sarin david corn, "russian roulette." then another book "when they call you a terrorist: a black atrisseatter memoir" by p khan-cullors. and roger simon was "i know best." festival ofmes" books come alive on c-span2. >> a look at changing demographics in the u.s. and the impact on politics and elections. we will hear reports by a number of think tanks, the bipartisan policy center, center for american progress, brookings and americanprri, enterprise institute partnered on this project.

john: good morning. welcome to the bipartisan policy center. i am john fortier. i work for the democracy project here. we're happy to see all of you and all you viewing from afar here at a very important fourth anniversary of project that's been going on called the states of change. the states of change is a coalition of a number of think tanks working on election demographic work, and it includes -- we're happy, as bpc, to be part of this with the center for american progress, the brookings institution, now the public research, public religion research institute, as well as some other think tanks that event evolved along the way like aei and others on our advisory board. this is a project that covers the political spectrum and has involved a lot of talent about town. i'm here to welcome you to introduce you and to set up the day.

we have two panels for you. the first is going to be the release of a report we put out each year, and it really is outlook at election demographics, how demographics data enter interact with our political data, and what scenarios what might look like . again this is of the fourth annual report we putting out and , and especially of note this report looks at the 2016 election. the first one of our series to incorporate the data edit will also makes things down this time with white college and white non-college voters, who were always in earlier reports but lumped together, and now the other closer look at with a pretty good look at what scenarios are going forward including that group. again, the people on the panel here don't need much introduction, but i will introduce first. we're going to have three

commentators, i will give long introductions, because we have a big panel, but we got mark hugo lopez on the pew research center. we got matt morrison from working america and amy walter from the cook political report. you will hear from th you will m at initial presentation. that i reserve here for our three key authors of the report that has been released today, ruy teixeira of the center for american progress, bill frey brookings institution, and rob griffin the start of the public research, public religion research institute. they will make a presentation. they will take some questions, will be some interaction among the panelists panels, and then there would be time for you. just looking slightly further ahead, we've always in this project wanted to get reaction to this data from a different, several different perspectives , and the second panel will follow this one, where ruy and i will come and join with two people of written papers for us and look in-depth from republican to from a democratic perspective. anna greenberg will be with us, but we can introduce or more specifically later, and then sean trende on the republican side. so that's the day. we look for to having you with

us, and i going to turn over to am rob griffin for this panel. rob: thanks, john. thanks, everybody, for being here. i know it's a rainy monday morning. so just to kick this off, we're going to do a short presentation by bill, ruy, and myself, where we will go over some of the top line findings of the report, but just to sort of point a couple tanks hold onto, because we'll throw a lot of numbers at you in a lot of different simulations. the demographics of the country are changing, and some of the changes are going to come to define the electoral landscape of future american elections. they will affect how the parties are going to need to strategize and what incentives they will have going forward. those are the two big things to take away today. without much ado, i will turn over to bill frey, who will walk us through some of the demographic changes. bill?

bill: ok. i'll kick it off. i think most people understand that the election of donald trump and the elections of barack obama in 2008 and 2012 were heavily affected by the changing demographics in the united states. what we are talking about there is the increased diversity of the electorate, the aging of the electorate, and increased disparity between educated and say college and non-college voters in the u.s. all of those groups, they tend to vote differently, and their changes had a big effect on some of the outcomes we saw in all of those elections, and will probably have even bigger impact on the elections to come. and so this 2018 report that we have written the fourth in the series as johnny said, again takes a lot of -- underlying demographics, key part of our research. the underlying demographics, how

it is changing, how it affects election outcomes, and politics in the future. two years ago two years ago, before the 2016 election we put out a similar report. that report projected the 2016 election in several tech respects. several simulations with several different outcomes. based on the 2012, guided by the 2012 votes. we sort of used those 2012 votes, tweak them to simulate different results for the 2016 election. those of you who may recall four of those outcomes, what if elected a democratic president in 2016 -- two of those outcomes -- what if elected a republican president in 2016, and without patting ourselves on the back too much, one of the republican outcomes, if you look at the electoral college, the shape of the states in the electoral college, not too much different than what actually happened in 2016, although a lot of people didn't believe that one. this new report, we are projecting the 2020 election, as well as all the presidential elections through 2036.

i say projecting and not predicting. what we do is many different scenarios with many different assumptions about how voters will change. what's common among all these different projections is the underling demographics of the electoral. -- the electorate. as to what's -- two things are different about this report from the last report. one is were using 2016 as the base rather than 2012, and secondly we're adding to the democratic projections education as well as race and age because , because we saw as a result of the 2016 election the election of donald trump, nonwhite, white non-college voters made a big difference. they are in there as well as education in general in our projections. that's what we're going to be doing with our simulations going forward. my job now is to take you to little bit of the demographics,

the underlying demographics of these projections, and that will be followed by discussion of the different scenarios. let's talk about race and ethnicity going forward. in 2016, the eligible voter population was 69% white, 31% minority. we moved up to 2036, which is the last of our projections, 41% of the eligible voters are going to be minorities. the percentage that are hispanic go from 12% to 17%. african americans stay pretty flat from 12% to 13%. asian and other races from 3% to 7%. we see will becoming more diverse national, but what's important is what's going on in different states. this chart shows to maps of the united states. it shows the racial diversity of different states in 2016, where the darker green, the higher percentage of electorate, are minorities, going up to 2036. in 2016, there were three states -- hawaii, california,

and new mexico -- that were minority white, and there were four others were more than 40% of the state or minorities concluded texas, mississippi, georgia, and maryland. if we move up to 2036, by then many more states or at least 40% minority. that includes texas, which by then becomes minority white. that occurs in 2020 according to our projection. by then, nevada with the minority white. other states or at least 40% of electorate minority will be arizona, florida, virginia, louisiana, and also three urbanized northern states, illinois, new jersey, and new york. you can see that's happening, and why is it happening? because dispersion inward of new minorities and the united states. hispanics moving inwards from

from california or up from texas or from florida to the other states that if you look at nevada, for example, in 2016, 60% of nevada is eligible voters were white, but if we move up to 2036, that 60% goes down to 45%, because of the dispersion of more hispanics and asians moving into nevada. similarly in the south east, georgia all largely major minority group were african-americans, even more african americans moved to georgia. atlanta is one of the biggest attractors of african americans in the united states, but more hispanics and asians -- asians moving to georgia. that will also be the case not quite as big a change in states like virginia, north carolina, and other parts of the south. it you think about it this way, a lot of these southern states, and even some of the mountain west states, prior to barack obama's election in 2008 were largely republican states for many elections. some shifts, but for many elections, many republican states, but their becoming much

more minority over time and more in play for the democrats. the of the set when you look of wider states and other parts of the country, those states are becoming a little bit more diverse over time. even in 2036 even in 2036, quite a slew of states will have at least 70% of eligible voters that are white. these include the famous states of wisconsin, michigan, ohio, and pennsylvania that stuck out in a 2016 election that is moving republican because of the largely white votes. we're seeing the shifts going over time not in the same way a in different states but affecting parties in different ways. let's look at age. if you look at the age structure, this chart shows the percentage of the eligible voter population for different age groups over time. the only age group that is increasing between 2016 and 2036 is 65 and overpopulation. these are baby boomers. myself included in this room.

as we move from that page, these will already turn 65 are going to turn 65. you might look at this chart and say what about the decline in these 18 to 29-year-olds? are millennials not going? -- growing? that's true but there will not be forever the 18 to 29. [laughing] bill: the oldest millennial now is 37. soon will be over age 30 that under age 30. that's something to keep in mind. but still if you think how this moves across states, aside from states like florida and arizona and south carolina at a big retirement magnets most of the states that an older populations tend to be decline in population because it's the young people who leave or tend to be whiter states because the white population has an older age structure. we project that in 2036, the state of maine one-third of its eligible voters will be over 65. similarly with the state of florida. the big shift in the new part of our projections this time is in, incorporating the education attainment of eligible voter population.

