they complained about it. i don't think anybody in congress paid much attention because they love it here it they love the fact that parcels can get to people through the postal service. we will leave this conversation at this point to hear from former joint chiefs of staff chairman and a former north korea advisor from the bush administration to discuss the upcoming meeting between president trump and north korean leader kim jong on. the title of today's session is u.s. north korean relations. efforts.ess on today is a special event because event.ture is an annual we decided, instead of a single lecture that we have this standing panel to talk about an issue that is very preoccupying and perhaps the number one national security challenge for the trump administration.

i direct the international security program at george mason turn school of policy and government. i am moderating today. our lecture series, we are delighted to have members of the wonky family joining us today and all they done is that have made this special event possible. --you know, our two state speakers are well-known. we have admiral mike mullen who was the chairman of the joint chief of staff. he's the executive officer of mgm consulting. and was a cochair of a 2016 foreign relations task force report. a shepherd choice on north korea. we will ask him to update and revise the judgment of that report. victor cha is currently the .enior adviser he is the curry of foundation chair and government and

international affairs at georgetown university. he was a member of that council task force and has written an article in foreign affairs that brings us up to date on his own as many peopleea know, he was tantalizingly close to being the american ambassador to south korea. we are going to start our conversation with a top-down look. i have asked both victor and admiral mullen to answer this question. on the continuing from war to please with coercive diplomacy, negotiations, nonproliferation progress, along the points of the continuum, how would you characterize the current moment? victor cha, would you like to go first? mr. cha: thanks, alan. it is a pleasure to be here and be part of this lecture. that question, i feel like we're certainly not where we in december.uld be

in december of last year, before the olympics can south korea, i think many people were concerned that we have a temporary pause during the olympics. both of the winter olympics in february and olympics in march. t once they restarted in april, but the northwood responded we would be in the cycle of provocation. that is not where we are today. spring of summit diplomacy and asia. the nonsense of south korean leaders, prime minister abbe is theng tomorrow next week, north korean leader went to china last week or over a week ago. then of course, the big meeting between president trump and the north korean leaders. weertainly think today are in a different place. the place we are in today are not without its own set of

risks. host: thank you. mr. mullen: if i could pick up on what victor said in terms of prognosticating for the next six months, i think it is tough to figure that out. there is over the course of the last year, a tremendous amount of uncertainty. the uncertainty that existed with respect to break it -- in particular maketh of kim jong-un in north korea, not knowing a lot about what he would do, etc., i think was added significantly by the uncertainty of what the united states of america was going to do. i think that is the entering equation -- the entry point with respect to these negotiations. in a couple of occasions, next month is a huge month for us. when you look at what may or may not happen with the iran deal and what main or may not happen with the negotiations. there is a lot on the table. as best as i can tell. thatnk it is important

people understand i am not on the inside. i don't have the kind of information that i used to have when i was in a decision-making position or making recommendations. there is a lot that i don't think i do know, but we clearly are in a fast path here in both toes, iran, and north korea bring nuclear weapons into play, much more so than i thought was possible. in that regard, i think it is more dangerous. up.ink the risk is way as a youngught midshipmen, high risk can bring high reward. at the same time, it can also bring a significant downside. that is where we are. honestly, i don't know if

anybody knows, but i don't know what is going to happen over the course of the next 60 days. except that it is incredibly critical, dangerous, fragile, time. host: while we are trying to calibrate carefully but it is impossible to make any strong predictions, i wonder, victor, knowing from your own experience, and how the uncertainty about the preparations for the summit, how would you rank the odds that the summit will take place? do you think there is any prospect that either or both of the parties will decide to hit the pause button? mr. cha: i think it was a surprise to everyone when the u.s. president agreed to meet with the north korean leader. everyonehich i think takes to mean by the end of may. -- admiralmerlin

