged by law to follow in determining my compensation decisions. when you read the statute, there they are. we shall make sure that compensation determinations maintain the competitiveness of these five companies. so that key employees will be maintained, the companies will thrive, and they will repay the taxpayer. ñrthe compensation determination to be made in a way that avoids excessive risk-taking at these companies.
, that there will be an appropriate allocation between short-term compensation, in the form of cash, and long-term compensation, in the form of salarized tarp and stock that must be held for a long period of time. the portion of individuals should rise or fall depending on the performance and the fortunes of the company. i should examine comparable structures and payments of other companies. i should consider empirical data on compensation levels at various companies that are similar in kind to the companies that fall under my jurisdiction. i have enjoyed the benefit of expert input from professors at harvard business school and university of southern california in advising me and my
excellent staff, most of whom are here today, by the weight behind me, in reaching these compensation determinations. as a result of the statute and the accompanying regulations promulgated by treasury,ia there are a few basic conclusions that i have reached about executive compensation at these companies. one, guaranteed income should not be permitted. compensation of key officials at these companies that owe so much to the american taxpayer should depend on performance, not retention contract, not guaranteed bonuses. what you earn, other than your base cash salary, should depend on long-term performance.
, objective metric promulgated by the company in conjunction second, based cash salaries should rarely exceed $500,000 and only then for good cause shown and should be, in many cases, well under $500,000. third, the special master preserves the right to pull back excessive compensation which is granted based on what proved to be material ms. statements. we will exercise that authority to pull back compensation inappropriate cases. the final summary 0.1 to make concerning inquiry made by this
committee when they ask me to comment on a rather interesting question posed by the chair and the members of the committee. what is unique about what i am doing? are there unique features in this statute that makes the job i have undertaken particularly challenging? i want to mention just a couple of those unique features that need to the federal reserve nor fannie mae have to deal with the way i have to. ñione, i have already mentioned- my role >> we are over the time. >> my role is extremely limited, second i have no authority to restructure or demand a restructuring of old retention contracts that were entered into long before the topple was in
britain -- implemented. finally, i have the distinct challenge of actually calculating individual compensation for these top 25 officials in these five companies. >> thank you. let me ask all of you -- one of the things we have to deal with is the threat of people to walk away if the compensation is not higher. how credible has that been? at some levels, it seems to me,
not to credible but at some levels these limits are right across the board. there is probably not another place that will make as much money. how credible -- do we have evidence of people walking away because they are not adequately compensated? >> yes, mr. chairman, we do. the senior executive business line manager at one of the enterprises who had a critical role at that company specifically to manage and reduced losses on foreclosed mortgages and the properties that are then taken by the company after words. this individual left the enterprise to join another very large well-known financial institution at a considerable increase in pay.
the consequence of his departure is that the head of this area of management that the area of the enterprise was vacant for a number of months. we lost several of the lieutenant in that particular part of the company, as well, given the upset in the opportunities those individuals had because this is a >> i am dubious about that claim. i will say this -- the determinations we have made were only made last october, last december. we do not see any exit of individuals from these companies. what ever individuals were exiting these companies i suggest exited long before compensation determinations were made by this office. there were quite a few vacancies. when i took a over this assignment. i do not see exited.
-- exitsing. i am rather dubious about that claim. >> to the extent that we do these in a uniform way -- the federal reserve has promulgated under its authority, not limited to tarp recipients. was there any dissent among the fed presidents? >> no. >> board of governors has imposed restrictions on all financial institutions that minimizes this between -- if the compensation restrictions are the same. i was gratified that you expressed your support for those elements of hr 4173.
you like the notion that we apply those across the board because you wouldn't have the competitive theoretical disadvantage. >> that is absolutely right. this is called the first mover problem. many people recognized that incentive compensation structures need to be changed, the incentives are not always aligned properly. sometimes they are badly misaligned. as a first person who fixes those policies is concerned that they will lose personnel to others who do not change the incentives, one thing we can do and you have helped do, is to set a policy that probably applies across the industry. so that everyone is subject to the same policy and principles.
