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tv   Joint Oversight Hearing on Security Failures During Attack on U.S. Capitol...  CSPAN  March 1, 2021 4:01am-6:02am EST

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thank you for the opportunity to speak before the committee today and thank you for your service
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to our country. my name is captain carnation mendoza and i served with the capitol police for 19 years. i take a light a lot of pride in my job prior to serving to the capitol police i served as active-duty soldier with the united states army my last duty station was split between the pentagon in the washington area criminal investigation division. i received various awards from the army in the capitol police to include an award during the pentagon attack. unfortunately i did not save any lives but there certain lessons that always stuck with me after 9/11. one of those lessons is knowing the unthinkable is always possible so be ready. so it always take my job very seriously as 9/11 is always in the back of my mind. with the capitol police i served in various operational administrative and collateral assignments i am currently serving as a captain in the special operations division
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where i have various responsibilities to include serving as a field commander in the field force commander for the service unit. throughout my career i have responded to and managed various critical incidents and events from congressional and member security related issues to shooting an armed project. i've served as a field force commander for multiple event including november 1400, 0000 maga march. in my career i been activated to work demonstrations with various controversial groups and i've been called some of the worst names so many times that i'm pretty numb to it now. as an agency we have trained numerous demonstrations it is something we do on a regular basis and is something i voice felt we've excelled at. during the million maga march multiple white supremacist groups to include the proud boys and others converged on the supreme court along with counter
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groups, the civil disturbance for hard that day physically breaking up fights and separating various groups. i literally woke up the next day unable to move due to the pain. on january 6 we anticipated an event similar to the maga march the took place on november 14 where we would likely face groups fighting among one another. additional civil disturbance units were activated that day. i was working evening shift and had planned to reporting at 3:0k a 16 hour shift and assume field force commanders should the event continue into the evening and overnight shift. it was approximately 130 in the afternoon and i was home eating with my 10-year-old spending time with him before what i would knew be a long day when a fellow captain contacted me and said things were bad and i needed to respond. i dropped everything to respond to work early that day. i arrived within 15 minutes and i contacted dispatch to see what
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active scenes we had i was advised things were pretty bad. i asked if her assistance was needed and advised of six active scenes. there was an explosive device with the democratic national committee building, a second explosive advice to the republican national committee building and large hostile groups at different locations outside the capital building. i advised the dispatcher i would respond to the d&c since the building was closest to where i was at the time. in route i heard officers at the capital building calling for immediate assistance so i proceeded past the d&c to the capital. as i arrived to the capital i heard an officer yell there was a breach of the rotunda door and various officers calling for assistance at multiple locations throughout the building. many of the doors to the building were not accessible due to the size of the crowd, i was able to enter a lower level door with the assistance of a capital division officer. once inside the memorial door i immediately noticed a large
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crowd of possibly 200 rioters yelling in front of me. since i was alone i turned to go back so i could enter another door but within a few seconds it took me too walk back i entered there were already countless rioters outside the building banging on the door. i had no choice but to proceed through the violent crowd in the building. i made my way through the crowd by yelling and pushing people out of my way until i saw capitol police, civil disturbance in the hallway. they were holding the hallway to keep rioters from penetrating deeper into the building. i immediately jumped in line to assist with holding the crowd of writers and at some point my right arm got wedged between rioters and the railing along the wall as sgt pulled my right arm free and had he not i'm certain it would've been broken. shortly after that an officer was pushed and fell to the floor and i assisted the officer to a safer location and got back in line.
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at some point the crowd breached the line officers work so hard to maintain. civil disturbance units redeployed to keep rioters from accessing other areas of the building. i proceeded to the rotunda where i noticed a heavy smoke like residue and smelled what i believe to be military grade cs gas of familiar smell, it was mixed with fire extinguisher spray deployed by rioters, the writers continue to deploy into the rotunda. officers received a lot of gas exposure which is worse inside the building then outside because there is nowhere for it to go. i received chemical burns to my face that i'm not healed to this day. i witnessed officers being knocked to the ground and being hit with various objects that were being thrown by rioters. i was unable to determine what those objects were. i immediately assumed command in the rotunda and called for additional assets. officers began to push the crowd out the door after a couple of hours officers cleared the
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rotunda but had to physically hold the door close because it had been broken by the rioters. officers big need for relief as they were unsure how long they could physically hold the door closed with the crowd continually banging on the outside of the door attempting to gain reentry, eventually officers were able to secure the door with furniture and other objects, i am proud of the officers i worked with on january 6 they thought extremely hard, i know some said the battle lasted three hours but according to my fitbit i was an exercise on for four hours and nine minutes in many officers wanted to fight before i even arrived. i'm proud of the united states capitol police and especially proud of the officers who are the backbone of this agency and carry out day-to-day operations i know what teamwork we can move forward. the night of january 7 into the very early morning hours on my birthday january 8 i spent at the hospital comforting the family of our fallen officer and
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met with the medical examiner's office prior to working with fellow officers to facilitate a motorcade to transport officer seen from the hospital. of the multitude of events i worked in my 19 year career in the department this was by far the worst of the worst. we could've had ten times the amount of people working with us and i still believe the battle would've been just as devastating. as an american and as an army veteran it is sad to see us attacked by fellow citizens. i am sad to see the unnecessary loss of life i am sad to see the impact this is had him capitol police officers and i'm sad to see the impact it's had on agency intercountry. although things are still raw and moving forward would be a difficult process i look forward together as an agency and as a country. in closing i want to honor the chiefs leadership.
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i served under his command of the watch commander for three years and able to personally see his hard work and dedication. he was fully dedicated to the united states capitol police and he cared about every employee on the department. i also hear employees from the department praise his leadership and his ability to inspire others he made a significant impact on our agency. thank you chief. thank you. >> thank you very much captain mendoza for that beautiful statement and your work on behalf of our country. i'm going to give you the files on the other witnesses and senator peters will swear them in. first witness today is robert j conti acting chief of the metropolitan police department and the district of columbia acting chief contee was sworn in on january 2 this year, he joined the department in 1989
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as a cadet after being sworn in he became a patrol officer before being promoted to attendant and leading the forces intelligence branch. in 2004 he was promoted to captain and put in charge of the violent crimes and branch after being promoted to second district commander he joined the operation division. for the next decade acting chief contee served in multiple leadership roles with the mpd and the patrol chief of patrol services south where he saw over police districts pretty was appointed as assistant chief of the investigative bureau in march of 2018 acting chief contee is a graduate of schools and a holds a bachelor degree in professional studies from the george washington university. acting chief contee grew up in a harvard community in northeast washington, d.c. our second witness today will be mr. stephen a son, he served as
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the chief of capitol police from june of 2019 to january 16 of this year. he joined the capitol police in 2017 as assistant chief and chief of operation. prior to joining the u.s. pp he spent 25 years with the metropolitan police department where he started out at the patrol officer in 1990. . . . commander of the special operations division in 2011. as commander of the division he served as the lead planner for the 2009 and 2013 presidential inaugurations and many other national security special events. he received his bachelor and master of science from john hopkins and security from the naval postgraduate school. our third witness will be
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sergeant-at-arms who served in that capacity from april of 2018 to january 7th of this year. he joined the senate in 2011 as assistant sergeant at arms from the office of protected service and continuity and served as the chief of staff of the sergeant of arms and deputy sergeant of arms. prior to joining the office, he was a 35 year veteran of the united states secret service where he served in many roles including as a special agent in charge of the washington field office. immediately before joining the senate, he served as assistant director of the office of government affairs for the secret service. he graduated from fairleigh dickinson university and is also a veteran obtaining the rank of captain in the marine corps. the final witness today is mr. paul irving who served as the sergeant-at-arms in the u.s. house of representatives from
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january 2012 through january 207th of this year. he joined the united states secret service in 1983 after briefly serving with the fbi. he served as the head legal instructor for constitutional law and criminal procedure at the training academy before joining the presidential protective division during the george hw bush and clinton administrations. following the white house service, he served as assistant director for congressional affairs, assistant director for government affairs, for homeland security and assistant director for administration for the secret service. he retired from the secret service in 2008 as assistant director and worked as a private security consultant as health sergeant at arms in 2012. he is a graduate of the american university and law school. i want to thank the witnesses for appearing voluntarily today and i look forward to your testimony.
