tv House Administration Committee Hearing Election Security CSPAN June 21, 2019 2:58pm-4:32pm EDT
political discourse in america. only through the rise of a vibrant, robust alternative media based in the internet was donald trump able to win because it gave him a platform for him to mount his counterattack and he is the debatest counterpuncher in american political history. [cheers and applause] >> watch book tv all weekend on c-span 2. members of the house administration committee today considered a bill that would boost federal election security efforts. it provides financial support and enhanced security for election infrastructure and andates paper ballots. >> a quorum being present, the committee will come to order and without objection the chair is
authorized to declare a recess at any time. pursuant to committee rule 4 and 2-h of rule 11 the chair may postponefurther proceedings today when a recorded vote is ordered on the question of approving a measure on adopting the amendment. ms. lofgren: we will consider the securing america's federal election act, a targeted bill to modernize our nation's infrastructure and respond to the ongoing attacks in our democracy. as we all should know and appreciate, our country suffered as special counsel mueller said, multiple system attic efforts to interfere in our election in the 2016 presidential election. when outsiders medical in our elections, it's an attack in our country and cannot be staged to defend against the sophisticated cyberattacks of state actors on their own. while we have made modest
progress to bolster our defenses, it is clear from our intelligence community and host of independent experts from across the political spectrum that more must be done. our state and local governments need the resources, know-how and support to harden our election infrastructure before americans head to the polls. in little over 200 days, new hampshire will hold the first primary election of the 2020 election cycle. we must act now. this we know is not a partisan perspective, quote the warning lights are blinking red, unquote. that is not my assessment but the administration's director of national intelligence, dan coates speaking about foreign attacks on our elections a little under a year ago. we recognize that our adversaries are going to keep uping their game. yet again, that is not my analysis but the administration's own f.b.i.
director, chris to havier wray who said the adversaries treated it as a dress rehearsal for the big show of the 2020 presidential elections. . expand risk limiting audits, equipping our states with the systems needed to ensure the accuracy of the vowtalt in an efficient manner, authorize a $600 million election assistance commission grant program to assist in securing election infrastructure while providing states with $175 million in biannual sustainment funding to help maintain election infrastructure. this initial $600 million is
being appropriated by the financial services and general government accounting appropriations bill. it will foster accountability for election technology vendors, creating a qualified election infrastructure vendor designation and much-needed cybersecurity deadlines and implement cybersecurity safeguards to protect our systems from attack, including prohibition on wireless communication devices and prohibition on election system internet interconnectivity. ultimately, the safe act will improve the resilience of the election, a goal we all share. together we need to work as a congress to counter attacks on elections. and i now recognize ranking member davis for any opening statement he may have. mr. davis: thank you, madam chair. thank you, all, for being here today. our election infrastructure is aging and at risk. congress should work together in a bipartisan way to put a
solution on the table to address this problem. election security should not be a partisan issue, and i'm frankly disappointed that our majority chose not to work with our republican colleagues, all three of us on this committee, for that bipartisan solution to strengthen our nation's election security and instead they decided to put forth legislation that stands no chance of being signed into law. it's disappointing for the american people who deserves a bill to allow them to trust in our election system and have their votes preserved and protected. during the debate in this committee on h.r. 1, the majority insisted that the bill contain serious election security components. if that's the case, why are we here? h.r. 1 fell flat in the media and with public opinion. now we're here discussing h.r. 2722, another bill aimed at federally mandating elections. this is simply more of the same. what we aren't going to hear about today is the work done last congress to provide
funding for election infrastructure and to create unprecedented cooperation among the states and federal stakeholders. hence, the result, not a single instance has been reported of interference in the 2018 mid term elections which experienced record mid term turnout. congress' role is to assist states to strengthen their election security, not create a federal takeover of election systems. that's why i introduced, along with my colleagues, mr. walker and mr. loudermilk, the election security assistance act, that will provide assistance to states in updating their aging and vulnerable election infrastructure, empower state officials to provide secure elections, and provide additional resources for improving cybersecurity. these are what i was asked to do by my election officials who are a bipartisan group of folks that work to secure our elections at the local level in the 13th district of illinois.
every democrat who -- every democrat and every republican county clerk and election official in my district who came to a meeting told me these are their priorities. a fundamental right of our nation is the ability to choose our leaders. the american people deserve to have that right protected. we should secure and protect that right without partisan politics. thank you and i yield back the balance of my time. ms. lofgren: thank you. at this point i'd ask that the opening statements of all other members be included in the record, without objection. i now call up h.r. 2722. the clerk shall report the title of the legislation. the clerk will report the title. the clerk: h.r. 272, providing financial support and enhance and security used to carry out
-- carry out elections and for other purposes. ms. lofgren: without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with and without objection the bill is open for amendment at any point. the chair recognizes herself to offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute. the amendment has been made available in advance and is in front of each member. the clerk will designate the amendment. the clerk: the amendment in the nature of a substitute to h.r. 2722 offered by ms. lofgren of california. section 1, short title, table of contents. short title. this act may be cited as the ms. lofgren: without objection, the amendment will be considered as read and be considered as original text for purposes of the amendment and shall be open for amendment at any point. i would like to take a moment here to explain what is in the amendment. as you know, we worked hard and we did have disagreements on h.r. 1, but we had less sagreement about the need to secure our infrastructure. and i think the remaining
disagreement, and we did have a -- substantial efforts to reach agreement. in large part the disagreement is whether we mandate what's in this bill or whether we work in a different way with carrots more than sticks. i'll let mr. davis speak later if he thinks there are additional matters. you know, it occurs to me that the russians had attacked with military weapons, we wouldn't say, well, let's let each state and county figure out how to counter that. the russians attacked us, and next election, it could be the chinese. they're not too happy with what we're doing right now. others. it could be other international ctors or even nonstate actors.
