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A tactical manual for the revolutionary. First published by the Central Intelligence 
Agency and distributed to the Contras in Central America. 

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Guerrilla warfare is essentially a political war. Therefore, its area of 
operations exceeds the territorial limits of conventional warfare, to penetrate 
the political entity itself: the "political animal" that Aristotle defined. 

In effect, the human being should be considered the priority objective 
in a political war. And conceived as the military target of guerrilla war, the 
human being has his most critical point in his mind. Once his mind has been 
reached, the "political animal" has been defeated, without necessarily 
receiving bullets. 

Guerrilla warfare is born and grows in the political environment; in 
the constant combat to dominate that area of political mentality that is 
inherent to all human beings and which collectively constitutes the 
"environment" in which guerrilla warfare moves, and which is where 
precisely its victory or failure is defined. 

This conception of guerrilla warfare as political war turns 
Psychological Operations into the decisive factor of the results. The target, 
then, is the minds of the population, all the population: our troops, the 
enemy troops and the civilian population. 

This book is a manual for the training of guerrillas in psychological 
operations, and its application to the concrete case of the Christian and 
democratic crusade being waged in Nicaragua by the Freedom Commandos. 



1. Generalities 

The purpose of this book is to introduce the guerrilla student to the 
psychological operations techniques that will be of immediate and practical 
value to him in guerrilla warfare. This section is introductory and general; 
subsequent sections will cover each point set forth here in more detail. 

The nature of the environment of guerrilla warfare does not permit 
sophisticated psychological operations, and it becomes necessary for the 
chiefs of groups, chiefs of detachments and squadron leaders to have the 
ability to carry out, with minimal instructions from the higher levels, 
psychological action operations with the contacts that are thoroughly aware 
of the situation, i.e. the foundations. 

2. Combatant-Propagandist Guerrillas 

In order to obtain the maximum results from the psychological 
operations in guerrilla warfare, every combatant should be as highly 
motivated to carry out propaganda face to face as he is a combatant. This 
means that the individual political awareness of the guerrilla of the reason 
for his struggle will be as acute as his ability to fight. 

Such a political awareness and motivation is obtained through the 
dynamic of groups and self-criticism, as a standard method of instruction for 
the guerrilla training and operations. Group discussions raise the spirit and 
improve the unity of thought of the guerrilla training and operations. Group 
discussions raise the spirit and improve the unity of thought of the guerrilla 
squads and exercise social pressure on the weak members to carry out a 
better role in future training or in combative action. Self-criticism is in terms 

of one's contribution or defects in his contribution to the cause, to the 
movement, the struggle, etc.; and gives a positive individual commitment to 
the mission of the group. 

The desired result is a guerrilla who can persuasively justify his 
actions when he comes into contact with any member of the People of 
Nicaragua, and especially with himself and his fellow guerrillas in dealing 
with the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare. This means that every guerrilla 
will be persuasive in his face-to-face communication - propagandist- 
combatant - is his contact with the people; he should be able to give 5 or 10 
logical reasons why, for example, a peasant should give him cloth, needle 
and thread to mend his clothes. When the guerrilla behaves in this manner, 
enemy propaganda will never succeed in making him an enemy in the eyes 
of the people. It also means that hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity will 
have a meaning, psychologically, in the cause of the struggle due to his 
constant orientation. 

3. Armed Propaganda 

Armed propaganda includes every act carried out, and the good 
impression that this armed force causes will result in positive attitudes in the 
population toward that force; ad it does not include forced indoctrination. 
Armed propaganda improves the behavior of the population toward them, 
and it is not achieved by force. 

This means that a guerilla-armed unit in a rural town will not give the 
impression that arms are their strength over the peasants, but rather that they 
are the strength of the peasants against the Sandinista government of 
repression. This is achieved through a close identification with the people, as 
follows: hanging up weapons and working together with them on their crops, 
in construction, in the harvesting of grains, in fishing, etc.; explanations to 
young men about basic weapons, e.g. giving them an unloaded weapon and 
letting them touch it, see it, etc.; describing in a rudimentary manner its 
operation; describing with simple slogans how weapons will serve the 
people to win their freedom; demanding the requests by the people for 
hospitals and education, reducing taxes, etc. 

All these acts have as their goal the creation of an identification of the 
people with the weapons and the guerrillas who carry them, so that the 

population feels that the weapons are, indirectly, their weapon to protect 
them and help them in the struggle against a regime of oppression. Implicit 
terror always accompanies weapons, since the people are internally "aware" 
that they can be used against them, but as long as explicit coercion is 
avoided, positive attitudes can be achieved with respect to the presence of 
armed guerrillas within the population. 

4. Armed Propaganda Teams 

Armed Propaganda Teams (EPA) are formed through a careful 
selection of persuasive and highly motivated guerrillas who move about 
within the population, encouraging the people to support the guerrillas and 
put up resistance against the enemy. It combines a high degree of political 
awareness and the "armed" propaganda ability of the guerrillas toward a 
planned, programmed, and controlled effort. 

The careful selection of the staff, based on their persuasiveness in 
informal discussions and their ability in combat, is more important than their 
degree of education or the training program. The tactics of the Armed 
Propaganda Teams are carried out covertly, and should be parallel to the 
tactical effort in guerrilla warfare. The knowledge of the psychology of the 
population is primary for the Armed Propaganda Teams, but much more 
intelligence data will be obtained from an EPA program in the area of 

5. Development and Control of the "Front" Organizations 

The development and control of "front" (or facade) organizations is 
carried out through subjective internal control at group meetings of "inside 
cadres," and the calculations of the time for the fusion of these combined 
efforts to be applied to the masses. 

Established citizens-doctors, lawyers, businessmen, teachers, etc.- will 
be recruited initially as "Social Crusaders" in typically "innocuous" 
movements in the area of operations. When their "involvement" with the 

clandestine organization is revealed to them, this supplies the psychological 
pressure to use them as "inside cadres" in groups to which they already 
belong or of which they can be members. 

Then they will receive instruction in techniques of persuasion over 
control of target groups to support our democratic revolution, through a 
gradual and skillful process. A cell control system isolates individuals from 
one another, and at the appropriate moment, their influence is used for the 
fusion of groups in a united national front. 

6. Control of Meetings and Mass Assemblies 

The control of mass meetings in support of guerrilla warfare is carried 
out internally through a covert commando element, bodyguards, messengers, 
shock forces (initiators of incidents), placard carriers (also used for making 
signals), shouters of slogans, everything under the control of the outside 
commando element. 

When the cadres are placed or recruited in organizations such as labor 
unions, youth groups agrarian organizations or professional associations, 
they will begin to manipulate the objectives of the groups. The 
psychological apparatus of our movement through inside cadres prepares a 
mental attitude which at the crucial moment can be turned into a fury of 
justified violence. 

Through a small group of guerrillas infiltrated within the masses this 
can be carried out; they will have the mission of agitating by giving the 
impression that there are many of them and that they have a large popular 
backing. Using the tactics of a force of 200-300 agitators, a demonstration 
can be created in which 10,000-20,000 persons take part. 

7. Support of Contacts with Their Roots in Reality 

The support of local contacts who are familiar with the deep reality is 
achieved through the exploitation of the social and political weaknesses of 
the target society, with propagandist-combatant guerrillas, armed 
propaganda, armed propaganda teams, cover organizations and mass 

The combatant-propagandist guerrilla is the result of a continuous 
program of indoctrination and motivation. They will have the mission of 
showing the people how great and fair our movement is in the eyes of all 
Nicaraguans and the world. Identifying themselves with our people, they 
will increase the sympathy towards our movement, which will result in 
greater support of the population for the freedom commandos, taking away 
support for the regime in power. 

Armed propaganda will extend this identification process of the 
people with the Christian guerrillas, providing converging points against the 
Sandinista regime. 

The Armed Propaganda Teams provide a several-stage program of 
persuasive planning in guerrilla warfare in all areas of the country. Also, 
these teams are the "eyes and ears" of our movement. 

The development and control of the cover organizations in guerrilla 
warfare will give our movement the ability to create a "whiplash" effect 
within the population when the order for fusion is given. When the 
infiltration and internal subjective control have been developed in a manner 
parallel to other guerrilla activities, a commandant of ours will literally be 
able to shake up the Sandinista structure, and replace it. 

The mass assemblies and meetings are the culmination of a wide base 
support among the population, and it comes about in the later phases of the 
operation. This is the moment in which the overthrow can be achieved and 
our revolution can become an open one, requiring the close collaboration of 
the entire population of the country, and of contacts with their roots in 

The tactical effort in guerrilla warfare is directed at the weaknesses of 
the enemy and at destroying their military resistance capacity, and should be 
parallel to a psychological effort to weaken and destroy their sociopolitical 
capacity at the same time. In guerrilla warfare, more than in any other type 
of military effort, the psychological activities should be simultaneous with 
the military ones, in order to achieve the objectives desired. 


1. Generalities 

The objective of this section is to familiarize the guerrilla with the 
techniques of psychological operations, which maximizes the social- 
psychological effect of a guerrilla movement, converting the guerrilla into a 
propagandist, in addition to being a combatant. The nature of the 
environment in guerrilla warfare does not permit sophisticated facilities for 
psychological operations, so that use should be made of the effective face- 
to-face persuasion of each guerrilla. 

2. Political Awareness 

The individual political awareness of the guerrilla, the reason for his 
struggle, will be as important as his ability in combat. This political 
awareness and motivation will be achieved: 

• By improving the combat potential of the guerrilla by 
improving his motivation for fighting. 

