tv Discussion Focuses on the Future of North Korea CSPAN May 31, 2017 2:33am-4:09am EDT
girl. if you're going to be good at your word, you are going to live up to your ideals and education, it is going to cost you. my question is what is the big idea? what is your big idea? what are you willing to spend your moral capital and pursuing outside of the walls of the university of pennsylvania? ♪ >> c-span where history unfolds daily. in 1970 nine, c-span was created as a public service by america's public television company and is brought you today by your cable or satellite provider. >> next, a discussion on north korea's future political, economic and military prospects following a series of global ships occluding president trump
winning the presidency and the 20 17th elections in south korea -- the 20 17th elections in south korea. >> thanks very much for coming to this event for a discussion of north korea. you will notice that clever play words. normally we have a 30% chance -- drop a great for those who signal attendance. i think today we had a 30% increase in attendance.
i think that is a true to our speakers and the issue at hand, which is one of the top security issues facing not just the united states, but the world. this event is part of a dialogue series where we seek to address and shed light on the issues that come up. the dialogue is a gathering of defense ministers around the region and in other countries. there is one asian defense minister who will not be there. that is the north korean. i tried many times to get the north koreans to come and it has been a failure every time i have my annual review as an area to improve on. let's get serious about north korea. we have four renowned experts to address aspects of the north korean issue, starting with
victor cha at csis. he's also a director of asian studies at georgetown university . from 2004-2007 he served as director for asian affairs at the white house. he is a longtime member and contributor. she was the deputy national intelligence officer for east asia at the national intelligence council. before that, she served as director for korea, japan, and oceanic affairs at the security council.
earlier, she worked at the cia. i met her at a conference in philadelphia where i was impressed with her presentation. thanks for coming. he is a professor at the catholic university of america. he served in several advisory positions in the korean government including communication, preparation, and the ministry of unification. we met eight years ago and our paths have crossed several times since then. finally, michael elamin based here in washington. before i hired him in 2009, he spent five years supporting the implementation -- previously he spent 18 months at the united nations for weapons inspections. the event will run for an hour
and a half following remarks by each of the panelists. we will have a discussion portion and then turn it over to questions for you. this event is on the record and being broadcast by c-span one and c-span radio. eventually a video will be posted. because of the c-span broadcast, we have actualize here which asked to the heat in the room and unfortunately, today, the air-conditioning chose to go out for the entire building in the room is packed with people so i'm going to encourage everyone to feel free to take off one layer of clothing. [laughter] >> i encourage the panelists to do that as well. if you see us sweating, it is not because we are worried about north korea.
victor, let's start off with some thoughts from you. victor: it is a pleasure to be here. mark neglected to mention how we first met. you probably don't remember. mark: i remember. victor: i was doing my phd dissertation in looking for people to interview for my thesis in when you are roaming the streets of tokyo, you are grateful and remember the ones who said yes. mark was one of the two people who had said yes at the time and the other was bill mckinney. i'm always grateful for that.
in terms of north korea, a great title, "boom or bust." if any of you have been paying attention to the news, you will notice an uptick in coverage of north korea largely because of missile testing activity. some of you may look at this and say we have seen them do this before. this is just cyclical coverage of every time they decide to test, but there is a qualitative difference today in terms of what has happened in the past. if we start from some of the basic metrics. between 1994-2007, so for about 17 years, north korea did 17
ballistic missile tests. since january 2008 until today, i think they have done 73 or 74 tests and fourle nuclear tests. so there has been a change in the amount they have been doing. in the past, there was a theory in washington, d.c. and calls -- and in academic halls around universities that the purpose of north korea's testing was that it was essentially a desire to have negotiations with the outside world and in particular, the united states. north korea, the poor and isolated country.
it has the largest country on its border, russia on its border . united states military is in the south and directly across the border is a very successful korea. for all these reasons, the north korean regime did these tests as a way to try to draw the outside world into negotiations to get some credibility and legitimacy because it was the only currency they had. they had no other currency to trade with the outside world. i think it is safe to say that there are not many in the policy community that still believe that is the purpose of this testing. the pace of testing clearly suggests that this is a military testing program.
