DTIC ADA470627: After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq

Brian Fishman

After Zarqawi: The
Dilemmas and Future of
A1 Qaeda in Iraq

a

1 Although they worked together nominally, the central A1 Qaeda
network, as led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the late
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s terrorist group in Iraq held vastly different con¬
ceptions of jihad. The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq minimized the
magnitude of that ideological clash, enabling Zarqawi’s limited cooperation
with A1 Qaeda in the Iraqi arena. Although they used each other for tacti¬
cal support, publicity, and recruiting purposes, their doctrinal differences
made them only allies of convenience rather than genuine partners, and as
Zarqawi’s tactics grew more extreme and indiscriminate, A1 Qaeda chose to
distance itself from his handiwork.

The U.S. air strike that killed Zarqawi on June 7, 2006, deprived A1 Qaeda
in Iraq (AQI) of its strategic leader. But the knowledge that U.S., Iraqi, and
Jordanian intelligence effectively penetrated AQI to gather information on
Zarqawi’s whereabouts is just as important to the group’s future as Zarqawi’s
elimination. The coalition’s demonstrated ability to gather accurate intelli¬
gence is likely to frighten and sow distrust among AQI’s remaining members.
This heightens the leadership challenge for AQI’s new emir, identified only
under the alias Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir. His response to the internal security
questions and the lingering doctrinal impasse with A1 Qaeda proper will de¬
termine the organization’s future trajectory.

The challenge for Muhajir is to strike a balance between appealing to secu¬
lar and tribal Sunnis in Iraq, some of whom likely provided intelligence that
helped doom Zarqawi, while maintaining an insular terrorist network that can

Brian Fishman is an associate in the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States
Military Academy at West Point and an instructor in the Department of Social Sciences. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent those of the U.S.
Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other department or agency of the
U.S. government.

© 2006 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology

The Washington Quarterly • 29:4 pp. 19-32.

The Washington Quarterly ■ Autumn 2006

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| Brian Fishman

sustain potentially weakening criticism from Islamic, Arab, and Western sourc¬
es. During his tenure, Zarqawi discovered that these two goals require unique
ideological and operational strategies that may be mutually exclusive. A mod¬
erate ideology allows for mass appeal, whereas a more extreme ideology that
emphasizes the moral imperative of separation from society increases group
cohesion but impairs recruiting. Zarqawi developed a controversial strategy
to sidestep this contradiction, which ultimately widened the rift between his
group and bin Laden’s. Now, Muhajir or whoever ends up at AQI’s helm must
clarify AQI’s focus to counter increasing factionalism. This is easier said than
done. Muhajir has done little to clarify AQI’s strategic future in the months
since Zarqawi was killed. The United States can seize on this turning point to
manipulate AQI’s points of instability.

Enemies Near and Far

After being released from a Jordanian prison in 1999, where he was held for
five years on terrorism-related charges, Zarqawi traveled to Afghanistan to
establish his own terrorist training camp. He did not, however, join A1 Qa¬
eda. Sayf al-Adl, a senior A1 Qaeda leader, explained that Zarqawi’s disagree¬
ment with A1 Qaeda, or more specifically, bin Laden, was ideological: “The
controversial issues with [Zarqawi] were neither new nor uncommon.... The
most important issue with [Zarqawi] was the stance regarding the Saudi
regime and how to deal with it in light of the Islamic laws that pertain to
excommunication and belief.” 1 The disagreement between Zarqawi and A1
Qaeda over Saudi Arabia hinted at what would become their fundamental
discord: whether jihadi-salafists should prioritize attacks against the “near
enemy” or the “far enemy.” This debate would not be easily resolved. Even
three years later, when Zarqawi was building a terrorist network in Iraq called
Tawhid wal Jihad, he did not join A1 Qaeda.

Zarqawi and A1 Qaeda based their versions of jihad on their divergent
understandings of their enemy’s center of gravity. Bin Laden’s A1 Qaeda saw
U.S. support (the far enemy) for Arab governments in funding, the granting
of legitimacy, and weapons sales as the source of apostate political power
and therefore prioritized attacks on the United States. In contrast, Zarqawi
focused on apostate cultural and political influence within the Islamic world
(the near enemy), which he considered a separate issue from U.S. govern¬
mental support. Thus, the two parties employed different strategies of war¬
fare even as they shared the same ultimate goal: the reestablishment of the
caliphate, a single, transnational Islamic state.

