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tv   Japanese Officials Examine National Security Strategy  CSPAN  May 1, 2017 3:06pm-4:31pm EDT

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for the proposed u.s.-mexico border wall. the house back at 4:30 here on c-span. tomorrow, united airlines c.e.o. oscar munoz will testify before the house committee on customer service. we will have it at 9:30 on c-span3. earlier today we got a look at the japanese approach to the trump administration from former japanese defense ministers. they talked about tensions on the korean peninsula and how the trump administration approaches foreign policy. this was hosted by the center for sfriegic and international studies -- strategic and international studies. it's an hour and a half. host: good morning. thank you for joining us today. i'm michael green, professor at
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georgetown. some distinguished -- in fact, this audience is pretty much 100% distinguished, as i look out. quite an impressive audience. thank you very much for coming. a few brief safety and security announcements. i am your designated safety officer in case of an emergency. you'll find the exits are back behind you. and you'll go down one floor, exit down through the stairwell and we'll meet around the corner at national geographic which is just down left and left should we have to so today together with the japan center for economic research is delighted to host this discussion with three of japan's leading lawmakers, statesmen with particular expertise in national security and to talk about our alliance and the years ahead. i'll introduce the other members of the panel in a moment. but let me first mention they
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are all here in washington for the week as part of what's known as golden week, and to join discussions here and around town under the mount my friend ue which runs and many are participants in that dialogue. he jcer, in cooperation with cses worked on the mount fuji dialogue. professor tanaka issued the jcer report on the future of the u.s.-japan alliance, what they kindly called sometimes the japan version of the armitage nye report which is a bipartisan effort to create a series of papers on the future vision for the alliance. really a very strategic and coherent and actionable blueprint for the alliance from
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the leading experts that were brought together by jcer. joining us today are three of the regulars in the mount fuji dialogue, three of the most important contributors to the u.s.-japan alliance of recent years, to my immediate left is member of the house of representatives. [applause] he served as defense minister from 2014 to 2016, was deeply involved in the debate on security legislation, new interpretations of article 9 of the constitution, defense policy reforms and defense guidelines. he's a former member of the ground self-defense forces and graduate of the national defense academy and i'm sure when he graduated and was a second lieutenant and showed up at u.s.-japan security meetings with the name gen nakatani i'm
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sure people were confused. i'm sure his success is due to merit and not his first name. sitting in the center is nother former defense minister , a member of the lower house from miyagi. we hosted him here in july, 2014, for the first real description of the defense policy and thinking about asia and the u.s.-japan alliance. i think he made a big impression. he's a graduate of tokyo university. nd sitting all the over on he had an interesting two weeks. two weeks ago he was a member of the democratic party of japan.
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now he's part of the party of japan. not the real title but he's moved independent which we might ask him about. he is deeply knowledgeable about security strategy having tud eat at -- with me and he served last in government as the special advisor and national security advisor to prime minister noda and served before that as state demin minister for defense. -- state minister for defense. so each of our guests will give a brief five to 10-minute opening statement. i think miniter nakatani will speak about his job as defense minister and where we are on defense guidelines, collective self-defense and other national security reforms. omo is leading within the l.d.p. a task force on missile
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defense. and both gentlemen will talk about north korea. what we do as allies to deal with it. and a grand strategy view of how japan is facing the array of challenges and working with trump administration. so gentlemen, you can use this podium if you like or stay at your seat. maybe the podium is a good idea for the opening statement. if you could join me in welcoming former defense minister nakatani. [applause] [speaking japanese]
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>> since the korean war. last year more than 20 times ballistic missiles were launched and the nuclear tests were conducted twice. 12 of this ry a missile was used and in march four were launched stult plea and three out of four landed in japan. and in april 5, a missile was launched. however, this was failed. u.s. ularly, on the
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carrier, getting nearer at this time. in spite of that missile was launched, currently we are investigating the reasons why it was failed. however, that was the intermediate range missile so it's a very provocative, very threatening behavior by north korea. who could stop the development by north korea and the ultimate goal of north korea is to maintain kim junge unregime by the -- kim jong un regime by the holding of the nuclear weapon that we tried to warn against the united states and tried to preserve their regime. so nuclear development and the regime are inseparateable so in exchange of -- insap rable so in exchange of position and
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life as they are acting and they are almost -- come jong un is almost stepping on the tail of japan and i do not believe there is no chance for making progress in the negotiation. on the short-term basis, for a while they may refrain from nuclear tests and missile launches. however, on the long-term basis, it's possible they develop nuclear missile which could reach the main land of japan. hat would increase the threat. they were to give up or abannedon of the nuclear development of -- abandon of the nuclear development of the weapon that would lead to the collapse of the regime so that probably would not happen.
