tv Former U.S. Ambassador to U.N. Samantha Power Addresses National Security... CSPAN January 17, 2020 4:32am-5:44am EST
at this time, i will administer the oath to all members of the chamber. will all senators now stand and remain standing and raise their right hand? swear that iny all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of donald john trump president of the united states now pending, you will do impartial justice according to the constitution and laws so help you god? >> for the third time in history, a president is on trial in the u.s. senate. watch live when the trial resumes at 1:00 eastern on c-span2. >> now, more from the center for american progress conference on examining national security priorities under a progressive government. in this portion you will hear from former u.s. ambassador to the u.n. samantha power.
>> how is everyone doing? good afternoon, everyone. i am so happy to once again thank you for joining us for this important event at an incredibly critical time for our country, and the entire international community. cal time for our entire, and the international community. we have gathered together at the dawn of a new decade, and it has become clear that the 21st century will be defined by a singular competition. a competition not of technology or of weaponry, but of ideas, ideas about how to solve
problems, and the best way for societies to do so. i believe the 21st century will be defined by a competition between democracy and authoritarianism. and while of competition may not have the same military company -- military consequences as the cold war that unfolded between democracy and communism, it is similarly a competition to define the future of the world. there are two distinct poles in this debate. on the one hand as the united states and european allies, and end, china and russia. and china is not passive in this debate, it is assertively making the case for its form of government on the global stage, and in latin america and the rest of asia. it argues its form is more adaptive and effective and better able to address
challenges like poverty and climate change. and if we want to be honest with ourselves, there are days our erratic behavior makes china's case very well. our world is perhaps more complicated than at any other point. because this company -- this competition is not only occurring between countries, it is taking place within entries as well. over the past few decades, have hades themselves leaders with authoritarian impulses, like victor or bonn in hungary, who has weakened the press and judiciary erie in india, the world's largest democracy, prime minister modi has championed a citizenship law that discriminates against members of the muslim community that echoes the disgraceful muslim ban in the united states. in our own country, the
president has attacked our federal judges, declared the free press an enemy of the people and undermined election after election. to say that president trump is a friend or faithful steward of our constitution and democracy might be something of a stretch. and yet it is not just democracies facing challenges from within. indeed, as democracies grapple with the rise of authoritarian populism, autocratic states have experienced growing political protests, demanding greater political freedoms. largely peaceful demonstrations have brought down taters in algeria and sudan and protesters flooded the streets of hong kong, moscow, and just this past weekend, throughout iran. ro testers in these different countries are united by their opposition to political repression, and by their pleas and demands for the simple right to have a say in their own political future.
warsd, in a world where between nations are thankfully rare, the battle between authoritarianism and democracy nations,ving within not just between them. i want to make a simple plea to this very esteemed group. politic.move beyond i appreciate the call for analytical detachment, but this is a moment for choosing. so i ask you to consider moving beyond that real politic to defend democracy abroad and here at home. there are so many moments in our history were today's realism looks very much like tomorrow's hypocrisy. dangerousject a unilateralism perceived by
donald trump, who speaks admiringly of foreign dictators, and alienating our allies. we must ensure strengthening cooperation with our democratic allies stands as a core pillar of our foreign policy agenda. this includes joining with ortner's to defend our collective democratic institutions against interference from authoritarian states. i don't fortunately -- and unfortunately we have more news of that happening today. we must also stand up for human rights. in order for the united states to uphold, critic values abroad, we must fully embrace them here at home -- uphold democratic values abroad, we must fully embrace them here at home. other countries take note if we don't embrace these values, lyticr it is ever present corruption. our government must and acts
solutions that defend the fundamental premise of this nation, that every person deserves a meaningful chance to earn a better life, to receive equal treatment under our laws, and to take part in our democracy. because what most fundamentally weakens democracies from within is the idea that democracies know longer deliver results for their people. breeds a cynicism that is crippling. so we must repair and revitalize our own micro c. people,invest in our and education and research on infrastructure and health care, we both deliver results for our people and strengthen ourselves for that competition with china. is 2020. this year will represent a t in themomen
history of the united states. it can help forge a new, aggressive agenda and domestic and foreign policies that tackles the great challenges of our time. in foreign policy, that means taking on urgent threats posed by climate change, to end unnecessary wars and to return to diplomacy with iran. cap is incredibly written for the partnership of all the people in this room, not just for today, but for days, weeks and months to come. when i think of the people who propelled the fight for democracy and human rights towards this core of our foreign policy, i can think of no one better to make that case than our special guests for our keynote -- guest for our keynote session, ambassador cement the power. from 2013-2017, she served as our representative to the u.n. she played a pivotal role in responsemerica's