given the nature and severity of that attack on our country, i believe it's important, really imperative that we as a nation respond, which is why we have proposed this bill and i'd like to explain the additional measures that are in the manager's amendment. first, fostering accountability for election technology vendors. it creates a qualified election infrastructure vendor designation in conjunction with d.h.s. to craft cybersecurity guidelines and require vendors to follow those guidelines. this includes agreeing to report any known or suspect cybersecurity incidents involving election infrastructure and grants would only be permitted for those qualified vendors. we also include specific cybersecurity standards to apply to paper, ballot or optical scanning voting
systems. there will be another set of standards applying to ballot marking devices. the requirements are that the device is built in a manner where it is me cancally impossible for the device to add or change the votes on a printed or marked ballot. consistents of hardware certified by the department of homeland security and the device is not capable of tabulating votes. it requires voting machines be manufactured in the united states. i think is enormously important requirement. and also, because we know that we have a disability community that has an absolute right to vote, even if they are not able to do -- to mark with a pencil, we have the capability to meet their needs. we require that the use of
software to hardware for which information is disclosed by the manufacturer be open source. and we also prohibit wireless communication devices. we found and have seen reports from the f.b.i. that we had voting systems connected to wireless communication systems. that is just a night mayor. so we require -- that is just a nightmare. o we internet connectivity. we think this is a sound measure and we think it's important to proceed a pace -- we have 17 days before the august recess, and we have, as
we know, appropriation bills that have eaten up our schedule. and because certain members of the house believe that there should be a recorded vote on every amendment that ordinarily would be voice voted, these appropriation matters have taken a very long period of time. so if we have a window to move this bill and we believe have that short window next week, we need to take it. so with that i would ask, are there any further amendments? any member seeking recognition for an amendment? mr. davis: madam chair, i have an amendment at the desk. ms. lofgren: the gentleman is recognized. the staff will distribute the amendment and report. >> i reserve a point of order. ms. lofgren: point of order is reserved. the clerk: amendment offered by mr. rodney davis. short title, this act may be cited as the election security assistance act. section 2, grants to states for election administration improvements. a, authorization of funds notwithstanding section 104 --
mr. davis: madam chair, i'm ok with waiving the reading. ms. lofgren: without objection, the reading of the amendment is waived. the gentleman is recognized for five minutes in support of his amendment. mr. davis: thank you, madam chair. this is the bill that was introduced by colleagues and me that would, i believe, address many of the election security concerns that we as americans should have in a bipartisan way in this country. this is a bill that preserves the system that we have, which is a decentralized election system which allows for less opportunity for nefarious actors and foreign entities to be able to do nefarious things. you know, let's be clear. if this markup and this bill is about foreign interference only, we're also missing the point about making sure our election officials have the resources that they need and also the flexibility they need
to continue to do what they do best at our local level. i can tell you, mike genesse is a county clerk in my town in illinois. mike and i have known each other since grade school. went to junior high and high school together. he's in the other party. i know mike genesse will run the most fair election as possible. he wants every vote to be counted. we got a lot of mike genesses in every congressional district in this country, but what this bill -- what this original piece of legislation does is take away mike's right to be ble to, until one, afford to upgrade the election software, the election equipment, and it forces and mandates a certain type of investment that they may have already planned to
invest in another type in the future that does nothing to address the concerns that we all have as americans to keep our election safe and secure. that's why our bill is a better bill. it doesn't have this one-size-fits-all approach. it's the approach we were working in a bipartisan way with the staff of this committee and our staff sitting down, talking about how we can come up with a bipartisan solution, a bipartisan bill, something we haven't seen a lot under this new democratic majority in this congress. frankly, outside of the usmca, which i don't even know if that will be bipartisan -- i don't know what bipartisan success any of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle will be able to tout. if there is anything that should be bipartisan it should be election security. but instead, instead, again, the far left fringe of the democratic party has decided to lead this committee and then
also this congress into a piece of legislation that's a lot more about show than helping people like mike and christian county, illinois. that's unfortunate. but here we go again. seems like h.r. 1 to me. if we want to do something together, this -- our bill you, the election security assistance act, will do that. it provides assistance to states to update their aging and at-risk equipment. that's what democrat and republican officials in my district told me they need the most. our bill does that. it keeps the decentralization. if we are worried about nefarious actors, the last thing we want as a congress is the federal government being the clearing-house for elections and registration and vote counting. that's terrible. the reason we have the safest elections and the most fair election system in the world, where we don't have a lot of outside foreign observers coming in wondering whether or not it's going to be a fair count, most cases around here,
clearly there are instances -- a la north carolina, recently, where you have bad actors that will likely go to jail for using the same process that is legal in another states. we have an amendment later to outlaw that. i hope our colleagues can join us there. let's stop playing games. we were sitting down talking about how to solve this problem in a bipartisan way and, again, the democratic majority did not live up to the promise that they made to the american people that they wanted to work with us. that's unfortunate. i certainly hope it changes, and i certainly hope -- i'm not optimistic. i certainly hope my colleagues the other side of this dais help support this amendment but i bet you i know what the count is. i have 22 seconds. i'll reserve that time later. i'll yield it back now. ms. lofgren: thank you, mr. davis. >> withdraw the point of order.
ms. lofgren: the amendment is jermaine. i appreciate the gentleman is offering -- the amendment is germane. i appreciate the gentleman is offering a proposal that recognizes the important role that the federal government has election security, although with a different approach. i do need to oppose this amendment. i fully appreciate there are elements of his proposal that could be a step forward from the status quo. however, voter verified paper ballots are the solution that really address the risks and threats that our nation faces. unlike the gentleman's amendment, voter verified paper ballots are what the safe act provides in section 103, page 3, line 6-24. and it is a solution that nonpartisan, cybersecurity experts have repeatedly urged congress to adopt. voter verified paper ballots are the best way to ensure a voter's ballot is counted and cast. voters should be able to see
their vote clearly and verify the vote they intended to cast is the one recorded, boosting voter confidence in cases where a recount is necessary. the safe act also requires risk limiting audits which are cost-effective and go hand in hand with paper. these risk-limiting audit requirements are section 303-ab, page 41, line 9. paper and risk-limiting audits are really the gold standard of election security and will address the national emergency our nation faces. that's why i think we ought to maintain our commitment to that proposal. moreover, unlike the gentleman's amendment, the safe act section 201-b on page 53, starting at line 3, expressly prohibits wireless and internet connectivity in systems or devices upon which ballots are marked by voters or upon which votes are cast, tabulated or aggregated. this is an important and basic
cybersecurity standard we ought to require. nobody thinks that connecting voter systems to the internet is a good idea. sometimes low tech is the best offense to a high-tech threat. so i would urge a no vote on this amendment. does any member wish to be recognized for the purpose of offering an amendment to mr. davis' amendment? >> madam chair, i'd like to speak. ms. lofgren: the gentleman is recognized for five minutes. >> i believe what representative davis is offering is a good amendment but i will yield back some time to him to articulate further why. mr. davis: thank you. sorry, madam speaker. i know my colleagues thought i'm done but i'm back for a few more minutes. [laughter] mr. davis: thank you. my good friend, ms. fudge. listen, i certainly hope we can come together after this bill is forced through the floor and ikely going to begin be a -- again be a bipartisan roll call vote. i would urge each member, my
side of the aisle and the other side of the aisle, meet with your local election officials, hear from them. frankly, that's why we have our bill, the election security assistance act. they don't want that heavy hand of washington. we were talking about technology. i'm sure today there's a lot of technological experts and security experts that will say, you know what, every single county in the united states should have this certain type of system. what about those counties that invested their hard-earned tax dollars and residents' hard-earned tax dollars in equipment that may be just as secure but all of a sudden they got to come in and because the federal government says you're going to do this -- and what are we doing to limit ourselves with technologies? that's why we have provisions in our bill to account for future technological advances. i mean, it wasn't too long ago everybody filed their tax returns on paper, right? are we requiring that to go -- that to happen again? technology will change when it
comes to elections and election security that can do a lot of things. it may -- it may allow the polls to be less -- less lines at our polling places. may allow for more polling places to exist because of technological advances. and oh, by the way, by the way, i know some may disagree with this. some may say this will never happen. it can be more secure. so what are we doing as the federal government with this piece of legislation? limiting the ability to bring new and safer technology into our election systems. let's not do this. that's why we need to pass this amendment. we have provisions in place, and i certainly hope my colleagues will join me in making that happen. i mean, you -- we even had a hearing not too long ago, unfortunately, the e.a.c. hearing. e.a.c., election assistance commission, is the one supposed to be administering some of the things my colleagues want to pass in the bill. they are supposed to be doing
this already. we had a hearing with e.a.c. officials that i wish we could have talked more about what they were doing to protect our election security in this country, but instead, it devolved in this room into a personnel meeting over who looks whom and who doesn't. that's where we're at right now? that's why we need to be serious about this. your own witnesses said the d.r.e. with voter verified paper audit trails are the safe in the one hearing we had. -- are safe in the one hearing we had. why are we now at the federal level mandating people like mike in christian county, illinois, to do something and have to pay for something? that may not be the most secure process. so with that i, again, urge a yes vote on my amendment and i'll yield back to my colleague, mr. walker. mr. walker: thank you, mr. davis. i'll yield back to the chair. ms. lofgren: the gentleman yields back. does any member wish -- the gentlelady from ohio is recognized for five minutes. ms. fudge: i want to say that a
lot of the things that my colleague, mr. davis, says i do agree with but he made a comment on the record i really want to clarify. he made the comment that what happened in north carolina is legal in many -- in most other places which in fact is not true. harvesting ballots is, but not submitting them or changing them is not legal anywhere. i just wanted to make the record clear. i yield back. thank you. ms. lofgren: the gentlewoman yields back. any other member wish to be heard on the amendment offered y mr. davis? swrell a vote on the amendment. all those who are in favor of the amendment will do so by signaling aye. all those who are opposed will say nay. in the opinion of the chair, the noes have it. mr. davis: i'd like to -- ms. lofgren: and mr. davis asked for a recorded vote. the clerk: chairperson lofgren? ms. lofgren: no. the clerk: raskin.