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so if the missile were to be developed, that would be the real threat for japan. so we currently need to put all the options available, including the military option. they are suggesting that the possibility of first strike so it is -- if they were to continue development, it's possible that the north korea would implode. -- ently the key result those exercises are being conducted jointly between the united states forces and the south korea and then those exercises are being conducted
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5015 and 5027 so hey are exercising the joint -- the special forces and the possibility for strike and the simulation of the command structure. toward the moving korean peninsula. they are capable of having monitoring nd the the behavior of the submarines of the enemy countries and escort ships are in the bay and ry to escort the refueling vessals which deliver fuel to
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the fleet. together with me, the member of the democratic party six years ago in washington, d.c. at the time of giving a speech the armed forces in order to protect them, the new federation was heat ed understood. the -- the member of the lower house, i think that was quite right approach and together with forces, the united states, when they act together is quite natural for them to protect u.s. forces and -- for the japanese defense it's very much needed. so two years ago, the security administration was established and within that the protection of the forces, the protection
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of the arms of the forces became possible. so the training had been conducted within the -- between the o armies and activities -- we tried to deter the actions of north korea. when i was head of the defense partment, when 9/11 took place, then from kitty hawk, en it left the bay, together with forces -- the japanese coast guard, they tried to the area tay around and that was under the name of research and study. not for the protection. but now we have the legal structure to do this. nd about that, i think mr. onodera will be explaining.
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detection and capability and all those capabilities should be acquired by japan and japan should make efforts. the satellite will be necessary. that is included in the proposal. -- the een the i.s.o. missiles should be solidified between the two countries. d what happens to china in terms of president trump and president xi? they seemed to talk with each other over the phone, but currently china is -- by the united states in many ways. and china is expected by the rest of the world. and if they are able to give up the nuclear missile development of north korea, if that cannot be done, the preemptive strike
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of the united states will be approved. nd therefore, china's response is of significant importance and therefore not to -- not the preemptive strike will help, i think the chinese must [inaudible] and about the japanese response, the state should having deterrence capability, we should contribute to the peace and stability of east asia. should have , we contingency outside japan. and we really need to protect using the alert. in other words, the protection of the gray zone and about that area, the response is necessary.
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we are going to have olympic games and paraolympic games three years from now and terrorist attacks happen everywhere in the world. the counterterrorists -- we do have activities for international security in the gray zone. response must be studied. the u.s. and japan should study. alliance mechanism, that should work. and b.p.m., that is the operational action plan. and they should be formulated in that in a very solid manner so that we're able to be ready for whatever the situation that may come in the future. thank you very much for your attention. [applause]
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mbings onodera: thank you, ladies and gentlemen. i am onodera and this is the second or third time that i have been given this opportunity. i served as defense minister. currently i am in charge of the policymaking of security within l.d.p. and this time the missile defense. we put together that proposal and submitted it to the prime minister abe. nd that the paper has been distributed for your reference. about north korea's issue, what we are really concerned about april, last month, the missiles were launched by north korea. and they actually launched it
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towards the sea of japan and the purpose of their launch was explained by north korea and they say that could be -- attack u.s. forces operating in japan and that was already transportable, the launcher, and among the new missiles, some of -- the test is conducted to launch it from the submarine. and that means the missile capability of north korea becomes quite high. and we never know when and from where the missiles will be launched. already, the five nuclear tests were conducted by north korea. and if you look at the examples of the countries, other countries, the nuclear tests, well, the nuclearization of the nuclear arms becomes very close
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to completion. therefore, that will be taken as a major threat to japan. so in order to protect from the ballistic missile, together with the united states, we do have antiballistic missile pac 3, that is -- the that is the ground launch and the ballistic missile defense can be possible. unlike before, 24 hours, 365 days, when north korea is going to launch, we'll never know and therefore we do need to have a lot of readiness. and therefore, just the response will not be enough. [inaudible] so that kind of -- it should be introduced to japan at high
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altitude. the deployment would be needed in japan. i think that has already been conducted. in other words, the diplomatic response alone cannot stop north korea's nuclear and missile development. and therefore current missile defense capability with the cooperation from the united states should be in japan and that is included in our proposal. ter world war ii, we introduced the idea which you would transform our policy. that is the idea of counterattacks to enemy spaces. our policy is to defend ourselves. that is it. so basically, if we are attacked, we defend ourselves. however, we would not possess
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[inaudible] so with that policy, we were able to defend our country. the bombers that came to japan and dropped bombs in japan, fighters and the ground to the air missiles will e used to counter attacks. and if missiles came to japan [inaudible] we can counter that using very capable submarines. and so forth. however, if the situation round japan is changing even north korea in world war ii attacked japan. they are thinking about using a
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ballistic missile. if a ballistic missile were to be launched from north korea against japan, it only takes a little over 10 minutes. so with cooperation with the united states, we have a missile defense system in place. however, what worries us is the missile defense requires very high technology capabilities so if there are so many missiles coming one after the other, one ter another, there will be limited to the capability of us defending. so we really need to counter the attack so we can neutralize -- by neutralizing enemy space. so for the first time in reference to a counter capability whether or not japan should possess such
