eric says look, you have to understand how powerful metadata is. you can run algorithms, you can the relationships, on and on and on. we go that's all true, eric, but we don't do that. all we get to do is take it any of those numbers called up one? >> host: know and believe me when i said google and amazon particularly together along with saving some of the companies like this who managed data, they know a lot more about you and what you buy and what sites you visit and so forth in the u.s. government does. >> guest: the public discussion got worse. a lot of folks should know better who say consistently, even after someone may try to explain this to them, they would say consistently, and then come and then if you really get interested in him has called the number they can simply click on the number and get the contents of the call. my explanation of that is that's not a violation of the laws of attorney, that's a violation of the laws of physics but you can't do that. it's not physically possible. >> host: let me turn you to another simple, easy go

collection, just for telephone metadata but for any metadata, not only under that section of the patriot act but under a host of different government statutes. that was well handled, and it enhanced our national security and the privacy of u.s. citizens. we have to handle this in the same way. kate: another judiciary issue that a lot of us have been following closely. there has not been any action passedhe committees sweeping patent reform action last year. there is worry in the tech community that the clock is running out, as it does every two years. now you see lawmakers introducing much more narrow bills, aimed at reforms so the so-called patent trolls cannot bring their cases to court. that is partly taken from your action -- words in the innovation act. rep. goodlatte: if you take the which is patent litigation reform, it addresses six or seven different areas of the law. supported.widely in the last congress, it was passed out of the committee with a big bipartisan vote. 350s supported by more than organizations around the country who recognize that patent trolling, the extortionat

collection not just for telephone metadata but any kind of metadata and not just under that particular section of the patriot act but under whole host of different government statue so i think that was well handled and an enhanced or national security and u.s. citizens privacy. we have to handle the same one. >> guest: another judiciary issue that i know we have been following closely is patent reform. there hasn't been any floor action since your committee and the senate judiciary committee passed a sweeping patent reform bill last year they think there is some sense of worry and the tech community that the clock is running out as it does every year. now lawmakers aren't adducing much more of narrow bill specifically in depth then you reforms in the so-called patent control. you can't bring your cases in the courts that are friendly to them in that language is partly taken from your language. are you open to moving the bill's? >> guest: well if you take the innovation act is patent litigation reform committee addresses six or seven different areas of the law and it is very widely supp

collection not just for telephone metadata, but for any kind of metadata, and not just under that particular section of the patriot act, but under a whole host of different government statutes. so i think that was well handled, and it both enhanced our national security and citizens' privacy. we've got to handle this same one, this issue in the same manner. >> another judiciary issue that i know a lot of us have been following very closely is patent reform. there hasn't been floor angst since both -- action since both committees passed sweeping reforms last year, and i think there's some, you know, sense of worry in the tech community that, you know, just the clock is running out as it does every two years. now you see some lawmakers introducing much more narrow bills specifically aimed at, you know, venue reform so that the so-called patent trolls can't bring their cases in courts that are especially friendly to them, and that language is largely taken from your language. are you open to moving a venue-only bill? >> guest: well, if you take the innovation act which is patent litigation refo

and so the metadata is literally the outside of the envelope. american law enforcement traditionally have looked at the outside of the envelope. the supreme court decided that who you called and when and how long also was essentially the outside of the envelope. the court held at 5-3. but then the telephonic metadata had no expectation of privacy and therefore was not constitutionally protected. >> it was decided that to a degree that it should stop the commander-in-chief from doing that and that has stood up in court. on two occasions it was taken as a given and the president has the constitutional authority. we have gathered the data. i think constitutionally we have done a lot quicker. but out of respect with american privacy we gathered the data and we put it into one of the lockboxes where it is not just lying there, we did not try to create relationships around algorithms against it or anything, which is frankly common practice. who so there is kind of a nervousness about their among the right left political reception and i just don't want

comey: in most circumstances, right -- metadata -- rep. chaffetz: in this case -- let's talk about this case. you -- you want to talk about this case. dir. comey: my understanding is you can see most of the metadata. rep. chaffetz: how would you define metadata?comey: i was just going to say that. metadata, as i understand it, is records of time of contact, numbers assigned to the caller or texture. but content. you cannot see what i said but you can see that i texted to you in erie. with texts in particular, that's tricky, particularly texting using imessage. there's limitations to our ability to see the metadata around that. again, i am not an expert. that is my understanding. rep. chaffetz: and do you believe that geolocation, if you're tracking somebody's actual -- where they are, is that content, or is that metadata? dir. comey: my understanding is it depends upon whether you're talking historical or real-time, when it comes to geolocation data. but it can very much implicate the warrant requirement and does in the fbi work a lot. rep