This ideological dispute between Zarqawi and A1 Qaeda was never resolved,
which explains much of the tension between them even after Zarqawi swore
allegiance to A1 Qaeda. Zarqawi and bin Laden put aside their differences

20

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After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of A1 Qaeda in Iraq |

because the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its subsequent intimate relationship with
the new Iraqi government conflated the near and far enemy. The functional
implications of the ideological gap between Zarqawi and A1 Qaeda were re¬
duced greatly by the invasion, enabling them to cooperate operationally even
as they continued to disagree ideologically. In
1999, when Zarqawi operated in Afghanistan,
his ideological differences translated into dif¬
ferent tactics. At that time, A1 Qaeda’s focus
on attacking the U.S. homeland required very
different planning than an attack on an Arab
regime or apostate cultural site. In present-
day Iraq, however, the operational implica¬
tions of the two strategies are not so distinct.

An attack on a U.S. patrol or an Iraqi police
station requires similar planning and is a direct blow against both an apostate
government and a critical U.S. foreign policy goal.

Zarqawi’s agreement to join A1 Qaeda in the fall of 2004, 18 months after
the invasion of Iraq, did not mean that he immediately acceded to A1 Qa¬
eda’s ideological and operational strategy. In a book released online in May
2005, the chief of Zarqawi’s shari‘a committee, Abu Hamzah al-Baghdadi, ex¬
plicitly contradicted Al Qaeda’s doctrine by restating Zarqawi’s focus on the
near enemy: “Apostasy is a greater transgression than original disbelief, and
the apostate is a greater enemy.... [T]he enemy who is close to the Muslims
is more dangerous. When you fight him, you avert his evil and the evil of those
who stand behind him. If the Muslims occupy themselves with fighting the
far enemy, the near enemy will seize the chance to hurt the Muslims.” 2

During Zarqawi’s tenure as emir, AQI’s relationship with Al Qaeda was
a function of strategic convenience rather than doctrinal agreement. For
Al Qaeda, attaching its name to Zarqawi’s activities enabled it to maintain
relevance even as its core forces were destroyed or on the run. Zarqawi,
meanwhile, used the Al Qaeda brand to facilitate recruiting. This nominal
relationship was never truly robust; its weaknesses became increasingly ap¬
parent when Zarqawi ignored instructions from Al Qaeda to cease attacks
against civilian and Shi‘a cultural targets, which could not easily be inter¬
preted as strikes against the far enemy. This decision was not taken lightly,
and it was largely a function of AQI’s second dilemma.

Zarqawi and Al
Qaeda were allies of
convenience rather
than genuine partners.

The Gharib Paradox and Shi‘a Strategy

All terrorist groups face an important ideological paradox. Their ideas must
appeal to a popular audience, but they also must be insular enough to main¬
tain internal group cohesion in the face of external criticism. The latter

The Washington Quarterly ■ Autumn 2006

21

| Brian Fishman

effect is often achieved by denigrating the masses that do not belong to the
group, which naturally limits mass appeal. Zarqawi dealt with this paradox by
favoring internal group cohesion over popular appeal, a tendency illustrated
by his long-standing nickname, al-Gharib, or the Stranger, a common nom de

guerre among jihadists.

Zarqawi’s adoption of Gharib in the early
1990s was a means of steeling himself for the
isolation of the long fight on which he had em¬
barked. This definition of identity—an outsider
from mainstream society—embraces and expro¬
priates isolation from the majority so that, in¬
stead of being a source of despair and weakness,
seclusion promotes unity and strength. 3 The
gharib identity informed Zarqawi’s activities un-

Will Al Qaeda

in Iraq follow
Zarqawi’s teaching
or bin Laden’s?

til his death. In October 2005, he paraphrased scholars and hadith to argue
that God smiles on strangers because they adhere to Islam even as the masses
abandon God:

The strangers ... are the good few among the evil many_These various

descriptions of the strangers by the prophet, may God’s peace and bless¬
ings be upon him, while explaining the great role of these strangers in their
places and during the times of their alienation, namely their role of imple¬
menting and adhering to the orders of God, also explains the immense pain
and suffering of these strangers and their great patience in facing them. 4

Zarqawi used the gharib identity to explain the disadvantaged political
position of jihadists and to suggest that their isolation and criticism indicated
the moral rectitude of their path. Zarqawi cultivated this identity within his
organization to prevent discouragement and disillusionment, stating that
“[tjhose who belong to the victorious group can tolerate the bleakness of
their path and they are not alarmed when they see that only few men take
such a path. They are only compared in this with the best of creation and the
eminent prophets and messengers.” 5

Zarqawi’s approach to the gharib paradox made AQI resilient but impeded
his ability to build a social consensus in the Sunni community that would be
strong enough to assert any real political control in Iraq. An inflexible, extrem¬
ist ideology that relishes violence and embraces criticism as an indicator of
ideological correctness is always going to alienate more people than it attracts,
a trend that played out as Iraq’s tribal Sunnis increasingly rejected Zarqawi.

