coming up this morning, charlotte's firm, virginia-based conservative talkshow host joe thomas discusses the violence this weekend. and a discussion about the opioid crisis. then a summit of the kaiser family foundation on disparity in health care. watch washington journal live at 7:00 eastern this morning. join the discussion. >> former national security adviser's on the future of america's global leadership and threats posed by russia, china, and north korea. it includes susan rice and tom donlon from the obama administration and condoleezza rice and stephen hadley who served in the george w. bush administration. the aspen institute posted this 90 minute event. this 90 minute event.

>> welcome, everybody. i am walter isaacson. this is the essence of what the aspen institute has been and should always be about. and what our nation should be about. the notion of very dedicated people of both parties coming together and trying to find common ground. it is under the auspices of the strategy group. a new cochair is condoleezza rice, her first year on the job. [applause] hadley,so have stephen one of the first -- one of the first time that for national security adviser's have been

together. ur national security adviser's have been together and h.r. mcmaster will be here tomorrow. susan rice is missing, she will be here in about seven minutes. she is on her way from the airport but just like bob gates last year, somebody who wants to make a dramatic entrance. [laughter] let me turn it over to a person everybody knows, digg barnes, the executive director of the aspen strategy group and an old friend of the institute. have been here many times and joined the board and are cochairing this did the year you first came here and why? >> first year was 1972, i was at the end of my sophomore year in college and i was a student in the aspen music festival school. [applause] experiencing all those

amazing musicians i went back to denver and changed my major. [laughter] [applause] >> good afternoon. before walter goes away, i think, given his extraordinary leadership of the aspen institute over 14 years, we should pay tribute to him. [applause] >> thank you all for being her. i am nick burns, the director of the aspen's presence group and we are a rare commodity in washington, d.c., nonpartisan. are nonpartisan and meeting billfor the 34th year, perry and -- they founding

fathers and we have founding mothers of this institution. we believe that republicans and democrats, and independents, can come together on behalf of our country to think through the biggest challenges we face and we are here every august or the reason. whont to pay tribute to joe is the longest-serving member of this institution and a great father intellectual he of what we try to do. thank you for what you have done. [applause] we have a lot of important people at i have to mention our great former secretary of state, madeleine albright. [applause] mention ambassador tom core logo's -- steel, whown and bob

have led the aspen institute overboard chair, thanks to both of you. we are bringing together a lot of foreign-policy experts and who willcted officials talk to a sunday evening about the red-blue divide, a divided nation. walter and jim have ran this project of healing america. mayor mitch landrieu of new orleans is here and we are happy he is he or today. [applause] if you have not read his speech about a very sensitive issue in his community, confederate you must read that speech of leadership and we will be joined by a good friend, senator dan sullivan of alaska and congressman joe kennedy of massachusetts on sunday evening to talk about how domestic politics has an impact on leadership positions. this week we are taking on a big subject. the american-led liberal order of the last 72 years.

we would try to describe it. 472 years, every american president from harry truman through to barack obama has agreed on one thing, we have to be forward deployed and engaged with the rest of the world as a leader. that is why we created this set of alliances like nato and our east asian alliances and why we stood for free trade and trading agreements to lift global prosperity. it is why we have nurtured this big institutions that are not always perfect, like the united nations and its agencies, the imf, world bank, because we believe when there is a national disaster that hit haiti, the earthquake has to be ready to respond. we have to respond. if the united states is the linchpin of all of this, and we believe in something else, every president and every administration in both parties, we believe in democracy and human rights, and a democratic order in the world.

that is under a challenge right now. under challenge by a rising china which does not share some of those values and under a challenge by a resurgence russia which has invaded every redline by invading and occupying crimea . by harassing our nato allies and causing trouble in the middle east and by a cyber attack on our national election in 2016. than just complicated china and russia because this liberal order is being besieged by the fact that a lot of non-governments, al qaeda, isis, cyber terrorists, have a lot of power now and are cutting into the power of government and diluting power, that power and our ability to achieve a peaceful and stable world. i will try to say this in a nonpartisan way, a love of people are thinking that the united states is not upholding its end of the bargain. critics of president obama

who thought he was too reticent in protecting the united states in some instances. there are many more critics of america first, president trump. the question i wanted to ask our threests today, questions, is that liberal order that is so important to our future, is it being weekend and how can president trump and the congress strengthen it? the second question is -- what do we do about vladimir putin? do we contain them in europe and engage him in asia and the middle east? the third question is -- china, the most complex of all, china is not our enemy, it is our partner on climate change and global economic growth. it is our competitor in the south and east china sea, how do you balance that? three questions we would take a run through and 45-50 minutes from now, we will stop the

conversation and turn it over to you and please feel free to ask any question you would like to ask. condoleezza rice is our new cochair, we are excited she is here. take it away. >> let me just say thank you very much to all of you for being here, because what we need more than anything is civic and civil dialogue about a number of the important issues we face. i wanted to pick up with the description of the liberal order. we have to realize that the liberal order was born, an idea designed after world war ii, when people looked out at the world they say it inherited after world war i and said let's not do that again. it had two important elements and one important fact, one element was that they really believe that the international economy did not have to be zero-sum game. it could be competitive but a growing economy and a positive

sum game. so my gains were not your losses and that is why they wanted free trade and comparative advances among countries. set up institutions to do it, international monetary fund, exchange rate, world bank and eventually starting as a european bank and reconstruction and development which would rebuild economies. and would become a source of capital for countries coming out of colonialism. in some ways, the most remarkable, tariffs and trade agreement, which was not a set of trade agreements but rules of the road to level the playing field so that the international economy could grow. buy it is nature -- by its nature, getting us away from conflicts any international system. they worried -- there she is -- >> susan rice. [applause] hi. >> sorry to interrupt.