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>> it is the practice of the homeland security and governmental affairs committee to swear in witnesses. if the witnesses would stand including those joining us virtually. raise your right hand. do you swear the testimony you will give before this committee shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you god? >> i do. >> thank you and you may all be seated. >> do you want to begin? >> good morning chairman peter, chairwoman klobuchar, and members of the committee. i'm the acting chief of police of the metropolitan police department. the primary police force in the district of columbia. i appreciate the opportunity to lead you on the events of january 6th 2021, a dark day for the country. i would like to begin by
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highlighting a few key facts to ensure the committee and the audience to understand the different roles of the mayor and the district of columbia including npd and those of congressional authority. first, npd is prohibited by federal law from entering the capital or its grounds to patrol, make arrests or serve warrants without the consent or the request of the capitol police. second, the president of the united states, not to the mayor of the district of columbia, controls the dc national guard. the scope of the request by the mayor must be limited to supporting the district's local jurisdiction and authority which excludes entities, federal entities and property. third, since mayor bowser declared a public health emergency last march, the district has not issued although the district may take pride in
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facilitating the exercise of the first amendment rights regardless of their beliefs, none of the public gatherings january 5th or 6th were issued permits by the city. on january 6, npd was prepared to support our partners with a first amendment assembly outside primarily on federal land while continuing to patrol and respond to calls for service throughout dc. based on our experience, we recognized there was a possibility of violence especially after the smaller groups of protesters gathered with malicious intent around city streets. to be clear although they came into a large presence that had contributed in the city after demonstrations in november and december. the district had intelligence indicating the potential for violent actions in the streets
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of the district of columbia. in preparation for the anticipated demonstrations and the possibility of violence in the streets, npd was deployed on 12 hour shifts the week of january 4th with days off and leave canceled at the mayor's request several area police departments were on standby in dc and more than 300 members of the national guard were deployed on the streets providing traffic control and other services. however, these resources were barely enough to encounter the event that had never happened in the history of the united states, a mob of thousands of american citizens, marching a violent assault on the u.s. capital. defeat of the government and a attempt to hold the counting of the ballot, the step for the peaceful power transition. it precipitated an equally
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unprecedented response within the capitol police chief issuing an urgent request for the npd to assist in defending the capital. needless to say when we received the call for help, the npd responded immediately. within minutes members arrived and the mom had overran protective measures of the capital in an attempted insurrection prior to the arrival of the officers at the west front. objectives were to stop the rioters from entering the capital building and remove those that were already inside. two, secured the parameters of the capital could be cleared for the lawmakers. three, and able congress to resume their sessions, to demonstrate to the country and to the world that our democracy was still intact and lastly, once the third objective had been accomplished, begin making arrests of anyone violating the law. at 2:22 p.m., a call with among
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others myself, leadership of the u.s. capitol police, the national guard and the department of the army i was surprised that the reluctance to immediately send the national guard to the capitol grounds. in the meantime, by 2:30 p.m., the district had requested additional officers from as far away as new jersey and issued a notice of emergency citywide curfew beginning at 6 p.m. from that point, it took another three and a half hours until all rioters were removed from the capital. ninety minutes later at 8 p.m., congress was able to resume its critical work and fulfill its constitutional duty. over the course of january 6 and into the early morning of the seventh, approximately 1100 members responded to the capital. at least 65 npd members
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sustained injuries. five people lost their lives on january 6th. as we reflect on the dark day, we offer condolences to all of the grieving families. in closing, i appreciate the opportunity to highlight the heroism of the npd officers who put their lives on the line to protect the capital, congress and our democracy. but to ensure the continued safety of the district and everyone in it, we must be frank frankin looking at several critl issues. this assault on the capital has exposed weaknesses in the security of the most secure city in the country. the federal police forces in dc will be re-examining the security protocols, given the risk of both foreign and domestic terrorism. as the chief of the districts, i must think about our preparations not only for possible tax, but the daily impact of the changing operation of our federal partners.
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as they harden targets in the federal enclave, other buildings in the city under this jurisdiction may become more likely targets. this concludes my testimony and i'm happy to answer any questions. >> thank you very much. mr. sund. >> good morning, chairwoman klobuchar, ranking member blunt, chairman peters and ranking member portman. thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before the committee's regarding the attack on the united states capital that occurred january 6th. i've been in policing for almost 30 years. the events i witnessed on january 6th was the worst attack on law enforcement and/or democracy that i've seen in my entire career. i witnessed insurgents beating police officers with fists, pipes, sticks, baths, metal barricades and flagpoles.
