tv Today in Washington CSPAN March 29, 2010 10:00am-12:00pm EDT
off their. guest: the number one thing you can do is set to vote and to be active politically yourself. and to become informed. there are more sources of better information out there. the main media has devolved into a place where we -- we talked about this a bit in the book. you are attracted to certain networks and a certain channels of communication. it is incumbent on us to become more informed and to become better citizens. ultimately, democracy rests on the conformed consent of the government, and that is everyone out there. that is the reality. be more aware. host: going back to the bush administration, you wrote to the don shula, the coach for the
miami dolphins -- you wrote that don shula, coach from miami dolphins made history of wal- mart in florida, becoming the first senior to sign up for the prescription drug benefits. is that program considered a government success or failure? guest: it depends on how you look at it. one of the things the about these medicare benefits for prescription drugs was the -- similar to the reason health care reform, it was pushed through on a largely partisan vote using a -- aggressive tactics. i think the vote was five hours in the middle of the night. two congressmen were actually reviewed for the pressure they put on others during the vote. -- were actually rebuked for the pressure they put on others during the vote. and we actually spent a lot of money.
but the interesting thing in terms of the execution part of it was that the legislation to set up this very rapid national rollout. when the medicare prescription drug first came out, you had incredibly bewildered seniors who did not know what to do. there was this doughnut hole the nobody understands. it is really hard to price with the copays and the generics, and it is still very complicated. but the program initially really made a lot of people very angry and i think it still does to some extent, make some folks very angry with the complexities of trying to deal with it. the program itself is running a little lower with some of the earlier projections. it is a mixed bag of results. one of the things that we talk about is that it is important, the process by which a
democratic amendment occurs. and it can help if you have a somewhat broad consensus, a cross partisanship consensus. you do not face as much resistance. i think it is a challenge when either party rams through a piece of legislation. host: the book is "if you can get a man on the moon." thank you for joining us this morning, john o'leary. that will wrap it up for this morning's "washington journal." on your screen is michael o'hanlon at the brookings institute discussing the future of nuclear weapons, arms control. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] . .
other issues nuclear weapons at some future date. there is news about iran developing nuclear weapons. these are relevant things to the question of nuclear weapons and we can do about it. many say something else about our panel. this has been a wonderful group to work with. we have enjoyed the participation of other people in lockheed martin and from other think tanks and regional experts, and nuclear arms control experts. we have tried to have a real conversation among different interest groups, different points of view on this question. we hope you feel this diversity. tom donnelly has had a number of
think tank jobs and a good friend of mine and an impressive scholar who has done a lot to drive the defense debate. he is a real asset to this venture. keith payne has had a fresh and smarts thinking that i've learned from over the years. he has been part of the defense department and part of mr. rumsfeld's task force in the 1990's, a task force that has been vindicated that six weeks after it said would have to worry about long-range missile threats, it happened. and then steve pifer, a senior fellow. he is a fellow ambassador to
ukraine and worked on nuclear issues and u.s.-russia issues for most of his career and has been writing on the topic including a brookings paper that i will promote here resetting relations. with that, we will hear from each of our panelists for about 10 minutes and then we will go to you. tom. >> thank you, mighke. when it comes to nuclear weapons, i do not know much about it. however, remarks have been informed by the expertise from my friend and colleague from committee staff days, dave trachtenberg, who served in several positions in the pentagon as principal secretary
of defense. he is a genuine expert. i am not making this up entirely out of whole cloth. i do think that the current moment is one where the basic approach of figuring out what american strategy is should come before decisions of an arms control treaty port indeed on what our nuclear posturing should be. this is putting the horse before the courts exercise, in my judgment. although there has anot been a durable strategy drop the entire post-cold war era, we have behaved in a relatively consistent ways. it is possible to look at our
behavior and pretty quickly understand what our enduring interests are and what our approach to strategy is. it will make much more sense because arms control and military force posture or tools of based krafthis craft. so if we have a clear statement of what our goals and how we attempt to achieve those goals, a lot of these questions and arms control and conventional force posturing would be much more easy to answer. the thing that concerns me about the approach that the administrations have taken is a backward-looking one. i would regard a lot of these treaties and these forced decisions that have been made
because we hear from the administration that the limit in the start of a treaty or to be consistent with the nuclear posture review that should be forthcoming fairly shortly. we have a good understanding of what the administration thinking is in that regard. i would like to continue on and give you a summary version of what date and i are working toward in this paper. it is turning out to be an epic of biblical proportions in the sense that we want to begin with a basic sense of american strategy and follow the chain all the way through to thoughts about nuclear posture and approach to the negotiating a treaty. we're not opposed to arms control treaties. they should be expressions of the underlying strategy.
you look at the white america has behaved, not only in the post-cold war years but since america has been a global great power and certainly since 1945, there are some things that are obvious and constant. of power in europe, east asia, and about a favorable balance of power in the middle east. we understood the greater middle east is not simply the persian gulf but extends to south asia, for example. it is not necessarily with the muslim world but our understanding with what the greater middle east is constantly expanding and is reflected by american be gauged and diplomatically and militarily. and then the united states has always cared about access to any
commercial exploitation of the high seas and the airplane that has included the aerospace atmosphere and space itself and the electromagnetic spectrum will recall cyberspace. -- or what we call a cyberspace. the goal has been to speak broadly with a favorable balance of power. our nuclear force posture has always been a subset of those goals. the united states has used the nuclear weapons. we're the only one to have used that. president truman said -- it suggests that some americans at some point have understood
nuclear weapons as it useful tool. our nyposture has reflected some version of that basic underlying recognition. through the cold-year awards, the united states maintained and expanded its nuclear arsenal to the point where we could make we could do this thousands of times over. it did seem the actual destructive power may have exceeded any immediate strategic purpose. but nonetheless, the comprehension that nuclear weapons were an essential part of american strategy persisted for more than 50 years. it is only in recent years we have come to rethink that. i do not know whether global zero any particular force level,
larger or smaller than what we maintain, is necessarily the correct answer. i am sure the measuring stick for figuring that out begins the global understanding of american strategy. the world is changing profoundly. most were some way, did most recent -- the press been americn decline. i would not except that. it has become a broadly accepted narrative. in that regard, and in light of strategic interests, my own personal view that we need to slow down and stop the momentum of our arms control negotiation and a forced postured discussion until we better understand whether the nuclear
force structure we have and the arms control treaties we are pursuing are relevant to continuing to preserve the favorable balance of power, the international order guaranteed by the united states, and whether in future the perceived truth of arms control or will took to the world in which we see. in particular, i think tying ourselves to russian bubbles leaves out much more than it includes. rusher maintains the largest nuclear arsenal. russia it is no longer a superpower of the sort when it was the soviet union. anyone looking -- i am not breaking any new ground. russia is included as an element
in that but only a secondary element. if talking about global great challenges to the united states, we are much more concerned about china then about russia. it is not just this news. it is a question of what indiroe indea wilia will play. they do not currently have a nuclear arsenal. has the opportunity and other means to go forward to expand. but first, the want to know what the united states is going to be capable of expanding a deterrent. you can go on around the planet to ask these questions.