>> i call her my little sister even though we are not related. ,o return to the liberal order it is important to know what they were trying to avoid. they hated the fact that there have been trading policies and competition over resources that was violent and would not do that again. they were going to try to create the democratic peace where they could and rebuilt germany as a democracy, japan is a democracy, it would be protected by american military power. that was the liberal order. china,eing challenged by although china has one fit in and one foot out. it is being challenged by russia because they do not really have a foot in the economic side and therefore use its military power for its respect. it is also being challenged by the four horsemen of the apocalypse, populism, nativism,

isolationism, and protectionism which tend to run together. one of the questions that we should be asking is -- not just the challenge to the liberal order from transnational terrorism or cyber warfare, or from big powers like russia and china, but how do we deal with the fact that it does seem that there are those who believe they were left behind by the global order and they are fighting back. givefound people who will them an answer as to why they did and succeed. populists always have an answer. it is the other. the chinese. the legal immigrants. if you are from the left, the big banks. and by the way, the other this time around is not just taking your jobs, the other is dangerous. refugees. immigrants. i think that the challenges, this time, not just one that we foreign policy people can

understand, but one that has to go and turn only to these societies and see what is happening which is why i am glad for the exit strategy group, we are having this wonderful session that mitch landrieu will help lead. this is a big challenge from the inside and outside. i am worried that the liberal order may not survive it. >> i think will give -- we will give susan a breather. the question is -- is the liberal order weakening, is america leadership of that order weakening? i will go to tom. your views. let me put a little english on this, america first, part of the problem of a weakening america? >> great to be here. deep polarization. not a lot of conversation takes place across political lines and

not a lot of conversation takes place in the policy world in the domestic side, it does take place in the international side and we are lucky. this institution have been an important part of that. you have almost two decades of service on the stage today. it is a manifestation of something very important for us to continue in terms of our national security. condi's description of the u.s. led post-world war ii world order is important to underscore that. this would not happen without the united states and will not continue without the united states. we cannot take it for granted. her description of what was put in place after world war ii has led to, with a lot of problems and a lot of challenges and mistakes, but the overall arc of the story is positive. for the united states with

respect to prosperity and security, and positive for large parts of the world. it is under pressure. one of the key elements is continued u.s. leadership. ii, the united states did not act like a normal country trying to -- it was an entirely different approach. putting together organizations that we would participate in, as real participants that will have a benefit for the rest of the world, the provision of public goods and pursuing a values-based foreign policy. we weren't a normal country. , theany other country united states was engaged in a special undertaking after world war ii. on the pressure on the order today, it has all of the sources secretary rice laid out. we have seen the reemergence of great power competition. we had an extraordinary time

after the fall of the berlin wall, there was quite high degree of constructive and productive relations between the great powers which has significantly come to an end, particularly with russia who, after the return of vladimir putin in 2012, decided to go in a different direction which presents a challenge to the world order and challenges to the united states. i think russia has become actively hostile to the united states. we have seen the emergence of an ideological challenge to the world order and the values the united states pursues successfully. that challenge comes from liberalism and from authoritarianism, those regimes make their case around the world and someone said that we have reached the end of history, history is back with a vengeance. the breakdowneen of the state system in the arab world. that has at external impact,

including the emergence of entities who fill the vacuum like isis. day, another the challenge to this is questions about whether or not the united states will continue to lead this. during the course of the campaign and the first six months of the administration, there has been questions about the u.s. commitment to the basic pillars of the world order in terms of alliances and trade, multilateral institutions. i think the united states, given the questions raised, to engage in a serious -- set of steps. >> thank you. when we thought about this meeting, what we did not want to do was have this to be some kind of a verdict on the trump administration and did not want to presume that the liberal world order is perfect. the question over the next couple of days as, what needs to

be fixed and how should it even all -- evolve? a paragraph said here is problems with america first at another paragraph president trump is bringing new ideas. are being concerned that free trade is undercutting them personally and industries they work and. -- in. an aggressive policy against the united -- islamic state in syria and direct. iraq. is america first in the continuum since every president since truman? should the administration make changes to it? >> i would like to blow it up a little bit bigger. what do we do about this? the brookings institution brought together five republicans and five democrats. before the election to talk about the rules-based international order.

the discussion was, we have to defend it. the election happens. it was interesting to see the change of mood and dialogue within the group. what we saw with the donald trump election was a group of people who felt that they were victimized by globalization. threatened by immigration. ignored and excluded from the politics, and betrayed by the elites. what this group began to say is, maybe we have to amend and revitalize the liberal international order. one, to reflect the fact that many people feel left out and also, the world has changed with the advent of china and india and other new players. and the fact that we have a new ideological bubble. interestingly enough, the question is -- can this administration be convinced that

it is in its interest to lead a process to revise and revitalize the international order? thes in warsaw to hear president speak and he talked about western civilization and the defense of western civilization. i talk to people afterwards and said, someone needs to explain to him that this rules-based international order has been a framework for defending all of the values of western civilization that he was talking about. he wants other countries to do more. not the united states being taken advantage of. let's try a recast and revitalized international order that lets other countries like china have a hand in trying to them in that order. so that they are taking more responsibility. at that point, you may be able to say to president trump, the world is stepping up the way you ask them to do, but they cannot do it alone, the united states

remains an indispensable party to the future. >> susan, your view on our role in the world. and remainsis indispensable. we are suffering fundamentally from is a view of the world and a view of our domestic politics as zero-sum. our leadership in the post world order has never been zero-sum, it has benefited from the concept that we can maximize benefits through strong and principled american leadership. we havethe extent that gone through a phase of us versus them domestically, i think condoleezza rice's characterization was apt. the other. it has become the same in our

relationships with many parts of the rest of the world. even our closest allies are looking at the united states and questioning whether we are leading a team of principled and like-minded values-based entities, or whether or not we will stand in opposition to them. much less our own adversaries. reform that vision of the united states leadership through a combination of reasserting and embracing the fact that america's leadership can be beneficial, not only for us but for others. that we have a system of alliances and of trade that has served us very well. it is not in our interest to see those jettisoned. approach, as a new renewal of our relationships

that we have suffered from. but i think also over the last six months. >> i agree completely that we need to revitalize and reassure, but we need help from our allies. who are we kidding -- how many of us on the stage gave that to gdp to our nato allies and said, can you just carry more of the burden? we basically got nowhere. and the large scheme of things, we got nowhere over a long time, the united states has carried most of the burden. i believe great powers have to be willing to do that. we could use a little help. and it will be appreciated, if we start to see greater engagement.