this chart shows between 2016 and 2036, the percentage of the electorate who are white non-college whites who do not have a college degree, go from 46% down to 37%. still pretty high numbers as a part of electorate over time, but what's even more important is looking at the geographic distribution of these non-college whites. here's a map of course the greener parts of the country are the ones with highest percentage of non-college whites. west virginia leads all in 2016, 75% of west virginia's eligible voters were non-college whites. texas is only 34%, california only 28%, and in washington, d.c. only 6% of the eligible voters were non-college whites. that's about the same percentage donald trump got in the district of columbia. what's more important is for 28 states more than half of the eligible voters are non-college whites. these include again wisconsin, michigan, ohio, and pennsylvania. and even if you project this up

to 2036, most of those 28 states will at least 45% of the eligible voters non-college whites. that tells us about how the electoral college might be different for different parties over time. i'm going to stop here except to say that these projections by education, by race, by age, we were doing for the whole country and for each of the 50 states. these are the background, this is the bedrock for the simulations that we are doing. what the simulations do is make different assumptions about the turnout of these groups and about the voting behavior of these groups. now i'm going to pass the baton to rob, and he will tell us all about that. rob: thanks, bill. so just to recap a little bit, the country is changing. we're getting more racially diverse, getting older, more educated. what this is before politics? what does this mean for the democratic party and republican party going forward and attack strategiestype of

they might pursue? one of the things we decided to do was write a bunch of simulations just for a second. simulations, not predictions. we are not in the prediction game. it's about time to get into in general. we are not going to does after the 2016 election. how i would like to talk about these is to say they are baselines for thinking about the future. the future is always sort of inherently harder to understand. nobody can predict the martian invasion of 2024, things like that. it's really hard to sort of not say really predict but to just use these simulations to sort of have the contours of the future in mind. to say how can we think about what might come tomorrow. as bill explained, all the simulations were about 2%, they use the exact same set of demographic projections, but what we're going to do is go in

and turn the knobs a little bit, so what if this group turned out more? with that group supported the democratic party all the more? sometimes what if two knobs turn at once? losing among what group would be gaining among another. start up with a pretty simple one. one we call 2016 forward. what that does is it says what the people voted exactly as they did in 2016? they turned out to vote in exactly the same way and a photo for the candidates and exact same way they did in 2016. if the only thing that changes if the demographics, such as walk you guys through our sort of visual legend. the type of each of these you'll see what actually happened in 2016, and we selected out a number of key states that are interesting in that scenario. in this what it is i will, texas, ohio, georgia, north carolina, arizona, florida, wisconsin, pennsylvania, michigan. say that three times fast. you can see by the color coding that we have iowa, texas, and ohio going through strong

republican wins, and then georgia north, carolina, and the rest sort of being a more moderate or lean republican way. on the right, we have what happened to the electoral college, which went for donald trump. the popular vote went for hillary clinton. what happens if we just sort of change the demographics between 2016 and 2020, but hold everybody else's behavior constant? what we see as wisconsin, pennsylvania and michigan all go blue. these narrow wins by donald trump in 2020 would actually turn into narrow less than one percentage point wins by the democratic party in wisconsin, pennsylvania, and michigan. this would result in a electoral college win by the democratic candidate, whoever they are. what's interesting about 2016 though is this is obviously a high water mark for third-party vote. about 6% of the vote went towards the third party this year. what if it doesn't quite hold? what if you can think about third-party voters going home, right, they go back to the parties they typically vote for, so that would make a lot of joe

and jill stein voters going back to the democratic party, a lot of johnson voters going back to the republican party, 100% of mcmullen voters going back to the republican party in utah. what happens under that scenario? it's not something i've i can walkere, but you through it. we expect michigan and pennsylvania to go democratic, but wisconsin not to go democratic. this would result in a very narrow one point electoral college win by the republican party. the reason that would happen is because the maine second district are some of you might remember in 2016, maine apportions its electoral votes are not known who wins the statement also wins than the congressional district. it went towards donald trump, and he got one electoral college vote. because single vote we would anticipate in a situation where third-party voters went home and everybody else turned out to

vote. anything else did the same that it would be a a republican, a very narrow republican win in 2020. what happens as we go forward? business 2020. i'll walk through some of the results and give you timeline is 2036. essential in 2024 we see florida flipping to the democratic column just a result of demographic change. in 2020, we with the north carolina and 2032 would be arizona and georgia. all of the states going blue activity states that were once a deeper red now going sort of a lighter red republican. democratic wins all the way out to be a democratic win of 350 by 2036. take our second scenario. in 2016 african-american turnout went down and african-american votes shifted slightly towards the republican party. what i mean by by that is donald trump gets slightly better among african-american voters than did mitt romney. what if we see a a return to those prior election behaviors?

an increased turnout among african americans and also a shift back towards the democratic party. we pulled out some key states to look at the this is what actually happened in 2016. as we shift forward in time, we see pennsylvania, michigan, wisconsin, florida, north carolina, which barack obama did not win in 2012, but every turn the 2012 turnout rates support rates among african-americans would result in a flip north carolina, and amazingly, georgia would join the democratic column. georgia is a fascinating state, one of the few seats with african-american population is growing, growing quite quickly. as a result of that the dynamics within the state would mean a return to this higher levels of activity among african americans would flip this into the democratic holder is that the huge win for democrats in 2020 if this were to occur. it would win when the electoral 350 vote tried what they've electoral college college for the democratic party.

north carolina even going dark blue, being heavily democratic win for them. our third scenario what happens to hispanic, asian and other racial groups? go to the gop. within the major notice we've seen the last couple of years is the republican party, certain portions of it had been trying to appeal to some of these new and growing populations in order to sort of, they think that's a path forward for them and look for luck. we selected out some of the states. here's what happened in 2016. what would happen if they improved their margin by 7.5%. republicans would do 7.5% better democrats would do 7.5% worse. republicans would expand the electoral electoral college win based on what they want in 2016. they would pick up new hampshire and nevada, security electoral college vote while still losing the popular vote.

this is an important dynamic that you will see through a lot of our simulation is even when republicans are winning the electoral college they are still losing the popular vote if we base went off of 2016. as we go forward in time, this starts to fallout not as quickly as it appears. this electoral strategy would hold for republican party between 2020-2028. if they will increase the able to increase the margin among these groups they would hold onto electoral college and 2028 but we see georgia and north carolina in wisconsin, at the venue, michigan, nevada eventually go blue the demographic change is occurring, overwhelming even in this increase in support that they saw. so these are not all of our simulations. we did 37 in total but i don't want to put everybody into a light coma, but in good head off to my colleague ruy teixeira who will walk through some changes in the white-collar vote. >> great, thanks, rob. we got a few more simulations for you.

hope everybody is staying awake in this numbers extravaganza. in these simulations were going to feature an attribute of our new simulations that's very important which is would look at the education gap, the difference between white noncollege educated and white college educated voters because we're able to break up our projections between those two groups. it turns out that's really important as you might expect. in 2016 according to our data we thought white noncollege voters supported trump by 31 points. we found that white college-educated voters supported clinton by seven points. this is an immense education gap even larger than showed in exit polls. we also found in our analysis white noncollege educated voters were 44% of voters which again is a lot more than the exit polls, an extremely important group. let's look at some of things

that happen we wish to look at this. this just shows you against the 2016 result in some states highlighted. what happens if white noncollege educated voters get a ten-point margin swing towards the republican party? five points less support for democrats, 5.4 for the republicans. as you can see they do very well indeed. they add to their hall in 2016. minnesota and nevada for 329 electoral vote victory. so even larger than in 2016. in addition they take the popular vote narrowly by one point. however that does not, the popular vote thing does not last forever as in 2024-2036 the democrats come back and take the popular vote, but this is interesting. in every election from 2020-2036 the republicans would take the electoral vote despite losing the popular vote in 2024-2036 eventually by the time we roll

around 2036 the democrats have taken back pennsylvania. they have taken back minnesota, nevada, but that's not enough. republican still at 296 electoral votes and victory all the way through 2036. that's kind of extraordinary. this is a different scenario that in a sense the mirror image of the one which is discussed. this is a white college-educated voters continue on trend and swing towards the democrats in a ten-point margin swing. so plus five democratic for white college minus five for republicans. what happens if we walked that into 2020? as you can see the democrats do way better. they take back the rust belt, wisconsin, michigan, come pennsylvania. they add arizona, florida for a very robust 334 vote electoral victory. that just continues rolling

until they get to 2036, take the popular vote of course all the way through this that they take the electoral vote all the way through this. by the time they get to 236 they have fully 391 electoral votes because they add to the ones that took in 2020, they get georgia and eventually down the line they take texas because of the influence of demographic change, to that electorate. this is a massive 391 vote electoral haul for the democrats by the time we get to 2036. as rob mentioned, it's not, these simulations showed a lot of our simulations just turning one knob but sometimes groups change in the voting behavior in reaction to changes in another group. so, for example, what if the republicans did a lot better among new minorities, hispanics, asians and those of other race because they made a special outreach effort or sort of made a real appeal to these voters

and it was a tremendous successful, what if in reaction to that white noncollege educated voters with an exactly the other direction because hey, it's not the party anymore. what if white noncollege voters reverted to the 2012 voting patterns? this is a lot less favorable for the republicans. what we find as we move forward to 2020 is this would not be a good trade-off for the republicans. they would not only lose the popular vote as they did in 2016 but they would lose the electoral vote as well and democrats would take back michigan, pennsylvania, wisconsin. it would also get iowa and although they would lose nevada, the end result of that as a -- i think about 279 vote electoral victory for the democrats. so that's not a good trade-off for the republicans.