>> my time is limited, the gentleman from alabama. >> mr. demarco, i know you had a career position so when the president as you take your position, you did not have a choice, did you? >> i was honored that the president last may. i still am a career official. i spent my entire career as a civil servant at the federal level in a variety and that a variety of agencies. i'm honored to serve of the acting director of fha. i believe we are ready critical juncture i am honored to lead an agency thatñr is working e tocy thatñr is working overseas companies and help bring stability back to the housing market. >> that is a good answer, i
appreciate that. last year, the administration possible regulatory reform blueprint indicated that it ministration would present a reform plan for federal may and freddie mac this month. yesterday, treasury secretary tim geithner testified before the house budget committee that that plan would not be ready until 2011, at the earliest. in testimony before this committee yesterday, chairman bernanke recommended we take steps to determine the future of gse's this year. with american taxpayers exposed to hundreds of billions of dollars in losses from fannie mae and freddie mac continuing operations, do you agree with german bernanke that we cannot afford to wait until next year to decide the gse's future? ñi>> i believe the time is now o
figure out what the proper questions are to ask him what is the proper role the government in the housing system, what is the future structure and objectives of the housing and finance system that policy makers believe is in the best interests of the country and i believe there is plenty of important questions and it is time to start asking in working toward answers right now. with that said, i appreciate the difficulties and challenges in getting to that as of the counter and get into a formal structure. i understand that will take a while. i believe we should absolutely take the time to get it right. i would be happy to work with this committee to start going through what some of those key questions are. i am ready for the discussion to get started. >> thank you. you look it august of 2008 which is when we first had to bailout
fed may and freddie mac. we have an adequate amount of time. i appreciate you saying that now is the time to start making those changes or at least advancing ideas. mr. alvarez, in your testimony,c you said that the misalignment of incentives is not confined to the top level executives? when the federal reserve or others start looking at these pay incentives, where you stop? do you include all employees of all financial institutions? >> what we are speaking of is employees that are given incentive compensation. many organizations do not provide incentive compensation to the vast majority of their employees. it is selected groups that
receive targeted incentives. an example of the type of lower- level and non-executive employee weaken --ñi we would consider to look at would be the mortgage brokers where volume of mortgages produced, compensation is often tied to the number of mortgages produced. we have seen in this crisis that this can encourage some employees to generate mortgages with weak underwriting so that they can increase their own compensation. >> when you get down to the volumes and incentives for volumes, wouldn't it be better if they make bad loans, wouldn't the bank want to get rid of them? >> you are exactly right. we would not try to set the compensation for those employees. we ask that the bank have a procedure in place to monitor the incentive it is creating an to take action when those incentives are misaligned.
>> i see. mr. feinberg, what did you think of the compensation packages awarded to fannie mae and freddie mac executives that were announced christmas eve. >> they were high but fannie mae and freddie mac, although they are not on my watch, posed some unique problems that i do not have to address with the five companies i am now dealing with. first, the future of fannie mae and freddie mac is sufficiently on certain, as you well know, so that attracting people to fannie mae and freddie mac with the talent necessary to administer the program is more problematic. secondly, it is not easy to develop a pay package that has
long-term performance-based the lelike i have with the five companies before me when long- term performance-based delay is uncertain with a company like fannie mae and freddie mac. you cannot simply say that you can pay them four or five years out when there is a question as to what fannie mae and freddie mac will look like that much time out. finally, a major proponent of what i am doing and what the office of the special master is doing is tied to stock. the portions of the individual will depend on the portions of the individual per the stock fell you will depend on how well the company is doing. fannie and freddie may have no stock. it is kasparov -- it is cash. >>
for firms that continue to depend on taxpayer assistance, more scrutiny is warranted i filed a bill to limit executive compensation for employees of tarp firms. in your work, have you conducted a cost benefit analysis of any employee making more than what the president receives or anyone making more than $1 million annually so we have a better idea of what taxpayer returns we should get from these employees in return for these compensation
packages? if not, would you provide a written response along those lines? >> i would be glad to provide to rittman analysis. -- a written analysis. we have examined the data as to what type of individual should receive what type of -- what level of compensation. it is a bit premature for us to draw a conclusion about the compensation determinations we made just last few months because we will be monitoring the performance over time. >> very good, i appreciate that. same question to you mr. alvarez. >> we have not done a cost- benefit analysis. we have an analyst with the market for financial executives
with the requisite expertise is and that certainly was a key input to into the pay-setting that was done. we have also looked at what it takes to recruit a senior executive positions at each company. i would be glad to provide more information along that line. >> i appreciate that i thank the witnesses for their testimony. i yield back. >> the gentleman from texas. >> thank you. mr. demarco, i want to talk about what activities are going on at freddie mae and freddie -- and -- fannie mae and freddie mac right now. you have two pieces that are insolvent. what is going on with their portfolio index and a much
portfolio growth are those two institutions experiencing right now? >> since the time the conservatorship was established, the portfolios have risen modestly. from the low to the mid-$700 billion. they are about to gradually decline. they have a dollar cap in which the portfolio much -- must be at the end of each year. for the past year, the cap had been at $900 billion. for the end of this year, itgv s $810 billion and will continue to decline slightly over the next few years. i have made clear to the companies and the committee that it is certainly my objective as conservative to see that those reductions take place so that the companies keep the portfolios with and those caps. i believe the cap that they have today will be used principally for the purpose of pulling
delinquent loans out of security pools and to seek loans -- lost mitigation activity on that. that is what that net additions to the portfolio will be working on, the liquid mortgages and trying to minimize those losses. >> have you been able to sell any of the portfolio? what kind of activities are going on in that area? >> there is a fair amount of run off every month in terms of the portfolio plus paying down -- portfolio's paying down. those are principally driven by the los coming of mortgage- backed security pools so they can work on. you were asking about the approach taken with respect to loss mitigation.