i felt a little bit, as secretary of state, that the secretary of state is the 911 fo r the world and if there is a problem, why don't you solve that problem? the us trillions are these -- the australians are the exceptions and said we got this one. i think some broader sharing of, if you want to call it the burden, would be a good thing. to the chinese, i would say, the , reallyhave really benefited from the liberal economic order. they would've not have lifted 500 million people out of poverty without it. they were admitted to the world traded organization probably prematurely and if you look at chinese practices, they are not in line with world trade organization's standards. as electoral property protection is a problem.

if you have a joint venture partner with china, you are likely to see your intellectual property taken any joint venture altered. national champions among chinese companies are advantaged through western companies. the chinese have not opened their financial services sector to investment as they are supposed to do under the wto. i am all for reasserting america's willingness to work with people. i do think others have an important role to play. that will be reassuring to the american people as well. >> susan? >> i agree, we all would, that our allies and partners need to play a commensurate role. the fact is, the reason why they call the united states and the iste department on 911, because there is not a country

that matches our military, economic and world might. and whether the challenge is gathering a coalition to impose sanctions on russia after they invaded crimea and ukraine, whether it is rolling the world to deal with the ebola epidemic or building a coalition to go after isis comment requires the united states to be front and center. it does not mean others do not contribute or should not pull their weight, they can and must. they do not always do so. but, when we step back, nothing seems to work. that has clearly been our collective experience. >> tom? steve? >> about how to revise and revitalize the international order, i think we do need -- we want others to do more. that means that we will have to give them more of a role and more of a stake.

that also means that we will have to change a little bit how we lead. ofwill have to be of a mind facilitating this kind of participation, not dictating, and be responsive to others -- enabling and less imposing. we were having this conversation, we need a little bit of an adjustment in how we lead because the world has changed. to be effective and to get others to take more of the burden, we will have to have a different leadership style. bob from brookings we do not getset to retire from this role and we would retire from this role at a very high cost to ourselves and the world. determining the way forward and reasserting and reassuring allies, having a conversation

with them about what it means to be an ally. this conversation has gotten off track and become to contingent, these are fundamental obligations we have to each other. having a conversation in a style in a manner and with a vision commensurate with the challenges we have is the right way to go. the united states does not get to retire from this role and it is not in their interest to do so. >> a last word on this and i want to ask you about russia, condi, i think president trump, i am a former ambassador to nato for bush 43, and when we were hit hard on 9/11, the allies came to us and said we want to invoke article five of the nato treaty, an attack on one is attack on all, we had never done that and they came through with us big time. on september 12,

she had had no sleep, to say the allies would be with us and wanted to go to war with us against al qaeda. did i feel at that moment the power of having allies in the world. the chinese are not always going to be there, you said it is good to have friends in the world. >> i recently gave a talk to the national war college. in human history has have this representation but to see how we'd differently, i could not agree more. obviouslyfferently .eans finding a role for others

i know we cannot retire from this role but there is a wariness among the american people. we cannotignore it simply say, we have got to get back there and leave. we have to say we are going to lead because it is in our interests and values, and our allies have to appreciate it and be part of it. that is my point. we really have gotten from the allies, what we mostly get his criticism for not leading. -- is criticism for not leaving. the only thing the world hates more than unilateral american leadership is no american leadership. we need our allies to step up. some of them have. the germans have stepped up. to try and settle the ukrainian circumstances. let's not underestimate outside of foreign policy leads the degree to which the american people are asking questions about how much more we can do. >> this is a good transition point to russia. since putin's invasion of

crimea, 20 of our 20 allies have -- 20 ever allies have raised 28 allies have raised defense spending. merkel is leading nato. we have got a dilemma here. putin attacked our election and tried to discredit our democracy. we know he did that. putin still has troops in eastern ukraine, dividing that country. he has annexed crimea. he has been a malevolent force in syria. what is the strategy for president trump? how does he respond to this? we saw this extraordinary situation where the president was repudiated by republicans in congress. there was a big vote to sanction russia. if you were to give advice to him, what would it be? [laughter] >> not to put you on the spot too much. >> well, thanks. [laughter] first, be sure you know who vladimir putin is. vladimir putin is someone who

likes to humiliate, dominate, and essentially understands power. and so don't go into a room with vladimir putin unless you are in a pretty powerful position. that means, when you go to talk to vladimir putin, first let's continue the policy the obama administration began, maybe even accelerate the policy of putting forces at least on a rotating basis, but possibly on a permanent basis in places like poland and the baltic states. so that you say to him, this far and no further. secondly, i like raising the defense budget as a signal to the russians. third, you have to say to the russians, we know you didn't on -- we know you did it on the electoral process.

-- did it on the electoral process. we will deal with it. we have confidence in our electoral system, so don't think you are undermining american confidence by what you are doing. because he feeds on this sense that he is succeeding in undermining our confidence. final thing, stop flying your planes so close to our ships and aircraft. someone is going to get shot down. once you establish ground rules, now you can talk about areas of cooperation. by the way, there is one other thing i would arm the , ukrainians. i think you have got to raise the cost to the russians for what they are doing in ukraine. it is not on the front pages anymore. in eastern ukraine, people are dying every day because of those russian separatists who with russian military training and intelligence are making a mess of eastern ukraine and making it impossible for kiev to govern the country.

