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Aden and the Protectorates were the

>r of Empire, avoided by colonial
seeking lofty careers. A molten
ock and sand with an aroma all
i and a raffish reputation as the
, t , | 0 r divorcees and alcoholics,
en had its fair share of both, yet
years the hardy overcame the
f the climate, the sheer ugliness ot
d the remarkable sights and
f its backstreets to stay, perhaps
by the very strangeness of it all,
and dedicate their lives to its
So it is no accident that more
1V e been written by the British
,uth Arabia than any other similar
es This book is different,
tracing the historical background
first to describe in graphic detail
I days of British rule when South
.vas'thc last frontier of Empire and
of world attention. Only in
le did the British withdraw in such
id leave behind such chaos. The
ay be controversial as it does not
■ to indicate those, both British and
,ho behaved badly or with
ncc. The story is not all tragedy and
,litics— these arc leavened with a
e of humour. It was written for the
, especially those who remember
Vrabia with nostalgia and a certain
crment as to how it all came to an
quickly and so badly. This book
•ovide some of the answers.

lar Publishing

9071 5 J 08 6

design: Colin Lurkin

holograph: United Press International

Shifting Sands

First published by Peninsular Publishing 1983
©D Ledger 1983

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any
lorm or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the
copyright owner.

ISBN 0 907151 08 0

Produced by Scorpion Pica

Edited by Leonard Marrow

Assisted by Dale Dawson and John Orley

Typeset in Melior Roman

Printed and bound in England by

Hazell Watson and Viney.

Distributed in UK. Europe and North America by

Scorpion Communications and Publications. London. England.

Photographic credits:

R Lewcock: 2: Daily Express: 3; UP1: 11, 12, 17, 18. 19. 20. 21.
22, 23, 24, 25. 26, 27. 29. 33: C H H Coles: 31; Imperial War
Museum: 38, 39

Contents

Maps

iv— vi

Preface

vii

Note on Endpapers

viii

Prologue

I Happy Arabia

11 Aden

m i ne Revolutionaries

IV Funeral in Aden

V Federal Government at Bay

VI This Month 's Magicians

VII Change at the Top

118

VIII The Mutiny

130

IX The Fall of the Sultans

151

X War with Two Fronts

174

XI ...So Depart

197

Epilogue

214

Postscript

227

Appendix— Political Organisations

228-229

Index

230-231

Aden and Shaikh Uthman

Crater

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

Preface

events which they desuibe. com For m

have commanded their regiments or risen tonignp

Srvice. Others have made their ownwa^ and ^ he most p ^

success. Triendsrups ;ma South ^^^^^^0*

old times ore remembered a shadow » 11 * a ^" , th is the suggestion

South Arabia was not quite right ^^Jj";™^, wh & was

that the British broke faith «^ J^,^, Uemence by

dishonourable. This view is he Id in vai ^8 Thi$

many. Whether there is truth in this or not .s h t reader «> J * of

book does not pretend to be a history or an , authout > buns a

events as I saw them, if in writing ^^^J^Kbia. and

then the labour has been worthwhile. ^intpr the

Haideri, and friends from all parties in South Arabia whe , have di splaj
much kindness and tolerance with my enquiries into heir a and
lastly to mv family, who will now be able to rega.n the use of the dining

David Ledger
Dartmoor, January 1983

A Note on the Endpapers

An Anecdote by the Artist

I painted this picture 'on spec' in the early 1960s. As it was Ihe Queen's Royal Irish
Hussars who took me along the Dhala Road on this once in a lifetime trip, 1 obviously
put them in the resultant painting— being strongly advised that 'they had plenty of
money and could easily afford the £90'! They said they couldn't— and that price
included the frame!

The painting did me an immense ammount of good, however, being hawked
around from one regiment to another, getting me a great many commissions, and it
didn't worry me that I hadn't sold it.

Eventually it was bought by the British Officers serving with the Aden
Protectorate' Levies (APL) for their mess in Seedaseer Lines, but before it was
delivered I was asked to alter some of the detail to link it more closely with the APL.

The alteration can be seen by comparing the painting with the later print. The
print, which is donated by Lt Colonel G H Coles (ex-API.), was found by him in a
Shell house magazine in a dentist's waiting room in Aden. The alterations include:
painting out the aircraft, altering the tac-signs and uniform of the scout car and crew.

David Shepherd

An End to the Tale by Major General J D Lunt CBE

When we completed the new officers' mess for the FRA in Khormaksar in 1962, 1
suggested we should purchase 'The Dhala Convoy' and give it to that mess.

The snag was that the original painting was of the Royals (not the QRIH who did
not go out to Aden until my time there.) I believe the Royals were offered it for
purchase but for a sum much in excess of £70. They turned down the offer and we
bought it for, I believe, £700. David Shepherd turned the British officers into Arab
ones, changed the vehicle markings and, rather to my sorrow, removed the Twin-
Pioneer which featured in the original. He did lliis. I understand, under the
misapprehension that we did not receive support from the RAF in the FRA.

The painting was a gift from the British officers serving with the FRA. We hoped
in due course that the Arabs would take over peacefully and that the picture would
serve as a memento of old comradeship. As you know, things turned out rather
differently three years later.

By then Brig (now Maj Gen) Jack Dye was commanding the FRA. It fell to his
unhappy lot to amalgamate the FRA with the National Guard to form the South
Arabian Army, and shortly afterwards to deal with the mutiny of his troops. Shortly
before leaving Aden, Dye, and another British officer, succeeded in removing the
picture from the mess. It was taken out of its frame and brought home. Then,
reframed, it hung in the GOC's house in Colchester (where Gen Dye was
commanding) until Brig C G T Viner drew my attention to the picture; he had been
one of my battalion commanders at the time we bought it. I was Vice Adjutant
General at the time and I got in touch with Jack Dye, by then Director of the
Territorial Army. He agreed with'me that since the APL/FRA was 90% infantry, and
Since most of the British who had served with the force had been from the infantry,
the picture's proper home was the School of Infantry.

Acknowledgements

The author gratefully acknowledges the permission to reproduce here as endpapers
the two versions of 'The Dhala Road' by the artist David Shepherd, and the artist's
publishers, Solomon & Whitehead (Guild Prints) Ltd, with thanks also to Colonel
Charles Lane of the School of Infantry, Warminster, where both versions now hang,
and to Major General J D Lunt CBF. for his account.

Prologue

It is jar better to be Britain's enemy than Britain's .friend. If you are
the former there is a possibility of being bought, but if you are the
latter there is a certainty of being sold.

Attributed to the Sherif Hussain of Baihan- 1966

it is said that the reason for the British Government's decision is
economy. You must understand that you arc economising at the
expense of the lives and prosperity of other people.

.Sultan Salih of the AudhaJi to Lord Beswick— 17 February 1966

The days of the Queen's Arabia were numbered arid the grace and favour of
Her Majesty's Protection were to be withdrawn from Her South Arabian
subjects. The great military base of Aden dismantled, the port abandoned,
the land and people left to their own devices.

By early 1366 South Arabia had become an embarrassment to the British.
International hostility, revolution, the loss of British lives and most
significantly the rising financial costs had convinced the Labour
government of Harold Wilson that the time had come to pull out.

Once the decision had been made and a timetable of withdrawal settled,
there only remained the task of breaking the news lo Britain's South
Arabian allies then engaged in a desperate battle for survival.

The time— 11 am on 16 February 1966. The place— the Chamber of the
Supreme Council of the Federation of South Arabia, in their capital city of
al Ittihad across the bay from Aden. The chosen instrument— Lord
Beswick, His audience, twenty or so Arabian chiefs sitting with their
Adeni colleagues, flanked by British advisors. Lord Beswick in his dark
suit, dark. moustache, was a heavy, deliberate figure. The Arabs wore
brightly hued kilts like so many Scottish clansmen, their clan identified by
the fashion of the headgear, a high golden turban for 1 .ahej, a white band for
the Audhali, the Adenis in suits and ties. The British wore a uniform of
sunburnt faces, white shirts and ties for the occasion.

A sense of duty had brought Lord Beswick to this moment. This was his
first excursion into Arabian politics and it was clear that he did not like it. If
the Arabs were mercurial and elusive, then their British advisors were
equally baffling. A lifetime devoted to Labour politics, the Co-operative
movement and the Church was no preparation for dealing with a society

which did no! comprehend political form, as he knew them. Part of the
^^■KESESSSt iSdSulhttocommandth.

Already the British „oo,,s u-.re c evotmg much o the, ^ >°

federation achieved planned '"JJJd £ Wt to f2. their

defence treaty with the new state and that tney wuuiu u C

^T^lmbs knew that if this policy was carried out they were rained and

with the Federation. Government saying

The South Arabian reply was b.ttcr. k the Brit w

X™,"' ;» Ive dd us is dishonourable ot the

^SXSK- »o„, o„ to ask tor aid and
thpv «nt a little of both but not enough to make any ddierence. in ui
Yorne'n the Egypt ans abandoned peace talks, reinforced then- army an
increase!) their support for terrorism in South Arabia: elsewhere the world
response was apathetic.

, , Beswirk w». home and prospered. All the South Arabian, who

What follows is the s on h d how Soviet warships came to

last days as the -J^CS the nationalisation of hicyc.es a Sou h

that his people are the first ,n the world to

aC ^IiXSnd what happened we have to go hack a long way.

Chapter I

Happy Arabia

Anybody who claims lo understand South Arabian politics has been
sadly misinformed.

Brigadier Lun! — The Barren Rocks

The basic trouble is thai the peoples of South Arabia have never been
united m a single state and have rarely owed allegiance to the same
overlord. The golden age of the land, if there ever was one, has long since
passed The empires which grew on the riches of the spice trade have
crumbled away. The famous sacred road, hallowed bv history and ancient
tradition along which trod Roman and Greek. Egyptian and Phoenician
bearing frankincense and myrrh bound for the Mediterranean, had
disappeared. Only a few Himyaritic remains and shadowy legends passed
down from father to son over the centuries record the splendours of a
forgotten civilisation. As each kingdom fell its survivors sought refuge in
the mountains, adding to thodiversity of South Arabian peoples dwelling
in sheltered valleys almost untouched by the passing of time. For most of

recorded history the land has been in a state of anarchy.
Aden has been famous as a port since the dawn of history, its fortunes

fluctuating with those of the people living in the vast hinterland.

Sometimes a foreign conqueror would seize it as a base for his ships and

Aden would prosper. When he left, it would decline.

In 1728 the chief of the Abdali tribe styling himself Sultan of Lahej

renounced his alliance to the Imam of (he Yemen. Seven vears later in

alliance with the tribes of Yafa' he stormed Aden and expelled the Imam's

representative.

The British visited Aden frequently and in 1802 concluded a treaty of
friendship with the Sultan.

Consequent relations proved difficult and the British administrators in
India began to perceive the strategic advantages of Aden, its possibilities as
a base for trade and as a coaling centre for the steamships which were
beginning to make their appearance.

The excuse for conquest arose when Sultan Muhsin of Lahej
incautiously allowed his men to pillage an Indian ship flving the British
flag which had been wrecked on the coast. This may have been an early
insurance fraud, but it was enough for the British. In January 1839 Captain

Stamford Beresford Haines of the Indian Navy commanding Her Majesty's
steamer Voltage, twenty eight guns, and Cruder, ten guns, with 300 British
and 400 Indian troops stormed and captured the port. Aden thus fell into
the hands of the British, the first new accession of territory in the reign of
Queen Victoria.

Captain Haines stayed on as the first Governor of Aden. He soon found
that if he was to be left in peace then he had lo come lo some
accommodation with the peoples who lived outside his perimeter. The
Sultan of Lahej had never quite got over his loss and made two attempts to
recapture the town, each of which was easily defeated, but the problem
remained. At length Captain Haines embarked on a policy to persuade the
tribes to sign 'treaties of friendship' which meant they were drawn within
the British sphere of influence and were expected to behave themselves
towards the British. In return they received a small annual present. Haines
soon realised that there was no need to conquer the hinterland lo make
Aden safe. Although the land was traditionally part of the Yemen, the
Imam of Sana had lost control a hundred years before. The tribes lying
between Aden and the Yemen proper were Sunnis of the Shafa'i Sect who
looked upon the Imam, who was head of the Shi'a Zaidi Sect, with the deep
suspicion of sixteenth-century Calvinists for the Pope and they had little
desire to see him back.