espionage, collecting metadata, comparing the metadata with known -- you guys know this stuff, okay? you do all those things that a lot of our european friends are wringing their hands about. so i'm less inclined -- i might criticize the belgians for a what they did immediately. i'm less inclined to create them for what their police did in that 96-hour period. i am more inclined to say, now, do you want to have that conversation you thought you had two years ago about electronic surveillance? you want to do it now with maybe a better handle on what the real facts are and why this is being done? okay? and i just thought the soccer metaphor would work were the in europe -- better in europe than baseball, okay in. [laughter] and i mean it. that stuff that became so controversial is about controlling the midfield. david ignatius had a wonderful piece in the post two days ago in which he said after this all the europeans are now lining up in front of the american intelligence leviathan. [laughter] and demanding more product. while till wringing their hands -- still wringing their hands ab

hayden also said, we kill people based on metadata. youman heart before the metadata when edwards snowden, famous whistleblower, reveals that the national security, they nsas was celting metta data on all of us and that is the phone calls we make, the sites we visit, our e-mails and they're supposedly not reading the content but just looking at the metadata. so, hayden said, quote, we kill people based on metadata, but our -- recently revealed that the nsa's skynet program, which uses an algorithm to gather metadata in order to identify and target terror suspects in pakistan, somalia and afghanistan, would result in 99,000 false positives. so what happens is that they target a cell phone believed to be carried by a terrorist, let's say gives it to his mother. she is the one who gets killed, based upon this metadata. obama said in an interview in the "atlantic" he has no second thoughts about the drone strikes in the middle east. armed drones are operated by pilots located thousands of miles from their targets. how many of you saw the f

and this approach of sealing the border is preposterous. metadata, do u.s. law enforcement officials have the capabilities today that they need in order to collect that information? >> well, as you know, the law changed recently, last year, so that the metadata is now held by the telephone companies. itself. and one of the challenges is to make sure that there is a platform that allows the rapid assessment of whether there's a metadata connection, and it's in the hands of the telephone companies. i think that is a little bit challenging. i think we are in good shape. but i think we can get in better shape. and this to me understores the importance of building that capability and implementing it as quickly as possible. >> once again, the debate and discussion continues about that collection there. secretary chertoff, thank you. this morning. donald trump says that this attack shows weakness against terrorists. more reaction from the (vo) you can check on them. you can worry about them. you can even choose a car for them. (mom) honey, are you ok? (child) i'm o

and this approach of sealing the border is preposterous. >> on that question of the metadata, do u.s. law enforcement officials have the capabilities today that they need in order to collect that information? >> well, as you know, the law changed recently, last year, so that the metadata is now held by the telephone companies. and not by the government itself. and one of the challenges is to make sure that there is a platform that allows the rapid assessment of whether there's a metadata connection, and it's in the hands of the telephone companies. i think that is a little bit challenging. i think we are in good shape. but i think we can get in better shape. importance of building that capability and implementing it as quickly as possible. >> once again, the debate and discussion continues about that collection there. secretary chertoff, thank you. this morning. donald trump says that this terrorists. pr >>> back with our continuing coverage of this breaking news. we should note president obama is in cuba this morning. he is expected to speak about the attacks that happened in brussel

and this approach of sealing the border is preposterous. >> on that question of the metadata, do u.s. law capabilities today that they information? >> well, as you know, the law changed recently, last year, so that the metadata is now held by the telephone companies. and not by the government itself. and one of the challenges is to make sure that there is a platform that allows the rapid assessment of whether there's a metadata connection, and it's in the hands of the telephone companies. i think that is a little bit challenging. i think we are in good shape. but i think we can get in better shape. and this to me understores the importance of building that >> once again, the debate and discussion continues about that collection there. secretary chertoff, thank you. this morning. donald trump says that this terrorists. presidential candidada >>> back with our continuing coverage of this breaking news. we should note president obama is in cuba this morning. he is expected to speak about brussels. we're going to have special report with his comments shortly after 10:00 a.m. eastern time.