and so i think it is time to arm them. in other words you have to show , him that you are tough. and then maybe you can find some areas of cooperation. >> thank you. susan, tom, i think president obama put in place a lot of what condi is saying. is there bipartisan agreement on this? >> certainly a bipartisan agreement on the steps condi described as what we called the european congress agreement. -- the european response initiative. we got nato with their leadership to put in those four countries and the baltics and poland a continuous rotating presence in poland and forward only personnel but equipment. we have reversed the trend of the downsizing of our presence in europe. that is vitally important. beyond that, if we are going to tackle the real challenge russia poses, we have to acknowledge the problem. we have to name it as some

people like to say on other topics. here the reality is with the president that has not expressed with clarity is understanding of -- his understanding of what the russians did to metal two meddle in our election, and has been unwilling to make a statement after the expulsion of our personnel from russia, and made no indication that we might respond in kind, because we are the aggrieved party in this instance. we are muddying the water and sending the signal that we don't understand that we face a very serious threat. we need to be very clear and forceful and unified in our characterization of the russian problem. i think we have seen from congress useful and credible

bipartisan leadership on this topic. thankfully the legislation has been passed and signed. this should not be the end. penalties should be increased if nothing improves. >> tom, to build on what susan just said, you frame this fall liberal order by recalling the origins of it. are we back to the containment of russian power in eastern europe? not so much in other parts of the world. is that the strategy that you pursued, you and susan and president obama? >> it is important to recognize the fundamentals. we are in an actively hostile posture with russia. it is not just in europe, it is in syria, afghanistan, and in our own elections and the european elections next year as well and probably our elections in 2018 and 2020 unless we act to prevent it. we are in an actively hostile posture with the russians.

it's coming from their side. i met with putin the friday night before he was inaugurated and it was clear he was taking russia and a different -- in a different direction. these ideas were not anachronistic to vladimir putin. they were very real ideas. he also had a domestic pressure on him that forced him and pushed them in the direction he has gone. he has his own sense of where russia should be, but a different place of where we had russian generals planning with us at nato headquarters. we had a big change. it is important to recognize that. second, secretary rice describes it exactly right, and i think there would be bipartisan agreement on straightening our position in europe. -- strengthening our position in europe. i think before you enter into a serious conversation with him about what the rules of the road will be going for it, you have

-- will be going forward you , have to position exactly as secretary rice laid out. the last thing is the election. it is important that there be a recognition as to what happened. it is important that we have, and i believe everyone else in the administration short of the president has said this, including people here. walter last week at the security forum. it is important that we move forward with a set of steps to prevent this from happening in the future. we had a set of events. we know what the playbook was. we know what its dimensions were from cyber assets to penetration in three dozen states. we need to take steps now to prevent it from happening in the future. we have been put on notice with respect to this threat.

>> steve, you are the transitional figure in the panel. i want you to say what you have to say on russia, that i will ask you about china. it will be my final question. >> i may provoke a little controversy on the panel. i agree with everything that has been said and all the measures condi talked about. i am no softy on russia. i have been arguing for those for the last two or three years. making and calling out what russia did in terms of our election and making sure it can never happen again by anybody. once first, shame on him. for me twice, shame on me. -- full me twice, shame on me. we should never let this happen again. -- fool me twice, shame on me. i am a little worried. i think we are in a dangerous period with russia. i think putin has decided that americans are anti-russian. there is no constituency for u.s. russian relations in the

united states. he says if you think i am an enemy, i will show you what it is like to have an enemy in russia. we are vulnerable because as much as i applaud the steps of a we have done, i don't think they are enough if putin really decides to process. -- to press us. we are putting battalions in the three baltic states and poland and in bucharest. battalions are 1200 people, 1500 people. russia is going to have an exercise in belarus that newspapers suggest maybe up to 100,000 people and 8000 tanks. i think i've got that number right. more tanks than germany, france, and u.k. have combined. we have to be careful that we don't get in this very confrontational, rhetorical position with russia and not have the resources to back it up.

i think we are not doing enough in europe, in syria. putin is doubling down, and we have pulled the plug on some of the things in syria. we are in an exposed position. we have got to be very tough, stand on our principles, stand on our allies. making it clear that we are prepared to deter putin. at the same time, be willing to try to improve the relationship and cooperation. what is the formula america has used for five decades about adversaries, from the soviet union to our most troublesome adversaries? it is cooperate where you can, where you have common interests. stand on your principles, stand with your friends, and be tough where you disagree. but manage those so doesn't come to confrontation and conflict. we have got to get back to that formula. we are not there right now.

i think it means it's a risky period. >> before we get to china, i just want to add to that. if i were advising the current president, i would give him the same advice, but it would be easier to get to a place where we could engage in a conversation with the russians and would not have the kinds of restrictions placed on the president out of the sanctions if we had been tougher on this and straighter on this and clear on this. i think that would be the place to start. we can get to a place to be tougher and deal from strength, and we would have a better opportunity to have a conversation with some domestic support if we acknowledge these problems. >> steve, my sense is you have articulated a bipartisan consensus that exists in washington. final question, then we will take questions from the audience. joe and graham allison and i had

a colleague at harvard, the late ambassador steve bosworth. this is how he framed our relationship with china two years ago. he said, china is not our enemy. china will likely end up being our most if not are most important global partner on climate change, stabilizing the global economy, the role of women, cyber in the future. here is the problem, china is also a competitor with us for strategic power in east asia. i think the south and east china sea military superiority. steve asked the question of my students i want to ask of you. he said this will be the toughest american challenge on foreign policy in the 21st century to balance these two and not to end up in a conflict with china and be dominated by china. in my view if i can say this in , a nonpartisan way, president obama achieved the climate

change agreement with president xi jinping. good example of the engagement. now president trump faces a difficult issue in the east asian sea. we will star with the woodwork backed down. what is your advice for president trump to deal with the chinese? he seems to support it if you read the recent tweets, i follow all of them on twitter. [laughter] >> i will try to frame this. a lot of people have a lot to say. it is a competitor. one of the problems is, the soviet union was a competitor, they do not really have the resources that was required to compete. in china, we have a competitor that has resources like crazy. this is a different kind of competitive threat than we have ever faced. we need to start on that. it does require balance. one, a revitalized international order. we need to find a way if we can

bring china as part of that process to revising that order because if we do not give them a seat at the table, they will take the lead and try to create a competitor. that is not in our interest. second, on issues like the south china sea, i think the framework for handling it is pretty clear. we have got to stand with our allies in terms of south china sea. we have to be present economically, militarily. and every other way. i think we can manage that because china's integration in the international community and the fact it is dependent on international prosperity and -- on economic prosperity and growth for the legitimacy of the regime means china doesn't really want to have a trade war. we have got some leverage there. i think we can negotiate in some sense with shrewd diplomacy. but not if we provoke a trade war with china. two issues i am worried about. one, i think the solution is easy. one belt, one road.

