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NOTICE: When government or other drawings, speci¬ 
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other than in connection with a definitely related 
government procurement operation, the U. S. 
Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any 
obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Govern¬ 
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supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other 
data is not to be regarded by implication or other¬ 
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other person or corporation, or conveying any rights 
or permission to manufacture, use or sell any 
patented invention that may in any way be related 







HOTS TP 21(6 
COPY 88 





K. S. Skaar 

Propulsion Development Deportment 



TiEfa enn nrsi 

j juiio inei 

ABSTRACT. This document presents safety fundamentals 
relevant to operations with almost all materials capable of 
sudden release of chemical energy and chemical products 
that may be harmful or dangerous. These fundamentals are 
intended primarily as training topics and as guides for 
evaluating safety programs in the fields of explosives, pro¬ 
pellants, pyrotechnics, and the like. While the fundamentals 
were developed as training aids in a research and develop¬ 
ment organization, it is believed that they are applicable to 
almost any operation with dangerous materials. 

Released to AdTIA for further dissemination with 
out limitations beyond those imposed by security 


China Lake, California 
June 1962 


C. Blenman, Jr., Capt., USN Wm. B. McLean, PhD. 

Commander Technical Director 



These fundamentals of safety for working with high-energy materials 
were prepared over a year ago and have been used and discussed in safety 
training courses of the Propulsion Development Department, U. S. Naval 
Ordnance Test Station. The fundamentals have been accepted by the 
research and development personnel of this department as filling a need 
by providing guidelines for new and hazardous work. It is hoped that by 
making them available to others who are doing hazardous work, the 
fundamentals might be found useful in their safety training programs 
and therefore increase the awareness of the individual to the necessity 
and importance for an understanding of these fundamentals. 

Released by 

Propulsion Development Dept. 
January 1962 

Under the authority of 
Technical Director 

NOTS Technical Publication 2866 

Published by.Publishing Division 

Technical Information Department 

Supersedes .IDP 1154, Revision 1, and TS 61-44 

Collation .Cover, 6 leaves, abstract cards 

First printing. 460 numbered copies 

Security classification .UNCLASSIFIED 




Technical Library (1) 

1 Army Cml C Research and Development Command, Army Biological 
Warfare Laboratories, Fort Detrick (Chief, MD Division) 

4 Army Rocket & Guided Missile Agency, Redstone Arsenal (Technical 
Library, ORDXR-OTL) 

2 Frankford Arsenal 

Pitman-Dunn Laboratory (1) 

Library (1) 

1 Holston Ordnance Works (Dr. Robert Robbins) 

1 Iowa Ordnance Plant 

1 Ordnance Ammunition Command, Joliet (ORDLY-R-T) 

1 Pantex Ordnance Plant 

5 Picatinny Arsenal 

C. J. Bain (1) 

Elmer Mohrenweiser (1) 

Library (3) 

2 Radford Arsenal (Library) 

3 White Sands Proving Ground (Technical Library) 

2 Headquarters, U. S. Air Force 

AFDRD-AN (1) . 

AFDRT-AF, M. A. Eaffy(l) 

1 Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 

1 Air Force Special Weapons Center, Kirtland Air Force Base 
(SWOIC 6336) 

2 Air Proving Ground Center, Eglin Air Force Base 


1 Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base (TPL-RQD-M) 

1 Armed Services Explosives Safety Board (LtCol. Gerald Couch/ 

R. G. Perkins) 

10 Armed Services Technical Information Agency (TIPCR) 

1 Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh (Reports Librarian) 

4 British Joint Services Mission, Ministry of Supply Staff (Reports 
Officer), via BuWeps (DSC) 

1 Aerojet-General Corporation, Azusa, Calif. (Librarian), via 

1 Aerojet-General Corporation, Sacramento (Librarian), via 

2 Allegany Ballistics Laboratory, Cumberland, Md. (Librarian) 

1 American Potash & Chemical Corporation, West Hanover, Mass. 

1 Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge 

1 Atlantic Research Corporation, Alexandria, Va. (Librarian) 

1 Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio (Defense Metals Infor¬ 
mation Center) 