mrs. davis of california, no. mr. butterfield. mr. butterfield is a no. ms. fudge. ms. fudge is no. mr. aguilar votes no. mr. davis of yes. mr. davis: we won the voice vote but i'll vote yes. the clerk: mr. davis of illinois votes no. mr. walker votes yes. r. loudermilk votes yes. madam chair, on this vote there are four noes and three yeses. ms. lofgren: actually, five -- i think you -- the clerk: five noes and three yeses. ms. lofgren: correct. and the amendment is not agreed to. are there additional amendments offered to the motion in the nature of a substitute? mr. davis: madam chair, i have an amendment at the desk, amendment 2. ms. lofgren: the clerk will report the amendment. the clerk: the amendment in the nature of a substitute -- ms. lofgren: without objection, the reading of the amendment is
waived, and the gentleman is recognized for five minutes. >> reserve a point of order. ms. lofgren: a point of order is reserved. mr. davis: madam chair, this goes to what we were talking about in the last amendment. mandating states to use paper ballots is a federal overreach. it preempts state laws and constitutional role of states in choosing the method of voting that's best for their own citizens. mandatory paper ballot voting systems introduces many logistical and fiscal concerns. there are -- they could be tampered with. as we saw in north carolina's ninth congressional district, during the most recent election cycle. tampered with paper ballots. that's where nefarious people, bad actors that are in both parties, that's where they can play a role in actually determining the outcome of the election. that's just as much of an election security issue as many other issues that we ought to
be able to face in a bipartisan way. these mandatory paper ballots, again, i alluded to, what technology may exist in the future to help us lessen the lines in polling places, well, what the majority wants us to do is mandate paper ballots that have been proven time and time again to increase the wait time at polling places. i thought that's what we were trying to stop. it's, you know, going to require more training of poll workers, which we had a debate on why there is a shortage of poll workers in the first place at this same committee a few months ago. this provision requires that paper ballots must be counted by hand or another primitive device which eliminates modern technology currently used in nearly every jurisdiction. in the election community, they are called direct recording electronic machines, d.r.e. machines, addressed by many of the witnesses that the majority called to hearings in the only one hearing we had on this issue before this bill was scheduled for a markup. you know, this one hearing was
the only one we had in this congress to address voting systems. not one witness claimed that voting machines were inherently unsafe or paper ballots were fool-proof. having spoken to local election administrators in my state, i know there is overwhelming support from states to have the option to choose the right voting methods for themselves. they ought to have the right to choose. there's simply no base for a proposal requiring the use of paper ballots in every election. now, additionally, i recognize that paper ballots come in various forms, but i'm concerned proposals like this will come back to the days of hanging chads in florida during the presidential election of 2000. last but not least, a paper ballot voting system would be detrimental to the disability and elderly community. we need to ensure every eligible american has the opportunity to vote. and you're going to hear a lot about assisted voting devices for those who are disabled. but they are not the same as the d.r.e. machines that many in the disabled community are using right now that many
communities and election jurisdictions are already using. it would be an additional cost to take another federal mandate to have the devices in place that would drop the optical scan card out. that's an added cost, unfunded mandate to every people in every jurisdiction. if the democrats -- if the majority wants to federalize the federal election system, just do it. run it at the national level. try to run it through. let's not use paper ballots as an unfunded mandate to the county election officials in all of our states. with that i'll reserve the balance of my time. ms. lofgren: the gentleman yields back. mrs. davis: i withdraw my point of order. ms. lofgren: i oppose this amendment. striking the mandate for paper ballots because, you know, striking the mandate would completely undermine the bill and the security that we're trying to achieve. section 102, page 3, line 6-24 of this bill mandates that
states conduct all federal elections using voter verified paper ballots. this provision, along with section 304-a-b, which is on page 34, line 9, risk-limiting audits is the heart of this bill. we simply cannot be sure our elections are free from outside interference unless we have an audible paper trail we can use to confirm reported election results. voter verified paper ballots are the best way to ensure a voter's ballot is counted as cast. voters should be able to see their vote clearly and verify that the vote they intended to cast is the one recorded. boosting voter confidence in cases where we count is necessary. according to the brennan center, in 2018, most states used computerized voting machines that were at least 10 years old and which election officials said must be replaced before 2020. obsolete software can pose a
security risk. we need to ensure that americans' safe in our democracy is preserved. paper ballots are the best way to ensure that faith. i would note, also, that the safe act on page 3 requires that states use voter verified paper ballots but we also line 15, page 16, that states use -- that use direct recording electronic machines, d.r.e.'s, that provide paper receipts to fulfill the requirements made may continue to do so until 2020. these machines are not as secure as paper, but they are not as dangerous as paperless electronic voting machines. in order to ensure that the most vulnerable machines are taken off the market, this bill prioritizes the replacement of paperless voting machines and provides two extra years to replace d.r.e.'s with paper
receipts. we also require that paper ballots are available at all locations that use d.r.e.'s with receipts in order to ensure we maximize the number of voters that cast their ballots on voter verified pauper ballot systems in the 2020 election. you know, paper reduces the risk of hacking and changing votes. it creates a trail for potential recounts and audits. the one thing that every american should know is when they go in they cast their ballot that that ballot is counted as cast. that's pretty simple. i think it should be a requirement and the idea that we would make this somehow optional -- i respect the gentleman from illinois, as he knows. when the russian attack occurred in the last election, our security people, our national security people said
that was a trial run for the next election. you don't say, let's leave this up to the good people who -- and they are good people. we all have our register of voters who are our friends in counties. you wouldn't ask them to stand for the country if it were actual missiles coming at the united states. these are cyber missiles. this is a federal attack on our federal system and we need a federal response. for these reasons i oppose the amendment. do other members wish to be heard on mr. davis' amendment? mr. raskin is recognized for five minutes. strike the last word. mr. raskin: move to strike the last word. madam chair, thank you very much. forgive me. i was on the floor for an amendment. this legislation is essential to the american people. i rise in opposition to the gentleman from illinois' amendment. let me first speak on behalf, madam chair, of what we're doing here, which is we are
rising to the defense of america's elections. and i'm surprised to hear that people are questioning our role in this process. the constitution says in the republican guarantano clause that congress has to -- guarantee clause that congress has to guarantee a representative form of government based on democracy that works. and channels for electoral participation that guarantee the will of the people is expressed, heard, counted, and then embodied in representation. congress also has the power and the authority through section 5 of the 14th amendment to guarantee equal protection rights for everybody. that's been the basis, along with the 15th amendment of a lot of federal action to vindicate the voting rights of the people. certainly that was the basis for the voting rights act of 1965. and at every turn, whenever
congress has acted either to amend the constitution or to embody in statute electoral democracy, there have been the claims this is somehow a violation of federalism or violation of states' rights. on the contrary, our action defends democracy at the local level to make sure that everybody's vote is actually counted. of he requirement individual durable voter paper ballots is absolutely essential in the cyber age, especially in the wake of what special counsel mueller described is a sweeping and systematic attack on american electoral democracy in 2016 by russia. that is not any kind of partisan invention, and it's something that should alarm every american of whatever political persuasion that there was an organized systematic, comprehensive campaign by