Haines remained Governor in Aden for 15 years, only otico leaving his
post through illness and then he had to be forcibly carried lo the ship taking
him for recuperation. Shortly after his appointment the Government of
India changed and the expansionists who had encouraged the capture of
Aden were replaced by those who entertained doubts over the enterprise.
From then on Haines had a difficult time, not made any easier by his own
prickly nature. No slight was too small lo pass notice and the records are
full of his quarrels with military commanders. Yet his personal relations
with the natives, Arab, Indian and Jew, were exccllenl. His efforts to
promote trade were only a partial success, and he financed il bv employing
1 reasury funds to back special ventures. Theaccounts were a shambles and
tiie son of the former Governor of Aden let him down. A commission of
enquiry called Haines to account and although he was cleared of
embezzlement the authorities held him personally responsible, as 'a
gentleman Thrown into a debtor's prison he was released a few davs
"etore his death in i860.*

cast! , v "'. ,? s brou 8 hl lo trial on three counts of baud and embezzlement. The prosecutor's
dronne'l • ! ,&' " ev p rt,l «'ess the jury acquitted Haines on two counts and the government
k , Ho » vcver - ,he establishment had no intention of letting Haines

"elicit" ad l,ee »ma<le. during and before Die trial, of his willingness to pav Ihc £28.000

instalments fr^T , U|J ,V, n lo l ,onour his 1'leuge. Haines probably intended lo pav bv
unable In Lui -ri S ry ' VVhen tarfid with a demand for immediate repayment ho'was
Kf'vornmeni 1 c ? nvmced '' ord HIpbinslone that he was a 'rascal' and bv order of the

to the /)„ ,„ r, ",'. d ? tasl "ered and thrown into jail. Haines was bankrupt although according
£10 0U0 IF , - , ii ° mpU and Cou "'« r (31 luly 1854) he had accumulated savings of over
Murray 1 ifi« f j"^ 0 Haines' career see Sultans of Aden bv Cordon Waterfield. John
>■ ui'8. and Aden under British Hule by R | Gavin. C Hurst & Co.. 1975.)

In 1871 the Turks launched another invasion of North Yemen and on
their own behalf subsequently asserted the imam's claims to Aden's
hinterland. Bv so doing they exposed the vulnerability of 'the Inendly
relationships' between the tribes and the British in Aden. A more formal
connection was required to counter the Turks. Yet the British m India,
haunted bv the ghosts of an army lost in Afghanistan, hesitated at
involving themselves too deeply with peoples alarmingly like those who
had given so much trouble on the North West Frontier. A compromise was
reached and gradually the tribes were persuaded to sign a form ol
protection treat v. These treat ies were negotiated with tribal leaders and as a
result of this haphazard process a series of British Protectorates evolved.

In return for Queen Victoria's gracious favour and protection' the tribal
leaders undertook to 'refrain from any correspondence or agreement with
any foreign nation and not to cede, sell, mortgage, lease, hire or otherwise
dispose of anv territory other than to the British Government'. From the
Arab point of view the treaties not only assured a regular income but there
was always a chance that powerful protection would be available against
raids from their fierce Zaidi neighbours. Moreover, as the British displayed
little interest in their internal affairs the tribes did not feel they were
surrendering their independence.

In the seventv-five vears between 1839 and the outbreak ot the Hirst
World War. British influence grew and the jumble of protected states
extended until thev stretched along the southern shore of the Arabian
Peninsula as far as the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman in the east and away
into the great sands of the Empty Quarter and mountains of the Yemen in

the north. (

The treatv policv, although admirable at the time, contained seeds ot
later disaster. The lack of fertile land had been the cause of end less d isputes
and bloodv feuds. Over the centuries the custom had grown up whereby a
much smaller tribe of outsiders had been used as mediators between, two,
three or more larger ones, so keeping the balance.

At Dhala in the west, it was the descendants of a rebellious Turkish
Satrap who apportioned the fertile wadi beds. In the east, the Ashraf of
Baihan, descendants of the Prophet, traditional peacemakers of Islam,
protected the waterholes without which the wandering nomads of the
desert would perish. Peace-keeping was a dangerous business: not
infrequently the peacemakers would come to a violent end or be held to
ransom bv their tribesmen.

There were exceptions. Since the days when men worshipped the sun,
the Affifis, priest kings of mountainous Yafa\ are said to have held part
temporal and part spiritual sway over their turbulent subjects, while the
Aulaqis claimed to trace their lineage to the rulers of the ancient kingdom
ol'Maan. ,

Generally speaking the people with whom the British negotiated,
although holding influence at the time, did not control the people whom
thev claimed to represent.

fir reio«nismg and protecting the mediators, and most important by
"L \ h em the annual gifts of money and arms to distribute to the tribes,
11, Rrilish made them rulers and their spheres of influence into states, so
viz r ^ an ever-shifting situation. While these had money to give,
■oaoons to distribute and British protection to rely on, the tribes paid hp
rvire and seethed with envv and frustration at the trick which fate had
Hve'd them Mo state was without its dissidents; there was many a nasty
murder to decide who was to be the leader of the ruling house.

Over the vears both the British and the rulers persuaded themselves that
(hey really did rule the people they claimed to. It was a mistake for which
both were to pay dearly.

After more lhan thirlv vears of intrigue and protests the Turks accepted
the position and by ratifying the Anglo-Turkish Convention in 1914
recognised a frontier between the Yemen proper and British South Arabia.
Efforts to delineate the border with exactitude failed. A joint commission
set up for the purpose gave up its task, confounded by tribal disputes. Only
some sixtv miles were surveyed, the remainder demarcated by a line
arbitrarily drawn on the map at forty-five degrees from a point just north ot

Dl The British had gained a cruel land, rich in wild untamed scenery but
little else The heart is a highland massif which gives way to sands in the
north and the Gulf of Aden in the south. Except for fringes of desert it is a
country of rock and gorge, mountain and plateau. In all South Arabia not a
single stream rising in the highlands flows all year or successfully traverses
the coastal plain to the sea.

It was during the First World War that the South Arabian people had
their first taste of British protection. In response to an appeal by the Sultan
of Lahoj to help repel the invading Turks, a British force set out from Aden.
The whole episode was a military disgrace. British and Indian troops
began to march across 40 miles of desert at midday. Many collapsed and
over thirty died of heatstroke. Aden's seven motor vehicles were
commandeered and used to rush ice to the exhausted troops. On the
arrival o f the survivors in Lahej the Sultan rode out to greet them.
Regrettably thev mistook him for a Turk and shot him dead. Then without
engaging the enemy they fell back on Aden. A replacement general
succeeded in recapturing Shaikh Uthman after which operations were
limited to patrol actions as the Turks cut off from their homeland
resolutely held a line of fortifications based on Lahej. Eventually after the
armistice was signed with the Ottoman Empire the Turkish Commander
Ali Said Pasha came into Aden with 3,000 men to surrender and a hero's
welcome.

With the collapse of Turkev at the end of the First World War her troops
evacuated the country leaving behind the Imam as ruler in Sana. The Imam
Yahva was a remarkable man who utterly personified the isolation and
backwardness of his country. Born and bred in the highlands he had never
left the Yemen or had even seen the sea. His election as Imam in 1904 had

been the signal for a general uprising against the Turks and for the next
eight years the Yemen was continuously at war.

Sometimes the Imam fought the Turks, at others he was struggling
against his own people to consolidate his position. By 1912 the country
was exhausted and all sides had had enough. The Turks, fought to a
standstill, recognised the Imam as a semi-independent ruler, their
commander remarking that 'ail Europe could be conquered by such men as
I had to subdue.'* For his part the Imam undertook to observeaten year truce
and have relations with no other power. The agreement was scrupulously
observed by both sides and throughout the First World War the Imam
remained loyal to his former foes.

Once the Turks had left the Imam was quick to reassert his claims to
Aden and take over from the Turks much of the territory in South Yemen
which they had occupied during the war. British protests were of no avail.
A diplomatic mission to Sana ended in complete failure and it was not for
eight years that 'King George's gracious favour and protection' was shown
to be worth more than the paper it was written on. For his part the Imam,
who believed he had a divine mission to bring all the Yemen under his
control, pursued a consistent policy of strengthening Imami authority in
those British Protectorates which he had seized. From his experience of the
British he had no reason to suppose that he would not be successful. But
things had changed since the war and the Imam, secluded in his
mountains, knew little about the development of the aeroplane. The British
had discovered that a single squadron of bombers could effectively become
an instrument of peace. Experience in Iraq, India and Somaliland and
elsewhere had shown them that air power could be used to 'pacify'
insurgents with the minimum of fuss and expense. In 1927 they were ready
to apply the results of the lessons learnt to the Imam. In September that year
a party of Zaidi tribesmen rampaged through Subaiha in northern Eahej,
burning and looting as they went. A second column moving south from
Dhala was cut to pieces by the tribes of Radf'an supported at the crucial
moment by the RAF. The Radf'an tribesmen gleefully dumped sacks of
Zaidi heads at the foot of an RAF officer who travelled up from Aden to
assess the results of the battle. The other Yemeni raiders immediately
withdrew on a forty-eight hour ultimatum that they would be bombed.
Berating his troops the Imam sent them back into the field so that in
February 1928 a further party of Zaidi troops raided across the border and
kidnapped two Protectorate Chiefs. British patience had worn out and the
reply was as swift as it was effective. Taiz and other Yemeni towns were
bombed and so shaken was the Imam that almost all occupied territory was
immediately abandoned.

* Ahmad Inzat Pasha (Ingrams. The Yemen, p, 61)

The Imam quickly revised his ideas about British strength and turned his
„ ies to expanding the divinely ordained frontiers of the Yemen in
ther directions. He was again unfortunate. In the north he came face to
face with Ibn Saud, a man of similar ambitions to himself. In the swift war
vhich followed the Saudis invaded the Yemeni coastal strip known as the
Tihama and so completely defeated the Imam upon his northern frontiers
t h-!t within two months he was suing for peace. In the meantime with the
Saudi war brewing the Imam had found it expedient to come to terms with
the British. In January 1935 he withdrew his forces from the parts of the
Dhala and Audhali stales which he still occupied. He did not withdraw
from the Rassas Sultanate although, according to the Anglo-Turkish
Convention this territory was within the British sphere of influence. The
British had no 'legal' treaty with the Sultan of Rassas, one had been
negotiated but not signed as the officials in Bombay thought his demand
f or ° two hundred and fifty gold sovereigns as a yearly stipend excessive.
The matter had been overtaken by events, and as a result the land fell
permanently to the Imam. The wretched Sultan paid for his mistake by
spending most of his life in an Imami dungeon.

The fate of the Sultan proved no stumbling block when the Imam
welcomed a proposal that Colonel (later Sir Bernard) Reilly should visit
Sana and discuss a treaty. The eventual result was the controversial 'status
quo' Treaty of Sana which in effect provided for a forty-year truce. Much of
the later trouble revolved around Article 3 and particularly the word
'frontier' appearing in the English text. In brief, to the English this meant a
line of the map over which neither side would seek to cross into the other's
territory. To the Yemenis it meant that the British would stay in Aden and
would not try and increase their influence outside the Colony. The Treaty,
with all its seeds of future trouble, was signed on VI February 1934. The
British recognised the Imam as ruler of the Yemen. To thorn this meant the
ex-Turkish part, to the Imam it meant the lot.*

Even if the British had understood the Arab interpretation of theTreaty it
is doubtful whether they would have been unduly disturbed. In 1934
British policy was still of minimum involvement in the Protectorates
although force of circumstances had already begun to erode this rather
complacent attitude.

Medieval and despotic as the Imam certainly was, at least he had
contrived to bring some form of rough and ready law and order to his
turbulent land. After nearly one hundred years of British influence the
Protectorates were just as backward and chaotic as before. The arrival of
significant numbers of modern rifles which followed in the wake of the
First World War had greatly exacerbated the already endemic blood feuds.

British official opinion cm the interpretation of this Treaty and the policy il represented was
not as unanimous as was later asserted. Colonel Jacobs in a memorandum >" 1930 was able to
™te the view of Sir Mark Svkes put forward in 19 IB that the whole of the Protectorate be
ceded to the Imam leaving a small buffer around Aden'.