this enormous infrastructure project that is reaching westward. it is a good thing. those in central asia and elsewhere need infrastructure. we ought to join it. we need to not fight it. we ought to get all of our friends to join it. i have a vision that if we all get around china and help them on one bill, one road, because if you have 50 people hugging you, it is hard to move. [laughter] what am i worried about? we used to say the taiwan relationship could destroy u.s. china relations. i think the taiwan issue is pretty well-managed. it's manageable but i am worried about north korea. i'm worried about a confrontation between the united states and china and north korea. the last two administrations have both tried to have a discreet conversation with china about what we do on the peninsula. my instinct is china may be finally ready for that conversation, but we have to have it. if we don't manage that issue

correctly, we could have a confrontation with china. >> tom. >> obviously the relationship , with china is not only the most complex but the most consequential bilateral relationship we have in the world. that requires us to do just as steve said when he was talking about russia, maximize cooperation where we can, manage competition, and avoid confrontation. i think in the last several years, we have managed to strike that balance white well. -- quite well. not only on climate change, but on peacekeeping, global public health, a whole range, nonproliferation, nuclear security, a whole range of areas with painstaking and sometimes frustrating diplomacy. and i spent a lot of time directly engaging our chinese counterparts.

we were able to expand the areas of cooperation in two rounds that were previously unthinkable. -- into realms that were previously unthinkable. we managed to whittle down some of the areas of friction. one area that is mitigated is in the cyber realm where we were able to negotiate an understanding with the chinese that they largely adhered to that they would cease the theft of our intellectual property through cyber means for commercial activity. we agreed to a series of cyber norms that took down the temperature and reduced the level of nefarious activity from the chinese type. -- side. that is something we need to watch and manage. i agree there are areas of real concern. i am quite concerned about the south china sea and potentially the east china sea. i think we have not yet,

particularly in recent months, figured out how front and center we will put that issue in the bilateral relationship. i think north korea, as important as that is, cannot overshadow our attention on that issue. on north korea steve, i would be , interested in hearing how you play out the scenario of the u.s. and china in direct confrontation over that. i think what we risk is our very understandable frustration with the failure to address the problem sufficiently relating to miscalculations on our side or the part of the north koreans such that we end up on the slippery slope. we can spend more time on north korea, but i think those are the two issues, north korea, south -- china sea where the competition could end up in confrontation. >> i imagine some of his son to

-- i imagine someone is going to ask about north korea. tom and condi, last words on the china relationship. >> a couple of things, number one is that the china relationship has to be nested in your overall asia policy. few nations on the face of the earth have benefited more from the u.s. lead and support of security and economic order over the last 75 years. the last 40 years for the chinese have been beneficial. on the largely built platform, the security platform, the engagement platform that united states put in place in asia on which social and economic development has been built. the first strategic point is that continued presence by the united states, continued commitment to our role as an important power, the premier power in the pacific is absolutely essential. if you ask what happens absent that, you have a place full of

conflicts and real challenges with respect to economic and other development. living that's the first point. the second is, we have been cooperating quite well on global issues. with the chinese. we have these regional issues that are quite significant. i would go back and add the economic issues as well. we don't want to get to a trade war with the chinese. we have serious economic problems with the chinese right now. there is lack of reciprocity, lack of access. it is becoming increasingly difficult for the united states to do business in china. there are real technology transfer issues. these have to be confronted. china has a big investment in the global economic environment. they have a big investment in us. they are most important market.

-- we are at their most important market. we have to push harder to play by the rules. the south china sea is where we need to maintain our presence and insist on the right rules of the road. north korea is probably the most perilous security issue facing us over the next year or so. it is a slow-motion cuban missile crisis. there are a number of steps we can take in addition to what has happened right now. it is the principle security conversation with the chinese. >> i would add one thing, there is a wildcard, and that is china's internal development. that is something we cannot control. it's going through a massive transformation and it's not all going well. the low cost of labor, heavy exports, heavy government investments, strategy they have pursued to lift 400 million people out of poverty. that model has kind of run out

of steam. they have had great reform plans. they were going to close down state owned enterprises, and they were going to introduce more market forces. there is a little problem. when you start to introduce market forces, you introduce a lot of voices. that does not sit easily with a top-down political system that is getting more and more concentrated in the hands of the very few if not one. the internal the balance of -- the internal developments of china are something we do not control -- developments of china are something we do not control. how that will play out in their policy in the south china sea or trade policy is hard to say. this careful management is going to have to be constantly attuned to what is transparent in china. -- what's transpiring in china. >> thank you. thanks to this great panel. you have seen these for outstanding people have the toughest job in washington. national security adviser, 24

-- two president george w. bush, four two for barack obama. thank you. [applause] >> now it is your turn. if you would just motioned to me if you want to ask a question. my only request is that you stand up. there will be a microphone that comes to you. give us your name. be sure the question is a question mark attached to the end, and we will all be happy. we will get in as many as we can. >> i am a mom and a local. i have a question for your strong intellects. who is intellectually on your level in this administration, who is advising? [laughter] rice, i say this with respect, have you studied steve bannon and his philosophy on the neoliberal order? have you looked at the dark side of some of the supporters? everyone is talking about the left behind american worker.