russians to injection poison propaganda into our body of politics through facebook and through twitter and through other social media mechanisms to engage in cyber surveillance and sabotage at the d.n.c., at the dccc, at the clinton campaign. and then also to directly attack the election machinery in more than 30 states, to actually hack into the computer systems in more than 30 different states. so that's a matter for traordinary alarm in the nation -- rather -- in the world's first modern democracy. we have to make sure we hang on our territorial political integrity and sovereignty and self-government. we know that russia does not have the power to attack us militarily. they don't have the power to attack us economically. they don't have the power to attack us intellectually
because our constitutional democracy is far superior to the clep to be rasi-i they have ere -- kleptocracy they have there. they have been attack us online through the cybersecurity campaign in 2016. our experts warned us they will come back again. they have never stopped. this is part of a global campaign where they have done the same thing in elections in europe and asia and africa. this legislation is essential. the american people want and deserve voter verified paper ballots. it's a major check against computer manipulation of the results. so i oppose this amendment. i strongly support the legislation, madam chair. i yield back. ms. lofgren: the gentleman yields back. do other members wish to be heard on mr. davis' amendment? if not the question is on the amendment. all those in favor say aye. all those opposed, no. in the opinion of the chair, the noes prevailed and the amendment is not agreed to.
are there additional amendments hat members wish to offer? sorry. mr. davis wish to have a roll call and so we'll get right back to you. roll call, mr. clerk. the clerk: chairperson lofgren, no. mr. raskin. mr. raskin votes no. mrs. davis of california. mrs. davis of california is no. mr. butterfield is no. ms. fudge. ms. fudge is no. mr. aguilar. mr. aguilar votes no. mr. davis of illinois. mr. davis of illinois votes yes. mr. walker. mr. walker votes yes. mr. loudermilk. mr. loudermilk votes yes. ms. lofgren: the clerk will report. the clerk: there are six noes and three yeses. ms. lofgren: the amendment is not agreed to. the gentleman from georgia is recognized for the purpose of offering an amendment. mr. loudermilk: thank you. i have an amendment at the desk. the clerk: the amendment to the amendment in a nature of a substitute to h.r. 2722 offered
by mr. barry loudermilk of georgia. mrs. davis: reserve a point of order. ms. lofgren: the gentleman from georgia is recognized for five minutes in support of his amendment. mr. loudermilk: thank you, madam chair. while i am -- my amendment addresses the recycled paper aspect of this. i'm going to speak on the entirety of the paper ballot issue that we're talking about here. look, the russians, they're bad. last year was not the first time that they ever tried to attack us. and i'm speaking from experience on this. i have a background in information technology, cybersecurity, and in the intelligence community. the russians have been trying to interfere with our elections for years and years and years. and let me tell you, if we were, as was said, trying to rise to the defense against russia, this is the exact opposite of what we should be doing. yes, the russians did attempt to get into our systems. yes, they got into some election databases. but the thing they did not get
into were the actual voting machines. and what are we addressing here? the voting machines. now, there's some peakts of this i think we do need to address, but one thing that has been missing in all of this is, why did the -- why were the russians able to get as far as they did get? and i've spoken about this before because in any type of military operation and in cybersecurity, when you see a threat, you have to respond to that threat. and mr. michael daniel, the cybersecurity coordinator for president obama was told to stand down when he told them that the russians were actively trying to get into our security system. he testified before the senate, he was told to stand down. is that the only reason? no. the fact you were not responding to that known threat makes us more vulnerable. the vulnerability was votea database systems, which is bad. now, here's the problem with the paper ballot.
and i spent a lot of my career helping people to automate on a secure basis. the risks that we face, as the ranking member has brought up, is paper ballots are the most susceptible for voter fraud. they are the most susceptible when that is your primary method of actually voting. that will perpetuate ballot harvesting. and especially when the minority has brought up -- they don't like verification. it's much harder to verify then. when we had the experts here before that were testifying, the most secure way -- and i'm all for having paper verification. i have been is righting this for years in the state legislature. i have been speaking about it here is to use the automation of the d.r.e.'s where you verify the person who is there punching the buttons, the automation allows us to move more people through quicker. we can get more polling places open. you use your technology that then produces a paper backup
report of how that person voted. so they're using the automation that then basically prints an audit that they can verify that this was the way they voted. they sign it. it's dropped in a secure box. now, if there is a need for a recount, then you have that paper backup. the problem we have with this legislation is it's making the paper the primary reason. if you go back and you look at most of contested elections, how many contested elections have we had that there were -- they actually created a new language? like hanging chad. these are manual ballots. we got away from that because we wanted automation that was more secure. there's a lot that we can do and there's a lot we should be doing on election security. but let me tell you, we're the wrong people to be doing it.
it's the boots on the ground at the state level who are managing those elections who have a greater interest in making sure that they are safe and secure than we do. here's another thing. what the russians are after is not to disrupt our election system. i can promise you they didn't want the guy who's in the white house in there any more than anybody else. right? what they're trying to do is sew discord and distrust of american people of our election system, and right now the federal government has the lowest approval rating by the american people than in history. if we then take over the election system, that is just going to further deteriorate and play into the hands what have they want. that's why i'm submitting this -- this amendment and also in support of the other amendments as i think we need to step back. we need to look at it from what is the actual thing we should be doing, not putting in something that can actually perpetuate something we are
trying to get away from, ballot harvesting. with that, madam chair, i encourage all of my colleagues on both sides to support this amendment. i yield back. ms. lofgren: the gentleman's time has expired. the amendment is germane so the gentlelady from california withdraws her amendment. i would like to note that the amendment actually strikes the recycled paper provision in the bill. that provision was approved unanimously by the house in the deliberation of h.r. 1. and so is included in this bill. the gentleman's discussion, however, as we know, was about the overall issue of paper ballots. i've addressed that issue in the prior amendment that was defeated. i think -- certainly i do not challenge the intentions of the gentleman in any way, but i do think that to say that the entire nation
is more properly lodged in the hands of county officials rather than the federal government when it comes to attacks by foreign nations is i don't think is correct. i don't agree with that, in any case. i think the paper ballot mandate, we heard from experts repeatedly is where we need to go. i think this amendment should, therefore, be opposed. do other members -- mr. davis: mr. chair. ms. lofgren: mr. davis moves to strike the last word and is recognized for five minutes. mr. davis: i'd like to remind those in the audience and my colleagues, yes, this language was put into the underlying bill. we did not pass it unanimously. i was on the floor and did vote no, but because we had so many other roll call votes on h.r. 1, decided not to ask for a roll call on this. this is just a provision --
ms. lofgren: if the gentleman will yield? mr. davis: yes. ms. lofgren: it was adopted by voice vote. and ordinarily that's considered unanimous but i take the gentleman's point. and i yield back of the mr. davis: only because this is a provision that goes back to the top-down approach that i believe the majority is taking. you think about this. look, we all want to recycle more. we want to do what we can to elp the environment. it may be more convenient for them to use a printing office in another caribbean nation versus here. look, we all want to make sure -- or they wouldn't have recycled paper. it will have to be new paper. will they have to apply to the federal government to see if they can make that purchase? i mean, come on. these are the provisions that just don't make sense. hey just don't make sense.
