khrushchev had suspected kennedy as khrushchev told his son, sergei, he said, he will make more of a fuss and then agree. that was not nikita khrushchev's best calculation. a few your leaders after that he decided he made one too many miscalculations. and what happened there was that at the same time, and this was jeffrey goldberg interviewed fidel castro, a couple years ago, and castro admitted that he had wanted the first strike against the united states. the gist of the conversation, moscow had with him was, if this happens, you know what is going to happen to your island? it is going to disappear and you with it. castro still wanted him to go ahead. it is also reported that, about 20 years later, castor renewed the request and moscow apparently said didn't we have this conversation before? this conversation before? so now you look at the situations in the mideast today. you have iran, and if iran goes nuclear you are going to have already the saudis have said that, publicly said they are prepared to go nuclear. several other gulf states will pipe bombs. pick up the phone, and by

khrushchev told his son sergei, he will make more of a fuss and then agreed. i think that was khrushchev's's calculations. a couple of years after that -- and what happened there was at the same time and this was jeffrey goldberg interviewing fidel castro a couple of years ago and castro admitted he had one of the first strikes against the united states. .. >> now you've got in close proximity, hundreds of miles away in some cases, with supersonic jets, in bases that may be vulnerable, small countries where even a small number of nuclear weapons can obliterate them. there was no hard line in 1962, that was bad enough, but when the soviets wanted to send a message to moscow, they gave it to western union and hoped the kid didn't stop to see his girlfriend on the way to the office. [laughter] it was very much a catcher's catch can, and if you have four or five people with nuclear weapons, all worried, no mar gyp for error, it's scary to say the least. ultimately, the only resolution is to stop iran from getting nuclear weapons, and a rev -- revolutionary state d

khrushchev told his son who was. [indiscernible] , he said and make a fuss, and make more of a fuss and then agree. that was not his best calculation. a few years after, a couple years after that they decided they had made one too many miscalculations. what happened there was that at the same time, and this was jeffrey goldberg interviewed fidel castro a couple of years ago. castro admitted that he had once the first track is the a states. the time moscow, if this happens, do you know what's going to have been seeing violence? been deleted trying to disappear, and you with the. castro still waters and to go ahead. he also reported that about 20 years later castro remove the request and moscow apparently said, did we have this conversation before? so now we look at the situation in the mideast today. you know, you have iran. and if iran goes nuclear, we are going to have the saudis said said that there would publicly say they're prepared to go nuclear. you pick the phone up. saudis and pakistan reason biofuel. how man

the other question related to courage was when he lied to khrushchev, and i believe khrushchev really respected ike. and he lied to khrushchev about the u2 pilot, gary francis power or francis gary power and then was caught in that lie. and i think that was very instrumental in postponing perestroika for many years. >> guest: yes. i agree with you on number one. it was certainly not eisenhower's best moment. i think it was in milwaukee that he gave that speech is, and people heard about it. and eisenhower was a modest person but not self-critical with others. i don't think he ever told someone i'm ashamed of what i did, but there are certain things he did that suggest that he wished that he had not failed to praise marshall in a speech where joe mccarthy was sitting nearby. and the second one -- >> host: the second one was marshall, mccarthy, i wrote that one down thinking you'd get the second one. >> guest: sorry about that. got swept up in the -- >> host: um, but going back to the mccarthy hearings, what years did those take place, and did they take place while eisenhower was presid

the other question related to courage was when he lied to khrushchev, and i believe khrushchev really respected ike. and he lied to khrushchev about the u2 pilot, gary francis power or francis gary power and then was caught in that lie. and i think that was very instrumental in postponing perestroika for many years. >> guest: yes. i agree with you on number one. it was certainly not eisenhower's best moment. i think it was in milwaukee that he gave that speech is, and people heard about it. and eisenhower was a modest person but not self-critical with others. i don't think he ever told someone i'm ashamed of what i did, but there are certain things he did that suggest that he wished that he had not failed to praise marshall in a speech where joe mccarthy was sitting nearby. and the second one -- >> host: the second one was marshall, mccarthy, i wrote that one down thinking you'd get the second one. >> guest: sorry about that. got swept up in the -- >> host: um, but going back to the mccarthy hearings, what years did those take place, and did they take place while eisenhower was presid

khrushchev and malenkov. by 54-55-56, crucial of was the supreme leader. >> what policy changes came with his ascension? >> guest: khrushchev would have been shocking 21 in the west only knew him as this engine of stalin but he essentially realized stalin had gone overboard. he knew the number of people who were killed under stalin and that the soviet union was despite its claims behind in defense and economically so the result was crucial of wanted to change something called the secret speech. wasn't secret but essentially said terrible crimes occurred under stalin and we got to fix this. people in the audience cried because stalin was their hero but the result became public quickly so the lesson learned about it but i was saying a moment ago some american presence gave lip service to end in the cold war but assume that would be a stalemate but khrushchev was a tough man but also hopes ultimately to end the cold war as well even if it did not mean the soviets would rule the earth. >> host: this e-mail from b