1 Boeing Airplane Company, Seattle (Branch 7 Library) 

1 California Institute of Technology, Pasadena (Dr. P. A. Longwell) 

1 Convair, San Diego (Engineering Library) 

1 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, Inc., Wilmington (Assistant 
Director of Research) 

1 Hercules Powder Company, Explosives Department, Wilmington 
(A. M. Ball) 

1 Jet Propulsion Laboratory, CIT, Pasadena (Library) 

3 Liquid Propellant Information Agency, Applied Physics Laboratory, 
JHU, Silver Spring 

2 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Missiles and Space Division, Palo 
Alto, Calif. 

Polaris Propulsion Department, 81-27, Polaris System 
Integration (1) 

Technical Library, Reports (1) 

2 Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (GMX-2) 

1 Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City (Librarian) 

1 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company, St. Paul (George E. 

1 New York University, College of Engineering (Professor of Chemical 

1 Nortronics, Anaheim, Calif. (Rockets & ECM, Department 2221) 

1 Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, Marion, Ill. (Mail Control 
Room, S P O, T. F. McDonnell) 

1 Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind. (E. T. McBee, Department of 

1 Rocketdyne, Canoga Park, Calif. (Librarian) 

2 Rocketdyne, McGregor, Tex. (Rocket Fuels Division) 

2 Rohm & Haas Company, Redstone Arsenal Research Division 

1 Sandia Corporation, Albuquerque (Classified Documents Division) 

2 Solid Propellant Information Agency, Applied Physics Laboratory, 
JHU, Silver Spring (K. F. Ockert) 

1 Southwest Research Institute, Department of Chemistry and Chemical 
Engineering, San Antonio (Dr. H. C. McKee) 

1 Stanford Research Institute, Poulter Laboratories, Menlo Park, 


1 The Martin Company, Baltimore (I. E. Tuhy) 

1 The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. 

1 Thiokol Chemical Corporation, Redstone Division, Redstone Arsenal 
(Technical Library) 

6 University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Technical 
Information Division, Livermore (C. G. Craig) 

J. Bell/M. Martin (2) 

Dr. John S. Foster (2) 

M. C. Larsen/W. L. Nevil (1) 

Kenneth Street (1) j 

2 University of Denver, Denver Research Institute 

A. Krill (1) 

D. K. Parks (1) 

1 University of Utah, Salt Lake City (Dr. M. A. Cook) 

NOTS TP 2866 


Research and development organizations, such as the U. S. Naval 
Ordnance Test Station, working on new propellants, high explosives, 
pyrotechnics, and other high-energy materials, have attempted to 
abide by safety rules and safety guidelines developed primarily for 
production organizations. While this has worked reasonably well in 
the past, there is concern about the adequacy of current safety guides 
for the present and future. Rules developed for production tend to fit 
well known materials and well established practices, but they cannot 
be expected to deal adequately with all problems in new areas of work. 

We have entered into a period of rapid changes where the materials 
being worked on are considerably different and some are more hazard¬ 
ous than the materials worked on in the past. Therefore, it is believed 
that some changes are needed in the approach to safety particularly in 
research and development organizations. 

Research and development organizations need guidelines that are 
flexible and that allow for safety decisions to be made as close as pos¬ 
sible to the point of greatest information on new high-energy materials. 
In the final analysis, it is necessary to depend on the persons working 
with new materials to analyze their safety problem and to develop safe 
procedures for which there may be no precedents. 

