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women voters, and she's saying, i like the guy. that does give him a surrogacy more valuable than any other. and george bush started all his campaign speeches in 2000 with reference to laura bush. he knew she was just likable. and particularly, he was saying, she likes me. and that's what they are all saying, to some degree. this worthy woman says that i'm a good guy. so the voters kind of respond to that on his behalf. we don't even have any evidence that anybody votes for vice president, much less first lady. >> you often here the term "humanize" that the first lady
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helps to humanize the president. and they also raise a lot of money. >> i would agree with both of them. i would also not want to overlook that in ways less obvious than that, they may actually wield more historical influence. go back to "influence and image" we still don't know how -- the full story of how important nancy reagan was behind-the- scenes in terms of personnel and policies. but she was clearly hugely influential. and i would argue, based on what we do know, most of the time for the better. >> i think the question was, did the voters vote for first ladies. >> and i don't think people in
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1984 thought mrs. montel mrs. reagan. historians get to vote in ways that voters don't. and i think historians may ascribe a different kind of significance to the many first lady than the average voter. >> well, first ladies, influence & image." monday nights. thank you for joining us. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> season two of first ladies begins monday live at 9:00 p.m. eastern with a look at the life of edith roosevelt. we are offering a special
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edition of the book. it presents a biography and a portrait of each first lady as well as comments from noted historians and thoughts from michelle obama on the role of first ladies throughout history. it is available for the discounted price of $12.95 plus shipping. our website has more about the first ladies including a special section, welcome to the white house. it is produced by our partner and chronicles life in the executive mansion during the tenure of each of the first ladies. you can find out more at www.c- c-span, we bring public affairs advanced in washington directly to you putting you in the room at congressional hearings, white house events, briefings and conferences and offering complete gavel-to-gavel coverage of the u.s. house all as a public service of private industry.
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we are c-span, created by the cable tv industry 34 years ago and funded by your local cable or satellite provider. now, you can watch us in hd. >> next, a discussion about the 10 year search for osama bin laden. then, the future of presidential debate with the cochairs of the commission that organizes the debates. later, a town hall meeting on public service with former senators trent lott and olympia snowe and others. >> next, a look at the decade- long search for osama bin laden. this is from this summer's aspen security for them. ofer bergen is the author "manhunt." it was made into an hbo documentary by producer director greg barker. they discuss their research and work with cbs news correspondent raviv.
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>> hi, everybody. this time you do not have former government officials here. you will find we have two very well informed tests. the two men behind manhunt. he might see this tonight. "manhunt: the search for osama bin laden" is the film title. today it was nominated for two primetime emmys for best documentary and for best cinematography. [applause] congratulations to the two gentlemen with me who are here today. you probably know peter bergen. you have seen him a lot. a best-selling author. he set up the first television interview with osama bin laden
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back in 1997. his books include "holy war inc." mr. barker lived in england for 18 years. he lives in los angeles now. making films for the pbs series "front line." the new york times loved your contest in egypt here it you learned a lot about the culture. his new film does debut on hbo. that is what we are discussing. this film is just over 1.5 hours. i think it is terrific in large part because their ability to get people to talk. let's start with an example of
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that. we have four excerpts. the first section is titled "sisterhood echo -- sisterhood. let's watch excerpt number one. ♪ >> we have patience and and we are not always looking for the payoff immediately. trying to keep track of all the threats and which ones are real and which ones are not real, you know, people say why did you connect the dots?
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because the whole page is black. ♪ >> to pull a story out of all this information but there is no single intelligence looking at all this information, it is a lot of different brains looking. the more you can bring people together and share what is important, the better it works. at the time the people who had deep expertise in al qaeda they were women. they did a job. at first it did not make them very popular with their managers. >> i was counseled once in a performance review that i was spending too much time working on bin laden. they said we were obsessed
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crusaders, it using all the women stereotypes. men throw chairs, women cry. which one is better? >> that gives you a sense of the tone of the film. one of the women you saw recently said that women are better analysts in counterterrorism because they understand relationships and terrorism is about relationships. the way it operates and is formed. they are better she said, at perceiving patterns. well. how did you get the women to speak to you? even after they were identified, how did you persuade them to talk? >> it is great to be here. largely it was a long process not just for the women but for everybody in the film.
