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funds or performs as well as dhs involvement in u.s. government and other efforts to address security concerns arising from the life sciences research. as the department considers the durc issue, several principles help guide our thinking. first, durc is an extremely complex issue for the scientific research and development community. balancing our nation's need to excel in science and exploration of robust technologies with ensuring our nation's security by preventing the misuse of such technology. second, almost all research conducted today in bioscience and biotechnology contains some degree of dual-use application. third, dual-use concerns must be addressed at a variety of different levels from research funded by governments to research funded privately, to experimentation done by individual scientists. and finally, there are both domestic and international dimensions to the durc issue as the recent hh5n1 papers have clearly demonstrated. dhs performs research which might be considered durc through a variety of mechanisms, including

it's incumbent on congress and dhs leadership to mark that path forward. i thank the subcommittee for the attention this critical homeland security issue, and i'm available for questions. >> thank all the panel members for their discussion. we'll go into a first round of questioning. start off. mr. wright, i know you haven't seen the entire report in your other memorandum, but you've been responding with respect to the discussions to the reports that you have. what is the leaked memo had on the morale of your members? they still have a desire to work for this program? they still think this program is worthy? do they still think this program is workable? >> above all, they think it's worthy and they are ready to move forward. with that being said, there was an aspect of insult to that report. there was an aspect of calling into question capabilities, education, training, and so forth. so there was and still is an aspect of being disrespected. >> mr. scott and mr. allmond, since the leaked memo came out, how has -- if they have, dhs engaged you on the issues

was it within dhs? >> the office of compliance and security which is an office within m p pd run by certified law-enforcement officer is conducting the investigation. it was begun in the league. the process is to go around to determine who had possession of the report at one point in time. as director anderson indicated. who then prepares the report? i don't believe there's anybody below them who had access to the report. i will let them speak to that. and it went up to me. and to my deputy and chief of staff. that is where the report appears to have been until the leak to the press. to determine who had custody and interview all of them and look for corroborating information that might suggest who was responsible. jeter -- these are never easy kinds of investigations. but because of the nature of the disclosure, while not classified information in the sense of our classification system it was extraordinarily sensitive information and we would like to find out who was responsible. >> the process began s

is it within dhs? >> the office of compliance and security which an office within nppd run by a certified law enforcement officer is conducting the investigation. it was begun in the days after the leak. the process there is to go around and determine first of all who had possession of the report at one point in time. as director anderson has indicated, the two of them prepared the report. i don't believe there was anybody below them whoever had access to the report. but i'll let them speak. to that. and it went up to me and to my deputy and chief of staff. so that's where -- that's where the report appears to have been from its final drafting until i received it and it was leaked to the press. so those determine who the people who had custody of it were and determine all of them and look for corroborating information that might suggest who was responsible for that. these are never, ever easy kinds of investigations, but because of the nature of the disclosure, while not classified information in the s

now i've been discussing the internal management of durc within dhs. let me now turn briefly to the broader durc issue. dhs has been an extremely aiskt participant in the formulation of the u.s. government policy on the dual-use research, including the 29 march government policy for durc oversight. we're in complete agreement that strengthening durc oversight and establishing regular reviews of u.s. government-funded or conducted research is both necessary and a responsible approach. however, even with the kind of internal dhs oversight policies described previously and the u.s. governmentwide policy on oversight of u.s.-funded life sciences research, dhs believes that security related concerns to durc cannot be entirely resigned by formal u.s. government policies. the international nature of life sciences research, coupled with the explosion in biotechnology funded by private sources means that much of the durc being conducted is not under direct u.s. government control. advances in the life sciences will undoubtedly create technological capabilities