to russian aggression in syria and ukraine, enacting sanctions in north korea, and ending the ebola crisis. since the conclusion of the obama administration, ambassador power has served as a professor of global leadership and human rights at the harvard kennedy school and harvard law school. last year she published a memoir, "the education and the as one of hailed 2019's most notable books by the washington post and the new york times, -- and the los angeles times, and it was a fascinating read. we are glad ambassador power could be here on the power of national security. kelly back to the stage and give a warm round of applause to ambassador samantha power. [applause]
kelly: thank you, all. i hope everybody had a good lunch. ambassador power, welcome to the national security conference, the first 100 days. you are an astute person who experienced the first 100 days of an administration and the rest of the administration as well, so we look forward to your perspectives. , want to mention your new book "the education of a new idealist." there are parts of that book that i feel like i lived with you through. it was nice to see it written down in a compelling and personal way. one theme that comes up throughout the book is how to , andce your ideals navigate a very complex national security bureaucracy, which many in this room have seen and lived through. reflectou get things to your values and ideals? many in this room have a foreign policy agenda, but there is always reflection -- but there
is always friction. i would like your views on that. ambassador power: thank you. it is good to be here, like a big reunion, a lot of people i haven't seen since that fateful day in 2017 when everything changed, a galaxy far, far away. so it is great to be back in that galaxy. i will divvy up the answer into two parts. where i landed after eight years of learning on the job in the executive branch, i and cap you late in the book and expression ncapsulate- i end caps yo in the book and expression i borrow, shrink the change. it isn't the trump years that brought about the democracy recession, they contributed and are helping fuel at end america
is now part of the micro c recession, but we were living that for all the years of the obama administration. we now have 13 straight years of freedom in decline around the world, and many people in this room were in jobs with that itlow -- that portfolio, and was maddening. and we were trying lots of tactics to chip away at that problem, gathering civil society, creating instruments at the u.n. like special rapporteurs and freedom of information and things like that, and then working on discreet issues. but sitting with the younger and more creative members of my team in 2015, we came up with this idea of a modest campaign called ethe20, which was our way of taking this huge decline in democracy around the world and this rise of xenophobia claire, and turn it into something concrete -- xena
-- ir, andflau turned it into something concrete. we profile 20 inmates, and in the end, thanks to the work of people in this room and others, and 20 female u.s. senators, because as it happened there were 20 female u.s. senators at the time in the senate who threw their weight behind the campaign on a bipartisan basis. 16 of the 20 women were freed from jail. you ask, how do you get things done, we didn't even make much of a dent in the freedom recession, but we did something concrete. it proved the concept ended then morphed into other campaigns
that were about very discreet causes. but sometimes you can define yourself out of meaningful action, especially now where issues like climate change by , evention feel so small if you have a very influential role in a future administration. so that is in a policy level. i guess i would say now that we , not evens period having the ability to do to make a list of prisoners and try to get them out of jail, something that modest, i feel like now it is each of our spots ability -- responsibilities to make sure that change takes place in january 2021. i feel like a lot of terms have been thrown around, like rebuilding trust, restoring alliances. i wasn't in the breakout sessions and i am sure it got much more concrete. i think one thing we can do now, those of you who have strong and
long-standing relationships with answer theries, is question of what actually will it take to not rebuild trust, because we know it won't be rebuilt overnight, but what are the kinds of very discreet, shrink the change, achievable that would land without size influence with other country -- land with outsize influence with other countries. or some it might be resubmitting our papers for the paris agreement. and that will take hold and come into effect 30 days after we do so. people,ook two young and they say i want to do something, make a difference in the world, and i say, no something. it seems like now we have a real
smuts ability to know how to alter the ecosystem, things but let's control, use the time we have to hear from others, what will make a dent. and comparably, you asked a great question earlier to the previous panel about how to thate foreign policy resonates with that domestic constituency or has domestic appeal. that is not entirely knowable because people are different all around the country, and it what subsection of the american public one is thinking about, but that would be another really good way to use our time right now. we talked about it in the china what subsection ofcontext, howe
in selling domestic mobilization around our entity investment -- investment, ai investment, our diplomatic corps , so what if the -- what is the sweet spot with china that brings about that domestic mobilization but also leaves space for areas of cooperation we know we need. what is that sweet spot? some of you have listened to john favreau on pod save america, going around the and he found himself surprised to hear among independents and swing state voters, how much it mattered to people that we had lost the respect of people around the world, or that we feel alone. people in that interesting people who change their