the gulf arab states that are deeply worried about iran. the north east asian states that are worth about north korea and also chinese-emerging power. in that regard, i think looking at the nuclear requirements for the united states, whenever they are, they're not strictly tied to the size of the russian nuclear force. the first principle that we offer in our paper is simply to do no further harm, think this through and figure out what is coming down the pike at us rather than looking at the rear view mirror. when it comes to thinking about our nuclear force posture, there are principles everyone can easily see that are necessary. it may be the case that the
number of warheads announced in the treaty might well be sufficient to guarantee our interest and the interest of our allies. it would be -- the arsenal would be of a different quality. you would have a much wider range of capabilities in the mix. i do not see anything in the right things that discuss this in great detail. more importantly, even the warheads is the question of the delivery systems. again, the argument should be for not simply maintaining the triad, making sure it is more relevant to the strategic conditions of the future. it really is a legacy of the past. one aspect -- if we're going to
build a new nuclear submarine built around an updated version of the trident missile, which makes a lot program and budgetary sense, it would be a different summary then the ohio- class submarine that has far fewer delivery tubes, and the missile itself would probably have many fewer warheads that is capable of, possibly even a single warhead. you would want to proliferate the means of response to ensure the deterrence. you should take the same approach to other forms of nuclear arsenal as well. i will try to conclude without going further on arms control or structure questions. i want to toss out the approach that is inherent from the past. it seems there much to me to be one that is increasingly irrelevant to the future.
before we make any decisions we made live to regret or constraint us, we should simply take a timeout, slow down, stop, not walk away from the prospect of negotiations, but understand negotiating with the russians captures all the a small part of the problem, that any future discussions should include many other powers. to approach the modernization of are marginarsenal. >> thank you very much, tom. i have one clarifying question with you. let me not put you on the spot but still ask, are you taking a position on the start treaty? are you voicing a channel notes
conservatism and nuclear force planning? are you opposing the start fall on treaty? would you stand on that? but there are some details i want to see, particularly when it comes to the launch question. so yes, i do want to see them in greater detail. i am not necessarily oppose to the limits that are in the treaty. however, i want to understand where they world or whether they it cheap a sufficient deterrent. but weather as we look down the road into different environment where deterrence are more complex because -- before i sign up to these limits, i want to see whether they will be sufficient for that future.
so i would just put myself in the agnostics but skeptical category. there is energy in answering the wrong question. >> think you. the papers we're producing out of this project will certainly be in due course very soon on the brookings website. but of course, everyone here is speaking for themselves and trying to keep up with world events and trying to be responsive. we will have a number of dew pointview points. then it quickly advertised one of keith s great writings. it can be read. we'll hear some new thought from
him today. those of you in the audience will have the added treat us of power. slides. those watching on tv, he is one of the clearest speakers and he is aware you may not be able to see the powerpoint slides. over to you. >> thank you. i can skip the powerpoint sli des. how much is enough? a broad review of the nuclear zero proposal. i would like to talk about a broad overview of the nuclear proposal. we can talk about the start treaty later. let me start out by pointing out that nuclear zero is not a new goal.
it has been announced goal of the nine states since 1946 per it was embraced by president reagan, for example. what i see different in the with the obama administration has presented nuclear zero is the priority they have placed on it. republican and democratic administrations pursued a balanced approach. looking forward to nuclear reductions but also modernizing the deterrent when necessary. the clinton administration's policy was called lead and hedge. hedge against possible negative developments in the international arena. they lead towards developments in nuclear reductions but they also hedged.
the more recent bush administration pursued this tool to track of keeping a balance between paris of nuclear reductions and nuclear modernization. contrary to revisionist history, the bush administration did a great deal in terms of arms reduction. the moscow treaty reduced weapons down by 2/3. that is a sizable reduction. the question i would pose and try to present a brief answer, why should we be worried of the obama administration's shift away famous duel track? what i say is they are placing priority on one track and that is on the nuclear zero side. the idea of the capability is now expressly forbidden as part
of this exercise. it is not the idea of nuclear disarmament is a goal of the united states. why should we be concerned? but me suggest a couple of reasons. the feasibility of nuclear 0 will depend on many countries coming to the decision that nuclear weapons are necessary for their security. despite the warm rhetoric that has been generated by the most recent vision, much of the rest of the world, including u.s. friends and foes, continues the great guy in nuclear weapons. some close allies of the united states, countries with centuries of painful experience, recalled the non-nuclear past as the destroyer of nations. there were no nuclear weapons to deter those bent on war in
1914 or 1939. the results, approximate 40 million mostly european casualties in world war i and somewhere between 50 million and 7 million casualties in world war ii. some countries and nations literally ceased to exist as a result of these conflicts. to go back earlier, you could look to the past 13 sentry invasions' of china and central europe. these horrific pre-nuclear history contrast sharply with the past seven decades in which another such conflict did not erupt despite titanic struggles
and conflicts. there has been a steep decline in global casualty's because of war since the onset of the nuclear age and nuclear deterrence. a french ambassador recently noted that the rapid succession two world wars and the absence of the third world war demonstrates one of the most -- the deterrent of nuclear weapons. margaret thatcher observed casualty's of world war i and a world war ii suggest they did not preserve the peace. she says there are monuments to the futility of conventional deterrence in every village in europe. these monuments have lots of names on them.