they wouldn't be happy with that. and then if you move forward to 2036, obviously the democrats continue to win across the board and they add to the states they took back in 2020. they get nevada back. they take north carolina and even add ohio. so republicans are just underscores the extent to which the republicans have benefit from this white noncollege shift and a difficult it would be for them if, in fact, that white noncollege shift went away. the final trade-off we're going to look at here is one thing we saw in 2016 was that the education gap widened at both ends, the white college voted became more democratic and white, non-college educated voters became significantly more republican. what if they continue into the future widening at both ends and say there was a five-point margin shift toward the republicans among white, non-college but a five-point margin shift among white college for the democrats? we find if you do that the republicans actually on net benefit from the trade-off and that reflects the fact nonwhite college voters there's more than white college voters and their

very efficiently concentrated for republican purposes. so under that trade-off the republicans actually like would slightly amplified the electoral vote victory even as they continue to lose the popular vote. they would add new hampshire to their column and by the time you get to 2036 this disappears for pretty fast. the republicans under our analysis would still take the electoral vote and a popular loss by 2024 by the time you get to 2020 and onwards they start losing on both ends and by the time you get to 2036 i think the democrats are about 350 electoral votes, if the democrats get back new hampshire, north carolina, florida and georgia to make a pretty overwhelming victory for the democrats. that just shows if we turn both the two knobs at the same time a things going in opposite

direction. you get depends partly on the distribution also the size of the different groups you are affected by turning the knob. again it underscores how important white, non-college voters are to republicans. as rob mentioned with 37 different simulations. with hundreds more we could have run but i think you probably got enough numbers to chew on for now. so i think we will move to a discussion. >> you know, thanks, ruy. i just want to start off, i guess with sort of a general question for all our panelists, and amy, we can start with you and move our way down. one of the things we did in this report sort of intentional intentionally as we avoided having a discussion about this is more likely that in terms of the scenario. it's something we're just wanted to go after i think the scenario we thought spoke to interesting dynamics and just and sticks of demographic change over interesting. my prompt for you a little bit, your general reaction to the report and was there scenario that you found really interesting?

maybe how likely do think that scenario might be? >> that's a fantastic question. i'll start off with my first reaction to the report, which you all touched on but is the tremendous disparity between the electoral college vote and the popular vote. and that in 16 of these and six of the 16 scenarios republicans win the electoral college but in only one did they win the popular vote. the applications of course for the populace, right, to see one party continue to win an electoral college victory while losing the popular vote would have tremendous consequences i think just going forward. but on the simulations, i thought it was fascinating that we get a look at all these and they all struck me as something that we've heard either from a candidate, a party, or an ideological group about which scenario is best for them. so then the democratic party the

debate right now is to just basically write off all those white working-class voters have voted for trump, we will never get them back, they are gone and let's just maximize, like barack obama did come nonwhite voters especially african-american voters? if we do that according to simulations we win. we don't need to win that grew the back. you can also have the rnc autopsy. remember when the recommended in 2013 we got to do better among nonwhite voters? that also succeeds a forever as you guys noted and has a short shelf life but it can get into 2020. then there's what i would call the trump more cowbell scenario which is give even more with white working-class. forget about everything rnc autopsy said, anything that the sort of never trumper said about reaching out to this traditional establishment republicans. that also can work. and then there's i would call the joe biden scenario which is get those white working-class voters back from 2012.

everybody can point to a scenario where it works. i think that is going be fascinating as we watch 2020 get in shape where anybody can come out and say if we do things my way, see? these guys tell me that there's a possibility of it working versus this debate in which one is the best. >> reactions to the scenarios and maybe which do you think is the likeliest to occur. >> first, i want to see the report is interesting to read and have enjoyed reading these reports over the years. there's a lot of insights, a lot of great thing relations to consider about what happens if this occurs or that occurs. the one thought that did occur was a synthetic or do, you have a lot of singers where one party wins the electoral college but the other one wins the popular vote. i can't imagine what would happen if red several years and

a row or elections interval where the sample with the democrats were on the losing second republicans on a winning second look at the conversations in california after 2016, for example. in terms of scenarios one synergy didn't talk about was what about what happens when you get the latino vote in the asian-american vote turnout rates up to everybody else, close the gap. great idea. would like to see it happen. i think if it did happen you would see some pretty big differences, but there's been a lot of effort to get out the latino vote over the years and the story and the track record has been one of declining at least flat participation in fact, we tend to be in a scenario right now were more than half of hispanics who are eligible to vote don't turn out to vote. as you say in the report, latinos are distributed in a way that's not advantageous for campaigns to pay attention to them. it's also young and those are part of the reasons why was he that. i'm not sure how likely that scenario is. the scenario i would've liked to seen you write is one that runs

what happens if the latino vote and the asian-american vote sees slight increases in voter turnout but not necessarily this matching what we see for whites or blacks across all education groups. that seems at the moment really, really unlikely. the other thing that i thought that was interesting about the report is looking at some of the statement you hear people talk about when will texas turn blue, when will georgia turn blue. it's interesting to see the different scenarios and when that happens. my final comment is when you take a look at latinos and asian-americans, i think there's two things you need to worry about. one, the slow down of immigration of both groups. it's happening in a significant way for hispanics, starting to happen for asian-americans. i wondered what that means in terms of growth. the second part is that spent a population is very diverse. it's not the same. your scenario but it an additional 7.5.2 republican candidate among hispanics not out of the range of possibilities. that's about where george bush was in 2004 so it's possible but i do think there is some changes within the hispanic population

that might lead to a different set of voter turnout rates and voter support for different candidates defending others candidates, and depending on the group whether we talk about puerto ricans in florida or in new york. cubans in south florida. i'm asking you to do a lot, i realized that is not speedy let me just get that on my schedule for the next year. >> matt? >> well, first of all thank you so much for the report. i always find the work you guys put together in forming a trend that we landscape. i'll say a couple things that jumped out at me. spent a lot of my youth in georgia, i'm really excited about the prospects both near-term and long-term. i do think it's interesting that one of the immediate questions before us is what happened this year, not just what happens in 2020 and beyond, for that timing

is everything. if we think about what's at stake this year, a full slate of governor's races, control of the house, etcetera this has implications for what the shape of congress is for the next decade, for example. the opportunities for dramatic shifts in power are pretty near-term. i think the second thing that really jumped out at me and this is partly a function of work we do, is there's really no meaningful path for republican party to exist in this country without over performing in the noncollege white vote share. and that national, localized, et cetera. that's a strategic proposition. i'm going to do what amy mentioned, an ideological group.

think if you have conservatives, -- partly what barack obama did to an extent in 2012 and in 2008, then the fundamental shifts what the map can be. i think to the point in terms of increasing voter participation for more diverse parts of the electorate, i agree wholeheartedly. i've been one of the actors is -- who has been trying to affect voter turnout and you see that behavior is a hard thing to move. it takes a lot of testing and adjusting and learning cycle to cycle. ohio went from 4.8 million to 5.8 million votes between 2002 to 2004. if hillary clinton got six and 600,000 more votes in texas than barack obama did. you can have these massive shifts in participation but it's hard to predict and it's even harder to cause.

those are some of the things that really jumped out at me. in terms about next steps playbook kind of where does the interest lie, we are working on your to do list, rob. i'd like to understand this question at a finer grain geographic level. if you look at the overlap between where education attainment exists particularly amongst white voters and urbanity. if you look at smaller communities obviously those of the older populations that was referenced earlier but it's also tends to be a lower educated population and, quite frankly, there's less communication in the spaces as a political matter. those are some of the trends that are jumping out at me. >> let me go off of what you had there and talk about that when 2018 election. so if none of you want to talk about the 2018 election. i apologize for this boring digression, but from here on out i think we can have a conversation. since the inauguration we seen a lot of special elections where democrats have been over performing. they've been doing a little bit better than hillary clinton did in 2016, republicans have been doing a little bit worse than trump did in 2016.