so i can't -- i can't say enough about what we should do to move election security priorities forward. it can happen in a bipartisan way. that's why we introduced our version, our bill that would actually take provisions like this out and make sure local election officials use what's less costly to them and more convenient to them without some federal mandate that's based upon a political philosophy rather than cost-effectiveness and rather than reality in many cases. i'd like to yield time to -- as much time as he can consume to my cohort, mr. loudermilk. mr. loudermilk: i thank my fellow cohort for that time. i just want to clarify to understand. my point being, we're going after the wrong thing if we want to secure our nation against russian or any foreign
influence. was s voter databases that actually hacked. this isn't doing that. this is going after the physical machines that were not hacked. i do support some federal standards, as continuing through the department of homeland security, through our department of defense working with states to set standards. but even within those states, there is multiplicity of database. they use different platforms. you can't come in and dictate to them a specific type of security because it may not be tailored exactly to those systems. if we want to address standards for security of voter databases, as it relates to federal elections, i think that's wholly appropriate. but to target the one thing that wasn't manipulated is ignoring the larger problem. and i yield back to my cohort. ms. lofgren: the gentleman yields back.
mr. davis: i yield back. ms. lofgren: mr. davis yields back. the gentleman from north carolina is recognized for five minutes. mr. butterfield: thank you, madam chair. i move to strike the last word. ms. lofgren: the gentleman is recognized. mr. butterfield: let me say i oppose the gentleman's amendment and support your amendment in the nature of a substitute. i think your legislation is thoughtful. it is a federal response to a huge problem, requiring paper ballots will protect democracy, in my opinion. it is long past time for congress to act boldly with legislation that responds to foreign interference that took place in our 2016 election. to strengthen election security so we can protect our democracy from future attacks. and so we are here today taking the very first step. thank you to the chair for including several provisions in your legislation that responds to incidents that occurred in my congressional district during the 2016 election. the mueller report found that russian military intelligence
targeted, quote -- this is a quote. targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related software and hardware such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations, end of quote. the report goes on, madam chair, to name a redacted voting technology company that developed software used by numerous u.s. counties to manage voter rolls and install malware on the company's network. subsequent reporting had identified the technology company as the very same one used in my district and whose electronic poll book called major problems in durham county during the election. the product provided by the vendor catastrophically failed and several prix syncs in durham having them transfer to paper records, which is what we're talking about, and poll books in the middle of election day which led to long lines and delays.
this is a fact. and this led some voters to leave. yes, they left the polling place without casting a ballot. section 297-a of your legislation contains provisions that requires vendors to notify the e.a.c. and d.h.s. of suspected cybersecurity incidents within three days. this reporting requirement will ensure that we will know about suspicious activity within days instead of three years later. so i thank you for your legislation, madam chair. i intend to support it and intend to oppose the gentleman's amendment. i yield back. ms. lofgren: if the gentleman will yield for additional comment. mr. butterfield: yes. ms. lofgren: the bill before us does address the issue of voter rolls by providing in the grant section 297-a that these funds can go towards enhancing cyber protection of voter systems and directing the e.a.c. to correct cybersecurity guidelines that
would apply to voter registration databases. we understand that the documented incursions were to voter rolls. and there's a multiplicity how those rolls are maintained. we don't intend to mandate to states how those rolls are maintained, but we do address the issue through the grant system and through voluntary cyber guidelines. i will just say this, that, you know, you skate to where the puck is not is going to be, not to where it was last time. the biggest vulnerability we have is, can you imagine if in 2020 we had the votes actually changed because of insecure voting systems that will be a can t.s.a. -- systems? that will be a catastrophe for our nation. those in favor of the gentleman's amendment will vote yeah. those in favor say aye. those opposed, no. those opposed -- in the opinion
of the chair, the noes have it. mr. davis asks for a roll call and the clerk will call the roll, please. the clerk: chairperson lofgren. chairperson lofgren no. raskin. mr. raskin votes no. mrs. davis of california. mrs. davis of california votes no. mr. butterfield, no. ms. fudge no. mr. aguilar. mr. aguilar votes no. mr. davis of illinois. mr. davis of illinois is yes. mr. walker. r. loudermilk. madam chair, on this vote there are six noes and two yeses. ms. lofgren: and the amendment is not agreed to. are there additional amendments being offered? the gentleman from georgia is recognized. mr. loudermilk: thank you, madam chair. i have an amendment at the desk. ms. lofgren: clerk. the clerk: amendment to the amendment to h.r. 2722 of mr. barry loudermilk insert the
following. subtitle b, risk limiting audits. funding to implement risk limiting audit system. section a, availability of funding. subtitle d of the help america vote act of 2002, 52 u.s.c. -- ms. lofgren: without objection, the reading -- mrs. davis: point of order. ms. lofgren: point of order is reserved. the gentleman from georgia is recognized for five minutes in support of his amendment. mr. loudermilk: thank you, madam chair. i hope not to take that much time to this amendment. i do want to respond to a couple other issues in my time, here. ne, we understand the russians attacked. they do cyberattacks. lockheed. other defense contractors. they're continually being intended to be -- attempted to be hacked by the russians. that's what they do. they're bad people. they have nefarious intentions. we protect ourselves against those attacks of what they're attacking. now, i appreciate mr.
butterfield's comments regarding the manufacturer, and i am right, they will be going after those manufacturers. the best way to know, though, if they are successful is to be able to immediately identify if the voting machine is not reporting accurately while the person is there voting which is exactly what i proposed that a paper ballot is generated after the d.r.e. that's the best way of telling. the local boots on the ground are right there to see that something is going wrong with it. it gives the voter the option then to change what's on that paper ballot. but, yet, we still get the efficiency of electronic voting. the other aspect is -- i appreciate that we're trying to address some of -- where the russians were able to hack into the voter rolls. if we are going to force our states to spend the limited resources they have, changing their voting machines, they are not going to have a whole lot
of money left over for securing their databases, which is the most vulnerable aspect we know of at this point. i'm not against making some changes. i just think we're going in the wrong direction. i think we're going in the wrong direction would be the audits as well. simply, all i'm saying instead of dictating to the states the specific type of audit to use -- there's four types of audits out there -- let's provide the states with some optional grant money they can use to actually choose the type of audit that best fits in their election system, the best that would work well for them. i am not trying to get rid of the odd ilaltogether. instead of mandating from the federal level, let's provide grants to the states and give them the flexibility to implement these. i yield back. ms. lofgren: thank you. the gentlelady withdraws her point of order. i would ask that we oppose this amendment. risk limiting audits are really the gold standard of postelection audits.