• By the guerrilla recognizing himself as a vital tie between the 
democratic guerrillas and the people, whose support is essential 
for the subsistence of both. 

• By fostering the support of the population for the national 
insurgence through the support for the guerrillas of the locale, 
which provides a psychological basis in the population for 
politics after the victory has been achieved. 

By developing trust in the guerrillas and in the population, for 
the reconstruction of a local and national government. 

• By promoting the value of participation by the guerrillas and 
the people in the civic affairs of the insurrection and in the 
national programs. 

• By developing in each guerrilla the ability of persuasion face- 
to-face, at the local level, to win the support of the population, 
which is essential for success in guerrilla warfare. 

3. Group Dynamics 

This political awareness building and motivation are attained by the 
use of group dynamics at the level of small units. The group discussion 
method and self-criticism are a general guerrilla training and operations 

Group discussions raise the spirit and increase the unity of thought in 
small guerrilla groups and exercise social pressure on the weakest members 
to better carry out their mission in training and future combat actions. These 
group discussions will give special emphasis to: 

• Creating a favorable opinion of our movement. Through local 
and national history, make it clear that the Sandinista regime is 
"foreignizing," "repressive" and "imperialistic," and that even 
though there are some Nicaraguans within the government, 
point out that they are "puppets" of the power of the Soviets and 
Cubans, i.e. of foreign power. 

• Always a local focus. Matters of an international nature will be 
explained only in support of local events in the guerrilla 

• The unification of the nation is our goal. This means that the 
defeat of the Sandinista armed forces is our priority. Our 
insurrectional movement is a pluralistic political platform from 
which we are determined to win freedom, equality, a better 

economy with work facilities, a higher standard of living, a true 
democracy for all Nicaraguans without exception. 

Providing to each guerrilla clear understanding about the 
struggle for national sovereignty against Soviet-Cuban 
imperialism. Discussion guides will lead the guerrillas so that 
they will see the injustices of the Sandinista system. 

Showing each guerrilla the need for good behavior to win the 
support of the population. Discussion guides should convince 
the guerrillas that the attitude and opinion of the population 
play a decisive role, because victory is impossible without 
popular support. 

Self-criticism will be in constructive terms that will contribute 
to the mission of the movement, and which will provide the 
guerrillas with the conviction that they have a constant and 
positive individual responsibility in the mission of the group. 
The method of instruction will be: 

a) Divisions of the guerrilla force into squads for group 
discussions, including command and support elements, 
whenever the tactical situation permits it. The makeup of 
the small units should be maintained when these groups are 

b) Assignment of a political cadre in the guerrilla force to 
each group to guide the discussion. The squad leader 
should help the cadre to foster study and the expression of 
thoughts. If there are not enough political cadres for each 
squad or post, leaders should guide the discussions, and the 
available cadres visit alternate groups. 

c) It is appropriate for the cadre (or the leader) to guide the 
discussion of a group to cover a number of points and to 
reach a correct conclusion. The guerrillas should feel that it 
was their free and own decision. The cadre should serve as 
a private teacher. The cadre or leader will not act as a 
lecturer, but will help the members of the group to study 
and express their own opinions. 

d) The political cadre will at the end of every discussion 
make a summary of the principal points, leading them to 
the correct conclusions. Any serious difference with the 
objectives of the movement should be noted by the cadre 
and reported to the commandant of the force. If necessary, 
a combined group meeting will be held and the team of 
political cadres will explain and rectify the 
mis understanding. 

e) Democratic conduct by the political cadres: living, eating 
and working with the guerrillas, and if possible, fighting at 
their side, sharing their living conditions. All of this will 
foster understanding and the spirit of cooperation that will 
help in the discussion and exchange of ideas. 

f) Carry out-group discussions in towns, and areas of 
operations whenever possible with the civilian population, 
and not limit them to camps or bases. This is done to 
emphasize the revolutionary nature of the struggle and to 
demonstrate that the guerrillas identified with the 
objectives of the people move about within the population. 
The guerrilla projects himself toward the people, as the 
political cadre does toward the guerrilla, and they should 
live, eat and work together to realize a unity of 
revolutionary thought. 

The principles for guerrilla and political-cadre group discussions are 

• Organize discussion groups at the post or squad level. A cadre 
cannot be sure of the comprehension and acceptance of the 
concepts and conclusions by guerrillas in large groups. In a 
group of the size of a squad of 10 men, the judgement and 
control of the situation is greater. In this way, all students will 
participate in an exchange among them; the political leader, the 
group leader, and also the political cadre. Special attention will 
be given to the individual ability to discuss the objectives of the 
insurrectional struggle. Whenever a guerrilla expresses his 
opinion, he will be interested in listening to the opinions of 
others, leading as a result to the unity of thought. 

• Combine the different points of view and reach an opinion or 
common conclusion. This is the most difficult task of a political 
guerrilla cadre. After the group discussions of the democratic 
objectives of the movement, the chief of the team of political 
cadres of the guerrilla force should combine the conclusions of 
individual groups in a general summary. At a meeting with all 
the discussion groups, the cadre shall provide the principal 
points, and the guerrillas will have the opportunity to clarify or 
modify their points of view. To carry this out, the conclusions 
will be summarized in the form of slogans, wherever possible. 

• Face with honesty the national and local problems of our 
struggle. The political cadres should always be prepared to 
discuss solutions to the problems observed by the guerrillas. 
During the discussions, the guerrillas should be guided by the 
following three principles: 

• Freedom of thought. 

• Freedom of expression. 

• Concentration of thoughts on the objectives of the democratic 

The result desired is a guerrilla who in a persuasive manner ca justify 
all of his acts whenever he is in contact with any member of the town/people 
and especially with himself and with his guerrilla companion by facing the 
vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare. 

This means that every guerrilla will come to have effective face-to 
face persuasion as a combatant-propagandist in his contact with the people 
to the point of giving 5-10 logical reasons why, e.g. a peasant should give 
him a piece of cloth, or a needle and thread to mend his clothes. When 
behaves in this manner, no type of propaganda of the enemy will be able to 
make a "terrorist" of him in the eyes of the people. 

In addition, hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity in the existence of the 
guerrilla acquire meaning in the cause of the struggle due to the constant 
psychological orientation. 

4. Camp Procedures 

Encamping the guerrilla units gives greater motivation, in addition to 
reducing distractions, and increases the spirit of cooperation of small units, 
relating the physical environment to the psychological one. The squad chief 
shall establish the regular camping procedure. Once thy have divested 
themselves of their packs, the chief will choose the appropriate ground for 
camping. He should select land that predominates over the zone with two or 
three escape routes. He will choose among his men and give them 
responsibilities such as: 

• Clean the camp area. 

• Provide adequate drainage in case of rain. Also build some 
trenches or holes for marksmen in case of emergency. In 
addition, he will build a stove, which will be done by making 
some small trenches and placing three rocks in place; in case 
the stove is built on a pedestal, it will be filled with clay and 

• Build a wind-breaking wall, which will be covered on the sides 
and on the top with branches and leaves of the same vegetation 
of the zones. This will serve for camouflaging and protecting it 
from aerial visibility or from enemy patrols around. 

• Construct a latrine and a hole where waste and garbage will be 
buried, which should be covered over at the time of abandoning 
the camp. 

• Once the camp has been set up, it is recommended that a 
watchman be positioned in the places of access at a prudent 
distance, where the shout of alarm can be heard. In the same 

moment the password will be established, which should be 
changed every 24 hours. The commander should establish 
ahead of time an alternate meeting point, in case of having to 
abandon the camp in a hurried manner, and they will be able to 
meet in the other already established point, and they should 
warn the patrol that if at a particular time they cannot meet at 
the established point, the should have a third meeting point. 

These procedures contribute to the motivation of the guerrilla and 
improve the spirit of cooperation in the unit. The danger, sense of insecurity, 
anxiety and daily concern in the life of a guerrilla require tangible evidence 
of belonging in an order for him to keep up his spirit and morale. 

In addition to the good physical conditions in which the guerrilla 
should find himself, good psychological conditions are necessary, for which 
group discussions and becoming a self-critic are recommended, which will 
greatly benefit the spirit and morale of the same. 

Having broken camp with the effort and cooperation of everyone 
strengthens the spirit of the group. The guerrilla will be inclined then 
towards the unity of thought in democratic objectives. 

5. Interaction with the People 

In order to ensure popular support, essential for the good development 
of guerrilla warfare, the leaders should induce a positive interaction between 
the civilians and the guerrillas, through the principle of "live, eat, and work 
with the people," and maintain control of their activities. In group 
discussions, the leaders and political cadres should give emphasis to 
positively identifying themselves with the people. 

It is not recommendable to speak of military tactical plans in 
discussions with civilians. The Communist foe should be pointed out as the 

number one enemy of the people, and as a secondary threat against our 
guerrilla forces. 

Whenever there is a chance, groups of members should be chosen 
who have a high political awareness and high disciplinary conduct in the 
work to be carried out, in order to be sent to the populous areas in order to 
direct the armed propaganda, where they should persuade the people through 
dialogue in face-to-face confrontations, where these principles should be 

• Respect for human rights and others' property. 

• Helping the people in community work. 

• Protecting the people from Communist aggressions. 

• Teaching the people environmental hygiene, to read, etc., in 
order to win their trust, which will lead to a better democratic 
ideological preparation. 

