tv Report on U.S. Policy Toward North Korea CSPAN December 15, 2019 5:28am-7:00am EST
it passed in the house this past week and is expected to come up in the senate this week. onch newsmakers at 10:00 c-span. report, a form on a new looking at u.s. policy towards north korea, including diplomacy can military readiness, cyber warfare, and sanctions. the foundation for the defense of democracy posted this 90 d this 90 hoste minute event. mr. may: welcome to the foundation for the defense of democracies.
i am fdd's president, founder, cliff may. i know most of you. i have met a lot of you. i am glad you are here. today's event marks the release of a major new fdd report. "maximum pressure 2.0: a plan for north korea." the report offers an actionable and multifaceted plan focused on the denuclearization of north korea. today in north korea, we have a young mercurial, brutal, and ruthless despot, kim jong-un, armed with nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles, using both to threaten america and america's allies. ot, kim jong-un, armed with nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles, using both to threaten america and america's allies. you may have seen reports earlier in the week in the washington times that a high-level defector from north korea sent a letter to president trump. the defector warned the administration that kim jong-un is unlikely to give up his nuclear weapons absent significant pressure. consistent with the recommendations and fdd's new report, which will be discussed today, the defector urges all-out sanctions, what our authors call information and influence operations.
while we understand people of good faith may disagree in the path forward, it is clear that u.s. policy, over decades, by republican and democratic administrations alike, has failed to achieve significant progress toward the denuclearization of this threatening regime and this threatening dynasty. fdd, you may know, has launched three centers that seek to integrate elements of american power in order to achieve better results for america's national security. our new report benefits from the work of all three centers. it provides detailed, actionable recommendations for american policy makers. we will here today from experts -- hear here today from experts with experience and intelligence, cyber warfare, defense, and sanctions to help build a holistic picture of what a maximum pressure 2.0 policy against north korea needs to look like. i want to note that today's program is one of many we host throughout the year. for more information on all of
our work and our areas of focus, we encourage you to visit our website, it's just fdd.org. we are glad to be joined today by a distinguished audience of diplomats, representatives from congress, the department of state, the pentagon, active-duty military personnel, many experts from the policy community and the media. most of this audience knows that fdd is a nonpartisan policy institute. we take no for an -- foreign government money, no foreign corporate funding. i will also note that today's event is on the record and will be livestreamed, recorded, and will be broadcast on c-span. i ask you to kindly silencer -- silence your cellphones. i encourage you to join in on today's conversation by using twitter, @fdd. just @fdd. with that, i am pleased to introduce our first speaker,
the honorable juan c. zarate. a wickedly brilliant and always charming, juan is the cochairman and founder of fdd's center on economic and financial power. he also serves as chairman and cofounder of the financial integrity network. prior to that, he was national security advisor to president george w. bush. please join me in welcoming juan zarate. [applause] hon. zarate: thank you, clifton, for the incredibly kind introduction. it is really an honor to be here. i was joking a bit with allie, who has helped organize the event. allie always does a great job. i was coming to learn and sit in the back and have a nice lunch, and i was asked to present. i am honored to present, especially before such undistinguished -- such a distant west panel. i have learned in the publishing world, you have to show the product. it is actually a great report. we will get into that in just a
moment. i want to talk a little bit about what the centers are doing and my experience with north korea, and that will lead into the great work that brad and david have done with the report and the panel. just a few weeks ago, i was honored to be on stage with dr. samantha ravitch and h.r. mcmaster, general mcmaster, to talk about the work of the three centers here at fdd. the center on military political -- military and political power led by h.r. mcmaster and brad bowman, the center for cyber and technology innovation led by samantha ravitch, aided by any -- by annie fixler, and of course, our center on economic and financial power that i chair and is led by eric warber. that day, we talked about a number of threats, number of issues, including north korea. and largely, the ambition of the centers in the work we are doing at fdd would result in innovative, impactful, strategic work on things that matter to fundamental american national
security. and that is exactly why we are here today and exactly what this report represents. it represents the best thinking of those three centers and the great work of brad bowman and dave maxwell and the authors. today's event and the report could not come at a better time, as those of you know, those who followed north korea closely, north korea and its leadership is returning to the well rehearsed playbook of bluster and brinksmanship. timed neatly to our holidays. those of us who worked in the white house often suffered holidays dealing with north korea's recalcitrance and brinkmanship in hopes of achieving premature lifting of sanctions and international -- brixon ship. in hopes of achieving premature lifting of sanctions and international pressure, north korea has reportedly conducted a very significant test at a satellite launch site, and there are indications that we may see more provocation soon from kim jong-un. as the report notes, north korea's nuclear biological and
chemical weapons programs as well as its ballistic missile program and developments represent a grave threat to the u.s. and our allies. north korea also represents a threat to the financial system and international norms. north korea is a rogue force for instability. now, the trump administration deserves credit for focusing on this issue, giving it attention, and accelerating policy work, and also bringing the north korean regime to the negotiating table. but unfortunately, as the report notes and as we know, the pressure campaign has not achieved progress toward its objective, the denuclearization of north korea. and so, for these reasons, now more than ever, we need sober and clear thinking, we need good analysis, and we need specific recommendations to think about a next steps.