Every South Arabian tribesman is honour bound to avenge the murder of a
kinsman. Tribal feuds became bloodier. As the casualties mounted the
weaker tribes were steadily pushed up the sides of the barren mountains or
out into the deserts away from the water and the wadi beds. Often a tribe
would be both hunter and hunted, feuds which had begun for some long
forgotten reason continued over the years in a seemingly endless trail of
blood. Trade was brought to a standstill and those who held fertile land
could only till it under the rifles of their friends lest they fall to some
neighbour with whom they were at war. Anarchy was king in a country
whose people had famine and fear as their constant companions.

Gradually the feeling was borne in upon the officials of Aden that if the
British were to justify the continuation of the Protectorate then something
would have to be done. The start was modest enough. From time
immemorial the tribes had respected the freedom of the road. Even in times
of war it was possible to move around the country by means of systems of
'companions' who escorted the traveller through their own tribal area,
handing him on to a similar 'companion' in the next, and so on. In the early
1 930s banditry and highway robbery had become rife and the fee paid for
'companions' rose so the number of merchants brave enough to venture far
outside Aden fell in proportion. Initially British political officers such as
Belhaven and Rickards went into the country with the sole intention of
trying to keep the roads open. Steadily the scope of their mission grew
wider as they became more and more in demand as mediators in tribal
disputes.

The real breakthrough came when Harold Ingrams was sent to the
Hadhramaut, which lies in the east far from the troublesome Yemeni
frontiers. At this time it boasted two recognised governments, Qaiti and
Kathiri. Although the once powerful ruling houses were run down and
their writ ran no further than their city walls, it was something to start on.
Little was known about the country and the attentions of successive
Residents in Aden was confined to what Ingrams has described as the
occasional 'How D'you Do and Goodbye' visit.

Ingrams was given the task of trying to bring some form of ordered
government to the area. The mission and the man coincided. Ingrams had
first become fascinated with the Hadhramaut from the tales of Hadhramis
he had met whilst serving in Zanzibar. Far from the restricting
encumbrances of the cable office and the telephone he set to work with a
will. Stumping around the countryside he made a direct approach to the
tribes, holding out the prospect of a three-year truce. The country was sick
of bloodshed and the results were spectacular. When Aden learnt of what
Ingrams was doing he was promptly told to desist but by that time the truce
was almost in the bag. Between thirteen and fourteen hundred tribal
leaders had agreed to it and peace had come at last to the Hadhramaut. In
his dealings Ingrams had always been careful to act in the name of the
rulers and not the government. Nevertheless the government and its air

3 One for the family album. Captain Johnny Ricketts in front of the Egyptian
transport aiiaafi he prevented from taking offal Lodar. Colonel Ricketts
commanded the Welsh Guards in the Falklands, 1982.

4 The Bedouin Boys' School. iVlukalla. established by the British to provide recru
for the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion.

pr were always discreetly there in the background. Further, being an
an and therefore a neutral, .he tribesmen could accept us
mediation without the all important loss of face. There can be no doubt that
.v,»v did so with relief. ,
* The fame of 'Ingrams' Peace spread and his colleagues, operating with
th om d-ing approval of the Aden government, achieved similar success
■S thTwest. So zealous did these peacemakers become that the Governor m
Aden exasperated at mutual complaints of poaching drew a line dividing
his officers' territories between east and west. Henceforth British relations
with the Eastern Aden Protectorate as it became known, would be
nn ducted through a Resident in Mukalla, and those in the Western Aden
KSatn through a British Agent based on Aden Colony. Both posts
remained under the authority of the Governor.

This was the first step and the second was bound to follow. Once again
the east led the wav. In 1937 and 1938 the Qaiti and Kathiri Sultans signed
advisorv treaties with the British, under which they agreed to accept a
resident adviser for the 'good government and welfare of their countries.
To the rulers it meant British support to maintain and extend their
authority to the Colonial Office it meant introducing British notions ot
good oovernmcnt and development. The two points of view did not always
coincide and the 'advice' was often imperceptible from 'direction .
' The success of these treaties in the east led to attempts at their
introduction in the west. Here the position was more difficult None ol he
states approached the size of either Qaiti or Kathiri and Uhcj alone boasted
anvthing resembling a state government. There was a constant background
of tribal turbulence and Yemeni interference so thai to construct 'status out
of the loosest and most fluid of tribal confederations was a slow and
unrewarding task. Bv the end of the Second World War only five of Hie
eleven principal chiefs had signed the Treaty and the 'forward policy , as
it was grandly called, had ground to a halt. It was particularly unfortunate
that in three of the five states which had consented to be 'advised the rulers
had been deposed for one reason or another. The Fadhli Sultan was as mad
as the Amir of Dhala was cruel, while the ruler of Lower Yafa ell
somewhere between the two. The other chiefs, alarmed at their examples,
regarded 'advice' as a euphemism for control and held aloof. But the
twentieth centurv would not be held a! bay for ever. The mam tactor which
swung the situation towards the British was renewed intervention in the
Protectorate bv the Yemenis. Nothing was more likely to throw the Shata l
chiefs into thearms of the British than the spectre of a Zaidi Imam hovering
over the horizon. For his part the Imam of the Yemen regarded the British
'forward policy' as a direct controversion of the Treaty of Sana and set
about counterbalancing increased British influence in the area with some
intrigues of his own. Thev were successful in stirring up short-lived tribal
revolts in Shaib and Dhala. but the real result of their machinations was the
very opposite of what had been intended. Fear of renewed Yemeni
domination broke the back of opposition and with one eye over their

shoulders the chiefs hastened down to Aden to sign up. There was a gap of
si ^^ars while some of the prouder or, at the other end of the scale, the
emo! "ruler made their minds up but by 1954 even the suspicious and
ercentrir u ers of Mahra and Socotra had been coaxed into conforming.

Adtise t t the rulers had a del icate and difficult task. Their prune aims
were to speed up development, keep the peace and try to drag the country
nto 'the wentieth century. Often these aims were in d,rect conflict with the
v" she o the ruler concerned and customs of the country which although
It 1 acceptable in South Arabia were distinctly out of place m a modern
and S world. For instance, the slaves of the Qaiti Sultan were tactfully
?ran ormed "nto the nucleus of .he local defence force and the habit of the
WahSi Shaikhs whereby an enemy was boxed in a crate and shipped out o
sea the more he was hated the smaller the holes, was allowed to fall into

di WdU were dug, roads cut through the mountains and doctors and
tea* rhe s introduced to areas where they had never been seen before. A
SnSg -heme in the potentially rich Abyan delta flourished
b? in° ing undreamed of wealth to the farmers. A strong government kept
fh Saw vet although the land seemingly prospered the gun remained
SeSTsman's most* prized possession, and the ways ol the people
remained unchanged.

1947. VVahkii 194'J. Mahra 19S4.

book? He looked up in astonishment - V* hat sen '^" ^ ^^V.., e S unrecorded.

soldiers at the end ot a six hour toi up the procip V.^VuVm 'J tt Fn und.^r. Chairman. Committee

Then there was the gult «'>*"^
and sole prolessional of the Ba han Co l - ul >. No IK. in„ i m;1| . r .hed nit into the Rub al

record for the loosest hole in the wo Id hc'.l n bo m ™ ^ , ntorn , ec l.

Khali, and taking a piece nt especudly pnn re< i ^^.^fomptv spaco In from of him the
the South Africans made an ^ ou ' J e Cons e a ion in ohannesburg and shortly

verification. . «hich served as I he Ramadhan gun broke

bright or ingenious

ircular from the nepartment ol Health vvarmng oU^

is pronounced it insanitary rtci arai aiiu i watched pre

shaft. The Bedouin for whom the well was me on y sou ^ — — t Unruffled, he turned
with increasing alarm and now began to show serious signs oia. ^o nic ignorant o

Relief Fund at a poker party lor his friends.

already anachronisms which could never

which made up .the f union was require( l if they were o

survive separately. Clearly someo federation began to

be considered m bo* Lond^ ^ Kcnnedy) ^ 1Q52 whe h

was ongmated b C K N ^ ^ Protectora te. It provided

was serv.ng as Br * ^jj 0 en^ Protectorate and one for

f0rU wTn a The scherne'took into account the more advanced
the Western. The scheme 1 historica i background and the

development m the caj lk dl » er ^ , hcir brethren in the West.
r n Sn?t^ Br t sf C^ve no° r in /den would preside over both councils
S as a first step to unity the twenty-three existing customs orgamsations

would be eliminated Government House, Aden in

The Pl^n -as presented to he ^-^^ Awadh bin Sa i ih the

)anUa ?" ndtr of the Upper Aulaqi Sultanate, had not left his Nisab house
eccentric ruler ot the upper nu aq dismite with his neighbour

for fifteen years. The Sultan 0 . H ;. l ^ 0 t,ftS t Lahej was attending
over their common border^

a contravention of the Treaty ot Sana ana a airet -' h borders

and authority. Tribal troubles were once again ^^^^^^
and the weaker chiefs were sent warnings of the dire consequent
falling in with the 'plot of imperialism'.

The imam* realised that the time had ™- o^ em Uon -
scale. He found his opportunity m Aulaqi coun n nr
between three states, Lower Aulaqi, the Upper Aulaqi Sheikhdom and
Upper Aulaqi Sultanate. ma c:«nf rnrk

Between Aulaqi and Dathina .ribes to the west lies " ul ^™^X
and mountain with the Wadi Halib the only pass. From ™"^es ttie
masters of this wilderness have been the Ahl Shams Rabiz whc e me a
precarious living playing one side off against the ^
merchants who dared to pass through their land. They ert aheach
chaffing under the loose authority exercised by the Aulaq Sulta m N sab
wh en the British decided to drive a motorable road through the Wadi

.'The Yemenis, particularly .he Zaidis. yarded 'he Prole— ehief^ith — ^
This is exemplified by a meeting between .bra s |P nhrt. e. U ^ Rri , h
and the newly appointed Amir °f Dnala. .? h ^ J ,™, ,„ .. it h the Amir and referred lo
repres«ntativesin May 1936 in Dhala. The Qadhi refused K talk u
him in a loud voice as 'You Shaikh of the day before vesterciay.

concealed inherent unreliability.

^ s eci „ s «*« . «~ ^»--l:3SS2 '2

the Yemen [0 receive money and arms whicnw

: u ^^i^^ r ^^'.. f oppressions Of

"S'flSm- the Rabiz began a J-J^K g^SSS
were burnt, pumps smashed and flocks >- d t0 be

fort at Robat became a nightly target for snipers, fcverj con j
escorted, every hilltop guarded. ambushe d by the Rabiz, three

In June a convoy en route to Robat was "™J™ ^ jlh five Ara b
officers two British and one Arab, were failed together .
oS. In the following month the fort was *°*Z^£fi% who
tSe Rabiz celebrated bv blowing it sky lugh^ong ,vn h a ocalres den^ ^

- tribal

Ru biz had nothing I. shoo, at and the Imam s at ent, » " « &

troubles at home. In April 1955 he faced . full scale coup or ;an
brothers Abdullah and Abbas. The rebels held hin, , p .80 uer m h s P J
Taiz but were unable to agree on policy or on what they shouic ° J
him In the meantime his son al Badrhad raised the northern tribes and

hesitation in dealing ^ r ^J° r ^ brib i n gtheheadsmentoensurca
-headed, the relatives ot the condei Tine a j i k cxccu iions began

^ d r\1SW^ that th rr re

to appear in the Aden bazaars, m i , ransp \red that the Imam

■\rab League mission visited lawin t « au boun(| t0 supp0 rt

^ not have been much '^Pf ^ifX People s Republic of China
he imam as a fellow member. 1 1956 bo h P jn 1956 a SovU! ,

asked the British to delay the ^ f ™ ,f ousV an d suspicion. Wahidi
floundered on the rocks g}^^^ be kno wn he preferred lo ,o.n

— bK^

powerful neighbour also J°PP^

Secure once again and u^th unaccusto Km sincc

opened the 1957 season in fyle. His pu n u bordM
1948 the former Amir. Haidara had been b ro odm ^ tafore rifle5

Qataba. Now the Imam espoused l is cause v " us \ d jn hundre ds.
had been handed out in dozens they were now hst I t rf a

Very soon nearly every Uhala tr.be ^"fj^^^u. The rulers of
well-known peacemaker became the s>gna to §^ab absconded to the
Alawi and Muflahi, small states on the border ^
Yemen. Thev were shortly followed J^.^f^^Sadhali in
vassal the Qutaibi Shaikh of Radfan. Tribal , « mgjb. ote out in
the centre and Baihan in the north-east. Neare. .Men ^ he A n ^

the field and threatened to cut the roads to the east J™ , the

. serious and the British took firm actio " J^J^ ^n to their
rulers to do likewise. The RAF persuaded the Dha la t * * to
allegiance whilst Sharif Hussain in Badjan ^^^WNakhai soon
sallied across the border and routed heir oppo«n£ ™* A and made
withdrew. The Alawi, Maflahi and Qutaibi Shaikhs came non
their peace in time for the late harvest paramount British

Times were changing m the Middle Eas 11 u _o P b&se
influence was fast on the wane. Thev had w.thd aw bom 8
astride the Suez Canal. A new dynamic figure m the persoi

Jamal Abdul Nasser had appeared on the scene m h the gospel of Arab
Socialism to unite the Arab world. In the years to follow came the Anglo-
FrPnch disaster at Suez. Then came the overthrow of the pro-Western
egin in So, and the subsequent collapse of the Baghdad Pact. The
Cyprus revolt followed and everywhere the British were seen to be on the

" The effects of those developments were soon felt in South Arabia. Cairo
Radio, with its steady stream of anti-British invective became part of the
daily lives of the people. Tribal uprising was given a new lustre as the
revolt of the Arab people against Western Imperialism; every opponent of
the British was a hero and every friend a traitor.