these audits involve a hand counting of certain number of ballots used advanced statistical methods to determine with a high degree of confidence that the reported election outcome is accurate. the audits accomplish two important goals simultaneously. ensuring the integrity of our elections and increasing confidence of the public in the election results to wit that each individual's vote was counted as cast. the safe act requires states to implement risk-limiting audits in section 303-a-b, which is on page 41. because these audits go hand in hand with moving to paper ballots. we need audits to ensure that ballot marking devices or optical scanners were not hacked and that the reported election results are accurate. i certainly appreciate the vital role states and counties play in administering elections, but it is the duty of the federal government to help states respond at this
national security and though the timeline to implement audits is tight, the issues are simply too important to delay. we can't risk the undermining our democracy by having an election where there is doubt about the reported results. so are there additional members wishing to be heard? if not, i'm -- i'd also like to say, i'm pleased this amendment also highlights the importance of vendors notifying federal and state authorities in the event of a cyber incident. that provision is already in the bill. i think we all agree, that provision of the bill is important. with that, those who are in favor of this amendment will say aye. and those who are opposed will say no. in the opinion of the chair, the noes have it. mr. davis: i'd like a verification of that. ms. lofgren: mr. davis asked
for a recorded vote. the clerk: chairperson lofgren says no. mr. raskin. mr. raskin votes no. mrs. davis of california. mrs. davis of california votes no. mr. butterfield. mr. butterfield votes no. ms. fudge. ms. fudge votes no. mr. aguilar. mr. aguilar votes no. mr. davis of illinois. mr. davis of illinois votes yes. mr. walker. mr. loudermilk. mr. loudermilk votes yes. ms. lofgren: the clerk will report. the clerk: madam chair person, on this vote there are six noes and two yeses. ms. lofgren: are there amendments members wish to offer? mr. davis: i do. the clerk: the amendment to the amendment to the nature of a substitute to h.r. 2722. ms. lofgren: the gentlelady from california reserves a point of order and i ask that the reading of the amendment be waived. mr. davis is recognized for five minutes in support of his amendment. mr. davis: thank you, madam chair. my colleagues across the aisle and i ask agree on one substantive thing on election
security, there's still a need for funding for state and local election officials. i held a roundtable on this issue, as i discussed earlier, and it was in my district and heard directly from those that run my home state's elections. though i agree that the federal government has a responsibility to states to assist with states' election administration, i want to make it clear that this is not the sole responsibility of the federal government. as representatives of our constituents, we need to be responsible to our taxpayers and be diligent to spend federal funds only when it is absolutely necessary. additionally, it is ultimately the role of the states, the states to administer their own elections. structure and procedure grew organically. that's why i proposed to have a 25% funding match for states that receive funding under this bill. this creates a system that provides funding on a
need-based criteria and forces states and localities to actually have some skin in the game. this is similar to last year's appropriations bill, which required states to match 5% of federal funds with state funds to be eligible. and i do want to thank my colleagues for the lively debate on this issue. i want to point out that the last amendment would not have meant only repsyched -- recycled paper a requirement, but we delved into the issue of paper ballot backup. i think it's a terrible thing that the federal government is mandating where our localities can and cannot purchase ballots. that's an unfunded mandate i would have hoped would have more bipartisan support. i have a lot of concerns about election security because my
home state of illinois, the illinois state board of election, was part of an initial attempt by nefarious actors to get information. we got to do what we can to stop that. the bill that the jerrett has proposed doesn't do that let's work together to get our local election officials the funding that they are requesting. let's do that together. requirements of the federal government, why wouldn't we ask them to devote resources, many people devoted their own resources to machines that if this bill is passed may become obsolete, that's something that we have to think about too. i appreciate my colleague mr. raskin almost saying we needed states and localities to be republican governments but i understood what you said. --i agree. we are a constitutional republic. and there is a role for the federal government. that's why i have my bill, the bill we've introduced together
that we believe is going to be less of a topdown approach, more cost effective, and also represent solving the problems of what our local election and state election officials need. i can't say enough, we all want to work together to stop countries like russia from coming into our election system but requiring paper ballots that will inevitably lead to longer lines is the antithesis of what my good friend, chairwoman fudge, the elections subcommittee on this committee, had hearings throughout this country to talk about. we were told long lines cause problems with people being able to cast their ball los. i would argue many of the provisions in this bill that the majority is supporting would cause longer lines. that's not what we should be doing. that's what we were told at the hearings that were held throughout this country. we need to do better. i know, not just because i wrote it and my colleagues wrote it, i know our bill is better at
addressing these concerns but i know it didn't pass the first amendment but let's come together an show some bipartisanship on making sure that states and localities help plan for their future and then we can make our federal dollars go further and help the counties that need it most never election urisdiction. with that, i ask that this amendment be supported in a bipartisan way and i ask the chair to rule on that voice vote etter than the last few times. ms. lofgren: does the gentleman ield back? i oppose the measure to increase the funding. the security of our national elections is a national concern and a national emergency given the threat that has been outlined to us by the director of national intelligence the
director of the f.b.i. and others. it should not be relianten state budget processes as the ranking member as indicated. this bill does institute requirements to protect our election. and making those safety requirements contingent on the state budget process i believe sun wise. we ought to shoulder that responsibility if we are -- we should not require 25% match. article 1, section 4 of the constitution allows the congress to provide for the conduct of federal elections. we are using that authority to protect our country and we should not make it contingent on tate budget processes. i oppose the gentleman's amendment. >> i move to strick the last
word. ms. lofgren: the gentleman is recognized for five minutes. >> i don't know if i have mentioned my opposition to mandating paper ballots but i do want to make one point. here in a little while, hopefully in about 20 minutes or so, they're going to finish debate on the floor. the speaker pro tem is going to call us all to the floor and the last thing that the speaker is going to say before we go to the floor is, members will record their votes by electronic device. why are we doing that? because it's more efficient. mr. loudermilk: because we can move more votes. anybody who has been on the floor in the last few days, we have moved a lot of votes through in a short time because we are voting by electron exdevice. you throw your vote up on the machine, you can see how it's voting there. if you want, you can go become to the back and pull a paper printout and verify that that's the way you voted.
>> will the gentleman yield? mr. loudermilk: i'll yield. >> if we weren't able to cruise electronic voting devices in the house we'd have to go back to what the senate uses. mr. loudermilk: the gentleman is correct. why are we using electronic devices with verification afterwards? because it's more efficient. we can do more. if we want to make sure more people are voting, let's go the rout that will allow us to put more vote inteers ballot offices with a verification afterwards. i yield back. ms. lofgren: the gentlelady's point of order has been withdrawn. f i may just make a comment. the analogy between 435 members to they have house casting votes in the house chamber and the votes are displayed in the
chamber in realtime while the members look at them, i think is quite different than millions of americans casting their votes for a later count. d.r.e.'s can be hacked to produce different electronic and printed results. actually, a recent study by the georgia institute of technology showed last year that unlike in the house chamber, half of the people didn't check their actual printed receipt from the d.r.e. to see whether they matched their vote and the other half looked at it for about three seconds, whether they actually made that connection or not is speculation. half didn't even look. i one surprised if members of the house of representatives didn't look at their vote. but if there's a vote that seems weirding our staff is running around say, did you moan to vote that way? it's a plotely different analogy. the gentleman from maryland is recognized for five minutes.
