on behalf of the center for strategic studies, thank you for joining and welcome to today's event. it's entitled, rethinking a homeland defense, global innovation, information dominance and decision superiority. there's a lot in the title and we will do our best to dissect it all.

we will talk about homeland offense for north america. both from present threats and recent activities that north american aerospace defense command in northern command are undertaking. and for those watching live, please remember you can submit questions via the csis registration page, which will come through to me through the csis and information dominance. known as a fire tablet. i will be able to post those to our guest speaker. our speaker is general glenn van hurt -- vanherck. we are happy to have you here. we will go through a lot. i want to hand it off to you to kick it off about your command and what's going on this week. gen. vanherck: it's a privilege to be here to talk about

defending north america and our homeland. i plan to talk about the commands. why we are rethinking homeland defense. i will talk a little bit about the integrated deterrence. our homeland defense design which relies on layered defense, that will get us to where we will talk about global innovation and globally innovated experience that we have been doing. what a privilege and honor it is to come into two commands. norad, 63 years old. binational command with the canadians and it will be 20 years old october the first of 2022. it stood up after 9/11. norad's mission is aerospace morning, aerospace control. and something people don't realize is we have a maritime mission. commands are, although separate

and distinct, they are inseparable. though i transferred, it's about the defense of the homeland, defense of civil authorities, which i've u.s. crucial to homeland defense, and then also cooperation. so the why is really why we are rethinking homeland defense. if you had asked me this question 10 years ago, the threat to homeland would have been dramatically different. over the past 10 years to today, it's really starting to shock back in desert storm one one folks around the world watched how the united states of america and our allies and partners projected power. they understand if we are allowed to project power that it won't end well for them. so they create capabilities to hold the homeland risk with the intent of destroying our will, disrupting the power projection capabilities. keep billy's that they believe -- capabilities that they believe can blow the nuclear

thresholds and change their objectives. i'm trying to create a new homeland defense designed to give space to our senior leaders so we don't find ourselves with limited options that are escalatory in nature. i.e., striking or responding early, or having an attack on the homeland, which we respond well. in both of those are escalatory. the secretary of defense of talked about this. that's where i'm focused, it's changing the focus away from a connecticut game defeat capability to day-to-day competition in creating that deterrence on a day-to-day basis. that deterrence is created with not over -- not only military capabilities, but it's with my fellow combatant commanders. like-minded nations around the world and all levels of influence, with our country and other countries. when i talk about homeland offenses, it's a layered defense.

homeland defense does not start in the homeland, it starts abroad. on up want to shoot down missile cruises. i think that's a little late in the process. i would like to engage or deterring what i call left of launch and create opportunities with allies and partners by sharing information and data for the influence that we may have. so we have to balance those. the foundation of making all that happened is global integration. it's about taking all strategies and plans. the way we do force design and budgeting acquisition. thinking about the global nature of the problems we face today. the days of having a single combatant command when they are supported only. the days of having multiple supportive's commands is the way of the future. whether it's leaving a rogue actor who has access to information that creates opportunities for them to challenge across all demands. so to execute that you have to have the capabilities.

the capabilities to collaborate near real time across all domains, with all 11 combatant commands. to create that decision space. a single pane of glass that gives you domain awareness, it gives you, when utilizing machine learning and artificial intelligence, dominance, and when provided to the right leader at the various levels from tactical to strategic, what i call decision superiority. whether it be day-to-day competition in crisis or conflict, gives us the ability to achieve our goals. >> before we get underway i would be remiss if i did not ask you about something going on this week, that is the afghanistan situation. i know there is special immigration implications going on there. gen. vanherck: we have been supporting the special immigrants coming from afghanistan for several weeks at fort lee, task force eagle.

we are almost approaching 800 that we have supported there. that will expand with the current situation ongoing in afghanistan to where we will take upwards of about 42,000 or so. one location at fort mccoy in wisconsin. we are building it to receive about 10,000 to 12,000. and fort bliss, texas. we expect to have the capacity in the next few days to start at fort mccoy. then in the next couple of days at fort bliss to house upwards of 22,000 total. >> let me seize on what you left off with. the title of this event is rethinking homeland defense. let's stay at the high level. why is it we are having to rethink homeland now? gen. vanherck: northcom was stood up and the response to

9/11 for rogue actors 20 years ago. those rogue actors today still exist. but as i said, the competitors have changed the at risk in the homeland. many people think of it as hurricanes and wildfires because we have continued to do the civil authority mission. but as you look at the environment, the threat to the homeland forces us to rethink that. it's all about giving our senior leaders decision space and creating options so that we don't have to have potentially an escalatory option, such as a strike on our homeland, which demands a response or a risk of strategic deterrence, which is crucial. china and russia have advanced capabilities. china was with russia and china -- and space capabilities. russia has developed

capabilities that did not exist 20 years ago. capabilities to circumvent our legacy warning systems. very low radar cross sections, cruise missiles. submarines on par with our submarines that can be very quiet-- they are doing that wite intent to create insurance for themselves and degrade our ability to protect our forces. i think we owe it to our nations leaders to have this discussion about what we must defend in the homeland, what we need to defend kinetic, what we can do through resilience. those are all discussions that i would like to see. >> you say they've been developing new capabilities. they've always had icbms and that sort of thing. your claim is different. it's not just the big attack. you are pointing to something different. >> that's correct.