what do you all see as driving that? is it just thinking about our knobs here, is this changes in turnout seeing democrats and republicans turnout at different rates, or is this people changing their mind? >> i'll just say at the outset it does look much more about turnout than it does about persuasion, about people actually changing their minds, although i think pennsylvania in special elections a few weeks ago did show that in order for democrats to win their while it was helpful that he got democratic turnout, he also did need to win over some republican voters. so we needed to get some minds changed. it's also true that the perception of donald trump and a lot of these districts is different than the perception of them back in 2016.

he took 58% of the vote in the special, sorry, not special, in that district in 2016. the approval rating according to the polling for the election was 49%. republican with 49% perceptions of the president for having a direct impact on the perceptions of the republican party. take some of the numbers you put on the screen in terms of the under or over performance by certain groups and you're just sort of pump those up, especially women, younger voters and nonwhite voters who, and the women's numbers right now to me are the most dramatic and what you're looking at the most recent poll that came up this weekend at just the perception of the president, job approval of the president that women now are off the charts in terms of the disapproval ratings of the president. we are also seeing that the intensity of disapproval of the president is that much stronger than approval of the president. i think a lot of this is intensity more than it is changing the actual

demographics. we'll know a little bit more about changing of the demographics. i think that's much more about once we get to 2020 than 2018. >> i'll jump in. i'll start with pennsylvania 18, the race where we are active campaigning. wait a chance to see up close what's going on with the different segments of the electorate. just as a broader oversimplification white college voters have decided where they are on trump. to the extent that was a significant portion of his coalition, if you were earned $80,000 a year of your four year degree and you're white that generally means you are republican. that portion of the electorate has started to shift considerably. we saw it in virginia. we see it in place after please.

we saw in georgia six. the question is how much of the vote doesn't make up after any given election? in pennsylvania 18 that was an important part, a 20-point gap or so. we tracked approval in that particular race for trump and what we are seeing, as you just said, trump approval is absolutely predictive of where you fall. second part of this iw do you get to this type of victory and you have to reach into a working-class portion because that is who the voters are so if you look at washington and greene county committees were outside of allegheny county. it's around 60% of the population, excuse me, of the vote. they shifted and every one of the counties in terms of his vote share and so that is unique when you look at virginia and alabama senate.

versus people of color the one thing that i do want to point out and i should have said this earlier we should acknowledge their cargo, was a unique historical figure and so the probability of getting american turnout and vote share back to the same level as when he was on the ballot does require imagination. imagination. you'limagination. you will see there is a primary coming up on the contact so should one of the candidates prevailed it can you replicate that particular phenomena.

among the women in the last four years to a 70% of the millennial identify as democrats or say they lean towards the democratic party an and begin a lot of that happened in the last four years. what is driving that right now and what do you think are the long-term consequences to that? >> i agree wholeheartedly about the shift of college-educated voters. we are always a little bit weary in 2016 since there was a sense of, i don't know about this guy, i don't really like his behavi behavior. i can't have four more years of

that. he's a businessman and outsider and is going to change politics. sure, there's a lot of republicans who fuel that way. i like what he's doing policy wise. i think for women what you saw was a sense of engagement that hadn't been ignited by hillary clinton got the idea of having a woman as president was exciting for many of these women. but what they got was even more intense in terms of the reaction to that and that is what's remarkable about this coalition that right now is engaged in. what we are seeing in american politics and what it takes to engage the coalition isn't that

there's a transformative figure everyone loves and is supportive of thaof that they turn out ande engaged because of how much they eat the other person and that can drive you through a midterm election and it may even drive you through a presidential election but it's not enough to sustain you as a party so what do they do with all of these folks that are engaged to keep them engaged, what kind of candidate is going to be able to take that coalition of college-educated white voters and say okay, and here is the path forward for the party rather than just you you're goio come out and thrust it at the white house. >> we've talked a couple of times about the non- white college voters. what we've seen since 2008 has

been eight equine among the that group. it's been a decrease in the last ten years now. this is just a question for the panel how much of that is permanent, and how much is the democratic party can still win back those that left the party. >> i might even make that question more in your face. if you look at the data, it's pretty clear they want to turn up the volume. how feasible is that. do they eventually have to something different? >> this is where a lot of us got in trouble in 2016 because we looked at president obama or western pennsylvania and said

they can't get worse than this. if they elect an african-american named barack obama, certainly they can vote for a white woman. or not. i just remember in 2016 in minnesota people say we hit the low mark with obama. democrats can't do any worse than this and it went that much lower. so could you get to 75% of? i can't remember they had the approval rating among those in the 70s and it was a 31% margin in the high 60s.

>> sure. it can always get worse. it is on a canvas that's influenced by a lot of other folks painting thfolks paintingo what's happening in the incarceration rates etc. when you start to look at the composite as indicators, the trend line suggests that it could be considerably worse with incarceration levels and obviously we've all heard about often we know firsthand what the opioid addiction means. 95% of the job creation was an

informal sector area it elevates the differences between the different constituencies. it change changes it in a measue and consistent way so if there is an explanation if i'm in southwest virginia medicaid expansion means something to our particular community and that gives you a different variable to process the. it's the possible reverse course to extend medicaid for 400,000 people partly because you had so

many republican defections from folks that said no i'm not voting for this and so it can get worse but it also can get a lot better. >> how much of this is driven by policy and how much is driven by culture. it has been a cultural fight for so long that you are on one team or another are no amount based e specific policies to. it's worth began in the political space to get the critique of the work. if we make too many assumptions of the identity and people will continue to identify as hispanic

going forward. i wonder if you can walk us through the demographic changes that are occurring in the community and why it might be wrong to assume they are going to continue. >> it is a great question. also is there a population or community called pitino. i try to use the word population iinstead because community implies he hav they have the sae length of view and it isn't clear that that is what is happening to the. is over half into these are big changes that reflect where the population is going. it's going to be driven by u.s. foreign people and latin america doesn't have the people who fill

the same flow that we had in the 1890s. the second big point is a rich when you take eluded the marriage rate how does that compare to white and black, it is more like ten or 15%. we will continue to see more and we just did a report recently that looked at what happened to people with hispanic ancestry no longer self identified as such. these people would say that the number one reason is i didn't know my ancestry or speak spanish. i grew up american. so i think we are going to see the population continued to gr

grow. it's also going to be important for the u.s. population growth however, we will see the numbers slowed down at the notion of the identity might be different 20 years from now. we are going to turn it over to the audience now. there should be people walking out with microphones. just a couple of borders here. please try t to fix the microphe so we can all hear you and let us know your name and know your question is a question. the gentleman right here in the front row. >> i wonder in these changing the demographic trends if they would point to one thing being more dominant in terms of the issues whether it be economic or cultural and so on. does this point to changing an

important issue that would arise in the 2020 election? >> the economy is always important. i think that all these will dominate especially minorities and of that may help turn them out even further in the future. the economy looks like it's okay now and it probably will be in 2020 though we don't know, something could happen. the idea of culture, we saw how important it was in 2008 and 2012. the turnout is not just of of jt african-american but other minority groups as well. that is not going to go away. as much as we want to talk to the interest of working class whites, this group of people that seem to persist in their simulations, sorthesimulations,e did in that they were going to be there and they keep popping up it's also important to look

ahead at the minority population which is going to be a bigger portion of the only 18 to 29 to 30 to 34 and so forth as we go out and despite what's happening in the hispanic population and i agree there's a little bit of a moving away from that identity that's not going to happen very quickly so i would say the cultural issues are going to be important. >> it's a little hard to separate cultural from policy or economic issues. the number one thing that occurs to me is maybe th me the x-rayse someone it's the geography because if you look at where the move is concentrated and the kind of communities these people live, which are distinct in that they have cluster of economic place and mobility.

it could be addressed by policy if that becomes underscored as something that is politically necessary and the same thing you can say about communities of color, they have things that are very pleased specific to their problems. maybe one thing we will see moving into 2020 is more of an attempt if not one-size-fits-all, the more distinctive problems and distinctive place the parties have to speak of the policies and in a distinctive way. first of all, senator johnson won by something like 3% of the vote as opposed to the 24,000 that trump had won by. so perhaps in your demographics and studies, and you might have looked at johnson's vote going forward.