This attitude will foster the sympathy of the peasants for our 
movement, and they will immediately become one of us, through logistical 
support, coverage and intelligence information on the enemy or participation 
in combat. The guerrillas should be persuasive through the word and not 
dictatorial with weapons. If they behave in this way, the people will feel 
respected, will be more inclined to accept our message and will consolidate 
into popular support. 

In any place in which tactical guerrilla operations are carried out in 
populous areas, the squad should undertake psychological actions parallel to 
these, and should proceed, accompany and consolidate the common 
objective and explain to all the people about our struggle, explaining that our 
presence is to give peace, liberty and democracy to all Nicaraguans without 
exception, and explaining that out struggle is not against the nationals but 
rather against Russian imperialism. This will serve to ensure greater 
Psychological achievements which will increase the operations of the future. 

6. Conclusions 

The nature of the environment in guerrilla warfare does not permit 
sophisticated facilities for psychological operations, and the face-to-face 
persuasion of the guerrilla combatant-propagandists with the people is an 
effective and available tool which we should use as much as possible during 
the process of the struggle. 


1. Generalities 

Frequently a misunderstanding exists on "armed propaganda," that 
this tactic is a compulsion of the people with arms. In reality, it does not 
include compulsion, but the guerrilla should know well the principles and 
methods of this tactic. The objective of this section is to give the guerrilla 
student an understanding of the armed propaganda that should be used, and 
that will be able to be applied in guerrilla warfare. 

2. Close Identification with the People 

Armed propaganda includes all acts carried out by an armed force, 
whose results improve the attitude of the people toward this force, and it 
does not include forced indoctrination. This is carried out by a close 
identification with the people on any occasion. For example: 

• Putting aside weapons and working side by side with the 
peasants in the countryside: building, fishing, repairing roofs, 
transporting water, etc. 

• When working with the people, the guerrillas can use slogans 
such as "many hands doing small things, but doing them 

• Participating in the tasks of the people, they can establish a 
strong tie between them and the guerrillas and at the same time 
a popular support for our movement is generated. 

During the patrols and other operations around or in the midst of 
villages, each guerrilla should be respectful and courteous with the people. 
In addition he should move with care and always be well prepared to fight, if 
necessary. But he should not always see all the people as enemies, with 
suspicions or hostility. Even in war, it is possible to smile, laugh or greet 
people. Truly, the cause of our revolutionary base, the reason why we are 
struggling, is our people. We must be respectful to them on all occasions that 
present themselves. 

In places and situations wherever possible, e.g. when they are resting 
during the march, the guerrillas can explain the operation of weapons to the 
youths and young men. They can show them an unloaded rifle so that they 
will learn to load it and unload it; their use, and aiming at imaginary targets 
they are potential recruits for our forces. 

The guerrillas should always be prepared with simple slogans in order 
to explain to the people, whether in an intentional form or by chance, the 
reason for the weapons. 

"The weapons will be for winning freedom; they are for you." 

"With weapons we can impose demands such as hospitals, 
schools, better roads, and social services for the people, for 

"Our weapons are, in truth, the weapons of the people, yours." 

"With weapons we can change the Sandino-Communist regime 
and return to the people a true democracy so that we will all 
have economic opportunities." 

All of this should be designed to create an identification of the people 
with the weapons and the guerrillas who carry them. Finally, we should 
make the people feel that we are thinking of them and that the weapons are 
the people's, in order to help them and protect them from a Communist, 
totalitarian, imperialist regime, indifferent to the needs of the population. 

3. Implicit and Explicit Terror 

A guerrilla-armed force always involves implicit terror because the 
population, without saying it aloud, feels terror that the weapons may be 
used against them. However, if the terror does not become explicit, positive 
results can be expected. 

In a revolution, the individual lives under a constant threat of physical 
damage. If the government police cannot put an end to the guerrilla 
activities, the population will lose confidence in the government, which has 
the inherent mission of guaranteeing the safety of citizens. However, the 
guerrillas should be careful not to become an explicit terror, because this 
would result in a loss of popular support. 

In the words of a leader of the Huk guerrilla movement of the 
Philippine Islands: "The population is always impressed by weapons, not by 
the terror that they cause, but rather by a sensation of strength/force. We 
must appear before the people, giving them the message of the struggle." 
This is, then, in a few words, the essence of armed propaganda. 

An armed guerrilla force can occupy an entire town or small city that 
is neutral or relatively passive in the conflict. In order to conduct the armed 
propaganda in an effective manner, the following should be carried out 

• Destroy the military or police installations and remove the 
survivors to a "public place." 

• Cut all the outside lines of communications: cables, radio, 

• Set up ambushes in order to delay the reinforcements in all the 
possible entry routes. 

Kidnap all officials or agents of the Sandinista government and 
replace them in "public Places" with military or civilian persons 
of trust to our movement; in addition, carry out the following: 

Establish a public tribunal that depends on the guerrillas, and 
cover the town or city in order to gather the population for this 

Shame, ridicule and humiliate the "personal symbols" of the 
government of repression in the presence of the people and 
foster popular participation through guerrillas within the 
multitude, shouting slogans and jeers. 

Reduce the influence of individuals in tune with the regime, 
pointing out their weaknesses and taking them out of the town, 
without damaging them publicly. 

Mix the guerrillas within the population and show very good 
conduct by all members of the column, practicing the 

Any article taken will be paid for with cash. 

The hospitality offered by the people will be accepted and 
this opportunity will be exploited in order to carry out face- 
to-face persuasion about the struggle. 

Courtesy visits should be made to the prominent persons 
and those with prestige in the place, such as doctors, 
priests, teachers, etc. 

The guerrillas should instruct the population that with the 
end of the operative, and when the Sandinista repressive 
forces interrogate them, they may reveal EVERYTHING 
about the military operation carried out. For example, the 
type of weapons they use, how many men arrived, from 
what direction they came and in what direction they left, in 

In addition, indicate to the population that at meetings or in 
private discussion they can give the names of the 

Sandinista informants, who will be removed together with 
the other officials of the government of repression. 

When a meeting is held, conclude it with a speech by one of the 
leaders of guerrilla political cadres (the most dynamic), which includes 
explicit references to: 

The fact that the "enemies of the people" — the officials or Sandinista 
agents — must not be mistreated in spite of their criminal acts, although the 
guerrilla force may have suffered casualties, and that this is done due to the 
generosity of the Christian guerrillas. 

Give a declaration of gratitude for the "hospitality" of the population, 
as well as let them know that the risks that they will run when the 
Sandinistas return are greatly appreciated. 

The fact that the Sandinista regime, although it exploits the people 
with taxes, control of money, grains and all aspects of public life through 
associations, which they are forced to become part of, will not be able to 
resist the attacks of our guerrilla forces. 

Make the promise to the people that you will return to ensure that the 
"leeches" of the Sandinista regime of repression will not be able to hinder 
our guerrillas from integrating with the population. 

A statement repeated to the population to the effect that they can 
reveal everything about this visit of our commandos, because we are not 
afraid of anything or anyone, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans. Emphasize 
that we are Nicaraguans, that we are fighting for the freedom of Nicaragua 
and to establish a very Nicaraguan government. 

4. Guerrilla Weapons Are The Strength of the People over an Illegal 

The armed propaganda in populated areas does not give the 
impression that weapons are the power of the guerrillas over the people, but 

rather that the weapons are the strength of the people against a regime of 
repression. Whenever it is necessary to use armed force in an occupation or 
visit to a town or village, guerrillas should emphasize making sure that they: 

• Explain to the population that in the first place this is being 
done to protect them, the people, and not themselves. 

• Admit frankly and publicly that this is an "act of the democratic 
guerrilla movement," with appropriate explanations. 

• That this action, although it is not desirable, is necessary 
because the final objective of the insurrection is a free and 
democratic society, where acts of force are not necessary. 

• The force of weapons is a necessity caused by the oppressive 
system, and will cease to exist when the "forces of justice" of 
our movement assume control. 

If, for example, it should be necessary for one of the advanced posts 
to have to fire on a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in which 
the guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political proselytism, the 
following is recommended: 

• Explain that if that citizen had managed to escape, he would 
have alerted the enemy that is near the town or city, and they 
could carry out acts of reprisal such as rapes, pillage, 
destruction, captures, etc., it this way terrorizing the inhabitants 
of the place for having given attention and hospitalities to the 
guerrillas of the town. 

• If a guerrilla fires at an individual, make the town see that he 
was an enemy of the people, and that they shot him because the 
guerrilla recognized as their first duty the protection of citizens. 

• The command tried to detain the informant without firing 
because he, like all Christian guerrillas, espouses nonviolence. 

Firing at the Sandinista informant, although it is against his own 
will, was necessary to prevent the repression of the Sandinista 
government against innocent people. 

• Make the population see that it was the repressive system of the 
regime that was the cause of this situation, what really killed 
the informer, and that the weapon fired was one recovered in 
combat against the Sandinista regime. 

• Make the population see that if the Sandinista regime had ended 
the repression, the corruption backed by foreign powers, etc., 
the freedom commandos would not have had to brandish arms 
against brother Nicaraguans, which goes against our Christian 
sentiments. If the informant hadn't tried to escape he would be 
enjoying life together with the rest of the population, because 
not have tried to inform the enemy. This death would have been 
avoided if justice and freedom existed in Nicaragua, which is 
exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla. 

5. Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects 

It is possible to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets, such 
as court judges, mesta judges, police and State Security officials, CDS 
chiefs, etc. For psychological purposes it is necessary to gather together the 
population affected, so that they will be present, take part in the act, and 
formulate accusations against the oppressor. 