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these criminals came prepared for war. they came with their own radio system to coordinate the attack and climbing gear and other equipment to defeat the security capital features. i'm sickened by what i witnessed that day. our officers fought valiantly using batons, shields, and pepper ball guns to hold back the attackers. capitol police and responding law enforcement agencies showed tremendous restraint by not using their firearms which would have likely led to a more chaotic situation and possible mass casualty incident. no civilian law enforcement agency to include the united states capital police is trained or equipped to repel in insurrection of thousands of individuals focused on breaching a building at all costs. i'm extremely proud and appreciative of the capital police officers in the metropolitan police department and the other law enforcement agencies that came to our assistance. a clear lack of accurate and complete intelligence across several agencies contributed to this event and not poor planning
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by the capital states police. we rely on accurate information from partners to help us develop plans. the intelligence that we base our planning on indicated that the january 6th protests were expected to be similar to the previous rallies in 2020, which drew tens of thousands of participants. the assessment indicated that members of the proud boys, white supremacist groups and other extremist groups were expected to participate on january 6th and that may be inclined to become violent. based on the intelligence received, we plan for an increased level of violence at the capital and some participants may be armed. but none of the intelligence we received predicted would actually occur. extensive preparations were put into place for january 6th that included the full activation of the department. intelligence and information sharing with federal and local partners and department officials. implementing a significant
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enhancement for the member protection, extensive operational enhancements to include significant civil disobedience deployments and expanded perimeter. we also distributed additional protective equipment for the officers and coordinated outside agency support. as recent as tuesday, january 5th during a meeting i hosted with my executive team, the capitol police board and a dozen of the top law enforcement and military officials from dc no entity including the fbi provided any new intelligence regarding january 6th. it should also be noted that a secretary of homeland security did not issue an elevated or eminent alert in reference to the event of the united states capital on january 6th. we properly plan for a mass demonstration with possible violence. what we got was a military style coordinated assault on the officers and a violent takeover of the capital building. i know that the images we saw of the officers battling for their lives and the visuals on the national tv had a profound
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effect on the nation. the united states capital police did everything we could at least on the intelligence and available resources to prepare for this event. while officers were fighting my post was in the command center coordinating resources from agencies around the capital region to provide critically needed support. i was also briefing the sergeant at arms and working on establishing an accountability and priority for the incoming resources. as capitol police and outside resources begin to reestablish the security perimeter i responded to the capital building to personally evaluate the situation and brief the sergeant at arms and leadership. i acknowledge that under the pressure of an unprecedented attack a number of systems broke down. one of the reported issues described by officers was a lack of clear communications and direction from officials. it appears the established command for the capital building was overwhelmed by the enormity of the situation and as officials battled the
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insurrection as opposed to directing the response. there have also been reports that some officers may have felt confused or letdown during the attack. as an official who cares as much as i do about my colleagues, nothing is more painful to me. these issues must be addressed in the training policies and procedures. even our best efforts were not enough to stop this unprecedented assault on the capital. however casting blame solely on the united states capital leadership is not only misplaced but also minimized what truly occurred that day. the focus going forward needs to be on the efforts to improve intelligence and the coordination of security measures between all involved agencies. hopefully this will be part of the focus of the independent action committee to look at all aspects of the january attack on the nation's capital. in closing, i want to again recognize the efforts of the capital police officers who on january 6th outnumbered and against the odds successfully
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carried out their mission to protect the members of congress and the legislative process. i couldn't have been more proud to be part of the team and the mission. i'm available to answer any questions that you may have. thank you. >> thank you. mr. senger. >> chairwoman klobuchar, chairwoman peters, ranking member blunt, ranking member portman. the national capital was weakened [inaudible] u.s. capital police, sergeant at arms and rising security of the capital complex and its population. there is a shared responsibility with other law enforcement. sharing the resources are paramount for success [inaudible] overworking the relationship between the office and capital police have been a priority.
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i'm a proponent of the concept. this methodology can be used to assess the individual members. it's only as good as the analyst assessing it and that assessment is placed in the proper hands to accept or mitigate any threats. we have to be careful of returning to a time when the events of january 6th started to reveal return to the concept of the possibilities of the security operations the result [inaudible] this is because the give and take of security planning. we had an opportunity to learn lessons from the events of january 6th. [inaudible] should be considered in
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conjunction with these investigations. the coordination and national capital should be reviewed for what can be done. intelligence collection, training and concepts must be consistent. this should come from the self-interest and in conclusion to prepare for a major event we should consider the possibility of some level of civil disobedience at these demonstrations and plan accordingly. the events went beyond disobedience. it's a wild coordinated attack and the loss of life could have been much worse. this concludes my prepared remarks. >> thank you mr. senger. mr. irving. >> chair peters, chairwoman klobuchar, ranking member
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portman, ranking member blunt and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. there's been a lot of press reporting about me, not accurate and i appreciate the opportunity to address some of that today. my name is paul and i served as the sergeant-at-arms for the house of representatives the past nine years. serving in that role is one of the great honors of my life, and i count it a privilege to have worked with speakers from both political parties including speaker boehner, speaker ryan and speaker pelosi. i'm a law enforcement officer by training. my professional career started more than 40 years ago in internet the department of justice, and then as a clerk at the fbi. i later became a special agent for the secret service where i worked on two different presidential protection details and rose to the rank of assistant director. like you, i'm profoundly saddened by the events of january 6th.
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the entire world witnessed horrific acts of violence and destruction, carried out by our very own citizens against a global symbol of democracy, our government but i'm particularly saddened by the loss of life, which included three officers. my heart goes out to all the families that lost a loved one. we begin planning for the protests of january 6th and december of 2020. the planning relied on what we understood to be credible intelligence provided by various federal and state agencies including a special event assessment issued by the capital police on january 3rd. the january 3rd assessment forecast that the protests were expected to be similar to the previous million rally that had taken place in november and december, 2020. every capital police daily intelligence reports between january 4th and january 6th, including on january 6th,
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forecast the chance of civil disobedience during the protest as remote to improbable. i relied on that intelligence when overseeing security plans put forth. the chiefs plan was all hands on deck whereby every available sworn capital police employee with police powers was assigned to work on january 6. that meant 1200 capital police officers were on site including units and other tactical teams. i also understood 125 national guard troops were standing by for a quick response. the metropolitan police department was also on 12 hour shifts and they stationed officers just north of the capital to provide immediate assistance if required. the plan was to multiple partners. based on intelligence, we all believed that the plan met the threat and that we were prepared. we now know that we had the
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wrong plan. as one of the senior security leaders responsible for the event, i am accountable for that. i accept that responsibility and as you know, i have resigned my position. much has been said about whether optics affected my judgment in a january 4th telephone call with the chief and sergeant arms about a national guard offer to incorporate 125 unarmed national guard troops into the security plan. it would have been to work traffic control near the capital. my use of the word optics has been mischaracterized in the media. let me be clear. optics as portrayed in the media played no role whatsoever in my decision about security. any suggestion to the contrary is false. safety was always paramount when making security plans for january 6th. we did discuss whether the intelligence warranted having troops at the capital. that was the issue.
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and the collective judgment at that time was the intelligence didn't warrant that. if the chief radioed security doubt about the readiness without the national guard, i would not have hesitated to request it. the sergeant arms and i were confident in the chiefs plan and i did whatever i could to ensure they had the support needed to prepare and execute that security plan. and on january 6th when i was asked for authorization to request assistance, i approved it. there are important lessons to be learned from january six. i commend the committee for this proactive review of the events leading up to and on january 6th. i want to help the staff and members make changes and improvements and to ensure the tragedies of january 6th never occur again. i look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you very much.
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we will now begin a questioning. i want to start to clear up one thing by just asking all of the witnesses yes and no questions. based on what we know now including the recent department of justice indictments, do you agree that there is now clear evidence that supports the conclusion that the january 6th insurrection was planned and was a coordinated attack on the u.s. capitol? >> yes. >> would you agree that this included white supremacists and extremist groups? >> yes. >> would you agree that this was a highly dangerous situation that was horrific but could have actually been worse without the courage of the officers? >> yes. >> okay. so, now let's look at what we knew leading up to it or the people that worked for you knew leading up to it.
