tv North Korea Nuclear Program CSPAN September 18, 2017 12:21pm-2:01pm EDT
still see that starting the populace wave or you could go back to barry goldwater in 1964. the way i trace it back in this -- is to 2008.8 many people began to rethink their loyalties. there were a lot of things that happened in 2008 politically. have a sarah palin populist nomination for vice president. she really launches the tea party movement. what is so striking to look back is we cover it at the time and it was based on fiscal policies and a smaller government. it has morphed into something that is not about that. it is more about the rage from the recession and rage about the unrest in american life. that is the real storm that still exists, not the tea party . sarah palin
jong-un. how did we get here? one argument that is made explaining the resilience of the kim regime is the fact that eastern europeans witnessed other political systems, good, bad terrible. the regime is truly the result three vision of totalitarian political systems. all, korea was under japanese occupation. made isment that is that this dictatorship of the
regime is truly the result of free totalitarian political systems. we know for sure is this is a criminal regime. in february, a you and tomission submitted a report the human rights council -- a report that found what is happening in north korea amounts to crimes against humanity. perfect human a rights record. only one country in the face of the planet where there are prison camps and that is north korea. women,re 120,000 men, and children being held in
prison camps, up to three generations of the same family. this is the only country on the face of the planet that classifies its own citizens based on their perceived degree of loyalty to the regime. there is a core class. , theres a wavering class is a hostile class. many of those classified as hostile have been sent to political prison camps. many of them have vanished to remote areas and parts of north korea. the abuse happening at north
isea's detention facilities absolutely unbelievable. ,e've had numerous accounts .ublix -- starvation the prisoners are subjective to a vicious cycle of forced labor and induced malnutrition. system ofe this vast unlawful imprisonment as truly at the heart of darkness he. as toback to the question how this regime has stayed in power for so long, they have anniversaryhe 70th of the dprk. as the general mentioned earlier, i was on and raise in communist romania.
someone country that came closest to kim jong-un's north .orea certainly, romania was a very oppressive regime. some of us remember the for aous secret police population of 23 million in 1989. for a similar population of 25 million, there are 270,000 korea's mainth internal agencies. has 50,000epartment agents. the ministry of public security that executes political 210,000 ins well,
the military security command whose mission is to keep an eye on officers, senior officers in particular, 10,000 agents. in romania, there were half a million informers and north korea, each and every individual andto become an informer report on family, friends, neighbors. each and every north korean has to participate in the neighborhood watch system. each and every north korean has to participate in weekly indoctrination sessions were people confess to their in criticism.gage
-- others criticize them and go on and on and on. truly the life of a north korean is lived under an overwhelming coercion, control, surveillance and punishment which means a level of social cohesion is very low. it difficult for people to get together to organize and discuss . torea continues restrict information coming into the country and also information --ting out of the country
what was the age of the revolution? late teens, early 20's? at the age of the revolution, each and every young man in north korea is in a military uniform for 10 years. also, many of the women spend six years in a military uniform. i have spoken with numerous north koreans whose sons have come back from the military after having spent 10 years. they said all the they had lived under this permanent indoctrination, the level of indoctrination that their sons have been subjected to was frightening, even to a north korean living in north korea. of thetime they are out military, the age of revolution
has already passed. i would be sitting in resetting the obvious if i said north korea today is different from north korea 10 to 20 years ago. in the mid to late 1990's between 600,000 and 3 million north koreans starved to death or died from disease due to attrition. reasonppens -- the main that affect the people of north korea was the well international aid was coming in, the kim regime chose to focus its resources on its strategical course as which is of we know by now, survival. --s regime does not want does not want its people to die
by the millions, but if that is what it takes to stay in power, it would do it in the blink of an eye and this is what happened in the 1990's. been some, there have positive side effects. first informers, many more north koreans have escaped the country. as of a couple of weeks ago, koreanere 30,800 north defectors living in south korea. there are 220 north korea defectors indiana state -- in the united states. through them, we have learned the truth about what is all, i willd after take the liberty of saying the work of organizations such as ours is the work that the kim
regime fears the most or if we find out the truth and tell the truth of north korea. of course, the regime cares about it pocketbook and legitimacy. if we bring up nuclear weapons once, we should bring up human rights five times. every time we dressed nuclear -- address nuclear weapons -- nuclear weapons have become an essential part of the very identity of the regime. nuclear weapons are in their constitution and every time we mention human rights at the u.n. , this results in undermining the legitimacy of the regime. at think one has to keep in mind the fundamental objective of
this regime is survival. is an absolute monopoly on .ower inside north korea if there are no competitors. it is the kim regime in only the kim regime. the main competitor is south korea, free, democratic prosperous republic of north korea. as preposterous as this may sound, this regime understands that the long-term guarantee of -- own vinyl is to establish have we seen any positive developments the past two decades? to belly, they tended
economy as an exchange with rations. they were no longer able to feed its people. small markets were established so ever since, we've seen a process of informal marketization curtis or a farmer's markets, black markets, open market. many more people depend on the market today than they do on the public distribution system which is still active for those living in the capital city. lives in the capital junkof don young -- p on -- one might say and of course i also have a memories of romania
where there was a lot of construction, but very little economic utility. regime has invested heavily in these high-profile projects and the same time if one takes a look at pictures from one year ago, typhoon lionrock affected north korea. i remembered pictures published in north korea's propaganda, if remember, there were pictures of men in recovery efforts. they had no tools. operates,w the regime -- first and foremost on
aspects that are critical to its survival is not the ordinary people of north korea. markets, nothe having to defend on the public distribution system, the regime not being able to control its own people is certainly a positive development. the other positive development is that social dynamics are somehow changing in north korea, slowly but surely. famine,ast prior to the light used to be centered on two places. the workplace in the place of residence. the workplace is always a side. nobody gets to choose the in north korea. on paper, everybody has to be employed in north korea.