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i try to make films that shine a light on how our government actually operates. although a lot of subject matter might be classified, human emotions are not. i made a point of talking to some people in this room and people in the clip. spending a lot of time with them and building trust saying i want to tell your story. in a full as way as possible. if we need to set certain for parameters, we can talk about it. that is fine. peter was a terrific help in that. peter made introductions. to go on camera they have to trust me. when i walk away with the footage, i can do whatever i want with it. >> let's bring you in on this. when you develop a source for what we do, which is getting
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people to talk about delicate work, you have to get than the sense that you are on their side. is that part of it? >> i think greg was able to correctly say that he was going to let people have that say. one of the interesting things is there is no narration. there's no one telling you what to think. one of the messages of the film which i think shows you're not thrown to think it is 9/11 was not an intelligence failure. it was a policy failure. the cia could not have provided more strong warnings. it is almost a case of perfect strategic warning. think of the august 6 daily brief. it does not get anymore graphic than that. >> illustrated in the film by
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john mclachlan who is probably in the room, putting up the pieces of papers and you could see where they were. >> the cia was providing strategic warnings. they are not able to save time and place. the women in the film and other people at the cia felt very strongly that this story had not really been told very well. that is one of the reasons they spoke. >> a lot of people in this room to get asked by folks like us will you give an interview, whether it is for print or a book. >> my advice is don't do it. [laughter] >> you think what is in it for you. you illustrated one thing, the story had not been told well. have either of you come across someone who wanted to talk
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because they were disgruntled? >> as an example of someone in the film who wanted to talk to is not prevented by the cia they were not disgruntled. she is the mother of five. she was the first person in the u.s. government to write in 1993 a warning about a guy called osama bin laden who is going to be a problem. she wanted to talk. she is a public figure. she's not undercover. the agency would not let her speak. at the end of the day, the american public has been trillions of dollars on this since 9/11. the hunt for osama bin laden is a huge success story. why not talk about it?
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>> everybody in the film had left office. it was interesting. we began shortly after. i got the rights to peter's book. it was a while before we started filming. at the time we are starting to film, all the controversy over the "zero dark 30" was breaking. the door started closing quite rapidly at the white house, at the cia in particular. the irony is we can talk what we want but the documentary is where we really wanted to just let people tell their story. that is where he faced a lot of roadblocks because of the cooperation with the movie. >> in both intelligent work and in intelligence related journalism, we are in a post- snowden era. what do you predict will be the
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effect of snowden's leaks when we ask for interviews and information? >> i do not think it will be a problem. in some cases it might be. people ultimately always want to tell their story. i have a much longer lead time with a documentary. 1.5 years or sometimes longer. it is a golden age for documentary filmmaking right now because of the decline in covers of some of the more mainstream media. it is not done as much as it used to be. it is a great time to be making these films. there is a desire to get the story out in a way that we can tell it through first-hand accounts. in the short term, with some
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people it will have a chilling effect. >> i think snowden is just one example. if you look at what the four years in the "zero dark 30" reveals, it was an investigation of the pentagon, mike vicker's conversation, they are all out there publicly. if i was sitting in this position or anywhere else and i felt like if i am going to talk to a journalist or a book writer or a filmmaker and there is a chance it will become public, do the math. i think snowden is just one element. the leak investigations, all these things have a chilling effect. >> let's have another excerpt
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from the film. it takes you into the information after you found someone who was detained. where do you take them? were there enhanced interrogation techniques. let's watch excerpt number two. [video clip] >> we were empowered more. we did things more aggressive. my job is to kill al qaeda. get with us or get out of our way. we had been focusing on capturing. we had been focusing on capturing. he knew who the leadership was. he new method of attack that targets. he was the highest we have ever captured.
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we captured him in march. he was severely wounded. we knew we had to get him out of pakistan. the way they had dealt with issues like this was to transfer the terrorist to a investigation. we needed to take responsibility for high-level terrorists ourselves. we understood what we had to do. we did it. >> we took a lot of bad guys off the streets. they got put up and now it is public knowledge in a nice little boutique locations. [end video clip]
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>> that man was a cia field officer. he introduces the word "downrange," the ones out there in the field. you took up the controversy. what do you think you were able to add in the film that was new in the debate about waterboarding? >> i try to place the audience in the mindset of the people who were making the decisions at the time. to hope that the general public would ask themselves what they would have done. when i have these long discussions with people in the film about being in the film, i never want talked about what i thought about this.