party affiliation from election to election. ugh, it is not good to have your respect and favorability ratings plummet. well, that is interesting and will have ramifications for the next administration, and how they package what we are doing. but it would be great to drill into. we know that is an issue that might resonate, but then what is the remedy? what are the issues that would land? and maybe it is not this community that is best positioned to do that. i don't think i am particularly good at that, knowing how to bridge those differences. but if we have learned anything in every discussion like this expert,reign policy where is the work being done in a specific way, to figure out how to get expert the most domec
bang for your buck, so you can sell all the wonderful things are breakout sessions decided we needed to do? kelly: i am going to put you on the spot a little bit. if you were in charge of the world and looking at big priorities, because we have no endinge, limit change, the wars, rebuilding respect, what would making a dent look like to you? bigwhat would be your muscle movements, policy moves you would consider within the first hundred days -- first 100 days? ambassador power: it is a little copout, because you did ask that question of others and i will try not to repeat what others said. i did sit in on jake's china breakout session and heard great ideas in that space. i guess i would say i would the enabling
environment to get back to the ecosystem, what others have referred to as the diplomatic blitz, whethert in that enabling environment what one does in the south china our and the power vis-a-vis messaging will turn on the power of success at rebuilding, because it would look different now, but building and a relationship with the republic of korea by injecting more trust into the relationship with japan. heads arean partners exploding and have been now for some time, so that is part of youenabling environment >> are not going -- enabling environment. you are not going to solve it in
the first 100 days or even the first term, but retrieving america's credibility, our weitimacy, their sense that have systems and processes and -- thereg that so that is going to be a huge amount of thatin our interlocutors would go to meet with the director of this of the --retary of that in the secretary of that and at a certain point you realize, these people have no idea what trump is about to do about anything. so it is not just whether our word matters and our future agreements matter, that is part of the enabling environment. -- personnell issues others talked about in terms of our diplomatic corps, to put a finer point on it, 225,000 u.s. pentagon personnel
serve overseas today. 225,000. 9000 diplomats. is just one9000 example of something that long predated trump, but maybe trump gives us an excuse to breathe new life into. a set of signals you can send early on, climate, we would be depositing instruments of re-accession, and that would be welcomed, but on climate not only the breaking down of silos within our domestic institutions in the breaking down of domestic ,oreign policy we know exist also thinking through what the pathway to paris 2.0 is. will saymate people it is far too soon and we haven't even sat down with china
yet, and what is that going to look like, but for us to say to the world, we know we have lost four years. here is how mayors and governors and mike bloomberg have made a dent in our absence, but we are we remember that paris was always a floor, and that we have to make up for lost time. and then, of course, the domestic set of executive orders that go beyond where we were when we left off. i think that is really important. what i haven't heard mentioned initiativese set of on human rights and democracy. are at a comparative advantage now, with china stepping up in the world in such cataclysmic ways and important that we have a comparative advantage in democracy. how do we show that early?
just a few ideas. confidencere is a deficit in democracies right now that we need to try to remedy, and remember the 55% of countries, even now with the -- the freedom deficit of 13 years, 55% of countries are democratic, that is half of the world's population. is there some gathering of democracies? people involved in democracies know that never had a huge impact, but whether it is ad hoc gatherings regionally with democratic countries, we need to be pooling our resources, pooling our ideas. other countries are way beyond where we are now on combating foreign election interference, other democracies that is. that is a topic for a summit of democracies, deciding who is an and who is out may be creates a race to the top. we know from the obama summits
that everybody wants to be at eight u.s.-chaired summit, and notwithstanding the damage of the trump years, that will still be the case. back, and energy pride in what it means to be a democracy, and giving texture to benefits that can accrue in pooling our strength. economically, the u.s. and european democracies, how potent the chinampared to export of its model. even with hungary and poland and the caveats to it, it is a much more powerful presence, and again, get a little spring back in the step. credible on human rights and democracy, most of our work is going to be on our
internal struggles and reclaiming the legitimacy of our efforts beyond our borders. so the rule of law, independence of the department of justice and attorney general, the return to the embrace of, even an adversarial relationship with the press, those are foundational to our human rights and democracy leadership. and there are small issues that like have outsize impact, opposing legislation. we have our cu legislation that -- our coup legislation that maybe we didn't observe to the letter in the egypt context, but coups are less the issue now than the extension of people's terms or the doing away of constitutional limits on executive power around the world as part of this freedom recession.