as one has to punch and come punch out. they have to participate in a line of mobilization campaigns. this is primarily why women are the main actors in north korea's markets. social markets, this is not a society that thrives on trust. deep distrust is everywhere. however, since there's nowhere , all of or borrow money comingarket transactions from china in the border area and wholesale market in regional markets, most of these executed basede on trust so perhaps one development that might take time.
it bit of trust more than before is developing. that is not to say the regime of jong-unn is less -- kim is less than the father or grandfather. my organization, the committee for human rights in north korea has identified several trends. we have identified these trends based on our research imagery,gy, satellite testimony by defectors and in the same age given technological advances that we can benefit from, we even have access to sources inside the country. we've all heard about the purge that has been going on in since
-- just minutes before. you are talking about a machine gunsystem for machine barrels, 50 caliber automatic fire, human body such as polarized. they are into pink mist. people of religion were exterminated. these officials who were executed or even denied the fundamental rights of leaving anybody -- a body behind. north korea is bound by the universal declaration of human rights.
the women's convention, children's convention in yet even -- each and every human right is finally did in north korea. diplomatic has zero presently given all the engagement that is broken. as far as we're concerned, human rights organizations, we will continue to tackle the toughest issue first. -- use the same terminal 2.
-- first human element, we were talking about. still talking about it. -- the center for national interests, thank you for the invitation. this is a very important subject. the president will be speaking tomorrow to include north korea. greg'sfollow up on what presentation was focused on and that is human rights, criminality. let me follow up on that. september, 2005 we had a joint statement with north korea. it took a number of years to come up with this joint statement in the joint statement and that north korea
is the father, committing to comprehensive verifiable dismantlement of all their nuclear programs. we made that very clear to the north koreans and in return for the outcome of a be getting the security of economic development assistance, against the -- eventually light water reactors. was formedclear that normalizations. i remember a discussion where they said if we denuclearize comprehensively, that does not lend itself to normalizations because united states this is their major objective. i said no, there are other issues. in the actions for actions.
denuclearize, they would get the security assurances. then there are bilateral issues. .ots of human rights issues , human the united states rights. we need transparency on human rights issues. onneed to see some progress what you're doing with human rights. relations,ave normal this is criminal behavior. ,e need to see progress elimination.
these become bilateral .iscussions korea committed to verifiable -- agree with you more in the human rights issue and that has always been a strong element of our dialogue that the japanr -- south korea, and certainly their allies russia and china. ted september 2005, let me go back a few years because it took us about two years to get to that point. the first meeting was august 2003. becauseer that vividly
in april 2003, we were at a -- they pulled out those -- out of the npt. they did not have to do much intelligence on these issues and they were doing that. it was our secretary of state who went to his counterpart in verylook, this is getting up to the north koreans and that was the dialogue that happened in 2005 which established the process so the north koreans and discussedble it. it was the beginning of the process. the first meeting i mentioned was in august. i remember one of my first meetings at the talks was a
statement that rings very true today as it did in 2003 were , except that we will be in nuclear weapons state and americans need to accept that and understand that and we can be good friend of the united states and if you accept that. latest gentlemen, they have not walked away from that issue. and as great indicated -- greg , a nuclear weapons stage and they are pursuing that. that has been their goal and limit just go back -- that fell apart at the end of 2008 four very clear reason.