mullen said, these summits, when they take place, they can be highly rewarding or if they fail, they are extremely risky. especially when you don't have a months long negotiating process leading up to this meeting. to me, one of the biggest indicators of whether this meeting will take place or whether it will be postponed will be the summit that takes place at the end of this month. because i would imagine coming out of that meeting, the south korean president will want to brief the american president on how that meeting went. and probably offer recommendation about whether we should go forward, things look good, the light is green, or whether it is yellow, or whether it is even read. -- red. guessing here because this is a highly unusual situation. but if i had to pick one event, it would be probably the meeting

that takes place between the north and south korean leaders. host: admiral mullen, and the task force, there was discussion the code or service signaling that takes place by the presence of u.s. military force in the region and by our relationship with japan and of korea and the allied activity, are you -- how would you, if you were advising the president today, and with the anticipation of a summit within 6-10 weeks, whenever it may occur, how would you calibrate the signals that are sent through our security presence and our security relationships in the run-up to the summit? mr. mullen: i would want them to be strong. and to leave little room for doubt about the commitment to security in that part of the world. taken abacka little

by the exercises resumed, there wasn't much that happened with that. if i were, in my previous job, at least i would have some insight into the preparations and recommendations would be set -- would be tied to how much we should do or not do based on what was actually going on. the big concerns i had a, victor and i were talking earlier, and i said, how long does it take to get ready for a summit? he said, with an ally, typically it is three months. think about this. the thing about this one, you typically, to the degree you can control it, you want to know the outcome before you have a summit, and then you sort of plan to that. and how much of that kind of work has gone on to this point, i'm not really sure.

the stakes are high. on the one hand, one of the things we talked about in the report was you have to move china -- china has got to move. china has moved. whoever you want to give credit thatt is very clear president trump's position has .oved xi jinping the tougher enforcement of the sanctions, i think china has almost complete control of the process by the amount of money that flows or does not flow across the border. and then secondly, the visit the other day by conjunction. -- by kim jong-un. perspective, that is fine. i think china is a hugely important player. one of the things we try to stay -- say in that study is the united states and china have to figure out a way to play here. to me, for the right outcome, it

doesn't make any difference for. the other thing tied it to the , is it isan summit possible that south korea is in a better position to lead in this them they have been in the past. and certainly amongst all of us. i have no problem with somebody stepping forward to do that, which president moon clearly has, and make that a part of what i hope would be a constructive outcome. on the security question, you both participated in the six party talks and have been involved in these things, whether signals we may want to send in an adversarial way to the north koreans also sensed signals to china. how do you balance what the chinese may desire in terms of an american military presence in the region, the status of our alliances with japan and korea,

with trying to resolve this particular problem of north korea? are there trade-offs in there that are particularly tricky for diplomats to think about? ellen, i think we don't want our north korea policy to be undertaken or executed at the expense of our broader asian policy. sometimes, if we get stuck in the tactics of a negotiation with north korea, we tend to lose sight of that broader objective, which is that those things have to be consistent. we always say that our north korean policy would start with our allies. to be ins have coronation and agree on a common front. ideally, as well as china. i think that is an important thing is we think about going the u.s.-north korea summit, is that a summit is not a strategy.

a summit without a strategy is very dangerous. for that reason, it is important for the united states, the allies, south korea and japan, as well as china, coordinated on what we are looking at in terms of what we seek from the north koreans at this meeting, and also the difficult question, what we are willing to give in order to get the things we want from the north koreans? i don't think there is any disagreement about what we want from north korea. we want them to give up their nuclear weapons. the hard part to gordon a among allies and with china is what we are going to be willing to give to get that. host: did you feel there were ay trade-offs between military dialogue with china more broadly about the region versus the military -- the use of the military as one of the components of our strategy toward north korea? mr. mullen: i've thought about

this differently. i suppose that is true. my other thought is, this goes views to the of contrary, is i am willing to deep -- to denuclearize that peninsula, to eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, the use of nuclear weapons in that region. i'm willing to trade trade with china. i'm willing to give up whatever that peace would be of trade and pay that price, which i think would be far less, by any measure, then the price -- price we would have to pay if there was some kind of nuclear war break out. to the degree, and i will go back to the military -- to the militaryat there are consolidations are compromises, i'm willing to have that discussion. i think victor's point is really