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i think that is one reason they decided to be a part of it. one man from the fbi has a substantial role in this section as well. >> well-known for believing water boarding does not work. many point to this as an example of how it can work. i am never trying to just break new ground per se. i'm trying to add contacts.-- context. how decisions are actually made as told by the people who were there at the time. it is what gives a film like this its value. >> your book and film are about searching for bin laden. the type of interrogation that took place, key to finding bin laden? >> there is a 6000 page answer to that that is still classified. any public discussion of this
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matter is made difficult by the fact that we do not really have the facts. in the course of my book i found wiki leaks to be very useful. the summary of the key guantanamo detainees were in the wiki leaks dump. you can piece together what these people were saying and to some degree when they were saying it. what you cannot find in there is a very specific analysis of what this information was given up before or after interrogations. there is no doubt. there is no doubt that played a role. we will never know if they could have been solicited another way. it is part of our history. on the question of did it lead to bin laden, i am somewhat skeptical for a couple of reasons. a lot of things led to bin laden.
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there was no detainee who said he is living here. that was one of the reasons of -- realize asians of the cia. tions of the cia. there were fragments of information that came from a lot of people. one person was interrogated. he was the real 20th hijacker. he went to bora bora. he fled to pakistan and then he went to guantanamo. in guantánamo, he said he was in afghanistan -- which wasn't true. after a few month they realize he was the same guy. then he was subjected to a pretty severe regime that susan crawford said amounted to torture. he was kept up for 43 days. he was subjected to hot and cold and white noise and lots of
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christina aguilera music at loud volumes and he was discomforted. [laughter] it seems he is the first person who identified the current year as someone who was important in al qaeda from what we can gather. i think there is a public interest in having a 6000 page report that the intelligence committee has done. there is a 300 page summary that is out there. the cia is trying to compose a response to it. i think it is in the public interest for us to know to what extent is whether these methods are ethical, were they efficacious. it also takes is in great detail into the successful search for the leader of al qaeda in iraq.
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the woman we met early we see her there. a jordanian doctor pulled the americans. -- fooled the americans. let's see excerpt number three. [video clip] >> he finds his way to pakistan and disappears. somebody expected him of being an informant most likely. nobody knew anything for three months. suddenly he is back on the radar screen. he is now beginning to trade the
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-- treat the number two leader of al qaeda. the place goes crazy. even the white house gets briefed. he is going to take his right to number two or number one. the meeting has to take place in a place where the cia can completely control the environment and becomes the cia basic khost. they come up with a plan to get inside here without being detected. the problem is that nobody in the cia had ever met with him.
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they made arrangements for him to come into the base without being checked because they were afraid someone might recognize him and his identity compromised. >> [indiscernible] >> that story was told by the triple agents about that. he is a well-known newspaper men. was this just a case where you could not get an official to tell the story? >> yes. later in the sequence others will speak about it. what we talked about for, i
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couldn't get access to some of the people who were around right the final years or so. nobody in our film was directly involved with the khost operation. those i wanted to talk to. access to write up. dried up. some of the people, including the women, had spoke about jennifer matthews. we just saw a still of her. she was killed in that blast. >> she played a very integral role in the fight against al qaeda. >> the reason we focus on khost is when i started this so may people told me you cannot underestimate the impact of khost psychologically on the cia. >> the setback. >> it became personal.
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they lost some of their own. there is an indication to seek -- a determination to seek justice. story needs a story arc and the cia is closing in on met modern. -- bin laden. then, this major setback. it is a major part of the story. >> absolutely. one of the female cia analysts says the great irony is she's been 15 years of her life trying to find bin laden and bin laden killed her. this is a woman with three kids and with a very rising career at the agency. the portrait of her in "zero dark 30" is extremely misleading. she's made to be an idiot who is stuck in the cold war. it was an unfair betrayl.
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-- portrayal. in this film, she's given her due. it is a more accurate treatment. >> we're about to turn to you for questions. another man who is here, general michael hayden, is in the film as well about khost. he portrays it in a war you are going to have casualties and losses. it is the sad truth that some on our side would die not only on 9/11 or on the obvious battlefields. i will call on anyone he raises their hand. we you will probably get a microphone brought to you. if you do not have questions i will continue. i want to ask you then, in the 16 months from khost to abbottabad, you have about 60 seconds. what is the key there?
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what really moves ahead that takes us to that one place in pakistan? >> there are a lot of keys along the way. let me try to lay it out briefly. they have an alias. abu kuwaiti is the father. there were several million. he was the career working for -- courier working for bin laden. sometime in 2007 we get the real name. sayed is a john smith name. even he is not a kuwaiti. he is a pakistani. that is twice the size of california. it is something that it is not great. in 2010, this guy makes a phone call to someone in the gulf. the content lead the agency to believe that this guy is still in al qaeda.