toexpected our monitors verify adherence to denuclearize . earlier, we had the commitment. they were not put it in writing -- would not put it in writing. that was the beginning of the end. the in of that was in 2002 when uraniumrea was with the enrichment program. basically, there's not much you can do about it. and thes to north korea
reactors being built. they still wanted a second path. committedhey were not and were totally not compliant. there were pieces there that speak to where we are today in 2017. where we the process had our secretary of state madeleine albright meeting with kim jong-un. we had some significant developments, but they eventually all fell apart as it is right now. as we have experience with over .6 missile launches
this is a critical issue to our president and all others saying -- it is a north korea that has pursued very vigorously. chemical capabilities, biological capabilities, looking at the conventional weapons they have. we are talking about a very tense. . i mentioned 2003. think of where we are right now. to 40sessment is up nuclear warheads. this is north korea.
korea that has sold nuclear technology to countries like syria. north koreans -- we have seen it with the missile transfers to iran, libya, syria. this is to make money. this is what keeps their program going, getting the revenue necessary so that is why i'm a believer in sanctions. sanctions get north korea to denuclearize? i think some of us say no, but sanctions bite and it touches them.
i think the last resolution was a very powerful one. it took about 30% and of the basically -- we are talking about $750 million textiles. things -- ae doing joint military exercise. only are they americans, the prelude to innovation. the decapitation of leadership. when you say why defensive, when you look back, you can go back to 1966 when they had a commando -- the coldat the's house.
we can go back to 1993 when they had a commando team coming in to take the leadership down are you irma. there airlines, 1988, were number of issues. . us and all many of of us in the room would say it is very distasteful. the succession of the military exercises if we want north korea to hold is freeze. those missile launches are in violation of the yuan security council resolutions.
what our secretary of state has a yourearly is separation. that with at to do gun to her head. we don't want to do it where they are launching missiles and having nuclear attacks. stop which are doing and if they go on for weeks, stop for a week. timeline and some during those talks, make a decision whether it would be --sible to reconstitute certainly to improve allies and maybe expand them. is that possible?
it is not a condition to stop. that is cold common courtesy. picked up onas not that. where -- that is the ability to deliver a continental lessig missile to the united states and ensuring that reentry vehicle does not burn up on reentry. that is looking at a best case scenario. it does not mean that is what is going to happen. it does not mean they are going waited, whend to
i don't doubt that kim jong-un is a rational actor from where he sits, but from where we sit, we need to be aware of the threat he poses to our allies and the yet it states. there is another piece to nuclear weapons as i mentioned. i mentioned illicit activities to make money. nuclear weapons in north korea, except how many maintain in north korea as a nuclear weapons state would be a accepting north korea as a nuclear weapons state would be a disaster. have an extended nuclear deterrence commitment to our allies. they know that. the fact is, with north korea retaining those nuclear weapons, it would be an impetus to get your own deterrent capabilities, our own nuclear capability and that is a reality.
there is also another reality. a miscalculation, misinformation, confusion or the sale of the proliferation issue. proliferation issue. syriauclear reactor in that was taken out in 2007. there is no doubt there was money transacted, there. now with the possibility of a nuclear weapon system, material out there, this is not where we want to go. let me end on this point. when all the president's options are on the table, i mentioned secretary of state rex tillerson offering exploratory talks to determine if negotiations could be reconstituted. just don't have a nuclear test while we are having these discussions. seems reasonable. north korea is not there because they want to prove that they have that capability of being a
real existential threat to the is to haveher option these missiles and nuclear warheads and they have their statements that come out of pyongyang. or the u.s. a sea of ashes. youtube detecting the nuclear event in washington and what have you. preemptive strikes. if there is a missile launch, as a imminent threat -- viewed as a imminent threat to the u.s. or its allies. i think it is clear that not only is this something we should do, it we have an obligation to protect our nation, our people, our allies, their people if it is a imminent threat. there is no ambiguity in that.
if there is a imminent threat, you have the authority, the obligation to do something. that is a preemptive strike. if there is a missile launch and north korea understands -- has to understand this. there is no way the u.s. is going to sit here and watch that. that is why we have the joint military exercises and that is why the sanctions are trying to compel or convince north korea to cease the missile launches and tests. so far, to no avail. sensetive makes eminent and north korea has to understand that. if you react to that, any untoward way, there will be further consequences. all options are on the table, which makes it a very critical period. let me just end on this. although nuclear weapons are part of the constitution of
pyongyang and we see the markets because of public distribution, nuclear weapons are there, economic development is there. the opportunity to come back because if north korea is still committed and still wants to have normal relations with the united states, which they said they wanted in 2003. , meeting withew them at continuing to meet with them is that they do want a normal relation, but they want it on their terms. this is a nuclear weapons state and they said they will be a good one and i believe that is the case right now and i have heard that close to a year ago. the fact of the matter is, we are saying you could be a good friend, and our allies, if you behave and it does not come with nuclear weapons and it does not
come with illicit activities and it does not come with abuse -- abusive human rights violations. >> thank you for the presentations. i think we can tell that not only is there deep experience with north korea sitting here at the front table, but there is the emotion attached to this. we will open it up for questions. we are on the record and we are on tv. if you want to ask a question or make a comment, let me know somehow and tell us who you are and what your affiliation is and we will go from there. you for your presentation. i am a strategist for the u.s. navy. but has been made about kim being -- much has been made
about kim being a rational actor. failure, soa abject what does this do to his mentality? does it have an effect at all or do they just not care? >> i think he would view himself as not a failure, but as a significant success and he is looking for a legacy as a young man of 33, 34, establishing north korea with -- as a nuclear weapons state. he probably feels he is at the cost of getting others to recognize and accept. we realize what he has, but accept that he has a nuclear weapon. that plays a little into the economic issue that greg so eloquently spoke about, where he is committing those private plots and private markets. reminiscent of china in the 70's with the revolution coming out of the great leap.