for many years, since the 1950's, russia has had nuclear capabilities. intercontinental ballistic missiles, as you've referred to, and bombers. the difference is the capabilities today -- i'm going to take the nuclear piece off of the table. those are always there. the homeland defense is our nuclear deterrent. i'm talking about conventional cruise missiles that can be launched from over russia today. 20 years ago, the range of those missiles required them to either fly a bomber over north american territory or they would have to drop a gravity bomb over north america. those days are over. you can show -- shoot a low radar cross-section missile from over russian territory that will challenge our existing warning systems today. they continue to develop traditional capabilities.

nuclear power capabilities that could nearly fly forever because of a nuclear powered engine. not nuclear detonation, nuclear powered engine. those are challenges we are facing. >> let me pull on that. you are taking nuclear off of the table. let's focus on nonnuclear cruise missile attacks. walk me through why that's important. what is the scenario? why does that make strategic sense for them? >> i would expanded beyond cruise missiles. it could be cyber capabilities, space capabilities. there are many capabilities. whites important is to delay and disrupt -- they believe they can destroy at will. i don't believe they will attack us out of the blue. in a regional contract -- conflict, where they understand

if we are allowed to debate conventional force, if we are allowed to do that and project power into regional or conflict, that will turn out well for them. they watched us change regimes around the globe for several years now. decades. putin believes that his potential. in a case like this, he doesn't have anything to lose to disrupt or delay. once he knows that we will be in a regional crisis, able to inflict our objectives upon him to delay and disrupt and destroy, he believes he can do that with his conventional capabilities. it's in their doctrine. they have stated it publicly. they have demonstrated the capabilities through several exercises recently. last year, we had more incursions into our air defensive zone then since the end of the cold war.

multi axis incursions where they stay for hours. they are demonstrating that capability to create deterrence. they are doing it in a crisis to destroy our ability to projectile. >> you've highlighted the cruise missile threat from russian bombers operating in russian airspace, targeting large parts of north america and the united states. that's a significant capability. the soviets had slick comes for a long time. we relied on deterrence. you are suggesting that there's a deterrence problem here for those kinds of threats. >> i do believe there's a deterrence problem. for the nuclear deterrence, richard has that covered. nuclear deterrence. the torrents is not just nuclear. it's more broad. all levers of influence that we have including conventional capabilities.

it's about creating doubt. getting in their cognitive space to make them believe yes, they can achieve their objectives or no, depending on what you are trying to make them believe. you can do that through conventional capabilities, and competition showing that you have the ability to respond in a timely matter, that you can detect them before they become a threat to you, through resiliency, demonstrating the capability to throw -- show resilience if they attack. that you can survive that. you do that across the inter-agency and within our nation to create doubt that they could ever achieve their success with a strike on our land. >> nonnuclear air missile attack with strategic effect. they are trying to get into our gray space. there is regional fights and they hold this to get into our gray space and affect us.

>> that's correct. to make us believe that we cannot achieve our objectives or we will be late, degraded, or they believe they can destroy the will of the american people to respond in that situation. >> it was a 2016 joint staff document called joint operating environment 2035. there was a phrase that highlighted exactly this. adversaries will threatened not to physically destroy the united states or hinder its economic potential but rather change the decision of its leaders. that sounds like what you're talking about. that documents subtitle is 2035. this is a this decade problem. >> i agree with that. it's a problem today. it will grow dramatically over the next 10 years. russia today has fielded two or three of their submarines.

they will have nine of them within five or 10 years. china has the cyber and space capabilities on par with russia but they are developing the kinetic capabilities such as submarines and bombers to do the exact same thing. we will have a persistent proximate threat off of each coast. all vectors, 24/7, 365. we never had that when you don't factor in an icbm nuclear threat. we haven't had to deal with this. that will challenge us to project power globally on our own timeline and place of choosing. >> you have highlighted threats there that could potentially come over the pole, over the arctic. can you speak to the activity you are seeing from our strategic competitors in the arctic? what do you see up there? >> russia relies heavily economically on the arctic. they get 25% of their gdp from

the arctic areas. certainly, they have a vested interest in being an influencer and having power in the arctic. they've taken their cold war infrastructure across the northern portion of russia and reinvigorated those facilities. they've completed their modernization of their nuclear forces and their bomber forces. they have about 54 ice breakers. some of those are nuclear powered. they claim their defensive capabilities they also clearly have offensive capabilities, not only on ships but also on the land which they claim for defensive purposes. they are utilizing those and coming up with policies to say they want to have military members as folks transit the north passage there on their vessels which is a violation of international laws, norms, and policies. they are trying to change those things. china calls himself the near arctic nation.