that is what this report does. washington sometimes struggles with the idea of broad, long-term strategies, or integration of all elements of national power in pursuit of strategic objectives, but the intent of this report is to break those orthodoxies and those approaches and to think collectively and constructively about what that means. i was very fortunate in government to work at the treasury department and the white house on these issues, as some of you may know. when i served in the administration, one of the things we tried to do was to pierce through some of these paradigms and orthodoxies that north korea can't be sanctioned or pressured anymore. the idea that we had thought through all of the potential vulnerabilities and elements of pressure that were possible. in fact, when we looked at the map of the world and north korea's economies and dependencies, there was
recognition that there was more to be done, much more to be done in terms of what those dependencies and decision-making looked like in pyongyang, and what we could do to affect the decision-making. precisely that led to the interagency efforts to look at the range of north korean vulnerabilities, in particular, in the illicit finance contacts, -- finance context, what led to the section 311 action against asia in september of 2005, and what led to the most significant pressure put on north korea, at least in that period, and the diplomacy that then followed. -- and to the diplomacy that then followed. to those of you who remember that episode, for two years thereabouts, north korea began and ended every nuclear negotiation with "we want our money back." "we want the pressure relieved from those actions." and so, the ability to bring all elements of national power together for sustained pressure campaign, to do so when a way -- do so in
desha do so in a way -- do so when away that breaks through some of these orthodoxies, is really important. especially as north korea returns to its classic playbook of requiring concessions without conceding or honoring its own commitments, something this report talks a little bit about. so this maximum pressure 2.0 report delineates the right next steps. the report has chapters on diplomatic, military, cyber, sanctions, and information tools of power, and it has at its core the principle that american power is ultimately what deters north korean aggression. each chapter includes specific recommendations in each of these categories, and the goal ultimately is to constrain north korea, reduce various threats it poses, affect decision-making, and ultimately avoid war. when considered together, these recommendations do provide a plan b that this administration and perhaps others to follow should and can implement without delay.
once again, i am very proud to be a part of fdd, proud of the centers we have built, proud of the concept of bringing innovative thinking together for real-world solutions for the american people and our allies. i look forward to hearing from david maxwell, his summary of the report in more detail, and then hearing the panel discussion to be moderated and led by brad bowman, who is also the co-editor and author of the report. with that, allow me to handed over to dave maxwell, senior fellow here at fdd, co-editor and author of the report, army veteran, patriot, and one of washington's leading experts on north korea. david? [applause] mr. maxwell: good afternoon. thank you to juan for those excellent remarks. they really set the stage for the discussion of our report. before i provide an overview, let me say i am here representing a great team that
collaborated on this report. first as noted, the senior director for the center of military and political power, brad bowman, will moderate the panel. he used to lead on this project and really drove the process and is responsible for the excellent collaboration and coordination and putting this together. he co-authored the introduction chapters. i would like to recognize the expert who co-authored the military, cyber, and influence activity chapters. ixler is the deputy director of cyber and cowrote the cyber chapter. ♪ -- david usher has probably done more than anyone i know to exert pressure in north korea.
i hope the u.s. government will call on his expertise for some of the great work that can be reprised so that we can execute a maximum pressure 2.0 strategy. leslie, the editing team that all the behind the scenes work to bring this together and danny ackerman is a person who designed the excellent graphics and turn this into what a think is a visually stunning report. we began to conceive this report following kim jong-un's failure at the hanoi summit. is his failure because he has been unable to get premature sanctions relieved from the u.s. from south korea and the international community. in april, he put an expiration mance withe bro president trump. we're coming near the end of the deadline with the rhetoric. we are seeing kim practicing the seven decades old blackmail diplomacy facebook, using tensions and provocations to get political and economic concessions. 2017 was the year of fire and fury. 2000 and team through the june
through june- 2018 of 2019 was diplomacy. he met with all major leaders in , prime minister of a of japan. we are at an election point. what will kim say in his new year's address and what will be his next provocation? we offer this report to the white house and the policymakers and specifically to the u.s. strategy group established less thereby u.s. and korean special representatives. the combined strategy group is that you can want sure that we move forward in a synchronized way that serves iraq and u.s. alliance interests. this report is based on new assumptions -- to -- two assumptions. one cap believes concessions woolly to denuclearization. another believes coercive external pressure will lead to denuclearization. the third camp argues for the
right combination of both. however, it is very possible and very likely that kim has no intention of denuclearizing. our strategy must reflect that fact. a report of some snow outside pressure alone will cause kim to make the right strategic decisions in return for a brighter future. we assume it is only when kim faces a significant internal threat that will cause him to recalibrate. he must realize from that internal threat that the threat of possessing a clear weapons is greater than giving them up. and until he feels that internal pressure, he is unlikely to ever change. the external pressure can and contributed this condition, but as it now stands, in kim kim's calculus, he needs nuclear weapons for survival and to support his blackmail democracy and ultimate objective, which is of course unification of the korean peninsula under the domination of what i like to call "the guerrilla dynasty."