Back in 2004, Zarqawi made a critical choice about how to deal with Iraq’s
Sunni tribes. At the time, Zarqawi believed that increasing cooperation be¬
tween Sunni tribal leaders and U.S. as well as Iraqi government forces left him
with two bad options and one long-shot hope for building an alliance with the

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The Washington Quarterly ■ Autumn 2006

After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of A1 Qaeda in Iraq |

tribes. The first option was to attack the tribal chiefs directly despite the prob¬
ability of alienating Sunnis in his base areas. The second was to abandon Iraq
to fight elsewhere. 6 Because neither option was palatable, Zarqawi reasoned
that his only hope of making common cause with the tribal leaders was to in¬
stigate widespread Shi‘a-on-Sunni violence. 7 Zarqawi hoped that provoking a
Shi‘a backlash against Sunnis would convince moderate and tribal Sunnis that
the Iraqi government was simply a veil of legitimacy disguising a coordinated
Shi‘a plot to attack Sunnis. This, Zarqawi hoped, would compel secular Sunni
groups to ally with him and adopt his ideology and methods. In other words,
Zarqawi believed that it was not necessary to moderate his ideology and strate¬
gy to become attractive to moderate Sunnis because he believed that he could
quickly radicalize the Sunni population. He would solve the gharib paradox by
dramatically changing the underlying conditions.

Six months before joining A1 Qaeda, Zarqawi explained this Shi‘a strategy
to its leaders, saying that

targeting [Shi’a] in religious, political, and military depth will provoke
them to show the Sunnis their rabies ... and bare the teeth of the hidden
rancor working in their breasts. If we succeed in dragging them into the
arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive
Sunnis as they feel imminent danger and annihilating death at the hands
of the Sabeans. 8

This is not to say that Zarqawi opposed attacking Shi‘a targets as a worth¬
while goal in and of itself. The killings were intended to punish the Shi‘a for
theological offenses, to correct historical injustice, and to penalize collabora¬
tion with U.S. forces. Yet, Zarqawi’s policy had a grander strategic purpose
of building popular support for Zarqawi in the Sunni areas of Iraq without
moderating the ideological extremism that insulates the movement from
outside criticism.

Zarqawi’s problem was that not all criticism of his strategy came from
outside the jihadist movement. In the summer of 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
A1 Qaeda’s second in command, criticized Zarqawi’s Shi‘a strategy, claiming
that attacks on Shi’a targets distorted the image of jihadists and distracted
them from their most important enemy, the United States. This disagreement
pertained to more than just the Shi’a; it reflected the older disagreement
over whether or not attacks should be focused on the near enemy or the far
enemy. Zarqawi’s attacks on Shi’a cultural sites and civilian institutions were
more difficult to justify as damaging to the U.S. far enemy than attacks on
U.S. or Iraqi security forces. As Zarqawi’s attacks grew more indiscriminate,
the operational nexus between the near and far enemies that was created by
the U.S. presence in Iraq dissolved, and the alliance of convenience between
Zarqawi and A1 Qaeda broke down.

The Washington Quarterly ■ Autumn 2006

23

| Brian Fishman

Zarqawi’s Strategic Failure

How much will Al
Qaeda in Iraq expand
its area of operations
outside of Iraq?

Zarqawi’s response to the two fundamental dilemmas facing AQI was inter¬
nally inconsistent and ultimately self-defeating. First, although AQI built a
nominal relationship with Al Qaeda based on the U.S. presence in Iraq, Zar-
qawi pursued an operational strategy premised not on the U.S. occupation

but on the underlying sectarian divisions in
Iraqi society. That operational strategy ulti¬
mately undermined the confluence of inter¬
ests that had enabled the original alliance.
Second, Zarqawi designed an insular ideol¬
ogy that would complement his brutal opera¬
tional strategy. This ideological decision was
ill conceived precisely because AQI’s contro¬
versial operational strategy ensured that the
most damning criticism would come not from
outside the jihadi movement but from inside Al Qaeda itself.