to let that go on because the public situation is doing so poorly. given that we have seen this massive purchase, practically all four fundamental building blocks of the regime have been purged. even the inner core of the executedoth the uncle, , the half-brother assassinated with vx nerve agent and international airport. those around kim jong-un will be afraid to deliver bad news to the supreme leader and this might result in miscalculation. kim jong-un not being able to accurately assess those accomplishments that he is so
keen on, along the policy line. wall. sir, against the preemptive war was mentioned. in a situation where the united states thought an immediate threat was coming, but there has also been talk about preemptive korea simply deny north the ability to strike the united states with a icbm. do either one of you think that is a realistic option? what would that scenario look like? how many people would die in ?outh korea and elsewhere is that realistic? >> greg, if you would like to start and i will pass it to you. >> the term i was using was preemptive.
that would be a preemptive strike against a imminent threat. i emphasize imminent threat to a united states or ally. left of that would be a preventive strike, to prevent them from having the capability of doing any ring of threatening the u.s. or an ally. with ally, i think preemptive and declaratory policy, north korea and the missile launches they have had, and the nuclear test they have had, i think anyone who is advising kim jong-un that the u.s. will not just sit there and is obligated and we will not just permit that to happen. something will be done to intercept or destroy the threat and that is the preemption sign. preventing is going in to prevent them from even having the capability to threaten now that -- threaten an ally or the
united states. kim jong-un would have to be very cautious on how he responds. they may do it on the northern limit line. , but heo something needs to understand, he is provoking a response, a necessary response. , where you are going in and going after infrastructure, deny the capability of even threatening is something else, and i think kim jong-un becomes more of his own player. actor who more of a we really can't understand his reaction to. my personal view on that would be he and his military people would react in a very significant way. indicative ofre
the fact that they feel they have been threatened significantly and attacked in a way. having said that, i think kim jong-un and those advising him have to understand he is at the others would make the case you cannot just wait for an imminent threat because that imminent threat would have to be delwin and are you waiting too long? you know there will eventually be an imminent threat, the you have to respond beforehand to prevent that from happening, and that is the issue right now. going into a different category of not just prevention, but prevention from those, from an actor who possibly or likely would be doing something of an imminent nature that would threaten us or our allies.
let me try and add something on this. 1993, we have gone through the same cycle of options every time north korea acts out. caused an analyst in this situation to characterize north korea as a land with lousy options. one is preemptive attack and then we decide the debt is too costly. is negotiations and agreements, north korea cheats on those and then there are sanctions. we always seem to settle on sanctions as the safe resort. that if an argument sanctions are truly effective, then they by definition are affecting the stability and longevity of the regime, so you get to another very risky situation.
another interesting question to contemplate is that our allies, the republic of korea and japan, have been under a existential threat for some time. we are now fully exercise because of the eminence of a existential threat to the united states. of if our a question allies are to continue to believe in our guarantees of extended deterrence, what do we do to make sure that they believe this is rock solid? there is a case to be made that a ballistic missile nuclear threat to the united states fundamentally changes things to say the least. when he did take other actions to shore up our deterrence in the far east, and it has been most famously stated the, including to the chinese, that if you cannot or will not help
us to restrain north korea, then we have no other alternative but to enhance our alliance capabilities. you may find that destabilizing, but this is not about you, this is about our vital interests and we are going to stand by our allies and that means moving capabilities and enhancing our alliance capabilities to guarantee we are doing the best we can to protect our allies against this threat we find so discomforting to the united states. there are no easy answers to this thing. earlier, oned thread of an answer. greg mentioned about more information getting into north korea. it is interesting that in the wake of the shelling of non-p young go -- there was a large degree of political unrest in south korea.