that is of course in order to ensure regime survival. someleads to the second of sugared we see no evidence kim has abandoned the seven decades use tension and coercion and the use of force to achieve unification. we assume he will not give this up in response to the current or any policy. kim believes the conditions will be right when the u.s. alliance is ended and u.s. forces are removed from the korean peninsula and extended to terms in the nuclear umbrella over south korea and japan are eliminated. this is also the description of both the security guarantee that as aemands and -- as all definition of u.s. hostile policy. must be-u.s. alliance viewed through the regime -- through the lens of the regime strategy. on the one hand, the shared values of the iraq-u.s. alliance. freedom and liberty, free market
economy, and human rights. on the opposite end are the kim family regime values, which of jong-unism,im canada and i'll of human rights ticket kim jong-un empower. human rights to keep kim jong-un in power. paul smith describes warfare vest. the use of political means to propel an opponent to do one's will. based on hostile intent. this very much describes what we might call kim jong-un's unique political warfare. what weso a form of talked about in the paper, in which kim jong-un is trying to play both president trump and the international community just as his father manipulated the six party talks and his
grandfather manipulated in 1950. this is in the dna of the kim family regime. from northn escapee korea wrote to provide advice on how to address this. we hope to complement that advice. bottom line, the challenge now is for the iraq and u.s. alliance to figure out an acceptable and durable political arrangement that will advance u.s. and iraq u.s. alliance interests on the peninsula and in northeast asia. the alliance has to determine the ways and means to achieve that goal. these must include new international diplomatic efforts, military enhancements, supporting cyber activities in defense and offense, and sanctions enforcement and robust information and influence activities campaign, including a strong focus on human rights. the working group must carefully develop a new strategy, a plan b, or maximum pressure 2.0 based
on the recognition that kim jong-un may never agree to denuclearize and will always seek to dominate the peninsula. i would like to highlight some of the key concepts described in a report. well we are recommending a maximum pressure 2.0 strategy, we want to give every chance for diplomacy to work. this must be done through working level negotiations without prematurely lifting negotiateuntil they in good faith and take steps toward denuclearization. untilmust be no summits working level negotiations produce an agreement. at the same time, the u.s. must continue to take the lead in the effort to crack down on the regime's global illicit activities in human rights abuses, such as overseas slave labor. comply, wes do not
recommend u.n. and other action. we must make sure cam understands all military options are always on the table. when he to strengthen cooperation and implement an effective diplomacy campaign and make human rights a priority. we must also target chinese and russian obstruction in support of the north. there could be no degradation of the military commitment to the alliance to deter north korea from attacking the south. the alliance must maintain the capability to rapidly defeat the north korean people's army. should kim jong-un order an attack. we have seen no reciprocal action from the north. south korea negotiated the conference of military agreement to reduce tensions, and while there was initial compliance such as removing guard posts, the militarizing joint security areas, there have been no confidence building measures in the north to
correspond to the ones being implemented by the iraq-u.s. alliance. as we speak today, 1.2 million personnel, military personnel are conducting the annual winter training cycle from december through march. this is a larger training combinedthan any iraq-u.s. of. we must strengthen the exercise program, address the one-sided aspect of the comprehensive military agreement, and also stabilize the iraq-u.s. burden sharing process while strengthening our ballistic missile defense. cyber operations have provided the regime with a myriad of capabilities. it gives the north the ability to strike relentlessly, as we say in the report, the manipulation of cryptocurrency's, infrastructure attacks, espionage, and social medial activities. has taken an aggressive
stance on cyber defense with the north. the defense. to the capabilities continue grow and they continue to wage cyber attacks. legal actions do not deter the regime. suggests -- they impose upon other countries to dismantle the digital forces within their territory. we should develop a cyber task force for combined strategy to prepare options. the alliance should create a cyber defense umbrella that declares a cyber effect -- attack will trigger obligations under the treaty. implement it comprehensive sanctions regime and 2017 was the height of the regime and forced kim jong-un to
experiment in the experimental -- in the diplomacy implemented by both moon and trump. but following the singapore summit, there has been an erosion of sanctions enforcement. there has been some success in evading sanctions. highlighted a handful of the conference of list of recommendations. initiativeighlight and initiate a pressure czar. initiate chinese banks who are not implementing sanctions fully provision the sanctions after north korea. we need to target joint ventures and step up maritime introductions. this department is the key to sustaining his legitimacy and controlling the regime's narrative both internally and
externally. however, the u.s. and south korea have rarely aggressively employed aggression. there is a saying that it is easier to put permission to put a missile on a terrorist then it is to put an idea between his ears. this needs to change. it is time to employ an effective information campaign against three audiences. information by defect organizations show the propaganda wall of the north can penetrated. now is the time to empower strategists and practitioners focus on what kim jong-un fears most. as the doctor often asks, who does kim fear more? the u.s. or the korean people? the korean it is people armed with information and a knowledge of the south. we recommend the following.
develop a combined organizational structure to facilitate activities and aggressively target the regime and its legitimacy as well as increase the exposure of koreans to the we should establish a defector institute -- institute. it will inform policymakers and strategists and evaluate plans and policies based on detailed understanding of the regime. the institute will also serve as a beacon to encourage defections particularly for members of office 39. conclusion, we cannot allow the status quo to persist will give a kim jong-un of the opportunity to make the right decision but we know he will not change a strategy and is needed to keep nuclear weapons unless there is a threat to drive him to do so.
but it is his long-term strategy to dominate the peninsula. he is executing political warfare to support his long, to play the international community term main a nuclear power and dominate the peninsula. denuclearization , we must consider that the only way we see and and to the program is through establishment of a secure, nonnuclear peninsula with a constitutional form of government. the iraqion is will and u.s. implement a superior strategy that can counter the long con and achieve the only ?cceptable arrangement with that, let me thank you and i will turn it over to our bowman.irector bradley
he will moderate our panel. i asked our panelists please join us on stage. panelists to please join us on stage. bradley: thank you, david, for that overview of the report. thank you to cliff and juan. onm the senior director military power here at the fdd. i want to welcome you and everyone watching online. i want to thank and welcome our panelists. i am very proud of the career experts we have with us today to discuss our new report, the current state of play with north korea, and where we go from here.