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capability. that's included in the recommendation. under the alliance, a counterattack, as far as counterattack is concerned, the u.s. is supposed to respond in such a way. however, north korea's capability is getting higher in .rder to enhance deterrence we think both japan and the united states, both of them should have the capability of a counter attack. so our policy is to defend ourselves only and that policy will continue. however, the way enemies attack s has been changing because of advancement of technology. so we would not have the first strike. however, if we are attacked, in order to prevent a second or we d attack, we feel that
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need to own such capabilities. of course, that has to be done with coordination and cooperation with the united tates and the possibility of japan a-- a lone counter attack. however, we should consider having such kind of capability and equipment. we feel lots of tension with respect to the behavior by north korea's intention is to attack u.s. forces in japan and even though that is a direct attack, it's not the direct attack against mainland united states but should be considered as an attack to the united states as well as japan. we should further enhance our
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cooperation between two countries and to deal with such threats. what's most important is to echo in the -- thank you very uch. mr. nagashima: thank you. nagashima, a hisa member of the house of representatives in japan. i am happy to speak about japan's security strategy for the trump administration. since i became independent two weeks ago, i have been fully enjoying the freedom of speech. [laughter] since c-span is broadcasting this event, let me make my presentation in english for the ake of american viewers.
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my presentation is a brief presentation today. i'll try to focus on three issues. first, i'd like to talk about the trump administration's foreign policy. next, i'm going to give you my quick overview of the strategic dynamics of the asia pacific region. and finally, i present some proposals to strengthen the u.s.-japan alliance to deal with those dynamics in the region. first, the trump administration's foreign policy. during the presidential campaign and initial phase, since the inauguration, there is a wide spectrum of concerns shared among japanese members and intellectuals about the trump administration's foreign policy. we encountered a series of unknowns of the new
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administration since its campaign promises did not echo to additional foreign policy -- of u.s. republicans. the american -- america's foreign policy, for example, has been vitally -- widely viewed as the u.s. -- from being the vanguard of the liberal international order. especially u.s. withdraw from the trans-pacific partnership and of the bilateral negotiation that emphasized the benefit of american -- created doubts on u.s. leadership on open and inclusive economic order in the asia pacific. president trump's own conviction for u.s. allies that needs to pay fair share has
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also been interpreted as if the alliance could also be a part of his deal. ahead of mentioning the value of enduring commitment to peace and stability through strengthening the alliance. but actually the first 100 days of trump foreign policy amended many doubts mentioned about. the conversation between president trump and prime minister abe reiterated to the u.s. -- the u.s.-japan alliance and thrust provided an assurance of u.s. allies in the region. appointments of rex tillerson, general james mattis and general h.r. askey members of the national security team
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witnessed that the united from isolationism but refirms an active engagement. peace through strength, the leading concept of the foreign policy of the trump administration, is also a play in asia, especiallyly to deal with north korea. -- especially to deal with north korea. the united states demonstrates large scale force presence off the korean peninsula. by requesting china to pay the pivotal role to tighten economic sanctions, thus to restrain north korea's path to continue modernization nuclear weapon and long-range missile capabilities. trump administration's proposed budget outline to increase the military spending as well as to modernize major equipment, to fortify force readiness and to
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invest in future technology would give good prospects for more promising u.s. defense strategy that we assure allies in asia and europe. -- that reassure allies in asia and europe. next, i'll give you a quick overview of critical challenges in the asia pacific region. in the past several years, tokyo and washington have worked together with tremendous efforts to manage ever-changing strategic dynamics of the region. as nkatani mentioned, we had the comprehensive national security -- to provide outlines of the operational cope of the alliance and legal platform to further enhance the
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ore integrated bilateral operations. as such, the u.s.-japan alliance has been in good shape and i have a lot of positive views on the current status. however, the alliance needs to have a constant update without which it can easily dilute from emerging geostrategic shocks that we will face in coming years. of t and foremost, the rise china. the chinese defense budget exceeded japan's in 2004, now spends 4.6 times bigger and most likely -- most likely it will become six times in 2020. more than 10 times bigger in 2030. so we should bear in mind these
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statistics. we have to squarely face with the new logic of the alliance management where japan's relative power will likely become constantly interior to china and its gap is increasingly widening. next, north korea. its nuclear and missile problem remains to be mostly immediate and actual threat to our national security. what the trump administration is doing. that is the so-called two-phase strategy of which on the first phase placement of additional economic sanctions on north korea where we urge china's serious implementations. then, on the second phase, to include all necessary means to -- pyongyang. i think this is the right approach to go beyond strategic
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patience. nevertheless, tokyo and washington needs to consult further on the strategy. all concerned parties, including china and russia, are committed to the denuclearization as a common strategic goal. this is a great asset that five parties need to retain. however, tokyo may disagree if temporary action is produced by north korea's freeze an nuclear tests and icbm deployment. we will -- alleged secret deals struck by washington and beijing. when we talk about the red line, from tokyo and seoul's perspective, it has already been crossed since a long time ago.