The powerful effect of Cairo Radio over the years cannot be
underestimated. By its very nature propaganda must accurately reflect the
policv of the government which employs it. If the government is weak,
conciliatory and vacillating, then this will show up in its propaganda
Despite its "distortions, exaggerations and often ludicrous hes, the crux of
the message of Cairo Radio from 1954 onwards was always the same- the
British are the enemies of the Arabs,' 'they will leave you in the lurch and
'they are going.' .

In 1958 the imam made his final attempt on Dhala The Amir Haider*
was established on the Jebol Jihaf Massif supported by regular Yemen
troops. These were promptly ejected by the Aden Protectorate Levies (APL)
supported by two companies of British troops and for good measure the
RAF demolished the barracks at Qataba. This was the Imam s last fling, he
had become tired and suspicious of his new found friends, his health was
failing and in Aprill959 he travelled to Italyformed.ca t re ^ n «' "|
al Badr as regent. The latter attempted to use the opportunity to institute a
programme of mild reform. In the absence of the Imam's strong hand he
Regular Armed Forces mutinied for more pay. Al Badr appealed to the
tribes for support and this was forthcoming only on paymen of a large
sun, In August the Imam returned and at once tried to retrieve »
The tribes refused. The Imam then arranged to mee the Shaikh , of the
Usavmat, paramount Shaikh of the Great Hash.d Contention, together
with his son under safe conduct. A heated argument took place during
which the Imam ordered both his guests to be se.x.ed and taken to the*
stronghold at Hajjah and executed. The Hashid never forgave Imam Jo
this act of treachery and within a few years were able to revenge themselves

on his son. , l .

The imam was equally decisive in dealing with the Egyptians , whom he
discovered plotting behind his back. The diplomats were expe ed, and £e
Imam broadcast a scurrilous poem attacking President Nasse. on, Sew
radio. From then on the Yemen ceased to be a member of the Urn ted A la
States in all but name. In July 1958 Yemeni delegates met with the Bntisn
Diradowa in Ethiopia to seal the truce. ,

Ahmad was a sick man dependent on morphine. He suil ere i
hallucinations and increasingly retired to a special room fitted out

C rtff ^S^ult on Dhala the British Faced a

; :S Sionalism nearer Aden. The South Arabia League

founded in 1951 with the object of bringing about an
(SAL) uas founded n i ^ induding North

j^rt K n ral alms of ^pX were not too different from those of
It BHti h but it was the method of achieving it which brought he Ivvo
1^ to conflict The founders were the Tifri clan. At one ..me tracht-onal
Imso to "he Shaikh of the Upper Aulaoi Shaikhdom they became
1, nllv redundant after the ruler signed his advisory treaties with the
S " aS oSe family moved to t ahej where they became friends
-md confidants to the Sultan Ali bin Abdul Kanm KBh

The Sultan succeeded his brother who had fled to the Yemen m 1952.
Thk foUouecl a wild nigh. when, more than usually irritated with his
r i e , he a d had thr°ee of them dragged from ^ their be, s and bod to
Se in the garden, and then shot them himself from the fla roof of the
house His vounger brother Ali was clever, ambitious and wol -oducat^
Th Sul tan of I .ahej had always been pre-eminent amongst the chie & of the
Protectorate and he strove to re-establish this posit , on. Advisee, by .he Jifn
considerable progress was made in reforming state administration and
ex i ing the cotton plantations. On the political front progress was les
easy The Sultan tried to persuade the British and his fellow rulers to gran
Lahei over-riding powers in the Federation then under discuss on. With
h demands finding little favour he turned to the League. A rederat.on
office was organised in Lahei and elsewhere in the state 'to educate the
people' as the°Sultan explained. The line taken was bitterly onU-Bntoh »
tone. This was the time of the Sue/, crisis and the League lost no
opportunity to twist the lion's tail. , , , oi

The results of the Sultan's attempts to spread his influence outsiders
were mixed. In the Upper Auk.qi Shaikhdom where J.fr. influence was still
strong, the Sultan, supported by the League backed one side in an
unseemlv squabble that was taking place over the succession. The League
organised demonstrations complete with Egyptian flags and loud speakers
and Sultan Ali let it be known that as Ruler of Lahej it was customary tor
him to be consulted in such matters. A committee of rulers setup to resolve
the issue was a fiasco when they could not agree where to meet. In the end
his opponents proved more practical, by supplying their proteges
with the arms and monev necessary to ensure their election.

After the defeat in Aulaqi the League looked around or other
opportunities and it was not long before their efforts were rewarded.

" Alto the revolution the Imam's possessions » m put out on display a d an * ill ha "tn I ' *
prions in a special museum in TMz. Class cases preserve a vast ™ I echo n o i »»^~P^
)«wellfirv and bath soap as well as superb rifles and a teasel presented by the British, tot
sum visitors may be accompanied by the official guide, a mute.

The rich farmlands of the Abyan Basin were shared by Lower Yafa' and
Fadhli. In the case of Lower Yafa' it represented the only part of the state to
be administered. The rest, more often ranges of mountains bisected by the
occasional narrow wadi, stretched away to the Yemeni border, a forbidden
territory, inhabited by fiercely independent tribesmen who stoutly resisted
any interference to the old ways, its customs and superstitions. The Ruler
of Yafa' had a mystical as well as temporal hold over his people to whom he
personified the spirit of Yafa' in human flesh. Sultan Aidrus was well
qualified to be the ruler of such a people being a! the same time half mad
and half wise. An old man by this time, a normal conversation would often
degenerate into incomprehensible ranting with foam flecking the old
man's lips and his eyes dancing a fandango to a time of their own.
Something of a shock to those who had not met him before. The Yafais
adored him.

The sultan's eldest son Muhammad was a chip off the old block, volatile,
impetuous and deeply suspicious. Yet he could be charming and retained
a magical hold over his people. Muhammad was appointed to the
Abyan Board and became Naib for that part of the state in which the Board
operated. He became a supporter of the League and its chief agent in
the urea.

Soon he realised that the farmers of Lahej were receiving more cash for
their crop than those of Abyan. The Abyan Board had made considerable
capital investment and the dividends reflected the repayment of loans.
Muhammad claimed that the imperialists were exploiting the people and,
backed by the League, canvassed this idea amongst the farmers. Conditions
within the Board worsened and when the British refused to bomb a Yafa'i
shaikh who had annoyed him, Muhammad decamped to the hills. His
nominees were ordered to agree to nothing in his absence. The work of the
Board ground to a halt. No cotton could be sold, no dividends distributed,
and no crops sown until Muhammad returned. Eventually the patience of
the Board, many of whom were farmers themselves, ran thin, and they
elected one of their members, Haidira Mansur as Naib to take Muhammad's
place. The following day Muhammad suddenly appeared at the head of a
tribal army, rampaged through Ja'ar. the administrative centre for the
cotton growing area, and carried off £10,000 from the treasury. For a few
weeks it looked as if Mother Yafa' was coming to claim her own.
Muhammad and his commandos made forays against the crops of those
who had opposed him. but the new order held and Muhammad
disappeared into his mountains not to emerge until after the British had
left.

1958 was a crucial year for the League. They had failed in the Upper
Audhal i Shaikhdom and although a great deal of fuss had been caused they
had little to show for their efforts in Lower Yafa'. The leaders of the party

had for some time been in contact with the Imam Ahmad then making his
final assault on the Protectorates.*

Army convoys going north to the threatened State of Dhala were often
held up by demonstrating crowds. The ruler of the tiny State of Alawi who
it was said never slept without the permission of his neighbour Lahej was
the first to depart to the Yemen. The League's hand was seen behind the
revolt of the Ahl Nalkhai and in Aulaqi [ifri supporters, the Ahl Bubakhr
bin Farid, forsook their oaths of reconciliation and took to the hills. The
British remained firm, the Imam was defeated, the Ahl Nalkhai went home
without firing a shot, the Ahl Bubakhr manoeuvred with the Yemen.

On the political front the Sultan and the League suffered equally severe
setbacks. The other rulers alarmed fit the activities of the Imam and
growing Egyptian influence approached the Governor of Aden with a
request to resurrect plans for federation, plans in which the Sultan of Lahej
played little part. The Jifris issued a stream of propaganda against the 'fake
federation', known troublemakers were given asylum and efforts made to
subvert the APL and Government Guards. These were not wholly
unsuccessful. There were a number of grenade incidents in Aden, carried
out by soldiers, and a British medical officer attached to the API, was
grenaded whilst asleep. The Sultan demanded independence and prepared
to abrogate his treaty with the British bringing in the Egyptians instead.
This was the final straw. Sir William Luce, then Governor of Aden, ordered
the arrest of the Jifri brothers who escaped to the Yemen. Sultan Ali left for
London to complain to the British government and on receiving no redress
moved to Rome and thence to Cairo, having first made arrangements for the
Lahej Regular Army to deca tn p to the Yemen complete with brass band. The
British government formally withdrew recognition and a successor was
elected by the Lahej electoral college who had taken their leaders,
discomfiture with amazing calm.

The power of the League was broken but the affair had an interesting
sequel. The new sultan, Fadhl bin Ali, went on a tour of his state and sent
word to his Director of Agriculture, Qahtan al Shaabi, that he was about to
call for lunch. When the messenger, Fadhl Hassan Aulaqi, an Arab official
of the Protectorate Service, arrived at the agricultural offices, the director
w ho had been implicated in the shadier activities of (he League, hitherto
unsuspected, thought he was about to be arrested and look fright. He leapt
mto a Landrover and, prudently collecting the agricultural funds on the
way. fled to the Yemen.

In Cairo the League was soon rent by internal squabbles. In 1962 al
anaubi, who acted as Public Relations Officer, was accused of embezzling
Party funds. He took refuge in the Yemen and joined the 'Shaikhs of the
outh . a rather tired collection ofdissidents still drawing meagre pensions
from the Imam.

cons,',?,,, 1 " 1 'i ur 'nli^ al!; f ' lu (:on 'es|jondene:e was intercepted and read bv the British who were
•Muently able to anticipate every move made by the League and the Sultan.

After the humiliation of the League and defeat of the Imam the rulers
began to understand the new threat posed to their existence by the
Egyptian brand of Arab nationalism.and within eighteen months six of the
more important were pressing for agreement on new plans for federation.
The British doubly welcomed this approach because it removed the stigma
of British inspiration from the federation proposals just when some new
form of arrangement was needed to protect Aden, then acquiring a new
importance in British defence thinking.

The negotiation of agreement between the six states on a federal
constitution and on a new agreement with Britain took longer to conclude
than was at first expected, but eventually the Federation of South Arabia
was born on 11 February 1959. *

The Dathina Confederation, the Lower Aulaqi. Haushabi and Lahej
Sultanates had all asked to join before the ceremony but arrangements for
them were not complete until much later.

Eventually all states of the western area joined except Upper Yafa'.

A capital city, al Tttihad.t was built for the new states on the borders of
Aden and Agrabi.