many key allies believe that this has prevented a repeat of the past global catastrophes. they have no great desire to return to that nightmarish world. the continued to see great value in nuclear weapons as the deterrent to war. this is not true of all allies, but it is true of many allies. winston churchill warned the united states in his final speech, "be careful not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are short and more than sure that other means of preserving peace are in your hands." many of our allies fear this because they do not believe we are close to meeting churchill's requirement to eliminate nuclear weapons permit we have not yet found
alternative for preventing war. president sarkozy made the point and said we live in a real world, not a virtual world. a commentator recently observed a story-eyed view of the world could put the united states at risk and cost allies to boost confidence to meet the allied commitments. the u.s. movement to zero to potential to increase nuclear proliferation by compelling these allies to see the need for their own nuclear deterrent capabilities. several allies and friends have made this point. even if the countries of the world war to unite and agree to eliminate nuclear weapons,
allies and friends with could see to secret ballot in nuclear weapons for deterrence. syria was still retain its ample stocks of chemical weapons. should israel be expected to promise to forgo nuclear deterrence in such an environment? others would face daily biological threats. are we to expect them to forego those that these would be naive expectations. how can we lead the world to nuclear zero when many of our closest allies and friends continued to see nuclear weapons as a pillar to their security. if we remove that pillar, some allies would have to find an alternative, including other weapons of mass destruction. proponents of nuclear zero have
not offered any possible basis for swearing this circle other than the hope that allies will stop singineeing the world like. the reality of course is that the apprehension about nuclear zero is understandable and the fears are reasonable. "one might hope in major war would not happen in a world without nuclear happens, but it always did." some prospective opponents are no less eager to retain nuclear weapons. they see the drive as a u.s. trek. to undercut the capabilities they see as vital. a russian -- russian officials have no interest in following the u.s. lead to nuclear zero.
when proponents presented the nuclear zero option to president putin, the russian president's scoffed at the proposal as another trip to weaken his country. numerous senior russians including gorbachev have said because russian conventional forces are so inferior and weak to those of the united states, nato, and china, that nuclear zero would threaten to put pressure in the position of inferiority. pressure rejects a world in which u.s., nato, and chinese forces are so much superior to its own. concern about an unbeatable superiority should come as no
surprise. it should not encourage russia or china to embrace that position. dmitri medvedev emphasize nuclear-weapons are the sine quo nine for russia. it will preserve its sovereignty. proponents of zero have offered no plausible basis forswearing this circle. just continuing expressions of hope that these countries' fears and conflicts will come to an end. finally, unaffected agreement would require a fundamental transferormation. states would not give up weapons they see as essential to their security. a system of sovereign states
with its inherent security threats would have to be replaced by reliable global security system that would protect all who would give up the forces they see as essential to their security. when states the locker need to rely on their own forces but can rely on a system of global security, then will the conditions called for by churchill be necessary for nuclear disarmament to take place. the directorate general of the atomic energy agency acknowledged this connection between the possibility of nuclear zero the requirement for a reliable security system. "the council must be reformed so the world can rely on it with the primary body for maintaining international peace."
the international system that we live in is extremely resistant to the fundamental transpformation of itself. it has been an unmet dream for years. i believe this may remain on that because sovereign states follow their own senses of interest. there is no evidence that this reality is fading. the international community's failure to cooperate of the weak state like north korea reflects this ongoing problem. the international system is missing the mutual trust necessary to create a global
collective security system or to inspire states to about their ultimate means of security, which includes nuclear weapons. when might international system see this condition? the undersecretary general of the united nations suggested that international unity and common purpose would become feasible "when there is an invasion from mars." perhaps. i think that might be optimistic. he forgets the potential of playing humans against each other. there are numerous reasons for being worried of nuclear zero. premature steps to the elimination of nuclear weapons could degrade the deterrence of war. it could destroy civilization. at gettysburg, there were
roughly 50,000 casualties over three days. roughly 11,000 fatalities. that was with 200-year-old technology. think about what a conventional war would look like today. steps toward nuclear zero could degrade deterrence for our allies, leaving them more vulnerable to attack and leading some to see their own nuclear weapons. it is important to remember our alliance commitments tie allied security to our security. there wars become our wars. we do not want extended deterrence to fail. nuclear zero could lead to nuclear reductions that would make sense only in the context of a dramatic transformation of the system and the direction of unity,, purpose, and effective
collective security. no evidence points to this taking place now. the fundamental problem with the nuclear zero initiative is that it reflects no appreciation of churchill's warning. it threatens to break down. it threatens to end the brakes on proliferation provided by the umbrella for allies. it offers no alternative, no plausible mechanism to prevent war or too short our allies. michael quinlan captured the fallacy of elevated nuclear zero to be the goal in the absence of a realistic global security system. he said, there is a world
without nuclear weapons but no major war. i see no reason to believe he got the trade-offs wrong. thank you. >> thank you, keith. i have to try to partially respond to keep with a slightly friendlier view of global zero. then we will hear from steve pifer. i think keith and i see this as a debate. it is relevant. he mentioned the relevance to suspended deterrence that would try to encourage people to feel secure under current arrangements. any kind of a move that wants to get rid of american nuclear backup or nuclear umbrella for our allies could be quite dangerous and served to weaken the non-proliferation rather than to strengthen it.
i take these concerns seriously. i would articulate myself and i think it's worth trying to emphasize that digit a bit more. president obama did last april in prague. he has a huge challenge. you want to defect near term policy. that is a bigger challenge. we agree and most advocates would add ballots this, that we're not in a position to move towards the elimination of nuclear weapons any time soon. we cannot think about writing a treaty until three decades, until some of the stability keith approved. keith and i would draw the line differently. the progress would be sufficient
in terms of the united states and china not being in a position and other issues. we would both agree we are not in a position now to move towards that world. if and when we are, and i'm thinking one to three decades, i think the division for global zero should be thought of in the following ways. this is not the equivalent of slavery were make something legal something that is inhumane. i except keitaccept keith's poi. i think we're making a mistake. when i talk about global zero, i do not a magic getting to this moment where we eliminate the
final nuclear weapon and think we have eliminated it from forever. i see it as a low state of readiness. i hope someday the materials will be eliminated. we cannot assume if that happy day arrives that it is permanent. someone could cheat. someone might have cheated along the way and the systems will not be good enough to be sure. the threat of conventional military rearmament and aggression is always going to be there. advanced biological pathogens could be potential reasons why we have to consider nuclear deterrence but gant in the future. some would reject that last argument or all of the arguments, but especially the last one and specifically
biological agents. i would submit to you there is nothing more fair, decent, and humane than that. i did not see a moral distinction. if we're talking about it but denies anthrax or a contagious pathogen which combines the transmission qualities of a flute with the lethality of a smallpox, perhaps by country able to build its own antidote for its own population. so i am a hawke on how i define global zero. let me just leave you with three motivated cases or motivating arguments of why i think we should keep this conversation on
the table and why president obama was correct to elevate it in our consciousness even if his next step is not so easy. the history of the cold war. many people get nostalgic for the cold war and talk about stable deterrence and the tradition of non-use. when i read the cold war, i get goose bumps and sweaty palms rethinking the crisis. the cuban missile crisis is exhibit a. the united states and so would union tried to maintain arsenals. we had a lot airplanes crashed with nuclear weapons on board. we have had weapons go missing. these are scary things. we do a good job 99.9% of the time.