It is proposed that more emphasis be given to the training of in¬ 
dividuals, especially chemists, engineers, and other technical and 
supervisory personnel, working with or supervising work on high- 
energy materials. It has been observed that conventional training in 
the rules of safety leaves some people with the attitude that rules are 
arbitrary and that one is compelled to follow them whether or not they 
make sense. Therefore, an outlook is developed that causes some 
people to oppose rather than to support well established rules and prac¬ 
tices. The supplementary training that may help form more favorable 
attitudes is background training enabling people to understand that most 
safety policies and rules have a reasonable and sound basis. It is be¬ 
lieved that individuals who have training in fundamentals will be more 
willing to accept the rules that are relevant because application of 
fundamentals would lead to about the same answers. It is also believed 
that individuals trained in fundamentals are better prepared to formu¬ 
late sound guidelines for performing experimental work on new 
hazardous materials. In new areas of work, it is necessary to formu¬ 
late some safety procedures where there is no precedent; otherwise 
progress is not possible on a reasonable basis that is acceptable to 
research and development personnel. 

This document is intended primarily as a training aid for giving 
the kind of background necessary for the conditions mentioned above. 



NOTS TP 2866 

The type of training suggested is a program where each fundamental 
is discussed by small groups. It is suggested that each person be * 

encouraged to challenge any statement and to present his own inter- J ■ 

pretation in groups large enough for varying viewpoints but small enough > 

so that each person can effectively participate. 

K. S. 3. 





NOTS TP 2866 


1. Take time to think, plan, and review. 

2. Learn and use the experience of others. 

3. Assume the worst with the unknown. 

4. Minimize hazards and exposure to hazards. 

5. Be concerned about the safety of others. 


Of mistakes and cures, learn the past. 
Think and plan, but not too fast. 
Something new, take double care. 

With our lives, we do no dare. 

Instead, we listen, heed the wise 
Minimize, minimize, minimize. 

NOTS TP 2866 


These fundamentals of safety have been reviewed by so many 
people at the Naval Ordnance Test Station and elsewhere that it is 
impossible to list them individually. The guidelines have been re¬ 
viewed by members of the Station's Safety Division staff, by the Pro¬ 
pulsion Development Department Safety Group, by members of the 
Process Development Division, the Explosives and Pyrotechnics 
Division, the Propellants Division, and the Test and Evaluation Divi¬ 
sion. The fundamentals have been further reviewed by Dr. P. A. 
Longwell, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, and formerly 
head of the Explosives Department, NOTS. Mr. Paul A. Donaldson, 
Safety Engineer, and Cecil Hunter, Safety Specialist, Propulsion 
Development Department, deserve special mention for their close 
cooperation, careful review, and interest shown in this document. 

NOTS TP 2866 


The objectives of a good safety program for work with high-energy 
materials are 

1. To minimize hazards to personnel and prevent loss of lives 

2. To prevent accidental fires or detonations 


3. To minimize possible loss of equipment and buildings 

4. To reduce accidents typically occurring in almost any labora¬ 
tory or operation 

The following statements are general guidelines that are relevant 
to work on almost every material that is capable of sudden release 
of chemical energy and chemical products in sufficient amounts to be 
harmful or dangerous. 

These guidelines are an organized set of fundamentals of safety 
on which there is general agreement, among experienced technical, 
safety, and supervisory people, that the fundamentals are an appli¬ 
cable and necessary part of an explosive safety program. These funda¬ 
mentals avoid stating exactly how an organization is to perform its 
responsibilities, but they do attempt to point out what the responsibilities 
are and to offer general suggestions of the important factors to be 
considered in hazardous work with high-energy materials. The funda¬ 
mentals by themselves are just a starting point; they must be put to 
work and given concrete meaning through thought, discussion, and 
training sessions. Safety in any situation calls for knowledge of the 
characteristics of the materials being worked on, knowledge of the 
behavior and characteristics of equipment and its possible interactions 
with high-energy materials, knowledge of the characteristics of people 
as they are, and knowledge of how to design and maintain facilities 
and equipment for safety. 