khrushchev realized if i'm interested the meaning of the word miscalculation. castro did not take that feeling. we have to worry about that when you're in the middle east when you have a rough neighborhood where people don't trust each other at all, where you don't have the superpower sponsor you could restrain, as khrushchev did, in 1962. who could restrain a surrogate so a client. so, the point is that you do not want to have this stuff spread and ideally you don't want to spread anyway but he certainly don't want to give it to the kind of people who run a country like iran. it's not going to make the world a safer place and we should do everything possible to see that they do not. >> how do you evaluate the possibility of defensive cyberattacks by the united states with allies like the one that disrupted the centrifuges we heard about in the past as a tactic in dealing with this? >> well certainly anything we can do in cyber, where we have more skills than the iranians and the iranians have more skills and their reportedly others around. anything that you ca

territory, eisenhower incident with the khrushchev in a position of having to be extremely tough. eisenhower had to be tough in response and so they air that was a full campaign during the era in which sometimes people think that creates all kinds of barriers and in fact it brings many families very close together because families are a principle source of support and solace, a friendship really even so then he moved up to gettysburg in his retirement years and my father worked with him on the writing of the two volumes on the white house. so i think i saw him two or three days a week for many many years and i was extremely fortunate to have that opportunity i think. >> what do you remember most about it? >> well if i were to stand back and think about what he was like as a grandfather had one quality that i thought was absolutely marvelous in retrospect. i always admired when i would find it and the people and that was that he always knew where you stood with him. he wasn't a soccer and he wasn't the kind of guy who would get angry and then not express himself on the subject. you

he took personal responsibility for it even though khrushchev gave him ample opportunity to place the blame on someone else. eisenhower refused to do that and he took his own responsibility for it and he did it -- >> next question comes from here in the audience. hi. >> i had a question about eisenhower's ability to affect nice talent. i have read that he was quite good at identifying maybe would other people considered hidden talent and i wondered if you could comment about that, if you also found that in your study of him and whether that was a particular trait that he looked for an pupil that allowed him to identify people who might have otherwise been overlooked? >> he had a military career as president eisenhower did. one of the things you learn very early on is how to identify talent. and eisenhower was a superb identifier of talent and i will give you one example. they were very close with president eisenhower. after eisenhower was elected president in november of 1952, he immediately took off to play golf and let clay and brownell brownell -- because he knew these people and h

business el, he took personal responsibility for it even though khrushchev gave him ample opportunity to place the blame on someone else at the paris sum. eisenhower refused to do that, he took personal responsibility for it, and he did approve it. >> host: our next question comes from right here in the audience. hi. >> um, i had a question about eisenhower's ability to recognize talent. i've read that he was quite good at identifying maybe what other people would consider hidden talent, and i wondered if you could comment about that, if you also found that in your study of him and whether or not there's a particular trait that he looked for in people that allowed him to identify people who might otherwise have been overlooked. >> guest: when you come up to a military career as president eisenhower did, one of the things that you learn very early on is how to identify talent. and eisenhower was a superb identifier of talent, and i simply to give you one example, herr berth brown el -- herr berth brownell and mrs. clay who were very close to mr. eisenhower. afterrizeen our was elected

may day can, eisenhower, khrushchev and the u-2 affair. 1960 and 1963 came out in '91. the conquerors, roosevelt, truman and the destruction of hitler's germany came out in 2002. presidential courage: brave leaders and how they changed america, 1789-1989, came out in 2007. and some of his other co-written and edited books include "at the highest level: the inside story of the end of the cold war." and then the two johnson books, and finally his most recent, jacqueline kennedy: historic conversations on life with jfk, interviews with arthur m. kenya to the presence she was wondering how they had affected her, and the column mentioned there was very little scientific research that could talk about the way that the drugs had affected children's development as they were growing up and so that got me curious. i myself had been taking medication since i was a teenager, and i think their must be huge numbers of people in my position and i would be curious to hear their stories and get their take on how it has turned out for them. >>> next historian h.w. brands talks about aaro

khrushchev andmao. resources not so much. possibly this will be different in the future but i don't think that with major. >> host: the second question was about russia but also about historically 9/11 and the response to 9/11. >> guest: i heard part of it. it was about surveillance particularly. no question that the levels of surveillance have grown enormously and to some extent that is connected with 9/11. a useful thing to do studying history is to drop dramatic -- if 9/11 had never happened would surveillance increase? it might be. that is tied to the technological developments that are there. we can surveil at increasingly ambitious levels. 9/11 may have accelerated the process but that technology is probably irreversible and we are going to be living with that kind of surveillance for the foreseeable future. >> host: "george f. kennan: an american life" is the name of the book that john lewis gaddis was talking about a little bit earlier. if you saw his presentation. if not very quickly, john lewis gaddis, what were geo