The best illustration of Zarqawi’s self-defeating strategy was the November
2005 coordinated bombing attack of three hotels in Amman, Jordan. The at¬
tack was widely derided in Jordan, particularly after the revelation that one
bomb had detonated amid a wedding party. Although there is no public record
of Al Qaeda condemning Zarqawi for this attack, in retrospect its silence was
deafening. On April 13, 2006, six months after the Amman bombing, Zawahiri
released a video that, in part, praised Zarqawi. 9 This was striking because Za-
wahiri’s tape appears to have been made in early November 2005, just before
the Amman hotel attacks. In the video, Zawahiri suggests it was intended to
mark the anniversary of the infamous Tora Bora battle in Afghanistan, which
occurred in November and December of 2001. He also referred to the Sep¬
tember 2005 reelection of Egyptian president Husni Mubarak and the October
2005 earthquake in Pakistan as recent events.

The delay between taping and release was perhaps an attempt by Zawa-
hiri to distance Al Qaeda from the Amman attacks because of the negative
reaction they generated in the Arab world. That Zawahiri did not mention
Zarqawi by name in any of his statements during the interim period is further
evidence that Al Qaeda did not want to be associated with an unpopular
attack that did not serve its operational and ideological strategy. Although
Zarqawi also tried to distance himself from some of the carnage of these at¬
tacks, he clearly considered the premise of attacking Jordanian hotels consis¬
tent with his modus operandi of attacking civilian apostates. To Al Qaeda’s
leaders, however, the Amman attacks demonstrated that the functional im¬
plications of Zarqawi’s ideological and strategic differences with Al Qaeda
remained significant despite their confluence of interests in Iraq.

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After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of A1 Qaeda in Iraq |

Al Qaeda’s Uncertain Future in Iraq

Many major issues drive factionalism inside AQI, including the basic ques¬
tions of power and influence. The most important strategic question is a
function of AQI’s two critical dilemmas discussed above. Should AQI con¬
tinue to conduct excruciatingly brutal attacks, particularly against Shi‘a
civilians, or should it fall in line behind Al Qaeda’s leadership and refocus
attacks on the far enemy? In other words, should AQI respond to the gharib
paradox by following Zarqawi’s teaching or bin Laden’s?

One man that seems to be firmly in the Zarqawi camp is Abdallah bin
Rashid al-Baghdadi, the emir of the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC). The
MSC, which was formed in January 2006 as an umbrella media group for
several jihadist groups in Iraq, may play an increasingly important role now
that the jihad’s greatest media champion, Zarqawi, is no more. On June 9,
2006, Baghdadi reiterated his determination to continue Zarqawi’s jihad
against Iraq’s Shi‘a. Baghdadi’s intentions were further clarified on June
21, 2006, when the MSC’s legal committee authorized the execution of four
Russian hostages. 10 A video of their beheadings was circulated online four
days later. 11

Baghdadi’s statement stood in stark contrast to the first official jihadi
statement made after Zarqawi’s death. In that statement, the deputy emir of
AQI, Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Iraqi, pledged to continue bin Laden’s strategy
in Iraq. 12 Iraqi ignored the fact that bin Laden’s strategy had never been fol¬
lowed in Iraq and that doing so would represent a major strategic shift for
the organization. His attempt to ignore this reality was likely an attempt to
position himself as a close intellectual ally of bin Laden.

In this internal debate, the Zarqawi camp is likely to have the upper hand.
Maintaining strategic momentum will be simpler than changing it midstream.
Furthermore, the apparent penetration of AQI by U.S. and Iraqi intelligence,
as indicated by the U.S. ability to pinpoint Zarqawi’s advisers and track them
to the safe house where he was killed, will compel the group to close ranks
ideologically and operationally. In an environment of internecine warfare
and distrust, the pressure to respond to the gharib paradox by increasing the
brutality of attacks and demonizing all nongroup members is very high. AQI
will attempt to increase group solidarity through shared participation in bru¬
tal acts and will use both ideological and operational participation in such
behavior as a means of vetting members. The increase of sectarian violence
in Iraq since Zarqawi’s death will only reinforce this tendency.