to me and many of my brown friends, it is not so soft and fuzzy. there is another element to the rallies. i want you to speak to that. >> who would like to? [laughter] >> any comment? >> i will take it, certainly. there are some very good and intellectually excellent people in this administration. rex tillerson is a very smart guy. let me tell you something, oilmen know the world like other people don't. they deal with difficult laces -- difficult places and difficult people. he is a great intellect. jim mattis maybe one of the great intellects of the last half-century in the american military. so is h.r. mcmaster. there are very good and smart people around the present. -- the president. i do know steve bannon's work. not particularly fond of it. i think we have to recognize

that, as i said, when one has a populist message, other things tend to go with that message. what we are seeing on the foreign policy side so far is that the foreign policy looks more traditional than i think many of us would have thought early on. if you look at the fact he -- that we finally got around to affirming article five. it took a while. we finally got around to it. we did agree that we did believe in a one china policy. it took a while. but we got there. when you look at the discussions about what will have to happen to nafta. during the campaign, president trump said this is the worst trade agreement in history. when you look at what they are actually talking about, it is pretty modest. they have learned a particular reality, which is the one steve and i learned after september 11, we closed the border with

canada after september 11. three days later, no one could make a car. because the supply chain was in canada. nafta is a fact. it's not a policy. if you take these issues issue by issue, i don't know that the syria policy is that different, or the north korea policy, is that different than what one could expect. i think the bigger issue of are we going to reaffirm the broad context for all of these decisions? the liberal order, american leadership, what does america first really mean? are we really going to not care whether or not states are democratic? by the way democracy promotion, , democracy support, it is not just the morally right thing to do, but democracies don't fight each other. they don't send their 10-year-olds as child soldiers. they don't traffic their women into the sex trade.

they don't attack their neighbors. they don't harbor terrorists. democracies are kind of good for the world. when you talk about american interests and say you are not sure we ought to promote democracy, i am not sure you have a weird concept or grasp on -- i'm not sure you have a clear concept or grasp on what constitutes american interests. i am more worried about the large piece of this. on the individual policies, we are seeing not that much divergence. it is a really good national security team. >> there is a pretty good book on this issue democracy, as i understand. >> by condi rice. [laughter] [applause] >> question right here. >> thank you -- next question right here. >> thank you. i wanted to ask the panel to reflect on the issue that steve early talked about. the changing nature of american

leadership. there are areas where other countries might be willing to do more if they get a clear signal the u.s. was willing to let them. i'm talking international finance and international financial institutions. there have been like the world bank, the imf, indications that other countries might want to step up to the plate and do more and frustration that they were not able to do more that led to the creation of the asian infrastructure bank i china and the new development bank by russia, china, and you, and so on. -- india and so on. what might it look like if the u.s. were willing to let others do more in leadership? what would be the element that would be that leadership change? >> thank you very much for that question.

for those who are not ir specialists this is a very , pointed question that for 65 years been a leaderys leading the international fund, turkey, india, why can't we lead these institutions. is a mistake to open them up? >> the question was asked by a woman who knows of what she speaks, the former finance minister of nigeria and one who we all admire for your service. [applause] and a candidate for world bank president. >> yes. >> well, look, i think this is a real conundrum because for the united states, we want to see the refreshing institutions that came out of the postwar era that we were the birth mother of. we do not have alternatives to the united nations, to the bretton woods institutions. you are pointing to a very

-- they need to remain relevant for the 20th century. you are pointing to a very particular and important challenge. in the current context, it is even harder in my estimation for the united states to truthfully embrace the kind of reform that many countries think is necessary. for example, look to the united nations. does the united states really want to give up our veto on the security council, which many would love to see? do we want to expand permanent membership and with it the veto? in theory, these issues -- and -- in theory we profess openness to these issues. in practice, these are very difficult and consequence of choices that would lead to a dim munition of our international power. i think the financial institutions is a somewhat different questions and one that

i think we need to come to terms with. if you are sitting in our seats in those jobs and most of us had a turn at who is going to be the next rollback president, it was -- world bank president our job , not to lose that leadership, right? but it is going to be lost at some stage. the question is, will we do it in a way that preserves our ability to be a preeminent force in these institutions that are so important to us. it's very hard -- this is a great place for an aspen strategy group or a like-minded bipartisan group to come up with solutions because the sitting administration will always find it difficult to be the one to basically abdicate the seat. steve: i think, to say that you need to have a sort of redefinition of americans role does not mean it has to be redefined on every issue. susan and i would probably agree

that others would have a different view. i think it is very important, the financial area, just the development of the past few days. one thing i learned was the amount of resources that china was making available through -- is making available through their national banks, development inks, very quickly are going to dwarf what everybody else is doing and that is before you get the investment structure bank in other things. so, we can treat this as a threat and grudgingly sort of surrender some control, or it as an opportunity. we can view it as an opportunity. one of the opportunities that came out from the session on development that was very interesting and i think it was john podesta who described the developing world criticisms of the existing sort of bretton woods lending institutions. too conservative and all the rest.

of course there is a problem , with the chinese, they don't have the right kind of standard to make sure investments are done in a transparent, non-corrupt way and support the country. is there way that you can in some sense partner between the two, co-invest the between the two so we can use our institutions to get the chinese institutions to accept more international standards but also showed the resources that china seems to be willing to apply to the problem. that is the opportunity. we should be looking at those opportunities. they may turn out to be not in our interest. but not to be open to them i think would be a mistake. >> thank you. >> i am a washington swamp lord. [laughter]

tom: first of all it one to give a speech. you guys are good. i have worked with all five of you in various capacities. i thank you for your service. you have served your administrations well. first of all, nick, we hope it fulfills the nato agreement. >> for all of the wrong reasons, it it has. susan talked on cyber. that's a coming problem. first of all, is the cyber five attack an article attack -- first of all is the cyber attack an article five attack? where is nato on that? i think the obama administration does deeply into deeply intoove that. it would depend upon the nature of the attack and how destructive it might be, right? the general direction is to have the physical laws of the world apply in the digital world as

well. the point you're making his important, which is that this is a critical new domain of vulnerability for the united states and the world. coming from a number of sources. we have nationstates that are engaged and all manner of activity from informational warfare like russian activity to espionage to north korean actions against sony. we have hybrid organizations which are kind of in the second column of nationstates, hard to attribute. you have criminal gangs, right? who are engaged in this. you have vulnerabilities sure -- that you are employees bring to the workplace everyday that need to be addressed. with the country need to address this is a bigger issue. the last three or four times the , the dni when he has given his global report two the congress in a nonclassified presentation has said -- and i think actually