they were angry at their government for not having any response options to provocation. provocation options were developed. the next incident was the placement of landmines on the southern side of the dmz that maimed some repeat look -- republic of korea soldiers. the option the r.o.k. chose to retaliate for that deadly force incident was to turn the loudspeakers on the dmz back on, broadcasting information into north korea. the north koreans reacted really vigorously. this bothered them. wedge, a.b. be there is a crack we can develop, more and more information getting into north korea may be one of the hooks we have for change. greg spoke eloquently about human rights. what are the strongest suits we have is pushing that, because we
are speaking to populations by going right past the leadership in a autocratic society. we are the country that stared down the state -- the soviet union over decade. deterrence may be amongst all the military options available, strengthening our deterrence may be the best option but it remains to be seen. after that, when it comes to information campaigns, i think can only comege from the people of north korea, themselves. we need to tell them three fundamental stories. the story of the outside world, especially the story of three, prosperous, democratic south korea. the story of the corruption of their own leadership, particularly of the kim family regime and the story of the rome
human rights violations, which they do not sincerely understand, living under such a regime. >> very good as always. is you laidering me down the dilemmas, not a whole lot in terms of actual solutions. if i am called into admiral harrises office or general mattis's office and asked what do we do, i am still casting a lot of folks talk about preemptive strikes of one sort or another. i wonder if that horse is out of that'sn, to lake because
too late because of the number of weapons the north has now that are usable. it does not take much imagination, to even see a very quote unquote, successful preemptive strike on the missile installations and all that creating a desperate sort of bring the house down around us mentality and you start having nuclear weapons going off in south korea. the level of carnage and damage that is fully credible under any military scenario strikes me as just off the charts. if it is viable at all, it is probably viable for a few weeks. at what point do the north koreans announced they mastered and can landology a icbm in new york city and say they will demonstrate it?
at that point, it is over in terms of preemptive strikes. eitheru are left with is physically cutting a deal very much on kim jong-un's terms of ok, we will give you certain recognitions in the name of preventing some catastrophe, or you end up with a mutually assured destruction, heavy investment in missile defense and hunker down and essentially resent kim jong-un with the message ok, you've been successful and developed all the systems. they aren't strategically worth much because we now have credible defensive capabilities that we can basically neutralize it and that is the only avenue left, it strikes me. >> cannot comment on that? -- can i comment on that? north korea makes it very clear
that that there and that's that they are building nuclear deterrence and they have made it clear since 2003, when they got on this path of building nuclear weapons, that their nuclear arsenal is to -- is for deterrence purposes. when you are sitting down with look at what to they say and what they are doing, but they are saying this vitriolic commentary, this is hyperbolic rhetoric and we have to believe what you have. if you are a threat to the u.s. and its allies and you have the ability to launch nuclear events, you are right on, joint military exercises, missile defense, secondary sanctions for anyone who is dealing in and as north korea becomes more isolated and that is where the u.n. comes in and the international community writ large, what they have done is
they have truly alienated china. we have not mentioned china in this discussion. this is not something china is very pleased with, not only because of the 19th congress coming up next month, because disrespectfuleen to the prc and to the president and totally discounts the concerns that are coming there. china has a lot of leverage and that was the last sanctions that we were talking about, the crude oil, over 90% from china. 85% of the trade. option as thet general said, but let me say many of the analyst to look at north korea say if they launch a missile and put a nuclear warhead on it, that is the end of the country and i think the country understand that.
survival is the key for that nation. however, when you are commander in chief and you have to look at the realities, we have to consider all of those options, all those pieces on the table. that is the value of exploratory , although most people would wonder why negotiations again, theailed in 1991, 2005 secretary of state visit. why would you even consider that? we want to do is stop the process. it is logical. you don't want them having another nuclear test. you don't want them to have another icbm launched. as you just said so correctly, the possibility of miscalculation is there and that could precipitate something. >> you did not mention your visit to north korea with bill clinton.