forward. my larger question on the demographics is my take away regarding dissimulation is the massive suppression on a multilevel works so you need to keep down the vote in milwaukee with strong voter identification laws and you need to punch out the democratic party stuff online and work on the social issues. if you have those three levels or more it will stay republican. >> just to underscore what you're saying according to the analysis was a 19-point drop in

black turnout and it is constant and 2016 which was massive so whatever the reasons were it is pretty hard not to think some of the walls that were passed into difficulties have something to do with it so it wasn't as effective or didn't seem as effective but clearly it is a part of the environment the parties will have to deal with and decided able to fight when it comes to scale. >> i just want to jump in on that earlier point. we took a look at the vote in ohio and we did a field survey and asked different cohorts that voted in 12 and 16 or didn't vote ivote and neither were toly did not succeed. we wanted to understand what was animating peoples participation levels. the black voter turnout dropped

by 10% in ohio from 2012 to 2016. why do you think that is, so we were intentionally provocative to see the response we could get in across each segment regardless of the level of participation, the consistent answer this half saying i don't think it even matters and so there's this kind of culture versus policy question and i think there's a big swath of folkthefolks that have no connet any level so you do need a singular figure like barack obama to elevate interest when you have to go beyond where's my self-interest in participating in this process so i think we have to take a deeper look at what the interests are not just peculiar to the white working class people that have economic interest as well so let's look at the full set of actors

involved. >> my question has to do with the non- college-educated white. in the presentation is treated as a single group but if you feel a part of for women is that much of th a difference and particularly looking at 2020 i wonder if you peel down the white noncollege women as concerned about sexual assault for the whole raft of issues where republicans are losing with college-educated women. >> white noncollege women if you look at the data was unable to include that in the simulation because it would cut to small

but if you look at the data from 2016 it does suggests there's a difference between noncollege white women and men in terms of their voting behavior however we do see in terms of the data since then noncollege white women are moving away from trump at a faster rate than men so that is a significance. significant. one thing it does show from 2016 is if the testimonials and again we didn't have it broken down they are quite different from a much less hostile than democrats before positive results and in 2016 it would appear the younger generation i would assume i'd be more accessible to democrats than some of their older counterparts so it's not just one big glob of voters there are

differences and i think does the have a potential for democrats. >> i think it's going to be important to see if this fits they are starting to occur who's moving to away from trump and it's not going to actually become clear in the midterm where you're going to see not just white college women in the suburbs but you will see is the drive driven by women. i will be curious to see if we have anything more significant turnout differential given the intensity we are seeing.

>> right here in the front row. >> over here we touched on a question and stolthequestion ani was wondering what role will these walls play as far as your demographics are concerned because the walls are changed every year and is a you say african-american turnout was low however a lot of them were purged from the voting rolls. they showed up but were turned away. how will the state law affect your demographics in the future as far as access to voting? >> ohio is one of our flagship

state so we have a lot of analysis. we looked at the change in population from 12 to 16 and then the number of by a race. we see a disproportionate level in terms of removing folks from the polls based on race it's not shocking i know there are several folks investigating this matter i'm not sure where it stands before the court i think it is going before the high court. what you're seeing is even inside of that context there is still the depression of the voter participation so you have a perch within the folks that are left are still not participating at the same level as before. some of this is a direct effect of the various laws passed to suppress voter turnout. i think we should take a broad view of what is suppressing voter turnout. i think gerrymandering is an enormous factor this if you don't have to compete for a

particular geography than who's engaging in who's mobilizing folks to turnout at last i think alabama isn't known for its most progressive voting framework into their use saw a heightened level of participation so the objective is clear the actual effect to be more nuanced and it's coming from a broad set of efforts. >> on the message mattering and people feeling like they have something at stake. stake. we've heard this over and over again with focus groups to solve the biggest drop between 2012 and 2016. it wasn't as much about that so

i think that if you are thinking ahead of the most important thing you need to do to engage people of color in the process it's not what our things for ous preventing you from voting. you look at a state like california for the example that has done more than almost any other states to get the process. it's like a laboratory what can we do to get people more involved and how can we do gerrymandering in a fairway with automatic registration, top two primary processes that encourages people to come into those it doesn't matter the party you can come and vote in the primary. yet we solve this in 2014 the last time i did all this was 2014 where they had the lowest turnout in modern history. when you talk to them why didn't you turnout it doesn't matter if it didn't get difference i think that should be a concern because

what they are saying is i going to vote, nothing changes, the system is still dysfunctional, my neighborhood isn't any better or they say my neighborhood is better so i'm going to vote in my city council and school board because that affects me that these people in sacramento or washington, they are not getting anything done so until they do, you've got to come and giv and , don't expect me to come to view and unfelt politicians get that and i think donald trump did get that with a certain community of voters and they turned out at a rate of the expected because he spoke directly to them, you are right nobody did ask you. i'm going to ask you to tell you what i'm going to do. so any candidate running if the first question is how do i get you to think i'm good to make your life better rather than how am i going to turn date could change the law, then it is your

kind of missing something. >> to keep on schedule, this has to be the last question. [applause] >> i would like to invite the second panel up to. [inaudible conversations] welcome back. we are moving on to the second panel. i'm here with my ringleader that you saw earlier, and we are going to be joined in this segment by a couple of people known to all of you but also

worked with us in the past very closely. they are part of an advisory board. they've been helpful along the way but there's other members of the advisory so we have a great demographers and they keep us honest and give us advice over the years but they've written papers from the perspective of the republican and democratic party. what should they take away from all of these scenarios. the papers are available for you to read and i will give you a couple of options.

we have a printed copy these are the two papers. the report underlined the project and both can be found online through to me at the bipartisan policy center, american progress.org and the other we heard of in the first panel. again, i want to give one award to sean. he was supposed to be a guest last year but he was coming in to give his commentary and had the worst of planes, trains and automobiles as you might imagine and couldn't make it last year. this year he was paired to come

the night before and everything was fine but of course things were canceled again. rainstorms prevented his drive but he is here with us and we are grateful. [applause] what we are going to do is have a conversation with you. we are not going to ask them to recount their papers. you should read them. >> maybe just telescope your basic argument but also may be related to what sean wrote. where do you agree with him and where don't you and where do you come out on that same, it's differ a little bit? >> i was lucky enough to write a paper from the democratic perspective it's a much more rosy scenario than it is on the republican side in a might have been more fun to write my paper

bench on writing his paper. but one of the things that's raised for me particularly horrific strategists is that it hits home the challenge for the narrative is for democrats because in the scenario laid out and some others i generated myself, there are some in my papers you can easily win in the future solely on the votes of white college educated especially women and not ever talk to the white working class. in other words, there are scenarios you can replicate the performance of the white working-class voters which is historically bad and you can keep the content and look at the shifts so tactically that was philosophically for the democratic party, not such a fine strategy in a sort of

mirror the identity politics that can be framed in constructive ways so why i think the most realistic present in the underlining report and fix the question what the swift populism because most would agree it isn't acceptable to say we don't care about the voters we just want to win the elections. i won't go through everything they talked about holding a constant and been looking at the demographic changes, a democrat can win in 2020. it's very tenuous especially if you allocate the third-party

vote where it is a one electoral votes when that if you keep the vote the same democrats can win purely on the strength of the new minority voters and college educated voters but it's very close, so you have states like pennsylvania and others where the .5 margin and that's when they matter in the close races the quality of the candidates, the quality of the campaign, what is happening by the campaign from the inside and the outside but i think that if we look at what has happened, that is unrealistic and you can look at virginia i think in particular is a good example but also pennsylvania e. team. in those cases they are slightly different about what we saw this better turnout from democratic leaning groups so the suburban part of virginia and pittsburgh but also a margin shifts as an example hillary clinton won about 15% of college educated

women and 58% of college-educated women in 2017. that is a significant shift in margin. when you look at the dynamic and the fact that turnout actually people have focused on african-american turnout and the state drop but actually the turnout went up among other minority voters and the democratic margin went up with other minority voters and so they were trending more democratically even as the african-americans margin dropp dropped. the scenario that i developed if let's say that the turnout is in between 2012 and 2016 i think matt pointed out that obama was a historical figure that generated enthusiasm that isn't easily reprehensible but it's halfway between 12 and 16 in terms of margin and then i had a slightly smaller increase