it is not simply a cry for help or provocation disguise as an all french. -- as in all of branch -- as an olive branch. this is military testing. what is the purpose of this program? clearly one purpose is survival. dictatorships in particular are quite often very much focused on this. i would put you that a regime that over the past 25 years has devoted a disproportionate amount of its resources to a wmd program is not doing this just for survival. north korea is demonstrating and actively trying to test the
capability of reaching the united states. we can talk about some of the obstacles that still remain. that is clearly the objective of this testing. the purpose of being able to reach the united states and to be able to threaten all of japan and south korea, the military objective is in my view they want to undercut the credibility of u.s. deterrence guarantees to south korea. in their own minds, they believe that if they can threaten the united states -- los angeles or san francisco with a nuclear attack, it will create hesitation on the part of the united states if they were
called on defending south korea. if they can threaten all u.s. installations and cities in japan, including tokyo, they will create some hesitation on japan to allow the united states to have forces. you have to remember that north korea -- the world for north korea is very small. it is about survival, but north koreans don't really care about climate change. they don't care about global governance. they don't care about responsible overseas development and policies in africa. they don't care about conflicted states. they only care about survival and dominance of the korean peninsula. while this idea may seem
far-fetched to some of you, if you look at it from a north korean mindset, this is all that matters. once they can create some sense of hesitation or doubt in south korean minds that the united states or japan would be there in the case of a conflict, then they will feel like they have effectives strategic bailouts. 25 years ago the north korean regime realize they were never going to be able to match south korea dollar for dollar, company for company, tank for tank, soldier for soldier, so they chose an asymmetric strategy focused on nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and cyber as a way to try to asymmetrically tried to match the other side of the fence and that is essentially the strategy they have been following.
in terms -- i don't know mark, how long do you want me to speak for? >> it should not be any more than 10. victor: let me make some comments about new government and south korea. new government was elected in south korea a couple of weeks ago. there was a lot of noise in the press about how this is the first progressive government and south korea in a decade -- in south korea in a decade. that they are going to take a very different view of policy towards north korea and create a rift in the alliance between united states and south korea. i think what we have seen thus far has shown the opposite, which is president moon has taken a pretty measured position
when it comes to engagement with north korea, reinvigorating the sunshine policy. of course the north koreans have helped in creating this measured response because they have already done two missile tests since the new south korean president was elected. i think from a u.s. perspective, i think united states doesn't have a problem with engagement with north korea, but it has to be done at the right time. it has to be coordinated and done at the right time which is what the south koreans want as well. they don't want to throw money down a black hole. it is not going to be effective
if it is not coordinated with the united states and other members who were involved in trying to do nuclear iran is north korea -- de-nuclearize north korea. thus far, i think if you look at the presidents statements they reflect the ground rather than ideology the -- an ideology. why don't you stop there? mark: thanks for letting out the situation which dr. juan is going to comment on. sue, you been looking at the north korean case for quite a number of years. tell us your insights. sue: when i used to work at the cia and i will tell you what is
the hard part is leadership, dynamics -- what the leaders are going to do. this is something that is hard to get a clarity on. as victor said, even though we have a handle on leadership, we have a handle on this tactics policy. we had names for which was basically north korea would do something provocative and there is international condemnation and they would up the ante. then, they would -- some sort of
concessions made by washington to north korea. this is not exactly the pattern under kim jong-un's leadership. he seems really invested in a nuclear program. he is bent on completing it. he sticks his entire legitimacy on perfecting this nuclear arsenal. he sees achieving this capability to be able to hit the united states as the final guarantee, so i don't think there's any -- what really concerns me is whether you are for maximum pressure or engagement and i happen to be for pressure and i
happen to be in terms of maximum amount of sanctions and other measures to try to get to the regime to change, but what concerns me is -- none of these measures were likely achieved. then we want to achieve which is to get north korea to give up nuclear weapons to give up its nuclear arsenal. whatever we do, sooner or later, i think sooner rather than later north korea will achieve that capability. and then i have many concerns once north korea achieves that capability.
the two main concerns i have , first, miscalculations. you can hold u.s. cities as hostages and then they could be more provocative acts and then lead to unintended escalation and obviously a problem so that is one concern i have. the second concern and i know a lot of folks share this concern is that nuclear deterrence has worked thus far.
again, i'm not as confident on this leadership that it will work with kim jong-un. i have less confidence. people like jeffrey lewis wrote a policy piece about how north korea might even be developing an offensive nuclear doctrine. if there is an argument that people are making that there's a possibility that kim jong-un could do that. could use nuclear weapons in the efforts to recoil u.s. efforts in south korea -- could use nuclear weapons to recoil u.s. efforts in south korea. that is a very scary scenario.
the trump administration recently said there is a four point strategy. recognizing north korea as a nuclear state -- the sounds are good, and i do think we have to be somewhat realistic. we have to be prepared for this scenario that none of these measures are going to work and what is our long-term policy? i don't know if we have that. we see regime change is off the table, but if this is credible than it is not going to change. this is something we have to
think about. just two points since i'm out of time. the sanctions. it is not only to pressure north korea. i think it helps to undermining the current -- you are hoping to create instability or change. sanctions is taking money away. i think if this information that we talk about. it is very important but i want to make the point that it should not only be targeted towards the public. i think we should try to target the elites because we're trying to get to messages across.