they are in the arctic right now with the vessel. it's a research vessel but it's of interest, where it goes in the arctic and what they're doing. both of them are trying to ensure that they establish rules, norms, behaviors and change those to their benefit. in may, rock -- russia took the chair of the arctic council. they will try to change the influence and utilize it to create friction where there's gaps between us and other arctic nations. there is great power competition , strategic competition ongoing in the arctic. >> in an article you published this summer, maybe a month ago, you highlighted our competitors doctrine, operations, public pronouncements, and demonstrated exercises. to suggest that they view the threat or conduct of conventional attacks on the u.s.

homeland as a viable thing. can you give us examples of their doctrine operations and pronouncements that you are paying attention to? >> i'm primarily talking about russia when i'm talking about the homeland. certainly the aide is encouraging. that has dramatically gone up last year. ocean shield exercise last year in late august, september timeframe. they took a large portion of the pacific fleet, operated it in our economic exclusion zone, off of alaska. you may remember where they surfaced a submarine in the middle of a bunch of fishing vessels up there. they actually fired a missile from that location. certainly intended to demonstrate to the u.s. and others their influence and to them back on the stage. this summer, their summer exercise in the pacific.

they were surrounding north and west of hawaii with large naval force presence and maritime patrol aircraft as well. the russians. they routinely demonstrate capabilities. every year for the past five years, they brought their submarine into the atlantic ocean. different times, they go different places. one year, they brought three submarines. they are demonstrating their capability and they are showing that they have a will to utilize it. >> we've laid the foundation here, talking about the y in the scenario. i think you have a video. this will be a good time to play for the audience. >> this is a great time. please roll it. ♪ >> today, the united states and

canada face competitors capable of striking military targets and critical infrastructure in the homelands through both traditional and nontraditional methods of attack. these threats limit our response options and could compromise our ability to search military forces from north america. norad and u.s. northern command, in collaboration with all u.s. commands, have executed the third in a series of global information dominance experiments in partnership with the joint artificial intelligence center, the under secretary of defense for intelligence and secured his project maven, and with significant funding and manpower support from the department of the air force chief architect office. >> i believe it will be crucial to enabling the globally integrated deterrence. what we saw was exactly that. you could court made options in real time. much faster than we do today. >> in the competition stage of the experiment, the team

aggregated early indications and warnings during 120 days of geopolitical events. adversary actions lead to cross combatant collaboration. >> the global information dominance experiments are a series of events to allow us to leapfrog in our capability when it comes to the ability to receive early indication warnings of competitor activities and take that information, apply artificial intelligence to it, and garner new insights for decision-making. to be able to collaborate between command to create deterrent responses. >> in the crisis phase, senior leaders assessed available data to develop rapid courses of action in preparation for deterrence or conflict while adversaries sought to disrupt logistics channels. >> it was an eye-opening experience to be able to bring in all the combatant commands into a single environment, be

able to talk with them, collaborate as we developed new plans around the congested logistics that we saw. >> in the conflict stage, real-world assets were employed in response to live read force threats. >> we deployed capability into michigan, combat readiness training center. we use those players to fuse them into the architecture, and the domain where it is a tool for operators to make decisions. it proved we can use our capability to access data anywhere in the world. tasking from both locations to show they are able to tap into the same data work. talk about cloud-based architecture. no matter where you are at, you have access to that same data. we are talking about real-world data and defensive forces to ensure that the systems we are fielding today have been checked

against actual adversaries and are giving us real opportunities to decide how to conduct actions faster and create that deterrent effect. >> leveraging these tools to gain decision superiority could mean the difference between peaceful resolution and unintentional escalation. >> the tools we demonstrated are ready to be applied at the operational to strategic level to create time and decision space. >> it's great that we off all the commanders coming together. norad has served as a banner that we can come together to look at global conflict. i appreciate the general's leadership, being able to pull that together. that's crucial. any activity on one spot of the globe might mean it is important somewhere else across the globe. >> for those of you who think we have artificial intelligence and play, we've only just begun to fight. i think we really started to

move the ball on transforming the department. that's a significant thing. it gives you time and decision space. that's what we don't have necessarily today. i can never get enough time to create deterrence options, escalation options, or advice to the chairman, secretary, or president. ♪ >> all right. there's a lot going on in that video. we will work through it a bit. we start at the high level. the video and you talked about your goal to create strategic deterrence options. for political and military decision-makers. you've talked about how nor odd has been focused on tactically defeating threats, closing kyl chains.