The target or person should be chosen on the basis of: 

• The spontaneous hostility that the majority of the population 
feels toward the target. 

• Use rejection or potential hatred by the majority of the 
population affected toward the target, stirring up the population 
and making them see all the negative and hostile actions of the 
individual against the people. 

• If the majority of the people give their support or backing to the 
target or subject, do not try to change these sentiments through 

• Relative difficulty of controlling the person who will replace 
the target. 

The person who will replace the target should be chosen carefully, 
based on: 

• Degree of violence necessary to carry out the change. 

• Degree of violence acceptable to the population affected. 

• Degree of predictable reprisal by the enemy on the population 
affected or other individuals in the area of the target. 

The mission to replace the individual should be followed by: 

• Extensive explanation within the population affected of the 
reason why it was necessary for the good of the people. 

• Explain that Sandinista retaliation is unjust, indiscriminate, and 
above all, a justification for the execution of this mission. 

• Carefully test the reaction of the people toward the mission, as 
well as control this reaction, making sure that the populations 
reaction is beneficial towards the Freedom Commandos. 

6. Conclusions 

Armed propaganda includes all acts executed and the impact achieved 
by an armed force, which as a result produces positive attitudes in the 
population toward this force, and it does not include forced indoctrination. 
However, armed propaganda is the most effective available instrument of a 
guerrilla force. 


1. Generalities 

In contact with the very reality of their roots, in a psychological 
operation campaign in guerrilla warfare, the comandantes will be able to 
obtain maximum psychological results from an Armed Propaganda program. 
This section is to inform the guerrilla student as to what Armed Propaganda 
Teams are in the environment of guerrilla warfare. 

2. Combination: Political Awareness and Armed Propaganda 

The Armed Propaganda Teams combine political awareness building 
with armed propaganda, which will be carried out by carefully selected 
guerrillas (preferably with experience in combat), for personal persuasion 
within the population. 

The selection of the staff is more important than the training, because 
we cannot train guerrilla cadres just to show the sensations of ardor and 
fervor, which are essential for person-to-person persuasion. More important 
is the training of persons who are intellectually agile and developed. 

An Armed Propaganda Team includes from 6 to 10 members; this 
number or a smaller number is ideal, since there is more camaraderie, 
solidarity and group spirit. The themes to deal with are assimilated more 
rapidly and the members react more rapidly to unforeseen situations. 

In addition to the combination as armed propagandist-combatant each 
member of the team should be well prepared to carry out permanent person 
to-person communication, face-to-face. 

The leader of the group should be the commando who is the most 
highly motivated politically and the most effective in face-to-face 
persuasion. The position, hierarchy or range will not be decisive for carrying 
out that function, but rather who is best qualified for communication with 
the people. 

The source of basic recruitment for guerrilla cadres will be the same 
social groups of Nicaraguans to whom the psychological campaign is 
directed, such as peasants, students, professionals, housewives, etc. The 
campesinos (peasants) should be made to see that they do not have lands; the 
workers that the State is putting an end to factories and industries; the 
doctors, that they are being replaced by Cuban paramedics, and that as 
doctors they cannot practice their profession due to lack of medicines. A 
requirement for recruiting them will be their ability to express themselves in 

The selection of the personnel is more important than the training. The 
political awareness-building and the individual capabilities of persuasion 
will be shown in the group discussions for motivation of the guerrilla as a 
propagandist-combatant chosen as cadres to organize them in teams, that is, 
those who have the greatest capacity for this work. 

The training of guerrillas for Armed Propaganda Teams emphasizes 
the method and not the content. A two-week training period is sufficient if 
the recruitment is done in the form indicated. If a mistaken process of 
recruitment has been followed, however good the training provided, the 
individual chosen will not yield a very good result. 

The training should be intensive for 14 days, through team 
discussions, alternating the person who leads the discussion among the 
members of the group. 

The subjects to be dealt with will be the same, each day a different 
theme being presented, for a varied practice. 

The themes should refer to the conditions of the place and the 
meaning that they have for the inhabitants of the locality, such as talking of 

crops, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation of crops, etc. They can also include the 
following topics: 

• Sawed wood, carpenters' tools for houses or other buildings. 

• Boats, roads, horses, oxen for transportation, fishing, 

• Problems that they may have in the place with residents, offices 
of the regime, imposed visitors, etc. 

• Force labor, service in the militia. 

• Forced membership in Sandinista groups, such as women's 
clubs, youth associations, workers' groups, etc. 

• Availability and prices of consumer articles and of basic needs 
in the grocery stores and shops of the place. 

• Characteristics of education in the public schools. 

• Anxiety of the people over the presence of Cuban teachers in 
the schools and the intrusion of politics, i.e. using them for 
political ends and not educational ones as should be. 

• Indignation over the lack of freedom of worship, and 
persecution, of which priests are victims; and over the 
participation of priests such as Escoto and Cardenal in the 
Sandinista government, against the explicit orders of his 
Holiness, the Pope. 

NOTE: Members of the team can develop other themes. 

The target groups for the Armed Propaganda Teams are not the 
persons with sophisticated political knowledge, but rather those whose 
opinion are formed from what they see and hear. The cadres should use 

persuasion to carry out their mission. Some of the persuasive methods that 
they can use are the following: 

Interior Group/Exterior Group. It is a principle of psychology that we 
humans have the tendency to form personal associations from "we" and "the 
others," or "we" and "they", "friends" and "enemies," "fellow countrymen" 
and "foreigners," "mestizos" and "gringos." 

The Armed Propaganda Team can use this principle in its activities, so 
that it is obvious that the "exterior" groups ("false" groups) are those of the 
Sandinista regime, and that the "interior" groups ("true" groups) that fight 
for the people are the Freedom Commandos. 

We should inculcate this in the people in a subtle manner so that these 
feelings seem to be born of themselves, spontaneously. 

"Against" is much easier that "for." It is a principle of political science 
that it is easier to persuade the people to vote against something or someone 
than to persuade them to vote in favor of something or someone. Although 
currently the regime has not given the Nicaraguan people the opportunity to 
vote, it is known that the people will vote in opposition, so that the Armed 
Propaganda Teams can use this principle in favor of our insurrectional 
struggle. They should ensure that this campaign is directed specifically 
against the government or its sympathizers, since the people should have 
specific targets for their frustrations. 

Primary Groups and Secondary Groups. Another principle of 
sociology is that we humans forge or change our opinions from two sources: 
primarily, through our association with our family, comrades, or intimate 
friends; and secondarily, through distant associations such as acquaintances 
in churches, clubs or committees, labor unions or governmental 
organizations. The Armed Propaganda Team cadres should join the first 
groups in order to persuade them to follow the policies of our movement, 
because it is from this type of group that the opinions or changes of opinion 

Techniques of Persuasion in Talks or Speeches: 

• Be Simple and Concise. You should avoid the use of difficult 
words or expressions and prefer popular words and expressions, 
i.e. the language of the people. In dealing with a person you 
should make use of concise language, avoiding complicated 
words. It is important to remember that we use oratory to make 
our people understand the reason for our struggle, and not to 
show off our knowledge. 

• Use Lively and Realistic Examples. Avoid abstract concepts, 
such as are used in universities in the advanced years, and in 
place of them, give concrete examples such as children playing, 
horses galloping, birds in flight, etc. 

• Use Gestures to Communicate. Communication, in addition to 
being verbal, can be through gestures, such as using our hands 
expressively, back movements, facial expressions, focusing of 
our look and other aspects of "body language," projecting the 
individual personality in the message. 

• Use the Appropriate Tone of Voice. If, on addressing the 
people, you talk about happiness, a happy tone should be used. 
If you talk of something sad, the tone of the voice should be 
one of sadness; on talking of a heroic or brave act, the voice 
should be animated, etc. 

• Above All, Be Natural, Imitation of others should be avoided, 
since the people, especially simple people, easily distinguish a 
fake. The individual personality should be projected when 
addressing the population. 

3. "Eyes and Ears" Within the Population 

The amount of information for intelligence that will be generated by 
the deployment of the Armed Propaganda Teams will allow us to cover a 
large area with out commandos, who will become the eyes and ears of our 
movement within the population. 

The combined reports of an Armed Propaganda Team will provide us 
with exact details on the enemy activities. 

The intelligence information obtained by the Armed Propaganda 
Teams should be reported to the chiefs. However, it is necessary to 
emphasize that the first mission of the Armed Propaganda Teams is to carry 
out psychological operations, not to obtain data for intelligence. 

Any intelligence report will be made through the outside contact of 
the Armed Propaganda Team, in order not to compromise the population. 

The Armed Propaganda cadres are able to do what others in a guerrilla 
campaign cannot do: determine personally the development or deterioration 
of the popular support and the sympathy or hostility that the people feel 
toward our movement. 

The Armed Propaganda Team program, in addition to being very 
effective psychologically, increases the guerrilla capacity in obtaining and 
using information. 

In addition, the Armed Propaganda cadre will report to his superior 
the reaction of the people to the radio broadcasts, the insurrectional flyers, or 
any other means of propaganda of ours. 

Expressions or gestures of the eyes, or face, the tone and strength of 
the voice, and the use of the appropriate words greatly affect the face-to- 
face persuasion of the people. 

With the intelligence reports supplied by the Armed Propaganda 
Teams, the comandantes will be able to have exact knowledge of the popular 
support, which they will make use of in their operations. 

4. Psychological Tactics, Maximum Flexibility 

Psychological tactics will have the greatest flexibility within a general 
plan, permitting a continuous and immediate adjustment of the message, and 
ensuring that an impact is caused on the indicated target group at the 
moment in which it is the most susceptible. 