Another question regarding Zarqawi’s successor is whether AQI should
be led by an Iraqi or another foreigner like Zarqawi. The appointment of
Muhajir as the new emir, whose pseudonym implies he is not an Iraqi, sug¬
gests this question has been decided, but that does not mean all of the issues

The Washington Quarterly ■ Autumn 2006

25

| Brian Fishman

It may be better to
let disagreements
fester rather than to
eliminate all potential
targets.

surrounding it have been resolved. One critical issue is the vulnerability
of AQI to penetration by U.S. and Iraqi intelligence. If Iraqi intelligence
brought Zarqawi down, foreign fighters in the group may lose trust in their
Iraqi comrades. Likewise, the revelation that Jordanian intelligence, which
worked closely with Iraqi tribes to gather information on Zarqawi, contrib¬
uted to Zarqawi’s demise may sow distrust of foreigners among Iraqi elements

of AQI. 13 Although AQI’s ideology eschews
nationality, having foreign leadership cer¬
tainly did not help the group win friends
among Iraq’s Sunni population. In the wake
of Zarqawi’s failed attempt to radicalize large
numbers of Iraqi Sunnis, some AQI members
will likely advocate reaching out to them by
elevating Iraqi members of the organization.

The third question concerns how much
AQI should expand its area of operations
outside of Iraq. Zarqawi’s Shi‘a strategy was a
long shot to avoid pursuing the only other strategies that he felt were avail¬
able: confront the tribal leaders head-on or leave Iraq. The Shi‘a strategy
was clearly failing even before Zarqawi was killed, which accounts for the
increase in attacks on tribal leaders and helps explain AQI’s effort to build
infrastructure for jihad outside of Iraq. 14 Even setting aside the November
2005 Amman hotel attacks, the evidence that Zarqawi was planning to ex¬
pand the jihad beyond Iraq is robust. Jordanian sources report that up to 300
terrorists trained in Iraq have since returned home to await orders. 15

Zarqawi’s final missive focused on a regional Shi‘a conspiracy against Sun¬
nis and threatened Lebanon’s Hizballah in particular. 16 A document found
in the safe house where Zarqawi was killed outlined a plan to incite a war
between Iran and the United States. One possible tactic was to frame Iran
for attacks in the West itself. 17 The debate within AQI over operations out¬
side of Iraq will inevitably be tied to the question of whether AQI’s future
revolves around attacking the near enemy, like Zarqawi advocated, or the far
enemy, as bin Laden argued. Even though Zarqawi was toying with the idea
of blaming Iran for attacks on Western targets, his long-standing doctrine
suggests that AQI’s primary focus would likely have remained apostate Arabs
in the Middle East. Zarqawi’s death may actually strengthen the negotiating
position of jihadists dedicated to attacking the U.S. homeland.

Decoding Muhajir

After Zarqawi’s death, Muhajir has assumed the responsibility of leading
AQI. His primary challenge is to consolidate control over AQI’s various

26

The Washington Quarterly ■ Autumn 2006

After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of A1 Qaeda in Iraq |

elements while providing strategic guidance on these critical strategic ques¬
tions, which will not be easy. From the moment Muhajir was appointed, U.S.
forces, AQI members, and online sympathizers speculated about the emir’s
real identity. Some sympathizers maintained it was Iraqi, AQI’s deputy emir,
whereas Maj. Gen. William Caldwell declared that Muhajir was really Abu
Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian with long-standing ties to Zawahiri. Meanwhile,
another group hoped to build support around Baghdadi, emir of the MSC. As
of this writing, confusion over the identity of AQI’s new emir has not been
definitively resolved, a fact that alone demonstrates how Zarqawi’s death
was a significant blow to AQI. In his wake, Muhajir must harangue disparate
factions into accepting his authority, but more substantively, he must address
the distinct strategic perspectives within AQI. Further, he must do all of this
in a very difficult operational environment. Zarqawi’s killing demonstrated
that AQI had been penetrated, and Muhajir must redefine AQI’s strategic
direction within an organization that he cannot completely trust.

During his tenure as AQI leader, Zarqawi used public statements released
online to convey determination, ideological fervor, and strategic purpose to
followers, enemies, and pole-sitters. These statements provided strategic con¬
text for AQI’s attacks, which might otherwise be perceived as simple acts of
sadism rather than military instruments designed to achieve specific outcomes.
They also encouraged widely dispersed AQI members to sustain criticism and
suffer the hardships of jihad. Without a central node defiantly explaining the
group’s strategic purpose, AQI as we know it would have ceased to exist.