how is it different for you today as opposed to the focused in the past? >> you hit on it. first, i don't want to be shooting down cruise missiles or other capabilities over our homeland as a starting point. we must be able to do that and figure out what we need to defend. my goal is to give that decision space to our senior leaders. decision space that they can utilize to create deterrence options. for example, if unable to see through the capabilities that exist today and utilize artificial intelligence and machine learning to give me indications of when a bomber may be planning, by looking at cars in parking lots, weaponry around an aircraft, now i have the opportunity to posture forces as an operational commander or give that information to the secretary of defense or the chairman or the president of the

united states to utilize the information space to create deterrence options. if required, we can do the same thing in defeat options. we can take offensive actions sooner rather than being reactive and having to shoot down things. >> a couple things. you talk about the conventional deterrence cap or something like that. first of all, the reaction might be, isn't strategic discerns -- discerns obsolete? why is this a you thing? what is the relationship between what you think out -- about and what you do? >> nuclear deterrence is richard's job. he does a great job. i think deterrence is more than our nuclear deterrent. it's all levers of influence we have across the government, with our allies and partners, with all 11 commanders. this is about creating global

dilemmas to get in their gray space. not just regional challenges. it's about demonstrating the ability, the capability, the will to take actions they today in competition. that's where you create that deterrence. it all involves being able to assess global risk, global resource allocation, and come up with a collaborative global picture. all 11 commanders are responsible for part of that deterrence as well. >> what you are pioneering here is something that will have applications across lots of different combatant commands. >> absolutely. it does not solely benefit norad and the united states northern command. it benefits all combatant commanders. it benefits the department of defense, the secretary of defense, the chairman. this is important to provide information that benefits our nations national command authority and senior leaders and allies and partners.

we brought in allies and partners to participate as well. they are crucial for integrating deterrence. part of our homeland defense design for integrating defense as well. they have to be part of it. >> we will come back to the details. you mentioned integrated deterrence for the second time. secretary austen has talked about that as an overarching concept. integration means bringing things together into a whole. what does it mean to you? what does being brought together if it wasn't integrated before? >> integrated deterrence would involve operations, activities, investments that we do today that are oftentimes done with a regional focus. not a created -- integrated across a global problem set. integrated deterrence within the military dimension is bringing all that together, to include not only utilizing the

operations and activities but also security cooperation. to have an effect. where secretary austen is and where we are going as well would be, all levers of influence across the nation are crucial. whether that be the diplomatic piece of that, the information piece, the economic piece. all those have a potential impact on overarching deterrence. when you bring all of that together into an integrated coordinated, sink a nice matter, that's very powerful. >> great. we will come back to combatant commands in a bit. let's move to the other part of the subtitle. you mentioned that, information dominance, global integration. let's unpack those things. talk a little bit about northcom and norad on the detection piece. what you have, what sensors you have. >> ok.

for norad, we have the north warning system built back at the end of the cold war, updated in the 1980's. that gives us a series of radars. it's across canada and alaska. designed to detect bombers flying at 36,000 feet. flying over the homeland to drop a gravity bomb. we have fighters on alert that provide additional radar and sensor capabilities. we can integrate with undersea capabilities as well. to detect undersea domain awareness also. space is a huge piece of awareness for me. in my norad hat, if there's a ballistic missile launch, my norad hat comes on first to provide threat warning. i put my northcom hat on if it is engageable. i put my norad hat back on to do

an attack assessment. if it would strike somewhere, i put my northcom hat back on to do consequent management. you see how intertwined they are to include the domain awareness that you're talking about. >> could you maybe walk us through this. there's lots of things moving quickly, perhaps challenges of picking up in the first place. walk us through the steps involved at the detecting, the tracking, the passing of information. what's the telephone game there? this must take some time. what are the steps involved? >> today, i describe it as analog steps. the radars that i alluded to, i will give you a bomber option. if a radar detects a bomber approaching from the north, east, west, the first step would be the controller that detects it picking up a telephone to

talk to a command center. they would then pick up another telephone to talk to you. the cone are, continental mourn -- norad region,. you talk about those sectors. we have to sectors as well. it will get to my headquarters through another phone call which would take minutes to do. that's not good enough in my mind. imagine having a single pane of glass to be able to see that all real-time, globally collaborate on response options to something like that. that's what were doing. >> stay with the detection and awareness piece of this right now. you had $27 million for radar, elevated radar. the national capital region. what is that in why is that important for you? >> that's a domain awareness.