An embryo civil service was created and state functions were put in
charge of ministers. More important, the British who had never been lavish
in their aid to the area, before the Second World War it had never exceeded
£100,000 and in 1954 was only £800,000, produced £5 million to fund the
project. Pleasure that the Federation had at last got underway was not the
only reason for Britain's generosity. The loss of British bases in Iraq and
Egypt and uncertainty about those in Cyprus and Kenya greatly increased
the importance of Aden in British defence planning. Aden was regarded as
a vital link in the safeguarding of British interests in the Gulf and policy
east. The formation of the Federation was an important step in creating a
buffer to protect the base.

For the first four years of its existence the Federation made steady
progress. There was little dissident activity, the land knew peace and a
measure of prosperity. Revolution and anarchy were at hand.

* Founder members of the federation, initially known as the Federation of Arab Emirates ot the
South, were Baihan. Farihli, Dhala. lx>\verYala\ Audhali and the Upper Aulaqi Shaikhdom.

tUnitvCitv

Chapter II

Aden

Tell Daddv we are all happy under British rule.

Banner welcoming Edward Prince of Wales
on his visit to Aden, July 1921.

If thirty years of peace and outward stability for the Protectorates was one
of Britain's greatest achievements in the area, then the development of
Aden as a port and as a social and political force in Arab affairs was surely
another.

When the British seized Aden they found virtually nothing. The port,
long neglected and abused by its rulers, had fallen into decay so that
Captain Haines was able to note in his diary that he found the community
in a 'condition of most indigent poverty'. 'How lamentable a contrast', he
went on, 'to Aden's former unrivalled celebrity, its impenetrable
fortifications and flourishing commerce.' Under the British, Aden soon
began to revive, first us a coaling station and then, after the opening ot the
Suez Canal in 1869, its harbour became famous again as the first port east of
Suez on the imperial highroad to India and Australia.

The genius of the British administration allowed all races to trade and
prosper so that Aden once again flourished as a commercial centre.
Opportunity was unrestricted. The Swiss-French family of Anton Bessc*
made a vast fortune out of the trade with Africa, the British themselves
tended to concentrate on the port where Luke Thomas, Peninsular &
Orient, Cory Brothers and Mitchell Cotts maintained major branches. The
banks reflected the various interests, the Bank of India, the Habib, the
Chartered, the British Bank of the Middle East, the Arab Bank. The great
Parsee Trading Companies of Palanjee. Dinshavv and Bhicajee Cowasjee,
made their fortunes in Aden. Shafai merchants, such as Havel Said A mam
so controlled trade with their country that by 1962 80% of North Yemen's
goods came through Aden. Hadramis were everywhere with particular
interest in property and construction.

Anton Basse was generous. Aden Technical Colle°e and many other social causes were the
Beneficiaries of numerous bequests. I le also gave over £1 million to Oxford University to lound
Anthony's College.

6 The Prince of Wales' visit to Aden

In 1954 British Petroleum built the refinery al Little Aden so that in 1964
Aden could boast to being the fifth largest bunkering port in the world after
Rotterdam. Liverpool. London and New York.

In all this commercial activity the peoples of the Protectorate were not
involved in any major fashion. The rulers and warrior classes felt trade was
beneath them and preferred to use agents such as the Persian family ol
Hassan Ali * to conduct their business affairs. For lesser folk tradition and
lack of education prevented their major involvement. In return the
Protectorates were not a major market for the Adeni merchants. Lack of
direct Protectorate interest in Aden's prosperity and Adeni ignorance of
the hinterland was a basic factor in the difficulties in merging Aden with
the Federation.

By the early 1960s, when Aden's prosperity was at its height, me
magnificent harbour was filled with every conceivable type of shipping-
Great ocean liners whose passengers poured ashore to buy tax-free bargains
from the bracelet of shops which clustered under the shadow of the jagged
hills, oil tankers calling at the British Petoleum refinery on the other side ot
the bay, stately dhows making their annual journeys from Zanzibar and
East Africa to the Persian Gulf, bumboats and battleships, tramps and

* Amongst the later activities of the Hassan Ali familv were the tegular purchases ot arms and
ammunition which the rulers were allowed to import by the British. In 1967 2.000 30: ntle.s ai
an average price of £15 wen; exported by (tie Crown Agents. Wadia Hassan. All pocketed to
commission in addition to what he received from his principals. The rulers sold the weapons km
as much as £100 a time. The British also rewarded tribesmen with like presents, so that it came a.
no surprise that manv dissidents w ere armed with British weapons firing British bullets.

trawlers, all bringing affluence and employment to the Adenis.

At the same time the British decision to make Aden her principal
military base in the Middle East injected a further £19 million into the
economy. Aden boomed. Within the space of two years the number of cars
on the roads trebled. Modern blocks of flats sprang up as merchants
competed to lease them to the British services and their families. Whole
new towns appeared in the formerly sleepy suburbs of Maala and
Khormaksar. Labour was at a premium, wages rose and with them the
! iving standards of the people climbed steadily upwards.

The Adenis were rich and furthermore they were educated, hver since
the British had landed they had been spared the misfortunes ol their
brethren in the Protectorates. In a sea of turbulence Aden was an island ot
peace and good order. From early days there were schools and a medical
service No arms were allowed to be carried in the streets and there were
courts of justice where a decision did not depend on a family connection or
a bribe.

Aden owed much to its cosmopolitan character. Somalia, Yemenis,
Indians and Jews had all settled under the protecting wing of the British,
influencing the culture and language of the people. Nevertheless Aden was
' always emotionally Arab and civil strife between the various communities
was never far beneath the surface. After the influence and number of Jews
had been reduced by the riots of 1931 and 1947, it was the Indians and
Pakistanis whom the Arabs regarded with the greatest suspicion Although
many of those who were Muslims had intermarried with the Arabs, they
were never wholly accepted, a fact of life which more than one would-be
Arab-Indian nationalist was to learn to his bitterness and cost.

When the Colonv was administered from Bombay it was natural that
many of the clerks and middle-ranking government officials were Indian.
Being more sophisticated than their Arab neighbours, they also came to
provide many of the lawyers and doctors as well as a large proportion of the
powerful merchant community. In short, Aden was in danger of becoming
an 'Indian Colony' and the British 'rulers' tended to be cushioned from
daily contact with their Arabian subjects by a waddage of English-speaking
babus. The process received its first check in 1932 when the control of
Aden passed out of the hands of the Bombay Presidency to the Centra
Government of India. In 1937 in response to Arab petition, the Colonial
Office took over the administration. At the time this development as
considered an act of liberation.

Political government in the Colony took the same well-trodden road
taken by British colonies elsewhere, In 1947 a Legislative Council was set
up and'eight vears later it boasted four elected members. By the time the
ill-fated Legislative Assembly embarked on its final term ot office in 1964,
sixteen of the twenty-one members were elected, four nominated and one,
the Attornov-General, ex-officio.

Organised political activity began in Aden with the Moslem Association
founded in 1946. This drew its inspiration, not from the Arab world, but

India and Pakistan, whose achievement of independence caused great
excitement amongst their fellow countrymen in Aden.
Aden was also the base for the 'Free Yemenis', a group of intellectuals
dedicated to the overthrow of the Imami regime. In 1948 with more
traditional forces they assassinated the imam Yahya* and set up a short-
lived provisional government, before the coup was brutally crushed by the
Imam's son Ahmad. Two Adenis who were to become prominent in South
Arabia, Muhammad Ali Luqman and Muhammad Hasan Obali, played
leading parts in the coup and after their return to Aden founded the Aden
Association. Still much influenced by Indian social dominance and by
memories of the troubles in the Protectorates they stood for Aden for the
Adenis and modest construclural advance, and as such, dominated the
early sessions of the Legislative Assembly. They pinned their hopes for
advancement on the visit of Lord Lloyd, Under Secretary of State to the
Colonies. They were disappointed, addressing the Assembly the Minister
made it clear that he entertained no such ideas. 'There has been much
speculation recently about the political future of Aden Colony. Such
speculation, unrelated to practical possibilities is harmful to the
commercial interests of the Colony', and went on, 'Her Majesty's
Government wish to make it clear that the importance of Aden both
strategically and economically within the Commonwealth is such that they
cannot foresee the possibility of any fundamental relaxation of their
responsibilities for the Colony.'

The Association was snubbed and the British had missed an
opportunity. The Federation was forming in the Protectorates and by
granting Aden early self-government and the prospect of independence
with the Federation when it came into being may have allowed time to help
keep the political initiative. Already more discordant voices were being
heard.

The United National Front (UNF) first made its appearance in 1954 as a
party demanding the total elimination of the British presence and the
merger of Yemen, the Protectorates and even Oman into a single state.
Certain of its founders were found amongst the more extreme surviving
Free Yemenis and others amongst the organisers of the vicious anti-Jewish
riots in 1948. It probably began in one of the football and social clubs in
which Aden abounded, the movement very quickly formed close ties with
the burgeoning Aden Trades Union Congress [ATUC) which had been set
up with the help of British trades unions. The movement owed its

"There is a coffee shop on the road south of Sana whore the Imam Yahya and his grandson were
gunned down. The heroic: manner of his death as he tried to shield the young hoy with his body
made a profound impression on public opinion and helped his son Ahmad defeat the plotters.

It is said that the killing fulfilled an old prophecy. Many years hefore when the Imam was
fighting the Turks he had been told that he would live so long as no impression of his features
was published. Consequently cameras were absolutely forbidden and visitors searched before
entering his presence. A few 'weeks before a French Canadian journalist had sketched the Imam
from memory. The portrait appeared in the Washington Post the day the Imam died.

• tion from E»ypt and some of its funds from the Imam, who was not
inSP1 iliin» to dabble in the muddv waters of Aden politics. Due to its
organisation at street level the Front could always be relied on to produce a
mnh for a given occasion.

In 1957 both organisations broke up. The Aden Association destroyed
. , f on a social rather than a political issue and this concerned the
hallowed subject of qat.* Qal is a small, mildly narcotic shrub which grows
n the Yemen, Ethiopa and Kenya. The green leaves which look and taste
rather like privet are chewed and produce an effect similar to that of
benzedrine- an effect which the Adenis discovered was heightened if
washed down bv copious quantities of Coca Cola. Qat chewing was the
national pastime" of the Yemen. Kvery afternoon the whole male population
seemed to retire into the house or clubs and begin a rhythmic and bovine
munching, cheeks bulging with a wad of green cud. There was not a man in
the place who did not seem to be determined to dribble, spit and chew his
way through enough green stuff to feed a cow. Qat customs varied. In
Dhala. whose people were lucky, or unlucky enough to grow their own
supplies, the Amirs would run up and down the hill after lunch to gain the
necessary appetite for the afternoon session. In Aden there was the
mabraz which with classic understatement means 'the place where things
emerge,' This was a qat chewers' club. Any number of the fraternity would
steadily get more and more excited and incoherent. It is worth
remembering that many of the decisions which were to affect South
Arabia's future were made whilst the participants were similarly engaged.

In Aden qat had reached the proportions of a national catastrophe. The
people spent more than £1 million a year on the stuff, and it was not
unusual for an ordinary labourer to spend half his salary on qat whilst his
family went hungry. In 1957 a Bill bann ing qat from the Colony was passed
unopposed by the Legislative Assembly. Within weeks the village of Dar
Saad just across the border in Lahcj had been turned into one vast qal
chewing den. Huge convoys of cars jammed the roads out of Aden as the
people, eager for qat, made nonsense of the ban.

The Aden Association now split. Bayumi, a great qat chewer himself,
called for the lifting of the ban which upset Muhammad Ali Luqman who
led the anti-qat chewing lobby. Bayumi won, as he was bound to, and
Luqman went off in a huff and founded his own party, 'The People's
Congress'. Although Luqman became the first Adeni to air his views
before the United Nations Committee of 24 on Colonisation in New York,
his party was not popular. The Adenis were already suspicious of the vast
Luqmani clan, which numbered over 140 strong. Luqmani males held key
positions throughout the length and breadth of the Colony's government
and commercial life and his attempts to ban qat won him further
unpopularity. This was a pity because Muhammad Ali was a wise old

introduced into the Yemen from Ethiopia along with coffee in 1541).

gentleman and his calm counsel would have benefited his fellow
countrymen in the years ahead.*

In time Bayumi founded the United National Party (UNF) which was to
become the rallying point for those Adenis who believed in federation.