The most striking attribute of Muhajir’s tenure thus far is the fact that
he has chosen not to define either his own identity or his strategic vision
for AQI clearly. Muhajir must have good reasons for this silence because the
costs of such strategic ambiguity are very high. Muhajir is likely foregoing the
benefits of strategic clarity in order to mollify different factions within AQI.
His silence prolongs the internal debate within AQI over the group’s future
strategy. Muhajir is unlikely to force a resolution until he is certain he will
win. In a covert organization that depends on the cooperation of many mem¬
bers, the standard for victory is not simply a majority, it is near consensus.

Predicting Al Qaeda’s Next Move in Iraq

In the long run, it may be better to let disagreements fester within AQI
rather than to eliminate all potential targets immediately. 18 Striking kineti-
cally at an organization’s leadership is not always the best way to destroy its
effectiveness. Asking who will be the next emir of AQI is a useful intellectu¬
al question, but it may be somewhat misleading. Asking which leader within
the jihadist movement in Iraq will be Zarqawi’s intellectual successor may

The Washington Quarterly ■ Autumn 2006

27

| Brian Fishman

be a better way to frame the issue than focusing on the AQI organization

specifically. Despite this ambiguity, some broad conclusions can be reached

about the future of AQI and the wider jihadist movement in Iraq.

First, A1 Qaeda in Iraq will fragment. Other Islamic groups in Iraq, no¬
tably Ansar al-Sunnah and the Islamic Army of Iraq, will collect some of
AQI’s inevitably disaffected derivatives. Zarqawi’s greatest strength was

not his ideological prowess, it was his personal
leadership skills. Muhajir, whether he is the
Egyptian Masri or someone else, is unlikely to
be commensurately capable. Some elements of
AQI will likely leave the organization, both in
response to doctrinal disagreements and to
fears that the group has been penetrated by
coalition intelligence operatives. In order to
build unity within AQI, Muhajir or whoever
ultimately takes control will most likely con¬
tinue Zarqawi-esque attacks but will at least

The leadership
would welcome a
fight between the
United States and
Iran’s Shi‘a leaders.

temporarily reduce AQI’s anti-Sunni-apostate rhetoric.

Zarqawi may be dead, but the gharib identity will live on, either in AQI
itself or in some derivative organization. Although Zarqawi was rightly and

frequently derided as an ill-educated leader, he combined ideology and ac¬

tion in a manner that will continue to inspire many in and outside of Iraq.
His ideology had teeth. As damaging as AQI’s brutal anti-Shi‘a attacks
may be to A1 Qaeda’s image, a public rift would be even more traumatic.
Despite continued strategic tension, neither party will provoke a dramatic
falling-out.

Second, AQI’s new emir will try to attack outside of Iraq. AQI’s long-term
focus on the near enemy suggests it is best positioned to attack Arab coun¬
tries, rather than the United States or European targets. Although a specific
location will not be Muhajir’s first concern, he will look for a place with es¬
tablished support networks, a large Sunni population, historical Sunni-Shi‘a
tension, and an unpopular apostate government. The most likely targets are
Lebanon and Syria, where a dramatic and bloody attack on Shi‘a targets
would be extremely destabilizing. Although attacks on Israel are the lowest
common denominator of terrorist act in much of the Islamic world and mov¬
ing in that direction is, to some degree, an act of desperation, organizing a
successful attack on Israel could bolster the credibility of AQI’s new emir
more than any other action. Zarqawi’s successors will be heartened by the
fighting between Israel and Hizballah. Although they would prefer to see a
Sunni group, rather than Shi‘a Hizballah, be the champion of militant anti-
Zionism, they will see war between two of their biggest enemies as a positive
development and a potential opportunity.

28

The Washington Quarterly ■ Autumn 2006

After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of A1 Qaeda in Iraq |

Attacks on the United States or Europe are possible, but this would signify
a greater degree of subordination to bin Laden and A1 Qaeda proper. No
matter where AQI chooses to focus geographically, it will attempt to exploit
events in the region. One of the most provocative would be a U.S. or Israeli
strike on Iran. Although Iran itself is not a good arena for jihad, Muhajir and
the AQI leadership would welcome a fight between the United States and
Iran’s Shi‘a leaders. If the United States attacks Iran because of its nuclear
program, the network will actively attempt to heighten the tension region¬
ally, perhaps by staging dramatic attacks in Syria or Lebanon and blaming
either Iran or the United States.