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we knew leading up to it that on january, leading up to january 6th, the president to send nationwide messages telling people to come to washington january 6 and said be there. it will be wild. and according to the public reporting by the "washington post," the fbi's field office issued a threat report on january 5th that detailed specific calls for violins online in connection with january 6th including protesters, quote, be ready to fight, and quote, go there ready for war. i guess i will start with you. when a critical intelligence report is received by the capital police from an intelligence community source like the fbi, who usually would receive it. did you receive this report? >> thank you for the question. in the last 24 hours, i was informed they had received that
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report and it was received by what we call one of our sworn members assigned to the task force which is a task force with the fbi. they received it on the evening of the fifth, reviewed and forwarded it over to an unofficial at the intelligence division at the capitol police headquarters. >> so you hadn't seen it yourself. >> it did not go any further than that. >> was it sent to the house and sergeant at our? >> i don't believe it went any further from the intelligence division. >> and did you get that report? >> before hand? >> no. >> i did not. >> okay. i think that may have contributed to the lack of information, but i will leave that for the future.
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now let's go back to another report i know on january 3rd you said in your testimony the capital police published intelligence assessments of the event including one on january 3rd. do you mostly rely on your federal partners like the fbi to gather and analyze intelligence on potential threats to the capital and members of congress? >> yes, i think what's important to realize is a law enforcement agency we are a consumer of intelligence and information provided by the community. the intelligence community is 18 federal agencies that collect information, do the analyzing of the data and then provided to us. we are relying on that to be complete and accurate. >> but in that report, we now know according to your testimony that tens of thousands of participants were likely to send to washington is that correct? >> that's correct. >> the january 3rd memo
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according to the post made clear supporters of trump was the last opportunity to overturn the results of the presidential election and, quote, this sense of desperation and disappointment may lead to an incentive to become violent is that correct? >> yes ma'am. it also quoted the memo stating unlike previous post, the targets of the supporters are not necessarily the counter protesters but rather congress itself as the target on this is that right? >> that is correct. did you have any indication many of these protesters might arrived armed or the extremist groups might be there? >> we knew the members of the extremist groups would be there and there were social media calls for people to come armed. >> you also said at a january 5th meeting with capital police the sergeant-at-arms and federal law enforcement military officials all present at the meeting indicated that there was no new intelligence report for
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january 6th is that right? >> that is correct. >> that your testimony says they took a number of steps after these assessments. what you said was the largest number of civil disturbance unit possible increasing dignitary protection coverage, coordinated with the dc police and ordering all hands on deck for the capital police, is that right? >> that's right we took extensive efforts to prepare for the events based on the information much of which you just reviewed. a. >> of the information was enough to get you to do that, why didn't we take some additional steps, why didn't you and others involved to be better prepared to confront the violence? ..
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>> you stated in your written testimony that you first made a request to the capital police to declare an emergency to authorize national guard support monday january 4th and that request was not granted. >> that is correct. >> your testimony makes clear the structure resulted from bringing in assistance from the national guard. >> yes ma'am. >> do you think that changes are needed to make clear the
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top police chief has the authority to call it the national guard? >> is certainly do in those circumstances there needs to be a streamlined process for the capital chief of police to have authority. >> and do you think that reform is needed for the capital police board? >> i think this would be a good time to do this now with the statutes that go back many many years things are changed it is not a bad time to look at what is they are. >> that is an understatement with what happened. >> i would agree with the chief i think the review would
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be warranted at this time. >> mr. t12 you said you had no authority to request assistance from the national guard without an emergency declaration under what rule or regulation did you base that view? >> you have to look back it is a standard sustaining rule i cannot request the national guard without a declaration of emergency without the capital police force it is interesting because it's very similar i cannot even get my men and water cold water on a hot day without a declaration of emergency. >> and you also faced delays to get authorization to bring in the national guard from department of defense? we will hear from them next week. >> that is correct spirit you agree there are serious issues at the pentagon that contributed to the fact guard
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troops did not arrive at the capital until 5:40 p.m. after most violence subsided. >> at an of issues at the pentagon but i was certainly surprised at the delays i was seeing. >> in addition to the reforms of the police board clearly need to be made any other suggestions that involve classified information you have for us? >> as reference to the recommendations? again one of the big things i think was a contributing factor was intelligence. as you meet with the intelligence community at law enforcement we have a very good relationship the aperture just needs to be opened farther january 6 was a new day a change of the threat
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that we face said getting down to look harder and internally looking at our policies and procedures for how we handle special events and what we can do and looking at physical security of the building and the grounds will be critical. a lot of people talk about defending the open environment. i understand i think there are ways to develop a more secure campus while keeping an open environment but i will leave that for a more classified or restricted hearing. >> anything you would add in addition to at the former police chief said. >> i would be very supportive of what the chief mentioned he is right on the money. this is no ordinary use of force that needs to be coordinated better.
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and with certain intelligence and needs to be taken a look at with how it works and then we ramp up since 9/11 and maybe it's time to take a look at when we gather intelligence. >> i will allow my colleagues to ask the same question because i have gone over my time. thank you. >> you brought up the issue of intelligence throughout your testimony and the gaps that were there and how we needed to strengthen the intelligence but i was struck by the fact you said the fbi reported my understanding that report added specific information that was troubling you said the report they get set to the
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capital police it went to the folks in the intelligence department but then you were not aware of it. that is a big question something coming in like that right before an event that i think is significant that does not get to operational commanders who are there to deal with it? how can that happened? how do you not get that vital intelligence on the eve of a major event? >> i hope that something that will be looked at i think that information would have been helpful again looking at the information for the first time yesterday it is strictly rod data and raw intelligence information come in seen on a social media post a lot of people posting things that needed to be corroborated and confirmed so it comes in as raw data keep that in mind. i agree that something we need to look at with the process is streamlined to where it needs to go.
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>> i understand it's raw data but it's the evil of the event you cannot do that analysis you would normally like to do. that is information that has to get to you. clearly that's a major problem. my question is also related to the report put up by capital police by your intelligence folks on january 3rd the intelligence issued the internal report which reportedly stated is this has been out in the public domain that it's been a targeting counter protesters as you have seen in the prior event that this is been out in the public domain that congress itself is the target by trump supporters. congress was the target also the proud boys and white supremacist groups and others that were in attendance and then may be inclined to become
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violent. so you have your own report did you see that report put out? >> yes i did. how is that not awarding of extraordinary measures? understand you had folks there and increased your presence but how is that not a warning flag and if it was what did you do when you read the report? >> that contributed to the fact we expanded our perimeter. i reached out to the metropolitan police department knowing even before that extremist were likely to be there and it was calling for people to be armed and talking to our partners a reach out to say can you provide a support and we coordinated that the
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morning of the sixth. we did take all of that into consideration for this event. >> you change plans on january ? >> just the perimeter we did a number of things we just did it a little bit before that as well. >> so we want to know more specifically also additional information from the fbi but that did not get to you i understand that. the other thing that's important to understand and all of you mention this in your testimony that this wasn't just a response to ms. klobuchar's question just a random violent attack but it was coordinated. i will also ask other witnesses to respond but how do you define coordinated? what did we see that leads you to believe it was coordinated?