>> move to strike the last word. thank you. to echo and elaborate on the chair's reputation argument, in the first placing the house of representatives has not been hacked, at least yet, directly by the g.r.u. and by the agents of vladimir putin. we're not aware that we've got that particular security problem on the floor of the house yet though i agree that we should obviously remain vigilant. but the chair's point, i think, is dispositive. mr. raskin: if there were computer computerized voting taking place in a state without a paper trail but everybody's vote immediately appeared online where they could check it then you would have a proper analogy. but what we're afraid of is the use of computer voting technology in the states where there's no paper trail and no ne can verify it in any way.
you're just sort of entering your vote online and it disappeared and could be subject to manipulation. >> will the gentleman yield? mr. cass run: i'm happy to yield. >> i agree in part with you -- mr. raskin: i'm happy pi to yield. >> i agree in part with you. i think it would be superior to have a voting system that printed a ball lot that you could check right there and i'm chair's ioning the study she brought up from georgia tech, i'm not sure what voting systems they were looking at but the constituent of georgia does not have the ability to print a paper ballot after using the d.r.e. i don't know if they were looking at other states when they measured. the state of georgia's systems physically can't do it. i have been fighting that fight in georgia for many years my point is we're going in the wrong direction. yes, in part, we can look up there immediately but you can also go and you can pull a printed -- a printout of how you
voted. the analogy i think is consistent. is that the reason we went to electron exvoting is for efficiency. with a way of verifying. that's the point i was making, the american people would like to see us abide by the same rules we put for them. i think we've adopted something for efficiency with verification and that's my point. i yield back. mr. raskin: i yield back. ms. lofgren: the gentleman yields back. unless others wish to be heard, we'll have a vote on the amendment. those in favor of the amendment will say aye. those opposed, no. in the opinion of the chair the noes have it. mr. davis asked for a roll call, he clerk will call the roll. >> miss davis of california, votes no. mr. butterfield. votes no. ms. fudge. votes no. mr. aguilar. votes no mr. davis of illinois. mr. davis of illinois votes yes. mr. walker.
mr. walker votes aye. mr. loudermilk. mr. loudermilk vote yes, sir. ms. lofgren: clerk will report. caller: six noes and three yeses. ms.-green: are there additional amendments? the gentleman from north carolina is recognized for his amendment. >> thank you. caller: the amendment in the nature of a substitute to h.r. 2722 offered by mr. mark walker. >> a point of order is reserved. ms. lofgren: the gentleman is recognized for five minutes. mr. walker: this amendment would have a subtitle prohibiting ballot harvesting. ball lot harvesting is the practice in which organized campaign workers or volunteers collect absentee ballots from certain voters and drop them off
at a polling place or election office. while this process seems inknockus at first it has been used to take vng of voters and has been severely abused by political operatives across the country. most recently, we saw a new election ordered in the north carolina ninth congressional district because of ballot harvesting allegations. in california this practice is actually legal and we saw it affect multiple races. valadao was up by three points on election day and lost three weeks later. one more x. was jeff denham lost because of the 57,000 vote by ballots cast and counted after election day. we've got members from california that are very versed in this. i'm not saying that this is the entire factor. but obviously it was some point a factor in these races. we can no longer ignore the most notable threat to our election security.
we've talked about it today. i've written a couple of things that some of our members have said. this is an attack on our federal system as far as what the russians and chinese have done. i believe mr. raskin, you said this calls for extraordinary alarm. the chinese and russian attack our systems, election systems, thousands of times per day. you know when i first heard that? my first month in congress. when i was on the me on homeland security. january, 2015. my question is, why wasn't there extraordinary alarm during previous elections? why seasonal is the extraordinary alarm happened during the 2016? we had the information. we had the data, the previous administration had the data that our election systems and that we were getting cyber attacked tens of thousands of times per day just by these two countries aloan. it is an extraordinary alarm. that's why one of the ways we can prevent that, any kind of
potential wrongdoing is to prohibit ballot harvesting. if my friends across the aisle say they're interesting in securing lexes and i believe they are, we must pay attention to actual evidence of election interference where votes were changed or even stolen. securing the ballot means protecting voters from all means of ballot tampering including ballot harvesting. this allows for commonsense election for disabled and elderly and specific inclueses. i support passage of thement a and i yield back. the chair: the gentleman yields back. ms. lofgren: arguably this amendment is not germane, i ask that the gentlelady from california not insist on her point of order so we can at least have the discussion and vote. i would ask that we vote against this amendment. although it's not in this bill, some states do have laws that make voting accessible for home bound voters and others who have
-- who may have trouble getting to the polls. california's election code 1317 provides that a vote by mail voter who is unable to return the ballot may designate any person to return the ballot to the elections official who issued the ballot to the precinct board or polling place or vote center within the state or to a vet by mail dropoff location in the state. allowing an absentee voter to designate a person of their choosing to drop off their marked ballot allows for greater participation. some vetters -- voters are home bound. some are have no family to delegate this role to. they should not be disenfranchised. ballot dropoff laws are in and of themselves perfectly appropriate election administration laws. that's white different than altering the vote, taking a vote and failing to turn it in to scam an election, or to engage
in fraudulent practices. tates like california see no credible report of fraud relative to the dropoff. i'll note since three of the members of the committee are from california and are pretty familiar with the elections in the last year we had monitors both republicans and democrats, , there e of those seats were no complaints filed by either party about this because there were no fraudulent practices. voter fraud is voter fraud. it's illegal in existing law. this act doesn't change that. in fact the safe act institutes measures like risk limiting audits to make sure that americans can have confidence that their votes are actually counted. experts like the brennan center has raised that an american will be struck by lightning than that he will impersonate another
oter at the polls. the straw man argument of voter fraud distracts from the real issues that many americans have trouble accessing the ballots. we dent want to prevent american citizens from actually being able to cast their ballots. this amendment arguably not germane but still i think ill-advised should be defeated. i would ask if other members -- >> madam chair, i move to strike the last word. ms. love bren sfk -- ms. lofgren: the ranking member is recognized. >> i guess lightning struck in north carolina. somebody committed acts of voter fraud in a special election being held right nouch the same process of collecting those ballot that was right for that lightning strike to happen, i'm sure the only place in the united states of america where a political operative took advantage of a process that's
illegal in that state but the same process that is legal in another state, that's the only place that lightning struck according to the brenham center. >> will the gentleman yield? >> yes. >> i'm sympathetic to your amendment and i've been listening to this debate very, very closely. >> thank you. >> because i know exactly what happened in north carolina 9 and it was ilie and disgusting. >> it was. >> i'm going to ask the gentleman if he would consider a friendly amendment to your amendment to allow the voter to designate a person of their choosing to deliver the ballot. if you would do that, i will vote for this amendment. that's the california stan card, they can designate a person of their choosing. >> you know, let me talk to my team about that. >> let's work on it. >> let's do work on that. mr. butterfield irk respect you and i respect your opinion on this issue. i want to make sure that we offer something, what i would like to do is ask you to vote for this amendment here and then