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he is in a city in western pakistan. the city is about several million people. he is practicing careful security. he takes the battery out of his phone. there's no way to track him. they have to put people into the city and eventually track and back 2.5 hours away to the city of abbottabad. what surprised them was the mysterious third family he was living in the compound. they began to think it might be osama bin laden. in august of 2010, they go to president obama and say we seem to have a good potential lead on osama bin laden. khost has just happened. khost was december 30, late december 2009. there was no great excitement in the oval office. the last really good lead took
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to several cia officers dying. clearly this was a good lead. then there is the whole agatha christie story about how that lead, how they tried to get a sense of how to make the lead better. there was a debate. at the end of the day when you make the decision under percent there are 100% not there. the analysts were saying 40% or 80%. it is an interesting case of presidential decision-making. the stakes were lower. if you think about president kennedy's decision in the cuban missile crisis, he made an extremely mature decision in a difficult circumstance. you can say the same thing about president obama. it is easy in retrospect to say this is the decision because you know the outcome. there were civilian casualties.
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they plan for every eventuality. one of the reasons why there were imprecise in the immediate aftermath. they have not really prepared themselves for success. it is a classic case of presidential decision-making. do not forget that his security advisers were on either side of the issue. >> in your book, do you dwell on that and take of the decision- making issue? >> we all know the outcome. i was hoping to do that. it was my intention initially to do that. it is hard to put drama in that because we all know what
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happens. it did not work. it is funny. when you make these films, you have to follow your access and course of the movie. the film is exhaustive. we do not have all the information on this. there are a lot of big gaps. there are a couple clues, but we don't really know. that is something that we will find out over the years, possibly decades to come. >> before another film clip about how they handled the rate raid -- another chance a
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questions or we will go on. about a month -- abbottabad, how is it handled in the film question mark with what excerpt number four. [video clip] >> the hunt from the courier to bin laden makes complete sense to me. it was based on all of the years of experience in a tightknit group of people who really cared about this and supported each
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other. we invented the technique that works. it is the technique that got bin laden in the end. >> i got a call from a former colleague. he said turn on the news. i was at home. turn on the news, the president is going to make an announcement. i had a feeling that it had been a good day at the office. >> good evening. >> finally, it is him. they got him. they got him finally. that was really something. [end video clip]
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>> all of you know where you were on that sunday too. it is great that in the movie we see a lot of the people -- everybody we met in the movie, saying where they were when they got the news and how they let me come to you greg on this. that little bit of video that we saw, osama bin laden an old man on a blanket. was he watching a speech by himself? wow. what was the decision to release what they found in the abbottabad home? >> that is the answer. i would have loved to see more. the documents are fascinating.
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if you've never read them, i encourage people to do so. i'm sure there's other footage that has not been released. >> you got to go there before the house was leveled by pakistani authorities. it was controlled by pakistani intelligence. you went there first. you must have expected hitler's bunker. >> i was working on osama bin laden for a long time. i was the only outside worker to get inside the compound. they must have known they were going to demolish it. i did not know that. i thought it might be like visiting hitler's bunker after world war ii. he was surrounded by his three wives and a dozen kids and grandkids. he was certainly not living large. there was no air conditioning. there's very little heating. people were sleeping on beds that were basically bit of cardboard put together. they were growing their own
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vegetables and raising their own chickens and cows and growing vegetables. it was very self-sufficient. they did not have to go out very much. for the world's most wanted man, it was not a bad life. he was there 5.5 years. he was surprised. he thought he was safe. there has been a 300 page report by the commission. there's more detail about what he was doing that night. he told his family that as soon as he heard the helicopter crash that they have arrived. he understood what was happening. there was no moon that night. there's no electricity in the building or the neighborhood. >> he did not try to set up defensive action. >> he had no plan b. when people look at the compound they were worried there would be tunneled out. the water table was very high. would there be a safe room?
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they had a sense of what it looked like from the outside but not in sight. i was able to retrace the steps of the seals that night. it was interesting to see the physical evidence of what happened. there was a huge metal door almost the size up to ceiling here that separates the second and third for where he lived. seals blew through that door. bin laden is living on the third floor. there was another big metal door that had not been blown through because bin laden poked his head out and closed it behind him. then you go into the room where he died that was relatively small and i could see that somebody has shot in such a way that there was a big blood spots are on the ceiling. there are different narratives about what happened but a lot of commonality. bin laden had 15 minutes to surrender. he didn't.