These safety fundamentals are intended as guides to aid in review¬ 
ing instructions and rules for specific applications and as discussion 
topics for training personnel connected with work on high-energy 
materials. They were prepared for use by research and development 
groups working on high-energy materials in amounts ranging from a 
few grams to full-scale pilot-plant quantities. 

The phrase "high-energy materials" and the word "explosives" 
are used here to cover the broad field of propellants, high explosives, 
pyrotechnics, and primary and initiating explosives. 


NOTS TP 2866 


1. Accidents with explosives are caused by energy concentrations, 
such as sparks, friction, impact, flame, hot objects, chemical re¬ 
action, radiation, excessive pressure, and electrostatic discharge. 
Energy concentrations anywhere near initiating levels must be kept 
away from explosives except when it is desired to ignite or detonate 
the explosive. 

2. The initiation of explosives is subject to probability consider¬ 
ations. With a low level of stimulus, the probability of initiation can 
be small; with a high energy concentration, the probability of initiation 
will be much larger but still not certain. The probabilities at the 
extremes cannot be determined with accuracy from a small number of 
tests. Therefore, in order to keep the probability of initiation low, it 
is good practice to treat explosives as gently and as carefully as pos¬ 

3. Probability is a consideration in virtually all accidents. The 
probability of a serious accident may never be reduced to zero, but the 
probability of an adverse incident can be kept very low by working to 
find ways to eliminate causes of accidents and by providing a safe 

4. A series of safety devices or steps may be employed to greatly 
increase the safety of an operation or of a weapon system that uses 
explosives. Unless there is an adequate review process for ensuring 
that all parts of the safing system are maintained and used, there is a 
tendency for the safety of the system to deteriorate. 

5. When specific knowledge is lacking on the characteristics of an 
explosive, the worst characteristics that might affect safety must be 

6. Explosives that are new to an individual or group working with 
them must be regarded as extremely dangerous until their character¬ 
istics are well known and the individual or group has become skilled in 
practices that minimize processing and handling hazards. 

7. Human errors and human failings must be allowed for. Even 
the best man may occasionally forget, fail to understand, act without 
thinking, go ahead without adequate knowledge, or become upset. 

8. Relaxation of safety regulations affecting personnel should be 
based on proof that present requirements are more stringent than 
necessary. Conversely, if it is suspected that existing safety measures 
may not be adequate, steps must be taken immediately to provide 


NOTS TP 2866 

added precautions even though the evidence is not conclusive. Pro¬ 
cedures for changing regulations must be known by everyone concerned. 


9. Important elements of safety are the formation of good habits; 
a calm, mature environment; and training based on previous experience 
in the whole explosive field. 

10. Supervisors of explosive operations must have adequate train¬ 
ing and knowledge to maintain safety of operations. 

11. A man performing an explosive operation without direct 
supervision must have sufficient training and knowledge to maintain 
safety of his operation. 

12. Persons working with explosives must have favorable attitudes 
toward safety and must be emotionally stable. 

13. For persons working with explosives or observing explosive 
operations, provide protection for their eyes, protection against fire 
or intense radiant heat, means for automatically discharging static 
electricity from their bodies, and means for keeping their bodies and 
personal clothing free from contamination. 

14. Means must be provided for safeguarding personnel from 
toxic materials, fumes, or other harmful effects. With very toxic 
materials, there may be need for protecting people considerable dis¬ 
tances away who may or may not be involved in the work. 

15. Provide showers, eye washers, and other first-aid devices, 
which are necessary immediate aids in preventing further injury, in 
locations that are quickly and easily accessible. 

16. Personnel working with toxic materials must be given periodic 
medical examinations. 

17. Adequate tools and help for lifting, for performing operations, 
and for emergency assistance should be available. * 

18. Visitors unfamiliar with explosive operations or the explosive 
facility must be escorted by a responsible person who knows what is 
going on and what the safety precautions are. 

NOTS TP 2866 


19. Data on properties and characteristics of new explosives to 
be processed in larger than minimum laboratory amounts should be 
reviewed by a qualified group before introduction of the explosive 
into a process. These data and recommendations of the committee 
must be available to the processing group before beginning work. 