this is not going to guarantee your survival and livelihood. if you are able to get out and there was some sort of amnesty because it is the only supports that has kept the regime going. why don't i wrap up. mark: you ended in a great place. it reminds me of what my friend a are no -- first one is a view from south korea, not representing south korea, of course. >> thank you for having me here.
i think -- i was wondering about the title of this seminar, "boom or bust." he actually asked me to talk about the south korean perspective, but unfortunately i'm not the government. i know a lot of people inside the korean government. i have many friends inside. i think i understand about the view of the south korean government to north korean policy. basically, i believe that that policy is different from those of previous cabinets. to emphasize the importance of the inter-korean relations and
i would say the three variables is domestic politics, action and reaction, and the third one is alliance politics. of course, the alliance between the u.s. and south korea. the first, regarding the domestic politics. it is natural to expect or view north korean policy -- which is known as the sunshine policy so many people predict it to be the moonshine policy. [chanting]
him, he is a director nominee, and deeply involved in relations so all of them believe sanctions are not enough to change north korea's course of action and they work to pursue a new north korea policy that changes the real nature of the north korean regime and society may be in the longer term perspective. however, it is somewhat difficult to pursue. it is fundamentally different even during the munging government. south korea's north korea's policy is influence by north
korea's behavior as well as south korea's symmetric politics. north korea has conducted five nuclear test for the last 10 years and maybe hundreds of missile test so it is not difficult to -- south korea's constant policy then so in defense, north korea's behavior is less likely to stop those actions. south korean people feel very threatened by with korea's military provocations so most korean people support the international sanction on north korea and believe that china has not been cooperating in implementing the sanctions.
if north korea continues provocative behavior, south korea's public opinion is less likely to support the views engagement. the munging government understands the importance of the korea-u.s. alliance in dealing with the north korea. the president also spoke about the alliance and talks about the need to strengthen so i think the munging government will keep cooperating with the essays, but south korean people are concerned about the uncertainty
and unpredictability in the north korean and north korean policy. -- the former bush policy come up trumps policy even to me is very uncertain and unpredictable which makes south korean people concerned about the possibility of child. when president trump says that north korea has shown great disrespect for its neighbor, china. china is trying hard, people do
not understand what he means. he also talked about -- the south korean people do not understand and so this is why the south korean people are concerned about the possibility issues and maybe the korean peninsula. i believe the u.s. and north korea resolving the nuclear issue, but it is still necessary resolve the uncertainty and coordinate very closely between
the two countries to let me stop here. mark: mike, i put you last the current -- because you would enlighten us even more. michael: as my co-panelists discussed earlier, missiles play a paramount role in north korea's statecraft and its means to ensure its survival. it is probably the preferred means for delivering a nuclear weapon. missiles also have a conventional capability and in principle, they could be armed with chemical or biological weapons. though, i would argue artillery is a much more effective means for delivering the two,
never heard of 75-78. it depends on how you count them. some of the news reports are little ambiguous, but nonetheless there are reasons north korea would want to test its missiles. primarily, at least under the kim jong-un regime, we see them trying to develop new systems. you can develop a missile without testing extensively. it typically takes 2-5 years to develop a new system. that includes the flight trial development phase. you could shorten that period, but there are inherent risk to doing so. flight tests provide north korean means to train its launch cruise for maintaining operational readiness. you can use them to survey your stockpile, to make sure as they age, they still perform to specifications. this is actually an important role of flight testing in the u.s. and russian programs, or soviet programs in the past. missile tests can be performed to deter rivals. to achieve some diplomatic
messaging, coercion, leverageion, creating for negotiations. we have seen them do this in the past. when we look back at the past regimes, we see missile testing was done primarily for political objectives as opposed to some technical imperatives such as developing new systems. it is interesting if we examine the history and i think previous speakers have talked about this. under kim jong-il, it was one missile per year in those came in bunches. with the exception of -- they either came in 2006 or 2009.