critical as well. we need to do this with our allies and not unilaterally. host: scott snyder is here. he runs the korea program here at the council. his latest book is in the title "a tommy or alliance -- autonomy or alliance questio? how they achieve greater independence or autonomy and how -- and still revalidate and remain very devoted to the alliance with the united states. --you see any new dynamics our expectations of the roles that republic of korea would play and a negotiating process p has it changed at all from the six party talks. bring -- six party talks period? mr. cha: i think it has. in one respect, as both of you have already suggested, the south koreans appear -- i don't

know if i would say in the league, but they appear to be the engine of a lot of this diplomacy. if we go back to last december when all of us thought this would be really bad in 2018, the south koreans were really working very hard, using the olympics, working behind the scenes, playing telephone tag between all parties trying to get something going. in that sense, they have taken on a big responsibility. past,her is that in the the north koreans were not willing to talk to the south koreans about nuclear weapons or denuclearization. anytime the south koreans raised it in a meeting, the north koreans would walk out or they would say, bathroom break. they didn't want to talk about it. something wet is talk about with the united states. it appears that the south korean carrying- president is

messages back-and-forth suggesting that of periods had conversations with the south and theinclined to denuclearize entire korean peninsula. which is a loaded phrase. but there is that. i think in that sense, there has been a larger role. i would say the other thing is in a different meeting a couple weeks ago with a bunch of academics where we were trying to understand the new types of hedging behavior by allies under the trump administration. in mike is, i said, for asia, i think there is some degree of hedging in regard to china. that is not one allies are doing. allies are not hedging against the united states. they are practicing autonomy, i'm giving all the credit to president trump. we sawl remember when

this extraordinary situation where the national security adviser of a foreign country

30's, the administration has and we were in government over tenures ago when we did the initial pressure campaign against north korea and what's available to the administration now. you can't even compare. they have so much more available to the point where almost 100%

of north korea external trade is under sanctions from the un security council. we have heard from ngos the prices of going up and north korea like the price of gas in these other things. i think they are feeling the pressure and that has brought them back all stop the other is the unpredictability of the administration with a lot of talk in past months about possible military action. i think that registered. i think it affected them and finally, i think they probably calculated that they could take a pause in their testing. they have already announced that they feel they can threaten the entire united states with nuclear ballistic missiles and they probably felt they had reached the point where there were other things they may need to do but they know -- but they

don't need to do it right now. think opportunity side, i the north koreans have been waiting for this meeting for four decades. it's the opportunity to meet the u.s. president as a nuclear weapons state even if the discussion on the table is about denuclearization. i think they have been seeking this meeting and seeking the status of this meeting for a long time. just the meeting in and of itself, i think the north koreans would consider that a victory. >> that brings us to the keyword of the title of today's conversation. achievable denuclearization goals? in theory, if the word denuclearization is spoken with --expectations of short-term of short-term steps to implement it, what does the u.s. do next? if the summit occurs and there

is not really a game plan for denuclearization, what is our next move? achievable think are denuclearization goals? is the rhetoric of total denuclearization the right approach to take or are there some downsides to setting a goal that seems very far away? i'm one who believes it has to be denuclearization. i'm not a contain them kind of guy. i worry that with nuclear weapons with a nuclear state that the south koreans will be asking themselves if they should do this and the japanese will be asking themselves the same thing. some indications are that they are thinking about it anyway. rising thenuclear region. it's the same logic quite frankly for me that works for

iran. if they get a nuclear weapon, we end up proliferating, if you worldin regions of the the most devastating weapons that man has ever put on earth. regard, that has to be the outcome. smarter than me in terms of what the line which means that the current language as i understand it that kim jong-un has used is similar to language that is been used in ,he past which is long-term which is glad to denuclearize. i think we need to pull these out. what we don't talk about is all the steps that have to be taken to get to that point, to satisfy him to the point where he would actually the nuclear eyes the peninsula. that is a really important part of discussion. how much of that gets woven into the negotiations and then outcomes. leaders don't have the summit so