Tactically, an Armed Propaganda Equipment program should cover 
the majority and if possible all of the operational area. The communities in 
which this propaganda is carried out should not necessarily form political 
units with an official nature. A complete understanding of their structure or 
organization is not necessary because the cadres will work by applying 
socio-political action and not academic theory. 

The target populations of the Armed Propaganda Teams will be 
chosen for being part of the operational area, and not for their size or amount 
of land. 

The objective should be the people and not the territorial area. 

In this respect, each work team will be able to cover some six towns 
approximately, in order to develop popular support for our movement. 

The Team should always move in a covert manner within the towns of 
their area. 

They should vary their route radically, but not their itinerary,. This is 
so that the inhabitants who are cooperating will be dependent on their 

itinerary, i.e., the hour in which they can frequently contact them to give 
them the information. 

The danger of betrayal or an ambush can be neutralized by varying the 
itinerary a little, using different routes, as well as arriving or leaving without 
previous warning. 

Whenever the surprise factor is used, vigilance should be kept in order 
to detect the possible presence of hostile elements. 

No more than three consecutive days should be spent in a town. 

The limit of three days has obvious tactical advantages, but it also has 
a psychological effect on the people, on seeing the team as a source of 
current and up-to-date information. Also, it can overexpose the target 
audience and cause a negative reaction. 

Basic tactical precautions should be taken. This is necessary for 
greater effectiveness, as was indicated in dealing with the subject of "Armed 
Propaganda," and when it is carried out discreetly, it increases the respect of 
the people for the team and increases their credibility. 

The basic procedures are: covert elements that carry out vigilance 
before and after the departure and in intervals. There should be two at least, 
and they should meet at a predetermined point upon a signal, or in view of 
any hostile action. 

The team's goal is to motivate the entire population of a place, but to 
constantly remain aware that defined target groups exist within this general 
configuration of the public. 

Although meetings may be held in the population, the cadres should 
recognize and keep in contact with the target groups, mixing with them 
before, during and after the meeting. The method for holding this type of 
meeting was included in the topic "Armed Propaganda," and will be covered 
in greater detail under the title "Control of Mass Meetings and 

The basic focus of the Armed Propaganda cadres should be on the 
residents of the town, where their knowledge as formers of opinion can be 

In the first visits of identification with the inhabitants, the guerrilla 
cadres will be courteous and humble. They can work in the fields or in any 
other form in which their abilities can contribute to the improvement of the 
living style of the inhabitants of the place, winning their trust and talking 
with them; helping to repair the fences of their cattle; the cleaning of the 
same, collaborating in the vaccination of their animals; teaching them to 
read, i.e., closely together in all the tasks of the peasant or the community. 

In his free time, our guerrilla should mix in with the community 
groups and participate with them in pastoral activities, parties, birthdays, and 
even in wakes or burials of the members of said community; he will try to 
converse with both adults and adolescents. IHe will try to penetrate to the 
heart of the family, in order to win the acceptance and trust of all of the 
residents of that sector. 

The Armed Propaganda Team cadres will give ideological training, 
mixing these instructions with folkloric songs, and at the same time he will 
tell stories that have some attraction, making an effort to make them refer to 
heroic acts of our ancestors. He will also try to tell stories of heroism of our 
combatants in the present struggle so that listeners try to imitate them. It is 
important to let them know that there are other countries in the world where 
freedom and democracy cause those governing to be concerned over the 
well-being of their people, so that the children have medical care and free 
education; where also they are concerned that everyone have work and food, 

and all freedoms such as those of religion, association and expression; where 
the greatest objective of the government is to keep its people happy. 

The cadres should not make mention of their political ideology during 
the first phase of identification with the people, and they should orient their 
talks to things that are pleasing to the peasants or the listeners, trying to be 
as simple as possible in order to be understood. 

The tactical objectives for identification with the people are the 

• To establish tight relations through identification with the 
people through their very customs. 

• To determine the basic needs and desires of the different target 

• To discover the weaknesses of the governmental control. 

• Little by little, to sow the seed of democratic revolution, in 
order to change the vices of the regime towards a new order of 
justice and collective well being. 

In the motivation of the target groups, by the Armed Propaganda 
Teams, the cadre should apply themes of "true” groups and themes of "false" 
groups. The true group will correspond to the target group and the false one 
to the Sandinista regime. 

For the economic interest groups, such as small businessmen and 
farmers, it should be emphasized that their potential progress is "limited" by 
the Sandinista government, that resources are scarcer and scarcer, the 
eamings/profits minimal, taxes high, etc. This can be applied to 
entrepreneurs of transportation and others. 

For the elements ambitious for power and social positions, it will be 
emphasized that they will never be able to belong to the governmental social 
class, since they are hermetic in their circle of command. Example, the nine 
Sandinista leaders do not allow other persons to participate in the 
government, and they hinder the development of the economic and social 
potential of those like him, who have desires of overcoming this, which is 
unjust and arbitrary. 

Social and intellectual criticisms. They should be directed at the 
professionals, professors, teachers, priests, missionaries, students and others. 
Make them see that their writings, commentaries or conversations are 
censored, which does not make it possible to correct these problems. 

Once the needs and frustrations of the target groups have been 
determined, the hostility of the people to the "false" groups will become 
more direct, against the current regime and its system of repression. The 
people will be made to see that once this system or structure has been 
eliminated, the cause of their frustration s would be eliminated and they 
would be able to fulfill their desires. It should be shown to the population 
that supporting the insurrection is really supporting their own desires, since 
the democratic movement is aimed at the elimination of these specific 

As a general rule, the Armed Propaganda teams should avoid 
participating in combat. Flowever, if this is not possible, they should react as 
a guerrilla unit with tactics of "hit and run," causing the enemy the greatest 
amount of casualties with aggressive assault fire, recovering enemy weapons 
and withdrawing rapidly. 

One exception to the rule to avoid combat will be when in the town 
they are challenged by hostile actions, whether by an individual or whether 
by a number of men of an enemy team. 

The hostility of one or two men can be overcome by eliminating the 
enemy in a rapid and effective manner. This is the most common danger. 

When the enemy is equal in the number of its forces, there should be 
an immediate retreat, and then the enemy should be ambushed or eliminated 
by means of sharpshooters. 

In any of the cases, the Armed Propaganda Team cadres should not 
turn the town into a battleground. Generally, our guerrilla will be better 
armed, so that they will obtain greater respect from the population if they 
carry out appropriate maneuvers instead of endangering their lives, or even 
destroying their houses in an encounter with the enemy within the town. 

5. A Comprehensive Team Program - Mobile Infrastructure 

The psychological operations through the Armed Propaganda Teams 
include the infiltration of key guerrilla communicators (i.e., Armed 
Propaganda Team cadres) into the population of the country, instead of 
sending messages to them through outside sources, thus creating our "mobile 

A "mobile infrastructure" is a cadre of our Armed Propaganda Team 
moving about, i.e., keeping in touch with six or more populations, from 
which his source of information will come; and at the same time it will serve 
so that at the appropriate time they will become integrated in the complete 
guerrilla movement. 

In this way, an Armed Propaganda Team program in the operational 
area builds for our comandantes in the countryside constant source of data 
gathering (infrastructure) in all the area. It is also a means for developing or 
increasing popular support, for recruiting new members and for obtaining 

In addition, an Armed Propaganda Team program allows the 
expansion of the guerrilla movement, since they can penetrate areas that are 
not under the control of the combat units. In this way, through an exact 
evaluation of the combat units they will be able to plan their operations more 
precisely, since they will have certain knowledge of the existing conditions. 

The comandantes will remember that this type of operation is similar 
to the Fifth Column, which was used in the first part of the Second World 
War, and which through infiltration and subversion tactics allowed the 
Germans to penetrate the target countries before the invasions. They 
managed to enter Poland, Belgium, Holland and France in a month, and 
Norway in a week. The effectiveness of this tactic has been clearly 
demonstrated in several wars and can be used effectively by the Freedom 

The activities of the Armed Propaganda Teams run some risks, but no 
more than any other guerrilla activity. However, the Armed Propaganda 
Teams are essential for the success of the struggle. 

6. Conclusions 

In the same way that the explorers are the "eyes and "ears" of a patrol, 
or of a column on the march, the Armed Propaganda Teams are also the 
source of information, the "antennas" of our movement, because they find 
and exploit the sociopolitical weaknesses in the target society, making 
possible a successful operation. 


1. Generalities 

The development and control of front organizations (or "facade" 
organizations) is an essential process in the guerrilla effort to carry out the 
insurrection. That is, in truth, an aspect of urban guerrilla warfare, but it 
should advance parallel to the campaign in the rural area. This section has as 
its objective to give the guerrilla student an understanding of the 
development and control of front organizations in guerrilla warfare. 

2. Initial Recruitment 

The initial recruitment to the movement, if it is involuntary, will be 
carried out through several "private" consultations with a cadre (without his 
knowing that he is talking to a member of ours). Then, the recruit will be 
informed that he or she is already inside the movement, and he will be 
exposed to the police of the regime if he or she does not cooperate. 

When the guerrillas carry out missions of armed propaganda and a 
program of regular visits to the towns by the Armed Propaganda Teams, 
these contacts will provide the commandos with the names and places of 
persons who can be recruited. The recruitment, which will be voluntary, is 
done through visits by guerrilla leaders or political cadres. 