metadata, do u.s. law capabilities today that they information? >> well, as you know, the law changed recently, last year, so that the metadata is now held by the telephone companies. itself. and one of the challenges is to make sure that there is a platform that allows the rapid assessment of whether there's a metadata connection, and it's in the hands of the telephone companies. i think that is a little bit challenging. i think we are in good shape. but i think we can get in better shape. and this to me understores the importance of building that capability and implementing it as quickly as possible. >> once again, the debate and discussion continues about that collection there. secretary chertoff, thank you. >> and thank you for your time this morning. donald trump says that this more reaction from the hey what are you here for? you getting poked, prodded or pinched?? uhhh yeah, colon cancer screening. hey me too, second time. it's a piece of cake! that sounds good right now. it's no big deal. that's what everyone tells me. today there is more

and this approach of sealing the border is preposterous. >> on that question of the metadata, do u.s. law enforcement officials have the capabilities today that they need in order to collect that information? >> well, as you know, the law changed recently, last year, so that the metadata is now held by the telephone companies. and not by the government itself. and one of the challenges is to make sure that there is a platform that allows the rapid assessment of whether there's a metadata connection, and it's in the hands of the telephone companies. i think that is a little bit challenging. i think we are in good shape. but i think we can get in better shape. and this to me understores the capability and implementing it as quickly as possible. >> once again, the debate and discussion continues about that collection there. secretary chertoff, thank you. >> and thank you for your time this morning. donald trump says that this attack shows weakness against terrorists. presid (vo) you can check on them. you can worry about them. you can even choose a car for them. (mom) honey, are you ok?

espionage, collecting metadata, comparing the data with known -- you guys know this. you do all those things that a lot of the european friends are wringing their hands about. i am less inclined -- i might criticize the build him's what they did immediately. i'm less inclined to criticize them for their police did in that 96 hour period. i am more inclined to say now you want to have a conversation you thought you had two years ago about electronic surveillance? you want to do it now, with maybe a better handle on what the real facts are? and why this is being done? i just thought the soccer metaphor would work better in europe than baseball. [laughter] and i mean it. that stuff that became so controversial is about controlling the midfield. david ignatius has a wonderful piece in the post two days ago where he said after this all the europeans are now lining up in front of the american intelligence leviathan. [laughter] they are demanding more product. they are still wringing their hands about american collection. control the midfield. extend the metaphor. about one

the collection of that metadata has proven to be very important could be a follow-on plot here. look, the bottom line is, when you have cancer, you go at it with a scalpel, you don't take a meat ax. and this approach of sealing the border is preposterous. >> on that question of the metadata, do u.s. law enforcement officials have the capabilities today that they need in order to collect that information? >> well, as you know, the law changed recently, last year, so that the metadata is now held by the telephone companies. and not by the government itself. and one of the challenges is to make sure that there is a platform that allows the rapid assessment of whether there's a metadata connection, and it's in the hands of the telephone companies. i think that is a little bit challenging. i think we are in good shape. but i think we can get in better shape. and this to me understores the importance of building that capability and implementing it as quickly as possible. >> once again, the debate and collection there. secretary chertoff, thank you. >> and thank you for your time this

border is preposterous. >> on that question of the metadata, do u.s. law enforcement officials have the capabilities today that they need in order to collect that information? >> well, as you know, the law changed recently, last year, so that the metadata is now held by the telephone companies. and not by the government itself. and one of the challenges is to make sure that there is a platform that allows the rapid assessment of whether there's a metadata connection, and it's in the hands of the telephone companies. i think that is a little bit challenging. i think we are in good shape. but i think we can get in better shape. and this to me understores the importance of building that capability and implementing it as quickly as possible. >> once again, the debate and discussion continues about that collection there. secretary chertoff, thank you. >> and thank you for your time this morning. donald trump says that this attack shows weakness against terrorists. more reaction from the presid ti see vanilla specks.. a little crushed vanilla bean. twenty hu

nineteen breaks a new details in the case of a local metadata the concertth. did 6-2 corey. called on a passion or did someone put him there. the eye team reporter has an exclusive story. >> the eye team obtained the never before seen photographs to get an inside look at the investigation surrounding the deathoo of 22 -year-old -- chute during a concert in 2014.0 the picture shows the 24-inch by 24-inch pressure that cody. alleged gotten into the night he died. >> the circumstances run are one of the then man that just graduated graduated, got new job had a great familyly life. no signs of despondency or depression.s >> you got the ankle and 45. a team of retired federal agents asked by chris have f don't think that corey's death was an accident. same corey headpieces to the head and chest thath were caused prior to his death. >> we believe that the flow is to the head and the ribs to advocate of the probabilities worth of this was hit and kicked first on that garbage chute. >> leading the skaters to the conclusion our discussions great family in place in the corners office,