that they cannot have outcomes. if we don't have outcomes, it's hard for me -- i don't know where it goes. it's got to be a downside and i hope the downside is not edging closer to conflict. risk thats the you talked about. when you ask your president to get into a negotiation, you usually want him or her to close it and take it over the finish line. on the denuclearization side, someone who used to do these negotiation, this will sound sort of pedantic to some of you that you look for it little things that try to show that your counterpart is actually genuinely interested in getting back to where youth thought it should of been 10 years ago.

said, admirals denuclearization of the korean peninsula for any of us who of looked at this means absolutely nothing. perhaps that is too strong a phrase. what it means in the broader context is north korea would be ready to give us their nuclear weapons. we have alliances in asia. that i would seek clarification on is whether north korea would agree to what they agreed to in september of 2005 which was not just denuclearization of the korean peninsula. i see some former negotiators out here -- it is the commitment and writing that north korea will disband all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. that is a different phrasing from the very broad

denuclearization of the korean peninsula. it was conveyed in the newspaper today the north koreans of also said kim jong-un apparently said that a nuclear free korean peninsula was the dying wish of his father. again, that may sound nice on what but that's exactly his father said about his grandfather when the last two were found toents be dysfunctional. think looking for some of those points of clarification -- the broader outline of what they do good and the colors -- of what a denuclearization iseement should look like based on issues of nuclear weapons, non-pleura for a, there are clear steps that one needs from a freeze to a verifiable declaration to a disablement and a dismantlement

all stop we know what those look like and we know there are capable negotiators who can do that. it's not the sort of thing the president of the united states can negotiate on his or her own. certainly not in a summit with a leader with which the united states is not have diplomatic relations and has never met with before at this level. >> you certain capture the paradox earlier when you said the great achievement of this third-generation kim leader is that he is meeting the president on his terms which is as a nuclear power. disconnect between the strategic objective of negotiation and his status. even if he is invoking his father and grandfather is wanting to denuclearize, he has, in fact, achieved status in the international system by going a different route. >> right, it's never that the

two sides come in and greek -- and agree on the same thing. that's what diplomats do. they try to close that space. not aer if the space is gaping valley. >> there are historians in the room who will understand this better than i but it is year he to me that kim jong-un just it erie to me that kim jong-un and has been able to reflect what his grandfather was able to do in the early 1950's and late 1940's. it was to bring this great powers together and figure out what action was going to be taken. in the case of his grandfather, andring them together essentially ignite a conflict that brought them both they are.

the comparison to me is bothersome and scary from one perspective. 30 -- under 35. i worry when the stakes are so high how much wisdom is actually going to be in the room. justm is not something you reach out and obtain as a thirtysomething. back to outcomes here and the seriousness of this entire effort. the third piece we have not mentioned, it's more uncertainty, i have asked in recent years when i made trips not part of the world, to either china or japan or south korea,

what is rush up to and they have been pretty quiet until recently. now, russia is back in the game. this used to be a very important place for the russian navy. they were very dominant out there. they are playing again and it's hard to know and i have no information whatsoever on how vladimir putin will play in this. >> we are now ready to turn to our members and our guests today. will ask you to please stand when you get the microphone. give us your name and your affiliation and just a reminder, we are on the record, being recorded by multiple services. let's begin. you, i think it's may