that is the history of the cold war. i am happy to discuss that more. you don't have to except president kennedy's view. george bundy thought the odds were much lower. there were unacceptably high. it is not clear how you get to the point where they're acceptable. this was not a great time of our stability over long stretches of time. the second argument, we may not need to relive that kind of experience. let me let it india and pakistan. these countries have weapon is the nuclear capability, which was bllatent for a long time
before that. i think it's scary that they could be used in south asia. if you talk to indians and pakistan iis, both sides are trying to think about aggression that could happen and how they respond to that or have it carry it out themselves. this is one of the concerns of india, how they figure out a way to respond in a significant way in a manner that does not lead to retaliation. heaven forbid if such a thing could occur, but it is not out of the question. there is a fine line between a significant military incursion for retaliation and something pakistan would see as a threat to this day come to this, bu, t.
to what extent can we imagine a world going forward where that kind of prices does not escalate to a nuclear use. perhaps inadvertently. people have written of the danger of conventional military systems, warning systems being struck in the course of a conventional war. people either misinterpreting that were wearing what comes next and the potential for a conventional action with repercussions. i am sketching out brief arguments here. i want to mention them. the third, when i watched the u.s. and the deliberations on how to respond to iran and north korea and the nuclear ambitions, i would can see the point that if we went towards global zero
more transparent and sincere way, it would not in any manner change the calculation p tehran. the international community more broadly is now trying to figure out a way to put enough pressure on iran and north korea where we actually make them pay such a high price for these kinds of nuclear shenanigans and adventures that either change their policy which can contain them with time from acceleration of the building of these arsenals and force them to walk them back and some a clear message to others that is not worth the cost. with the current international system, i think we are losing in these efforts. a big part of the reason is many countries do see a double standard.
they say iran and north korea are worse in terms of their forms of behavior, but there is an unfair double standard. there are other reasons -- economic self interest being reason number one. i do believe a more sincere incredible vision for global zero could help us marginally over sanctioning peron and north korea. these are presently negotiations i think we are losing -- over iran and north korea. we're not punitive enough to change the calculations before it acquired their nuclear arsenals. this is a new uanced are given. it might still fail. i am struck that our current approach of holding onto our
nuclear weapons is at best a holding operation and i do not think it will be sustainable indefinitely. thank you for your patience. now i will be mike the moderator again and turn things over to steve pifer. >> i agree with a lot of things that have been set so far. it will be difficult. it is much more difficult than during the cold war. now you have to think about how you of that the perceptions in russia and how you affect the calculations in other potential adversaries. i hope one of the things we will see is, what is the administration's answer to that? it does seem we should think in
a broader term about deterrence in the sense that we should not ask nuclear weapons to be the only part of the specter contributes to deterrence. this includes some very substantial and conventional forces in terms of power projections in terms of position strike. missile defenses. i do not think it will reach a point in the foreseeable future of being able to block a russian missile attacks. when you look at deterrence, it is not reasonable to put all the burden on nuclear weapons. it is a key part of that. we should look at the full spectrum. let me talk about arms control and the vision of president obama. on this idea, i would come down with mike's point of view.
it's a good and important vision in terms of signaling that as one country that would possess 95% of the nuclear weapons. the united states is prepared to be serious about reducing these numbers of weapons. whenever i've seen president obama speak about this, he almost always says it probably will not happen in his lifetime, which a bank is a shorthand way of addressing many of the concerns keeith mentioned. the new start treaty was announced on friday. i think it will be good for the united states. will reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons by 30% and 40% per it will inject a degree of transparency into the u.s.-russian relationship.
assuming it is ratified, we will know a lot more about nuclear weapons than we would note without. -- then we would know without. the non-proliferation treaty -- the states would reduce and would not acquire nuclear weapons. i do not think been start treating would affect the calculation in tehran or north korea to give up their nuclear programs. in terms of trying to press and putting more impediments in the way of other states to follow the course of iran and north korea. it does seem when you look over the last 40 years, it tends to
have a positive impact on a broader relationship. going back to a year ago, one of the goals of the administration's approach in terms of trying to find a solution, was the desire to build the more positive relationship in which it could secure russian assistance on afghanistan and iran. for the new start treaty, one test has to be -- doesn't allow the nine states to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent. president obama -- you need to have an effective nuclear deterrent. based on what we have seen so far, which have not seen the text of it. but i think the answer will be yes. 1550 warheads is a formidable
nuclear force. i think it's going to be sufficient to give us confidence that we will be able to deter the range of potential adversaries out there. i think it is true when we look at the force characteristics when we implement the reductions and it seems to me that when you look at the structure, the structure after the treaty is not going to be that much different than the structure that we have today. that is in large part because the united states is going to reach its limit primarily by downloading, that is taking warheads off of ballistic missiles but still keeping the basic structure along the lines it is today. i would anticipate after the reductions are implemented, you will have a force structure that has either 400 or for under 50
minuteman missiles, perhaps -- for under 5450 minuteman missil. some of the bombers and keeping the aircraft but assigning them roles. i am told the treaty will come out and those sorts of aircraft would not be kept with the limits. it does seem we will maintain a very strong and powerful triad that in sorts of terms you look at for deterrence is going to be very positive. when you look at the minuteman silos, there's a reason to suspect that the inviolability of subs at cs will be increased. when you talk about and
attacked on the u.s. strategic forces, you are talking about russia that has the capability to contemplate. -- to complica contemplate that. it will present the president' mix of capabilities to execute short and long-range attacks. when i look at that force, it seems to make it will be a force that will deter any rational potential adversary we might face. who might not be deterred by this back there are some cases that might not be deterred by that force. in that case, if there is a country that will not be deterred by 5050 weapons,
probably will not be deterred by 3000 or 10,000 or 15,000 weapons. a couple of comments because in some sense, this will be the last arms control agreement. the next step, this is the first step in the process. the next step will get in to some difficult questions, but tactical nuclear weapons, for example. you have a very large symmetry that favors directions on this. the russians over the last 10 years have adopted a policy on nuclear weapons from the 1970's. it will use nuclear weapons to offset the inferior iinferiorit.
one thing i hope natal is looking at now -- one thing i hope nato is looking at now is what role the will play in the defense structure. its second issue will be how to deal with non-deployed strategic weapons permit if we push out tactical nuclear weapons, the russians will come back and say, what about reductions in the warheads you took off the submarine's which at some point could always be put back on? a third question will be what to do about third countries? at some point, is difficult for me to see the united states and russia pushing the numbers of strategic forces down without having some handle on what is happening to those countries. . .
my hope is that the nuclear posture unit comes out. it will talk about doctrines, a declaratory policy. it will look not only of for we are today, but answer questions as to how to manage more difficult questions as to the next round of control talks. >> they do. a quick clarifying question. do you have any sense of when the administration's review is likely to be released? -- thank you.