trending in that direction and of thithis project was unable tk at gender but it's mostly college-educated women that will drive the shift but i didn't touch the turnout because not only do the turnout go up but not as much as the white noncollege they have higher turnout. in that scenario democrats win by nine points and so they easily win the electoral college and all the states in north carolina so that strikes me if you think about what has been happening since trump was elected and you look at the virginia election is entirely realistic to me that is without anybody doing anything because so much of what is happening on the ground and as someone that works on campaigns it is organic

it's not that they are specifically doing anything to generate this enthusiasm, people are just desperate to do something. the implication is for democrats, they can win and that is problematic from a moral perspective. sean wrote an interesting paper that i mostly agree with in the sense that real events happen. 9/11 happened, world war ii happened and things shift and realign and we can project out from these numbers but nothing is sort of set in stone and nothing is inevitable that could change the dynamics in the short and long term so he does a good job talking about all these things in the past that ended up being quite changeable. >> don' >> don't lead off with your paper is going to be memorable to everyone. you look at it as if you were an analyst for the project in 1925

and look at some trends republicans have been doing very well and trends that would never change that they would always win the battle can african-americans woulbattle ans both republicans and working-class voters were trending and of course those things will change dramatically within just a few short years. could you look at some of the factors? in the long term these demographic projections what it might not hold as we go for a number of years but also, what are the scenarios that you see in the report seems to be the most likely, what might change in what seems to be most unlikely? >> it's not just 1925 commits any number if i told you that republicans were about to win seven of ten with a landslide if

i have told you that in the 2009 the republicans ar were going to nominate somebody that what his campaign off saying that they were a bunch of rapists except for the few that fo were good people and when he would win i'm a skeptic and i would have said no way that isn't not going to happen. these things have a way of not finding out once you get a few cycles down the road so i don't disagree with the way the data was presented. it's important to distinguish between the democratic majority in some of the stronger versions that make it seem like this is a done deal. some of the issues that are worth raising, some of this was covered in the last panel of

what happens if it increasingly shifts to a nativeborn population as you get more intermarriage and as you get more conversions to protestantism which does happen a few generations in. do they take sall take sally any that it is today or doesn't turn out like being italian-american sort of days for me for my grandparents house if, like that was their identity and for my mother that is sort of her identity and for me that's the site of the family that i'm the closest to, but i don't particularly identify. my kids have no clue that they are one eighth battalion and we forget that in like 1985, part of why justice scalia gets appointed is because the italian boat is incredibly important to the swing state of new york so these things can shift in very short order. we talked a lot about the african-american vote and what i think is a difficulty all things

equal and i think with president trump all things are not equal to all things being equal getting that to return to the 2008, 2012 level of turnout isn't just an histori the histoe of barack obama's candidacy in that he was the first african-american president because i think quite frankly self-insured for the the trip io the position he was, but he was able to do that by keeping the white working class largely on board it was tremendous but we wouldn't have seen from the other politicians we've seen along the way. that was the concern that jesse jackson has a different presidential run than barack obama then there's the question of the white working class which is what happens if those trend lines continue. there's already a buzz voters out there somewhere along 40% of the electorate. but supplements sooner or later

you start to run into college students who yet do not have college degrees and are not susceptible to the message and start running two baristas so there is a ceiling for the republicans dare we just don't know what it is and i think that the republican strategist and 1970 would feel comfortable at 30% because that is how it had been for 24 years and then saw it fall down to 10%. i'm not convinced we haven't seen the worst. >> you have a lot of good things to pick from in the demographic you laid out a number of scenarios from do very little and you still win or do a little

and even by a lot. looking out past the current climate ten or 12 years in the future, what is the party going to be moving and maximizing? what is the one you would pick k out and say i think the democratic party is good to be getting much better here and taking advantage of the trends here and then on the second question i know you've spoken about this before you saw some weaknesses around the edge of the coalition maybe it is african-american men or other parts of the coalition where would you say they might have more weakness than other parts of the coalitio coalition othere might think? >> i do think and this isn't just based on the data that a potential weakness is from my perspective it isn't necessarily a moral weakness but a potential weakness of the democratic party so i' on the one hand, you are

seeing gender gap particularly driven by white college educated women and younger women with overlapping but not a complete overlap and certainly they face tremendous support. they are almost becoming a democratic peace group much more likely to vote than other people than you have a historic number of women running without out they will face a significant shift in the gender makeup of the house. even if nancy pelosi isn't the leader you will have to see significant women in leadership. they didn't want to vote for hillary clinton i heard some folks say awful things about her

and i'm going to hold my nose because she's married to bill clinton but at least she's been in the white house before not even mentioning secretary of state but that she was the first lady and i ain't i did some post election research and only 50% voted for clinton not for chumps that a third party so i think one potential weakness would be a backlash which we are seeing already when you think about the women's march and a backlash democrats from male voters. women in the majority elected and democratic party that i think you could see something like that happening. >> what we ask that something that you mentioned that is near and dear to my heart which is that emerging democratic thesis. i do feel speaking as someone that is pretty close to the genesis of that thesis that it's

a widely misunderstood and oversimplified to the point of just being h. rove without a real analysis maybe you can speak about the weak and strong version of the democratic majority thesis because again speaking as someone close to the emerging democratic party it felt like you were onto something. >> those of you in the audience i don't know them in sync patrick's day in the majority just a few years ago as well as some later work but that's an important book. my book if i may plug the lost majority was conceived as a response to the emerging democratic majority and then i had made the mistake of sitting down and actually reading the

book like this book is nothing like what i see in the new republic or the new yorker or the favorite progressive publication. it's a very nuanced work that emphasizes heavily the importance of careful governance tending to the various coalitions at the time. it relies heavily on the white working class vote which things have changed and i would agree with support to the coalition that it was at the time. about a book is a very careful book about spelling out that this is not inevitably what will happen, some of the states will come around and it was dead right about trends in virginia and colorado and nevada at a time but no one took that seriously. it got a lot of things very much right so i think it's important

when talking about the demographics at his best in the arguments or whatever because the emerging democratic majority was in the demographics just the argument. real quickly on what was said and i jus,and i just kind of wao follow up. i've always taken the view political coalitions are like water balloons. you step down on one side and the other side pops up and i think that is a problem for the democrats going forward. you can try to tend to the various portions of the coalition but inevitably you have a message that dominates and i think we kind of sold out in 2009 and 2010 where we are trying to keep this coalition at the time of wealthy white liberals, other middle-class suburban, white working class voters, minority groups together causing some tensions and fractures.

i agree you can win in a particular way but keeping that group together when they have some competing interests without the threat of donald trump front and center i think is difficult. .. van that certainly relies on the white working-class but the scot walker winds are will look different from the donald trump wins. what is your thinking about white working-class and what should we be thinking about also

labor and the importance of labor and the union diversification but also what is the future? >> i think one of the things that we have danced around talking about the popular vote in the electoral college and the senate and with the nonwhite vote you did get a lot of concentration states. the white working class tends to be spread across the upper midwest and become the swings set--some swing state that i think the real alarm bell for the republicans there is the water they are taking on. if you want to know what really made wisconsin a republican state yeah the swings are part of it. kramer has a very good book written about that documenting the shift in attitudes before trump's election but it's crucial.

salve bright red ring around milwaukee and the senate republican base. if that turns purple republicans are up the creek to the same thing with the county i live in ohio columbus delaware voted republican in every election since the 1960s but it was still a trump county. it moved five or six points toward donald trump and it was it historic showing for republicans. they are a real alarm bells going off and in addition to some of the movement toward republicans that counterbalance in 2015 but down the road may not. >> i don't think you can separate what happened to hillary clinton from the movement in those states and i think there's important research that shows the elimination of collective bargaining in wisconsin for example a padded big impact in people voting democrat read at ranges from

what happens when people are in unions and not being diminished over time but also the resources the indians have brought so you also saw the same assault. the most extreme example certainly in ohio you had real attacks and bargaining collectively. i cannot remember the name of airport but it specified what the impact of these sorts of power pieces have announced the strength of unions in their ability to get out votes for democrats. they do think one other thing and that's not a problem that's going to go away. even if democrats have to take over state governments and that's going to be tough in some places we anticipate the culture around union organizing is not going to happen overnight.