dhs has a domestic responsibility, a preventive responsibility. and in that sense it's different unless expansive and fbi and the other case. the interesting thing that you've testified to, and i think senator mccain was, in hearing, is that you are building exactly the kind of cooperative relationship between nsa cybercommand, dhs, and the fbi that didn't exist before 9/11 and the fact is, senator mccain and i introduced an amendment to the national defense authorization act last december that codifies in law the working agreement between nsa and dhs. so i know -- incidentally, i would say this for the record -- i've talked to admiral mcconnell, a former dni, i've heard him speak in a public setting, he thinks both bills are not strong enough. but if you ask him, do you prefer the cyber security act of 2012 which senator collins and i, or the security i.t., which my colleagues have put in, he couldn't be clearer. secure i.t. doesn't do it because it doesn't provide for defensive preparation by the private sector. look, i know private sector's lob

nsa is already working with dhs. for example, at the 24-hour, seven days a week entity that has been set up there is an exchange of personnel between the dhs and the nsa; is there not? >> there is. >> under the bill that senator lieberman and i have introduced to try to get that essential disability that you emphasize is so important we would require mandatory reporting in the event of an attack because this can't be discretionary effect there's a significant attack critical infrastructure and critical infrastructure is defined as infrastructure and attack upon which would cause mass casualties, severe economic impact or a serious degradation of our national security. so do you support requiring that mandatory reporting in such cases the? >> i do, senator, and i think i would add that as we discussed earlier that in order for us to help prevent it, it has to be in real time i think it is absolutely vital. >> and the reporting and the information sharing under our bill is directional as it has become the latest craze

i think we have to partner with dhs and fbi. the reason that i bring dhs into this is that, i believe we want them working with the rest of government to help set up the rest of government networks and work with that. we do not want to take the people that i have and push them over here. i think we want people that we have looking outside and that goes to senator mccain's comments. we're the offensive force. we're the ones that are going to protect the nation, we need to see what's going on and be prepared to do that. we can give and work with dhs and provide capabilities and technical expertise, and that's growing. finally, i'd add in fbi. they have some tremendous capabilities. they have the law enforcement arm. when you put all three of us together, i think our country knows that what we're doing is transparent and we're doing the right thing. in doing that, you've brought all three players to the table. i see command and control in partnership is key, especially with our allies, and i'd put the allies on the table because th

last month dhs assistant secretary david hammond informed me by june of this year dhs will have a fully operational biographic exit system in place. it's going to provide real time information on those who exit united states airports. this new exit system is expected to allow you to calculate over stays per country by may of this year. here's the question. i think this is very important. we've got 15 million people that come in every year. we don't know whether they leave or not on a visa waiver. is dhs on track to have a fully operational

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the experience is there, meaning at dhs. we do have lessons learned from cfats no doubt, but those lessons have been learned and they give us confidence we can administer this properly. >> last if i could, concerns about privacy and bringing the public into this conversation. i think it was senator lee who previously asked about future attributes, screening technology and its development, something i'd be happy to get a briefing on about its trajectory. recognizing that a lot of what's going on in the dialogue between the administration and congress about the cyber threat, is occurring in secure briefings and that a lot of the information that at least i and i think many other senators have received, it makes it care s is us just how big a threat this is and how much loss there is of intellectual property and how much potential risk there is. most of that critical information is shared with us in a secure setting. my concern is that this committee previously legislated on intellectual property threat through the protect i.p.

there is an exchange of personnel, between dhs and nsa, is there not? >> there is. >> under the bill that senator lieberman and i have introduced to try to get that essential visibility that you have emphasized is so important. we would require mandatory reporting in the event of an attack. because this can't be discretionary, if in fact there is a significant attack on critical infrastructure, and critical infrastructure is defineded as infrastructure, an attack upon which would cause mass casualties, a severe economic impact or a serious degradation of our national security. so do you support requiring that mandatory reporting in such cases? >> i do, senator, and i think i would add that as we discussed earlier, that in order for us to help prevent it, it has to be in real time i think that's absolutely essential to the defense. >> and bidirectional has become the latest way to prefer to this. even nsa, the capabilities of which are unparalleled can learn from the private sector, i think you learned that in the study that there were some signatures th