11 or may 12 the president is required to make a decision about re-imposing sanctions on iran that were lifted for the nuclear agreement. and thething he says national security adviser has said and the secretary of state nominee has said, he is likely to do that, reimpose the sanctions. will that have any affect on north korea's willingness to move toward denuclearization or vice versa? leaveoncern about that the administration to do something more sensible? >> that's a statement, isn't it? [laughter] one of the very clear things that i can remember kim jong-un moing was talking about market duffy who gave up his weapons and how did that work moamm mo market duffy --

ar khaddafi. it's just hard to know and you have one new player, john bolton has taken over today. whether mr. pompeo will be in place by then is somewhat up in the air, i just don't know. thathard for me to believe it won't have an impact, that it of't be related in terms whatever happens on may 11 tied to things that may or may not happen in these negotiations long-term. that should be informed by the korean summit with cap -- which happens before that. i just don't know. supported the agreement, it has its flaws but it also has its strengths. the downside of living out of

in terms of iran's ability to bring nuclear weapons forward . we forget how rapidly they can move their technology. that is a huge concern i have. the knock on effects, the reason i talk about earlier is part of this as well. andn't know how kim jong-un his advisers would not be paying a lot of attention to that as well. actually, it probably could work in the other direction. in a constructive way. in terms of staying with that and kim jong-un might be able to think he can make a deal. i'm just not sure. mr. cha: can i offer a slight addendum to that? both you guys i don't know what the administration will do on iran. there are a number of different

arguments related to the iran piece. let me offer a thought i had as to how it would -- it could affect the negotiation with north korea. don't normally think about. if we try, it is, i have tried to think like we think the president thinks. conceivable that he might see a pulling out of the iran agreement as a way to put more pressure on the north even an iranying, deal is not good enough. i am not even excepting that you have to go further than the iran deal. even as he is saying what -- saying something 100% in north korea's trade. yes, it is entirely possible the north koreans could look at that

and say, if he doesn't do that, why should we bother negotiating? to try to understand it from the other side, i would guess there are people who believe that is actually a way to put more pressure on the north koreans. host: the woman in the back? standing. >> hi. i'm from radio free asia. i have a question regarding the u.s. and north korea. specifically about the location and timing. over the weekend, several news reported kim jong-un message he is willing to discuss the new -- the denuclearization. there is no report about where or even around when, we just the end oft could be may. some say it is because kim jong-un invites trump, soap young chunk should be the location for the summit. but some say there should be a

lot of [indiscernible] there could be the third country or -- host: what is your question? know where the speakers should think the location should be? toelieve it would take time tighten the security. once the location is confirmed, specify it will take to the finalized spot? we actually know where it is but we're not going to tell you. [laughter] no one has any idea where it is going to be. i can't imagine the u.s. president would go to north korea. i can't imagine that. aside from that, we have no idea. yes, it takes every minute of a is choreographed. the challenges of trying to

coordinate this with a country with which we have no diplomatic relations are formidable. mr. mullen: maybe that is a better way to get at it. start eliminating those that it can't be and you will get down to a few. i think it was mongolia that said today that they would be happy to host it. what that says to me is, it reinforces nobody knows yet, that we are still looking. i think they will figure that out. host: on the aisle side. jim dobbins. >> yes. we don't know how many nuclear weapons north korea has we don't know where they are. an agreement to fully denuclearize can't be reliable verified in all of its aspects. could you comment on the difficulties and downsides of concluding an agreement that you

know you can't fully verify? even before the verification requirement, they have a pretty rich history of lying about what they are going time weter every other got some version of close. so i think we have to go in from that -- from a verification standpoint, with our eyes wide open. i supportedeasons the agreement with iran is because i sat down with a achnical side and it is brutally specific technical verification regime. as i thought about, what do you do in the north, north korea, i think it has to meet that standard. can you generate that in north korea? that is one of the challenges. obviously, it would be up to whether there is any kind of seachange from the perspective

of the leadership in north korea , in terms of their future. but i worry about the iranian now, are they cheating because they have done in the past? i would have the same concern with north korea. mr. cha: the only thing i would add to that is that in the last agreement, the six party agreement, this is where it all eventually broke down because they provided -- we are at the point where they provided a declaration. that declaration was clearly not a declaration of all of their capabilities that would have to be verified. is clearly going to be one of the biggest obstacles, if we even get that far, in some sort of negotiation with them, on the weapons and the materials. mr. mullen: there are technical means that we did not have 10 years ago or 20 years ago. the question is, can you put it in play in a way that would