certainly the labor movement is committed to doing that. on the other hand in addition to what sean said about suburban voters i think there are consequences to austerity but if you look at the difference between minnesota and wisconsin and how it did. minnesota have the resources that wisconsin didn't have around medical fields of academia. if you look at the recoveries that happening in minnesota as opposed to wisconsin he didn't make cuts he borrowed there were massive cuts in wisconsin. if you look in kansas where you are now seeing actual democrats becoming stronger and moderate republicans on the increase the austerity reaction has really hollowed out schools and infrastructure in places like ohio and wisconsin that some of it's been restored in pennsylvania but it takes a while to rebuild that last area. it's kind of a cautionary tale for republicans but i think we

have seen a backlash in the states as well. >> let's sort of stipulate sort of the week version of the emerging democratic majority and let's also stipulate an environment that is moved in the way it has since 2015 giving the democrats better chances. given that with the respective parties what's the worst thing that the parties respect respect--respectively could do to deal with the situation? what is the catastrophic mistake it could make in dealing with this? >> that's a good question. [laughter] >> and i talk about republicans? [laughter] we are to talk about the hearing someone mentioned this on the earlier panel and it's in my paper but winning over time with

the electoral college and not the popular vote i think that is profoundly problematic and there are two ways. one can be problematic for republicans and undermining their legitimacy as a party. you keep governing as if you have one free of not run bradley strikes me as making the party weaker and less effective. democracy is demobilizing. if you think your vote doesn't matter then why go out and vote? you hear a lot especially among young millennials that if hillary clinton won the election and donald trump is the president our democracy doesn't work anyway. that's a danger for the republican party. >> while we saw in 2005 and 2009 and 217 which is taking the

single election results and the mandates. it's not necessarily how most voters vote. most voters will look at their pocketbook and look at the historic nature of the candidacy there's a great quote about the elect are at and doesn't work yes or no i tried to interpret that is a prime example. regardless of what happens in 2019 and 2021 i think over playing the hand is like real like being careful about that. it's tough because your base is excited. they think they won because it's the end of history. they got to toe that line between keeping your base happy and the reality that your base is almost never majority of the electorate. >> we have strong partisanship and the way they govern in a

compromising way of governing and with the rise of nonparty funding that is continuing that goes up every single year i don't see a party shift anytime soon. even if you want is a party to govern in a way where you are compromising in the moderate it's impossible to do. >> we see the popular vote going one way or the other. i figured i would put mine on the electoral college after people vote. we do have a scenario that it might be good for the book. but my question is generally the democratic story is good for democrats with the rise of latino vote and the decline in the white working-class vote but let's focus on millennials are younger voters.

it's a little bit of a political transgression which you both have expertise on but if you look at millennial voters they are strongly democratic. partly that's because they are more diverse but even the white vote is strongly democratic. one would assume unless the tenant 12-year-old since they are very different that march is for the elect are at and looks good for the democrats. people believe you're voting behavior is formed at an early age. you stick to the party that you had when you came of the age to vote and it doesn't change very much but there's a little evidence of maybe a change as you acquire family or grow. what is your thought on that? are we likely to see this being a democratic group going forward or may not that be the case? >> when i started writing on this a decade ago my line was

that's a decade or two down the line for republicans and we won't have to worry about this. now it's a front and center problem for republicans. their voters are old and many of them will be around and there will be more and more of these younger more liberal voters. i do think it's an organ to keep in mind that the government carries 18 to 24-year-old demographics and today those are boomers who are voting overwhelmingly for the right of the country as a whole. i'm not saying that something republicans can't sustain on. events really do impact it to the other thing is the parties will change. the debate over marriage equality is over. there are still battles around the edges but the core debate is not going anywhere.

sooner or later the republican party will change. the country as a whole is 75% in favor of marriage equality then we will have a majority of the republican party in favor of it. i don't think that will happen in 2020 but by 2030 that's going to be how things go. it's just hard to speculate. >> i would say i'm a little less optimistic. obama lost when he lost white millennials in 2012. what i saw in the millennial voters is a real part of the democratic party so while the liberal progressives especially on race and orientation and gender in that sort of thing and in fact people of color and

vulnerable communities. you don't see that with older white voters. white millennial art--but it's a very passionate democratic party and if you look for example at older african-americans have very profound attachment to party in history you don't see that with younger african-americans. younger african-american men in particular did not vote for trump but they didn't vote or they voted heavily third-party. and younger millennial hispanic men as well. while i think the ideology certainly those who have come of age and trump are even more liberal but i don't think the party has any stake. part of what the democratic party has done this to make sure in midterms are not talking

about security and medicare and you're not talking to the electorate. i don't think democrats have talked to one else and i don't think democrats often default in talking about college affordability in loans which is important but we know the majority of people are going to go to college. what do you say to millennial noncollege voters and i don't think democrats have figured that out. >> with that the issue of immigration? if you look at the data from 2015 it's pretty clear trump has a profile of a certain amount of bias. the issue that was most prominent was anti-immigration and those attitudes were the most predictive. when he goes out and does his rallies it comes up but it's like an incredible contentious issue within the republican party. do we feel that changing anytime

soon in some of the dynamics we have talked about in our scenarios or does this continue to be the party is at complete loggerheads about this that i won't have a significant effect? >> i think the talents to democrats of immigration is that it's a much more important issue for republicans. if you ask people what their most important issue is immigration falls down to four or five for democrats. have this imbalance around communication and activity around immigration etc. and republicans if you think about social media and information propaganda immigration is a huge piece that the right and the far right and the russian thoughts and bulgarian trolls are pushing from the media. the question to democrats how do you talk about immigration when your side doesn't care about much as republicans do and daca

and comprehensive immigration reform will continue to be of that part of what the party talks about. it is in some ways a benefit to republicans or the democrats but the one thing i would say is going back to millennial fear the divisiveness and hispanics in particular with regards to immigration, women don't like it. maybe it's not that they are out there wanting to march for immigration reform but they are marching against hate and prejudice and they really really don't like it. it's less about specific policies and more about what is this mean for who we are sick country and what were you represent and morals? >> i talk a little bit about the fight over her that we had in

her our politics in the 1980s and i looked at europe and if you didn't like the religious right wait until you meet the secular right. it gets to stuff that i think even if you are someone who is not particularly progressive but more racially progressive gets an attitude that's hard to appreciate at a gut level. it has a lot of resonance for people. the republican party overlooked their peril and it's part of what has come down in the 2016 primary and i think if i had to point to an area potential democratic overreach that would be the top of my list. i don't know how widespread that attitude is but a lot of my younger progressive friends is an issue for them i think you would be crazy for the next deck

paid to go with immigration enforcement. i doubt the democratic party leadership would go along with that. there's a lot of energy in that direction. again it's hard for me because of something that just doesn't register in a visceral way the waves register with other people but it's real. look around the world. it's not just us. >> there was a potential showdown over daca and speak about the democratic party. they didn't go far enough. they should have shut down the government for two weeks to get daca and the republicans would have caved. that's really contentious and a point going forward. >> but to follow up on rudy's question immigration the republican party has been more

skeptical and the other party in the other direction and one of the key dividing points on the white working class but the other issue of donald trump's trade and that is come to the forefront today. when you think about the issue trade within the coalition perhaps in the midwest. as a greater divide between the different types of republicans may be on the democratic side. is the issue trade something that's going to have a potential shakeup or do they go together? sully i think trade and immigration are a lot of ways different sides of the same coin. you are seeing a shift. i'm a lot more interested in seeing how it plays out with the democrats because i think trying to reinvigorate labor and to the labor base causes some real

tension on the trade issue. >> i think with trade and even the polling with tpp people don't know a lot about trade. they don't know how works and i don't know what our policies are for the most part so it's interesting to watch over the last three years is how it becomes partisan. i just asked a question about a chinese terra in a poll i did last week in 75% of democrats think it's bad end 25% of republicans thinks it's good. there's nothing interesting to say about this. i don't know what to make of that but to say as a subset of voters i don't think they care that much and they see it through the lens of whatever policy is on at that time.