metadata, collecting comparing the data with known -- you guys know this. you do all those things that a lot of the european friends are wringing their hands about. -- i mightnclined criticize the build him's what they did immediately. i'm less inclined to criticize them for their police did in that 96 hour period. i am more inclined to say now you want to have a conversation you thought you had two years ago about electronic surveillance? withant to do it now, maybe a better handle on what the real facts are? and why this is being done? i just thought the soccer metaphor would work better in europe than baseball. [laughter] and i mean it. that stuff that became so controversial is about controlling the midfield. david ignatius has a wonderful piece in the post two days ago where he said after this all the europeans are now lining up in front of the american intelligence leviathan. [laughter] they are demanding more product. they are still wringing their hands about american collection. control the midfield. extend the metaphor. about one more -- i have got

there is metadata about computer metadata and you trace it back, the kind of computer it was created on and when and how. liz: the window into isis at psychology could be opened further with this information. >> is very troubling. they have an entire brigade of martyrs, people who have committed have time to kill themselves in battle. liz: 800 germans have gone overseas to fight with isis. 800. you can stop that flow because they have passports and the ability to come back secretly and large paris style attacks. >> even worse, they come into the united states on a visa. now we have the list. of the list is really is good. if it is geo this will be future for us. liz: i have to ask about apple versus the fbi review as big cybersecurity organization run by general alexander, how will this play out? >> both sides are dug-in, you got to find a way to work together. at the end of the day we have to find a path forward that makes sense. you can't give up privacy but you can't give up security. liz: thank you so much. come back again. while we were talking look what happened with the dow jo

and this approach of sealing the border is prepostestion of the metadata, do u.s. law enforcement officials have the capabilities today that they need in order to collect that information? >> well, as you know, the law changed ar, so that the metadata is now held by the telephone companies. and not by the government itself. and one of the challenges is to there is a platform that allows the rapid assessment of whether there's aon, and it's in the hands of the telephone companies. i think that is a little bit challenging. but i think we can get in betterd this to me understores the importance of building that capability and implementing it as quickly as possible. >> once again, the debate and discussiont collection there. secretary chertoff, thank you. >> and thank you for your time this morning. donald trump says that this attack shows weakness against more reaction from the presidendi >> samantha: thanks so much, gail. time is 8:38. it's 38 degrees outside, and this is a live look over downtown cleveland. a little hazy out there this morning, mostly cloudy from th

and this approach of sealing the border is preposterous. >> on that question of the metadata, do u.s. law enforcement officials have the capabilities today that they need in order to collect that information? >> well, as you know, the law changed recently, last year, so that the metadata is now held by the telephone companies. and not by the government itself. and one of the challenges is to make sure that there is a platform that allows the rapid assessment of whether there's a metadata connection, and it's in the hands of the telephone companies. i think that is a little bit challenging. i think we are in good shape. but i think we can get in better shape. and this to me understores the importance of building that capability and implementing it as quickly as possible. >> once again, the debate and discussion continues about that collection there. secretary chertoff, thank you. >> and thank you for your time this morning. donald trump says that this attack shows weakness against terrorists. more reaction from the we know designer when we see it. like the designer smile. it's bolder,

the metadata is not encrypted. if i called someone else for that phone had called at other people, all the information is available to the fbi, correct? >> in most cases. let's talk about this case. >> you can see the metadata, correct? we can see most of the metadata. >> how would you define metadata. >> it is records of time of contact, numbers assigned to the particular color or texture, it's everything except content. you can't see what somebody said but you can see someone texted you in theory. my understanding is that can be tricked tricky. there are sometimes limitation on my ability to see do you believe geolocation, if you're tracking somebody's actual, where they are, is that, is that content or is that metadata? >> my understanding is it depends upon whether you're talking historical or real-time. it can very much implicate the warrant environment and does a lot. there is nobody on this panel that's representative of the people that can see what the guidance is and understand how you interpret and what y

you can look at metadata, correct? >> yes. >> if i called someone else or that phone had called other people, all of that information is available to the fbi, correct? >> in most circumstances. >> in this case, you want to talk about this case. you can see the metadata, correct? >> my understanding is we can see most of the metadata. >> how would you define metadata. >> as i understand it, records of time of contact, numbers assigned to the particular caller or texter. it's everything except content. you can't see what somebody said, but you can see that i text to you in theory. my understanding with texts in particular that's tricky. texting using i message there's limits to our availability. i'm not an expert, but that's my understanding. >> do you believe that if you're tracking where somebody is, is that content or metadata? >> it depends upon whether you're talking historical or realtime. but it can very much implicate the warrant requirement. it does in the fbi's work a lot. >> what's frustrating to me being the