the good news is dhs did complete an initial validation study in april 2011, which concluded that the program was more effective than random screening. however, as the study itself noted, it was not designed to fully answer the very important question of whether you can use behavior detection principles for counterterrorism purposes in the airport environment. a scientific consensus on this issue simply does not exist. another key report recommendation was to develop better performance measures. the importance of this is underscored by looking at the arrests made under the program. for example, 27% of the 300 s.p.o.t. arrests made in 2010 were illegal aliens, raising questions about mission focus. the second tsa program i'd like to discuss today is tsa's body scanner program, commonly referred to as advance imagine g a technology or aits. as you know, these scanners were deployed after the attempted christmas day attack on a flight. about 640 of these units are now in place at 160 airports. according to tsa, these machine provide superior benefits over walk-through metal detectors sin

dhs has continued to evolve as well. i look forward to working with you and members of the committee to build on the progress we have achieved across these and many other mission areas. we remain ever vigilant to threats, as we continue to promote the free movement of goods and people, essential to our economy. and to protect our essential rights and liberties. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. of course, we will put your post statement in the record. we did one ask you some questions. >> all americans are concerned about the safety of our president, if it could have been jeopardized by this kind of behavior. just as i concerned about any of the protect these, i mentioned governor romney, but there are several others. >> with the misconduct we have heard about, we have heard about the pose of security. >> mr. chairman, that was my first question to director sullivan. the answer is, no. there is no risk to the president. based on the information supplied to me by the director. >> is the secret service coordinating it

last month, dhs assistant secretary david hay man informed me that by june of this year, dhs will have a fully operational biographic exit system in place. it's going to provide realtime information on those who exit united states airports. this new exit system is expected to allow you to calculate overstays per country by may of this year. here's the question. i think this is very important because we've got 15 million people that come in every year. we don't know whether they leave or not on a visa waiver. is dhs on track to have a fully operational biographic exit system by june of 2012? >> senator, i believe we are. the final plan is in the clearance process with omb. but that is our intent. >> good. will dhs be able to provide overstay rates per country by may of 2012? >> we should be able to provide some of that information if not all. >> good. thank you. >> thank you. we will -- now we will go to senator grassley. senator kyl, next with -- no, we'll go to senator kyl next. senator grassley would have been next, but he's -- yielding to senator kyl prior to me and then we'll go to

the experiences there, meaning at dhs. we do have lessons learned from ceefax no doubt that those lessons happen and those lessons learned gives greater confidence that we can administer this properly. >> last if i could, some concerns about privacy and bringing the public into this conversation. i think it was senator lee who previously asked about screening technology and its development, something i'd be happy to give a briefing on about its trajectory. recognizing that a lot of what is going on in the dialogue between the administration and congress about the cyberthreat is occurring in secure briefings and that a lot of the information that at least i and many other senators have received that make that clear to us just how big a threat to this and just how much lost their hiss of intellectual property and how much potential risk areas. most of the critical information is shared with us in a secure setting. by concerned is that this committee previously legislated on intellectual property theft, the protect i.d. act i

and provide dhs with the higher inflexibility to attract and retain the cybersecurity professionals we need to execute our complex and challenging mission. mr. chairman, threats against our nation whether from terrorists, criminals or cyb cyberadversaries continue to evolve, and dhs must continue to evolve as well. i look forward to working with you and members of the committee to build on the progress we have achieved across these and many other mission areas. we remain ever vigilant to threats as we continue to promote the free movement of goods and peoples essential to our economy and protect our essential rights and liberties. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, and of course, we'll put your full statement in the record. as i told you, our jurisdiction over the u.s. secret service, we did want to ask you some questions there. i'm of, of course, all americans are concerned about the safety of our president, whether it could have been jeopardized by it type of behavior just as i'm concerned about the safety of any of the protectees i mentioned governor romney, but there are severa