>> the original goal was february 1, then we were told march 1, now sometime in april. >> now we would like to request that you stand, wait for a microphone, state your name, and please pose a brief question. yes, sir? >> john coffee, retire state department. why is there such a concern about nuclear weapons which are so inanimate. a gun is only a danger depending on who holds it. one lies awake at night worrying about french or british nuclear weapons. there is a double standard. secondly, the nasty sticker of
that verification has only been possibly mentioned up here. it seems it would take such an intrusive a global inspection regime that no one would ever accept it. then what happens the morning after zero is reached in the country x? and country x says we have two left? and unless you do this, you will find out -- ? >> let me address the second half of his common. that is the issue of verification. we do not know what kind of verification capabilities we might have 10, 20, 30, 40 years from now. they be much better than now. on the other hand, unless
countries feel absolutely secure in the verification capabilities available, there will not openly be willing to give up what they see as the ground floor of their security. that is why my suggestion and comments was in addition to whatever verification capabilities are capable in coming decades, the basic requirement for an actual nuclear zero agreement would be an effective, reliable, global collective security system. countries will not be willing to give up these weapons in the absence of that. in the context of a global, reliable collective security system, then countries it may be willing to trust the technology we have at this point. that global collective system solves much of the problem. if you have competence and the system, you were be less about
the verification. that system is supposed to deal with security threats. that is why i say that ultimately that condition is a necessary condition to meet churchill's requirements when he said do not give up atomic weapons until you have the alternative means of keeping peace. >> steve, do you want to follow up? is it two separate issues? >> getting to the point where you have a verification regime that would allow confidence in the global zero longer down the road. but we're getting better. the treaty signed in 1991 have a dozen types of inspections. in the course of that treaty there were 600 inspections conducted in russia and nearby countries.
it is becoming a normal thing. in new treaty they will sign it next week in prague, there will be reasons for on-sight inspection of warheads. that is how they will determine the number is inspectors will have the right to go and count. we're getting into areas that 25 years ago would have been way too sensitive, but we will have to go further in coming up with a verification regime the most countries would have confidence in to monitor the absolute elimination of nuclear weapons ester next question. -- absolute elimination of nuclear weapons. >> next question. >> from cnn, you were talking about the point about obama and his approach to this. steve is making the point that
obama says you need an effective deterrent and to you have the possibility of global verification. are you taking obama it too much at his word, or rhetoric? we have seen the conflict with a iran and north korea on the issue of engagement. the president says we will engage, reach out our hand, then it does not happen. now limit in towards stronger sanctions. is it possible the president is only stating something that is a very far ideal? but the question he does not have an effective, and effective idea for nuclear deterrent? >> first of all, i did not say he does not have an idea for affected nuclear deterrence. i said if you eliminate them you have a panoply of problems. you have to have this solved first. far be it from me to think my
president is not presenting a serious position when he makes the speeches at serious international conferences. i believe his word and what he says. even the construction that you just presented, we need nuclear deterrence until weapons are eliminated -- that says if we get rid of nuclear weapons in a global agreement, we will not need deterrance anymore. i and some other folks on the panel said what about chemical, biological weapons? do we really expect israel to be willing to give up nuclear weapons and when syria reportedly has a vast quantity of chemical weapons? do we expect countries to our allies who face biological threats that could be every bit as destructive as know where weapons, expected to be satisfied if we pull away nuclear deterrence and leave them naked to biological threats?
that is why i do not accept the construction the says nuclear weapons are only useful for nuclear deterrence. we have no alternative to deter chemical and biological threats that are possible. so, even that construction as you have described i have some concerns about. >> it is interesting that you can carry your obama quotes to suit your needs, but particularly if you look his speeches, as the one in prague, it is not just the snippets about global zero on the one hand, or that we understand nuclear weapons will be around a long time. the overall tone of the speech was a celebration of collective security and human cooperation as the wave of political progress. you sit there and said we are in
the prague, the end of the 20th century, very violent century, and this reflects the fact that people can get together to solve political problems. that would be a minority view of the history of the 20th century, particularly for most czechs. it is the overall framework in which these ideas are advanced. presidential rhetoric has consequences. when the president says the most important thing for me is to create an international system not just altogether by the exercise of american power, but by a system of, cooperative of and in which the measure of success is the elimination of nuclear weapons. there are perfectly good reasons for taking his words and asking what he means. he creates a set of
expectations. even if he returns to a more incremental, sensible policy, the rhetoric itself has consequences. particularly if you see international politics as competitive, a traditional competition for power, and you have the leader of the u.s. who finds it difficult to talk in this terms, again you can see how people would pay attention to that. >> let me add a quick word. i accept what time and keep a buzz saw. one of the notable things about president obama is that in the time he has been in the white house he has become frankly, a bit more hawkish. a golden opportunity to talk about new forms of human security. give acceptance speech for the nobel peace prize made him
sound like henry kissinger. it was solid for its practicality. he has been pragmatic. this does raise the point as tom mentioned that he has a disconnect, a challenge, trying to link the global zero mission meaningfully to near-term policy. we have heard many cautionary notes about how difficult it is to do that. i would throw out one specific, possible suggestion. it is sold monday that it might underscore the dilemma. it builds on the excess warheads point that steve talked about. if you believe and at least the hope of global 0, or the idea to take a couple of steps and see where we are -- what might the
next couple of steps be? maybe a u.s./russian agreement that would cap their tactical warheads. the russians may not be in the mood to agree on common ceiling. maybe cawe can at least cap them. maybe in the spirit of george'w. s more informal control. then have monitoring to give each other into the habit of being intrusive that way. that may be the kind of step that allows us to be pragmatic on all kinds of reductions, secure nuclear materials better, and get more experience on warheads this mental -- dismantlement. on some level it is fairly matter of fact, step by step. it will be hard to negotiate. in some sense it is not a huge
milestone towards global zero and that may be the biggest thing that president obama can really considered given the difficulty of removing towards this kind of a world. i would still suggest that he consider it. yes, sir? >> bill, defense technology international magazine. could you talk a little about -- we talked about the next steps in arms control, the need to become multilateral. can you talk about how that would be helped or hindered by an underlying rhetoric that calls for global zero? >> steve, you want to begin on that? >> in terms of how you approach third countries, the first question will be in this next
round between the united states and russia. there might be one number you can go to for you don't have to engage their countries. i suspect we're getting close to that. then you have to think about how you bring these countries in. i would suggest with baby steps. rather than negotiate with every nuclear power around the table, see that the u.s. and russia are prepared to go to this level. maybe other countries are prepared to cap and have no buildup. it will require more transparency than we have ever had. you need to take very modest steps in this area. you will not succeed by bringing everyone into the game at one point. the question of how you use global zero, and the president has articulated that -- to put
some pressure on other states. if we're talking about reducing nuclear danger, about reducing nuclear risks, this is not only about the u.s. and russia. other countries have to do their part. before long that includes china, britain, france, and others. >> the you care to comment? >> i would say a step we could take that would prepare us -- it doesn't have to necessarily be an arms control. we could start creating a nuclear force that anticipated this. to anticipate that this is the way we see the world unfolding. we are prepared, and people of want to talk about preserving a favorable balance of power at lower levels of nuclear armament -- an expression of seriousness on our part would be to be
prepared and in a position to start the arms control talks to get the out come -- however we define that. to anticipate this by taking steps ourselves to build a force that would be quite a differencdifferent, but an exprt we could talk about with anyone who wants to talk about it. >> let me take a quotation from president nicholas sarkozy who says we live in the real world, not a virtual world. in the real world we have opponents who seek global zero as a trick on the part of the u.s. to get them to give up their nuclear capabilities, putting them at a disadvantage because of the u.s. conventional superiority. if you think that is an unfair
interpretation, you have to understand the u.s. administration officials have said just that. global zero is to be an advantage for the u.s. because it gives the u.s. conventional superiority in a world where it could accomplish its military goals because it has conventional superiority. if you're sitting in beijing or moscow, that probably does not look too attractive. our foes have this dilemma. they see the u.s. on the one hand saying that nuclear zero is the way to go, and the u.s. can go in that direction because we have such great conventional superiority. we have potential foes and foes is say, given that, the last thing we want to do is give up nuclear weapons which are the great equalizer of these of the u.s. conventional superiority.