the first approach taken by the enterprise is consistent with a homeowner affordable modification program. that is driven principally by reductions in interest rates and extending the term of the mortgage to get to an affordable mortgage that is set at 31% @ 2 the borrower's monthly income. if that does not work, the enterprises are quite active and rigorous in seekinge1 the way to resolve the delinquent mortgage at the lowest cost to the company, and the lowest cost to the taxpayer. that could include short sale. it could include foreclosure. it could include a loan modification that does not follow the hamp program but at the end of the day, if those programs do not produce a better income, we will expeditiously moved to foreclose on the
mortgage. >> what about the securitization activity? what volumes are receding there? >> right now, they are securitized almost all of the new business they do and they are responsible for about three out of every four mortgages that are being made in this country with fha representing most of the balance. >> what is the credit quality and underwriting standards being used? >> one minute remaining. >> the credit quality of the new book is substantially superior to that of the middle& part of the past decade. the loan to value add origination is lower, the credit scores of the borrowers are higher, these are much sounder loans.
>> thank you. >> the gentleman from missouri. >> mr. chairman, mr. feinberg -- >> we can switch if you want. >> i am here. >> tell me who will talk. the gentleman from missouri. >> thank you. have you examined companies like goldman sachs who received passed through tarp funds from a.i.g.? the american public had to endure announcements recently from goldman sachs of record profits and record bonuses. can you determine if any of that pastor money went toward paying
those bonuses and if so, did you ever address it with them? >> goldman sachs is not one of the company's that falls under my mandatory. mandatory unlike the other seven, now 5, i have no mandatory jurisdiction over goldman sachs. there is a provision in bill law that requires me to seek information about goldman sachs pay practices. we will do this and examine the data. we have no mandatory jurisdiction to set compensation at goldman sachs. >> yes, do you think any of the past through monday whewent to paying out record bonuses -- duke -- do you think any of the past for money went to paying a record bonuses? half of america is trying to pay their mortgage.
>> i share the concern. my role is somewhat limited, congressman, but i do have this one opportunity to inquire shortly, and we will do so. >> thank you for that response. as a follow-up -- what did you finally decide was fair compensation for a.i.g. employees and did you take any action towards their financial products division, the sector of the company at a.i.g. that traded derivative swaps? >> we certainly did. there is a company that falls within my jurisdiction. the retention contracts that were entered into are legally binding contracts that i could not invalidate. i asked aig financial products to roll those contracts over, like other companies did instead
of asking for the cash, put it into long-term stock so that whether that money -- what it will be worth will depend in the long term on the future of the company, repaying the tax payer. >> did they follow your advice? >> they did not follow my advice so in 2009, last year, since they did not follow my advice, we[< slashed the base salaries, which i could do under the law, and reduced substantially the overall compensation of those officials, both the 1-25 group, that refused to roll those retention contract over. we are now in 2010 with financial products in negotiations with him to do the very same thing. >> "thank you. i hope it goes well.