according to the notes that i have here, dhs began inspections of tier one facilities in february of 2010. by september of 2011, you had performed only nine authorized inspections and as of january 23rd, dhs had only completed 53. are those correct numbers? >> 55 now ma'am. >> out of how many that needed to be done? >> the overall number -- >> your mike is not on. >> excuse me. the overall number that would need to be done is about 4500. the tier ones are about 110, 111. >> so, of the 55, do those all come out of tier one? >> yes. >> o a. in light of that, how do you, how are you planning on being able to complete all of these if we've only done 55 and 4,500 need to be done? >> the current plan is that we will finish the site security plan reviews for the tier one facilities in the next several months and then move on to the tier two facilities in the remainder of fiscal year '12. >> so about what time do you think you'll start tier two? >> sometime this summer, roughly. >> and will the tier one facilities be required to submit new i think their called ssps? even though the inspectio

funds, as well as dhs involvement in u.s. government and other efforts to address security concerns arising from the life sciences research. as the department considers the durc issue, several principles help guide our thinking. first, there it is extremely complex issue with scientific research development community -- committee. with ensuring our nations security by preventing the misuse of such technology. second, almost all research conducted today in bioscience and biotechnology contains some degree of dual use application. third, dual-use concerns must be addressed and if right after that levels from research funded by governments to research funded privately, to experimentation done by individual scientists. and, finally, there are both domestic and international dimensions to the durc issue, as the recent 85 in one papers. dhs performs research which might be considered durc or a bride at different mechanisms including our internal laboratories, such as the national biodefense analysis and countermeasures center, and

the experience is there, meaning at dhs. we do have lessons learned from cfats no doubt, but those lessons have been learned and those lessons give us greater confidence that we can administer this properly. >> last if i could, concerns about privacy and bringing the public into this conversation. i think it was senator lee who previously asked about future attributes, screening technology and its development, something i'd be happy to get a briefing on about its trajectory. recognizing that a lot of what's going on in the dialogue between the administration and congress about the cyber threat, is occurring in secure briefings and that a lot of the information that at least i and i think many other senators have received, it makes it clear to us just how big a threat this is and how much loss there is of intellectual property and how much potential risk there is. most of that critical information is shared with us in a secure setting. my concern is that this committee previously legislated on intellectual property threat thr

creates a new regulatory bureaucracy sill, i'm also concerned that this new regulatory power given dhs background on overseeing the chemical facilities security cf app ts program, congress gave your department regulatory power over chemical facilities, regulations were issued 2007. five years later, nearly 4200 chemical facilities have complied with the regulations, but your department has yet to approve a single security plan so far spending a half a billion dollars and not getting anything approved. i've obtained a copy of an internal review by undersect rand beers by two subordinates that details the problems dhs faces in implementing cfats. this memorandum is the most candid review of a failed government federal program i've seen. this mem dal details failures at an unprecedented level, more hiring, hiring people not skilled, poor staff morale, management leadership fail urz, lack of subject matter expertise it, union problems, ands. catastrophic failure to ensurely personal and professional accountability. the memorandum also states that inspectors lacked expertise to effectively

will dhs be able to provide overstay rates per country by may of 2012? >> we should be able to provide some of that information if not all. >> good. thank you. >> we will now go to senator grassy, senator kyle. no, senator kyle. senator kyle is behind me, then we'll go to senator schumer. >> thank you. this isn't the first time that senator feinstein and i have been thinking about the same thing. let me touch on the three things which were a concern. on student visas it's not just the sham schools but also the failure of i.c.e. to follow up with student who is have overstayed air visa and the poor record of schools providing information to ice. on the ag workers, the regs could be reformed. it's not just our failure. h 2-a regulations were more workable i'm told, that was then changed with the obama administration. if we could work more toward the kind of regs that existed toward the end temperature bush registration that might be a help for some. on the visa overstays, i think your budget was denied $30 million by the appropriations committee because of