After a chain of voluntary recruitments has been developed, and the 
trustworthiness of the recruits has been established by their carrying out 
small missions, they will be instructed about increasing/widening the chain 
by recruiting in specific target groups, in accordance with the following 

From among their acquaintances or through observation of the target 
groups - political parties, workers' unions, youth groups, agrarian 
associations, etc. - finding out the personal habits, preferences and biases, as 
well as the weaknesses of the "recruitable" individuals. 

Make an approach through an acquaintance, and if possible, develop a 
friendship, attracting him through his preferences or weaknesses: it might be 
inviting him for lunch in the restaurant of his choice or having a drink in his 
favorite cantina or an invitation to dinner in the place he prefers. 

Recruitment should follow one of the following guidelines: 

• If in an informal conversation the target seems susceptible to 
voluntary recruitment based on his beliefs and personal values, 
etc., the political cadre assigned to carry out the recruitments 
will be notified of this. The original contact will indicate to the 
cadre assigned, in detail, all he knows of the prospective recruit, 
and the style of persuasion to be used, introducing the two. 

• If the target does not seem to be susceptible to voluntary 
recruitment, meetings can be arranged which seem casual with 
the guerrilla leaders or with the political cadres (unknown by 
the target until that moment). The meetings will be held so that 
"other persons" know that the target is attending them, whether 
they see him arrive at a particular house, seated at the table in a 
particular bar or even seated on a park bench. The target, then, 
is faced with the fact of his participation in the insurrectional 
struggle and it will be indicated to him also that if he fails to 
cooperate or to carry out future orders, he will be subjected to 
reprisals by the police or soldiers of the regime. 

• The notification of the police, denouncing a target who does not 
want to join the guerrillas, can be carried out easily, when it 
becomes necessary, through a letter with false statements of 
citizens who are not implicated in the movement. Care should 
be taken that the person who recruited him covertly is not 

• With the carrying out of clandestine missions for the 
movement, the involvement and handing over of every recruit 
is done gradually on a wider and wider scale, and confidence 
increases. This should be a gradual process, in order to prevent 
confessions from fearful individuals who have been assigned 
very difficult or dangerous missions too early. 

Using this recruitment technique, our guerrillas will be able to 
successfully infiltrate any key target group in the regime, in order to improve 
the internal control of the enemy structure. 

3. Established Citizens, Subjective Internal Control 

Established citizens, such as doctors, lawyers, businessmen, 
landholders, minor state officials, etc., will be recruited to the movement and 
used for subjective internal control of groups and associations to which they 
belong or may belong. 

Once the recruitment/involvement has been brought about, and has 
progressed to the point that allows that specific instructions be given to 
internal cadres to begin to influence their groups, instructions will be given 
to them to carry out the following: 

• The process is simple and only requires a basic knowledge of 
the Socrates dialectic: that is the knowledge that is inherent to 
another person or the established position of a group, some 
theme, some word or some thought related to the objective of 
persuasion of the person in charge of our recruitment. 

• The cadre then must emphasize this theme, word or thought in 
the discussions or meetings of the target group, through a casual 
commentary, which improves the focus of other members of the 
group in relation to this. Specific examples are: 

Economic interest groups are motivated by profit 
and generally feel that the system hinders the use of their 
capability in this effort in some way, taxes, import-export 
tariffs, transportation costs, etc. The cadre in charge will 
increase this feeling of frustration in later conversations. 

Political aspirants, particularly if the are not 
successful, feel that the system discriminates against them 
unfairly, limiting their capabilities, because the Sandinista 
regime does not allow elections. The cadres should focus 
political discussions towards this frustration. 

Intellectual social critics (such as professors, 
teachers, priests, missionaries, etc.), generally feel that the 
government ignores their valid criticism or censors their 
comments unjustly, especially in a situation of revolution. 
This can easily be shown by the guerrilla cadre at meetings 
and discussions, to be an injustice of the system. 

For all the target groups, after they have established 
frustrations, the hostility towards the obstacles to their 
aspirations will gradually become transferred to the current 
regime and its system of repression. 

The guerrilla cadre moving among the target groups 
should always maintain a low profile, so that the 
development of hostile feelings towards the false 
Sandinista regime seems to come spontaneously from the 
members of the group and not from suggestions of the 
cadres. This is internal subjective control. 

Antigovemmental hostility should be generalized, 
and not necessarily in our favor. If a group develops a 
feeling in our favor, it can be utilized. But the main 
objective is to precondition the target groups for the fusion 
in mass organizations later in the operation, when other 
activities have been successfully undertaken. 

4. Organizations of Cells for Security 

Internal cadres of our movement should organize into cells of three 
persons, only one of them maintaining outside contact. 

The cell of three persons is the basic element of the movement, with 
frequent meetings to receive orders and pass information to the cell leader. 
These meetings are also very important for mutually reinforcing the 
members of the cell, as well as their morale. They should exercise criticism 
of themselves on the realization or failures in carrying out individual 
subjective control missions. 

The coordination of the three-member cell provides a security net for 
reciprocal communication, each member having contact with only an 
operational cell. The members will not reveal at the cell coordination 
meetings the identity of their contact in an operational cell; they will reveal 
only the nature of the activity in which the cell is involved, e.g., political 
party work, medical association work, etc. 

There is no hierarchy in cells outside of an element of coordination, 
who is the leader, who will have direct but covert contact with our guerrilla 
comandante in the zone or operational area. The previous diagram does not 
indicate which new operational cell is the limit, but it indicates that for every 
three operational cells, we need a coordination cell. 

5. Fusion in a "Cover" Organization 

The fusion of organizations recognized by the Sandinista government, 
such as associations and other groups, through internal subjective control, 
occurs in the final stages of the operation, in a tight connection with mass 

When the guerrilla armed action has expanded sufficiently, armed 
propaganda missions will be carried out on a large scale: propaganda teams 
will have clearly developed open support of the institutions; the enemy 
system of target groups will be well infiltrated and preconditioned. At the 
point at which mass meetings are held, the internal cadres should begin 
discussions for the "fusion" of forces into an organization - this organization 
will be a "cover" source of our movement. 

Any other target group will be aware that other groups are developing 
greater hostility to the government., the police and the traditional legal bases 
of authority. The guerrilla cadres in that group - for example, teachers - will 
cultivate this awareness-building, making comments such as So-and-so, who 
is a farmer, said that the members of his cooperative believe that the new 
economic policy is absurd, poorly planned and unfair to the farmers." 

When the awareness-building is increased, in the sense that other 
groups feel hostility towards the regime, the group discussions are held 
openly and our movement will be able to receive reports that the majority of 
their operatives are united in common, greater hostility against the regime. 
This will be developed and the order to fuse/join will come about. The 
fusion into a "cover" front is carried out thusly: 

• Internal cadres of our movement will meet with people such as 
presidents, leaders, and others, at organized meetings chaired 
by the group chief of our movement. Two or three escorts can 
assist the guerrilla cadre if it becomes necessary. 

• Publish a joint communique on this meeting, announcing the 
creation of the "cover" front, including names and signatures of 
the participants, and names of the organizations that they 

After releasing this communique, mass meetings should be initiated, 
which should have as a goal the destruction of the Sandinista control. 

6. Conclusions 

The development and control of the "cover" organizations in a 
guerrilla war will give our movement the ability to create the "whiplash" 
effect within the population, when the order for fusion is gives. When the 
infiltration and internal subjective control have been developed parallel with 
other guerrilla activities, a democratic guerrilla commander will literally be 
able to shake up the Sandinista structure and replace it. 



1. Generalities 

In the last stages of a guerrilla war, mass concentrations and meetings 
are a powerful psychological tool for carrying out the mission. This section 
has as its objective giving the guerrilla student training on techniques for 
controlling mass concentrations and meetings in guerrilla warfare. 

2. Infiltration of Guerrilla Cadres 

Infiltration of guerrilla cadres (whether a member of our movement or 
outside element) in workers' unions, student groups, peasant organizations, 
etc., preconditioning these groups for behavior within the masses, where 
they will have to carry proselytism for the instructional struggle in a 
clandestine manner. 

• Our psychological war team should prepare in advance a hostile 
mental attitude among the target groups so that at the decisive 
moment they can turn their furor into violence, demanding their 
rights that have been trampled upon by the regime. 

• These preconditioning campaigns must be aimed at the political 
parties, professional organizations, students, laborers, the 
masses of the unemployed, the ethnic minorities and any other 
sector of society that is vulnerable or recruitable; this also 
includes the popular masses and sympathizers of our 

• The basic objective of a preconditioning campaign is to create a 
negative "image" of the common enemy, e.g.: 

Describe the managers of collective government entities as 
trying to treat the staff the way "slave foremen" do. 

The police mistreat the people like the Communist 
"Gestapo" does. 

The government officials of National Reconstruction are 
puppets of Russian Cuban imperialism. 

Our psychological war cadres will create compulsive 
obsessions of a temporary nature in places of public 
concentrations, constantly hammering away at the themes 
pointed out or desired, the same as in group gatherings; in 
informal conversations expressing discontent; in addition 
passing out brochures and flyers, and writing editorial 
articles both on the radio and in newspapers, focused on the 
intention of preparing the mind of the people of the 
decisive moment, which will erupt in general violence. 

In order to facilitate the preconditioning of the masses, we 
should often use phrases to make the people see, such as: 

The taxes that they pay the government do not benefit the 
people at all, but rather are uses as a form of exploitation in 
order to enrich those governing. 

Make it plain to the people that they have become slaves, 
that they are being exploited by privileged military and 
political groups. 