Whatever the specific target, AQI’s network outside of Iraq will begin to
freelance. Communications problems will make it more difficult for AQI to
exert bureaucratic control over its global network. In lieu of direct bureau¬
cratic control, ideological homogeneity and group insularity are very impor¬
tant for organizational cohesion. 19 Although Muhajir, like his predecessor,
will eventually develop a strategic media presence to distribute ideology,
Zarqawi’s death will loosen the personal and ideological bonds connecting
the dispersed jihadis to AQI. These individuals will maintain a kinship to the
Iraqi jihad but may be less directly tied to the AQI network.

Implications for U.S. Withdrawal

Wittingly and unwittingly, U.S. policy shapes the political terrain on which
the jihadi-salafist network, including AQI, is built. By employing a selec¬
tive use of force, a carefully designed political and military presence in the
Middle East, and information operations, the United States can design the
battlefield to be as disruptive to the jihadi-salafists as possible. Generally
speaking, measured actions are best. AQI, like other terrorist groups, would
like to provoke unhelpful overreactions.

U.S. policymakers must always think holistically about U.S. interests before
embarking on any initiative. No single approach is correct, and policymakers
must carefully analyze the costs and benefits of all options. Although disrupt¬
ing the AQI-A1 Qaeda nexus is a critical foreign policy goal, it should not be
pursued at the expense of all others. Protecting U.S. economic interests and
containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions are but two examples of more important
priorities than driving a wedge in A1 Qaeda. Nevertheless, in order to increase
the discord inside AQI and between AQI and A1 Qaeda, the United States
should increase the distance between the near and far enemies by minimizing
public support—military, economic, and moral—for “apostate” Arab regimes,
including Iraq’s. To divide Zarqawi’s ideological successors from the bin Laden
sympathizers, the United States should aggravate the functional implications
of their ideological disagreement by disengaging from Iraq as much as possible.

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| Brian Fishman

Strategically, disengagement means beginning the process of moving

troops out of Iraq and explicitly guaranteeing that all U.S. forces will leave

eventually. Even if credibly separating the near and far enemies in the short
term is not possible, the United States can complicate jihadist long-term

planning by forcing on them a debate about
how to proceed once the near and far enemies
are less obviously linked. The U.S. debate
over Iraq has been focused on means for too
long, specifically the timeline-for-withdrawal
debate, to the neglect of the most important
issue, the end state, i.e., complete withdrawal
versus a semipermanent presence. To disrupt
the jihadists, U.S. strategic direction must be
very clear, and talk must be supported by vis¬
ible action. This is not a call for U.S. troops to

nor Al Qaeda were
ever the center of
gravity of the Iraqi
insurgency.

run for the exits immediately but for the United States to make its strategic
intentions to withdraw completely apparent. If that is not its intention, the

United States must be prepared for Americans to die in Iraq in perpetuity.

Critics will rightly question whether the benefit of upsetting AQI’s relation¬
ship with Al Qaeda justifies a strategic reorientation. If the war on terrorism
is our primary concern, it very well may. The sectarian violence wracking Iraq
is extraordinarily disruptive but does not necessarily translate into increased
support for Al Qaeda and its affiliated movements. Iraq’s violent mobs and
numerous secular insurgents will not target U.S. interests beyond Iraq’s border,
but AQI and Al Qaeda will. The argument that we must prevent Iraq from
becoming a haven for terrorists is certainly potent, but its impact is mitigated
by the fact that Iraq is already serving that purpose. If the war in Iraq is but
one front in a wider war on terrorism, then the campaign there should be de¬
signed to disrupt those elements that threaten U.S. interests around the world.
Furthermore, the functional aspects of the strategic reorientation, in the short
term, need not be overly dramatic. Although the timeline is protracted, Gen.
George W. Casey’s reported plan to reduce U.S. combat brigades in Iraq from
14 to six over the next 16 months is the right kind of thinking, as long as it is
coupled with an unambiguous strategic message. 20

Most importantly, U.S. planners should resist the temptation, in an at¬
tempt to avoid the psychological costs of defeat, to pursue middling strate¬
gies that have little hope of bringing victory but carry significant costs in
blood and treasure. If the long-term outcome in Iraq resembles what many
now consider victory in Afghanistan, the United States will be in a very
precarious situation indeed. Maintaining a small U.S. force to advise and
support an Iraqi government that can assert continuous authority only in
some of Iraq’s provinces would be a very expensive strategy to give Zarqawi’s

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The Washington Quarterly ■ Autumn 2006

After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of A1 Qaeda in Iraq |

successors and other jihadists exactly what they want: access to U.S. troops,
ungoverned space in the heart of the Middle East, a means of draining the
U.S. Treasury, and a recruiting boon.