20. Compatibility of different explosives should be established 
before combining them as part of a design, for storage, or for scrap 

21. Having more than one explosive in a processing building or 
bay at the same time must be carefully considered for hazards and 
done only for good reason. 

22. General operating guidelines should be written for all new 
operations to ensure that careful thought and careful review have been 
exercised before the start of potentially hazardous work. The general 
operating guidelines may permit flexibility where justified, but they 
must be reviewed by one or more qualified, experienced persons. 

23. Keep up-to-date charts and instructions in the operating build¬ 
ing. They can serve as ready references, as reminders of procedures 
to be followed,and explanations of the essential features of equipment. 

24. Time must be allowed—even at the expense of deadlines and 
schedules — for adequate thought, planning, and preparation of hazard¬ 
ous operations. 

25. Within limits of reasonability and practicability, the safest 
method for processing or working on high-energy materials should be 

26. Any explosive operation performed with personnel exposed 
should be of such a nature that there is no detonation hazard, and with 
ample opportunity to escape unhurt in case of fire. Usually, operations 
in closed vessels will be performed remotely. 


27. Supervisors are responsible for the safety of operations and 
the men they supervise. The safety-engineering staff is responsible 
for advising the line organization on safety and is responsible for 
helping the organization maintain high standards of safety. 

NOTS TP 2866 

28. Whoever recognizes a hazardous situation is responsible for 
taking steps to have the condition corrected. 

29. Scrap or waste disposal is a hazardous operation. The scientist 
or engineer who originates a new formulation is obligated to assist 

in specifying disposal conditions and procedures. 

30. Most careful consideration must be given to setting processing 
limits such as maximum temperatures, pressures, rates of machining, 
rates of mixing, and rates of extrusion. 

31. Containers of explosives and explosive ingredients should be 
clearly labeled at all times as to their content and nature of hazard. 
When possible, label the explosive directly. 

32. Explosive-processing or storage areas should be posted with 
warnings to advise of precautions to be taken and how to obtain guidance. 


33. The number of individuals exposed to hazards should be kept 
to a minimum consistent with operational requirements and safety. 

34. Always work with, and in the presence of, the least amount 
of explosive needed for the operation. 

35. Get as much useful data on as small a scale as possible. It is 
much easier to protect individuals and minimize losses with laboratory- 
scale work than with full-scale work. 

36. Check new equipment and new procedures with inert materials 
whenever possible. 

37. Cleanliness and orderliness help to prevent initiation or the 
spread of a fire or detonation. 

38. Operations should be conducted at all times with a view toward 
minimizing the effects of an accidental fire, detonation, or any other 

39. Only the immediately needed portable tools and equipment 
should be retained in a processing room. 


NOTS TP 2866 


40. With few exceptions, containers should be used for transporting \ 

and storing explosives. These containers should provide delay of 

ignition from fire, should attenuate shock energy, and should protect 
against contamination and physical damage. 

41. When explosives are transported, precautions must be taken 
to protect persons and property on or near the roadway. Precautions 
must be taken to reduce the probability of an accident and to minimize 
the effects of a possible transportation accident. 

42. Shipping explosives to individuals or activities should be per¬ 
formed by a group or individuals familiar with pertinent regulations 
governing packaging, shipping, and handling in transit. 

43. Before sending explosives to other activities, it should be 
established that that activity is qualified to receive and handle the 
explosive. The receiver should be fully informed in writing of the 
characteristics of any new or nonstandard explosive. 

. 44. New or experimental explosives whose stability and compati¬ 
bility with other materials have not been thoroughly established should 
be stored in small quantities under conditions where possible ignition 
will cause limited damage. These explosives must never be stored 
with quantities of other explosives whose ignition could create a hazard. 