i think they launched seven missiles within the best within a few hours. when kim jong on came to power, things changed dramatically. they are now averaging about 13-15 test per year in this is indicative of a missile development program. north korea is pursuing the development of more than one system. they seem to introduce something new each day. i want to talk about their capabilities, where they are, and then project some timelines and maybe at the end offer some policy prescriptions, but some ideas of what we could and the limitations we have in trying to
halt missile development. the scud and no dong missiles were established during the kim jong-il regime. i think they conducted a handful of tests read it was indicative of having received the technology from a foreign source. in this case it was very likely russia. more recently what we have seen north korea do is leverage that existing scud technology. your call last year, they tested the scud er for extended range. they change the materials of construction to lighten it
increase the diameter from .88 meters to one meter in this allows it to travel about thousand kilometers. it is an old soviet design. it is unclear if they develop it themselves or if it was imported in the 1990's with all the other technologies they receive. but why the scud er? it essentially matches the performance of a no dong. it was aimed at messaging to south korea that we can overfly your missile defense battery. we have options to counter your missile defense capabilities and then more recently and then
build it during the military parade on april 15 and tested over the weekend, is it a -- it is a scud with a new reentry vehicle. one that to maneuver. this could serve two purposes. maneuvering in the atmosphere would help against missile defenses and achieve better accuracy. north korea has been ingenious and leveraging the scud technology. like most of element programs, if failed its first three or four launch attempts. it succeeded in the last two, but the object placed into orbit probably means it has not worked so they have a ways to go. the concerns is that it could be used as a stepping stone to creating an icbm and i will talk about that in a moment. over the course of the last two years, we have seen several
surprising developments and the one that surprised me the most was the emergence of this two-stage solid propellant missile. it is launched from a submarine which provides additional retaliatory capability, but all the missiles that the north koreans had relied on in the past have been liquid fueled. this is a solid fueled system. it appears these are developed indigenously. dismissal can cover 1200 kilometers, so the submarine can patrol relative distance from north korea -- or from the korean peninsula. i would also argue that just a few tests does not mean they have the capability. right now they have a single submarine. they will have to develop at
least three. there's an old saying in the navy if you have one ship, you have none. they will have to have a minimum three submarines, probably six to retain a reliable retaliatory capacity. they also have to do another -- a number of other things. where are they going to patrol the subs? how are they going to protect
them? i don't think they will patrol very far from the peninsula. if they do, they will have to develop that capacity. i don't see that emerging quickly. there is a land track version. and more interesting development from a long-range missile capability. it has failed six or seven times in its first eight launches. more recently, they tested two weeks ago. it is an intermediate range missile. the engine that has been used is a mystery, but it is the most troubling thing i have seen come out of north korea because this is a true steppingstone towards an icbm. the quickest way to get to an icbm would be to convert the launcher. this would be in a mobile system and vulnerable to prelaunch. it would take modifications and flight test. it could be ready for emergency use in 2018, 2019. they could rely on this hs 12 technology. they would have to prove out the
intermediate range missile first before they go a step up, but we have seen them take shortcuts in the past. they could achieve a road mobile system based on these technologies sometime 2020-2021. the more distant prospect is the use of solid propellant that we have seen, but i would be shocked if a missile would be operational little -- operational by 2025. it is more likely 2030. policy options are very limited. we treat all missile tests the same. i think that is wrong. when the test the scud, we
should probably ignore for all practical purposes. the test of the intermediate range system is a big deal, but a response has been the same for every other missile and i would like to the more thought going to individual tests. the development of the medium range is a lot more consequential even then the flight tests. mark: there is a lot on the table. there's a lot of policy options to discuss. we can discuss to the abilities, intentions, which i thought it was fascinating when he talked about how it was difficult to get a track on it and then you got it and then they changed intentions. we're going to go into a q&a session for about 35 minutes. we are called upon, said your name and affiliation and make it quick and witty if you can, but
solid is more important. here in the third row, i will call on two people at once. in the blue shirt and greg in the white shirt. speaking to the mic. >> what are the prospects for the new regime in south korea to take such measures as reopening the kaesong industrial complex or any other reaching out question mark mark: hold tha --
? >> could you elaborate on the scenario you fear? i'm having trouble imagining kim jong-un using any military force against south korea which would involve thousands of americans in south korea and result in his demise? mark: let's go to professor wong to address that. professor wong: right now, it is very difficult to reopen the
industrial park because i think the government will focus on the starting the cultural -- and maybe political and military issues. i think the moon government will start maybe in the foreseeable future. they already talked about the humanitarian aid, but the kaesong complex is a difficult issue. rather than an industrial park,
-- the first is the social cultural exchange. the last is political and military. mark: various forms of interaction with north korea that are being talked about seem to be in direct contradiction to the u.s. policy of isolation politically, economically. kaesong industrial zone might be in violation of the security
council resolution sanctions. i'm wondering, is there any recognition in south korea that such initiatives are going to run against u.s. policy and maybe victor or soon -- professor wong: they think about the policies so concerns about whether it will. they complicate the sanctions on north korea. mark: victor and then soon. victor: i think the tip of the spear by any engagement policy of the south korean government will start with food and fertilizer. that usually happens at a certain time of year. we may be passed that point now. well, food you can kiss but fertilizer not so much. i think kaesong right now is off-limits because if they were to reopen it would be a
violation of standing sanctions, so that is really off the table now. there may be -- we collect a lot of data and for what it is worth, we predicted accurately that north korea would do kinetic provocations, bracketing elections. no one cares later that you got it right before, but i'm just telling you. our data suggest there are really driving forces coming up over the summer. usually what happens is north korea enters a piece period which starts from june 25, going to about august 15 which is liberation day in south korea.