a low it to be marketable from a different standpoint? mr. cha: the other thing i would add, i know we are being i am offending north koreans, i'm sorry, but there is a human capacity -- there's a human capital problem. the iran agreement is hundreds of pages. we negotiated into the thousand 5, 2007, was like 12 doublespaced pages, if that. it has none of the technical things but we are discussing in the iran agreement. even something along those lines, i wonder whether they have the technical capacity to negotiate an agreement like that. host: second row. you mentioned earlier, mr. cha, the importance of maintaining our security relations with the south koreans and japan. one concept that has been floated and discussed somewhat

in these kinds of forums has been china providing the nuclear umbrella for assuring denuclearization of the peninsula. what do you think about that as a possibility as an outcome of these discussions? mr. cha: china prevent -- mr. mullen: china providing the nuclear umbrella for the entire peninsula? i would have a hard time with that up front. [laughter] mr. mullen: when you ask that question, one of the things i think of that we are not very good at is trying to put ourselves in china's shoes and what their interests are here, even though we can take them off -- tick them off. is there a way that we can figure out in these negotiations to respect some of their national interests? because they don't trust us and we don't trust them. the concern they have with respect to instability. the concern they have with the unification piece.

the potential for a regime change. the u.s. has historically been tasked with securing the nuclear material. i would be a happy camper to have china go do that. i am not sure i am willing at this point to have china provide the nuclear umbrella, although, yeah, maybe i'm missing something here. certainly, might be willing to talk about that. i think -- >> www.c-span.or [indiscernible] mr. mullen: i think that is -- my understanding is different. now, i think that would be

worthwhile to discuss. china's interests here are big, as ours are. we have to take them into consideration if we're ever going to make progress on the peninsula. host: do you want to come in on this? mr. cha: i will just say that historically, the chinese have a mutual treaty friendship with north korea for the duration of the cold war, which was seen as china's defense commitment to north korea. it was never clear whether that included a nuclear umbrella. probably it did not. as far as i know, china has not extended its nuclear ability to any other country. -- theer thing is that north koreans and the chinese, they share a border. they have fought in a war together. but they do not like each other. the north koreans feel like the chinese treat them like dirt poor province.

the chinese can't stand that the north koreans do things that drag china through the mud all the time. there is not a lot of love between these two countries, let alone trust. theainly not at all like defense commitment and nuclear umbrella the united states provides to iraq. host: the woman in the back. can you bring her the mike? -- mic? >> hello. mentioned the difficult question is what the u.s. is willing to offer to north korea? mullen said to prevent nuclear war, he is willing to trade off any trade areas to stop the nuclear war. my question is, should north korea commit to the denuclearization, if they pull out the u.s. troops from south

korea, pull out a news -- a nuclear ballot, is it worthwhile considering for the united states? thank you. that is always a fun question to answer. [laughter] long-term, obviously, if we are able to sort through the security issues in our region, and in particular, with our allies, both south korea and japan, and where theat a point possibility of conflict, if you has diminished dramatically, i would certainly be willing to have a discussion about how long the u.s. troops should stay there and how many of them should be there. but i have also dealt enough 28,500e peninsula, that troops that are on the peninsula now in the south, they don't

actually do this, but when you move 10 of them, they know almost before i knew that they were moving off the peninsula. it is an unbelievably strong, strategic commitment on the part of the united states of america to the security of the south korean people. it is not anything that could happen quickly. mr. cha: i'm fine with that answer. [laughter] host: roberto, then we will go to the back of the room. i'm with the naval postgraduate school. this has been an enlightening discussion. i have a very monday in question. where would -- monday in question. where would these nuclear things go to die out? we have trouble thinking about putting our nuclear stuff into the colorado them mountains -- colorado mountains. is there a place they can go? mr. mullen: yes, there is a i don't know.