and this approach of sealing the border is preposterous. >> on that question of the metadata, do u.s. law enforcement officials have the capabilities today that they need in order to collect that information? >> well, as you know, the law changed recently, last year, so that the metadata is now held by the telephone companies. and not by the government itself. and one of the challenges is to make sure that there is a platform that allows the rapid assessment of whether there's a the hands of the telephone companies. i think that is a little bit challenging. i think we are in good shape. but i think we can get in better shape. and this to me understores the importance of building that capability and implementing it as quickly as possible. >> once again, the debate and discussion continues about that collection there. secretary chertoff, thank you. >> and thank you for your time this morning. donald trump says that this attack shows weakness against terrorists. more reaction from the pres >>> clouds are scattered around the area. we have blue skies to the east but it so cold. 35 degrees

collecting metadata, comparing the meta data -- you know this stuff. you do all of those things that a lot of our european friends are ringing their hands about. i am less inclined, i might criticize the belgiums for what they did immediately but less inclined to criticize them for what their police did in that 96-hour period. i am more inclined to say you want to have that conversation you thought you had two years ago about electronic surveillance? want to do it now with a better handle on the facts and why this is being done? i thought the soccer metaphor would work better in europe than baseball. and i mean it. that stuff that became so controversial is about controlling the mid field. david ignasious with a wonderful police saying the people are lining up demanding more control. after you establish control of the mid field and you can blunt aatta atta attacks before they get into your airports, why don't you think about scoring goals? get into the attack zone and worry about threatening their goal level. aggressively take this fight to this back t

if we need to -- it's metadata. >> first and foremost, that's what we need. >> we've done far more authoritarian things than having apple help catch terrorists. i'm not saying i agree with those authoritarian things. this is just low-hanging fruit, for them to be doing this, the only thing i can be thinking of is tim cook is looking for a cheap marketing ploy. >> let me bring adam in here for one second. >> i just want to point out, again, i'm not 100% on their side at all, but they have said, if this was in the cloud, we've answered many of these requests, we've helped out law enforcement many times, we can do that. but we created the phone in such a way that the bad guys can't get into it, now you're asking us to devote our resources, it's a bad precedent. >> they're one of the biggest companies in the world. >> it's a principle. >> of course they can do it. >> adam, if the richest company in the world wants to, they can throw a few bucks at this thing. >> i get that. so do they. you should be scared of the united states. >> this segment is over. you can bring it up on twitter later on. >>> hi

guest: it is true that the verizon data is metadata and not necessarily the data. very often enough to follow up on new leads. they would know for instance who the shooter was texting with and so on. the leads are preserved to the verizon data. again, it is true that icloud backups are optional. apple walks you through a process when you set up the phone and the default option is to academic to icloud. in this case, that is what the shooter had done. then, so, as far as this phone it is noted, particularly a concern. i think the fbi does have all the information that it's going to get. even if apple were to crack the phone. host: how did you get involved in this conversation in this business? i have always loved technology and my background is in economics. have age mason, we center that this academic isearch on policy issues and -- hadlled to have been the opportunity to join the four years ago and i now leave their technology policy team. phoneopening this compromises all of this security. this is a tweet. we talk about issues involving technology ended on public

especially given the wealth of metadata that the fbi already has been able to extract. they know who he is called, who syed farook culprit they know the content of this sms messages. they know what patsies download. they even have a backup copy of the iphone albeit one data back to october 19 but we are not talking about the huge gap. isn't it really just what an opportune for the fbi to make a point rather than to actually gather evidence speak with i have two reactions because this has been raised quite a bit. want is we don't want certain laws for law-enforcement really, really, really wants evidence and whatever they choose kind of want evidence. the rule is both decent weather not a judge says they can get and that's the role. a little bit i think while certainly the facts might be more friendly in one case for another, it might be more or less useful in front of the public conversation. i think it's important to understand we are attempting to help neutral principles. >> by the all writs access necessity. >> ss because when the government can do it so. it's the as

if we need to -- it's metadata. >> first and foremost, that's what we need. >> we've done far more authoritarian things than having apple help catch terrorists. i'm not saying i agree with those authoritarian things. this is just low-hanging fruit, for them to be doing this, the only thing i can be thinking of is tim cook is looking for a cheap marketing ploy. >> let me bring adam in here for one second. >> i just want to point out, again, i'm not 100% on their side at all, but they have said, if this was in the cloud, we've answered many of these requestst many times, we can do that. but we created the phone in such a way that the bad guys can't get into it, now you're asking us to devote our resources, it's a bad precedent. >> they're one of the biggest companies in the world. >> it's a principle. >> of course they can do it. >> adam, if the richest company in the world wants to, they can throw a few bucks at this thing. >> i get that. so do they. you should be scared of the united states. >> this segment is over. you can bring it up on twitter later on. >>> hillary and bernie compete for dele