as a negative -- as a negotiation success. i was involved in the arranging of president clinton to get the journalists back and i think this is something that kim jong-il wanted. he one of the visit of a former president. a president he thought was making progress with, when they andthe secretary's visit the possibility of a clinton visit, except for what happened in the middle east. for kim jong-il, i think that was the point. >> it looks like it was our high point. yes ma'am? >> congressional quarterly. what do you think of the possibility of or the method for obtaining to confliction conversations with china over what to do in the event of any
range of incidents in north sure weoth to make don't inadvertently touch off world war iii with china, but also as a means of pressuring north korea. should the potential talks with china be kept quiet? >> a good question. we had our chairman of the joint chiefs in china, secretary mattis, rex tillerson, a lot of discussions with the chinese. certainly our ambassadors to the united states -- united nations has been discussing with their counterpart. the chinese are not happy with what has been going on with north korea. there is a lot going on. there is a lot that is public and i'm sure there is a lot that is not public and that is encouraging. china pressuring north korea, i'm not sure if pressure is the
right word. i don't think kim jong-un responds well to pressure from china. he is showing independence and how he is his own person, but i think china could truly, using economic terms, put that pressuring on. if you cut back on crude oil going into north korea, that is key and it was not coincidental that in 2003 when the north koreans came to the table, for they said the u.s., mechanical reasons, the pipeline from china to north korea providing the crude oil was an operative -- was inoperative. i think china can get north korea to the table to have exploratory talks. talk.s is a frustrating venture -- we are
a very strong argument can be made that we have to do something. preventative, preemptive, whatever. europese, our lives in were as concerned about stalin as they are in japan and south korea concerned about kim. itcan do it -- we didn't do and we know what we didn't do it, because we couldn't. we could not without acceptable risk of measured military confrontation in europe. the solution was deterrence. solution, a perfect -- mccarthy thought it was
it just was discovered that deterrence was the only practical solution available, and if we strengthened deterrence and today, combined deterrence with sanctions, can't of things welot need? not everything we want, what we really need. withrence in combination sanctions, can it satisfy our minimum requirements? >> from where i stand, especially since you have made that comparison with eastern certainly this is one possibility that will be on the table, but going back to the content of my presentation accept today, how do we
a kim regime that is doing all of these terrible things to its own people, perhaps on a scale much greater than what was happening during the stalin days. semblanceere be any of trust if we were would we leave the other issues completely off the table?when we address them ? would it be done? under what context? ofhaps under the context something along the lines of the helsinki accords. but wouldn't that simply further legitimize the kim regime? >> thank you. very good point. i do not disagree with you.
i totally agree. i think deterrence is very important. there is always the possibility, we have the extended deterrence commitment to our allies in south korea and japan. i think it would be impotent for nuclearhave their own weapons capabilities and i hope to see the dialogue starting now. i think other countries will be saying we need our own deterrence capabilities. i think our ability to isolate and watch north korea closely to make sure there is no proliferation is another issue. possibility.is a the negatives on that would be in the potential of a nuclear arms race, miscalculation. -- weoking at the idea of are looking at the idea of nuclearing the weapons, north korea is not there. analysts are saying they are not giving it up.
we're hoping to stop it with talks and to determine if there th to moving forward.\ the truth is, we don't know the dynamics within north korea. some people were eliminated. why were they eliminated? loyal, they have a different point of view, where they isolated? in the information gets in and they look at their brethren, they say, my god. why not us? there are some other imperatives frommay come to fruition within the country. last year, i was able to participate in a conference in
europe, in which north korean officials were present. that is always an experience in it of itself. one of the comments are caught everyone's attention from the leader of the north korean matter of was that fact assertion that we have the united states deterred. that, i reflect upon think that probably is right. whenever --cades -- whateverth korea north korea do something outrageous, we have never laid a glove on them. as a former naval officer, the snatching of the pueblo comes to posturing. that is it has never had a consequence.
it is not surprising north korea after all these decades have come to the judgment that, yes, we have the americans deterred and the south koreans very good reason to dmitry just laid out. the consequences of taking action runs the risk of starting another korean war with terrible loss of life. while joe's arguments of trying to get negotiation is perfectly good sense, it strikes me we make sure as best we can that the north koreans think we have them deterred. and 30 the exercises, and a nuclear posture review the that undoesot --
the last wave of nuclear weapons. what happens if north korea uses a nuclear weapon and say in a way that is not cloaked in ambiguous language but in very makefic ways to try to -- make it less self assured. begin the discussion of making sure they understand that we think they are also deterred. >> that is a good point. >> jim keith. thank you, mike. i am a retired american diplomat and a current business associate. just to take this path of
deterrence and containment a bit further, what does the u. imply?cy what does china have to do now to end up on the right side of the payment -- detainment? to do to convince kim jong-un that we actually are during them? >> i think those are excellent points. agree on theof us sentience side -- sanctions side, they need to up their game. they need to ensure they are not dealing with north korea on illicit type of transactions to implement sanctions.
there is no way the u.s. can do that. this is really china's issue. when they see the secondary sections, i think china -- i think we have their correct attention and i don't think anyone sees it as malicious. this is something we need to do detain north korea. to ensure the sanctions are abiding and so forth. no, i think your points are right on. were getting at -- and i think it is really sally and -- is china cannot be happy -- salient -- is china cannot be happy with the joint military exercises that are -- that include japan and possibly australia bring a strategic forces into the region. these are not issues china wants to see. -- this is notst what they want.