45. A periodic review of high-energy materials in storage must 
be made to ensure against storage of these materials for longer than 
their safe life. Records of all materials in storage must be kept 
where they are not likely to be destroyed. 


46. The design of new facilities, new equipment, and tools should 
receive the same careful safety review as do new explosives. Designers 
should remove the human factor from hazards by making protection 

as permanent and as automatic as possible. 

47. All automatic safety devices, such as fire-fighting systems, 
interlocks, and warning signals should be checked at predetermined 
intervals or more frequently. 

48. Schedules of preventive maintenance should be set up for all 
equipment used in explosive operations where failure to institute and 


NOTS TP 2866 

conduct such a program can lead to processing hazards. 

49. Equipment taken to a shop for repair or adjustment must be 
freed from explosives by a suitable decontamination process. Shop 
personnel should be warned of added precautions to be taken during 
further disassembly. 

50. All explosives must be removed from a processing room when 
it is turned over to a maintenance group for repair or adjustment of 
equipment. Equipment that may be contaminated with explosives 
must be cleaned so that repairs or adjustments can be made safely. 
Maintenance personnel should be given complete information on con¬ 
ditions that might affect their safety. 

51. Although every reasonable effort has been made to decontaminate 
a facility or equipment, anyone performing maintenance or repair 
work on the equipment should proceed with caution. 


52. The discernible facts associated with any accidental deflagration 
or explosion must be reported completely and accurately so that others 
doing similar work may be warned and so that the best corrective 
action may be taken to prevent similar accidents. 

53. Minor incidents, which in themselves do little or no harm, 
frequently give warnings of unsuspected hazards. These incidents 
should be widely reported and their significance given thorough con¬ 

54. Complete records of operating conditions should be kept. 

When accidents occur, the records are an important aid in determining 
the cause and in preventing future adverse incidents. Critical temper¬ 
atures, pressures, speeds, power consumed by motors, etc., should 
be recorded continuously when possible. 

NOTS TP 2866 


14 Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons 

DLI-31 (2) 

R-14 (1) 

R-362 (1) 

RM-281 (1) 

RM-35 (1) 

RMMP (1) 

RMMP-2 (1) 

1 Special Projects Office (Code 2710) 

2 Chief of Naval Research 

RMMP-4 (1) 
RRMA-221 (1) 
RRRE-5 (1) 
RRRE-6 (1) 
RRRE-21 (1) 
RUME-11 (1) 

Code 104 (1) 

1 Fleet Anti-Air Warfare Training Center, San Diego (Guided Missile 

1 Naval Air Development Center, Johnsville (Library) 

2 Naval Air Mobile Training, Naval Air Station, Miramar 

Naval Air Mobile Training Detachment, 4003 Ordnance (1) 

Naval Air Mobile Training Detachment, 4030 Missile (1) 

2 Naval Ammunition Depot, Crane 

Code 42, Ammunition Loading Production Engineering Center (1) 
4 Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak 

Guided Missile Warhead R & D Planning Committee, c/o Project 
Manager for Warheads (1) 

Dr. J. E. Ablard (1) 

Dr. Sigmund Jacobs (1) 

WC (1) 

1 Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey 

3 Naval Propellant Plant, Indian Head 

Code P (1) 

Code R (2) 

1 Naval Research Laboratory 

2 Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, Kirtland Air Force Base 

Code 401(1) 

Vulnerability Department, W. Gordon (1) 

1 Naval Weapons Laboratory, Dahlgren (Technical Library) 

2 Naval Weapons Station, Yorktown 

Research & Development Group (1) 

Mr. Manley (1) 

1 Office of Naval Research Branch Office, Pasadena 

1 Bureau of Naval Weapons Representative, Azusa 

1 Bureau of Naval Weapons Resident Representative, Sacramento 

3 Chief of Ordnance 

ORDTB (1) 

ORDTU (1) 

W. W. Cowgill, Special Consultant (1) 
3 Aberdeen Proving Ground 

Ballistic Research Laboratories (1) 



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