you could imagine tom carruthers of carnegie has proposed this, legislation that we once did for ui -- once did for coups, for constitutional transgressions that would have ramifications. spaceconstitutional , marrying the domestic and foreign policy, an example of climate, where the full scope of our domestic tools and international tools are brought to bear. i read a statistic that 10% of leadership changes that occurred between 2013-2018 were fueled by public anger over corruption. if you combine some of what is motivating progressive anger at the present, even some of what ,ontributed to trump's election
but the residents of the sense elites are making off with national wealth of all kinds, and the potential resonance of the work we have to do to rebuild the rule of law here, and then embed that in a big initiative and get the democracies of the world who haven't strayed quite as far as we have at the head of state level at least, it could be a powerful signature initiative at a new administration time when the rule of law is under siege, at a time when china is projecting deference to whoever the sovereign is, irrespective of whether they respect the rule of law, at a time when china itself is bringing corrupt practices to a share of its important infrastructure investments around the world, there could be
distinguishing power in that agenda area. there seems to be a major paradigm shift happening. cap put out a paper last year about having democratic values in foreign policy, pulling democratic power to shape the world to our interests and values. how should we think about partners who are less democratic, like the saudi arabias of the world, who are not democratic? especially after president trump has been talking openly about how he prefers autocrats to democrats. -- do you feel like partners feel about partners like saudi arabia and others around the world that have challenges on the democratic side? how do we engage in those spaces? ambassador power: with human
rights diplomacy, sometimes your efforts, and this will be true in the future even if it is a signature part of a future administration's leadership in the world, partly the reaction to trump, partly the reaction to china, but one of the main tools in your toolbox is diplomatic, issent sure -- is censure, condemnation, and even the trump administration doesn't some of that, they just do it to venezuela, iran, cuba, anybody else? they don't do it for the philippines, of course. s of our humans rights diplomacy at the outset is something we are going to have to work hard to address, and it is going to take time. warook time after the iraq
was waged, in part under the ,antle of liberty and freedom and i think it is going to take even longer in the wake of trump. back to my point about bringing democracies together, what is important is that we function ,ogether, that we are a bloc that when these modest tools are brought to bear, and they need not be modest, we should cut off assistance to the saudis in light of atrocities in yemen. there are straight-up cut off some support that are imperative and have long been imperative. of the other less precipitous and dislocating tools you will employ, the power will come in numbers, and the power will come and the power
will come in showing ourselves as well as thoug -- as well as those on the fence and as well as authoritians that have been strutting around for the past three years, now we are doing this together. and there was a lot of hedging going on. countries like greece, at the end of the obama administration you used to be able to barely pull them into human rights criticisms of china, and now forget about it. theese investments within founder of democracy, the heart of democracy, greece itself, they don't want much to do with that. so i don't want to pretend, hey, we are back, everybody to ready -- everybody ready to be a democracy club again? i don't think it will be like that, but the power to remember coalitions.al and with governments like the
saudis and the egyptians and others, more and more dangling their options. we lived with that at the tail end of the obama administration, the specter that they are going to go to putin, go to china, and we need to get more comfortable, figure out where those lines are , and which countries where that would harm our interests, which countries where we areip has sailed and just offering gravy because major investments are coming from elsewhere anyway, so we might as well have it's a bold positions. have principled positions. chinese military sales at some point in the future will end up diminishing our leverage. it has been an argument for us keeping our iron in the fire,
maintain the relationship funneling more economic assistance to whomever, but at a we can lookt plainly at that assistance. china has come, russia has come, they have made their bet, they have chosen that relationship. each of these is a case-by-case situation. , whichthe positive side , ieasier in many ways mentioned the importance of sharing lessons learned on election interference, banding together on the uighurs would be an example of where you do a public statement and do it in human with other rights-respecting countries as you can, but it is also thinking strategically about sudan, ethiopia, transition -- tunisia, all these years after its
transition. resources way to pull with an eye toward investing at critical times in countries that are trying to make transformational change? everything they are doing in sudan is just pushing water with a occasionally low-level statement out of the state department, occasional pompeo trying to take credit for the transition in sudan. but there is no process. there is no strategy. there is no, how could we bring investment that a certain point, or anticorruption , technical expertise whether at a civil society level or a governmental level to assist them where they need it most, and capacity building for an experiment that a year ago nobody in sudan would have dreamed they would have a chance