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i think in your testimony you mentioned military style coordination that means command and control, understanding the layout of the capital and knowing the internal operations of the defense perimeters of folks that are engaged. talk to me. what did you see that led you to believe this was a coordinated attack i would like other witnesses to engage in that as well. >> this is why i think it was a coordinated attack. they came specifically with equipment bringing gear to a demonstration and explosives and chemical spray. you are coming prepared. the fact that the group that attacked 20 minutes before it ended which means they were planning on our agency not being at full strength watching the other vet that is ending get on post knowing we
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wouldn't be a full strength at that time also dealing with two pipe bombs specifically set on the edge of our perimeter which i suspect to draw resources away i believe there was a significant coordination with this attack. >> chief the also believe this? >> absolutely my view is from the data i think there were hand signals used by several insurrectionist and radio communication with several individuals that were involved with coordinated use of chemical munitions to include spray i certainly believe it was coordinated and with the placements of the pipe moms in the area all of those things plus adding to what we know now as a result of the ongoing investigation handled by the
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fbi i think we are learning more and more clearly this was a coordinated effort. >> mr. irving? >> based on information and pride - - provided, i would agree it would indicate a coordinated attack. >> looking at folks in the intelligence reports like the proud boys and others that were engaged in these violent extremist groups to collect more intelligences the subject that we will do it with those cases. and the rhetoric and this is
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clearly an area as to focus on as to why we didn't have more information about these groups that were coming here planning and usually they leave a trail using encrypted devices clearly the national guard presidents was critical but just a question you mention this in your testimony but you are stunned by the tepid response by the army officials to the request for assistance while it was escalating clearly we have a coordinated attack i can imagine the conversations with the national guard can you clarify that and tell us how those conversations went?
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>> sometime after 2:00 o'clock i left the west front of the capital after being on the scene assessing what was going on after looking at those actions that were taking place shortly thereafter the chief was on the phone literally pleading with other army officials from district government but the chief was pleading for the deployment of the national guard and in response to that there was not an immediate yes or yes it was on its way or yes they are being restage from traffic post to respond it was more asking about the plan or what was the plan for the national guard the response was more focused in addition to the
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plan of the optics or with boots on the ground on the capital and my response to that is that i was stunned officers are literally fighting for their lives and going through an exercise to check the boxes and it was not an immediate response in the chief but the response was no and then to deny the request. and with that response. >> thank you chairman. chief with your testimony if i
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get it correct i think what i am hearing you say based on the intelligence you saw on january 3rd it on january 4th you decided it would be a different kind of protest that you had seen in november and december and that's when you asked for and expanded perimeter and national guard assistance? >> yes just more detail we been analyzing how we responded to the previous marches and decided to expand the perimeter be expanded as large as we did is a large area you have to defend the primary reason knowing the protesters were coming in we were the focus to create a perimeter and we knew this would be a long day. >> did you know the time you expanded the perimeter you would need more help and to
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defend the perimeter then you could provide? >> we need the additional support we could utilize it, yes. >> why did you believe you needed the approval of mr. irving and mr. stinger to request assistance to the national guard? >> that's always been the case we only request for very specific events like the inauguration that requires a declaration of emergency to utilize resources. >> is a statutory requirement? >> i can look into that and get back to you. >> i don't know if there is but i do know if you get the approval to expand the perimeter and you don't have
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the assistance to do that then obviously that is a problem. why didn't you contact the third member the architect of the capitol? >> thank you for the question. my conduit to the police was to the house and sergeant of arms they had communications with the department especially law enforcement issues and also the fact that mr. stinger at one - - mr. stinger at the time was a chairperson but outside the monthly meeting that we would have a less issued specifically to the architect regarding the building structure my conduit was regularly the house sergeant arms. >> why the architect is on the four. >> as a voting member to provide oversight. >> but apparently not enough oversight that you thought you needed to involve him in the conversation? >> my usual conduit was going to the house and senate sergeant arms in the future guess is that something we implement i would do that but
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i was following the usual course of action. >> mr. irving and mr. stinger both why was the request for national guard assistance not approved at the same time you approve the expansion of the perimeter? mr. irving? you are muted. now you are definitely muted. >> i didn't as a request to tell me he had received an offer from the national guard to provide 125 unarmed troops to work traffic control on the perimeter of the capital. shortly after that discussion i said does that include as chair of the board and another senior official the three of
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us talked and during that call the number one question on the table was to the intelligence report or support the additional offer for the 125 troops. >> did you discuss this with anybody except sergeant and arms stinger? >> no. just the one phone call. during that call we all agreed the intelligence did not support the troops and collectively decided to let it go. but michael stinger said what if we put them on standby just in case and that is what we ended up doing but we had a robust security plan that was
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consistent with the intelligence at the time. >> mr. stinger why did you think they were on standby? >> they were away from where we needed them so what does that mean to be on standby? >> when i spoke to the chief with the attempt to get the national guard it wasn't going forward then i suggested to reach out with the national guard commander with the metropolitan police department i suggest they reach out for a couple of reasons one of them i read in the paper or heard on the news the national guard in dc was rather reticent to
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engage with the demonstrations because what had arisen during the white house demonstrations of a month ago and we need to make sure that they were engaged and would be willing. >> you did make sure they were engaged in would be willing. >> did you think they were engaged in would be willing is called on? >> so when the national guard assisted to improve it and to
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approve that to 10:00 p.m. why would it take an hour to approve the national guard assistance on your part in that moment of crisis? >> one oh 9:00 p.m. it was for mr. irving in the company of mr. singer. >> why would you not remember that quick. >> senator i have no recollection of a conversation with the chief at that time. i was on the floor during the electoral college session. my conversation with chief mr. sund was shortly before 130 when i recall he was
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describing conditions outside is deteriorating. may in fact submitted a request and i carry that forward. that is much as i can tell you. i have no record from mr. sund so that request at one oh 9:00 p.m. did you make that decision then? >> i did not get a request at one oh 9:00 p.m. the first conversation i had with the chief in that timeframe was 1:28 p.m. or 130 and that conversation he indicated that conditions were deteriorating and he might be looking for national guard approval and a mutual aid agreement. i went to mike's office.
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>> this is the time mr. irving i'm sure my colleagues will want to follow up on this because i am out of time but this is the time when the difference between 130 and 210 and one oh 9:00 p.m. makes a big difference. one of the things i am wondering if we don't have time for you to answer this is that any moment like this, if your focus is chiefly on the safety and one is on the safety of senate members one is on the house members may be that's a problem where the board cannot function as a board because you have diverse areas of immediate responsibility that whatever happened here doesn't seem to me to be in agreement with the various time frames. i'm out of time. >> thank you senator and as an argument with the votes in the set order based on the rules
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between the two committees i would like to submit for the record a written statement from the united states capitol police labor committee dated february 23, 2021. >> without objection. >> with regard to the conversation let me add on the discrepancies with the national guard assistance, i word request that both chief sund that you provide us with the phone records. i know there have been interviews conducted but i'm not sure we have the phone records and that seems to clear up the confusion. now i want to talk about preparedness. chief sund you talk about the
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need for better intelligence and better coordination. that was your conclusion. i think that's true. what we have learned indicates that was part of the problem. but what about preparedness? we have received information prior to january 6, capitol police officers were not trained on how to respond to an infiltration of the capital building. is that correct? >> when you talk about infiltration you mean a large insurrection like we saw on jan? know. >> why not? why wouldn't we be prepared for an infiltration of the capital given the risk that is out there? i would say those that you have distinguished careers with the secret service, i would ask you to give me a quick yes or no does the secret service have trading regarding infiltration as an example to the white house? yes or no. >>.