i mean, they already have the metadata. remember all the discussion of metadata? like, the business record of what numbers my phone has dialed and what numbers have dialed my phone. that's already out there. that's not in the phone. they could have got that already from verizon or sprint or whoever. that's out there. in fact, the nsa director said in an interview that there are no foreign numbers in the metadata that they've seen. so i don't know what's in this phone that they need. if they really wanted, they thought there was something in here that we need right now for national security purposes, they could have sent a letter to the nsa, the nsa believed it, they could have gone to the attorney general, gotten an order, and they could have hacked into this phone in certain ways that did not require the active cooperation of apple. they can do -- there are many wayses they can do this. ways they can do this. same time, apple -- so i think, basically, what the fbi is trying to do and i think apple is right about this, they are looking for a new legal precedent th

some is collect information, metadata. people communicating with other people. focus on people who might be threats. some of it is randomness. having canine teams in area where people congregate. you see this sometimes on the train. the dogs walk by. having an armed presence in certain areas so you can respond quickly. none of these things are a perfect magic bullet. they will never have a perfect level of security. but you're reducing the risk, managing the risk. >> michael, you talk about metadata, the nsa has it. we had an incidence with snowden, maybe we were more vigilant -- were we more vigilant before snowden than after? >> no question that snowden created a lot of misinformation and a lot of pushback against intelligence collection. it was an effort to look at what we're doing, see the things that are excessive and need to be reformulated. i think on balance we still have most of the capabilities that we had before. and unlike ten years ago, we built an ability to use behavioral analytics and to collect and assimilate and integrate data that is far super

to be able to search the metadata. i might want-- i might want to watch films by my favorite actress. i might want to watch a comedy one night. i might be in the mood for comedy. i will say show me the latest comedies. and so you know, today we have an enormous amount of content. we only have 700 channels. but we don't have anything to watch. because we don't have the time to go through 700 channels on channel search. >> sounds look a great bruce spring steen song, dnt it. >> it does. but it's so true though. you think about it. and so we're trying to take all of that clutter away and make it simple. >> and how long will it take to you do that. >> well, i think in the beginning we've got netflix, hulu, showtime, hbo. >> rose: today. >> that will be searchable when we start shipping in a couple of weeks. they will be on there. i think others will rapidly come. and if we can do something to be a cat list for that, we'll do it. and. >> rose: what does that mean, if we can be a cat list for that, we'll do it. >> meaning if

metadata political correctness and american exceptionalism it is the best place for that message message, because texans have a merciless content for political correctness. and i am always reminded of that i had occasion last year to be in the your with a photograph taken with the young lady she happens to hail from the opposite side of politics in the photo posted on facebook sure enough there i was on sixth avenue from fox news and myself on starts reading -- bringing. he says you have a minute? i thank you are making a mistake. i said what have i done wrong? i now want you messing with no liberal women. [laughter] i love that refreshing friendship and honesty that emanates from the texan and spirit. i also have to think my friends from colonel last the extraordinary ability so i figure i have 30 seconds before they take the offstage. but to have graciousness and knowledge it is touching that he is spending so much time with young men and women who share the values of the traditional principles so ladies and gentlemen, we stand here in the greatest history of the world the constitution

including metadata. very helpful in identifying people that might be a threat. the issue here is whether the marginal benefit of handing out the encryption for the occasional case is worth the fact that you are opening millions of users to a risk from criminals are from foreign powers to get their data. i would argue that in the long for people tolly maintain trust in the internet it is important to allow us to continue to build more security medications and better encryption and reduce on her abilities so that people don't get our stuff. emily: should there be any warrant proof devices? michael chertoff: it is not that they are legally warrant proof. that may incidentally preventer law enforcement from getting out information. the fact that we don't have a perpetual recording device in our houses don't make it easy for law enforcement like in the book 1984 doesn't mean we are doing something wrong. we're balancing personal security and privacy against other issues. emily: i spoke with attorney general loretta lynch yesterday. lynch: if there was a box of docume

so-called "gang of eight," what was then called stellar wind, which was precursor to the bulk telephone metadata program. i insisted then and believe now that security and liberty are not zero-sum game. you get more of both or you get neither. two former congressional colleagues of mine, ted's colleagues, zoe lofgren of california and darrell issa a republican, wrote an op-ed yesterday for "the los angeles times," my hometown paper. they say the debate is too big for one courtroom. a conversation belongs to congress. and so here at the wilson center today we want to kick-start that dialogue. we have a rock star program starting with congressman ted lew, a leader on these issues. one of congress's few genuine techies. we are pleased to welcome another good friend, kate martin, senior fellow at center for american progress and former long time director of national security studies and someone i consulted regularly trying to wrap my old brain around these very tough issues. we also have susan hennessey, is she here? there she is. managing editor of law fair and national security agency lawyer and d