The break up of the United National Front was a much more squalid
affair and basically concerned money. The Trade Union movement in
Aden had grown rapidly. The first unions had been registered in 1 953 and
by 1956 the number had risen to 25, all of which were affiliated to a newly
formed body called the Aden Trades Union Congress [ATUC). All
members of the ATUC's executive council were office bearers of the UNF
and through unions, funds collected from the workers financed the party.
Some of the funds were emhezzled by members, union and non-union
alike, and other sums were misused. Union members accused the rest of
living it up at their expense and the whole party collapsed in mutual
recriminations of treachery and bad faith. From there on until the founding
of the People's Socialist Party (PSP) in 1962 it was the ATUC which
provided the more vocal opposition to the British and their Federation.
Their tactics in the main consisted of political strikes which in the end
provoked the Aden government to retaliate by passing an Industrial
Relations Ordinance making it illegal to strike unless the case was first
brought to arbitration.

After the break up of the UNF, the ATUC was comparatively quiescent.
Much of their thunder was stolen by the South Arabian League (SAL)
which was basically a Protectorate party and organised the first
'nationalist' revolt in 1958. The party's objects were a united South Arabia
but they attempted to bring it about through the then Ruler of Lahej who
saw a chance of regaining the glories of Lahej and the prominence of her
sultan in the affairs of South Arabia. The details of the revolt are
discussed elsewhere but suffice it to say the object was not so much unity of
South Arabia as unity of the rest with Lahej. The movement was strongly
supported by Egypt and the Yemen and failed when the leaders took flight.

By 1960 the parties were already beginning to polarise into those which
supported the British, including the Federal government, 'the right', and
those which supported the UAR and Arab nationalism, 'the left'. Once
battle was joi ned in South Arabia there could never be any accommodation
between the two, it was a case of all power for the winner and death or exile
for the loser. The so-called 'moderates' consisted of those who had not

- The Luqmans founded Hie most advanced newspapers at that time in the Arabian 1 enmsula.
The Arabian Fniat til Jozirat competed with the equally influential Af Ayyom edited by
Muhammad Ali Bashara Heel and a host of lesser titles. In the British tradition the press was
free. I.uqman's English weekly. The Aden Chronicle, was widely read by the European
community and the forces. , ... . ,„-. f u p

Its earnest columns were occasionally the target of practical jokes. In May 1961 me
archaeological review faithfully reprinted a letter from a correspondent who claimed to have
discovered an interesting metal pot on a well-knowr iLahe; | dig and N ^ed the help of rcv.ders
to interpret its inscription which read: TISA PI SSPO TA ND ATI NO NF. A I 1 HAT (Ceorge
Thomas).

, in their minds which way to jump. The words -democracy the
m3de I k", ons and 'the rights of man' were used by the left merely as
Unl,0d n the ladder to power. Likewise 'elections' which nobody had any
n '? S nl n on o holding were used by both parties. Individuals could
r f tide but onlv one party could win. Everyone was an oppor un.st
Ch T.f " w- s onlv one object, the retention or assumption of power, it was
aA ? V ■ t t"uo basic aid one disadvantage of the moderate Adems and
p0 | ltl cs at its niosi ^ Hnt , sh mlcs

th d S ^unahl i to X the Jokyll and Hyde tactics of .heir opponent.
■r\ p St were well understood by the South Arabians. A comprehension
F fJ vcr struggle goes a long way to explaining the apparent

° f taSons of n ob^uctlveness of Mho left' and the stubbornness ot
Z A which was to give the British so many headaches and cause

^XXXX^TJZs was the unholy alliance
. tt <!oc alisf ?TUC and the Imam Ahmad. On the face of it no

as ^similar. - Ahmad the Victorious' as he was known
o hfs s b ert inside the Yemen or 'Ahmad the Devil' as soon as they got
Lot was a medieval despot who made the Protectorate rulers look
nosit ve v progressive bv comparison. Ahmad ruled his country with an
ire S d and his solution to most political problems was to lop o f a few
e ds Not unnaturally for a man in his position he loathed soaa hsts and
libera s and particularly disliked the Aden brand i whom he he Id
Sensible foHhe assassination of his father In 1948. J"^^™
pleased to subscribe to ATUC funds and help them on the w der pol tical
' front. For their par. the ATUC were only too wel aware of the Imam S
limitations as a 'socialist hero', yet he was anh-Bntish, a respected member
of the Arab community-the Yemen having been accepted as a J
the United Arab Republic alongside Syria and hgypt, and much of he
ATUC's support came from the Yemeni immigrant labour m Aden- And
then of course there was always the money. Neither side had any illusmns
about the other. The Imam brusquely turned down an offer from the A t UO
to organise unions in the Yemen. For their part the ATUC were not above
plotting behind the Imam's back in the hope that somebody more
respectable would emerge. Indeed, for the last two years of the Imam s rule
relations between him and the ATUC were decidedly cool. I his followed
naturally from the Imam's discovery of an Egyptian sponsored plot to
replace him with his son. , B ... , „. e : v iio«

The second dilemma faced by the ATUC in the fil .es and early six es
was the question of elections in Aden State. The franchise was particularly
narrow, out of a population of around 200.000 only 20,000 or so possessed
the right to vote. On the lace of it even when allowance is made tor he
traditional custom followed bv most Arab countries of denying women the
franchise it was very limited, it had been initially devised by the Adems m
the Legislative Assemblv who were fearful of becoming a minority in their
own land. The bulk of support for the ATUC came from 80,000 Yemeni

workers who would stay 2 or 3 years in Aden to earn sufficient money to
return to their villages and live in reasonable comfort. The ATUC therefore
demanded that these workers be enfranchised knowing thai the British
would never agree because it would mean giving the vote to a group who
had virtually no stake in the country and owed their primary allegiance to
another government. Il was also next to impossible to keep stock of the
number of Yemenis in Aden at any one lime. Both the ATUC and the
conservative Adcnis turned down an alternative suggestion that the 60,000
or so Protectorate workers in Aden should have the vote, fearing perhaps
that the representatives of the traditional rulers would end up as the
Legislative Assembly. The Nationalists were by this time being ably led by
Abdullah al Asnag whose cherubic appearance gave little hint of his
capacity for rabble rousing or the brilliant political ability which enabled
him to remain at the head of the many diverse and quarrelsome elements
that made up the ATUC. Asnag put it abroad that the reason for his
opposition was that votes were being given to Indians, Somalis and the like
but denied to Arabs. He therefore called for a boycott of all the elections so
that in 1955 and 1959 only around 50% of the electorate voted and not until
Aden's last elections in 1964 was there a reasonable lurnoul with 76% of
the electorate going to the polls. The real reason for the boycotts was that
Asnag appreciated that his party could not take the risk of either failure or
more important, success; had he been elected there was chance of his being
dubbed pro-British and he would have been forced to try to keep his
promises to his supporters. This he knew was impossible. Almost certainly
the leadership of the ATUC could have passed into other hands.

The other question on which the ATUC displayed considerable
ambivalence was the political issue that dominated Aden politics from
1960 onwards: whether or not the Colony should accede to the new
Federation.

The nationalists dreaming of Arab unity, advocated unity with the
Yemen, yet flung up their hands in horror at the suggestion that Aden
should merge with the Protectorates. Many claimed that the rulers were a
band of semi-literate pirates, feudal throwbacks from the Middle Ages and
British stooges to boot. The doubts of the ATUC were also shared by many
of the Adeni old guard and merchant community. They had learnt from
childhood of the tribal bogeyman who lived in anarchy in the not too
distant mountains. Very few even dared to venture into the Protectorates to
find out the truth for themselves and those who did were rarely reassured.
In short, all Adenis of all shades of political opinion were terrified lest
closer contact with their brothers in the Protectorate meant the loss not
only of their freedom but their household goods as well.

The ATUC] emerged from comparative shadow in 1961 to conduct a well
organised campaign against the merger. Following the example of other
colonial liberation movements elsewhere they sought sympathy in the
House of Commons and those sections of the British press where it was
most likely to be found. They cultivated lobbies of supporters in those

, e who could be relied upon to harass the British government and
P fl^nrp British public opinion. To the Labour Party in particular they
tlrl themselves as honest trades unionists, fellow socialists who
P1 ' eS ,l,l onlv he too happv to talk reason if only those stubborn officials in
" uid condescend to get down to their level. They were quick to take
a Tntaoe of the fact that manv people whose geography was none too hot

I r«tnrid ' '\deiv to be svnonvmous with the rest of South Arabia. Asnag

M H-iim with justification that he had support in Aden even if it was
°h in v based on immigrant labour and was careful to spread the illusion
Hial his oartv onjoved equal support everywhere else. In fact he was almost
... iJnorant as his audience of the true stale of affairs in the Protectorate
haviri" not at this time journeved more than an hour's drive from the border
nf the' Colony Not a few were convinced. Critics of the proposed merger
were legion/but none ever produced a sensible alternative. The absurdity
of an independent Aden State within the Commonwealth had died with he
Aden Association, and a sight of the map was enough to persuade most that
Aden and the Federation could not be separated. In 1962 two Labour
Members of Parliament. George Thomson (later Minister of State at the
Foreign Office) and Robert Edwards, visited Aden as guests oi the ATUC.
Thev made no secret of their sympathies and obviously regarded Asnag as
a future Prime Minister. They attended a mass meeting of 6.000 workers.
Most of the proceedings were in Arabic and Edwards was seen to
enthusiastically applaud the speakers all of whom were anti-British. The
visit of the two MPs had a powerful effect on Aden public opinion. The
illusion qui cklv grew up that the Labour Party thoroughly disapproved of
the Federal government, and once it obtained power would hand over
unilaterally to Asnag and his colleagues.

Shortly "after the MP's visit the People's Socialist Party (PSP) was
formed, most of its 'Supremo Council' were members of the ATUC. In Aden
they were seen as the same but abroad the PSP enabled Asnag lo ventilate
his views without upsetting genuine socialists who disapproved ol union
participation in politics.

On the home front the ATUC/PSP were equally active and their
campaign consisted mostly of intimidation of Legislative Council
members. The British were having difficulty enough in getting the Adcnis
into agreement with the Federal government that it is a wonder that these
tactics were not successful.

Hasan Bayumi had emerged as the leader of the pro-Federal party. He
was one of the few Adonis who knew the Protectorates and understood the
rivalries and jealousies which separated the various states. He realised that
the Protectorate opposition could be divided although he had difficulty in
persuading his colleagues of the fact. After nearly a year of talks Aden State
eventually came to an agreement with the Federation on the terms of its
entry. A conference in London in July 1962 straightened out the details, the
most important of which was that Aden State would have four ministers on
the Supreme Council to everybody else's one and 24 members to the

Federal Council instead of the usual six. On the 24 September tU

Suf /PSP TJ ™' a ^ ratincd ' he a « reement w h««t suppo "rs of t
ArUC/PSP waited outs.de. Asnag was alreadv in jail havino hi
sentenced to a month's imprisonment two days before fo avino tak en Z
•n illegal processions. Even as they voted events were taking
Yemen which changed forever the face of politics in the area ^«

Chapter III

The Revolutionaries

29 September 1962-31 September 1964

Some may ask, why fight for independence when the British will
grant it freely in 1068? Comrades, true independence is not given
but taken. For th is reason, my brothers in the South, there is noway
out of war and armed struggle. For this reason the people must
wage armed revolution against the enemy, in which they must pay
the highest price in life and blood.