it sort of stops around august 15 because they have to get ready to get angry at the annual u.s. exercises that start at the end of august. there could be a period during the summer for social and cultural things, but i think he gets -- i think it is harder when you start talking about big products like kaesong or diamond mountain -- diamond mountain project. the last time the progressives -- i think even those people who are the strongest advocates of engagement understand that 2007 is a different north korea than the north korea we are dealing with today. it was a different leadership and their behavior is very different.
there's a common misperception if we just talked to the north koreans maybe they will come down. what has become clear under the current leadership is that the north korean government has no interest in talking to anybody. if you look at their behavior since january 2008, there has been no interest in talking to the united states, japan, south korea, or russia. this particular period we are in now in terms of interactions between china is the lowest ever. we all know this has been a summit between -- we also found the reason for the low level interaction is not because the -- upsetre just off
with the north koreans, that is what we also found was the reason for the low-level interaction is not because the chinese are upset at the north koreans. i mean, they are, but that's not the reason. the reason is because the north koreans do not want to talk to the chinese. the chinese have been trying very hard to talk to the north koreans and it has been the north koreans who have been denying all contact. while there are many from the previous progressive government that are in the new government, the new reality is on the ground and they also understand it is a different north korea that it was in 2004. >> i want to repeat greg's question because apparently the mike was not working. >> we will take a brief break from this for live coverage of the u.s. house.
my recommendation next month for the summit, mr. trump is not trying to address any of the thorny issues. we're asking for verification. -- clarification. for mr. trump, that connection is important as we have seen be.h prime minister a when the premise to try to seek clarification, that did not go well. -- when the prime minister tried to seek levitation, that did not go well.
in terms of your question, i don't think it is a likely scenario that kim jong un is trying to attack the united states, it is just that there could be many times when you it could always escalate when you have this deterrent capability. -- and thanks we are about to attack. in the trump administration, a lot of heated rhetoric early on. there was hysteria. if there was any kind of miscalculation that we are about to do something, then that would trigger for him because he doesn't want saddam hussein's fate. the idea is they will strike
first if there's on the war at all. not that there is a likely scenario was to be a worried about. >> we have 10 different people here. we will take these two questions . speak loudly and i am going to repeat the question. >> my name is angela and i am from the university of southern california. you mentioned that the korea looks to undermine relations between south korea and the united states and japan in hopes of dominating the korean peninsula. china and the grand scheme of its goals and is there any goal that we can play? >> the question was how to view the china factor in this north korea
desire for dominance in the north korean peninsula. we are going to take two at once. >> my question is, as the -- as they build up their crews and ballistic missile capabilities, do they recognize it or to make that doctrine effective, they need to have isr capability and a lot of it, otherwise they will be reliant upon -- do they understand those kinds of intel requirements? >> bob peters asked a question with some acronyms which i did not get. did the south koreans understand that as they develop their kill chain missile-defense system, that they will need intelligence requirements that they do not now have.