they said the number one threat , facing the country is in the cyber arena right now. when jim klapper first did this i said, are you sure about this? he said, i am sure about this. he turned out to be right. we are nowhere near, in terms of mind share, resources, expertise, anywhere in where we need to be in confronting this. it is very uneven. we have a ways to go. we have made a lot of progress but we have a ways to go. susan and the president requested a panel on cyber security last year. we had a number of conclusions including that we are nowhere near where we need to be. we have some real challenges coming just in the technology development area. we could have tens of billions of devices that could be hijacked by maligned actors and

used to attack systems. we have a lot of work in this area, tom, and it is very critical. >> yes, sir right here in the , third row, six people in. >> hello. i am bruce mcgarrett. i wonder, given our i think insulated view of ourselves and -- insulated view of ourselves and our economy in the world, what would germany and japan play as a role moving forward against russia and china and could they play a constructive role? >> i think, certainly in terms of germany, germany has been politically and diplomatically on the frontlines when it comes to the issue of ukraine. germany is a critical ally. but there is still a shadow of a

legacy of world war ii. germany and japan have a similar problem. they still a shadow of a legacy of world war ii. the germans far less than japan, but both it is a shadow that is perhaps not as much a problem for their neighbors as it is for them and their populations. when germans talk about germany, they do not like to talk about german power. i remember i was on the delegation that did the unification of germany. and when george w. bush would say george h bush to helmut kohl, he would say "within a unified europe." because germany was not supposed to act on its own. germany untethered from others was a problem. if somebody wants to say something really nasty they will say, "it is not brussels, it's berlin." so germany likes to have american partnership and what

they do to play the quite good role they can play in europe. in japan, even more so the case that there is still a lot of unhealed wounds from world war ii. again, because united states has been a partner for japan, japan has been able to play a role. so the united states does not get to retire from this role, either. if germany or japan is going to step up, it is always better in partnership with the united states just to keep the balance right in the region. >> susan, do have a comment on this? susan: i agree completely with what condi just said. [laughter] >> i would just add one note on in other administrations we tended to look toward britain , in the 70's, 80's, 90 as our primary partner.

in brexit and the weakening of their military, there is no question now i think, especially for susan and tom, germany has become our lead partner. one thing i think has been a problem with president trump is that he describes germany as an economic competitor and does not talk about it as our leading strategic partner in europe. angela merkel is our greatest ally in europe. if i could say one thing to donald trump it would be, you need a better relationship with a glut merkel. she -- with angela merkel. then you have right now. she is our key ally. if not, we're all in trouble because we will not have the anchor role they are playing. i think germany is absolutely critical. nick, i agree with your characterization completely. the other thing we need to commit to is the idea of europe that is strong and unified in shares our values. -- and shares our values. when we see what is going on in hungary and poland and you see

russia working very hard to exacerbate these divisions, then our challenge is magnified. and then we have to figure out how do we keep britain fully involved in how do we envision a future in which they might come back? >> this is what i think is very important, it is important to have this conversation with germany about the nature of an alliance. with the critical role that chancellor merkel has played. because we have not really, of late, been fully embracing of the european institution. we embraced a number of individuals and organizations and local parties who are -- we -- and political parties who would undermine these institutions, frankly. right? it is important to be more involved in europe. condi's point on the ukraine becoming involved in the mentor process, i think actually having a view on how the brexit negotiations should turn out.

-- the united states has a view of these things and we should not be shy about expressing those views, frankly. >> we have time for one more question. i would like to ask our panelists any final thoughts on american leadership? this is the core of what we are talking about this weekend. former member of congress jane harman is a member of our route. -- our group. she is our friend. thank you. >> thank you. fabulous panel. it is a multilevel conflict and the organizations they grew out of it is multilateral. yet president trump sees things much more in bilateral terms. by cutting out tpp he said he could cut better deals with the countries. my question is, is the bilateral approach a productive approach in an age like this?

>> and is it sufficient? this is a good final question for each of you and stick it -- and take it where you want to take it. if there issues you want to cover that we did not cover, please go ahead. >> i will answer jane's question in a roundabout way and start with something madeleine albright said. if i get it wrong, please stand up and correct me as you are free to do. americans do not much like multilateralism. it has too many syllables and ends with an "ism." [laughter] and that is the problem. look, we all grew up in the cold war era. we had the rules-based international order in our bones. we understood what happened in world war ii and the cold war. and how important that was in

era of peace and prosperity it ushered in. people now don't have that shared experience and we are not teaching them that history and they do not understand what we've really in our bones. -- what we feel in our bones. it spills over and terms of the issue of roles-based rules-based international order and america's role in the world. they haven't some sense grown up -- they have, in some sense grown up on the fear of 9/11 and , the lack of instant success in iraq and afghanistan. they do not understand what we did after world war ii in terms of germany and japan to help remake those countries as some of our most prosperous allies. so we have a huge gap in him for -- and if we are going to reassert american leadership in any form, if we're going to lead the process and revitalize international order, we have got to take the case to the american people.

i think we can because i think where there is a crossover point is what condi started off on. donald trump can reflect the american people's views that friends and allies need to do more. if we can say we're going to lead the process of adapting the international system which has as a cooler allies that will -- which has as its core allies , that will step up and will be allowed to step up and take more responsibility, i think we can sell that to the american people. >> on your question on bilateral versus multilateral trade negotiations, president obama led an organization to put together tpp and we pulled out. it was a terrible mistake economically and strategically because it was really part of what i talked about earlier which was the u.s. presence which has been the work of multiple administrations on a bipartisan basis for a long time.