we can work on any friendly additions at the -- >> that's putting the cart before the horse. if you would give me your word that you would consent to adding that provision, that the voter can designate a person of their choosing i will today vote for it. >> will the gentleman yield? we will hopefully have a vote on this before votes are called on the house floor. probably in the next 10 minutes. otherwise we'll come back after votes. >> i'll reclaim my time. we'll talk. seriously. we know this amendment will fail here. it's going to go on a 6-3 vote but let's talk. because we have to do something to stop the process. the idiot in north carolina 9 that committed fraud and likely will go to jail is not the only political operative to take advantage of processes like ballot harvesting. we know it sometimes a lightning strike didn't happen because many didn't get caught. we need to fix this. i look forward to working with
you, mr. butterfield and i yield such time as he may consume to mr. walker. mr. walker: i thank the gentleman, i respect the time mr. butterfield has on behalf of his constituents. in north carolina we saw the reproach that took place that was very disgusting as far as broke down the confidence people had, whether their votes were being counted and how the whole process went down. we will certainly be flexible on this. >> the gentleman yields back and certainly all of us condemn the crimes that were committed in north carolina. -- to the relate to california experience pause there's been no fraud there the gentlelady from california is recognized. >> if the chair would yield for a minute, strike the last word, i can tell from the body language of my colleagues that
you don't believe that. as the chairwoman said there have been a group of attorneys there, i can assure you from both sides, the best in the country, that are observing this process. if you have evidence, though, that there was fraud in that process, we would, i'm sure folks would want to know that. but the reality is, it's highly, highly monitored and i don't believe even that the colleagues that lost those elections came for an appeal. >> would the gentlelady yield? i give the jerrett a lot of credit you had more lawyers on the ground and a lot better folks on the ground after the election and while ballots were somehow being collected from those that obviously california has a much higher home bound population, they need somebody to collect the ballot, a substantial amount of ballots
coming in after the election they can american people want elections to be decided not weeks later. but to begin work those lawyers were not on the ground before -- >> taking my time. yes they were. the reality is, the law states as long as the postmark is by the date of the election that the ballot can be counted and is counted. and so, you knowing that's the law. >> partisanship is the biggest threat to our fair elections. >> if the gentlelady will yield. the vast majority of the late votes weren't late votes, thearp votes postmarked by election day delivered by the post office nder california law. vote et -- those votes are counted. there were huge numbers. bheth sides. >> also military ballots. >> also military ballots . the gentlelady has additional time. votes have been called on the floor. the question is, do additional members wish to be heard on this
amendment? if not we'll have to come back after the votes to continue this. do you want to just vote? all right. those in favor of this amendment will say aye. those opposed, no. the opinion of the chair -- mr. davis asks for a roll call. in the opinion of the chair the noes visit. let's have a roll call. we've had roll calls so far. call the roll. caller: chairperson lofgren. no. mr. raskin. no. mr. davis of california. mr. butterfield, no. ms. fudge. no. mr. aguilar. no. mr. davis of illinois. yes. mr. walker. mr. walker is yes. mr. loudermilk. yes.
ms. lofgren: the clerk will report. caller: six noes, three yeses. ms. lofgren: the amendment is not agreed to. are there additional amendments to be considered? -- the en the endments will be dispensed with. the question is on agreeing to h.r. 2722 as amended. those in favor say aye. those opposed, no. in the opinion of the chair the ayes have it. mr. davis has requested a roll call vote. caller: chairperson lofgren. yes. mr. raskin. yes. ms. dais of california. yes. mr. butterfield. yes. ms. fudge.
yes. mr. aguilar. yes. mr. davis of illinois. no. mr. walker. mr. walker votes no. mr. loudermilk. no. ms. love fwren: in the opinion -- the -- >> go ahead. ms. lofgren thk the bill passes. >> closing comment is, i to question some electronic scoring over the last couple of years of the congressional baseball game. i have been very concerned over what the electronic scoreboard has shown. next wednesday night, i reserve the right for a paper backup of whatever the score is. ms. lofgren: a paper backup on the baseball game is required. or requested. i will note that. if any member gives notice of intention to file supplemental minority additional dissenting views, we will have two days. pursuant to clause 2-1, rule 11,
the committee rule 10-d, i ask that committee have additional two days to file with the clerk the committee supplemental. and where are we reporting the bill? i move that h.r. 2722 as amend bd reported favorably to the house. those in favor say aye. those opposed, no. in the opinion of the ayes have it. do we want a recorded vote again on -- then the ayes have it. the bill is reported. there are two days as noted for additional or minority views to be submitted to the committee report. without objection, the staff is authorized to make any technical and conforming changes. i want to thank the members for participating in today's markup. there being mo further business the committee stands adjourned wem go to the floor for votes.
hoyer announced that the house will vote on this election and security bill next week. the bill, which aims to boost federal election security efforts, will be taken up first by the rules committee. watch live coverage of the vote on this bill right here on -span. >> the complete guide to congress is now available. it has lots of details about the house and senate for the current session of congress. contact and bio information about every senator and representative. plus information about congressional committees. state governors. and the cabinet. the 2019 congressional directory is a handy, spiral-bound guide. ord yourer -- order your coppy from the c-span online store for $18.95. >> tonight on c-span, south carolina congressman and house majority whip jim clyburn hosts his annual fish fry. he'll be joined by more than 20 democratic presidential candidates.
that's live at 9:00 p.m. eastern on c-span, online at c-span.org and on the free c-span radio app. >> join american history tv sunday when we mark the 509 anniversary of the stonewall riot a key turning point on the gay rights movement, starting at 8:30 a.m. eastern we're live with historian marc stein, editor of "the stonewall riots: a view and history." then at 4:00 p.m. on reel america two gay rights films by pioneering filmmaker and activist, ners 1958 film "the second largest minority." >> homosexual human beings and homosexual american citizens. everybody always remembers the first word in both of those phrases, homosexuals but creent conveniently overlook the second words in those phrases, american citizens an human beings.
>> followed think be1970 film "gay and proud." >> tell me how you feel about being here today? >> beautiful, fantastic. >> how many years have you been homosexual? >> i was born homosexual. >> has the new movement given you added pride? >> yes. i was sad not to see there was some politician or something here with us. i think lindsey should have made it a point to be here today as well as possibly some of the gay movement organizers themselves. ofwatch the 50th anniversary the stonewall riots, this eekend on c-span history tv. >> i view political cartooning almost like advertising on television. you've got about five seconds to capture the vier's attention. another five seconds to deliver the point or to sell the product. you only -- the only difference is with television you're selling a product. political cartoon you're selling an idea. >> sunday on "q&a," two-time
pulitzer prize winning cartoonist michael ramirez on his book of satirical cartoons. >> the clintons are probably my favorite political family. i won my first pulitzer on the back of that administration. when you take a caricature of somebody you're changing the dynamics of their features, not only to make them into a cartoon but to show the dynamics of their personality as well. >> sunday night at k eastern on c-span's "q&a." >> earlier today, news came out of iran shooting of a u.s. military drone over the strait of; hormuz. joins us, at, john good morning to you. ? host: fine, thank you. can you update
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