when the metadata discussion, it's not tracking phone calls. you've got gazillions of records out there that the government has to have a centralized place to be able to have that data, to be able to access the data if the need arises. they can't go out and get court orders with companies that may oar may not cooperate. >> gotcha. thanks. >> this is an important point, one that everyone should recognize, there's always going to be information that the government can't access. even if apple voluntarily complied with the order. there are all sorts of communicating in secure methods that the government is not able to access. this is about getting the access to which they're a able to get access. right? in this case apple continues to maintain the capability. they admit they're able to do this. in the fub chur apple might change the way their technology is structured so it can no longer main tin the capability that the government is requesting. they're allowed to make the technological and the business decisions that make sense for their business m

they already have the metadata, the business records of what numbers the iphone has dialed, that is already out there. they could have gotten that from verizon or sprint, the intercept -- interstate director said there is no formula for the metadata. i don't know what is in this phone. if they really wanted, they thought there was something in there we need right now for national security purposes, they could send the letter to the nsa, the nsa believes it, the attorney general -- in certain ways it did not require the act of cooperation. at the same time, apple is right about this, they are looking for a new legal president that gives them the authority to do this kind of thing before encryption gets really hard. it is going to make it much harder for law enforcement and intelligence, not impossible, and a talked with a number of people, white house hackers and people in the intelligence agency and i am pretty convinced there is a way apple could have cooperated without writing a new operating system. they were being forced to do by their first amendment rights and commercial energy. the f

gang of eight on what was then called stellar wind, which was the preoccur son to the bulk telephone metadata program. i insisted then and believe now that security and liberty are not a zero sum game. you get more of both or you get neither. two former congressional colleagues of mine, ted's colleague, zolof and darrell issa, a republican, wrote an op-ed yesterday for the los angeles times, my home town paper. they say the debate is too big for one courtroom. the conversation belongs to congress. and so here, at the wilson center today, we want to kickstart that dialogue. we have a rock star program starting with congressman ted lieu, a leader on these issues and one of congress' few genuine tech keys. we're also pleased to welcome another good friend, kate martin, senior fellow and former long-time director at the center for national security studies and someone i consulted regularly trying to wrap my old brain around these very tough issues. we also have susan hennessey. is she here? >> yes. >> there she is. i can't see her. managing editor of lawfare and lawyer. and dave pererra, reporter

around really crazy on letters in thet, alphabet to be by voice and we are down in the mated data -- metadata. to watch films about my favorite actress. i might want to watch a comedy. show me the latest comedies. today we have an enormous amount of content. we have 700 channels. we don't have anything to watch because we don't have the time to go through 700 channels to find it. charlie: sounds like a bruce springsteen song. takeook: we are trying to all of that clutter away and make it simple. gothe beginning, we've netflix, hulu, showtime, hbo, when wel be searchable start shipping. they will be on there. others will rapidly come. if we can do something to be a catalyst for that, we will do it. if we can see a way to get the world to move in this by playing ater role, we will do it. in particular, charlie, think about the presidential debate tomorrow night. it would be great instead of having a focus group of 100 people, in a room somewhere, telling us what they thought, it would be great to source the american people on it. if you have a convergence of tv you can do that instantly. the 20

loretta: look to remember the conversation about metadata, what numbers i'm calling and receiving? that is owned by the phone companies, verizon, sprint, whatever company the guy was using. that information is already known. the fbi, the nsa, can get access to that with a court order from the companies. was the number of a terrorist in pakistan or whatever on this number, they would know that. there is very little -- look. on both sides, fbi is trying to create new precedents. one thing that needs to be realized as there has been cooperation or complicity, call it what you will, between the telecoms and the intelligence community, the law-enforcement community, going back to the 1920's when an organization that was nicknamed the black chamber, which grew out of a world war i intelligence agency, got western union to turn over all the telegraphs they had. this was renewed with telephone companies. it got into the internet companies. it works both ways. the nsa got into microsoft's stuff. it and would look at say, the first windows program had 1500 points of vulnerability. the nsa he