that radar would give us, in the national capital region, the domain awareness today is challenged by cruise missiles i talked about. they fly about 500 miles an hour and 500 feet or below. the challenge is the existing systems that we have. across canada, north america, and around the rest of north america. that would be able to give us a proof of concept. why that is important is having the domain awareness, especially in the national capital region where strategic decisions are made gives decision space for continuity of government options , for nuclear response options if needed, those kinds of things. that's crucial. >> great. we will get into the data and all that sort of thing. i've heard you say that all these sensors are collecting data, some 98% of the data is

left on the cutting room floor. what does that mean? >> that means we are not processing all of it. the raw data from the radars that i alluded to, that data is not what you are seeing. it goes through multiple filters and is presented to an operator on a radar scope. what we are finding is that that data, as it goes through filters, is not being analyzed. across-the-board, what we are seeing is a large portion, 98%. we are not asking for new sensors. but utilizing software capabilities and artificial intelligence and machine learning to take the raw data from the radars and assess that. we are finding that when you take that raw data and you combine it with other data, such as from the federal aviation the secret service, capitol police,

now you are able to create a much better picture and see the threat much sooner. >> you mentioned the early warning system a couple times. you want to leverage all the data that has come in off of that. you mentioned that it was last updated in the 1980's. is there some work that needs to be done on making the sensors better? >> ideally, we would like to go to an advanced system, over the horizon radar. the north warning system is limited. radars are limited by over the horizon capabilities and the curvature of the earth. it doesn't allow us to see far enough out away from the homeland. there's technology today, proven technology that would give us over the horizon radar capability to that domain awareness were talking about. it's crucial as we create new systems that we don't make some singularly focused. any new systems that we create must be able to not only detect

bombers but cruise missiles, even small systems to be affordable and usable. >> great. you've talked about a data centric approach. you've talked about filling in some of the gaps there. the purpose is to move left of launch. you are not talking about left of launch in the sense of tracking the launcher. you are talking about moving into their thinking about the launch so as to create that space. is that right? >> that's exactly right. when i say left of launch, it's not in the connected -- kinetic round. it's really getting left of their launch. for example, if dprk or somebody launches a missile, a ballistic missile, the first indication i don't want to be is a hit for launch. that's her overhead infrared

capabilities. i would like to be able to get hours or days for the left by watching pattern of life, fusing overhead sadly capability with intelligence collection capability to give us as much decision space as possible. i can create deterrence options and we can use the information space. that's what i mean. >> indications of warning. >> it is. the data and information that were talking about is oftentimes not shared across multiple agencies. it's not shared across multiple combatant commanders. it's not analyzed for hours or days. i'm talking about sharing that data, making it available in real time, the raw data. utilizing machines and capabilities to learn patterns of life and give you that global

>> are there new data sets you're working with. gen. vanherck: i would not say new data sets. i'm not asking for new data. i'm utilizing data that exists today, that is not process. i do need additional data awareness capabilities. specifically radar, undersea capabilities, we need all axes and vectors that could attack the homeland. >> moved to information outlets. that thing -- that phrase means different things to different people. you mentioned a couple of times, and it was in the video, visual intelligence. what does artificial intelligence mean to you in the mission you're describing, how is it going to help you get this information you are aspiring to? gen. vanherck: to me, artificial intelligence is taking data and

information, and analyzing it with computer and software capabilities to do assessment and analysis. it is not about making decisions. today, oftentimes that analysis and assessment is made by humans , and we do not have enough analysts, fast enough to do what we need to do. if you can take advantage of a computer and software capabilities, those software capabilities can analyze and detect changes in pattern of life, or detect changes at an airfield or submarine base and qs sensor to look at that -- qa sensor to look at that. you need to pay more attention to what is going on here. that is the artificial intelligence aspect. >> in terms of the prospect and potential, to get more out of artificial intelligence, to say go look at this, there's an

example, if you tell a computer, ai to look at this image of a panda, if they put a few pixelation in to confuse the computer, it is a stop sign. isn't there an assumption that the bad guys will not recognize what we are doing and try to spoof or create new ones, and pixelate, as it were, what they know will be relied upon for this? gen. vanherck: certainly, they do that today. that is a technique that you would expect any time. the difference come up what i am talking about, is not do data -- new data, it is data all rate available, we are going to analyze and assess it much sooner than we do today to present global near real-time options. it is not new data, that is what is crucial. >> the next piece of this is the global integration thing. again, integration is one of those words they gets thrown

around a lot, a kinda means everything, different -- something different to everyone. when you are talking about global integration across combatant commands, sharing, collaborating, communicating, other than holding two funds together, what do you see with that? what is your vision of the cross cutting combatant command integration? gen. vanherck: let's start off by taking the intelligence. imagine all the combatant command j choose, which are the intelligence -- j2's. be able to come up with that assessment of what's cup going on by a potential competitor or adversary. imagine they could send that to thej3's, the -- they can

collaborate in near real time across a single pane of boss, all saying the same picture. imagine you can hand the off to the logistics us -- experts -- logistics experts. they can determine are those fees -- feasible options, are the weapons in the right place, the platforms in the right place and assess can we execute it? that is what we did in guide three. that capability exists today. that is what global integration truly is. assessment of global risk, a look at global resources, the ability to collaborate in near real time across all domains in all combatant commands. >> using phrases, j3, j4 come up talking about doing this at lower levels than what is being done today? gen. vanherck: the j two-piece -- j two piece.