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what we need here is an alliance strategy of long-term containment with north korea. maintaining constant strategic superiority in every domain. north korea's prime objective is to be recognized as a nuclear armed state with -- capability against u.s. intervention. therefore, they repeatedly contended that a six-party talk is dead and thus pyongyang would not abide by the joint tatement in september, 2005. washington, tokyo and seoul need to decisively deny north korea's objectives by maintaining dominance against north korea. to forcefully make them
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recognize that their pursuant of deterrence against us will never be achieved. this is probably the only way that north korea would seek serious negotiation with a security guarantee. lastly, let me also adjust agendas to strengthen the u.s.-japan alliance. first, the alliance needs to further materialize. seamless bilateral responses. especially joint response to gray zone challenges. as a low end of conflict as well as ensuring operational capability under the so-called a 280 environment. this should be highlighted. in the gray join, of course, japan has the primary responsibility to deal with.
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we will enhance our capabilities and operations, mobile deployment of light armor and amphibious operation capabilities. based on the seamless and phased joint operations among japanese coast guard, maritime, ground and air forces and u.s. forces in japan. we also need to further enhance u.s.-japan defense cooperation for high-end operations under the a-280 environment. to that end, i believe it is necessary to come up with u.s.-japan joint concept on roject power despite anti--- challenges.
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u.s. guidance -- moreover, japan needs to dramatically increase the resiliency of critical defense platforms and ethics. we should not let china neutralize the u.s. forces in theater operation. measures, including fighter based air defense, ballistic and cruise missile defense, hardening of facilities, ncluding underground, tactical dispersion among multiple in-theater bases must be highlighted. second, the u.s. allies and partners in asia need to enhance the security cooperation among themselves. i have long been a proponent of a host region support concept in addition to the current set of the host nation support of each ally.
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to strategically ensure u.s. force presence in this region as well as to facilitate regionalwide operational support, close cooperation among key allies, including korea and elsewhere and southeast asian partners based on the host region support network across the region under japan's leadership is vitally important to develop. japan and the united states together with the regional partners would also need to ramp up the capability building of states in southeast asia, amely, the philippines and vietnam. this is constantly challenging in the south china sea. a rapid disruptment to enhance
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the maritime awareness capability and to facilitate common operating picture to counter behavior of the chinese naval power remain to be a high priority. i will stop here and look forward to your comments and questions. thank you very much. [applause] michael: thank you to each of ou for concise and precise observations on the challenges and responsibilities on us as allies going forward. i am going to ask a few questions of our distinguished statesmen on the stage and open it up for your questions in a moment. first off, aki, i appreciated hat you said about the two
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staged approach to north korea -- pressure and then diplomacy -- because like you, i am skeptical that we're going to get very much out of diplomacy. i actually wrote the first memo creating the six-party talks when i was on the n.s.c. staff and there was some hope but i think experience has taught us all that we cannot expect even a renewed effort and pressure will change kim jong un's calculation that he has to keep nuclear weapons. and if it undermines deterrence and credibility of our extended deterrent, in particular. so your comments, aki, and onodera and by
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nakatani. aki, you said we have to be prepared for a collect sk effort to contain the north korean nuclear program. and then you mentioned your study on host regional support. the idea that the region should responsibility but also decisionmaking about yuss forward presence. there's been talk of bringing back the so-called quad. u.s.-japan-australia-india, quadry lateral cooperation forum that prime minister abe proposed. and in all of this, especially the republic of korea, south korea has a critical role. d i believe i'm correct when the former foreign minister they came close to agreeing to a statement that would have been collective security.