it is an inherent dilemma they face. it is a circle that has not been squared, or the other way around. facts are stubborn things. >> we have about 15 minutes left. two over here. then responses. >> bruce with the institute of peace. thanks to you will. to some comments to were negative about nuclear zero. keith, i agreed with 95% of liu said. there are more cautions you could cite. which a good down to zero let could be great, but then only one or two weapons makes a huge difference. there was an undercurrent in your remarks that the obama
administration seem hellbent to go to azero no matter what else is going on outside. i hear that it is very traditional that only when certain circumstances permit. am i misreading you, or are there steps or words the obama administration is taking that are making you uneasy? that will drive down to zero no matter what else is going on? >> and we will take the question right behind you. >> could you comment on the role of the allies, please elaborate on south korea or japan? >> two for you, keith.
>> i'm sorry, i did not understand him. [unintelligible] >> official demand for extended deterrents? clear enough. >> let me respond to the question of bruce first. every administration since 46 46 of the positive nuclear disarmament goal. i don't see anything wrong with that. ronald reagan posited that as a goal. the difference i see in the current expression is the prioritization placed on it. your question is, where does that concern seemed to become real? an example, during the clinton
administration, the administration sought a new type of capability as necessary for deterrence. it deployed at key buildings. various spokesmen from the obama administration have said there will be no nuclear capabilities. -- it deployed the capabilities. now oppose the question to you -- how can we know now which nuclear capabilities will be necessary for deterrents in the future? we do not know. we cannot. no one on this stage or in the audience or in washington knows that. we don't know which type might be essential for deterrents. i'm very concerned when i hear the notion that there can be no nuclear capabilities in support of nuclear zero and some type might be essential for deterrents, regardless of
whether the numbers are 15, 50, or some other number. with regard to extended deterrents, i'm sorry that i don't understand exactly the question. let me make a couple of comments and up i can capture it. what we see particularly with the south koreans and japanese allies is the continued need for deterrents. they have expressed the point that they see themselves in security intimately tied up with the u.s. extended deterrence. there have been comments from south korean leaders who said that if the u.s. extended nuclear deterrents lose credibility, we will have to find an alternative. japanese leaders have said the same thing. if there is a lack of credibility for the u.s. extended nuclear deterrent, we will have to find an alternative. some japanese leaders have
added, and we could reach a large number of nuclear weapons in a short period of time if necessary. so, my concern is that the premature and elimination or reduction of the credibility of the extended nuclear u.s. deterrent really compels allies who stick to their security on the u.s. extended nuclear deterrent -- compels them to seek some alternative. that might be some other alliance relationship, or seeking some other form of weapon of mass destruction. it might be seeking independent nuclear capabilities. i do not know which it might take. none of them seem very helpful to international security to me. what we have seen is that the senate nuclear deterrents have allowed key allies to remain non-nuclear, and be fully secure of their security.
it strikes me as positive. it is something we should challenge only gradually and with great sensitivity to their security requirements. my fear with the nuclear zero is it could find that lacking. >> two more quick questions. we will begin in the very back. >> greg, arms control association. three ways in which follow-on negotiations will be hard following a new star -- i did hear strategic missile defense mentioned. i want to ask steve what you think any kind of follow-on negotiations can be successfully pursued if russia and the u.s. don't have a meeting of the mines on strategic missile defense. then, related to that, how can we engage other countries like
china in arms control if we do have some meeting of the mines with them on strategic defense? >> the last question right here. >> [unintelligible] the pentagon has been [unintelligible] in the perfect world that might be a good deterrent, but it may stimulate other countries [unintelligible] what the you envision for the future pmd? >> let's begin with steve. >> that maylet begin to do we wl have treaties with language
defining defense and offense. it will not have any limits that will affect current or planned programs. i should mention missile defense as a question we will come back to in the next round. i believe the russians will push harder in subsequent negotiations. back off to the conversation a couple of years ago with russian experts. they said if you're talking about a strategic level, at that level russia probably did not need limits on missile defense. if you went to 1000 or below, russia would want some understanding or regulation. i think the russians will probably push us and a more forthright way then in this term of negotiations. from my perspective there is some no. i would not want to
reduce u.s. forces below without having an understanding of the russian ones. what often gets lost in the debate concerns u.s. nuclear plants. today russia still retains a system around moscow. there are a couple that are actively marketed as having capabilities for use against tactical missiles. but sometimes i think the u.s. needs to worry about how low we go given the russian defense effort. secondly, returning to the point of keefe on the first question, on no new nuclear capabilities, i think the white house is clear it does not want to at this time adopt a new nuclear weapons capability. what i found interesting was
that it is between $500 million and $600 million increase in the budget that goes to support the nuclear weapons complex. i see that as an investment. it seems the administration is making an investment and the nuclear weapons infrastructure at the complex so that at some time down the road if we discover there is a serious need for that capability we will have a complex ready to deliver that. >> with regard to the new start in missile defense, i am quite concerned about the language and in the fact sheet. the new agreement does not capture current or planned
missile defense. no one has been around washington as long as i have does not recognize words parsed like that. it's just other things may be captured. here i'm concerned about the actual details. there may be no capturing of current or planned missile defense, but are there other restrictions on missile defense that do not happen to be part of the current or planned program? the language makes it sound like there are. the reason why i'm a bit concerned, in addition to the fine person of words, is because the russian threat is full of announcements the say the u.s. and russia had an understanding on the limits of missile defense as part of this treaty. it is a basis for concern on a
missile defenses treated. another example, the discussion that there are 30% reductions in this new treaty, from the moscow treaty numbers -- again, look at the fine point. that is why i'm holding back until i see it. the fact sheet itself says the bombers will be counted as one weapon. if you look at the accounting rules now, bombers could have 16 or more weapons. if you have 100 bombers and 16 weapons per bomber, you have 1600 weapons, but they are only counting as 100. the russian federation has announced such a program.