they may call a couple combatant commands, it is going to take hours if not a couple of days. they will assess the options. the j3's will make actions. the guide to took -- in a matter of half-day come, we've assessed it, come up with actions, they have validated, we will execute, rather than taking days to produce a powerpoint brief. first time you integrate is that the joint chiefs combatant commander or sect f level. -- sec def level. >> a single pane of glass, you're talking about ever basing the same thing, it sounds a lot like the aspirational division strategy. what is the difference between this and jan c 2?

gen. vanherck: i don't use that, command-and-control is not what i am after. the decision superiority, whatever you do with the information. i want to make sure the right decision maker has it at the right level at the right time has information, whether they want to use it for command-and-control or deterrence options is irrelevant. eventually, this is what you would call joint all domain command-and-control. services have a different program than i do. i'm focused at the operational to strategic level. they have to focus primarily to the tactical level, to develop information and share it to individual platforms, such as an individual airplane, platoon platforms on the sea. i'm trying to do is take the information that you are seeing and share across operational at the strategic level to create

deterrence and de-escalation options, and if needed, defeat options. >> you have a different job, different authorities in the services. why is this a you thing, a northcom thing as opposed to the services? gen. vanherck: that is a great question. the first thing i would tell you, i saw the value of data and information area that was required for me to give decisions based to our national command authority, our senior leaders. i saw that last year, after i took command on september 3, we partnered with space command and the air force to do their air manage -- air battle management system. at that time, they were focused on kinetic and game defeat options. i saw the value of deterrence, getting further left to create decisions like we talked about. i changed our focus to do that, not that we do not have to do

the kinetic kill capabilities, we certainly would. that is when guide one came out in december. we've gone down this path. in the end, i'm doing this to change coat -- change culture. to show the capabilities exist. 2 -- our homeland defense plan relies on allies and partners and a global perspective, and to get away from regionally focused single domain options. that is why i'm doing it, to show this is where we are ready to go. >> your pointing in the way, but presumably this sort of capability that you pioneering would be handed off to someone else at some point, is that fair? gen. vanherck: yes, ultimately the bull is to handed off to an entity -- single entity within the department. what i am concerned about is a will slow the process down. i think we are ready to go

faster. the department is set up with what i would call in industrial processes to field ships, planes, the acquisition processes. what we are doing is primarily software-based. we are updating software every 14 days. our budgeting process, you have an annual budget. don't fit well in a 14 day update cycles. we have to continue to push to change the culture to adapt to the environment we are in. i would say that is digital transformation. that is culture change to embrace a digital culture. >> the problem of acquisition of software is one of the products of study here at csis. i want to give that some credit. to that question, what you're describing, you keep single fast, somebody's got to take the lead aerated sums urgent. urgent is the you.

it is not a jihadi, not a jew on -- not a -- gen. vanherck: we saw a need to get after the integrated deterrence and bridge that gap. we moved out of partnership with some of the agents -- agencies in the department as well. i did get a sense of urgency. the next 10 years, the threat to the homeland will dramatically change. i do not think we can continue to do things, looking in the rearview mirror. we have to look at the wind shield, that is why i'm trying to do. -- what i am trying to do. >> as i'm listening to the dramatic price increase, it is sobering. you have to maxing homeland is not a sanctuary, we have to look at friendly. to me, that says north america is a region, too.

our adversary see north america as a special thing. gen. vanherck: certainly. they are developing the capability. they have not had it. we have been the only nation capable of projecting power around the globe on our own time and place of choosing. that is changing. they understand that -- what they must change to limit our access and influence around the globe. that is how they are born to compete with us. as how they are going to deterrence, that is what that show they want to -- >> your >> pointing out >> how the communication needs to come out a different level. in a way, you are not just -- you are also pointing in the direction of perhaps needing to evolve the relationship of the combatant commands, and the ucb,

potentially down the road. i do believe it is something we ought to gen. vanherck: look at gen. vanherck: look at what the future of what not only conflict would look like, but, -- crisis management. i think our combatant constructor today does well for competition focus. day-to-day, the relationship i have with my counterparts are crucial. the fellow combatant commanders who have the same relationships is crucial. i am sure we will ever see single supported combatant commander, it may be worth studying further the future for the ucp for a conflict scenario. that is certainly a policy decision, the president signs the ucp, that is something i will leave to the department. >> fair enough. you alluded to the guide three