citigroup comes under your your street -- jurisdiction also? >> they did come under my jurisdiction last year. they have repaid the taxpayer all play a role -- all dayowe. >> did they have compensation issues you had to negotiate? >> yes, we did roll over their retention contracts. we did negotiate and work out appropriate compensation at those levels all under 5 $4,000 base-salary which we were comfortable with. >> i am glad to hear that and thank you for your testimony. >> the gentleman from california. >> mr. demarco i mentioned a legal defense bills paid by the taxpayers to the executives at any mae and freddie. freddie
is the $6.3 million figure from september 6, 2008 through july of last year accurate? >> yes commissar. >> that is the total amount that has been the -- been paid out to date? >> that is my understanding. >> how is paying out the $6.3 million figure for legal fees for executives consist of with the conservatorship that allows you to preserve and conserve assets and property and to put the company in a sound and solvent condition? >> the payment here is covered under indemnification agreements that were in place and are in place and that is the grounds. we also have considered looking at the ongoing litigation and the issues that are in play at the moment, what is the approach that best satisfies those goals
of the conservatorship and it is our judgment that we are proceeding in the proper course of action. >> if fannie mae and freddie mac moved into receivership, should these institutions move into receivership, would you be able to do anything about those funds? >> i don't know the answer to that question at this moment. i would have to look at that. >> i raise this issue not because the $6.3 million will make any mae and freddie mac solvent again but because, as we look at the housing boom and bust which caused the financial collapse, one about roads lead to fannie mae and freddie mac. some of us were raising alarms about those institutions long before their failure and well before their accounting scandals and we understood the fundamentally flawed structure of socialized losses and privatized profits. we saw the over leveraging and
the buildup in the junk loans. frankly, the federal reserve warned us about it. we have an obligation to the taxpayers to prevent their failure. we failed largely because the bill which the fed had requested which passed out of committee on the senate side was blocked by the lobbying of fannie mae and freddie mac. their executives leaned in and said no in terms of those portfolios. if the fha fails to take action
to get the money back of the legal defense fees and also curb the executive pay out, then i hope that congress will intervene. these are wards of the state. in might view at the end of the day, they should be treated as wards of the state. i will yield back them u. >> the fha pursuit former executives at fannie mae and freddie mac and reached settlements for certain payments that came back from them. to your larger point, i would like for you to be assured that it is personally my goal and absolutely the goal and the endeavor of the employees of f hfa that the conservatorship are done in a way to meet the goals
of conservatorship that congress has set forth in the statute, to preserve the assets of the company and we are focused on doing everything we can to minimize losses that the taxpayer ends up incurring as a result of what has happened at these companies. everything we do is directed at that objective of minimizing these losses. we made that quite clear to the new board's directors and senior managers. i do what we are doing in the area of bringing in new executive leadership of these companies as part and parcel of the overriding objective. >> thank you, mr. demarco. >> of the gentleman from new york. >> thank you and it is good to see you, mr. feinberg. i was wondering how you get these jobs.
mr. feinberg did a tremendous job working with the 9/11 victims. i think you x blamed what you're mandatory jurisdiction is. many people need to understand this. my concern is that the company's who are not in that status and may have resumed the excessive compensation structure -- if i understand this correctly, the company needs to be competitive in compensation for retention purposes per however, if they start to bring increased revenues for compensation, that leads them down the road to being less capitalized and unstable again. the question is -- how are the financial institutions who are not under your regulatory power handling compensation? do you see them reverting back to their old ways?
are they going away with your guidance? we know you want tarp people at the top of the company. when we saw this whole financial mess starting, is there one person that deserved any compensation being that they got this whole country and in my opinion the world in the mess we are in right now? >> first, i would like to think that much of the private sector that is not within my jurisdiction is adopting many of the prescriptions that fall in my jurisdiction, lote based stop -- cash sellers, stock rather than cash, no guaranteed bonuses. goldman sachs, morgan stanley wells fargo, i get the early
signs that in terms of the criteria of the compensation they seem to be following voluntarily the prescription -- prescriptions i have entered into. but, in terms of long-term compensation, what i am doing, as you know, what i am doing is one small part of a much broader venue that the chairman and the committee no great deal about, corporate governance reform, regulatory reform, the g-20 principles promoted by the secretary to make sure that foreign corporations are doing what we are doing, the federal reserve, the fdic, the legislation of the chairman. there are a lot of other initiatives out there that can have an impact on those companies that are not part of my jurisdiction, including some
advanced by the administration concerning bank fees and other initiatives. i take no position on all of those other than to say that if you examine all of the items that are out there that are being considered by this committee, it seems to me there is an appreciable opportunity to rein in some of that excess of pay we see now that got us partly into this mess. >> i agree. following up on that -- when we talk about the international community, we saw that france and the u.k. have put a fine onto their high bonuses, a 50% tax -- additional british action -- they put a onetime tax on bonuses. how do you think that my work with our companies that are
international over there? do they have to look at what we are telling them to do? do they have to bring that to a foreign land? >> a u.s. company that has an international presence, how it would have to deal with compensation rules abroad depends on its structure. if it were to own a bank, a u.s. bank owns a bank in france, the bank in france would likely have to abide by the compensation structures in france. if it had a branch or some other extension of itself that was not a separate corporate entity, it would abide by the u.s. compensation standards on a worldwide basis. that is one of the things we try to do in our guidance is to have the management focused on incentive compensation on a worldwide basis. >> the gentleman from illinois. >> thank you, mr. chairman.