to embark upon. so part of the conversation about what you do about democracy and non-democracy is throwing your weight behind those who can be your friends, but who are at critical junctures on feeling right now mentally lonely. offering nore, strings attached infrastructure, they have been there. no human rights strings attached, a different kind of string. note onesting side nobody could have expected that they would have will talkfar, and we at some point about multilateralism, but the un security council, because of 's support foria government was
useless as these earth-shattering events were taking hold. and because the security council was paralyzed on sudan at a time when the body charged with protecting peace and security it wasave been helpful, just irrelevant. but it freed up space for the african union to do something positive and constructive. it created for the first time a situation that may be something , one couldhe future hope, where the african union and the chinese were at each other. because the african union wanted to go farther for pushing for a civilian-led government in sudan , and the chinese wanted status quote, preserve what you have, the investments have been made, things are working out for us biasy, and this statism or against whoever is in charge, irrespective of what they are
doing. last two years, it has been open season for china in sub-saharan africa, and latin america and many respects. see is an example where you a country going through a democratic transition, or seeking to and then stepping up under the auspices of the african union to facilitate another democratic transition , andfew saw coming elbowing out-of-the-way the authoritarian big brother who the powers of the international system to preserve the state disk while. quo.eserve the status within that reminders -- within that are reminders of how things could work.
if the united states was back in the game, others could argue there is a vacuum that creates for prospects -- creates prospects for things like that to happen. but with the change in ethiopia, leadership on behalf of rights, thed human support for the rule of law, the aspiration to deal with historic grievances, increased liberalization for political parties, and the media, you can imagine when countries are going through that, they want company. and regional organizations can assert themselves, as the u.n. and more traditional bodies end up taking a backseat because of the gridlock between the u.s. and china. kelly: you have been the ambassador to the united nations and speaking of gridlock, it
will persist and worsen now that we are in this era of great power competition. how do you balance investments in working through international institutions with the new, ad hoc multilateralism that we are seeing, whether it is coalitions, democracies, what does that look like? into adou lean too far hoc multilateralism, do you create a world that is more competitive? you have competitive blocs that aren't as good. so how do you balance working inside institutions that may be hamstrung by politics, and then working outside them? we aredor power: definitely in that. you think ofif old-school gridlock in the security council, you
immediately think of the cold war and the paralysis between the u.s. and the soviet union. but with the ending of the cold war and the opening up of the possibility of the security council being a because i executive organ on peace and security, you had a couple of decades where it was irrelevant at times on issues were permanent members felt really, really strongly. was notecurity council impactful on issues related to israel-palestine, because of the traditional u.s. position within the security council. certainly anything related to taiwan or u.s. membership issues or burma for a long time, the kind of near abroad for china. in the obama years, because of what putin is doing, you saw a list of things you couldn't make progress on.
the list of issues before the security council expanded, but the list of issues where you couldn't get past power issues expanded, because ukraine is on the agenda, very little you could get through the council and alsof russia syria, the redline, boot and treating it as if it is near yemen, where in many ways the russian position on the inclusivity of the peace process -- peace process and so forth that led it to block actions might be alongside the position of what people in the room today might wish was our position, but to be a spoiler also and try to create equivalents from what the coalition was doing in yemen and what what russia and syria were doing in places like aleppo, burma again with the rohingya and today, so many of the other
crises, it is just block libya, r.an, cashmere -- kashmi so if you think of a conflict in the world, someone has a dog in the fight, even sudan, where china and russia are on one side and western democracies were on the other but not very assertive . so it is more and more blocked onto more and more issues -- blocked on more and more issues. and the more and more obama administration, putin it was just originally ukraine where he was going to throw his weight around, then he wanted to play spoiler on the south sudan arms embargo. he never cared about sub-saharan africa, and yet he was personally vetting security council resolutions just to be the disruptor writ large.