again, the russian federation. you see a discounting of bomber weapons such that it would be easy to envision 3000, 3500 weapons as being there under the accounting rules. i will be interested to see the fine print and details to see what more issues are looking like that before making any kind of specific suggestion as to whether or not the treaty should be supported. >> do you know anything more about this issue? >> i think that you can be reassured. in part i think the administration has been taking some careful soundings of the last eight months. they are sensitive to making sure the treaty is not only signed, but gets ratified. i think when the words come out you will be comfortable. >> tom?
>> i offer keith a hopeful interpretation of his last point. maybe someday we also will have a bomber modernization program. [laughter] >> the whole discussion really does reinforce my view that this is such a russian-centric discussion. particularly when you introduce the zero think it's so distorts in the calculation of what the requirement is for the foreseeable, strategic future that it really does more harm than good. in our group discussions one of our colleagues suggested, a person who devoted a good deal of his life to figuring of what sensible arms control means,
that anything more than 1500 would require a multilateral negotiation. >steve suggests there is another number out there. if you have the tug of zero after all the goal, it frames the way you think about i the about in away that i think is profoundly distorted me know it could be the difference between 1500 and 1000 is really immaterial, but that is not tested proposition. my fundamental view is that we need a better understanding of where we are going before you not only take this step, but think about the next ones. in particular, expanding consideration beyond just the u.s./russia bilateral
relationship. even if this does improve the relationship overall, is this positive and a broad, global strategic sense about which there has been almost no discussion? i tried to be agnostic about it. -- i try to be agnostic about it. planned missile defense would tend to cut out laser and other forms of directed energy that have recently been terminated. would there be a follow-on program? the current and planned term needs a bit of parcing. i just wanted to reiterate again, let's figure out where we're going. >> a last bought from me, you can already gathered from this discussion and from any others that we have a lot of issues
before us -- a last thought from me. i would offer the not so bold prediction that the debate about this treaty will consume enough of the senate ratification discussions of 2010 that you will let me off the hook for not having forced more discussion about the comprehensive test ban treaty ratification today. maybe we will have time for from conversation on that anywhere from six to 12 months from now. thank you for being here, and thank you to my fellow panel.
>> undersecretary for arms control and international security will give a report today on the new treaty and on the it obama administration is a non-proliferation agenda. live coverage in less than one hour. president obama has returned from afghanistan where he made a surprise visit to troops. today he will meet with foreign ambassadors at the white house. it is the start of passover. tomorrow he will sign the healthcare bill. he will go to a committee
college in northern virginia for that. it also changes student loan programs. >> tonight, the federal communications commission director talking about response to the broadband plan from legislators, telecom industry, and public interest groups. >> so, when i hear president obama said that he is president of all-america, i say obsolete. but black people have helped to make a president of all america. >> tonight, the black agenda forum. at 8:30 p.m. eastern on c-span2. >> throughout april see the winners of the studentcam competition. middle and high school students from 45 states submitted videos on one of the country's greatest
strengths, or a challenge the country is facing. watch every morning on c-span just before "washington journal." and during the program meet the students who made them. for a preview visit the website. >> palestinian president abbas spoke to readers in libya and warned that talks with israel will stop if they continue to build settlements. leaders voiced concern when israel said they are planning to build thousands of new homes in east jerusalem. this 20-minute event is courtesy of the arab television. >> today i address you, dear brothers, in the name of my palestinian people. from our belief that the cause of the palestinian people regaining its right is the center -- the center of the arab
countries represents the point of consensus on one of the strategic bases of the joint arab action in the future, particularly that we are living in exceptional circumstances. and in very dangerous conditions that will form a turning point in history as a whole. the direction of the future will rely on how we deal with this phase that we're going through, and to what extent we are ready to face these challenges. there's no doubt that you are following with us the dangerous, grave developments, and you know what israel is doing against jerusalem and its citizens.