mr. feinberg, you are the pay czar? >> that is the characterization. i don't like that characterization but that appears to be sticking in the public mind. >> it is grand parents were reef -- heard him refer to as a czar, they would be very upset. >> who is the job czar? is there a job czar? >> i have enough trouble keeping track of my job. >> i guess there is not one. mr. demarco, as your staff indicated, you review the legislation? >> yes, congresswoman, i have taken all look at it. it has just come out and i am looking at it in more depth.
>> i can help indicate where this information is available and if it would be more useful to provided in a different format or structure or to make it more real -- more readily known that some of this data is already being published either by fhfa or the companies themselves. i look forward to doing that. >> this would be in statutes.
is there any difference between tarp and the inspector general for you? >>the tarp program is not supervision program for the special inspector general for tarp has a somewhat different function than the inspector general for fhfa. the thing to make clear is that i am looking forward to the administration getting an inspector general. the role of the inspector general would be to monitor and evaluate and inform congress on the efficiency and effectiveness of fhfa carry in their responsibilities. they are the federal agency responsible for monitoring and overseeing and reporting on the activities of any may, freddie mac, and the federal home loan banks.
i do think that the structure includes an ig and a look forward to that piece of the structure being put in place. >> wouldn't the gse's, with the conservatorship be doing all these things? reporting these things? >> much of it they are reporting. >> the problem is that congress is never able to question them about this. >> without waiting for additional legislation, i would be happy to see what we can do -- >> we talk about the bonus is paid to freddie mae -- fannie mae and freddie mac. it seems like we would solve all our problems if we had more reporting. >> i would be glad to respond to you or any other member who
would like to have more information. >> can you tell us what losses fannie mae and freddie mac have incurred to date? >> they have run through all of the shareholder equity they had pre-conservatorship and between the two of them through the third quarter of 2009, they have drawn $111 billion from the senior preferred stock purchase of the treasury. they have run for all their initial shareholder equity and an additional $111 billion. >> or will there be more losses? >> i expect there'll be more drawing on the senior losses? >> de you expect that would be more than they tarp program? >> tarp progress and was initially authorized at $700 billion.
it is not my expectation that combined with that they would lose as much. >> the gentleman from indiana. >> thank you. mr. feinberg, when we look back, goldman sachs was very close to going over the cliff, morgan stanley was very close to going over the cliff. they were saved by money from everybody's paycheck in this country. when you talk to them about these bonuses, what i was wondering is, did you ever asked them if they felt, as they talked to you about these bonuses, and the obligation to the people of this country to not conduct themselves that way? >> the answer is yes. first, remember that goldman sachs is not on my watch. >> i understand that. >> goldman sachs and others have asked my advice in following the
prescriptions i have laid out for the companies that are under my watch. i have, at the request of goldman sachs and others, urged them to take into account the very reality that you are pointing out. >> did they feel -- obviously, they have the choice to do what they want. they talked to -- their very existence owes to the people who are riding the bus and heading to work every day. did they feel it was idle funds in that when these small businesses that the people it will enable them to survive work that can top kick -- can't find credit because of the actions that were taken that it was inappropriate for these bonuses to be given? >i don't know what that discussion took place. >> i don't know if i am the
right person to ask about what they felt were thought. i do know that goldman sachs, for example, has tried somewhat to accommodate the principles i have enunciated with my office with no cash bonuses, with bonuses that will be paid in stock over many years, the ceo of goldman sachs refusing to take any catchable, the ceo of morgan stanley refusing to take any cash bonus at all. i think there is some effort. whether that effort is satisfactory in light of the financial uncertainty you posit is a fair question but it has to be directed to them. >> if you see them in your travels, you are a widely traveled man, in your travels,
the biggest problem we find is the ability to obtain credit and we have company after company not only in my home state but elsewhere who cannot employ additional people because they cannot get credit to go out and buy an additional piece of equipment for their line of credit has been reduced -- if these funds were used for credit purposes instead a bonus purposes, it would be a great way to let the american people know we get it and we are all in on bringing this economy back. if you have $20 billion in bonuses that are given out, that was used for lending purposes, think of the job creation that could cost. ause. i read an article where it said that a gentleman you talked to about compensation and you
mentioned $9 million and he said to you, "why don't you like me?" is there any connection between everyday reality of what the rest of the people in this country go through and this kind of mindset? >> come much. not much connection. i'm amazed in my work, congressman, at the perception of wall street versus the perception of main streets. . it is one of the most difficult gaps that i am trying to bridge in doing what i am obligated to do under the statute. >> thank you very much for your service, sir. >> you can watch this house financial-services hearing on executive compensation at cspan.org. >> i come from latin america.