referenced, there is sometimes a tendency to bring -- wring our hands and admire the problem, failing to propose specific recommendations things a tthings -- one-dimensional it. in my view, this report does not suffer from those maladies. actionablede recommendations that can be employed using all the tools of national power. for that reason, i am proud of this report. it was -- i was honored to work with david maxwell who is an institution in of himself on north korea. i also think the other at -- authors who could not be here today. i think it is timely.
unfortunately, i would say. just a couple reminders of why it is timely. kim jong-un has issued a deadline, threatening to give the u.s. an unwanted person's gift. it was reported pyongyang conducted a test at its rocket , suggesting -- site they might be considering another test to threaten the u.s. homeland. not enough, the u.s. special envoy is reportedly arriving in south korea on sunday. here we are, talk about one of the most important, timely issues we could be. you have bios for each of our panelists, but we hit a few of their highlights. pak is the chair of korea studies at the brookings institution center or east asia policy studies.
she has held senior positions at the central intelligence agency and the director of national intelligence focused on the korean insula. of ravitch is the chairman fdd center on technology innovation and cyber innovation lab. she is also a senior advisor at fdd, serving on our advisory board. as vice chair of the president intelligence advisory board and was appointed the congressionally mandated solarium commission. when do you sleep? [laughter] holds a chair in political economy at the american enterprise institute where he writes on demographics and american development, specifically the korean peninsula and asia.
he is a member of the board of directors for the committee of human rights in north korea. you have already heard from david maxwell. he is a 30 year veteran of the united states army, senior staff positions and he has taught at the national war college. is for us to engage in a 30 minute discussion. around 1:00, i will open up the audience for questions so get them ready with the intent of concluding promptly at 1:30. i thought we could organize our discussion in three ways. layout the threat, assess current policy, and most importantly from my perspective, prescriptions. what should we be doing forward -- going forward. for those who do not follow the threat as closely as you have, can you provide a brief overview
on the nuclear ballistic missile programs? andhank you, congratulations to the fdd for this new report. i'm proud to be part of this panel and thank you all for joining us. i wanted to briefly talk about what the problem is. korea has beenth working deliberately and shown the political will to develop a capable nuclear weapons program in the 1960's. it is designed to ensure regime survival as well as provide the regime with strategic relevance the region. extract political and economic concessions from its neighbors and the united states.
jong-un, hisat kim regime, intentions, his , comparedion of power to his father and grandfather, kim has been bigger, better, and bolder in all sorts of ways. he inherited an advanced nuclear weapons program that he has and has shown he is willing to demonstrate. in the past two years, he has tested 100 ballistic missiles which is over three times more than his father and grandfather combined. he has conducted for nuclear tests, the last one had a yield 18 times greater than that in hiroshima.
it is hard to say with any confidence how many nuclear weapons he has but the range is from 20-60. even the lower end is something that should be of concern. he has demonstrated a willingness to show the fact that his missiles are mobile, advanced, and more sophisticated. to the nuclear shown aprogram, kim has willingness to use chemical and biological weapons. he used it to kill his half-brother in malaysia in 2017. finally, he has been willing to use cyber attacks against u.s. entities. these are all of the tools of coercion that kim has in his
strategic and the environment is much different than before kindra. he has developed and tested well as as as willingness to step up provocative actions. the threat is much bigger than we expected and anticipated and this is a very different environment. you mentioned the chemical and biological components because those are sometimes overlooked. mind, if you wouldn't talk about where we are in conventional military culture. >> they are suffering from a lack of resources. they have prioritized missile
resources, but quantity has a quality on of its own -- all of it soon. 70% of forces are deployed near the dmz. but north korea continues to try to improve its conventional capabilities. focuses heavily on artillery. anetimes, we say it's artillery army. and we seen this summer since the announcement of the move of u.s. forces has been the development of short range ballistic missiles and rocket systems. we have seen 13 tests over the summer. indicates is they said
they were developing these weapon systems for the fat can assume iswe --p humphreys, o son airbase airbase, and others. but this indicates they continue to improve conventional capabilities, which certainly has to be part of their deterred. arewe should realize they postured for offense of operations. while postured for defensive operations along the dmz, the north is offensively oriented and ready to attack. which is why the commanders will always say they have to be ready to fight tonight. >> that's great, thank you. we have made certain concessions
in south korea in support of the diplomatic endeavor. we have not seen that reciprocated, would you agree? >> yes. the military exists to support the political object. military commanders have tried , the best to be creative fact is we have postponed a number of important exercises. what's most important is what brad emphasized. by us suspending postponing the exercise, it is not gained is any goodwill from the north. we must acknowledge our postponement canceling of exercises does not really do us any good. you, theeference to
trump administration implemented a very impressive economic usher campaign -- pressure campaign. interested in your assessment and the degree of what gave the north korean economy pressure. is that increasing or decreasing? i don't want to send our friends were audience here at seizureo a narcoleptic with statistical arcana. let me give you broad strokes. over ag-un took dictatorship, a dynasty that had left in an economy in shambles. just as his father was the only economic mastermind in history who had managed to oversee a
in an in peacetime urbanized, literate society. it is the only achievement of his dads -- dad's. to get credit for what he managed to do, because he rebuilt the party, rebuilt the state. admittedly, from a very low bar. he resuscitated and advanced the north korean economy. grandpaand maybe his who were deadly afraid the reformed opening was honey coated poison. -- honey-coated poison. some of you may know that phrase. he knew that system could stand a little bit of that was, maybe
even more than a little bit. and with a bit of economic experimentation, he was able to achieve a limited but notable economic upswing for the dprk economy. sector,rowing consumer his regime took a bite. that is part of what helped to finance the race to testing of weapons and -- long-range missiles. it is part of what helped finance would kim jong-un himself decreed as the move to mass production of nukes and missiles. due.t where it is he made the north korean threat more formidable and he should recognize what he did with that.