for some time the occupation behavior has been escalating against this sacred town in a concentration that has not happened for many decades, the composition of lands and building more sediment unions has become a daily behavior that is implementing the ethnic cleansing. mosques and holy places of islam have become a target for the occupation and the israeli extremists. this campaign that targets the sacred places of muslims and christians is seeking the jewish-ization of the israeli and state and to isolate the
sacred town from the west bank, a decision [unintelligible] and an obstruction to the peace process as a whole with a clear breach of the agreements and commitments, and guarantees that represented, including the american guarantee letter that was given to us at the madrid peace conference, and also the other declarations of international legality, and looking down the feelings of muslims and christians in the world. i always said, my dear brothers, that jerusalem is the jewel of the crown, the door and
date to peace. reiterated that playing with the sacred town by the occupation is enhancing the fire of conflict, and furthering the crisis, and beginning new wars in the region. we, as we salute today the steadfastness of our people in the holy town as they face-off with the rest of our nation, people, everywhere, to this new attack against the moscow and jerusalem, we renew our commitment to every grain of soil and every brick of jerusalem as we're committed to defend the capital of our country -- this new attack against the mosque in jerusalem -- and we are determined to support the courage of our people, and reiterate that there
will be no agreement that will not guarantee the end of occupation to our land, number one jerusalem. there is no meaning of a palestinian state without jerusalem being its capital. dear brothers and sisters, at this time were we are fighting for, to defend jerusalem and our nation, people, off we are facing a confrontation, a very heated confrontation on the peace process. we have welcomed all the sincere attempts to relaunch the peace process. we have welcomed the new directions of president obama, particularly the two-state solution, and work with the u.s. administration in continuing effort to translate these visions into reality while preserving the principles of our
positions that were determined by the arab summits and initiatives, and have reiterated these positions everywhere. we never came under influence and did not abandon our role, and cannot allow for the palestinian voice to be absent from any forum, but we wanted to be brave and courageous as presented to defend our rights, and have reiterated it in all international forums that we are committed to the peace option with which we believe that it needs the requirements that the international community has established and president obama to relaunch the peace process and negotiations, the total freeze of settlements activities
in jerusalem and the rest of the occupied palestinian territories. and the clear statement of the framework of the peace process -- we have found an understanding of our position in the world. we understand the uselessness of the gratian's while cement activities continue. we understand the uncertainty of negotiations where the occupation keeps working to delineate the borders -- is understand the uselessness of the negotiations while settlement activities continue. this idea of the country with a provisional borders -- we reject that and reiterate our rejection today. reiterate our rejection today. i understand now that any peace process any peace process is doomed to failure as long as it lacks a clear framework based on what
the international community and l legality has determined. this has been cleared through the u.s. envoy, george mitchell, in what we called the proximity talks, of which you have been notified through the follow-up arab committee. mr. mitchell has said the that the framework or the time frame would be 24 months for talking about all the final questions and solutions and that the borders of the frontiers would be set within the first 12 months. our work to relaunch the peace process on its previous tracks -- we are committed to all the arab initiatives and joint
coordination with all of our friends and brothers in all our steps. but the continuation of negotiations needs real partnership and sincere partnership. this partnership is contingent on faith in the true intentions of the other side, the israeli side, and its commitment to the letter and spirit of the previous accords. there is no need for resuming negotiations without agreeing on previous agreements. the decision of the palestinians to relaunch these proximity talks under the auspices of the americans -- this is not possible if the change in the situation on the ground,
continuing the building of the settlements by the current as really government -- by the current israeli government, which has continued to commit crimes against our people. gentlemen, i continue to say to the arab people that jerusalem and its surroundings are a responsibility that god almighty has bestowed on us. the settlement and the risks of division we need to stop all of that. i call on you to work seriously and swiftly to defend and to save jerusalem, to reinforce our opposition to this -- to preserve its cultural and religious identity. i want to reiterate the importance of us working on a number of points.
one of them -- to call the international community, particularly the security council and the european union, and also the international organizations, particularly unesco, to not recognize any unilateral steps that israel undertakes in jerusalem. we put the responsibilities -- they take the responsibility to stop such measures in the historic archaeological sites in jerusalem, bethlehem, and galilee, and the rest of the occupied palestinian territories. save it from the israelis. there are more than 150 such archaeological sites. the israelis are working to include them as archaeological jewish places, as they claim. they need to send international
monitors to observe the israeli breeches on the ground and to prevent them from happening and to provide international protection to our people. no. 2, the arab group in new york needs to call for a special session of the general assembly to condemn the actions of israel in jerusalem and to impose the international illegality on israel as an occupying force that has no right to change the situation in jerusalem. number three, to mobilize the support of the arabs and moslems and incorporate with the islamic conference in jerusalem to stop the actions of israel in jerusalem and to mobilize international opinion to stop the aggressions on christian and muslim heritage in jerusalem and
to realize that east jerusalem is an occupied land. all the measures the occupying force undertakes are nil, as east jerusalem is the capital of the palestinian state. number four, to give immediate financial support to increase the support that was agreed upon in beirut in 2002, which were directed at the sites -- up to $5 million to preserve and enforce the resistance of the palestinians in jerusalem through these funds, the arab funds. they also need to implement developments in the sacred towns to reinforce the presence of the arab populations there
and to work with the palestinians and the palestinian budget. 58% of the budget is now being dedicated to our people in gaza. number five, make a plan for arab action to put jerusalem -- the secretary general needs to call on the arab league ministers to follow up in the coming three months. mr. president, majesties, excellencies -- saving the two states solution and the risk is facing and the peace and security in their region need swift action to impose on israel -- to declare a clear position of accepting the two state
solution on the borders of 1967. i say the two states solution. israel does not believe this option. it is not working in this direction. we do not know to what direction they want to take us. israel needs to be forced to stop all settlement activities, as the road that stipulates. implementing these points is necessary for the possibility of success for any revival of the political process which might lead to ending the occupation and lifting the siege on our people, particularly in the gaza strip. they must open safe passage to protect the unity of territory of the palestinians and preserve the possibility of having a
contiguous, sovereign, independent palestinian state. we reiterate our acceptance and our welcome to the statement from the meeting in moscow on march 19, 2010, as we welcome earlier the statement from the european union in december 2009. both are important. more important even is for all the parties of the international community, particularly the u.s. administration, to act swiftly and practically in concrete steps to find mechanisms to force israel to implement what came in those statements. the frivolity of the israeli government toward the future of peace and security in the region -- not only to force them to implement the agreements to the
peace process and the two state solution, but also to take steps to freeze the settlement activities. dear brothers, at the time when we are facing these challenges on jerusalem and on the political front, we have been and continue to be -- to work very hard and tirelessly and honestly to fulfill the national reconciliation, to stop the divide that has been forced on us by hamas in the gaza strip in june at 2007 and to regain the unity of the land of our people, and our institutions and political regime, and to put an end to the siege our people in the gaza strip face. we have responded with the
efforts of egypt, with the support of the arab countries, which ended into the egyptian reconciliation memorandum which came as a result of many months of work. 5 california has signed this letter -- fatah has signed this letter and has lifted the obstacles to national unity. we say today that home loss needs to sign this paper, too. -- we say today that hamas needs to sign this paper, too. we believe in going back to the people and going back to the polls. this position is derived from our commitment to protect our loaws and our beliefs, to refuse
violence and to refuse weapons. our interest in political action is to face the policies of occupation and its animosities. occupation is the only beneficiary of our rift and our divide. that reconciliation reinforces the positive action of the international forces. i thank you all for listening. i am confident that we will come out of this summit, this very important summit, the summit of jerusalem, with great success -- with what is necessary and needed and what supports the steadfastness of our people in jerusalem and its defense of its sacred places, m
>> we will go live to the state department to hear from the undersecretary who will brief reporters on the new treaty and the obama administration is a non-proliferation agenda. >> night, a discussion on reaction to the federal communications commission's just-released decision. on c-span2. >> which president was buried wrapped in an american flag and a copy of the constitution under his head? andrew johnson. find these and other presidential facts in the newly updated both "who is buried in grant's tomb/" >> a guidebook, troubled history, and many biography of each president --