i want to have that problem. [laughter] host: roberta is next. >> hi. you know what i am going to ask you. human rights. and the task force met report was developed, there was a general consensus that human rights issues should be integrated in some way when there are discussions with the north koreans. either parallel tort -- parallel talks or involved in the overall agenda. i wonder how you see that now? there are two summits coming up. there is a lot of sense that while the north koreans are ready to talk about denuclearization, which is tremendous, they haven't said we are ready to talk about human rights. where will the u.s. -- where should south korea be pushing this? how much priority should be

given? mr. mullen: you know where i am on this. i think it is a hugely important part. i don't think we can stand by actions byhe kind of hisjong-un has taken, as family has taken for decades, and not say anything and do anything. obviously, you have to prioritize. that weght be something can use in these negotiations in trading for something he wants to include -- in terms of his trading off the nukes, but also other things. it is my sense that this is a leader who wants to be recognized on the world stage. who wants to participate as some version of a normal country. i think there is huge opportunities if this goes well to have that kind of impact.

think it isdly, i where we are in this particular negotiation, it certainly has not appear to be part of the discussion. part of theto be discussion. it needs to be, even if it is not a part that generates an outcome, it needs to be a position very clearly made inside the negotiations with respect to where we are on human rights. we can never, ever let our guard down on that. the united states, in terms of who we represent, what we represent, and the values we stand for. there should never be a doubt in his mind, in any interaction, that that is where we are. mr. cha: i would agree. it would be very difficult to imagine the leader of the free world meeting with the worst human rights abuser in modern history. and not raising the issue. all the narrative is about

nuclear weapons, it seems inconceivable to me that it would not be raised. it requires a willingness on our part to raise it. the second is it requires a willingness on the part of the north koreans to discuss it. i actually think that they may be more open to discussing it thatif the theory is true, part of the reason they are coming to the table is because they are feelings of much pressure. so much pressure from the global sanctions campaign against them. it may not be a discussion on human rights that you or i would like to see, having to do with the treatment of the citizenry, the camps, and all these other things. it made -- it may be a discussion that they try to shift toward humanitarian assistance. and humanitarian support, food support, vaccinations for their children, things of this nature would be to -- which would be their way of trying to get support from the outside world that circumvents the u.n. sanctions regime.

there is an ideal way we should have a discussion with north korea about human rights and there is a practical one. right now, i think that is the most practical avenue. but i have no idea whether the administration will take that. take that view. host: i'm going to go to michael and then don daniels next, then over to you. >> pbs on lies news. there are a couple of historical points. if he was quoted directly before he became appointed -- he was appointed national security adviser, he expressed the expectation or hope that the summit would fail. president gone into a nuclear negotiation with this national security adviser expressing the hope that it would fail? allour point, victor, that summits are choreographed, i don't think the 1961 the anna summit was choreographed for chris just rain against kennedy and kennedys inability --

kennedy's desire to get into debates with him. my reaction on the bolton perspective, or the question about bolton, is that sometimes your perspective changes a whole lot when you now have a real job. [laughter] mr. mullen: and sometimes it doesn't. but i think you are sobered by the reality of the responsibility. that is one. is workingohn bolton for the president of the united states to whatever happens in the outcome of this, is going to for or to and credit against is going to be the president. i actually believe that. it doesn't mean bolton won't have influence and all those kinds of things. he will be living with his rhetoric, i think, for a long time because there is a lot of it. but there is a reality of the

job, that is very sobering. across many challenges. mr. cha: can i just say -- on the, i'm looking around the room for people who were involved in this, the last time bolton was in government was under secretary perry the two things he carried most from the north korean issue is the and the of psi, sanctions campaign to something we call defensive measures up a time to get at north korea's proliferation financing through counterfeiting, drugrunning, things of that nature. a guess, again, he is national security adviser, he is not the president, is he will not stand in the way if the president wants to do the meeting. but he will be very firm on continuing to maintain the sanctions pressure and a