campaign,m pressure which seems to have a headed into its vacation phase starting , it can be2018 described in sort of a stylized way. who hasre for someone more security clearances. since we have been enforcing ,uch more stringent sector-wide and sincede sanctions we have been doing the same thing independently through the , we havedepartment been forcing the regime to spend down their currency reserves and their strategic reserves of food
and energy. an outsider, i cannot tell you how quickly this is occurring. certainly, a regime that is a past master of strategic deception will do everything it can to make it look as if this outside siege as having absently no effect at all. it's like the old days where they would send people of on the parapets-- up on the to show how well they were fed. us,idea is to discourage but what we can be sure of is everything will look normal to the outsiders until all of a sudden it doesn't. thel the exchange rate for currency spins out of control
and the prices spin out of control. point, all sorts of facts on the ground will change very rapidly. the north korean regime is a desperate to break sanctions before we reach this discontinuous point. >> thank you. we talked about the military element, now let's talk about the cyber element. what you mind characterizing the goals. their and what have been the major effects of their activities? han want to commend mathew and andy on the great chapter. also, there was a companion piece written last year on north korea's economic warfare activities.
i do recommend reading, because it gets to the concept of cyber-enabled economic warfare. which is the ability to use meansmean to undermine -- to undermine our key strength, our economic economy and vitality. say what back when we were in the white house, we started putting more and more pressure on north korea's economy. we never considered they would ever have the capability to constrain our economic observed.l, that was means, they can do it and they have shown they will. i was going to characterize the cyber capabilities as they are good and getting better, but i
like your configuration. bigger, bolder, and batter. -- badder. there cyber forces somewhere around 6800 untrained trainedecialists -- on cyber specialists. that's about equal to the u.s. cyber command. they think this is very important. what is the purpose, and where have we seen it? the first is to steal money. hundreds of millions they have stolen to date. cryptoesh bank heists, thefts, stealing atm's.
hundreds of millions in successful attacks. unsuccessful, 2 billion. if they had actually done with they tried, $2 billion. that number is even more impressive when you think their military budget maybe $10 billion. 20% on top of their existing military budget. they want to increase by thievery. we know it's not a choice of guns or butter. you don't care about butter for the rest of their population. it can all go to guns. clearly, stealing money is the purpose. stealing secrets. ways the republic of korea works with its partners.
they clearly showed that's what they were after. how south korea and our partners work together. we are seeing more and more. lazarus is another state enterprise. potentially, working with other eastern european partners. they want to understand how we ifk to be able to undermine and when they needed. -- need it. piece,ts to the third which is selling panic. they had the attack against south korea was expensive and went through the banking system. went through the critical infrastructure and how
in anment's business ,olice report from south korea they showed they could so panic. panic. looking at this attack, it was not money necessarily coming out. not many actually paid the , but it was to show that panic.uld sew all of a sudden, you could have broad-based populations in south not being able to get into their atm's, not being able to hear messages from the government. how do you think that affects the population and what that
population put pressure on to maybe back off? maybe not go as far as we need to go. so that is a very quick overview. secrets,ealing, strategies, those are the three big areas. -- those are the big areas. >> anything you want to fill in have not discussed? a 1.2 million range of that number for the military. north korea has what looks like a gigantic military, but they are also very underfed. most are doing things like construction work, agricultural duties.