people who may not have known their phones were collecting metadata or what have you. law enforcement has a legitimate purpose in america. now, there are constitutional restrictions on that. it has to do with due process. the 14th amendment and everything like that. but, law enforcement has the responsibility to do as much as it could. shouldn't there be a way for society to develop laws that will say, yes, we know long to see, but they have to check off your and here and here. and say under no circumstances can they do it because we can develop ways to can never do it. max: i think apple plans to build something that is effectively unbreakable is actually the right ring to do. i think it is most certainly the case that people trying to safeguard themselves have access berry, anyft, black , someone who is keen on protecting data knows how to do so and will do so. the fbi and the cia have used exploitations and bugs in that practice will remain. that is not something we need to worry about. that is the spy craft of the agencies. the notion of compelling the company to d

the metadata is still out there. there's no prohibition on the government other than having to issue a warrant to get that information. if there was urgency in this case, why didn't they do this back in december? what are they opening up for the future? we have to be very careful here. >> you wear a disguise going into your "new york times" -- do you go in there as who you are? >> i just think -- i think there is a middle ground. unfortunately what's happened here is this idea that somehow it's absolutionists on both sides. >> they're all whispering, that sorkin guy. >> i'll take it. >> congressman, thank you. congressman chaffetz on the size of right there. >> okay. when we return, jim cramer always on the side of right from the new york stock exchange. we'll talk to the man in just a moment. e*trade is all about seizing opportunity. and i'd like to... cut. so i'm gonna take this opportunity to direct. thank you, we'll call you. evening, film noir, smoke, atmosphere... bob... you're a young farmhand and e*trade is y

including metadata. records of who calls who and who communicates with who, which are very helpful in identifying people that might be a threat. the issue here is whether the marginal benefit of handing -- handicapping and encryption for the fact that we are putting millions of innocent people at risk for criminals or foreign powers to get their data and misuse it. emily: is it? michael: in the long run, strategically, it is to the benefit of the people this -- of this country to trust the internet. it is important to allow us to build more secure communications, better encryption, and reduce vulnerabilities so bad people don't get our stuff. emily: should there be any warrant proof devices? michael chertoff: it is not that they are legally warrant proof. if you want to design a system that is simply not accessible except by those who send and receive messages, i think there is real value in that. that may incidentally preventer -- prevent law enforcement from getting out information. the fact that we do

over the e-mails he handed over paper hard copies and let e-mails meaning she kept for herself the metadata that underlies every e-mail which the government would have gotten had she not taken in the first place. i am sick and tired of hearing her say this that she says over and over again, she said it to bret baier on what we just ran, quote, i neither sent or received e-mails marked classified. mrs. clinton knows this. nothing is marked classified. markings are confidential, secret or top-secret. she materially misrepresented bret baier, to the audience, to the democrats and the fbi who heard their say that until they're sick of hearing patty: >> why did people want to sweep this under the rug? judge napolitano: they are hardened supporters for her, they have a dream of a female progress in the white house and are willing to overlook even criminal activity to achieve that goal. >> we are learning she personally wrote 100 secretive e-mails. judge napolitano: they contain state secrets, she was oblivious of the fact that these were state secrets and failed to safeguard them. she wrote them

but even from the paris attacks, they haven't gleaned much from the metadata, the data mining. they're learning as they go, just as they're learning how to make better bombs, and communicate with each other and hide these cells. in addition, they're being protected by the local communities. as salah abdeslam was. if he knew about the attacks on the airport, let's wait to see on that. another thing they've learned is to compartment their information. they don't tell each other what they're about ready to do. and they don't need instructions from syria. all are data collection, it's been initiated in a big way. >> congressman rogers, i remember being in paris, and there were at the time reports and concerns that something like this could happen. some sort of an attack on an airport. is this something that can be prevented? again, this happened in a city that is already on high alert and was expecting an attack. >> well, you know, guards, gates and guns is the old debate. the intelligence that we need needs to be both electronic and intelligence generated. that's how you're going

they're not connected with metadata. they're not calling each other. they're compartmented. as the islamic state loses ground in iraq and syria, the way they're going to react is by striking europe. >> i thank you all for much. outfront next, a utah teen who survived a brush with death in the airport bombing. our camera is there for the emotional reunion. ted cruz lashing out over a salacious tabloid story. >> so donald when he has losing, when he's scared, when republicans are uniting against him, decides to pedal sleaze and slime. ful moments. with flonase allergy relief, they wont. most allergy pills only control one inflammatory substance. flonase controls six. and six is greater than one. flonase changes everything. you can get a great andeal on this jetta., it drives great... volkswagen believes safety is very important so all eleven models come standard with an intelligent crash response system... hmm..... .....and seven stability-enhancing systems... hmm... ...for more confidence... on road trips. hmmfff... hmm... for those who take safety seriously. like we do. the