when they are looking at the south and east china sea, they are domestic issues. send thisny would becomes more of -- i think many would say this becomes more of a way for china to become more proactive since they are implementing coal and other sanctions and but even more proactive on other entities in china and dealing with north korea. -- in china dealing with north korea. they do have leverage with north korea. using some of that leverage to get north korea -- i hate to use the term, but when you say this to the north koreans, to better behaved, they don't like that. it is like speaking to a child. i think north korea has to understand it is not a question of behaving, it is a question of threatening your allies. the united states. that is the behavior we are
talking about. i think china continues to be key. but what china is telling us is we have to be more proactive. patience had its place e initially. when you are not talking to the north koreans -- i think if anyone did a study on north itea, when you see that no is negotiating talking to north koreans, they are on their. they are building more nuclear -- they are on their own path. they are building more nuclear weapons. i think there is value with china it using it as leverage and seeing where we can go. and then deterrence and all the other things. >> now that we brought in china, it is a perfect intervention by
ambassador roy. >> thank you. i am actually not from a deal directly with china, although this is part of the problem. thank you very much for the terrific presentations. you have convincingly established we are dealing with regime in north korea. you also demonstrated it is probably the most frustrating foreign policy problem we face. problems, iting generated a lot of nonsense. [laughter] asmic ll sorts of concepts of how we deal with the question. the reason why china does not provide the convincing answer to
it is crystal clear the north korean nuclear program is designed as a deterrent to the united states, which sees the principal threat to it. keep reminding them we are the principal threat because we keep putting military options out on the table, either them -- either implicitly or currently going to about having military options out there. we clearly need some additional safety about this. some thoughts to put out on the table. the first problem is to probably stabilize the situation. about deterrence and containment effectively if you have an unstable situation. to get a stable situation, you have to have programs. you have to somehow get a hold halt to missile
testing. he cannot do that through sanctions unless miraculously the north koreans change their behavior or collapse, which is probably not a good policy or section to proceed on. therefore, you have to give them something. here, the contradiction emerges. with --ot get to this except within a realistic timeframe, and that timeframe is probably decades. it is decades because it requires whether the receipt -- theer the regime changes, attitudes have to change. they have to be willing to consider the trade-offs between giving up a no longer necessary deterrence and the economic benefits that they can take advantage of if they had a regime that could open up to the
outside world. they cannot of the economic benefits because the regime cannot take advantage. your priorities after the stabilization, and that means the program has to be up there. we keep taking it off the table, elements that go into getting a cap. we say we cannot do about exercises. we end up with the same contradictions that, for 20 havingprevented us from something high priority on our side. missile defense does not do the trick. ourile defense destabilizes nuclear relations with china and the soviet union -- with russia. you create a bigger problem in the process of trying to deal with the north korean problem. the collateral aspects of the north korean problem are deterrence works. we know that i terms of state actors.
despicableorea is a regime, the more the sanctions were, the more desperate they input orr any cash other inputs they can get. that means is they have a nuclear capability, the danger of them getting this into the hands of actors that cannot be deterred becomes a big thing. the second is the danger that north korea is a regime that has no respect anywhere in the world and, therefore, to permit that type of regime to continue at a nuclear status well respectable regimes do not have nuclear weapons creates a big problem. therefore, there is no question the pressures for proliferation will get worse. we need a more effective way of dealing with that them the simple old structure, which in the modern world no longer has a credible basis for it.
which is some countries will have nuclear weapons in some countries agree they will not have nuclear weapons. that is broken down because technology is widespread and countries are technically capable of getting nuclear weapons now. we have already seen that. our prioritization isn't quite right. negotiate denuclearization because that has zero credibility. then, we have to live with a despicable regime for an indefinite. indefinite period of time. hopefully, changes in the regime create an opportunity to try to deal with it. is that possible? impossible?
not necessarily. iran is an example. they wanted to and their isolation and we were able to better thanequate, nothing nuclear agreement with the iranians. it was a basis for negotiation. of the moment, we do not a credible basis for negotiations with the north koreans. it seems to me we have to structure those elements together. increase oury frustration if we keep putting this in terms of a realistic possibility of denuclearization, which is clearly a long, long process requiring regime change induced by be outside intervention but i occur tomorrow because of our lack of knowledge about the internal stability of the regime. as a minimum, we need to talk sensibly about this and not let ourselves get off into these
about somehow forcing the chinese to force the north koreans to give up something vital about national security. can i just say one thing? two comments. i fully agree. this is not one or two. it could be five decades. a cap is the first step. there are deliverables with the cap. we have a number of military exercises, and i think even the north koreans alluded to it. you can still that one or two and give us a little relief on what are two of the sanctions. ouraybe an intersection in respective capitals to show there has been dialogue. there are some intermediate steps we can take to start to do
what we do not have. that is we have no trust in the relationship. we have absolutely zero trust. start building some sort of relationship. i think your points are really outstanding. >> mr. donald smith. donald: some of my questions have been answered. a basic question is, what would get out of this crisis? like a d nuclear is korean peninsula? -- denuclearized korean peninsula? removed?y like kim
nuclear weapons and north korea will lend itself to strike in the region and beyond the region as we see right now. status well with the kim jong-un governments that is respectful to china and dependably on china, and a china that has the that china is committed to. earized north korea. reunification has to be way down the line. i think that is for to say. if therern has to be is reunification on south korea's terms, that would bring the u.s. potentially into the north and that would be part of a discussion that would have to be separate with china. is there a possibility that we could agree to some of these objectives that china may
want if we would agree to remove our troops from south korea? >> i'm sure there's a dialogue with china going on as a snake. -- as we speak. there is no question about that. that hasis something to be very sensitive to our south korean allies and our commitment is to south korea. we all member the korean war and what that entails. this is our discussion between the united states and china and my personal view. has to be a discussion with our allies south korea at the table. paul: thank you. it is kind of interesting to me that we are a little bit converging on a new version of the containment we used against the soviet union.