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>> i will take that as a yes. >> yes. >> then it seems obvious you would have training on responding to the infiltration so if nothing comes out of this process that we have to figure out how to deal with the real danger that is out there but the previous demonstrations that would indicate a need for that kind of training. let me ask you about something else if i could that has to do with us capital police officers that i saw on video in the world saw fighting against this attack is street uniforms. many did not have riot gear of
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a contrast metropolitan police department provides helmets, shields, gloves, gas mask, having seen those incredibly disturbing videos and photographs of your officers attempting to hold the line and defend the capital without that gear are all police officers outfitted with riot gear? >> no they are not. >> they are not. >> why not? >> if you look at the way we outfitted our officers very similar you would find even with metropolitan and i've been with them for years they have a certain number of officers not the entire force that outfitted to the level one which is the big protective gear like helmets and things like that. we outfitted 17 teams we can activate and those float on -
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- platoons are activated at level one full gear and equipment it requires extensive cost in training to keep and maintain that level for us a number of officers are posted in interior post with that gear would not provide any support. we have determined through january 6th that number sufficed for all the demonstrations we had dealt with on the capital. >> obviously those officers you say have interior post and needed it that day so it's not accurate to say they didn't need it but i know you activated seven civil this turbines unit platoons. but only for had riot gear. i don't know why you'd have a civil disturbance unit that does not have riot gear. but you just testify that is true only four of them had it. >> that is correct.
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one additional point since i have been chief i pushed for every member in the department to have riot helmets i ordered those back in september we were looking at delays because of covid they were just delivered january 4th and distributed just days before this with limited numbers given prior to the event. >> too late for many of those officers. metropolitan police to settle have riot gear is that true i thought they did. >> we have seven platoons that have the hard gear all officers have ballistic helmets they have gloves as well and gas mask. they are deployed with that level but talking about all of the extras we have seven
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platoons. >> it every officer has a helmet and protective gloves and a baton. >> and a gas mask. >> that is correct. >> it appears to the metropolitan police department i am told the capital police officers did not have the training of civil disturbance tactics that they had. that's i was told during some of the interviews. is that correct? >> yes. i heard the same thing with respect to the training. >> or all of your metropolitan police officers trained in civil civil disturbance tactics. >> they are trained for every patrol district and special operations division some do
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not have that training. >> all officers leaving the training academy get the same training they all get the basic training but some members for example have been on 30 years and they haven't done the cdu training they don't backup patrol those coming out of the academy have received that. >> is that true with capitol hill police officers as well as they go through training? >> that is a process being implemented i can see if it's fully implemented coming out
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of the academy that was the initiative i was working on that. >> so as far as you know it was not provided even for new officers? >> the new officers i believe are but i need to confirm that. >> i think the bottom line is unfortunately officers were not given the proper training with dental training on - - a filtration dealing with civil disturbance and they didn't have the equipment necessary most importantly to protect themselves. my hope is one of the ways the joint hearing and the committee report can be helpful is to bring the capital police department up to speed. i appreciate the sacrifice and the bravery that day but we owe it to those officers to provide the training and equipment they need to protect themselves and the capital. thank you mr. chairman. >> the chair recognizes senator leahy's. >> thank you mr. chairman. i like to follow up on what
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senator portman said. i agree with his concerns. but i might ask a question from the appropriations committee. time is limited so these are yes or no answers. the appropriations committee always working in a bipartisan fashion to get money to the police. mr. t12, the appropriations had met your request for salaries the fiscal year is that not correct? >> yes sir. >> on the appropriations committee with your request for salaries and operating expenses during the fiscal year is that correct?
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i cannot hear an answer. >> so with those operating expenses during the fiscal year to increase your salary is that correct? >> yes. that is correct. >> that is correct. >> thank you very much. i have to think that with the resources to deploy the people that we were supposed to i look at those that would protect the capital and we saw this is a violent and planned
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and organized attack against the united states government by domestic terrorist they will be prosecuted as fully as they can but when we see people encouraging them including the former president of the united states to urge them to fight, i really wonder why they didn't take it seriously enough the hours that it took to bring in the national guard and everything else. i read the letter from speaker pelosi that you said that wasn't enough intelligence but stated the intelligence assessment and members of the
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power boys the white supremacist and other extremist groups were expected and they may be inclined to become violent. >> that is correct that is what the assessment said it's very similar for the november and december the intelligence assessment that we developed for the january 6th event all the way through january 6th said the same thing. we planned for the possibility of violence and some people being armed not the possibility of a coordinated military style attack. >> if this goes on for months
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i would think there was more there. no fence or barrier would provide the defense that we would need. we needed more safety but we do want to commend the chief for your fiscal response and
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to protect the cities as large as washington dc and with that delicate balance of law enforcement. but i commend the two chairs and ranking member for holding this hearing to hold appropriations but very closely if we do have another one of these. i yield back my time. >> thank you senator leahy the chair recognizes senator johnson. >> thank you to the law enforcement witnesses for your service. 2020 hindsight it's easy to monday morning quarterback we have to guard against doing so. is a scene from testimony there is a fair amount of thought and due diligence went into this so i appreciate your service. i also want to say i find the videos as you said
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chief, sickening, the violence reprehensible and repugnant and want to make sure the perpetrators and those that engage in the violence are prosecuted to the full extent of the law. have a long list of questions so i will be doing is preparing a letter for the chair hoping they will ask the questions and investigate those issues so want to start off by reading an excerpt by an eye witness account a senior analyst for the concentration including political and psychological warfare at the institute of world politics current lecture at the jfk special warfare at fort bragg's at the capital
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right on january 6, he basically arrived on scene at 1130 from union station i walked from your unionization and noticed a small number of capital police in full riot gear with shannon shoulder guards and they walked up toward an empty freedom card and noticed it was broken up so the crowd was walking down that said the mood was positive and festive of the thousands of people that i pastor past me, some were indignant and contemptuous but not one appeared angry or inciting a riot many had elderly or overweight or had children or tired or frail
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many war pro police shirts are black and blue flags for although the crowd had a broad cross-section of americans working class by the appearance and manner of speech some stood out those that didn't share the jovial demeanor of the majority some didn't fit in and he describes the plainclothes militants, agents provocateurs, fake trump protesters that disciplined uniform these are the people that probably plan to this. he goes on the dc metropolitan police were there professional self standing at crossings exchanging occasional greetings from marchers crossing the capitol grounds where they had jurisdiction i noticed no police at all several marchers expressed surprise is you like a courtesy gesture to control security that made no sense of a low threat level yet no police appeared from what we can see now taking these
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excerpts in order but there's more to this piece will look like tens or hundreds of thousands of people as far as one can see but almost everyone seemed talkative and happy. no police could be seen anywhere people cap searching and quickly filled up on the line everyone squeezed closer together but mostly in high spirits at the base of the inaugural platform some trying to see what was happening then something happens at the front of the crowd seemed like a scuffle but i couldn't see. people started to chant usa and other slogans and for a few seconds i saw police tussling with marchers up front what appeared to be an organized group in civilian clothes they are the played closed militants that fit right in with the maggot
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people now the energy surge and then once into the crowd itself of the teefour people and then the tear got gas change their demeanor then error of this on - - disbelief as they were firing on them what are you doing we support you all the sudden pro police felt they were attacking them but they did not know why more teargas canisters record on the face joey drawing blood they went from disbelief and confusion to anger. i will stop there the last five pages is titled provocateurs into the invading mob i recommend everyone in the committee to read this account and ask for it to be entered into the record. chief, the house managers made
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a big deal that this was predictable and foreseeable. do you believe that what happened the reach of the capital do believe that was foreseeable and predictable? >> no i don't if you look at other partner agencies they actually made the statement the reach of the capital is not something anybody anticipated graduating federal partners expected it i don't think secret service with a broad of the vice president if they expected that. >> so with the vast majority of trump supporters are pro- law enforcement the last thing they would do is violate the law? >> the information i have received they were trying to prevent people from coming in the building people were saying we are police let us through still wanting to violate the law to get in the building. >> i have a long list. and to close with the two former sergeant and arms, i
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knew this was investigation they waited a couple of weeks i did see the oversight letter not go i wrote my own on the 21t and i have a question for both former sergeant of arms did you get my oversight letter with my questions? >> i did not receive your letter i left town right after i resigned but i look forward to working with you and your staff to answer your questions. >> give us an address we descended to the acting sergeant and arms they won't even let us know if they pass that letter on to you apparently you did not. did you receive my letter? >> i don't recall. it might have come i don't recall. >> do you regret re-signing? >> yes i do.