• The foreign advisers and their counseling programs are in 
reality "interveners" in our homeland, who direct the 
exploitation of the nation in accordance with the objectives of 
the Russian and Cuban imperialists, in order to turn our people 
into slaves of the hammer and sickle. 

3. Selection of Appropriate Slogans 

The leaders of the guerrilla warfare classify their slogans in 
accordance with the circumstances with the aim of mobilizing the masses in 
a wide scale of activities and at the highest emotional level. 

When the mass uprising is being developed, our covert cadres should 
make partial demands, initially demanding, e.g. "We want food," "We want 
freedom of worship," "We want union freedom" - steps that will lead us 
toward the realization of the goals of our movement, which are: GOD, 

If a lack of organization and command is noted in the enemy 
authority, and the people find themselves in a state of exaltation, advantage 
can be taken of this circumstance so that our agitators will raise the tone of 
the rallying slogans, taking them to the most strident point. 

If the masses are not emotionally exalted, our agitators will continue 
with the "partial" slogans, and the demands will be based on daily needs, 
chaining them to the goals of our movement. 

An example of the need to give simple slogans is that few people 
think in terms of millions of cordobas, but any citizen, however humble he 
may be, understands that a pair of shoes is necessary. The goals of the 
movement are of an ideological nature, but our agitators must realize that 
food - "bread and butter," "the tortilla and red beans" - pull along the people, 
and it should be understood that this is their main mission. 

4. Creation of Nuclei 

This involves the mobilization of a specific number of agitators of the 
guerrilla organization of the place. This group will inevitably attract an equal 
number of curious persons who seek adventures and emotions, as well as 
those unhappy with the system of government. The guerrillas will attract 
sympathizers, discontented citizens as a consequence of the repression of the 
system. Each guerrilla sub-unit will be assigned specific tasks and missions 
that they should carry out. 

Our cadres will be mobilized in the largest number possible, together 
with persons who have been affected by the Communist dictatorship, 

whether their possessions have been stolen from them, they have been 
incarcerated, or tortured, or suffered from any other type of aggression 
against them. They will be mobilized toward the areas where the hostile and 
criminal elements of the FSLN, CDS and others live, with an effort for them 
to be armed with clubs, iron rods, placards and if possible, small firearms, 
which they will carry hidden. 

If possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry out specific 
selected "jobs." 

Our agitators will visit the places where the unemployed meet, as well 
as the unemployment offices, in order to hire them for unspecified "jobs." 
The recruitment of these wage earners is necessary because a nucleus is 
created under absolute orders. 

The designated cadres will arrange ahead of time the transportation of 
the participants, in order to take them to meeting places in private or public 
vehicles, boats or any other type of transportation. 

Other cadres will be designated to design placards, flags and banners 
with different slogans or key words, whether they be partial, temporary or of 
the most radical type. 

Other cadres will be designated to prepare flyers, posters, signs and 
pamphlets to make the concentration more noticeable. This material will 
contain instructions for the participants and will also serve against the 

Specific tasks will be assigned to others, in order to create a "martyr" 
for the cause, taking the demonstrators to a confrontation with the 
authorities, in order to bring about uprisings or shootings, which will cause 
the death of one or more persons, who would become the martyrs, a situation 
that should be made use of immediately against the regime, in order to create 
greater conflicts. 

5. Ways to Lead an Uprising at Mass Meetings 

It can be carried out by means of a small group of guerrillas infiltrated 
within the masses, who will have the mission of agitating, giving the 
impression that there are many of them and that they have popular backing. 
Using the tactics of a force of 200-300 agitators, a demonstration can be 
created in which 10,00-20,00 persons take part. 

The agitation of the masses in a demonstration is carried out by means 
of sociopolitical objectives. In this action one or several people of our 
convert movement should take part, highly trained as mass agitators, 
involving innocent persons, in order to bring about an apparent spontaneous 
protest demonstration. They will lead all of the concentration to the end of it. 

Outside Commando . This element stays out of all activity, located so 
that they can observe from where they are the development of the planned 
events. As a point of observation, they should look for the tower of a church, 
a high building, a high tree, the highest level of the stadium or an 
auditorium, or any other high place. 

Inside Commando . This element will remain within the multitude. 
Great importance should be given to the protection of the leaders of these 
elements. Some placards or large allusive signs should be used to designate 
the Commando Posts and to provide signals to the sub-units. This element 
will avoid placing itself in places where fights or incidents come about after 
the beginning of the demonstration. 

These key agitators of ours will remain within the multitude. The one 
responsible for this mission will assign ahead of time the agitators to remain 
near the placard that he will indicate to them, in order to give protection to 
the placard from any contrary element. In that way the commander will 
know where our agitators are, and will be able to send orders to change 
passwords or slogans, or any other unforeseen thing, and even eventually to 
incite violence if he desires it. 

At this stage, once the key cadres have been dispersed, they should 
place themselves in visible places such as by signs, lampposts, and other 
places which stand out. 

Our key agitators should avoid places of disturbances, once they have 
taken care of the beginning of the same. 

Defense Posts. These elements will act as bodyguards in movement, 
forming a ring of protection for the chief, protecting him from the police and 
the army, or helping him to escape if it should be necessary. They should be 
highly disciplined and will react only upon a verbal order from the chief. 

In case the chief participates in a religious concentration, a funeral or 
any other type of activity in which they have to behave in an organized 
fashion, the bodyguards will remain in the ranks very close to the chief or to 
the placard or banner carriers in order to give them full protection. 

The participants in this mission should be guerrilla combatants in 
civilian clothes, or hired recruits who are sympathizers in our struggle and 
who are against the oppressive regime. 

These members must have a high discipline and will use violence only 
on the verbal orders of the one in charge of them. 

Messengers. They should remain near the leaders, transmitting orders 
between the inside and outside commandos. They will use communication 
radios, telephones, bicycles, motorcycles, cars, or move on foot or 
horseback, taking paths or trails to shorten distances. Adolescents (male and 
female) are ideal for this mission. 

Shock Troops. These men should be equipped with weapons (Knives, 
razors, chains, clubs, bludgeons) and should march slightly behind the 
innocent and gullible participants. They should carry their weapons hidden. 
They will enter into action only as "reinforcements" if the guerrilla agitators 
are attacked by the police. They will enter the scene quickly, violently and 

by surprise, in order to distract the authorities, in this way making possible 
the withdrawal or rapid escape of the inside commando. 

Carriers of Banners and Placards. The banners and placards used in 
demonstrations or concentrations will express the protests of the population, 
but when the concentration reaches its highest level of euphoria or popular 
discontent, our infiltrated persons will make use of the placards against the 
regime, which we manage to infiltrate in a hidden fashion, an don them 
slogans or key words will be expressed to the benefit of our cause. The one 
responsible for this mission will assign the agitators ahead of time to keep 
near the placard of any contrary element. In that way, the comandante will 
know where the agitators are, and will be able to send orders to change 
slogans and eventually to incite violence if he wishes. 

Agitators of Rallying Cries and Applause. They will be trained with 
specific instructions to use tried rallying cries. They will be able to use 
phrase such as "WE ARE HUNGRY, WE WAND BREAD," and "WE 
DON'T WANT COMMUNISM." There work and their technique for 
agitating the masses is quite similar to those of the leaders of applause and 
slogans at the high school football or baseball games. The objective is to 
become more adept and not just to shout rallying cries. 

6. Conclusions 

In a revolutionary movement of guerrilla warfare, the mass 
concentrations and protest demonstrations are the principle essential for the 
destruction of the enemy structures. 


1. Generalities 

The separate coverage in these sections could leave the student with 
some doubts. Therefore, all sections are summarized here, in order to give a 
clearer picture of this book. 

2. Motivation as Combatant-Propagandist 

Every member of the struggle should know that his political mission 
is as important as, if not more important than, his tactical mission. 

3. Armed Propaganda 

Armed propaganda in small towns, rural villages, and city residential 
districts should give the impression that our weapons are not for exercising 
power over the people, but rather that the weapons are for protecting the 
people; that they are the power of the people against the FSLN government 
of oppression. 

4. Armed Propaganda Teams 

Armed Propaganda Teams will combine political awareness building 
and the ability to conduct propaganda for ends of personal persuasion, which 
will be carried out within the population. 

5. Cover ("Facade") Organizations 

The fusion of several organizations and associations recognized by the 
government, through internal subjective control, occurs in the final stages of 
the operation, in close cooperation with mass meetings. 

6. Control of Mass Demonstrations 

The mixture of elements of the struggle with participants in the 
demonstration will give the appearance of a spontaneous demonstration, 
lacking direction, which will be used by the agitators of the struggle to 
control the behavior of the masses. 

7. Conclusion 

Too often we see guerrilla warfare only from the point of view of 
combat actions. This view is erroneous and extremely dangerous. Combat 
actions are not the key to victory in guerrilla warfare but rather form part of 
one of the six basic efforts. There is no priority in any of the efforts, but 
rather they should progress in a parallel manner. The emphasis or exclusion 
of any of these efforts could bring about serious difficulties, and in the worst 
of cases, even failure. The history of revolutionary wars has shown this 


The purpose of this appendix is to complement the guidelines and 
recommendations to the propagandist-guerrillas expressed under the topic of 
"Techniques of Persuasion in Talks and Speeches," to improve the ability to 
organize and express thoughts for those who wish to perfect their oratorical 
abilities. After all, oratory is one of the most valuable resources for 
exercising leadership. Oratory can be used, then, as an extraordinary 
political tool. 