last month, dhs assistant secretary, david heyman informed me by june of this year, dhs will have a fully operational biographic exit system in place that is going to provide real-time information on those who ask that united states air force. this new exit system is expected to allow you to calculate overstates her country by may of this year. here's the question. i think this is very important because it's got 15 million people that come in every year. we don't know whether they leave are not on the visa waiver. his dhs on track to have a fully operational biographic exit system by june of 2012? >> senator, i believe the final plan is in the clearance process with omb, but that is our intent. >> good. will dhs be able to provide overstay rates per country by may of 2012? >> we should be able to provide some of that information is not all. >> good, thank you. >> well, now we will go to senator grassley and senator cayo -- over to senator kyl max. senator grassley would've been next,, but we will go to senator schumer. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you in the senator grassley. this is

. >> dhs has had expensive flops in the past. after a scathing government report it killed a system, despite spending more than $200 million for it. dhs is giving development funds to other companies exploring technologie technologies. >> there are any number of companies that have developmental funding. because our objective is to protect america against nuclear terrorism. we have a pipeline of technology. >> steve flynn was an at visor to the commission on national security and is he on an advisory council for decision sciences. >> the tools that dhs have in place to deal with this risk are not nearly sufficient in my view for mitigating that risk. that is identifying the possibility that a terrorist might use a cargo container for moving a weapon of mass destruction into the united states. >> decision scientists aren't waiting for dhs. it's deploying its equipment in the bahamas right now, and expects to begin onsiteting of cargo in the next few months. >>> how is this possible? friday the 13th and it finally happened. brad an

was is specifically validated in 2011 by the dhs science and technology division representing the most thorough analysis of any behavioral screening program to date. no other counterterrorism or similar security program is known to have been subjected to such a rigorous systematic evaluation. this study revealed that s.p.o.t. was significantly more effective at identifying high-risk passengers than random screening protocols. that said, tsa continues working with dhs, snt, and the broader research community to increase the effectiveness and the efficiency of this behavior-based screening process. subsequent to the validation study, tsa took steps last fall to enhance the program. under a new pilot, behavior detection officers employ a specialized technique to determine whether a traveler should be deterred for further screening at the checkpoint. this additional interaction used by security agencies worldwide enables officers to better verify for dispel concerns about suspicious behavior and anomalies. preliminary analysis shows an increase in the rate of detection of high-risk passeng

last year dhs turned special registration requirements. because of special registration many innocent arabs and muslims face deportation or citizenship. we issued a memo to address the situation with these individuals providing individuals who failed to apply that they wouldn't be penalized if not compliant, or intention or reasonably excusable. will you ensure the status for noncompliance with the short registration are going to be applied fairly and generously? >> yes i will and i will make sure that ice for reports how that is being implemented. >> i've visited an immigration detention facility in d-backs southern illinois. and i applaud ice for issuing its revised standards. in the process of looking those over. we are concerned about the conditions. some of them will take a deep investigation before we can say with certainty that there are violations but there was something basic that caught my attention. lack of access to the telephone. there are 300 miles from family. it may seem like a small issue but the immigration detainees, it

nsa, dhs, fbi. all of us need to work together to provide the best set of signatures to protect that critical infrastructure. industry can actually operate that and tell us when that occurs. i also think that you need to set a set of standards for how those systems are operated to give you the best and i'll call that, general kehler mentioned it and it's in there, resilience. we need resilience in those networks to ensure they can operate and be defensible while we're trying to defend the country outside. does that make sense? >> um-hum. you know, just last friday, i read about it yesterday, microsoft was accompanied by u.s. marshals, and they raided office buildings in pennsylvania and in illinois to disrupt a group of computers, a botnet, that was harvesting bank accounts, passwords and other personal information from millions of computers, and microsoft's actions show what's possible and some say is certainly necessary now to stop cyber crimes. what are your thoughts on these actions just taken r