i don't want to make north korea seemed to be this giant juggernaut of military might. -- i would also say that he has been intent on improving those in addition to developing new armaments, kim has also been focused on training. nighttime training, special operations, all actions that are consistent with what dave said in his opening remarks that are consistent with a desire to have unification. to the just add that very excellent comments so far. >> one might say the trump
administration's policy has thus graciously,r, more has not succeeded yet. let's go with the more gracious version. why has the current approach not succeeded yet? >> we need to give the trump administration it's due. years, thest three trump administration policy towards threat reduction has been more successful than that of any previous administration since the nuclear crisis began. some may say i'm holding the trump administration to a lobar and i suppose that's true. i think what we can see is that the trump administration brought
out a new instrument that -- that previous administrations had not experimented with and put the cutlery on the table that we would need for a real advance in this sort of area. it's there and promising if we wish to pursue it. again to give the trump administration it's due, the argument can be made that the only way of achieving denuclearization of the north is having the one and only decision-maker in the dictatorship agree to such a path. have the experimentation with
top-level diplomacy, that we have seen over the last year and a half. the northo me as if korean leadership has no intention whatsoever of denuclearizing. they have a different definition of denuclearization, which involves the u.s. breaking its alliance with the south, moving out of the south and removing that from the north. the definition of denuclearization. we can use the tools the admin -- the ministration got into place. with excellenter analysis and strategy which you and your colleagues have laid -- hardly berley more timely than now. david, why we have been
unsuccessful in shaping kim jong-un's cost-benefit analysis commitments one his nuclear weapons program? >> you said sis inkling? succintly?k -- he knows nothing else. the footstepsg in of his father and grandfather. is in the regime -- regime's dna. he has made tactical changes. he is still following the same strategy from the kim family regime. ,e talk about possible failure
they are not our failures. >> shifting to our third and onal category, focusing andcriptions going forward accurate prescription depends on a good diagnosis. if you could advise decision-makers on critical elements are components of a more effective policy toward north korea, what would you emphasize? would sayem -- >> i enhancing alliances. what we have seen in the last two years is extreme bilateral is him. korea-u.s., north korea-south korea, north korea-china. the damage of extreme bilateral is him is that it makes it easy
for north korea to take advantage of national rather than international priorities, and to take advantage of the policy priorities of individual countries rather than denuclearization of the gulf. what the trump administration has shown us is the leader to leader thing was fine, interesting to try. into northeeds korea's efforts to divide and conquer. >> any thoughts on the north korea-japan front? my christmas gift, you mentioned earlier north korea promised a christmas gift for the u.s. there is some gift inherent in north korea's christmas gift. nothing brings north korea and japan closer together than a very belligerent north korea.
we could see this as an opportunity to try to unify the two countries. the cornerstone and linchpin of the u.s. alliance system, to get some unity of action. >> one critical component of a more successful north korea you would emphasize? >> think of this as the christmas gift that keeps on giving. you talked about information campaigns in your report, very persuasive. the most powerful political communication instrument in the world is the tweet feed by president donald trump. can you imagine what would happen, imagine the effect in north korea, if president trump should start to tweet maybe once a month, every month, to the north korean people? we know about your oppression, the corrupt regime leading you.
we know about the political camps. this is not going to last forever, have courage. era peoplereagan speeches.t reagan's how long would it take for tweets from president trump to reach the oppressed north korean people? you want to change the lay of the ground, you could do that in 35 minutes. >> wouldn't it be consistent with the best traditions in american foreign policy and international security interest to highlight to the north korean people they deserve better human rights from their regime? >> absolutely. that is key. to build on the example of president reagan, his advisers advised him to forgo human rights in return for arms control over negotiations and he refused to do that. human rights along with arms control negotiations.
a moral is human rights imperative, it is a national security issue. kim jong-un denies the human rights of the korean people, instituted a system which is designed to oppress human rights, in order to stay in power. they are exploiting prisoners in gulags to mine uranium. including overseas foreign workers. the koreanhing, people in the north do not know, they do not understand human rights the way we do because they have been so indoctrinated. that is breaking down because of information. calls friend of mine psychological paralysis. it is necessary to get that information to them, but they have to overcome a lot with how they have been indoctrinated. for theresponsibility
free world to emphasize the importance of human rights. that has got to be a part of our diplomacy, our strategy, and an information influence campaign to let the korean people know that we care. >> would you like to add anything? >> i would. and beyond. cyber underlies all systems, all of what they communicate and do. breaking the orthodoxy, we do need to break the orthodoxy on how we are looking to contain and constrain. need to move into a different world in a different way. punishment.y not just cyber, but sanctions and beyond. to think aboutd
different ways to showcase our capabilities in this sector. if you want to deter by punishment, the other side needs to know how they will be punished. analogy,not really an years agotell you, 50 it focused the mind of the adversary when they understood our capabilities. public attribution, it is something the trump administration has done in terms of calling out china. publicly attributing china to helping north korea in endeavors. out other north korean cyber activities. deterrence by punishment, denial. would suggest our friends in south korea need to be doing denymore to be able to what north korea is trying to do against our system, our economy.
escapees thatave went to south korea and the south korean database that held information on the people that escaped from the horrors of north korea, exploited and breached. people allof these over again. we have to have much better systems in place. and deterrence by entanglement. need to pick up on working with allies and friends. the analogy in some ways can be the great work of proliferation security initiative in 2003. -- 105 countries have stepped in, notably not north korea, china, iran.
we, the u.s. and more advanced countries would help those technology to see a ship that may be transiting precursors.wmd how do we help other countries were north korea is using their and other countries may not be able to have the capabilities to stop this. we may be able to help them with that. as a consortium we are stronger together. >> thank you. let's go to audience questions. wait, use the microphone to identify yourself. >> patrick from hudson institute. congratulations on a great report. i want to ask you about china's response to maximum pressure 2.0. 2017, the great power
competition had not said in. china was plausibly a party and moving to where sanctions fell off. you could say china is bigger, better and bolder. it is not going to be pushed around. it is courting south korea, moon jae-in. it could provide more than survival. how do we deal with the china factor in this maximum pressure 2.0 strategy? >> thank you. let me add to it. couldn't one argue we should just tread water using containment, deterrence, mutually assured destruction to focus on the bigger problem of china? that is kind of it, isn't it? >> the foreign minister said the u.s. is the world's biggest troublemaker.