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an attack on any of us is an attack on all of us. that never actually became public but we have all these different recent examples with the quad, with movement towards some u.s.-japan r.o.k. collective security statement with fed rated defense, which we study here. all the pieces are here but we haven't done any of it. so the first question is, are we at a stage now, especially with north korea, where the u.s. and japan and others need to think about some kind of deeper collective security arrangement? probably not nato. but something different from what we've done in the past. so aki, since you raised this question, why don't we start with you. and give us your thoughts on whether we need to move from the bilateral alliance we have to something closer to collective security rrangements in asia.
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r. nagashima: in asia, we need to deepen the security arrangement in order to do so, particularly given the situation in the north korean peninsula, strategic tie between japan and south korea need to be tightened and trengthened. whether or not this could be achieved politically and i think that's a very important point. , we've been continuing with the united states for a long time and we anticipated that we are going to have a diverse -- with south korea but it didn't
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happen and now we have two plus two with australia and even with russia but it hasn't happened with south korea. and currently we are experiencing a very tense situation vis-a-vis north korea . we always enjoy a good relationship between japan and the united states and the united states and south korea but i think this is a good opportunity for japan with the further cooperation with north korea -- south korea and we hould add australia and india. , 10 years, $7.5 billion investing that money is strengthening the presence of
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the united states in the asia pacific. that was proposed in the united states and i am looking to see how this will develop. and in japan -- if the trump administration asks japan to further build up our capability or increase the budget for the a different dget could be raised up to 1.2% of g.d.p. and then that additional -- the budget can be used to increase the capability and increase the infrastructure capability. o support the u.s. presence. by doing so i believe that
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japan should take leadership in structuring the network in asia. the first, i would like to talk about the relationship with south korea. when the missile was launched y north korea and that was considered as the exercise to attack u.s. bases in japan so they shot the four missiles so they wanted to demonstrate that they could simultaneously attack several different bases in japan. the united states has the responsibility to defend south korea as well as japan and i really would like the south korean politicians and the public to understand that in
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order for the security for south korea. japan also has responsibility in that respect. i would like to talk about my personal view about the north korean situation. what worries me most is how the twrump trump administration would face north korea. china definitely had some influence over north korea. however, if you look at recent relationship between china and north korea, that would give me some doubts. for example, secretary llerson has a meeting with president xi, north korea has n icbm test. when vice president pence was
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touring asia, north korea conducted a ballistic missile test. it seems to me that north korea is not that concerned about china, and kim jong un has been in power the last five years, but he hasn't been abroad at all and he hasn't gone to china currently -- in the past, the president of china -- the korea president and then they had a new president of the united states. however, the president had a meeting with the president before he had the meeting with kim jong un. o i do not believe it's easy
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to make -- to have a nuclear development stop. even if china had more pressure. once china stopped providing oil to north korea, however, that triggered a six-party talk. however, even though north korea did not receive oil from china, it's possible it could get oil from russia. about the me worry impact of the sanction to be imposed by china. o the question here is how the trump administration would deal with this. >> the missile to syria and in afghanistan, another bomb was
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used. d the korea was -- was deployed in japan. ven with that if they continue nuclear missile development, what would be the next step for the trump administration, if they try to be patient like the previous administration or if north korea does not respond, further steps will be taken by the trump administration, so their approach -- japan needs to pay a lot of attention to the next step of the trump administration. japan's alliance from bilateral to multilateral, that is for is h korea, the -- this very important. east asia defense minister's
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meeting is held regularly. this is important for south korea and also including the japan-u.s. and australia, the tritt lateral meetings take place and -- trilateral meetings take place. and the meeting is held between japan and south korea. there are many issues. however, with this trilateral japan-south korea, things became more smooth in many ways. between japan and south korea, very difficult to implement, but with the involvement of the united states it could be conincluded. and therefore when the missile is launched momentarily, the three countries, japan, u.s. and south korea can share information immediately. think that's an important
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milestone. we cannot -- efense talks between japan and korea, the defense leaders meeting was held and i think that has given a very good impact. a.c.m. -- between the united states we do have alliance, the mechanism. but within three countries, i think that's kind of similar mechanism and maybe military-to-military working and higher levels, i think we should increase and enhance relations between three countries, u.s., japan and south korea and the u.s. has a lot of important roles to play. other than the security area, we are able to provide support to the rest of the world and
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for the situation impacting japan or -- japan is able to provide support to the united states. australia the arrangement was already made. and therefore the survival is written and is impacted. from bilateral to multilateral, australia is involved and as you know, the indian ocean, when you consider the importance of sea lanes, and the exrecks with india is critical because of the sea lane. anti-piracy, the japanese ive -- are ct active. and the countries that support, that sponsor the terrorism, how to introduce the counterterrorism, and the ship inspections.