mike, if you have any thoughts on that. let's first go to victor. >> the china dprk relationship is quite bad right now. after normalization of relations between china and south korea in 1992, no north korean leader went to china for a decade because they were so upset with it all. you saw a reemergence of a renaissance in relationship between 2008 and 2009 because the chinese signed a bunch of industry contracts with north korea. they were taking a lot of minerals out of north korea. this was not a relationship with a kind of like each other. they actually both hate each other. the north koreans feel like the chinese treat them like a poor
province, which they do, and the chinese feel like north korea, every time to do something bad, china's name gets dragged through the mud. they are stuck with each other. north korea leverages that greatly to their advantage. they know that china will never allow north korea to collapse. they are willing to push the envelope as far as they can. that creates problems for the united states because the united states has a policy that is aimed at treating china as part of the solution, which is that if 85% of north korea's external trade is with china, we can go after slave labor exports and all these other sorts of things, but if 85% of the traders with china, then china is part of the solution in terms of cutting that trade down and putting pressure on north korea. the problem is china is never
going to put a truly pressing amount of economic squeeze on north korea because for fear that they will collapse the regime. the chinese and masseter himself had a op-ed -- ambassador himself had a op-ed were he essentially said that. china is willing to put some pressure on, but is afraid it will collapse the regime. that is music to north korea's ears. that is the box we are caught in, right now. >> thank you, victor. >> i am not familiar with those acronyms and i am not an expert on the defense policy but as far as i understand, the defense policy is not clear, yet,
actually. there is more room for the u.s. and south korea to coordinate. mostly, the korean people are not really sure about the capabilities. south korea government is trying to develop its own capability. the government strongly stresses the importance of understanding security, rather than military, as opposed to the former --
the national security adviser is a former diplomat while the former national security adviser was former military. >> i will follow up on your question to mike because in terms of technical capabilities, you mentioned one person -- one purpose of the long-range scud was to send a signal that thaad won't be able to deal with such a high trajectory. does it become irrelevant? >> no. i should explain it more fully, but there are targets that lie south of the thaad battery that may be vulnerable if you can overfly the reach of the thaad interceptors. the maximum ceiling of engagement for the boundaries, i
thaadagement for the batteries i have heard 150 , kilometers, 250 kilometers. to attack pusan, it would be -- busan, it would be vulnerable. i agree with your premise that airborne isr is essential for kill chain. for those who are not aware, kill chain is the republic of korea's strategy for defeating the ballistic missile forces of north korea, prelaunch, free -- pre-assembly. it goes from birth until it land somewhere. -- lands somewhere. we have the experience from the gulf war in 1991, where relative
to today, our airborne reconnaissance and intelligence gathering capabilities were very poor and we were unable to interdict iraqi scud launchers, even though we have air superiority. in north korea, the job is a little easier because most of the launchers cannot stray too far from the roads. there is a limited number of paved and resurfaced roads in north korea. with extensive use of uavs, maybe a few manned aircraft, overhead satellites, you have a pretty decent chance of doing interdiction or disrupting operations on the ground for the north koreans, and that would be essential. the two elements that are required are the isr and communications is not a simple thing.
it is what distinguishes american missile programs from others. >> what does isr mean? >> intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. it is a catchall phrase for knowing what is happening on the ground. >> i'm going to take the last two in the back. the gentleman and then stanley. just speak loudly so i can hear. >> brian from ohio state university and my question is for dr. terry. completely agree with your analysis that kim jong-un is likely undeterminable in his goal to get new their capability, deliverable capability -- nuclear capability, deliverable capability. you believe our policy is to tighten the screws.
if he really is undeterminable, undeterminable, what do we achieve in sanctions? is it possibly regime change or is it that we do our best to erode north korean capability? what risks do we run if he really is undeterable, and sanctions won't do the job? do we end up looking like a paper tiger? the other risk is that we are with the destabilizing the situation or are we destabilizing the situation? >> i will repeat that after stanley posts his question. >> a very related question on regime change. i'm not sure if i heard you or interpreted you correctly. the u.s. policy may well fail as well as our allies policy and
deterrence may not work. we are in a horrible situation in terms of threat to our security, so don't we have to think about regime change? i don't want to put those words in your mouth. if you do think that, do you believe that any country, u.s., r.o.k. or even china has the capacity to affect regime change? do we have a candidate? do we have a hope for placement? -- for replacement? >> that was great. i don't know if you coordinated those. brian from ohio state university , you said kim jong-un is likely undeterable in his quest to get nuclear capability, but you said that the best policy is sanctions.
right, whattood you is the purpose of the sanctions? is it regime change and what are the risks in this? do we look like a paper tiger if it fails? stanley also asked a question about regime change. do we have the ability to pursue regime change? do we have somebody waiting in the closet, so to speak? >> given that we can't do nothing with all of these provocations -- proponents of sanctions would argue that strong sanctions have not been in place since february of last year. there are so many countries that we sanction more heavily than north korea. sanctions have not had a real chance to succeed.