this kind of provokes a question for me, because there is one really important profound difference between the soviet union and north korea. even talking about it for the last several minutes. there was no other state that would be willing and able to bail out the soviet union at the point when it was ready to collapse. in this case, there is a state able and willing to do that, and it has been doing that for a certain amount of time. time, with inventing the view we don't want north to collapse. --gradually evolve over time we want north korea to gradually evolve over time and have relations with many of our allies and others in the region
. but i also wonder to what extent is that in the interest of this that has ther someility to shape to extent north korea's evolution. my question in brief is we have been talking about a frustrating problem that it isn't saying the answer is to wait. -- isaiting a solution waiting a solution? know, the only comment i would make on that is piece-- there is that that goes right back to the korean war.
china feels they invested heavily in north korea and they still do. that is the reality. to deal with what we have -- i think back to the literature on the framework that with the kiming of kim il-sung, jong-un was the government that would sort of faded and things would be different. i think we learned from that that we have to do with the reality we have now. the reality we have now is kim jong-un, was on a path to becoming a existential nuclear threat to the u.s. -- and existential nuclear threat to u.s. they cannot use all the leverage because i think china would want normal some sort of relationship with north korea, where they could maybe possibly influence them. have at least someone there to influence them. it is a very complex and dynamic
although i was bringing business people that we were not coming to do business. probably emphasized that a dozen times at least, maybe more . they never really heard what i was thinking. , and it'srived there very elaborate and are on the first evening of our presence, it became clear they believed we were there to do business. and i had to make a very strong statement in their presence at that point. world wase in the going to come to do that either unless we find a satisfactory resolution to this. we were immediately in a crisis. day, it was not
clear what the outcome would be. together privately with another delegation and i said we could get on an airplane and leave our we can stay here and spend an amount of time that we can be here trying to get to know each other better. that is exactly what we ended up doing. i won't go into a lot of detail but this is probably the most star -- i've been dealing with people in various elements for a very long time. >> including bizarre people. [laughter] >> for in the end, it became clear that they -- while they eventually realized we were not there to do business, the of talking to them
-- absolutely p necessary. this is another world. this is kim jong-un. but that was important and it came through. you can give up on getidea that we're going to them to give up the nuclear program. is there a way we can -- -- rationalize their behavior through opportunity to become part of the international business community? i don't know how to do that there are smarter people than i .ere
is there with his back from the world of sanctions and trying to isolate them further and further and actually give them an opportunity to come in the a member of the -- to come and be a member of the international community while simultaneously maintaining a capability that is present invisible and understandable? colleagues. my a scenario for- sitting down and having a discussion. you made a case and the only other thing i would add to that is if they sat down to hear what you just said a lot they are hearing that they are not launching a missile are having a attack,e -- a nuclear that would be a pretty powerful presentation to me. that would open it up. open up aspects and join them -- ands another path showing them there is another path.
stopping the proliferation. seeking of eventually down the road to get comprehensive dismantlement. but you have given them a path and i think that is the value of having discussions and i think some of us we have these discussions, we get into putting along the table read the patent be done -- on the table. that needs to be done in formal channels. weapons,nly, nuclear missiles, and sanctions aside, this could open up the ability for interesting conversation. this is an extraordinarily difficult investment environment. a government that defaulted on its foreign debt. a government that has expropriated south korean companies. some chinese companies are also having a tough time.
the intent to take you hostage. the infrastructure is in bad shape. tment has to be frontloaded. the use of forced labor in north korea. minerals, cold. -- coal. perhaps we can initiate a conversation on those difficult topics. it comes to the difficult aspect that this is a very tough investment environment. chinese investment in north saya has been -- if i may so -- more business motivated based on more of an economic rationale then south korean investments, which is now no longer >> you can continue watching this discussion later online. take you live to the floor of the house for a brief session.
>> house is in order. the chair, placed before the house and communication from the speaker. rooms,speakers washington dc, september 18, 2017. i appoint the honorable george holding to act as speaker temporary this day. offered by the guest chaplain, reverend michael wilbur, lutheran church of the reformation of washington dc.