experiments, what are these guide three, that you engage the summer, what are these things? gen. vanherck: global information dominance experience number one took place in december of 2020. brought combatant commands together with project maven to approve so -- proof of concept about sharing of info and could we get further left, like i asked for. the decision space i'm looking for. what we found was, it was incredibly successful to utilize the machine learning and artificial intelligence when shared across multi-domains in the four combatant commands. i said, let's expand this, let's try to get all 11 combatant commands. what i wanted to do show all 11 combatant commands a valuable data and information was that we could share and collaborate globally. that occurred in march of this year. all 11 combatant commands, we had the jake in there with her

capabilities, project mainland as well. >> this is extrema two? gen. vanherck: experiment to in -- experiment number two in march of this year. the combatant commands all came together and talked about the value of what we are seeing. never heard any pushback. it was why don't we have this now? can we get this in the field, now? guide three took place last month. it was expanding, with allies and partners included, to challenge not only the ops piece or intel piece with the congested logistics to create options and bring data from service readiness and platform readiness and collaborate in an example such as the panama canal is closed, how quickly can you come up with options for your logistics flow.

what we saw was we have the data and ability to -- is invaluable. we just got question from rachel in australia come up she wants to know, given that allies have communicative abilities to that can be brought to bear there, is their intent to bring them in? some involvement or witnessing of these experiments, is there an attempt to expend this further? we must -- gen. vanherck: we must. it really was -- relies on allies and partners. they must be part of it. >> let's move to another topic, more on the guide experiments. this is another big part of your responsibility, because northcom , norad and missile defense. we were for that space and

missile defense symposium, you highlighted in your remarks the importance of the next generation or agi for the rogue state ballistic missile plans. what is that, what does it mean to you and why is it significant? our gen. vanherck: our listed missile defenses are mostly aligned on dprk, north korea. they are building their missiles out, we saw much larger capability. the total numbers of missiles tends to increase. next-generation interceptor for the mission i'm given will continue to keep us on a successful path to maintain capacity, address the threat, and also the capability, as they develop capabilities such as decoys or balloons that may be challenging the system, the next-generation interceptor will

give us that capability. i'm concerned that we must develop it and build it on time. is currently on track for 2028. the department, with the missile defense agency has established a contract mechanism that will reward the timing of the mgi and the capabilities -- the ngi. >> schedule is your top priority for ngi. this is of policy discussion, not your call, but from where you sit, if it were to go away or be delayed, what does that mean? what does that mean for you and homeland defense should? gen. vanherck: totally a policy decision. i will stay out of politics and policy aspect of that. i feel like my job is to convey what the impact and risk would be of that decision, convey that to the secretary and chairman for their advice to key

decision-makers on that. i think that would make us more reliant on our strategic deterrence and capabilities. potentially could increase the risk of deterrence failure if there -- should there be an attack. what there is to recognize about the next-generation interceptor capabilities and the others i've not talked about as you have deterrence by punishment. our ballistic missile capabilities is why call deterrence by denial. it is the gray matter at the sum by police they may not be able to achieve their objective, because you have a denial capability. you know if they are denied, there shot, there one time -- their shot. as you look at making decisions

like you referred to, it is crucial to look at that, not in a vacuum, but on an overarching strategic deterrence. right now, we have a chance to look at that as we are doing a nuclear posture review, they're doing a new glare defense review, those should be looking -- look at hand-in-hand. -- nuclear defense review. they should be looking at hand-in-hand. >> there's also the broader homeland ballistic missile defense gmd program enterprise, it is deployed today. i heard you emphasize the importance of things between now and ngi. what is going on with that and why is it important? gen. vanherck: slap is important , it gets us to mgi -- ngi. >> gen. vanherck: gen. vanherck:

they look at each and every component, that will give us crucial reliability data or we can now predict future reliability. what that that does is give us the ability to potentially change shock doctrine, which gives additional capacity. not only is the missile defense agency working with the contractor on that reliability aspect mother but also adding additional capability to counter the potential threats i talked about earlier. that will get us to mgi- ngi. >> the video you showed earlier, there was a lot going on. it highlighted some political, economic, military technique -- targets in north america. one of the questions, when you're talking about the target list is, everything is critical, then you have to move from what is critical to what is going to be affected.

to the cruise missile side of the house, the difference between -- do you think we can get to a defendant asset list for the critical things in the united states homeland? gen. vanherck: do i think so, i do think we can. it is a tough discussion, that has been had for a while. i think it is crucial we go down the path. the critical asset list exists. we need to look not only across the department of defense, but the whole nation on what we must defend. that is a policy issue that i have asked for. when i say must defend, i'm talking not only kinetically, but other means to defense, such as using cyber resiliency. not every threat is threatened kinetically. we are a resilient nation, but we need to find out what our most strategic assets are and how we are going to defend them. can utilize it hardening for