Although a decisive, complete withdrawal of troops is vital, the inverse
principle is just as important. If the United States is determined to remain in
Iraq, it should maximize the opportunity to crush the insurgency by increas¬
ing the number of troops on the ground. Calls for maintaining current troop
levels or a phased drawdown of troops without a clear, strategic end state are
well meaning but will ultimately serve our worst enemies’ interests rather
than our own. In other words, strategic action must be resolute.

Getting Al Qaeda Out of Iraq

The United States should take advantage of AQI’s differences with Al Qa¬
eda rather than criticize AQI’s ideology, overtly or covertly. Zarqawi’s gharib
identity will live on in AQI. Directly criticizing the network will be counter¬
productive, particularly in the months after his death, because the group’s
ideology will manipulate criticism from the outside into solidarity within. Per¬
haps most importantly, the United States must be aware that neither Zarqawi
nor AQI were ever the center of gravity of the Iraqi insurgency. AQI will be
less dangerous without Zarqawi, but its derivatives will metastasize and grow.
Secular, Sunni, and Shi‘a groups will continue to kill Americans and disrupt
the Iraqi government. Nevertheless, the United States can improve its over¬
all prospects in this long war by sowing division within AQI and between
AQI and Al Qaeda by simply avoiding actions that unite these rivals despite
their ideological divisions.

Notes

1. Abu Hamzah al-Baghdadi, “Why Do We Fight, and Whom Do We Fight?” June 2005,
http://www.tajdeed.org.uk/fomms.

2. Ibid.

3. The nickname also invokes an Arabic literary tradition that celebrates the lonely
traveler longing for the simple comforts of home. See Abu ‘L-Faraj al-Isfahani, The
Book of Strangers, trans. Patricia Crone and Shmuel Moreh (Princeton, N.J.: Markus
Wiener Publishers, 2000).

4. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, audio lecture, September 30, 2005, http://www.world-news-
network.net (appears to be derived from the Sahih Muslim, Kitab al-lman [The book
of faith], chap. 66.

5. Ibid.

6. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, letter released by the Coalition Provisional Authority, Febru¬
ary 12, 2004, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20040212_zarqawi_full.html.

7. Ibid.

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| Brian Fishman

8. Ibid.

9. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Four Years After the Tora Bora Battles; From Tora Bora to
Iraq,” Global News Network, April 13, 2006, http://www.w-n-n.net.

10. Mujahidin Shura Council, untitled video, June 21, 2006, http://www.hanein.net.

11. Mujahidin Shura Council, untitled video, June 26, 2006, http://www.muslm.net/vb.

12. Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Iraqi and the Mujahidin Shura Council Media Committee,
“Statement Untitled—Acknowledging Zarqawi’s Death,” June 8, 2006, http://www.
tajdeed.ork.uk/forums.

13. Borzou Daragahi and Josh Meyer, ‘“We Knew Him’: Jordanian Spies Infiltrated Iraq
to Find Zarqawi,” Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2006, p. Al.

14- “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Situation Report,” Harmony document no. IZ-060316-01, http://
www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony_docs.asp. This document was written by an aide in
Zarqawi’s organization. The document was captured in Iraq by U.S. forces in early
2006.

15. Michael Slackman and Scott Shane, “Terrorists Trained by Zarqawi Went Abroad,
Jordan Says,” New York Times, June 11, 2006, p. Al.

16. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, “Has the Story of the Rejectionists Reached Thee?” Islamic
Renewal Forum, June 1, 2006, www.tajdeed.org.uk/forums.

17. For a document found in a safe house and released by Iraqi national security ad¬
viser Mouwafak al-Rubaie, see Sameer N. Yacoub, “Al-Qaida in Iraq Sought War
Between U.S. and Iran,” North County Times, June 15, 2006, http://www.nctimes.
com/articles/2006/06/16/news/nation/15_01_226_15_06.txt. As this document was
released just after Zarqawi’s killing by the Iraqi national security adviser, some have
questioned its veracity. Whether authentic or not, the claim that Zarqawi hoped to
instigate hostilities between the United States and Iran is likely accurate.

18. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Department of Social Sciences, U.S.
Military Academy, “Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational
Vulnerabilities,” February 14, 2006, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/Harmony%20and%
20Disharmony%20--%20CTC.pdf.

19. Ibid.

20. Michael Gordon, “U.S. General in Iraq Outlines Troop Cuts,” New York Times, June
25, 2006, p. Al.

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