Cairo Radio, 18 January 2965

'War, violence and sudden death are no strangers to South Arabia. The
diversities of the tribes, a thousand years of isolation from the main streams
of cmhsaUon together with the all embracing poverty in a land rich in rock
and sand but little else have ensured that chaos and anarchy have been the
order rather than the exception. It is the all too brief periods of peace that
Have been remarkable, momentarily rising above the tangle of bloodshed
and treachery before falling back to be swallowed bv the sands. From the
beginning of time rebellion and civil strife have been a normally accepted
eature ol South Arabian life. In such a society continually at war within
itselt it is natural for the disaffected to seek and receive refuge with the
enemies of their opponents.

tr,^ USCS i° f '', eVOlt and foud have alwa - vs been basically the same:
act t tonal rivalries between the main tribal groups sometimes encouraged

exislnr . e ' t f° metim , eS " 0t - ,hc P aucit y of lund and thB hand-to-mouth
su S 1 ] T P c l °' S ° that the Potion a vvell often meant
toTm^L f W }° f ° Ught ° Ver Lack 0f land and ™^P)ovment also led
spears .mrf?? trad ! tion -* V oun 8 men with nothing else to do hiring their
vShint 1 th n rg, , mS '° thft highest bidder - Squabbles over leadership

brououY J tak '. n 8 * ,des ' Tf| o 20th century and the coming of the British
on a ° trihll st, . muIants for dissension. The impact of modern civilisation
experte \ r S ° C | 10,y 1 s ? n,e,lmes caus «d resentment where it was least
son's k n n f C0U mcan thR ' OSS ofcus,oms dues: a S!:,, ool the loss of a
■ labour when the rest of the family were working to gather in thc

^^■n^^'tX* Ul * qi a " d t,1<! 1 ' adrami and Mau *>"* ^ Upper Vara" .re particularly

harvest. The rise of Arab nationalism and the invention of the transistor
radio reinforced the natural xenophobia of the people. Further, in fighting
the British and building a new society they could be sure of applause from a
watching world.

On 19 September 1962 the Imam Ahmad confounded his enemies by
dyiri" in bed. He was succeeded by his amiable son Muhammad al Badr*
A week later, on the night of 26 September, in Yemen north and south the
mould of traditional politics was smashed when Lt. Ali Abdul al Moghoy
used the few armoured cars and tanks in the Yemeni army to bombard the
Bashour Palace in Sana. The attack was not pressed home and al Badr
slipped through the rebel cordon and escaped to the northern tribes. At the
critical moment al Moghov was supported by the newly promoted Chief of
Staff, Brigadier Abdullah Sallal.t The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was
born and Sallal became its first President.

The conspiracies against the Imam had been orchestrated by the
Egyptian Charge d'Affaircs Abdul Wahad. In the first week of October the
troopship Star of Sudan docked at Hodeidah bringing the first Egyptian
forces to defend the Republic.

In Aden the nationalists were jubilant. Flags of the new Republic were to
be seen everywhere in the streets and on the highly decorated lorries, the
main mode of transport to the north, countless pictures of Sallal alongside
that of President Nasser were displayed. The bazaars buzzed with talk of
Arab unitv and revolution. There can be little doubt that if the coup had
taken place two days earlier the passage of Aden's merger bill with the
Federation would have been impossible.

The ATUC/PSP were ecstatic, local issues were forgotten as they
organised truck loads of volunteers to go north and fight for the Republic.
Manv soon returned disillusioned. Victory for the revolution had not been
as complete as was first reported. The Imam, many times reported dead,
was alive and fighting back.

There can be no doubt that from the first the Egyptians intended to
exploit their position in the Yemen to drive the British from South Arabia.
Over the course of the struggle the political positions of Egypt in North
Yemen and Britain in the south ran curiously parallel. Both were trying to
set up administrations in a country which knew nothing of them. Both
aroused the xenophobia of the people. Both had the same political problem
of trvin" to unite the urban intellectual, who spoke a language that was

• According to Yemeni custom, imams named _ Muhammad arc sumamed 'al_ BauY ™™' d n .f
■nZ 1 1,,™,,.' a<s those named Ahmad arc <:a Wed 'al Shams meaning the sun . In Munamnw
the name ,.„ck^.?S.fof his lather it was only used by .he must sycophant,,.

tTwciUvfivp years old. t.t Ali Ahdul al Moghov was the instigator of the coup. He had been
r nod in a mlmarv college in Kgvp. and on his return

armoured corps. Sallal whose own conspiracy was not reader ee l to p the rc he s « n
were shelling the palace on condition he he made president Oye „ \ u '"^^Valist
al-Moshnv agreed. A lew weeks later Sallal sent him with ...adequate forces against ku.
tribes in Khawlan and he was killed.

accepted
real po"
Aden to
series of
marry in
tough tn
'comniar
mirage o
large pat
Furthe
assured
the Brit
influent
years bo
leave th
midst ot
All th
in Sana
they w
presence
disillus'
tribesmt
fan out
British
influen
historica
regimes
Yemen
chief r
criterio
Londor
allegia
territon
the Brit'
Dr Abdi
for a
Egyptia
recogn'
their '
to the
Egypti
Egypt'
the de
Americ
British
interest

tpri hv the outside world, with the tribal leader who represented the
accepted m ^ ^ r(}flectBd in the pro blom of getting

rea l P° wer ; f „ t in tha Federation. For the Egyptians, a frustrating
Ad ? n "fYP neni oovernments, and as far as South Arabia was concerned
Sene vil al -Ksnag and his Adonis with their international reputation to the
ma 'Tt tribal rebels who provided the South Arabian revolt with most of its
tough tnb i nenc ^ h E tians had ideology in winch the

A^bSity and the magneUcappeal of President Nasser played a

I .rthJr" in the political double standards of the times the Egyptians were
Sd of vocal international support. They could do no wrong whereas
Kr ish could do no right. Against this ideology the Bn.ish had the
lue ce nd rus, built on 125 years of occupation. Over the next four
" ars 1 oth the British and the Kgyptians were to betray then pr.nr.ip es and
W the Yemen, north and south, within a day of each other and ,n the
midst of humiliating defeat. •
All this was hidden in the future when the firs. Egyptian troops arrived
in S n o make the Yemen safe for revolution. Everywhere in the towns
Lv X e weloimed and could have been forgiven for presuming then
nreLnce was no more than a victory parade. They were very quickly
5 sEnad. The Imam al Badr had escaped and within a few weeks us
nb sinen e e inflicting bloody defeats on Egyptian troops as they tried to
fen out into the countryside. There was considerable pressure on the
British government to recognise the new Republican regime Many
influential people in and out of Whitehall considered that because of he
historical position Britain was always compelled to back . the ha h t o al
regimes in the Middle East against the new order of revolution. Here in the
Yemen was a chance to switch over. But it was not to be. Britain had two
chief reasons for declining to recognise the Republicans. The British
criterion for recognition is not whether the regime has the approval ot
London but whether, with appearance of permanency, H contro s tne
allegiance of the majority of the inhabitants and the greater part ot national
territory. In this case neither condition appeared to be met. Furthermore
the British were reinforced in their belief when they were approached by
Dr Abdul Rahman al Baidani the deputy President who asked lor support
for a breakaway Shafai state in the southern part of the Yemen, tree ot
Egyptians and dissidents.' The United States on the other hand tends to
recognise regimes of which it approves and considers will undertake
their international obligations. President Kennedy extended recognition
to the Republicans in December 1962 on the understanding that the
Egyptians would withdraw. Recognition alone had been the object ot
Egyptian diplomacy and they quite blatantly went back on their part ot
the deal and reinforced their forces instead. To cover up their error
American diplomats tended to exaggerate Republican power whilst the
British became partisans of the Rovalists. It was not the first time that the
interests of the Western allies in the Middle East had clashed. In the event

8 Qahtan al Shaahi, leader of the NLF.

YAR expelled the US consul in Taiz in June 19B7.
The Federal government were bitterly opposed to recognition. Fleet
> >i and many British diplomats thought that they sided with the Imam
V-ause like themselves, he was a traditional ruler. They cared not a jot
ho ruled from Sana so long as it was a regime well disposed to the
Federation. They argued that by extending recognition to the Republic
Brit-un would be helping Egypt, the Federation's most malevolent enemy,
nd'destroying those who for reasons of their own were fighting I hem. It
has been said that if Britain had recognised the Republic early on then Egypt
would not have mounted her campaign of terror and subversion against
South Arabia. There is no evidence to support this contention. It was a
carrol hung out hopefully by the Egyptians. From as early as November
1962, six weeks after the revolution they were announcing the formation of
a -National Liberation Army.' They had been nibbling at British power
since 1954 and their treatment of the Americans suggests that they
regarded negotiation and agreements as stages in the struggle which can
only end when final victory is achieved.

Amongst the very first to declare himself for the revolution was Qahtan
al Shaabi who, at the time, was eking out a meagre existence in Taiz. as a
pensioner of the Imam. As a reward for his zeal the Egyptians made him
head of the 'National Liberation Army' formed out of South Arabians who
had flocked north to join the Republican army. Most of these were
disillusioned soon after arrival and the Egyptians wasted little time in
trying to form them into regular units. 'They were quarrelsome and lazy
people given over much to fighting amongst themselves.'*

Cadres of the 'National Liberation Army' were sent to Cairo for military
training. A special camp was set up in the old Imam's palace at Salah near
Taiz as a headquarters and training depot for the force. The initial
object was to set up an army on the lines of the Algerian FLN, an aim
which was never to be achieved.

In the meantime the Egyptians looked around for areas to cause trouble
in the Protectorates and their eyes soon lit on the Radfan. The Radfan is an
extensive and savage tribal region some 50 miles north of Aden straddling
the road to Dhala. The country is mountainous with no roads penetrating
the narrow valley although some, notably the Wadi Taym, has fertile land
capable of exploitation if the factious character of the people would permit
it- It is amongst the roughest country in the world to light over and the
People had a tradition of raiding the Dhala road or their neighbours and
then returning to their mountain strongholds, which lor centuries no
enemy had been able to penetrate. Technically the tribes of Radian owed
allegiance to the Amir of Dhala to whom they had all sworn oaths of
allegiance. The ruler maintained a naib at Thumair on the Dhala road but
th e links wore thin and the Radfanis would not infrequently try and assert

Maior (later l.t Culrmell Hanuida of the Egyptian Army. (Utlar Dec. I9H:1)

• , B n,.ndenrc In general there was a mutual understanding that so
th6ir m fhSe "were left alone they would cause no trouble, and although
10118 8 * mitie for tribal blackmail on the road occasionally proved
the oppo tu m ties u short .| ived .

irresistible the ca i re temp difference to their agreeable status

^Z^f^™*™*™* shaikh of the Qutaibis °St

qU0 '' H -ivv n to Aden and complained that he had been 'oppressed by the
C8me HI \ a bv his inclusion in the Federation. This was an unusual and
Am ,r ot Dl laid b. t is in c hief and to the surprise and

S ,° pbi v ffi ^ Son°other lesser Radfan shaikhs followed sint
dismay ot s p e0 ple's Socialist Party began to publicise their

Significantly a A na s Peop Commission knew what was

f e ' V ZZ t t h d risi on their ha^ds. The real cause of trouble was
oKTl g s£lab! sitting in the border town of Qataba handing out money

i r ;fl ot tn all witli promises of more to come,
""on 4 Ortobe 1963 the Amir of Dhala's naib in Radfan on a rou me tour
tnVl ed in the Wadi Tavm. The Radfan Revolt had begun. A rash of

SSltn h d encountered since the Ahl Bubakhr bin Fand had boe„
f a nt» thn Yemen in 1960. And so in November the Federal torces
£w - Nulcracker- with the limited military aim of clearing
h road. The military objectives were quickly and easily
there was no political success to back them up 1 he muddle started m he
Fe<leral government itself. It could not decide whether to release the
Radian is in the Federal forces on leave for the duration of the operations as
manv of the ministers wished or to keep them on. The 1- ederal Armv _ argued
that some were in key posts and were necessary lor the success o the p am
in the end a bad compromise was reached whereby the rank and file wore
allowed to depart and the senior officers con tinned with their duties, jo he
deepl v suspicious Radfanis it seemed that the latter were traitors whi st the
rest received due praise for having refused to fight against heir fell™
tribesmen. Right from the start the Federal government allowed dissension
and lack of confidence to creep into the ranks of (he armed forces upon
which thev relied. Further, the danger in Radfan was not appreciated and
no real political effort was made to follow up the military success. It was
assumed that having been taught a lesson the tribes would come down to
Aden and make their submission as they had under similar circumstances
in the past. The effect of the massive distribution of arms and the presence
for the first time of agitators from other parts of South Arab.a combined
with the publicity given to the affair bv Radios Cairo and Sana was under-
estimated in Aden. When the Federal forces withdrew from their positions
the Radfanis saw it as a great victory and for the first time all the tribes
co-operated in the revolt. By the New Year the situation on the road was
worse than before.

There were two schools of thought as to how to deal with the problem
The Federal government and most of their British advisers came down on
the side of air action with limited ground support, which had proved so
successful in the past. Air action they argued was cheap, effective and
humane. Planes always overflew target villages an hour before the raid was
duo to take place, dropping warning leaflets to avoid loss of life
Nevertheless there was considerable international pressure against this
sort of action; and the 'hawks' of Middle East Command supported an
alternative solution; massive ground action which would crush the
rebellion and bring the Rudfan to order for once and for all. Air action alone
could at best be a temporary solution. The latter view won the day. British
troops were sent to support Federal troops in the Kadfan and eventually
rose to brigade strength.