2. The Audience 

Oratory is simultaneous communication par excellence, i.e., the orator 
and his audience share the same time and space. Therefore, every speech 
should be a different experience at "that" moment or particular situation 
which the audience is experiencing and which influences them. So the 
audience must be considered as "a state of mind." Happiness, sadness, anger, 
fear, etc., are states of mind that we must consider to exist in our audience, 
and it is the atmosphere that affects the target public. 

The human being is made up of a mind and soul; he acts in 
accordance with his thoughts and sentiments and responds to stimuli of ideas 
and emotions. In that way there exist only two possible focuses in any plan, 
including speeches: the concrete, based on rational appeals, i.e., to thinking; 
and the idealized, with emotional appeals, i.e., to sentiment. 

For his part the orator, although he must be sensitive to the existing 
mass sentiment, he must at the same time keep his cold judgment to be able 
to lead and control effectively the feelings of an audience. When in the 
oratorical momentum the antithesis between heart and brain comes about, 
judgment should always prevail, characteristic of a leader. 

3. Political Oratory 

Political oratory is one of the various forms of oratory, and it usually 
fulfills one of three objectives: to instruct, persuade, or move; and its method 
is reduced to urging (asking), ordering, questioning and responding. 

Oratory is a quality so tied to political leadership that it can be said 
that the history of political orators is the political history of humanity, an 
affirmation upheld by names such as Cicero, Demosthenes, Danton, 
Mirabeau, Robespierre, Clemenceau, Lenin, Trotsky, Mussolini, Hitler, 
Roosevelt, etc. 

4. Qualities in a Speech 

In general terms, the most appreciated qualities of a speech, and 
specifically a political speech in the context of the psychological action of 
the armed struggle, are the following: 

• Be brief and concise 

A length of five minutes [line missing in Spanish text]...that of 
the orator who said: "If you want a two-hour speech, I'll start 
right now; if you want a two-minute one, let me think awhile." 

• Centered on the theme 

The speech should be structured by a set of organized ideas that 
converge on the theme. A good speech is expressed by concepts 
and not only with words. 

• Logic 

The ideas presented should be logical and easily acceptable. 
Never challenge logic in the mind of the audience, since 
immediately the main thing is lost - credibility. As far as 
possible, it is recommended that all speeches be based on a 
syllogism, which the orator should adjust in his exposition. For 
example: "Those governing get rich and are thieves; the 

Sandinistas have enriched themselves governing; then, the 
Sandinistats are thieves." This could be the point of a speech on 
the administrative corruption of the regime. When an idea or a 
set of guiding ideas do not exist in a speech, confusion and 
dispersion easily arise. 

5. Structure of a Speech 

Absolute improvisation does not exist in oratory. All orators have a 
"mental plan" that allows them to organize their ideas and concepts rapidly; 
with practice it is possible to come to do this in a few seconds, almost 
simultaneously with the expression of the word. 

The elements that make up a speech are given below, in a structure 
that we recommend always putting into practice, to those who wish to more 
and more improve their oratorical abilities: 

• Introduction or Preamble 

One enters into contact with the public, a personal introduction 
can be made or one of the movement to which we belong, the 
reason for our presence, etc. In these first seconds it is 
important to make an impact, attracting attention and provoking 
interest among the audience. For that purpose, there are 
resources such as beginning with a famous phrase or a 
previously prepared slogan, telling a dramatic or humorous 
story, etc. 

• Purpose or Enunciation 

The subject to be dealt with is defined, explained as a whole or 
by parts. 

• Appraisal or Argumentation 

Arguments are presented, EXACTLY IN THIS ORDER: First, 
the negative arguments, or against the thesis that is going to be 
upheld, and then the positive arguments, or favorable ones to 

our thesis, immediately adding proof or facts that sustain such 

• Recapitulation or Conclusion 

A short summary is made and the conclusions of the speech are 
spelled out. 

• Exhortation 

Action by the public is called for, i.e., they are asked in and 
almost energetic manner to do or not to do something. 

6. Some Literary Resources 

Although there exist typically oratorical devices of diction, in truth, 
oratory has taken from other literary genres a large number of devices, 
several of which often, in an unconscious manner, we use in our daily 
expressions and even in our speeches. 

Below we enunciate many of their literary devices in frequent use in 
oratory, recommending to those interested moderate use of them, since an 
orator who over-uses the literary device loses authenticity and sounds 

The devices that are used the most in oratory are those obtained 
through the repetition of words in particular periods of the speech, such as: 

Anaphora, or repetition of a word at the beginning of each sentence, 
e.g., "Freedom for the poor, freedom for the rich, freedom for all." In the 
reiteration, repetition is of a complete sentence (slogan) insistently through 
the speech, e.g., "With God and patriotism we will overcome Communism 

Conversion is the repetition at the end of every phrase, e.g.: 
"Sandinismo tries to be about everyone, dominate everyone, command 
everyone, and as an absolute tyranny, do away with everyone." 

In the emphasis, repetition is used at the beginning and at the end of 
the clause, e.g., "Who brought the Russian-Cuban intervention? The 
Sandinistas. And who is engaged in arms trafficking with the neighboring 
countries? The Sandinistas. And who is proclaiming to be in favor of 
nonintervention? The Sandinistas." 

Reduplication, when the phrase begins with the same word that ends 
the previous one. For example: "We struggle for democracy, democracy and 
social justice." The concatenation is a chain made up of duplications. For 
example: "Communism transmits the deception of the child to the young 
man, of the young man to the adult, and of the adult to the old man." 

In the antithesis or word play, the same words are used with a 
different meaning to give an ingenious effect: e.g., "The greatest wealth of 
every human being is his own freedom, because slaves will always be poor 
but we poor can have the wealth of our freedom." 

Similar cadences, through the use of verbs of the same tense and 
person, or nouns of the same number and case. For example: "Those of us 
who are struggling we will be marching because he who perseveres 
achieves, and he who gives up remains." 

Use of synonyms, repetition of words with a similar meaning. For 
example: "We demand a Nicaragua for all, without exceptions, without 

Among the figures of speech most used in oratory are: 

Comparison or simile, which sets the relationship of similarity 
between two or more beings or things. For example: "Because we love 
Christ, we love his bishops and pastors," and "Free as a bird." 

Antithesis, or the counter-position of words, ideas, or phrases of an 
opposite meaning. For example: "They promised freedom and gave slavery; 
that they would distribute the wealth and they have distributed poverty; that 
they would bring peace, and they have brought about war." 

Among the logic figures are the following: 

Concession, which is a skillful way to concede something to the 
adversary in order to better emphasize the inappropriate aspects, through the 
use of expressions such as: but, however, although, nevertheless, in spite of 
the fact that, etc. For example: "The mayor here has been honest, but he is 
not the one controlling all the money of the nation." It is an effective form of 
rebuttal when the opinion of the audience is not entirely ours. 

Permission, in which one apparently accedes to something, when in 
reality it is rejected. For example: "Do not protest, but sabotage them." "Talk 
quietly, but tell it to everyone." 

Prolepsis is an anticipated refutation. For example: "Some will think 
that they are only promises; they will say, others said the same thing, but no. 
We are different, we are Christians, we consider God a witness to our 

Preterition is an artifice, pretending discretion when something is said 
with total clarity and indiscretion. For example: "If I were not obligated to 
keep military secrets, I would tell all of you of the large amount of 

armaments that we have so that you would feel even more confidence that 
our victory is assured." 

Communication is a way to ask and give the answer to the same 
question. For example: "If they show disrespect for the ministers of God, 
will they respect us, simple citizens? Never." 

Rhetorical questions are a way in which one shows perplexity or 
inability to say something, only as an oratorical recourse. For example: "I 
am only a peasant and can tell you little. I know little and I will not be able 
to explain to you the complicated things of politics. Therefore, I talk to you 
with my heart, with my simple peasant's heart, as we all are." 

Litotes is a form of meaning a lot by saying little. For example: "The 
nine commanders have stolen little, just the whole country." 

Irony consists of getting across exactly the opposite of what one is 
saying. For example: "The divine mobs that threaten and kill, they are 
indeed Christians." 

Amplification is presenting an idea from several angles. For example: 
"Political votes are the power of the people in a democracy. And economic 
votes are their power in the economy. Buying or not buying something, the 
majorities decide what should be produced. For something to be produced or 
to disappear. That is part of economic democracy." 

The most usual plaintive figures of speech are: 

Deprecation or entreaty to obtain something. For example: "Lord, free 
us from the yoke. Give us freedom." 

Imprecation or threat, expressing a sentiment in view of the unjust or 
hopeless. For example: "Let there be a Homeland for all or let there be a 
Homeland for no one." 

Commination, similar to the previous one, presents a bad wish for the 
rest. For example, "Let them drown in the abyss of their own corruption." 

The apostrophe consists of addressing oneself towards something 
supernatural or inanimate as if it were a living being. For example: 
"Mountains of Nicaragua, make the seed of freedom grow." 

Interrogation consists of asking a question of oneself, to give greater 
emphasis to what is expressed. It is different from communication, since it 
gives the answer and is of a logical and not a plaintive nature. For example: 
"If they have already injured the members of my family, my friends, my 
peasant brothers, do I have any path other than brandishing a weapon?" 

Reticence consists of leaving a thought incomplete, intentionally, so 
that mentally the audience completes it. For example, "They promised 
political pluralism and gave totalitarianism. They promised political 
pluralism and gave totalitarianism. They promised social justice, and they 
have increased poverty. They offered freedom of thought, and they have 
given censorship. Now, what they promise the world are free elections..."