and china within the u.n. system, you would have seen it very active on things that mattered to china, keeping itself off the agenda above all, keeping anything related to the very near abroad off the agenda, and then preserving a constructive space on north korea, which was surprising, the willingness to work with the security council on north korean proliferation issues. and this has been totally accelerated in the past three years, and 2009 when we entered the obama administration, china contributing 3% of the u.n. budget. the year it became number-two donor to the united nations behind the u.s., now at 12%. already threed years ago, but it is translating
every day now, into a willingness to assert itself across the budget process, trying to cut human rights posts from peacekeeping missions. some of you read about how china threatened to veto the u.n.-afghanistan mission, a pro forma resolution, because they e complement th to the belt and road initiative renewal unama resolution, just throwing weight gradualo ensure a very standards by inserting language around state and sent everywhere, chipping
away at the idea there are principles within the u.n. charter that are higher than the state, and supposed to which states have to be accountable. if you look at you and resolutions now, look at the language around state consent. so in the security council, these battles are happening, this assertiveness is going on, and the problems aren't going away anywhere in the world. organism-adapts dimension happening, and that predated trump. 2016, ethiopia role through the a you on sudan, you are going to see more of that. but to your question about the way you will see any of these , it will turn on ' bilateralntries
relationships are faring. there is nothing in the multilateral ether that fixes itself. are you doing with these vetoes, no products are coming out, you are making yourselves irrelevant, people are very aware the security council is losing reasons other than having five permanent members selected in 1945. that used to be the big legitimacy concern of the security council. and now it is just on the big security crises of our time, it is not functioning. but that is going to come back to the china relationship. backmocracies are cooperating -- right now the democracies on the security council aren't really caucusing with each other. germany,e,
france on the u.k. are lining their messages, but the united states decided in the wake of north korean missile test that we didn't want to bring those violations of security council resolutions to the security council. the europeans did. they were, last i checked, that was a violation. and brought them over u.s. objection. the idea that we are in a moment where the u.s. and our european partners would be disagreeing about whether to bring north violations to the security council, the cleavage is not just on human rights and democracy issues or human rights and all the ones we know about. ask you but i know the audience some ants to ask you questions. i do have one question before we go to the audience. to teaching.ing
congratulation congratulations. one of the things, they have we've lling, and what discovered through that, there is significant generational divides on what we consider and nonimportant in terms of our role in the world, what issues we should be focused on. you're engaging young people now. how are you thinking about this in terms of shift priorities but also how we can engage our younger generation on policy issues in a way that resonates with them? in two ways.wer it first, sort of at a generic to where we s back change.on shrink the both am teaching and just completed a three-month book tour where i was in 40 cities or something. a lot of campuses, and i don't know if this will resonate. feel like this is true of
people of all ages actually and my students but my main impression was a level of engagement, activation, anger, in certain quarters, that i don't recall travels, and rior my prior experiences in the classroom. but it was coupled with a real sense of feeling small. the problems, it's almost like australia's fires become a metaphor for this even i was in australia at the time of the fires and not on american campuses, but even just images. all of you who are parents, talking to your kids about these problems. a parent's job is to tell a story about how everything will how do you tell a story? and that's true of climate but issues, you of
now, whether inequality or the opioid crisis or mass migration. and then y caring when you t sort of, write the solution with your own capacity, that's where the strength of change comes in. we're trying to meet people they are, not paralyzed and then kind of hamstrung by that. i think that's well beyond what anyone thinks our foreign policy be.uld the nk as we think about kind of activation we need for the set of challenges we face, remember that simply stating the size of the problem for those who are experts on issues, without pathway, where you can tell a story, there is something within your power to control. out of control.