i don't think it's a voting issue when it comes to these economic policies. >> we will take--turn to the audience. over here and then i'll come to you. >> thanks. the question for each of our paper writers. i'm sorry. sean made to structural points up front one having to do with the possibility for which he knows the 21st century and the other is whether the ceiling for white working-class voters has reached yet and i'd be interested in your response to that deshaun first of all i have to congratulate you on the working on the voting studies

panel. congratulations. in the previous panel amy walter raised a very adjusting question whether talking about people the working-class vote. to what extent are we talking about cultural and to what extent are we talking about actual policies and the consequences of those policies? suppose we get into 2020 and working-class wages have risen smartly and most of the coalmines have not reopened and steel is not doing so great despite the tariffs and life for people is not perceptibly better >> i do think we can see if you look at the differences among latinos for native born english speaking latinos they are more conservative than foreign-born and spanish speaking latinos. if the republicans had taken the

republican report seriously in 2012 actually doing outreach i think there would have been a real shock at making some gains with latino voters. it's a problem in the next 10 or 15 years is what is happen around immigration because it's such a source of strength for republicans. it makes it much harder for that dynamic to change. by the way it's not even so much about the immigration policies. there are plenty of latinos who say i came here legally and i came the right way. it's about if you look at what's happening on the secular right to demonization and just how gross the conversation is. i think by the way that's asian-american voters who have shifted heavily democratic in the last 10 years. but most recently in 2012 to 2015 so that demagoguery around

race is really problematic for this notion of assimilation and translation. i think we see some different dynamics. it went the other direction on that. i don't know if republicans have reached their ceiling. seems hard to imagine democrats doing much worse than hillary clinton did and already working with big pockets of working-class voters people running for governor and other things. some of that may be driven by white working-class women. we are seeing some improvement at the margins that but hillary clinton lost at the margins. i can imagine republicans doing even better and we are not seeing that now but i don't really know. >> i take the view on a macro

level referenda on the parties in power, i think at the micro level the message does matter. i think democrats were able to do well because they had conor lamb and he was running a very focused message but i don't know that nationally the democratic presidential nominee is going to run. that said if we are in a recession or there is a mini-recession and some of the industrial areas i can't imagine trump with a repeat performance. that set in 2015 i couldn't have imagined that trump would when. >> i would add one thing about latinos. mark lopez said something very interesting to me.

i think him might have cited in your paper the decline in the hispanic population and the implication of that is if latinos are less likely to identify with that ethnicity that they will become more politically conservative. you said that the data didn't see a lot of controlling risk factors. among these people who lost the latino identification their attitudes would be similar. i just think that's the issue in mark said they were going to publish something--. >> i'm curious what you all think about the move of college white voters and how much of that is a reaction to trump will continue? trump's no longer the head of the party and how much of it is

what the democrats are doing? how the democrats continue to hold onto it? >> 's more than that. the trend of college educated specialist postgrad education traub has accelerated it. but it predates it and white college women also predates trump. trump has accelerated the dynamics that were already in place. >> if you look at the college degree vote and you control for national vote share you get a line. you don't see lines like this in elections but that's what we get with that respect it's a continuation of trends. it's a trend both suburbanites

were the republicans base in 60s, 70s and 80s when bill clinton started to break them away. i think they are the swing vote right now. they are kind of the name of the game for the party. >> i think that the republicans have a challenge to the extent that republicans are being anti-science and anti-women's rights and women's rights in the work place in particular. i just think it's very difficult not necessarily with the entire block but important segments of it. as long as that's part of the republican base i don't see how you do it. >> from my perspective a cultural issues that the republicans are on did not resonate at all. i think if you take it bernie

sanders progressive approach that's going to be tough and trying to balance those few impulses from both parties. >> the bernie sanders campaign in the primaries had not been awaited. >> the thing i would add about white college grads is among my own comrades john guidice saying an emerging lid was taking place that was part of an emerging republican advantage. it's an emerging republican advantage but it's among college voters. the ford degree only population is a trend similar from my lower baseline. it appears a four-year degree in up is all in the same direction. >> over to the back here into

the right. >> there has not been much discussion about the impact of foreign-policy and various electorates that at various times the democratic party as well as the republican party have been motivated primarily by foreign-policy issues. democrats, there has been a dominant wind in the democratic party that has been anti-interventionism i suppose you could say there's not much that rand paul and bernie sanders agree on except get out of asia, focus on domestic spending and domestic programs. i wonder if anyone would he willing to talk about the role of foreign-policy come interventionism, non- interventionism, isolation-- isolationism global whatever term you want to use.

it certainly there but we don't hear much about it. >> i think americans like winning more so when the war is being won they will rally to the party of power. when a war is going poorly they will react to that party. otherwise they don't care much about foreign policy. that's sort of my take on post-war foreign-policy dynamic tree they just don't know much about it. >> completely agree. >> far in the back here, moving around the room. >> my question comes from something that an iq raised. my question comes from something that anna raised in it was raised by the first panel as well in terms of the disconnect in 2016 between the electoral

college and the popular vote and then perhaps that continuing through the next couple of elections. it's clearly bad for democracy but i wonder if it's more problematic for the democratic party or the democratic leaning vote in terms of there not been an incentive to vote because their vote is not worth as much as it should he where is the republican leaning votes, their vote is actually counted more than it should. it might not be a discouragement to voting. >> i think i mentioned that. it's demobilizing people don't think their vote matters. democrats are losing the electoral college might hear that now. >> i'm just going to add the

scenarios we come up with are generally right and in the right direction they'll show it for her publica winds in the upper college--the speculation was perhaps it could go the other way. perhaps al gore would win the electoral college and i guess one other bit of wisdom was really hard to have a split that pro college. we have disproven that in some of these scenarios are going further and further apart. so i don't doubt that the demographic is playing towards states. there are surprising trends we are not paying attention to.

there are some places where the vote that really matter. perhaps we are not seeing some of these things but i do think the data is showing that. >> lets go here. >> one thing i thought of was the wall which is the most visceral anti-immigrant image the tis donald trump to a lot of places where people did not think that was possible. if it doesn't get told which i think is likely to happen with this congressional makeup or it does detract to get help and you ices arizona and texas were its really not popular what would be the effects of that?

>> i am starting to see different hard-core people upset that trump is not living up to his promises but crazy people like alex jones, i don't know. >> i think democrats have dodged the bullet would the trump administration. think he is has led with something like infrastructure instead of a muslim ban you'd have a different dynamic and i think it was brain-dead idiocy not to take the daca bill. that was something, what is that there's no way he's getting the ball. his supporters were right about it. if you overlook the daca thing we have our wall and the democratic base sees the wall as

an important symbolic thing. >> we have time for one last question. cf. thanks for the second question. i just want to make a point that there black people that actually live in the suburbs who are concerned about education and affordable education and accessibility to education, higher education. i'm one of them. i have a kid in college but in rural in inner cities their american dream has become a nightmare. what donald trump's been able to do is to reach out to those people in rural areas to give them hope. what are the democrats going to do to get those black voters hope? it no daca had a dream and that blacks had a dream two and became a nightmare in this administration. what you going to do to give them hope because they are lacking hope from leadership.

>> you have a scenario where you thought it was pretty favorable the black voters would return tool barack obama but what would make a go that way in part it's a reaction to trump but it's not an answer about what democratics are going to do. first of all there has to be a vision that includes people of color in all circumstances you are in. i also think criminal justice reform if you think about the new jim crow and what this system has done to the african-american committee and continues to do that is certainly a place and you are starting to see some places like philadelphia starting the conversation with wedge democrats getting more comfortable with that as a priority. in addition to an economy that works for everybody that's the most important place to make

change in positive terms but also in people's lives. >> i do think that's an area where you start to see some of the tensions of the democratic coalition that you point out. one of the most deafening political science papers ever written and i'm thinking in particular of the obama administration initiative trying to create low income housing in suburbs. they were able to track when they tore down cabrini green the wide area became more republican. there was a white reaction. i think some of those pictures become salient when you start getting into the and bolts of governing.

>> first of all for this panel i'd like to thank anna and sean who have done a tremendous job. [applause] this is the fourth annual report. we are planning on being here for another year and for the foreseeable future so we hope you'll come back. ruy teixeira tent--we all think you and we hope we'll see you ne >> jerry brown has challenge the trump administration on a number of issues, including national guard troops to the border and environmental policy. he will be at the national press club this morning. later on c-span3, the nominees command.he specific --

they take questions from me armed services committee. live coverage gets underway at 9:30 a.m. eastern. you can follow the events on c-span.org. monday on landmark cases, a case about student free speech. moinesudents from des were black armbands to school to protest the vietnam war, violating school policy. challenged the school boards free speech restrictions and the supreme court decision established they keep their first amendment rights on school grounds. we will discuss this landmark case. she began working as a free

speech advocate for students. an independent federal appellate litigator with the experience at the supreme court, including work on 100 cases. he clerked for clarence thomas in 1996. watch landmark cases monday on c-span. join the conversation. you can follow us on c-span. we have resources on our website. we have a link to the national constitution center. there is a landmark cases podcast. >> we feature our studentcam contest when it. we asked students to