particularly, enforcement of sanctions have not been working which is why we are trying to push china to enforce sanctions. proponents of sanctions would say let's give it a chance because it is the only option we've got in terms of pressuring the north korean regime. given the limited options, it is the only thing we could try. my point is, after we try and let's say we try to do sanctions and that of this works, what are we going to do? and if it does potentially destabilize the regime, is it the worst possible thing? it is not a popular thing to hear, but my personal view is
that the north korean state has to disappear. there are 25 million people and we are not even talking about human rights. the ultimate solution to the north korean problem is for north korean state to disappear and we have unification. as far as having an effect, that does not truly concerned me. concerne me. it creates a whole lot of other problems that we need to be prepared for, but it is a separate conversation. in terms of regime change, i am not optimistic we have a new candidate and we could just make this occur. kim jong-un's regime has done an excellent job of getting ready any opposition. even for the regime change to occur, the other measures we are talking about, whether sanctions or information campaign, all of
these other measures are contributing to that. we need to be clear whether we want that are not. it is something to think about, is what i am saying. we need to face the hard truth and have it as a goal or not. it is something we need to discuss. >> thank you, very much. i will go to the lady in the second row from the back and then three rows ahead of her. >> diane perlman at george mason university. there is a body of literature that is not very well known. i know you worked with robert jarvis and we talked about this before. he said that there are no other options and that we have to do pressure but there is evidence that coercive techniques can have the opposite effect and there is a study of 100 cases of sanctions and they worked 14
times and failed 86 times. it is likely to produce the opposite effect and sometimes people talk about when you behave according to deterrence or dynamics, you could trigger spiral theory and that we need to do more attention -- in tension reduction -- intention reduction. could you talk about some of the literature? >> and then three rows ahead? >> almost a flipside to what was said before, there was an article in the op-ed, and the outlook section of the washington post about three weeks ago by a person who was advertised to have been a chinese investment banker, but it could've been henry kissinger in disguise, suggesting that the
deal we need to make is no regime change and a freeze on the nuclear program. it gets you away from the qaddafi problem. is there any future in that because so far, from everything i've heard today, it has been an inadvertent advertisement for -- foric patients which strategic patience which some people say is not doing much of anything. is even this possibility that is even this avenue a possibility? >> diane perlman from george mason university mentioned literature in the 80's which reach the conclusion that the techniques can have the opposite impact and in 14 of 100 cases of sanctions, they actually worked, meaning 86% did not work. and then mike asked a question about basically the freeze. one variation of a freeze option
, a freezing on the nuclear program, and exchange for clarity, but no regime change, which sounds like the strategic patience policy, which has been disavowed. i guess this is -- this first question is more to victor or sue. >> she asked for victor. victor: it is a debate. there are people who say, in terms of sanctions, sanctions don't work until they do. you look at any sanctions case and people will say they don't work, they don't work and then all of a sudden the target state does what you want and they say oh it does work, but they have some other cause, some alternative explanation. the thing about sanctions is they don't work until they do.
the other thing is in the minds of many in the policy community, as a result of the obama administration policy, there is the model of iran and the view that sanctions appear to have worked, whether you agree with it or not. there is a view out there that committed multilateral sanctions worked to bring iran to the table and maybe something like that could happen with north korea. this coincided with a number of studies that were done by think tanks in washington and south korea that compared the scope and breadth of sanctions in iran to north korea. north korean sanctions were so minimal compared to what has been done on iran. the other side of the debate which is this is 14 out of 100 cases that have worked. in addition to that, we will soon have two aircraft carriers off the coast of the korean
peninsula. we are in a sanctioning mode and north korea is on a missile testing warpath. no dialogue taking place. historians will write about how this was a path to war. there are two debates here and there is no right or wrong, but that is what we are in the middle of in terms of policy. >> thanks, victor. sue: quickly on the sanctions, sanctions is a leverage effect. once you have heavy sanctions, you have something to give away. why would north korea ever give up anything? in terms of the freeze question, this is so unpalatable, but we might have to live with nuclear russia and live with china, just live with north korea -- nuclear north korea.
going to deterrence and that is .he end goal it is not a goal, that this is my -- this is what we might end up with. both have a lot of problems. freezing has a lot of problems. we don't know where all the things are. some are over, that there are a lot of covert facilities. we have many deals with north korea. there is a lot of consensus with both options. >> we obviously need to go for another hour, but we only have five minutes. three 20e 320 -- take second questions. >> is there a way to take the strategic importance of north korea away from china so it is devalued in the eyes of china's
own agreement could come forward -- as of china, so an agreement could come forward? >> right in the back. >> the question i have is with regards to a possible regime change or collapse of the regime nobody predicted the soviet , union would collapse. should we be putting in plans or thinking about how to secure the nuclear program elements that are there, loose materials, missiles, command and control in terms of a collapse -- in case of a collapse? >> my question regards their ability to use chemical and biological weapons and i wanted to know to what extent they have worked to develop those two types of weapons and with with -- with which countries they might work in the future if they cannot do it on their own.