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where i think the multilateral approach is more effective, and therefore for the sea lanes, for maritime, the security, multilateral security, the mechanism should be enhanced and developed. mr. green: in the unclassified statements from the administration, it seems that there is a consensus that in donald trump's first term, north korea will develop some kind of icbm capability. a missile and warhead that could potentially hit the united states. whether it's demonstrated, whether it works, will remain questions. but there will be some kind of new threat in the coming years. this has raised concerns about what is called decoupling. the idea that the u.s. would not maintain its nuclear umbrella over japan or korea.
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because it is now directly threatened. this is not new. in the cold war france asked, would you trade new york for paris, when the soviets developed that capability and change, in many ways it was strengthening -- strengthened. it's understandable these concerns would come up now, that we face avation where the u.s. homeland could -- face a situation where the u.s. homeland could be hit by a missile. in your comments i heard a little flavor, maybe, of concerns about decoupling. you said, it would not be good if the u.s. and china arranged some freeze with north korea, that maybe temporarily halted the icbm's but kept the missiles that target japan and korea up. not only in place, but developing. so that would be an example of some decoupling concern. and you talked about the counterstrike capability,
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presumably some kind of surface to surface missile. emphasizing it should be within the u.s.-japan alliance. i think many people in the u.s. would say, from a requirement standpoint, the u.s. doesn't need new capability. could you give our audience a sense of how serious the public, in japan, government, about decoupling. this study of a counterstrike capability just a kind of study or is this a real development or real requirement, japan will probably push? and should we be worried about this in washington and paying attention, to make sure that ur extended deterrent, our
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nuclear umbrella, is as redible as possible? >> the alliance with north korea, the anti-strike capability, i think we have trust in that. ballistic missiles is to balance themselves against japan and missile defense, that is intercepted. mr. onodera: second and third launch will continue. and in order to stop it from happening, we need to have a response. so in other words, the readiness is needed. ready response is needed. counter something needed. our response -- countering is needed. our response capability, the main thing is in hawaii and guam. the bombing from the bases in hawaii and guam would be the major one. but it may take time. we need readiness.
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in order to keep the second and third launch from coming, the corporation of the united states, we -- with the cooperation of the united states, we do need to enchance our capability and we need to enhance our safety. so japan has a role to play. among all the countries in the world, when the countries that talk, we have self-defense. , by preventing ourselves from preventing the other side from launching the attack again, i think japan is a country which does not have that capability. of course that doesn't mean we engage in war. but when the second attack is carried out by the enemy, we do have the capability of self-defense. to keep our enemy from doing so. i think that is constitutional and our interpretation of the constitution. and what we have to do at the government, and we made a
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proposal to the prime minister about this and the prime minister accepted that proposal. the collaboration between japan and the united states, i think we do need to enhance opportunities. mr. nakatani: we wonder what would happen. however, after the president trump became president, the first summit that he had that was with prime minister abe, playing golf, they established a very friendly relationship of trust, based on trust. secretary mattis and the secretary tillerson, also came to japan.
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soon after they were appointed to positions. nd i understand that the general has a lot of knowledge of japan. o strategically, the importance is -- i think this is the time where we really have to discuss the strategic importance between japan and the united states. need soldiers to assist this alliance and we really should play a role in a responsible manner and those need to be worked out. the counterattack against enemies' base. it really has to do with apan's security.
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not that we can completely secure our safety by relying upon the united states around currently the information gets , ound very quickly and u.a.v. could be youth niesed and also -- euthanized and also information could be shared between allies and, based on that, they can -- device the devise the y -- responsibility. the arm and shield, which will be responsible for providing shield and which one is responsible to provide arm, i think those need to be -- we should discuss more about doctoring. and other weapons, the biological, chemical weapons, we really need to prevent proliferation of such dangerous weapons.