i'm accustomed to poverty. i'm not accustomed to finding this poverty and the capital of the u.s. >> "in the shadow of power," sunday on c-span 2 and day. >> new york congressman charles rangel broke congressional rules by not disclosing financial details of a trip to the caribbean. he spoke to reporters for six minutes. >> good evening. i don't think that i will be taking any questions but i just got a copy of the press release by the ethics committee ended its 2.5 pages and one paragraph
deals with me. the report further fines that representative charles b. rangel -- canada is duplicated? >> unofficial press release, yes. >> the report further finds that representative charles b. rangel violated the house gift rules by accepting payments for reimbursement for travel to the 2007 and 2008 conferences. evidence shows that staff knew that corporations have contributed funds to the carib news, they were sponsors of the trip, for the 2007 and 2008 conferences. this information was not provided to the standards committee when he sought and received approval from the committee to accept these trips. the committee does not find any evidence to conclude nor does it believe that it will discover
additional information to alter the conclusion that representative rangel had any knowledge of the memorandum written by his staff. however, the report finds that charles rangel was responsible for the knowledge of his death and the performance of their official duties to is the intention of the committee and the publication of this report will serve as a public admonishment by the standards committee to repay the cost of the trips to the respective entities that paid for the travel. some portions of this transportation costs were paid for by the carib news out of the fund's pads. what this says is that the report would indicate that two
members new that somebody from the private sector was actually making a contribution to the carib news, who was the sponsor of the trap. ip. one of the people that did that was discharge. d. they say there is no evidence that i knew and they don't think they could find any additional evidence to alter the conclusion that i did not know. they move on with the admonishment. i am disturbed that legally that what the report will be saying is that a member of congress did
not know the false information -- strike that -- what this amounts to is that the ethics committee authorized my trip and other members trip to go there. but they say the ethics committee did not have all of the fax in terms of what was supplied by the carib news and that they were receiving corporate money but did not tell the ethics committee and that is what the ethics committee ok'ed the travel. they're also saying that might -- two of my staff members knew that corporations were given to the carib news but rangel didn't know because they were my staff members that new, one of whom
was discharged, that i should have known. they have not even gone that far. that is the imputed to me. i don't want to be critical of the committee but common sense dictates that members of congress should not be held responsible for what could be the wrongdoing or mistakes of staff unless there is reason to believe that the member new or should have known. there is nothing to the record to indicate the latter. i have to now deal with my lawyer as to what the hell do they mean. does it mean that no matter what the staff member does, if the member does not know it that the member could be charged and it must publicly for it?
-- and it must publicly for it? i have to let the general community make its own judgment based on what the ethics committee has said. i will then get back to with a larger statement when i have more information as to how these conclusions would i am sharing with you all the information i know. asking me questions would just embarrass me because i cannot give you answers. you got a scoop. [laughter] for what it's worth, they don't want to talk about the jobs bill but this is the news, go with it. this will be issued tonight. you tell the editor that you have the this private scoop.
>> what paper are you with? >> the new cspan video library is a digital arcade of cspan programming from barack obama to ronald reagan and everyone in between. over 150,000 hours of cspan video is available to you. it is free. you can't try it out at cspan video dog board. .org. "washington journal" is next. the house will be back in session in a couple of hours per we have live coverage at 9:00 a.m., eastern. new jersey congressman robert andrews was at th