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he had two weapons but he did not pick them up. the wives try to intervene. the seals moved in. this is the consensus version. there is a dispute about who killed him and at what point. that is probably too arcane to get in here. i do not think we are going to have a particularly good answer to that. it was a confusing situation to the seals. it is a firefight. there was a lot of adrenlaine pumping. witness accounts can differ. there's more commonality than differences. >> have you concluded whether it was just a kill mission? is there some circumstance in which they would have taken them captive? >> yes. if someone surrenders it is a
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war crime to kill them. >> hands up? >> he did not surrender conspicuously. when the helicopter crashes in your house it is a loud event. if you want to surrender you have 15 minutes to do so. he did not. at the end he did not want to end up in guantanamo. he chose to die essentially. >> your big decision as a filmmaker, not to attempt what we call a tick tock of how that raid went down. did you think of having that and decided not to? >> of course i did. when we began i thought that is the obvious piece at the end. >> there have been a tv documentary last year. maybe he thought it was already covered. >> i would only do it if i could do it better.
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when i make these films, i used to make "frontline." those are investigated films. they would have that. they would have the question if he would have surrendered or not. this is a movie. i made a decision a few years ago to make documentaries that appeal to the widest possible audience. that means at the end of the movie you have to have a strong ending. if i did not have the great stuff that needed needed to really advance the story somehow and make people feel like you're watching something they have never seen before, i was not going to do it. the khost material became so good. the other thing that was so interesting is the point of view became that of the people who have been hunting bin laden going way back to the mid-90s.
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a lot of them were not involved in the final -- >> he wanted to get their reaction. >> none of them were high-fiving or cheering at the end. they all had this melancholy reaction. that is why there is a cello going underneath the final graphics. it is intentional. it creates the sense that this was a long, very difficult, very painful chapter in our countries history but also in the lives of the characters we come to know. that is how it played. eventually it worked. we were able to do it rather elegantly without having to do a tick tock of the raid. >> it was elegant. there someone with a question. thank you. littlely starting a series of questions. >> a cascade effect. >> hi.
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in your reporting, did you uncover any new information or speculation about the 15 minutes? people trying to defend him? there seems to be a hole. >> he thought what protected him was the position of pakistan where he was. >> for 15 minutes. he doesn't do anything? >> it is impossible to do -- to interview him now. it is not clear. he must have been confused. it must've been surprising. you cannot see anything. your opposition can see somewhat with the night vision goggles. with the night vision goggles. one anecdote i thought was interesting is he told, and i confirmed, the last words we know he spoke was "don't turn on the light" which he told his wife.
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she did not know the electricity was down. he was cognizant that this was not a visit from the local police man. >> a gentle man not far from there. >> one day the wives will speak. >> the cia tried to speak with them. there are very few things the pakistanis and americans agree on. the hostility of bin laden's wives is one of them. >> my question is did you request access to the helmet cam video? >> my understanding is that there was no helmet cam. for the precise reason that
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people like me would be asking for footage forever. this is what i was told. there was no helmet. >> there's one interesting thing. we are in a new era of warfare. it was revealed. the bin laden rate is a tactical operation at the end of the day. the president was watching in real time. it is the first time in our history where that is the case. there was a stealth drone. sitting in the situation room you could see this thing unfolds in real time. admiral mullen who i interviewed for the book was very concerned that somebody, if things started going wrong, that somebody in the situation room would start to intervene on a tactical operation on the other side of the world. that did not happen. you could easily imagine. we have the capacity for the commander-in-chief to watch a tactile operation unfold on the other side of the world. it is something we have never seen.
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>> and perhaps give orders right there. of course, a different level of pilotlesse unmanned vehicles, the robots we're going to happen the future, etc. we may be dependent on the real- time cameras. another question out there. >> thank you. one thing if i read a report correctly that surprised me was that mohammed was very much involved with the family of the courier. >> the pakistani report? >> yes. if that is true it is interesting. here is a guy who was interrogated perhaps more than anybody else that was at guantanamo. what do you make of that? >> there is a mention i think of
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them being in touch with people from captivity? >> my understanding was that was the red line despite all the interrogation techniques. he made it clear he would never speak about that. >> just a few minutes left. we will move a bit more rapidly. i will get you for sure. promise. high impact when it is a later question. >> chad sweet. former cia. what i thought was nice was the operation to get affirmation of who was in the compound. what is hard to understand is why he was not traded when the operation went down?