pulling that economic presence out, that alternative if you will to other things, is a critical mistake. it will takes years to replace it. indeed condoleezza rice talked , about the nafta agreement. it is quite a thing. we are importing a number of the concepts for the modern economy that we developed with the tpp negotiations. it is quite a thing. on the leadership issue, i think there are two things. one is, she is exactly right. there needs to be a full appreciation and endorsement by leaders of the international order of the united states and have a keen explanation and presentation of what that has provided. last point, the west and the democracies have to work, right? and, they have to work for a broader part of our population and at the end of the day, if

you did and assets and liabilities chart. there are a lot of financial people in this room. we have a long list of assets. on the liability side is the future of work and expanding prosperity. at the end of the day, that may be the most important thing after national security. -- the most important thing for our national security. >> jane, to your question whether the economics or securities sphere, i think nick was hinting with his reformulation the question was necessary but are from sufficient. -- but far from sufficient. if you do not like the term "multilateralism," i would prefer the term "collective action." we need that whether we're talking about terrorism, pandemic flu, proliferation, or cyber threats or climate

change, failed states all of , these are challenges that only can be dealt with effectively through collective action. more often than not, it is us against the pack which is the -- it is us leading the pack which is the whole point of how our leadership is so indispensable. it is both/and. i share the implied concern in your question, which is that if we look at everything through a bilateral lens, which is inherently forcing one into a transactional mode, then we are back to the mentality that i fear is undermining our leadership. the last point i would make, i think one of the threats to the liberal world order into -- and to american leadership is our own domestic politics and the fact that we are now so internally divided that we cannot even agree on the necessity of responding to a critical pernicious external threat with russia being the most proximate example.

we have got to get our act together internally, domestically, or we will be absentingng -- ourselves from international politics and that is not something we can face. [applause] >> can i just say before condi answers, one of the things walter and jim bob and others have done is, can aspen be a convening place? can we overcome these divisions? there is a direct question the between that. it is a great point. >> i think it takes both and actually, multilateralism is really bilateral is some strong together. -- is bilateral is him strung together. i think it takes both. some of the great institutions

we created our ones in which we believe that collective action would bring about a positive sum game not a zero sum game. that was the great insight after world war ii. to do that, it takes confidence. it takes confidence for the united states to enjoy 55%, 60% of the world's gdp to say, we're not going to protect that. we're going to build a free trading system in which everyone can prosper. it is the confidence and which -- with the soviet union and with half of europe exploding a weapon five years ahead of schedule in 1949 to say we're going to take a pledge and you bet we will trade if necessary new york for london. that is the confidence. what i am concerned about is our confidence these days. it is a part that the american people are wondering how much longer does this have to go on but the american people also do not like what they see when we

do withdraw. they do not like seeing syrian babies joke on gas. -- choke on gas. seeing peoplee beheaded on television as isis rises. they don't like to see the russians on the march. there is something to appeal to americans to say, yes, i know we have been added a long time but -- we have been at it a long time but we cannot retire. but the confidence piece of it i am concerned about because i think what we are really saying -- seeing is a split between those who are moving easily and capably in this global elite and those who are not. if i teach a course in stanford at the business school, i will have a student with roughly the following characteristics. born in chile, went to college in oxford, first job in shanghai, now they are in graduate school in berkeley and their next job will be in dubai. they moved easily around the world.

in fact most people never move , more than 25 years -- miles from where they were born. we are getting a flip the -- a split between aspirations, fears, prospects of people were are moving easily in this globalized environment and those being left behind. those who do not have the skills and cannot keep up and cannot find a way to the dignity that comes with a decent job, they are saying no. -- they are saying do you hear me now. if we are continuing down a road in which we're going to have third graders who cannot read and 18-year-olds who cannot find a job and 50-year-old who are opioid-addicted we're going to be two countries. one capable, one not. for a country held together not by ethnicity or -- you can come -- or from humble circumstances,

do right things doesn't matter where you come from, matters where you're going. that split will be devastating and then we are not going to lead because we are not going to lead from confidence. this starts at home. i want to underscore -- this starts at home. not america first. that is terminology i do not like. but it does start at home because it was a confident america that built the liberal order and it has to be a confident america that sustains it. [applause] >> wonderful. thank you for being here. walter, thank you for convening us. thank you. [applause]

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> this morning, the mexico chief trade negotiator talks about the upcoming negotiations on nafta. we joined the event from the wilson center live the getting at 9:00 a.m. eastern on c-span

two, online at www.c-span.org and streaming on our free c-span radio app. this week at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span, tonight, the future of the internet. the white house interim chief digital officer. >> we are talking about how certain platforms came to provide people with information that reaffirms what they already think. it's not like facebook said -- you are conservative, i think you're conservative, i will show you conservative content. they said i will show you things on the people you know. i will show you content from the pages you like. when you start clicking on those things, i will figure out whose content you seem to like and keep showing more of that. had facebook not done that, we would not be having this conversation because they would not have grown to the scale to which they grew. >> wednesday come a form on the changing world of cities.

here the former mayor of rio de janeiro. >> i think cities will play a major role of fighting against populists. cities can change representatives. it's a great machine to change what is going on. thursday, an in-depth look at the opioid epidemic including the ohio attorney general who is suing several drug companies for their marketing of opioid painkillers. >> what is different about this drug problem we have is how pervasive it is. it is absolutely everywhere. it is in our smallest communities, our cities, it's in our most affluent suburbs. >> friday, a conversation with supreme court justice elena kagan. >> you said we are not a pure democracy, where a constitutional democracy and that man said the judiciary has an important role to play in

policing the boundaries of all the other branches. that can make the judiciary and set of people when they say to a governor or president or congress that you cannot do that because it's just not within your constitutional power. >> watch this week at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span and www.c-span.org and listen using the free c-span radio app. c-span,today on "washington journal" is next. then government efficiency and reorganization. thomasup in an hour, joe from charlottesville, virginia city's role for ground zero of white nationalists who oppose the removal of confederate statues. at 8:30 a.m., i news correspondent talks about what comes next after president trump

declared the opioid crisis a national emergency. later at nine a look at minorities and health care disparities with the kaiser health foundation. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016]] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] host: good morning. it's tuesday, august 15, 2017. yesterday afternoon, president trump again addressed the deadly violence that took place in charlottesville, virginia, over the weekend, calling out the kkk, neo-nazi common sense the racism they represent. but those found the number of such groups are increasing around the country. this morning on the "washington journal," we want to know what you think maybe behind the rise in hate groups. we split our phone lines by age for this morning's discussion. if you're under 30 years old, phone number for you, 202-748-8000. you're 30 years old to 50 years old,