i guess that's another way to scale commensurate to the of those issues. that's just part of my reaction question, and then the last thing i would say, i think poll is really interesting. there is pew polling also that's quite similar. it's what we know, which is that younger people are much more skeptical than older generations force.he use of military our challenge collectively is appear in many u.s. s a conflagration of foreign policy in the world with policy.y we're not just the country of the iraq invasion. we're also the country of leading world to end the ebola crisis. teach that case at the
county school and the law school at harvard, they come out like, you know, bouncing into the fact that there is an example that's concrete and well scholars about how working behind and in support of local people who to put their lives guinea, but in new how the democracies in the world, in support of those ground, can on the build the airplane while it's flying. we've forgotten we can do those kinds of things. so, in other words, you can't wish away the fact that people have lost confidence. can't wish away or simply conflating. you're spearhead the paris agreement. we helped neutralize iran's weapons program in
incredibly complex negotiations hile bringing russia, china, europeans and iran to the table. when you give them those oh, yeah, but those examples are not part of our political culture. we have american carnage. nothing that the last worked.ration did ever which seeps in among democrats, a lot of what i've talked about has been about confidence. but i will say that the cap poll and the pew poll show something really interesting. poll, if i'm not mistaken you, correct me, with one, climate was number sorry, this is generations -- so younger crowd you're talking about climate number allies s, and then polling also ros and number four was protecting human rights. protecting human rights and global poverty, and like
lower than that was terrorism, among young rorism people. so it's not that they want to bath the baby out with the water if you disaggregate but if about k in the abstract u.s. foreign policy everybody thinks that's just going to mean militarization. that.ere is a reason for our personnel are involved in operations in m 40% of the countries, terrorism missions, which include operations and other activities, training and other activities in 40% of the countries in the world. -- here is a sense of what how our foreign policy, you now, has become overweighted, you know, in that direction. a breakout session. i want to open for at least a couple of questions. running a little bit behind so if folks have questions please raise your hand collect two of them in the beginning here. back, at man from the
here.ble and please state your name and identify yourself, please. i'm matthew petty and i'm a reporter at the national interest. a lot of i've heard from the trump world is the idea one the clock is ticking, talking point i've heard is force a decision point on iran, we've seen like the europeans start to move away from the nuclear deal. we saw serious military escalations. do you think a new democratic administration should do if the trump administration brings us past the point of no return? what do you think the way to do if the deal with getting stuck into, escalation spiral that the next administration may not believe is justified or wise, if we're already in it?
you.k one.'ll take another lady in the front here. >> thanks so much, that was great. the question about the one. lady in the frontu.n., and, we both had this collective enormative sion and dimension. in analysts think they are juxtaposition. while trying to shore off the u.n. you'ree of the eakening the institution in that russia and china do see some incentive on participating strengthening, but in their own terms. you've got to do both. you've got to strengthen the collective security but you cannot give an inch on the normative side. to continue to compete
and ultimately we can be successful but i'm curious as to that and particular think sequencing, because if we go aggressively on the enormative side, i can see continued cipe for impasse. >> why don't we start with those two. backwards.ork you know, i'm not sure, suzanne, a level of abstraction exactly where to go with your question. absolutely right to point to the interplay and to the duality of all of that and and normative on but in order to defend against erosion, which is really more, maybe i'll say worried technology norms and that bucket of norms that are underdeveloped, but if part -- if part of what is appening and going to continue
to happen is going to get over time, is to chip away at some of the belated realization that the way a is me treats its own people a predictor of how they are likely to behave within their as partners. i mean, china just fundamentally or er doesn't accept that doesn't care, right? of use the ramifications accepting that events that occur nternally have broader ramifications just implicate them too much, right? of now implicate a set bedfellows of theirs. to guard against their desire to kind of turn back the clock, i mean, which mirrors what trump has tried to do domestically here, about countries acting collectively to prevent that norm erosion. one reason they have been --
fortunate that their ambition in the phase that oincides with trump is nasience. here are even views about whether they coexist, chipping away here and there or whether make the world you a to come atocracy, you prefer to for them in the a nicent seat every ra and pretty much utilization, where, doesn't care o do diplomacy or understand multilateralism, for whatever reason, we're lucky that it's have been luckier if it was 10 years ago when they at all, but it
this is where, again, two times trump, not two times it's, you know, an exponential occurs in the second term because china more and ore, as i spoke to, so we just need collective action to preserve norms, and then when that bucket of new and, again, need not happen initially at the u.n. but it ny multilateral setting will sill be about collective action on behalf of a set of wish to s that we espouse, that we'll probably, if a re ever to get china to be part of them, and others, you absolutely have to, would be the point. there will be some compromise involved in that, and again, the wait, the more leverage they will have, the more countries they will have on right?ide of the table, who are the beneficiaries of guess, chnologies, so i