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can you share any color you might have on that aspect of the operation? >> i think it was brilliant on two ways. it is ethically dubious for them to be hiring doctors. >> we're talking about the doctor who helped set up the raid. >> he had no idea he was involved with the bin laden operation. he had no way to know. he thought he was being recruited to people in a particular neighborhood and he is working for the cia. they never succeeded in getting dna from the bin laden compound. >> you wrote last week that he is still in prison and pakistan. >> he is not a hero. jonathan pollard is still in the united states prison. it does not matter if friendly countries are spying, they are still spies. the pakistanis had every right to lock up someone who was spying for someone else.
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the reason i think it is ethically dubious to put it mildly is in pakistan people are being routinely assassinated because of the view that they work for the cia. this is a common urban legend. we added to this. now it is true. the cia is employed people to do vaccination programs. before it was an urban myth. it was a creative idea. you can applaud that. at the end of the day, the cia abhorred the idea of using journalists of cover. there are certain categories saying they would not use. i think one of them should be people engaged in medical activity. >> a lot if you are in the intelligence field. it is perfectly understandable that someone in the cia wants to be good to this doctor and get him out, similar to the ways
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people demand that pollard be released. >> i am interested in national security. a common question. the invisible war, the documentary on military sexual trauma. now your film. the invisible war has achieved unprecedented policy changes that are being debated on the hill for legislative changes. with respect to your work am the sisterhood and bring out the stories of these courageous women analysts, do you have any policy aspirations with respect to your work? is telling their story enough? >> it depends entirely on the
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film. really he just got into that subject not knowing at all what was the tip of the iceberg. it has taken over his life. the film that she will make has an account of this but will portray him as a hero. >> don't predict that. >> i do not want to say that. i think it will give this perspective in perspective. >> we will decide. -- the viewer will decide. >> figure it out for yourself. i made a film called "ghosts of rwanda" of those in the white house or the un when the genocide happened and why they did nothing to stop the killing.
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it was impossible not to feel like i was on a mission making that film. the reason people were talking to me were to try to prevent similar officials from making the mistake they may. -- they made. they cannot believe what people have been through. they're not going to let happen on their watch. with manhunt it was different. i spend most of my life living overseas. based in london for on most 20 years. coming back to the states a few years ago i fell like i was
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stunned by the divisive this of the debate. also a sense that the night of the raid everyone was cheering also a sense that the night of the raid everyone was cheering and then it went away. i knew enough. i have been around the world enough to know there was a dark, painful history that ultimately led to abbottabad. i knew we can learn from the people who were part of that history. he said did you know there were a lot of women? i have been tracking bin laden since 95. i did not. that was something i wanted to portray. that is a human story. >> only have about two minutes up. you are one of the best known analysts. where do we stand? bin laden has been killed. is al qaeda finished? are they more than just the bin laden core? >> i think al qaeda is going the
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way of the dhs tape. they have not conducted an attack on the united states since 9/11 or in the west since 2005. all most all their top leaders are dead. we are not playing whack a mole. we have completely destroyed the central al qaeda organization. there are maybe three or four leaders that. the number two is dead. they are under in enormous pressure. there'll always be some takers. there were always be some disaffected young man somewhere
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who thinks this is a solution. 121 americans have been killed in the united states by jihad the terrorists. that is not a lot of people. if we have this conversation in 2002 or 2003, because a lot of the work of a lot of people in this room including jos? rodriguez and general hayden and others who are interviewed in this film and others who are not. >> i did want to fit this in. are you not adversarial enough almost by instinct? some of us are. we need someone to work in the
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cia. we know he's not telling us everything. are you skeptical enough? >> about what? what the story and the way they tell it. are you setting them up as heroes? >> i do not know. i do not see myself as an adversarial person. i don't think that is particularly beneficial.
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i think was more useful just to hear what they had to say. bin laden declared war on cnn in 1997 in an interview i produce. >> on america. >> imagine the high commander said we are planning to attack the united states and if pearl harbor would have turned out differently. where is the business of trying to find out what people think and believe? i do not see adversarial being a useful trait in all of this. >> did you try to leave us with a feeling, with the cello and all that, that the war is not over, that is going to happen again one of your main characters says. >> it is such an interesting point about how you tell the
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stories and interact. i do not take an adversarial approach. some people may not like films. i try to get into the world of the people who stories i'm trying to tell. here is what i have tried to do. if god forbid there is some other major attack at some point


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