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ctbt, that is the system to manage such situation. to impose sanction if it's violated. so by providing deterrence, we preserve this. flexible deterrence strategy it, kitty hawk was mobilized and we really need to give very strong support to that. as far as decoupling discussion has been going on for a long time. among experts. particularly vis-a-vis europe. japan is now facing a sad
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situation. the current situation in the , ean peninsula, the media the communications become very intense and i think japanese public become very worried and concerned. so the discussion has become so heated, really needs to maintain calmness. we rely -- japan on a nuclear deterrence and in spite of such tense situation, there's not much japan can do. mr. nagashima: we either ask japan, the united states do and then united states and china discuss the things, to work things out, and there's not much role to be played by japan. so it's a kind of awkward situation. so i think that this kind of discussion needs to be done on
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a political level. of course the counterattack capability, i think the possessing this capability is necessary. however, i think that the defense corporation between japan and the united states has to be conducted in very different, various different levels. for example, by sharing nformation, we can determine where to launch the counterinsector missiles. so by having lots of delares of cooperation would further strengthen japan and the united states. mr. green: thank you. are our microphone troops ready? let's take questions from the audience. you can direct it to a member up here or -- yeah, right up
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ront here. questioner: thank you. retired fema. currently teaching disaster prepared innocence japan. thank you for an excellent presentation. my question is regarding the terrible event, if there were an attack on japan, there would be a large number of civilian casualties. who would require humanitarian assistance. the japan self-defense portion, the u.s. military works together wonderfully six years ago after the tsunami and earthquake in eastern japan. so my question is, given the dangers of an enemy attack, are the self-defense force and u.s. military planning and working together on how to provide large scale humanitarian help in the future if needed? and is this planning going to include working with the civilian authorities for disaster relief in japan? thank you.
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, we passed ears ago the contingency law and in it there is a law regarding protection of the citizens. mr. nakatani: at the time of contingency, how to protect lives of the citizens. even on a municipal level, the plans being prepared, when the missile that was launched actually evacuation exercise as conducted in an archetype infrastructure. of course u.s. forces in japan -- structure. of course u.s. forces in japan ill act together with us and we need to consider the possibility of receiving
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at ort from u.s. forces and the time of the operations are very effective support was provided by the u.s. forces. so we would like to continue conducting exercise based on plans. the time of the earthquake, i was one of the people affected by this earthquake. i actually saw with my own eyes how much the support was provided of u.s. forces. i think at the time of such disaster, we -- i think that u.s. support is very critical. and if an attack was made and we need support. mr. onodera: but what's important is prevent such an attack. and for that we really need
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diplomacy and missile defense. we have the system called jay alert. if -- j-alert. if north korea, actually comes to japan immediately japanese government, the center government, would send alert to the municipal governments. nd each municipal government is going to issue alert. and also we receive such alert by mobile phones. however, it will only take a few minutes for the missile to launch. so really it needs to figure out where to evacuate people and then providing shelters. think the relief of the affected people is very, very important.
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mr. nagashima: using guidelines 20 years ago between japan and the united states, this has been discussed. after that, about the assumption of this kind of emergency, the program has been updated constantly. the united ween states, because they're allied forces, how to evacuate known combatants, i think there has been a lot of the programs updated. but between japan and south korea, as far as i know, between japan and south korea, the japanese are noncombatant -- are noncombatant in seoul. how jointly evacuate them and sent them to overseas. i think there is not much scussion and plan formulated
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between the two governments yet. therefore at this moment, unless we do that seriously, unforeseen situation could happen at any time. and therefore the information sharing is something we really have to improve. evacuees. of the i think that is a very important starting point for us to conduct the discussion between japan and south korea. in that process, the united states has a lot of important roles to play. when the japanese evacuated from the korean peninsula, when the u.s. forces or the u.s. carry south see evacuation, the nationals may join. mr. nakatani: i think between japan and the u.s., also the adjustment in the coordination is needed. questioner: thank you very much . in recent years traveling to
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japan, one often hears that japan's concerns for security primarily centered on china, whereas many japanese perceiveded united states was more worried about north korea. based on your combhent today, it sounds like you have now changed your perspective on the ranking or ordering of the threat. first, could you comment, is that accurate? is that driven by the recent missile tests that were explicitly by north korea described as targeting japanese basing? second, given that the administration is prioritizing working with china to address this threat, in years past, japanese have been very worried that japan might be bypassed by the united states in favor of working with china in order to address regional and global problems. do you sense any fear that this is something that you are seeing happening again and do you have any advice for the abe administration on making sure japan is not bypassed? thank you.
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>> the concern is the revision of china, that is for the military expansion of china. mr. nakatani: china has been expanding. together with that, the existing -- the interest, like territorial water, the expansion by china, and for japan, the east china sea, the ame thing is such an importance. the territory. how to protect the island is an issue. from the japanese defense posture, we do have to protect the island. in south china sea, the reclamation of the coral reef, hat can be be tolerated. that is the place where japan uses as a sea lane. such military facilities built the that may strengthen
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japanese safety and therefore japan should collaborate with the rest of the world so that japan should convince china to follow the rules set by the international community. the difference between north korea and china is that china is able to consult diplomatically. that's what we believe in. mr. onodera: but north korea diplomacy cannot work. therefore the crisis facing us is, i think, north korea should the cop on the top of the ranking. rrently, china using the lateral approach, trying to change the status quo in the south china sea, japan and russia used to have a very good relationship. when i was the defense minister, japan was first carried out, very good relations.