dhs is working with universities to build a curriculum for more cybersecurity professionals. it includes scholarships, fellowships and internship programs. >> ama: thousands of computer users could have trouble getting online. the fbi is asking owner to check for dnf changers. the hackers have been caught but the temporary solution keeping ineffected machines online will go away in july. you can find more on our web site, answer 7 news.com, and click on "see it on tv". >> alan: if you're looking for something to do it's not to late to head out to a unanimous -- national park. admission is free all week long starting today and goes until next sunday. >> ama: great weather to take advantage of it. >> frances: do it tom because we have rain on the way. i can't believe it. we did have some gorgeous temperatures and beach weather, with this live shot at santa cruz, you can see it's in the 60s today, and all though we didn't break in the records, we did warm up very nicely. in fact our numbers were about 15 degrees warmer in many locations compared to what you expect this time of y

funds or performs as well as the dhs involvement in the u.s. government and other efforts to address security concerns arising from the life sciences research. as the department considers the issue, several principles help guide our thinking. first, it's an extremely complex issue for the scientific research and development community. balancing the nation's need to excel in science and exploration of robust technologies with ensuring the nation's security by preventing the issues of such technology. second, almost all research conducted today in the bioscience and biotechnology contains some degree of a dual use application. third, dual use concerns must be addressed in a variety of different levels from research funded by the governments to the research funded privately to experimentation done by individual scientists. finally, there are both domestic and international dimensions to the issue as the recent h5 in one pavers have demonstrated. dhs provides a variety of different mechanisms including our internal laboratories such as the body of

>> i would put it as a platform, anymore we want dhs to re-create an nsa, so we need these two components of dod to work together. it's got the technical talent, it's got the access and the capability. and work with the intelligence side of nsa to further support the combat and command. i think that is going in the delight direction. thank you for your service as well. >> gentlemen, thank you for your service, general alexander, i thank you for your recent trip down to ft. gordon where you say a pat on the back and a morale boost to some of the smartest, hardest working, most committed americans who are doing a great job of helping protect our great country and i think for doing that at the nsa, ft. gordon. cyber com itself has a little over 1,000? >> a little over 1,000 authorized. that's not only cyber command staff, but it also directs the defense of the dod networks. in our cyber, what i counted in those other 12,000, army cyber command. >> okay, i wanted to make sure i understood that. nsa today does a pretty good job of intersecting and protecting the dot-gov networks. over 1,000 ti

chairman, we continue to evolve and dhs has continued to evolve as well. i look forward to working with you and members of the committee to build on the progress we have achieved across these and many other mission areas. we remain ever vigilant to threats as we continue to promote the free movement of goods and people's essential to our economy and protect our essential rights and liberties. thank you which betcha chairman. >> thane and of course we will put your full statement in the record. as i told you, our jurisdiction over the u.s. secret service, we did want to ask you some questions there. i like all americans and concerned about the safety of our president, weather could've been jeopardized by this kind of behavior just as i'm concerned about the safety of any of their protect these. i mentioned governor romney but there are several others. but the misconduct we have heard about, did that pose any risk to the president security within colombia or to national security? >> mr. chairman that was my first question to director sullivan when he called

when it was time to go back to dhs -- i decided i needed to be more engaged in the public debate. there's some things you cannot do as a public servant that you can do on the outside. that's how i ended up at the immigration policy center. we're all about trying to provide the kind of facts and information that helped shape the debate in the way that it supports the idea that immigration is important to america. we are part of the american immigration council, formally known as the american immigration law foundation. we work very closely with lawyers, including one of the sponsors of tonight's events. when i talk about compehensive immigration reform to people, i often like to move away from the movie analogy to the game analogy. think about it as a rubik's cube. if you get one side right, it probably means the other sites are screwed up. you cannot think about immigration as the one issue. there are so many that interact with each other. we often focus on legalization because it's such an overwhelming issue in many ways. we have so many people that are here without the appropria