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i love this agency. i love the women and men and i regret the day i left. >> first of all look for my letter i would like to an answer quickly as possible. thank you. >> thank you senator. we are waiting for senator warner and any other member. >> thank you senator klobuchar. like to start off expressing those police officers up at their life on the line to protect us and the heroic actions it with those violent rioters and we know so many of these courageous men and women
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are hurting in the insurrection and i'm particularly heartbroken to hear about the death of the capital police officer and then protecting us in my prayers are with his family and loved ones. when they came to the capital on january 6th they also came with hate the international holocaust remembrance day the world watched in horror inside the capital wearing auschwitz shirts pushing forward on the house and senate floors while the rioters waving confederate led flags and hanging nooses on the front line assaulting a jewish reporter at the capital.
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referring to the cattle cars to transport the jews to the nazi death camp during the holocaust this violent attack featured followers from the anti- somatic group from the hate groups and then they shared the intelligence with the violence on january 6 including specific threats at the capitol complex talking extremist activity then why didn't you alert anyone? >> thank you for the question.
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so on january 5th was the form of an e-mail i would take something as violent as the insurrection of the capital but as the chief mentioned earlier it was not corroborated and the information that we had the information was not fully vetted and had not been through the metropolitan police department but they were prepared with a larger violence and demonstrations that we expected to see in our city. >> so i have to ask the same questions so what did you know as of tuesday night january 5th? because i have a follow-up for both of you on this. so what did you know on januaryh or were you alarmed?
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what did you expect. >> yes. i was concerned we had the intelligence that was coming out that we would be planning for. keep in mind those assessments at the end of december and janud are very similar just provided a little more specificity so we were already planning for the threat for violence and people protesting and that is what we were planning for now referring to the norfork letter i just became aware the department was aware of that 24 hours ago i was not aware that memo existed. >>'s you said there was a breakdown with the fbi because we have rallies in protest happening in washington all the time how many were armed with insurrectionist or the
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hundreds or thousands of rallies that we see in washington through the years? >> the men and women of the metropolitan police department and those at the first teefour rally and the second. >> was that intelligence or resource. >> i don't think the intelligence is where needed to be. >> because the fbi did not raise it to the level that they needed it to in your mind? >> we received an e-mail that was the alert bulletin 7:00 p.m. the day before so
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that was reflected in terms not just the national guard that was deployed but the officers that surrounded those jurisdictions that what we took with respect to that threat. >> can you tell me was that a researcher on - - resource issue or intelligence breakdown because this is very important. >> as part of my introduction i think it was more than the norfork letter we need to look at the whole entire intelligence community and the view they have on it domestic extremist and the effect looking at the intelligence problem. >> so to raise up the flag to get more resources for the capital police because we saw
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a loss of life so what is the threshold? >> i did in advance reach out and i also went to the house and sergeant-at-arms to request the national guard. >> i think i have five seconds you can take this off the record but i do believe there for some plants from t3 to hear on march 4th and what we are doing to protect that capital on march 4th for many more violent extremists. thank you. >> we can talk about that later and senator warner has arrived also working with the witnesses for the restroom breaks let us know we don't want to take a long break but
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i could imagine you need a break at some point. senator warner. >> thank you madame chairman and to the witnesses. for appearing today. we talk about the deployment our lack of deployment of the national guard. and one of the questions is the fact the district did not have the ability to bring the guard to the table because frankly they were not treated in a fair fashion. this may be outside your lane but with that ability to bring the guard to me is a
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reflection. but on a going forward basis sent the mayor of the district of columbia do that in terms of a checklist. >> and anybody else is a question as well. >> and for the capital police it is included and against the district we have seen it's they did not's we see the same level of support that other states did that we saw that play out on january 6th from the previous administration i have concerns that the deployment of the
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guard. i hope that we in the congress see that move forward but even short of that that the mayor has appropriate powers going forward with the fbi in coming out of the outfits if they could ever fully relate to all of you individuals. but katie talk more generally about the fbi sharing of intelligence? i had a number of conversations. i called director ray with concerns there could be this activity i had no idea this level the fifth and the sixth
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the fbi don't they could all be fully informed of what would come to pass but i felt they were in better shape in terms of intel and preparation and i would like each of you to comment how well you felt they did sharing intelligence on the actual activities were coming up. >> . . . . and then having it pd
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and put forward is something we have to look at it. i would say on the sixth when this started happening the fbi established a process where we can begin to analyze video footage to go out and make arrests of the individuals that had created the insurrection on the capital. >> if we can get the balance to
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respond. we have something as significant our government is responding to a level more. not just the intelligence approach and not specifically the fbi. my concern is the antigovernment
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extremists we see the same kind of groups come to the forefront by january 6th. i feel at times while the fbi and others have pointed this out that it can get the level of serious review that it should have. i hope that we will be coordinated in taking the antigovernment extremists this is an ongoing threat i can tell you from the intelligence committee we have seen many of
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these groups have connections and ties in europe where they've taken a great presidents. my time is expired but this is something we need to work on. >> thank you very much. we look forward to working with you and the intelligence committee. next will be senator langford and senator carver. i want to validate something. there's a letter in the public domain that is attributed to you to explain the events of the day. are you familiar and is it accurate? in the letter it self, you describe several things. can you tell me why you wrote this letter to speaker pelosi? >> i feel at the time i resigned with limited communications she
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called for my resignation without full understanding of what we had prepared for and deserves to read firsthand what we've prepared for. you mentioned the letter about the pipe bombs located at the republican national committee headquarters. how was that located. who founded and why was that particular moment the moment that it was found? >> i don't know why that was a particular moment. there was an employee of the republican national committee that located in the rear of the building. you mentioned before that you
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thought this was coordination. i'm glad they did find it at the headquarters as well as 150 in the document as well but you had to send quite a few individuals to be able to go to the arden see to deal with those explosives. >> the pipe bomb is one that was run by the capital police metropolitan ended up taking that so we could run them concurrently. it took extensive resources. >> so it isn't what caused the evacuation. there's been quite a bit of conversation today and quite a few members that talked about the national guard and the
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length of time it took to go through the bureaucratic process to get them deployed. it seems to be a misunderstanding on the dais as some individuals describe it as the police what's a typical response when they are not positioned? >> it's approximately two hours. >> but then it's multiple hours to do that or multiple days to do that. you started that process several days before in making that request. >> that is correct. as far as the process, the initial request was an in person request and it wasn't until the evening of the fourth i talked to general walker he informed me if needed because they wanted to
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lean forward to 125, if needed in a fairly quick fashion once approved. so that is what deleted it to the january 6th request. >> but that was prepared to move faster because they were in the streets in different places doing traffic duty at that point. you had already been informed of the city of washington, d.c. in the office made a request the dod approved that none of them would be armed or would have heavy gear on. there would be no military vehicles available and there would be no helicopters used. those were prohibited for those 125 individuals on the street is that correct? >> i did not know that was the restriction and when i talked to general walker.