building that counter proliferation regime it goes isse are two key pieces that part of any strategy, whether the summit fails or succeeds. host: if you can keep your questions short, we have don daniels then you, then barbara, then one more. >> what happens if this does not work at all? maybe there is no summit or the summit goes south. how do we think about what the options are then and what the for -- could we settle extended deterrence and say, ok, we can't do anything about it and we will settle? mr. mullen: i think certainly that is a possibility. i think if it doesn't work, we will see both countries and those others who are associated with this explaining it politically why it and not work likely blaming somebody else for that outcome. i worry we are tied back to

recent rhetoric. think theg-un, and i empirical evidence is correct, but he clearly has stopped his testing program. if you start again, then i don't think we are far from where we were a few weeks ago which is in very far from conflict. that is my view. gets back to the stakes that are in play from here -- that are in play here, from my perspective. >> dan bob. this seems like a minor issue, the japanese prime minister -- you both talked about how important it is for working with allies. the japanese prime minister will be here soon. one of the things he will bring up at the president are the 17 abductees that north korea has kidnapped. it seems like a minor issue but it is something the prime minister came to prominence for

a result of. his political fortunes are not so great. there is a -- there are delegations of families coming over sin. with that issue? host: thank you. can we grab barbara's question and final thoughts? >> nice to see you both again. squishyp doesn't like outcomes. he has talked about kicking the can down they were dashed down the road and how frustrating that is. what is the least i could come out of this that he could declare a victory over? would it be enough to go to the 2005-2006 statement? could he beat his chest and say that is a huge victory? i'm having trouble envisioning something coming out of the summit that he could call a win. thank you. with thestarting question about japan, yeah, this is politically an important issue for prime minister are they -- prime minister abbe.

time, united states has its own three detainees still in north korea that hopefully will be let go. as you know well, dan, the even bigger issue from -- four japan from a strategic perspective is if we are going to talk about ballistic missiles on the peninsula, prototype missiles, are then's concerns already deployed ballistic missiles. there is a danger of decoupling tot the allies will try narrow. on what constitutes a successful -- a great question. not an easy want to answer. thatirely agree with you this president does not like failure or he does not like to look like he has failed. that may incentivize him to make big statements.

peace treaty, normalization, things of that nature. that handed off to people like you in the audience to negotiate for the next two years. it could be something like that. but i do believe that as we get closer to this meeting, all the parties involved, even the ones who are not involved are going to have invested interest in not seeing it failed. thethe very reason that admiral talked about, on the other side of failure with a adversary, there is not a lot of space left in terms of diplomacy. big floriday be statements. the promise of a negotiation process. host: any final thought? mr. mullen: i thought that was brilliant. host: that was the way to end. [laughter] host: we have run out of time. i want to thank for their participation. all of the members of the council for your participation. and our wonderful speakers. [applause] [captions copyright national

cable satellite corp. 2017] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [indistinct conversations]

>> congress returns to washington this week after a two-week easter passover recess. gaveling in at 3:00 p.m. eastern to start the debate on the district court judge in

kentucky, also, senate republican smith of sydney will be in. can see the senate live on our companion network at 3:00 p.m. eastern. the house will be back for legislative is less tomorrow. and number of bills to make changes to the dodd frank legislation law. a constitutional amendment will require congress to balance the federal budget and a vote on that is scheduled for thursday causing a constitutional amendment, a two thirds vote is required. on our companion network on c-span3 this week, mark --kerberg will test it testify on capitol hill about 50's use of personal data. mr. zuckerberg testifies before a joint hearing at the senate commerce committee tomorrow at 2:15 eastern.

they will testify on the other set to startastle at 10:00 a.m. eastern wednesday c-span3. c-span, where history unfolds daily. created as a public service. the white house, the supreme court, and public policy events in washington dc and around the country. c-span brought to you by your cable satellite provider. minutese cbs program 60 marked its 50th anniversary this year. minutes correspondent bill whitaker and executive producer of the