put a punctuation mark on china's attitude, saying america is the biggest troublemaker, suggesting they are not as open for cooperation as they were. >> how do you respond? an excellent question. we should make a little more trouble for them. i do not think they have seen what sort of trouble we can make for them. in particular, economic trouble for sanctions. is veryese economy large, indebted. interesting,a very slightly shaky financial system. economytes in a world where our currency, the u.s. dollar, is the reserve currency for international world transactions.
onhave a real expert sanction crafting and implementation here. with small trouble details i will throw myself at his mercy. in broad strokes we need to the chinese international economic activity has a higher proportion of activity in dollars then does india or brazil. to denial vulnerable than manyllarsphere other emerging, developing economies. which is to say many of the beingsance chinese firms caught as a violator, sanctioned as a violator, and denied the
privilege of participating in is dollarsphere, this actually a death sentence. we have been curiously cautious about helping some of these .hinese firms i think we could establish our credibility in short order if we would relent to help, i do not know the right number, a dozen medium-sized or larger chinese firms. do as mucht need to with the russian firms because the russian situation is shakier. we have much more leverage than we recognize. china's relationship not just with the u.s. but a growing number of countries and populations around the world is growing more contentious.
on human rights, the million people they are keeping in concentration camps. the greatest problem in terms of being able to own intellectual property people create. on the environment, the death traps they are causing -- creating across the world. and on their cyber attacks against critical infrastructure and elsewhere. i would say, do they really want to add north korea to that list? this growing list of contentious problems. add north korea. beijing, you really want to side with north korea, a country no one likes, adding that to your list of problems you have to unwind? i think a lot can be done to potentially peel them away. they will not want to add it to their troubles. >> to take a different
perspective. patrick you brought up the national defense strategy. the two revisionist powers, road powers. north korea and iran, china and russia. interesting, china and russia are connected to north korea, but north korea is also connected to iran. we have not talked about proliferation and north korea's extensive proliferation around the world. china does not want north korea as another problem. i also think china and perhaps russia are exploiting the korean situation to their purposes. korea is the shrimp among whales. amongographic location, many great powers. it is a problem we cannot ignore. we cannot go back to strategic patients or say we have to deal with china and russia.
china and russia will exploit the north korean situation to undermine. the statements today were in effort to do that, by putting the blame on us. that is one way they are exploiting north korea for their purposes. >> anything to add? >> o -- no. >> right here. i am the political advisor to u.s. command in korea. i am so honored to be here today. timing --only the timely topic, but we have never had this maximum pressure ever. thing.tion is one how can we make this
recommendation for maximum pressure, how can you realize the, make it really real, policy? think it has to be through international community help. park mentioned north korea to be bilateral with the u.s., korea. we do not have to be played that way. how can we proceed with maximum pressure? adding to that, can the trump administration implement this in an election year? will the moon administration and south korea supported? what do we do when china and russia try to obstructed? anyone? >> i will take that. reframing of the question hit on
it and you identified it. it is leadership. that is one word. it will take american leadership, south korean leadership to harmonize the international community. we have to want to do this. we have to appreciate the context, understand the problem, develop an approach. it takes leadership to do that. we have to have the strategic will to do this. it will be tough in the election year, not just in the u.s. but south korea. we cannot neglect this. we have to put forth this proposal and recommend president trump, president moon demonstrate leadership. when you look at it, president trump, president moon and prime minister abe.
it takes our alliance structure to do this and bring in as much of the international community as we can. it will take leadership. agree that working with allies is optimal and having a broad, deep alliance is best, but if we need to be unilateral, we can be unilateral. north korea fell into a trap. it is not even clear our friends in the kremlin and beijing understood the trap when it was being formed. thicket of the sanctions the u.n. security council has put into place. sete sanctions have been with a timeline of eternity. theong as one member of vote tove vetoes a
release those sanctions, they stay there forever. we have the means, as i tried to ago, to encourage of our maximum pressure campaign through paying chinese and russian economies and society. so long as we are willing to stick by this, it is possible to bring the north korean defense economy to the point of lock. >> next question? >> microphone should be coming. >> thank you. it was a great report, a great panel.
i have trouble with the title. i am still waiting for maximum pressure 1.0. maximum pressure looks like what we're doing with iran on the information and financial side. in north korea we have large money laundering enterprises not designated. in north korea we have had an unofficial 20 month pause in sanctions designations, but for some very small ones and a sham designation of north korean cyber operators. there is a ray of hope. you mentioned subpoenas against three large chinese banks. those are being litigated under for those who were interested. read that opinion. that explains exactly what the
answer is with regard to china and how we can make the chinese financial sector too scared to help break the sanctions. i congratulate you on an excellent report. stanton is one of our leading experts, as nick said, on sanctions and legislation and has been a key advisor to the hill in formulating legislation. thank you for your kind words. keep up the great work. comment.astic i am a big fan of your work. not want to did take many minutes to say, that kind of list is incredibly important for when there is the next big event, which there will be. i focus a lot on cyber. there will be probably sooner
than later a major cyber event. or it getsposefully into the wild. banks and critical infrastructure will feel the effects. these are the things we have to take and put into practice. worksw how sometimes this . sometimes it takes a crisis to get things done. the work you are doing and the work the team is doing, some of it is pre-positioning to put it into effect. add, the media is focused on the launch facility, the nuclear test site. north koreans are masters of deception. what are they not showing us?