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at that point the russia carried out the unilateral, the change of the status in ukraine. ukraine is a distant place from japan, but we should not tolerate the coercive, the change of status. and therefore together with the united states, japan carried out the economic sanction vis-a-vis russia. and japan, russia, the country, the relations have been somewhat strained. the coercive change of status, by force, i think that is a universal principle. anything which is contrary to this inconsistent with that, that is against basic principle of the united states. and therefore japan and the united states should be firm against china. to convince the coercive change f status by force is not
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tolerable and china can respond to that diplomatically, i believe. the north korean threat is an immediate threat. short-term threat. chinese threat is -- i don't know whether we can call it threat. mr. nagashima: that is the long to medium-term threat. so we should straight the two kinds of threats. in any case, we have a great concern about chinese activities and there is the emergence of trump administration. maybe i think that is our perception only, the trump administration security and the trade issue, the trump administration may use this as trade or the deal. decided not too use the -- not to use the currency money thing. but while that is done, in a security -- the picture, china
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takes a different approach. unless that is -- [inaudible] -- over the last two years with the obama administration, the artificial -- the island reclamation was under way. so rapidly. so we requested it. and after the burst of the trumped a -- birth of the trump administration, i may be wrong, if i'm wrong, please correct me, freedom of navigation operation has not been carried out even once after the start of the trump administration. while you look at the situations of china, and the island in the south china sea, he fighters seem to exist. in training or formally deployed, they say that aircraft will not be useful military -- used for military . rposes
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but even the military aircrafts exist there. that is a fact. therefore as time passes, the strategic balance seems to igh more heavily, more advantageously to china. therefore this is not a smart deal. caken y should be always care for the best security interest disease taken care for the best security interest -- taken care for the best security interests. mr. green: we have the best and brightest of japan's national security thinkers. the reality is we could probably get many, many more members to fill the rows who would agree with what you're saying. i think there is a pretty strong consensus among political elites about japan's strategy going forward. people can tell me i'm wrong later. but i would even argue that among american allies, treaty
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allies, there's probably more consensus on strategy in japan than there is anywhere. particularly europe. i think even maybe australia. that's all quite impressive. at the same time, national security legislation was a hard, hard legislative fight. and almost half of japanese opposed it. some people pointed out, there are opinion polls that showed if japan is attacked, only 11% japanese would join the defense forces to fight. if you do the math, that's a 10 million-man army. 20 times the current self-defense force. so that's pretty impressive. unless the people who entered are all 75 or 80 years old. so we don't know. but you do in a way. you're at the intersection of strategy and politics.
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what is your sense of the japanese broad public opinion on these security challenges, on the self-defense form, on the defense policy reform on collective self-defense, on, for example, counterattack against enemy bases? are you all way ahead of the public? or do you think you're just in front of the public? here's public opinion? mr. onodera: i think it's very important for us politicians to work, looking ahead and when we and -- when the japan
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u.s. security, the treaty discussed, there's a huge opposition and there's some deaths in the protests. however, now i think hardly any f the japanese would think that there shouldn't be -- that there's no need for security treaties. so if time goes on, where we'll be able to understand the importance of security legislation. when we discussed about securitization two years ago, we said that in order to counter missile attacks from north korea, not only ships owned by japan, but also ships owned by united states are necessary.
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if there's a huge crisis in korea, in either peninsula, we need to deal with a lot of -- [inaudible] -- and whether japan alone could deal with it. so those are examples which are presented to the public. rrently we have this tension with the north korean peninsula. however, there's legislation already in place so that we can deal with it. so we really need to take leadership in lookinging ahead. and put in place the necessary legislation to two years ago -- legislation. two years ago the democratic rty of japan opposed , that did not
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agree. the reason why i left the democratic party of japan is because of that. hat i felt through the debate, of course the security shouldn't be too much. mr. nagashima: but security arrangements should not be too little. however, we have some trauma by the doing too much in that area. however, these days i think people really recognize that too little security is not enough. we really have to put necessary legislation that was the discussion with the public. however, at that time, two years ago, the opposition parties plit sized -- politicized this issue too much. one thing i would like to add
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is 2003, i think it was made reference to a contingency from 2003. at that time the democratic and l.d.p. an played very important roles. we are to build consensus and pass legislation. however -- [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017] >> all of this available at search u.s.-japan relations. theu house gaveling in for legislative work on this monday afternoon. five bills on the agenda. several dealing with s.e.c. regulations. the house will resume proceedings on the postponed questions at a later time.


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