the fact that dhs raised none of those points. instead, presenting the appearance of an ongoing regulatory program. while the undersecretary has testified he was not aware of the scope of the problems until 2011, the senior iscd official in charge would seemingly have poeszed detailed information not able to the undersecretary. additionally, conditioning has required reports and briefings on facets of the cfats program, none of which reported the challenges iscd was experiencing. it is our job to attempt to identify the root causes of the challenges experienced by iscd in order to avoid similar problems in other agencies and attempt to identify how prior funds were spent and how we should attempt to identify the officials responsible for the failures in iscd performance. mr. chairman, besides the fact find thag we need to do rkts there's a bigger question of authorization. it seems only reasonable to me that in light of these leaked memorandums, this, excuse me, this leaked memorandum and the host of problems it outlines for cfats

those machines, how much did dhs bent on acquiring them? >> mr. chairman, the machines are at a unit cost of approximately hundred $30,000. i think we can get you the exact number. i think expenditure is probably, total, about $130 million. >> the changes, after the reaction on the original ones, the retrofits, they cost $12 million? >> i am not sure the cost that much. part of the contract was that the hardware would be able to accept the software. i will verify if it was $12 million. >> what companies were awarded contracts? >> rapidscan and l3. >> i apologize for taking the extra time. please go ahead. >> welcome, madam secretary. i have really enjoyed working with your office on things unique to south carolina and the country. my experience with the secret service is very similar. the time i have travelled with senator mccain turned the last presidential election, i was impressed by the people, a lot of time away from families, long hours. anytime you have problems, you do not want to paint with a broad brush. let's start with the baseline. >>

we expect all dhs employees in the secret service and throughout the department to adhere to the highest professional and ethical standards and we will continue to update the committee as the investigation proceeds, and more information becomes available. let me now move to the department's progress since 9/11. ten years after the terrorist attacks of september 11, america is stronger and more secure today thanks to the support of the congress, the work of the men and women of the dhs, our federal, state, local partner who is work across the homeland security enterprise. as wiv said homeland security begins with hometown security, as part of our commitment to strengthening hometown security we have worked to get information, tools and resources out of washington, d.c. and into the hands of state and local officials and first responders. this has led to significant advances. for example, we've made great progress in improving our domestic capabilities to detect and prevent terrorist attacks against our people, our communities and our critical infrastructure. we've increased our ability to

has military responsibility but dhs has responsibility for civilian and the section with the private sector. we both use the technology resources of the nsa, but we use them under different authorities and with more restrictions, particularly on the privacy side than you would in an international military sort of context. so, the position that we have is to make sure that the statute mirrors what actually is happening on the ground. >> well, thank you. second, madame secretary, both of the bills in the senate give private companies a new authority to freely monitor the communications and files on their systems, many of which would be private. these bills create this new sweeping authority despite existing provisions in the wiretap act that allow companies to perform monitoring to protect their systems. the administration's proposal does not contain that broad new authority. can you tell us why it does not? >> what we are looking for, and part of the protection of critical infrastructure, we're looking for the code. we're looking for the fact of the attack, the methodology used, the c

role of the department of homeland security is with regard to dual-use research happening outside of dhs grantees. >> well, senator, we sit as part of the inner agency body that deliberates. and so we have a strong voice. in fact, as i'm sure we'll talk more about later, the 29 march policy actually reflects much of the work that we have been doing previously in fulfilling our biological weapons convention requirements. we made use of the nsabb seven experiments of concern. we've always looked at the select agent program to make sure that we are in accordance with the requirements and reporting requirements. so we do that tiered process in order to make sure that experiments do full and fall -- full compliance with the bwc. what we've done, though, because of the alignment of the 29 march policy and the work that we have done previously, we essentially have a leg up on the implementation of the 29 march policy. >> okay. and just to take this one step further. on the board on which you sit, is this to determine governmentwide policy or also to approve particular projects or to evaluate pa