i see them just very ntermingled, and i will say, you know, on norm development, my way of that thinking about it already anachronistic. i don't know. been in these negotiations for a while, and stood still not during this period. it's probably the case that normative unresolved to beons, where china has part of the conversation, that he process lend up having to look something like, i'm saying this tentatively but the paris process. p-2 negotiation ccurs, as happened in the
podesto with president xi. it's a democracy process that where we're then the spokesperson on behalf as large a coalition as possible, giving potency in what amounts to a subsequent p-2 process. that in y i mentioned year one, all of that rainstorming among democracies about how we handle this juggernaut that's coming down the path. with say that in contrast the traditional u.n. process, where it's kind of bottom up. the u.s. is leading behind the scenes. you can't get away with that anymore. it's not going to play itself the u.n. it may end up at the u.n. it should end up probably at the u.n. we tried that in the obama years ith a lean set of cybernorms, and from what i gather from the intelligence people, it brought down cybertheft and some of the looking at but we
hottest -- the hottest issues, i guess, or the that ontentious idea and was the idea, we would start there and build out. iran question, ou know, i don't think i have, i think it's just, i can't even know what scenario you have in exactly. i guess i would just say you ozed the phrase point of no return. just will never, i don't know what that means. there is always -- it can always get worse, right? no matter how bad it is. it can always get worse and it can always get moderately right? anything. as a limate stands out possible exception. so i don't know what the apocalyptic scenario is that you mind.n profound 'll have two
issues irrespective of sort of months play themselves out under trump. have a major credibility hallenge in sitting down with the iranian regime again, in so ready response to whatever reboot we want to do, this, too, be replaced the next time someone who doesn't like the deal takes office? and in the old days, we would ither have the norm that denis referenced earlier of respecting an executive's prior agreements or we would have the prospect of locking down an international agreement in a treaty, but, you know, given the 67 vote threshold for treatise we don't treatise anymore. we were lucky on new star, so i going to be very down.nging to sit on the other hand, the
circumstance in iran is helping fuel these protests, alongside the recent trigger event of shooting down the plane and the lack of credibility around the regime generally in isms of iranian welfare, but a profound economic crisis, and to that crisis is going persist irrespective of, you or , whether escalation de-escalation occurs, especially because the trump administration s intent on just piling more and more sanctions, not only on but on anyonegime externally who complies with the national law, and sanctions -- the jcpoa has nshrined in unthe unsecurity council resolution, anybody who complies with that the trump administration is treating as a international the system so the economic pain, you is going d on to iran
to be a major change in circumstance with huge ramifications for their internal seen that and we've in this week's protest to but also in the largest protest since occurred, you know, just weeks ago. t's very hard to speculate given the number of moving parts and that set of scenarios. we'll have a panel later this afternoon to solve all the problems on the iran front. samantha, for joining us. i'm sorry we don't have more questions. but it's been a very in depth conversation about how to ideals in a very complex world. thank you for joining us and if are under ive her a of applause. thank you, everybody. [applause] >> we're now going to break for breakout sessions and we'll see you back here later. >> we'll now have a brief break breakout afternoon
sessions begin. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp 2020] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> washington journal live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up this morning, henry olson discusses president trump's senate impeachment trial in the potential impact on campaign 2020. watch c-span's "washington journal" live at 7:00 eastern this morning. join the discussion. live friday on the c-span networks at 10:00 a.m., the middle east policy council hosts
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country in the long run. break factional fevers before they jeopardize the core institutions of our government. it, the senate with confidence enough in its thesituation can preserve necessary impartiality between an individual accused and the representatives of the people, his accusers. president, the house's hour is over. the senate's time is at hand. it is time for this proud body to honor our founding purpose. >> here is what alexander hamilton warned of an federalist 65. he said the greatest danger is
that a decision in an impeachment trial will be regulated more by the comparative strength of the parties rather than innocence or guilt. alexander hamilton even before the day political parties were as strong as they are today wanted us to come together. leader wants to do things on his own without any democratic input. fortunately, we have the right to demand votes and to work as hard as we can for a fair trial. a full trial. a trial with witnesses. a trial with documents. the founders anticipated that impeachment trials would always be buffeted by the winds of politics. they gave the power to the senate anyway because they believed the chamber was the only place where it impartial justice to the president could truly be sought. , these ofing days
apple and important coming days, each of us will face a choice about whether to begin this trial in the search of truth or in the service of the presidents desire to cover up and rush things through. the third time in history, a president is on trial in the u.s. senate. watch live tuesday, when the trial resumes at 1:00 eastern on c-span two. >> russian president vladimir putin addressed lawmakers at his annual state of the nation address. he outlined limits to the power of a future successor and called for a nationwide referendum. he also discussed russia's military power and global leadership as well as domestic issues like government support for low-income families.