certain capabilities. the goal would be, it is unaffordable and unrealistic to defend everything, figure out what those items we must defend our, that contributes to that deterrence i talked about earlier of the homeland. >> you have alluded to barriers to getting to that list. you have, domestic and legal, law enforcement entities, what are the barriers to getting to that? gen. vanherck: i believe it is having a sit down and discussion. you do not have to identify every single point in space that you want to defend. i think the barriers involve educating folks on the ability to defend wide area spaces, for example, future capabilities such as use of the electromagnetic spectrum, where you can defend wider area with a missile will give us the option

to lump into multiple large areas, critical assets from across the interagency. where you are getting the challenge is when you're trying to pick between one department's pinpoint location and another on the priority. i think we can move beyond that with future capabilities. >> back to your two hats, i'm picturing you taking hats on and off between norad northcom, what are the differences between the different kinds of cruise missile and ballistic missile threats? what are some synergies other than the fact you are wearing both hats, synergies between the entities between cruise missile and ballistic missile defense? gen. vanherck: cruise missiles are totally different than the list missile threats today. chris missiles can be launched from multiple platforms, from air lunch capabilities to see launched cup of dust

capabilities to summering launch capabilities to container on a commercial vessel. there's multiple ways to do that, or ballistic missile typically is going to be launched from some type of rocket, a large ir you're going to be able to detect. you will not see that with the cruise missile. domain awareness goes across both commands, from detecting of cruise missiles to detecting of ballistic missiles. both hats, i absolutely need that domain awareness to where i can attack, provide options to our senior leaders to defend or deter against those cruise missiles or ballistic missiles. >> let me refer to another combatant command, one of which the conversation between those two threats is very of the day, we heard about last week. we have to worry about the defense of -- for both the

cruise missile problem and the ballistic missile problem, china is going to come out us with everything. is your tracking that, that is your number one priority, are there lessons and things that could be harvested from whatever efforts are done there that you might apply here at home? gen. vanherck: lessons for -- >> from what they are to do. gen. vanherck: i'm sure there are lessons there. what we do back home is purely a policy decision on what we are going to defend and how we are going to defend it. but i would like to do is invoke that discussion to make sure we are making informed decisions based on the threat that has changed over the last 10 years will change going forward. the threats to guam, he is in the region, close to that

threat. i believe the culture believes, we are a sanctuary here. i want to force that discussion. >> north america is a region two. -- a region, too. what is the next steps? gen. vanherck: i believe there will be a guide for. -- guide four. we are going to talk to secretary hakes within a week or so. i plan to move as quickly as possible to feel those capabilities. i believe these capabilities can warrant fielding them, dissing -- different testing processes for software. where you have to do developmental tests and operational tests before you feel that. there are valid reasons to do that. for software-based things, or we are not pulling the trigger

immediately, the decision-makers do not, we can move forward to feel this quickly, with a next spring validation for a globally integrated exercise. >> another experiment, another exercise, but presumably you're looking to hand this off to somebody to build and implement? gen. vanherck: absolutely. that will be part of the discussion with the deputy secretary. for long-term, as a combatant commander, i'm not in the acquisition and capability development job. i would love to hand this off to somebody, as long as we can keep it on the path it has been on. when you go from december to july and develop the capabilities, updating them every 14 days and utilizing those processes, i think that is a model for the future that we need to look at. what i do not want to do is go backwards and start using annual or -- keep processes for the capabilities we have today. >> we covered a lot of ground. i want to see if there's a thing

else you feel we have not covered or you want to talk about for the near term you church? gen. vanherck: i appreciate the opportunity to talk about the defense of north america and the capabilities we are developing. i think culture and education are two things i'm focus upon. educating folks on threat to the homeland and embracing a digital culture moving forward, to adapt our processes and a global mindset. we have moved the ball along ways, a lot of people involved. i'm encouraged by what we see, we are not there yet and i'm not right to spike the ball. >> please give our best from csis to the deputy secretary hakes -- deputy secretary hicks . please come back soon.

[captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> c-span's washington journal. every day, we are taking your calls live on the news of the day and we will discuss policy issues that impact you. coming up this morning, we will discuss the history of america's war in afghanistan with the former state department political officer in afghanistan, and author of "the american war in afghanistan." and we will talk about the biden administration's increase in snap benefits. watch c-span's washington journal live at 7:00 eastern this morning. be sure to join the discussion with your phone calls, facebook comments, texts, and tweets.

>> representative michael mccaul, the top republican on the house foreign affairs committee, sat down the discussion with the washington post to discuss u.s. troop withdrawal from afghanistan and the coronavirus pandemic. regarding the situation in afghanistan, representative mccall said the troop withdrawal was a mistake, leaving the u.s. and its allies vulnerable to future attacks. this runs 30 minutes. announcer: you can finish watching this program at c-span.org. we will go live to the washington post for a discussion with ranking member mike mccall. -- mike mccaul. >> i am the congressional reporter at the post-covid the taliban has quickly taken over afghanistan, just as u.s. troops were being withdrawn from the

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