>> we have three quick questions. is there anyway to take away the strategic leverage that north korea provides to china so as to take that out of the equation? the second question was if there is a regime change or collapses, plans for securing the nuclear program and lastly, a question about chemical weapons capabilities. with whom might north korea be working in the future, and how is that program going? anybody want to address any one of those questions? they are not exactly in each person's specialty. -- use this as your .umming up 32nd pitch mike: on securing the nuclear weapons and other wmd missile technology in north korea, yes, there are elements within the department of defense that look at this seriously.
whether we have the capability or not, is a matter of argument. i have long argued that you need a group of experts in various fields. the key is to wrap up the people and document the program and then go after the assets. it is the opposite of what we did with the iraq survey group. i have confidence we would succeed in securing the nuclear materials. on cw and bw, north korea is a very opaque target. we don't know what is going on. the presumption is they have the capacity to develop chemical weapons. i would argue that chemical weapons are not that effective battlefield weapon -- not an effective battlefield weapon if your opponent is one that cannot be detected. rok forces and u.s. forces would have that capacity.
against cities and such, it could be rather disastrous, and because seoul is within artillery range, you could deliver a lot of agent over the area to saturate it and kill large numbers of people. that is a major concern. who is helping them? i think they have the capacity themselves to do these things. they may rely on certain chemicals that probably come over the border with china because it is -- to even say it is leaky is a generous description. it is as porous as a screen door. i don't have a lot of confidence that it could be stopped. >> we will just go down the row. >> i'm going to respond to the question on north korea and china.
north korea is not only an asset for china, but -- china is a strategic asset for north korea, so they need each other, that's why china does not enforce the un's sanctions, because the chinese prefer the status quo of north korea to regime collapse. north korea has some reservations about china, because china is not in cooperation with north korea. there are policy limitations. they are moving between these
two, and so maybe they are trying to maximize their own strategy. right now, it is difficult to distinguish completely, the chinese benefit from north korea. sue: i will answer in reverse order. north korea definitely has a chemical weapon program. - the problem is, while there are plans to try to secure because a getof government tries to
them out, trying to reach those places to secure it. if we do not take the united nations route, which could take months. very protracted. the problem is, how they will perceive that. there are a lot of problems. some challenges in trying to ofure all the wmd in case instability. korea, no north stability. very difficult to get china to change when it comes to north korea of their they and actual war. right, it a war would be the threat of instability. it would be hard for all of us to try to get china to change to think it's interest would be better served with north korea. >> three quick points. the first is, chinese policymakers, experts, they know what all the arguments why they should drop north korea.
they know them all. cards right. >> so that is my answer to your question. mike had a question, what if we just contain this problem and you know mutual deterrence contain it. the only thing there is the horizontal proliferation problem. north korea is a serial proliferator. we can go through the list. the jihad missile is a north korean missile. they tried to sell to a rack to saddam hussein but saddam hussein wanted to pay on credit not in cash. [laughter] >> there is a whole list. they are sold every one they have developed. i would be where i was wary of proliferation. a unification
ceremony come i hate to throw data at you but we did a survey where we asked experts what was the number one issue in a unification scenario in terms of the cross between priority and how much we knew, right? said the big line spot is where there is high minority and no knowledge. those are the big wind spots. what we actually found was the number one issue was not wmd. the number one issue was domestic stabilization and north korea. not because we don't care about the nuclear issue but relative to domestic stabilization we figure we know more about the situation that about domestic stabilization so it was an interesting finding based on the data we did surveying 100 government officials. texas was fantastic if i may say so. good questions, very good answers. this has been the most overflow
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on earth just for you, you'd see that face. for me, donald trump is like up at the opposite. when i first saw him on the campaign trail i thought, this ,s a person who is unique horrible, amazing, terrible characteristics were put on earth, you know, specifically notme to appreciate your appreciate or whatever the verb is because i really had been spending a lot of the last 10-12 years without knowing it preparing for donald trump to happen. taibbi is a journalist. "smells like dead elements --
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2018 budget. >> what is a billionaire family get a $52 billion tax cut. >> because we think it is wrong -- nary folks it >> ordinary people, is the walden family and ordinary family? >> know they aren't, there are no. >> i ask you why the wealthiest family in the world is getting a tax cut? legs and i am telling you, because we cut obamacare. >> loser kids that were born and raised in france, germany, they have legal passport. they have left to go and fight in the caliphate. many times their countries do not know they have left and they come backs of their countries don't know they were ever gone and now they are hardened warriors that will do things like manchester. as manchester was, my expectation is we will see a lot more of that kind of attack.
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