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the individuals assigned to traffic duty had no weapons or military vehicles or overhead visual on anything and those are folks currently on the covid duty so this description is interesting around the dais that they think someone just bursts in and is ready to go on that. that isn't what they are pretty positioned to do. >> anytime we request the national guard i was looking for them to help support the perimeter that we had established there wasn't training for what to do if a group comes through the door and
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tries to burst through. whether it's an insurrection or a mob to be able to burst through the door there was no clarity for the officers inside the building on the rules of engagement once they came to the building. my impressionists had to make it up on their own and determined it was going to be where the members and the staff were located that was going to be there stand for the force so a couple of questions for that. at this point now is there a need for greater or less than lethal force capabilities on officers at the time or available to officers at the time if they had the capabilities and rules of engagement? we don't train for the insurrection and they do have less lethal capabilities they carry with them. with hindsight being what it is,
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absolutely there needs to be additional training and equipment to consider this type of attack in the future. >> the challenge is we all watched and the committee had a hearing on the assaults on the federal courthouse in portland and went through and all of us saw for a month individuals just attack the courthouse day after day and we sell the techniques that were used. some of the same techniques used by individuals and i'm not saying the same individuals but the techniques so the challenge is that we saw attacking a federal institution all summer long and to get less than lethal capability and find ways to be able to stop any kind of us holt on a number of individuals.
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they hadn't had a break since that time period we are all looking at this as the hindsight why couldn't you read this particular scrap of intelligence that came in the night before. none of us saw it at this level and we are grateful for the service and let's find the lessons we can learn. >> i call on the national guard storms, you name it. a lot more.
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in contrast to every other national guard for a thousand or 2,000 guardsmen deployed at the capital in a timely way that destruction would not have occurred. to activate the dc national guard one of the reasons why i worked for years with the congresswoman eleanor holmes norton to support the legislation. you highlighted the request for the dc national guard assistance
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and with the consent of the u.s. department of defense. let's take a minute to explain the process with the property as well as human rights. please go ahead. the mayor doesn't have the full authority over the national guard to include their activation or the department. we make the request to send back to the federal government ultimately the secretary of the army and going through the resources for the district of
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columbia without going through the approval process and receiving approval from the highest level of the federal government. that just doesn't take place with a hindrance to cover them up. >> can you take a minute to share your thoughts it might help the metropolitan city police to better protect the city and citizens i think we certainly showed.
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that requires approval of the highest levels of the federal government to include the secretary to just move the national guard so that should certainly be something. it would have allowed, let me start over, for the capital police to prepare. as i was looking through the testimony, the former sergeant-at-arms resources are paramount for success and i
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agree with that statement. in why do you think the likelihood of the devastating attack, mr. sund? >> as you start to year from the federal agencies only investigations going on with finding evidence that this was a coordinated attack that had been coordinated among the numerous states for some time in advance of this, that's the information that would have been helpful to detect some type of level of coordination that we will see more than just a may become violent type of preparation. you look now and see what type of resources brought to bear around the capital. that information couldn't give the warning to the plan for more of an attack such as we saw.
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we have a failure to communicate. do we have a failure to communicate here? i believe that question is for me i think there is a failure of having a wide lens to look at the threats we are facing from some of the domestic extremists. they need to be worked on a little bit but the community needs to broaden its aperture. >> we know in retrospect the
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rioters started weeks before and somehow all of the intelligence was gathered and never found its way to. thanks particularly to the office, the capital police and others the joined in trying to protect us >> c-span's washington journal every day. we're taking your calls live on the air, on the news of the day and discussing policy issues that impact you. coming up this morning. a conversation on the week ahead in congress. and other political news with national journalist and then
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coronavirus vaccine supply chains. watch c-span's washington journal live at 7:00 eastern this morning band sure to join the discussion can your phone calls, facebook comments, text messages and tweets. >> the treasury department is taking steps to put harriet tubman on the front of new $20 notes.
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Joint Oversight Hearing on Security Failures During Attack on U.S. Capitol, Part 1
CSPAN March 1, 2021 4:01am-6:02am EST


Two Senate committees held a joint oversight hearing on security failures during the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. Witnesses included former U.S. Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund, former House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving, former Senate Sergeant at Arms Michael Stenger, and Washington, DC Acting Police Chief Robert Contee. "A clear lack of accurate and complete intelligence across several federal agencies contributed to this event, and not poor planning by the United States Capitol Police," said Mr. Sund. Mr. Irving said intelligence reports they had received expected the January 6 protest to be similar to previous MAGA marches and forecast the chance of civil disobedience or arrests during the protests as "remote to improbable." Mr. Irving and Mr. Sund provided conflicting accounts of their conversations on January 6 as to the timeline of requesting and authorizing the use of the National Guard for support. Mr. Sund also said he was made aware only the day prior to the hearing

Sponsor: Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,Senate Rules and Administration Committee

TOPIC FREQUENCY
Us 19, Fbi 18, Washington 13, U.s. 7, United States 7, Klobuchar 6, Columbia 5, Npd 5, Irving 4, Portman 4, Pentagon 4, House 4, Peters 3, Hindsight 3, Mr. Irving 3, White House 3, Pelosi 3, Mr. Senger 2, D.c. 2, Norfork 2
Network
CSPAN
Duration
02:00:59
Scanned in
Richmond, CA, USA
Language
English
Source
Comcast Cable
Tuner
Virtual Ch. 15
Video Codec
mpeg2video
Audio Cocec
ac3
Pixel width
528
Pixel height
480
Sponsor
Internet Archive
Audio/Visual
sound, color

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