we all think there will be a missile launch, nuclear test, christmas surprise. but what if it is a cyberattack? where are we not looking, not focusing? that is where we ought to focus. >> it is hard to practice what we preach. we stay consistent pushing for human rights, create an alternative vision. what is on the others of the tweet? a tweet.t the north koreans, one of their biggest weapons, once defectors go to north korea, they do not have fantastic lives. 42-year-oldnews, a defector woman and her six-year-old son were starved to death in their apartment in aoul and no one noticed until
bill collector went in and saw their decomposing bodies. this made all the rounds in south korea and -- information goes both ways. lots of information goes into north korea, the good stuff and bad stuff. think of the bad stuff. defectors have a tough life outside north korea, despite the image of milk and honey. we have a problem sticking true to our principles and values. also that of south korea as well. there is veryact little support for defectors, little incentive for the north koreans to leave. amen toted to say a big brother stanton. his blog, youknow should. it is indispensable. one of our partners in crime who is not in the room at the
moment, a professor. i wanted to mention him because his work on the north korea-middle east connection, absolutely indispensable. we have talked about russia, china. you do talk about the middle states andhe terror organizations and their financial support for north korea is something which flies under the radar screen of those of us who work only with open sources. let me give you an indication of how important this is to the toeat being mobilized incinerate san francisco and washington, d.c. from pyongyang. korea's2012 when north currency was still in freefall, signed a and tehran scientific cooperation agreement in september of 2012.
six weeks later after 10 years of freefall, north korea's currency suddenly stabilized. what happened in the six weeks after the tehran-pyongyang scientific cooperation agreement? i am sure it was not cooperation on life sciences. my guess is, there was technology going from one country, and financial resources from the other. guy,only an open-source but i have no confidence we have chased down these financial connections nearly as well as we should. we should dry up that swamp. >> other questions from the audience? hi, from usa today. i was hoping you could talk about what you are expecting in tone and substance from kim jong-un's new year's day speech and provide historical context
about how these speeches have been used in the past to communicate to both his domestic audience and >> i know there a lot of attention focused on them. they are like new year's resolutions. i promised myself last year i would go to the gym. this year, zero. we neeread more into it than what there is. said something about a new way going forward if the u.s. doesn't respond with what they want to see. had a summitry in relationship to the year before that. they talked mass producing nuclear weapons. we focused on the part willing to go to the olympics. it's really a rorschach test of how we are going to respond to the speeches.
it is not a prescription for what they will do. when the speech comes out,i anticipate there will be a lot of casting a blame on the u.s. for failed talks. how they will focus on strengthening the economy and national might through their own will, regardless of what's going on on the outside. kim jong-un is the only one that can bring it for them. don'that you will, but think of it as someone will tell us what to happen in the coming years. >> i agree with all of that. north korea has been masterful in getting something for nothing. one of the things we may see in the speech is since we have seen the conditions being established where we believe there will be a major provocation, icbm test, they will give us a christmas
gift, a counterintuitive interpretation is maybe they will do nothing. he may say he's going to give us a concession of not doing a provocation and having something in return. that may be happening now. mass trying to generate hysteria that he's going to test a nuclear weapon and he doesn't do it, and gives the appearance he's being conciliatory and should get something in return. we may see that. i'm not downplaying the possibility of a nuclear test, a missile launch, or cyber attack, but kim plays the long con. he's masterful at denial and deception. we are focused on one thing and he may do something different. >> one last question from the
audience. you have painted a convincing picture of the bolder things and the master of deception, but what gives you confidence that the maximum pressure will work? you haven't really said much about the vulnerabilities of kim, where he may be inclined to make some sort of concession or treat in response to this policy. >> as i mentioned, it is the internal threat. that's where it really has to be generated. he's not going to change based on our external pressure for our external pressure, the holistic approach, military diplomacy, to really create the conditions inside pyongyang that will force
him to change. if he doesn't feel the internal threat, if there is not something that forces him to change, he's not going to change. they haven't changed for seven years. maximum pressure has to be the external pressure to generate an internal threat inside of the regime as the only way for him to make a decision, or something comes after. agree since the secretary lost the chance to turn back the clock on conventional and otherwise threats for north korea, we have tried everything. all different types of pressure campaigns. saw north korea get
bigger, bolder, and better. the cyber element is interesting. for them to use it and obtain the capabilities they want does open them up to conductivity issues. for them just one way to do what they are trying to do. they're potentially could be new vulnerabilities opened up by the very case that they want to use this tool. it requires them to get on global networks. >> i would say north korea, despite their image as the ,ermit nation and very isolated they rely on the outside world to conduct cyber attacks. they can't do it inside. they have to do it through other means.
north korean diplomats, and there are tens of thousands of laborers and other trade they require with china to generate revenue for the regime. all of that is outside. touristsillion chinese that spend a lot of money in korea comes from the outside. despite this notion of them being isolated and sealed, they require interactions with the outside world to sustain the regime. >> we have run out of time. thank you for joining us. [applause] hope you have a good afternoon. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2019]
>> coming up, our daily three-hour "washington journal" program is next. on newsmakers, we hear from max thornberry on the space for us that is part of the defense authorization bill that passed the house last week. after that, a look back at the impeachment of president bill clinton including house or debate from 1998. are 23chairman, there ayes and 17 nos. >> with the house judiciary committee of proving two
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