The Radfan operation lasted from the January of 1964 until May, and
from the military angle it was a model of success. The whole area was
occupied with the minimum casualties but from every other aspect it was a
disaster. The presence of British troops had excited a far greater opposition
than would otherwise have been the case. In the event air action had to be
used. The population as a whole fled into the Yemen and it was months
before they could be induced to return, but the greatest damage of all was
clone by the publicity.

From the military point of view the prime object of publicity was to
increase recruiting. Radfan was a showpiece and so every facility was
granted to journalists to go and see things for themselves. Accordingly
enormous coverage in the British press was assured and an outbreak which
was minimal when compared to the rebellions of 1 954 and 1958 was blown
up in precisely the way that the propagandists of Cairo wanted; a
nationalist rebellion being crushed by British troops in support of their
Federal puppets. The publicity reached its height over the so-called 'heads'
incident. In April 19(54 a patrol of the SAS operating deep in Radfan
territory was surrounded and forced to fight its way out, two of the soldiers
being killed and their bodies abandoned.

General Cubbon, the British Army Commander, gave a press conference
in which he claimed that the heads of the two dead men had been exhibited
over the gates of Taiz. the Yemen's second capital — he meant lo say Qataba,
the border rebel base. Not unsurprisingly the General's statement caused a
considerable furore in the United Kingdom and he was asked to provide
proof, which he was unable to do. especially as the US consul in Taiz
denied the reports. The removal of heads was traditional in Radfan and the
headless bodies were later recovered.

Whi 1st the Radfan venture was a setback to the British and Federal cause
as a whole, in the area itself the benefits soon became apparent. Eventually
all the tribes except two very minor ones returned and were given
considerable development aid with which they soon recouped their losses.
Generally for the rest of the emergency the area was quiescent and became a

Federal showpiece of what could he done if they wore given the chance. *

In the spring of 1963 the Federal government had its first taste of the
United Nations. For some time the PSP, SAL and others had heen
nearing before the Committee of 24 on Colonisation to complain about
•British injustice in South Arabia'. They had been carefully shepherded
a j on g the spacious corridors and into the lobbies by the delegates of Iraq
•tnd Egypt, and reports of their allegations and activities were beginning lo
attract international attention. The Committee on Colonisation was already
oaining a well-deserved reputation for rant, prejudice and racialism. As
the Federal government were lo discover, the only standard to be observed
was that proteges and supporters of the British were automatically
condemned whilst their enemies and opponents were given an
enthusiastic welcome. The Federal government were worried by the
reports coming in and believed that they had only lo appear before the
Committee to put the matter right so they despatched Muhammad Karid,
the Oxford educated Minister of Finance, to present the Federal case. When
he arrived in New York he found that two other petitioners from South
Arabia had already preceded him. Sayid Hasan Sohbi. an articulate Aden
lawyer, spoke on the behalf of I he PSP. condemned the Federal
government, condemned British colonialism and demanded union with
Yemen. He was followed by the rhetorical Shaikhan al Habsh i l or the South
Arabian League who agreed with everything that Sohbi had said except he
rejected union with the Yemen and sought the unity of the whole of British
South Arabia into one state, the process being carried out under the
guidance of SAL. Although the policies of the two speakers were
contradictory, the Committee felt they were on the right lines and both
received a sympathetic hearing. Muhammad Farid, on the other hand, had
a cool reception. He gave a concise resume of the Federal case but his words
tell on deaf ears. The Committee appeared lo be more interested in kicking
the British than listening to facts. As soon as he bad finished the
Cambodian delegate read a long denunciation of the British and their
presence in South Arabia. True to form the Committee later passed
resolutions both anti-British and anti-Federal in content. These were due to
oe placed before the General Assembly in December.

December was also the month earmarked for the next South Arabian
Constitutional conference in London with the object of setting a date for
independence and bringing Aden, whose status was still that of a colony,
m to line with the other members of the Federation. In London and New

ork. South Arabia would be in the news, a fact which did not go unnoticed
'r\ ', ? E8y l 1tii,ns - tnR p SP and other opponents of the British Federation.

'erndy sorneth ing dramatic should happen in South Arabia to prove to the

SW>"ian! ti u W '>'">' given by British newspapers to tin; Radian did not always improve the
limp i- ' . ! V i u ' 1 i ' 1!i "-" !rs - secretary working for the Hi^li Commission in Aden Colony at this
"upuvof't • ' tullfm 'i»S '(-'tier from her aunt: 'Dear R. What terrihle news from Aden. I do
. ™ Hon t nave lo drive through Radian on \ uu r wav to work.'

i i ,u„ nnnnl,-'s reiortion of British colonialism. The Egyptian forces
H i 2 the £meni borders were alreadv plaving the Imam's old
an e o stirring up the tribes, but something more spectacular was needed.
The r'fo e the Aden High Commission were not surprised when a few days
SoreUedelegaUonsvveredue.oleaveforLondontheForce Umoncame
out on s^ike over some minor matter. This was of course ,n defiance of the
inc u rial ordinance and the ATUC expected the leaders to be arrested,
L in' them the excuse to call a general strike and prov.de an opportunity
for ample publir.itv regarding British oppression ol honest trades umons.
For once thfi authorities took firm act ion. Most of the strikers were Yemenis
and as such illegal immigrants. A batch was promptly rounded up and
deported The strike broke down and Asnag found hnnself surrounded by
Yemeni complaining about the deportations lor wh.ch they held him
re^on^. There were to be no dramatic trials but the trades un.omsl had

^"A^h^rdorktnfho evening of 9 December 1963 a group of men
o*he£ f on thV£ a - beach just to the east of the Queen Elizabeth
Ho Si was lo be a fateful meeting. Amongst those present were
Abdullah al Asnag, two of Ms closest henclmiem Muhamtnad Sjkj
Bislndwah and Mahmud Saddiq, Muhammad Ah Abdu a leaning
me, beT of the PSP who had once coined the phrase TB germs to
StetheVederal ministers. Muhammad Mi-.aclerk^ AjW

he should use a machine gun As an officia of Ac on J lrv ^
presence on the tarmac would be unremarked. He sugg .* *ec tha
should hide the gun in his trouser leg and approach theparj « ^
were about to board the London bound plane. He would hen pull o
gun and empty the magazine into the closely packed 9^^^
killing as many as possible Asnag vetoed the ^"^^ would
Khalifa would be caught red-handed and PSP/ ATUC, mvolvemcn
be impossible to deny. nnrsuaded that a

He wanted to call the whole thing oH but wa a. last per ade
arenade would fulfil his conditions for anonymity. The ,nc.et.n„
with Khalifa going off with Basindwah to collect a gren ad e. ]a
For some time the High Commissioner had been cn K ^
conversation with Asnag in the ^f^^^^te***
apparent policy of destruction. Most of these ^' cr f ° r ^2 s u „ion
the telephone. According to Sir Kennedy he would n g , f *e t«d be
leader at around eight in the morn.ng. Invariably the depho u ^
answered hv Asnags mother, her son still lying abed. Consequent
Sir Kennedv rang at seven before departure to the airport and the

orw i hp was surprised to hear that he was not only up but had already
anS 7o, business and indeed had only just returned to the house. When
bRCn ° ooke sTr Kcnnedv though, he sounded a little flustered and
A,na Ld that a demonstration condemning the conference had been
expected " ,a . , , , h ai ort he was rcasS ured; there was

a,T f 86 LVe v hu looked peaceful and normal. Most of the delegates
n0,h, ;Lc v S 0" ^« tannac together with a host of well wishers and
"' e '"al ts fathered to see then, off. The spectators' gallery which
,0U , Xok the tarmac had its usual collection of onlookers; a couple ol
T d officials shepherded passengers out to the plane for Dj.bouli. a
tilin ■ Sonudis and Indians briefly mixing with the Arab ministers
Za Br Sh officials awaiting their barn. It was a colourful scene and one
which Khalifa, looking down on it from the flight observation room was
•p use to He had already been in position for five minutes and sine .led
\ M h from the onlv other occupant of the room, a man called Qashbar.
J d m le h vav to the window hiding the grenade under his hat which
1 ^ heed on 'the ledge. Moments later something was seen to fall from
P ' 1£ 5 immed iate.y by a deafening explosion as the grena e
van off For some minutes all was pandemonium. The splinter, had cut a
Wide swathe through the crowd on the terrace. Some not realising that the
a been hit themselves turned to help others who had fallen on the
gmuncUn the middle of it all stood the Sharif of Baihan blood ncklrng
down his face brandishing an enormous revolver and looking tor
somebody to shoot. Yet despite the apparent carnage the grenade had
missed its main target. Sir Kennedy had been |erked out of the way by his
deputv George Henderson and escaped with scratches. Henderson was
unluckv and received a splinter in the liver. He died a fortmgh later in the
Queen Elizabeth Hospital. The only other fatality was an hid .an woman
transiting through Aden en route for Addis Ababa with her husband and
three children. She had never been to Aden before and was the lirst of man,
innocent people to be killed in the Strife which followed over the next four
vears. . ,

" The grenade injured over fifty others, none seriously but the
psychological scar remained. The conference was postponed, rtie t-edera
government proclaimed a state of emergency and Sir Kennedy followed
suit in Aden. Under its terms a man could be detained without trial it the
authorities had reason to suspect his implication in terrorism. Ihe
authorities immediately took the opportunity to round up known
troublemakers including Asnag and all the principal participants in the
airport bomb plot and ship them off to prison in the Protectorates. There
was to be no more serious terrorism in the Colony for nearly two years.

Khalifa and Mia were arrested on the afternoon following the explosion.
Nobody had told Asnag about the grenade lever which springs oft as the
h onib is detonated. In this case the lever was found on the airport root and
by the simple expediency of throwing a dummy grenade and watching
w bere the lever landed the authorities concluded the only place from

which the bomh could have been thrown was the flight observation room.
The rest was easy. It was soon found that Khalifa who had no business in
the office had been there when the bomb was thrown. Qashbari's evidence
clinched it and Khalifa was charged with murder. Everything seemed set
for a trial but it never took place. Incredibly Qashbari was allowed to go
home. He was got at and fled to Cairo. The only people who seemed
surprised were the Aden Police. The trial proceed ings wore suspended and
Khalifa was immediately rearrested and detained under the State of
Emergency .

If the Aden and Federal authorities were satisfied with their actions
others were not. From Damascus to Moscow. Cairo to the United Nations, a
chorus of protests arose condemning the State of Emergency, and
demanding the release of Asnag and his colleagues.

More important, a posse of Labour Members of Parliament descended on
South Arabia. They made it quite clear that they had not come to
sympathise with those injured by the bomb but to bring succour to those
detained after it. The confidence of the Federal government was badly
shaken bv the actions of the MPs which gave added credence to the belief
that the Labour government would sell them out to Asnag and President
Nasser. From this date began a macabre interest in British bye-election
results which would continue almost until independence. That the MPs
were sincere and that thev thought they were putting wrongs to right there
can be no doubt, but it is also undeniable that their actions constituted a
grave disservice to Britain and to South Arabia as well as those democratic
principles which thev claimed to care so much about.

The protests were successful. All those detained were released in the
next months. Nearly everyone subsequently took an active part in the

terrorism. .

Events in Radian reinforced by the Aden airport bomb and tie
subsequent declaration of the State of Emergency encouraged the
Egvptians to continue with their plans to start trouble elsewhere.
Sometime in the spring of 1963 they had finally decided on an all-out
offensive on the British in South Arabia. In November a parly ol Egyptian
Intel ligence officers had arrived in Taiz to set up rebel bases on the frontiers
and enlarge the National Liberation Army. With Radian going well tnej
decided to reactivate the Imam's old base at Baidha which, with its sultan
released from prison by the revolution, was not unnaturally staunchly
pro-Republican. . .

On 1 December 1963 eleven Egyptian officers boarded an »'y u& "'"
transport plane at Taiz and headed for the town ninety miles away to tn
east. Unfortunately the pilot had never flown the route before on
navigation was not his strong point. Seeing an airfield through a gap m
clouds he brought the plane down into a perfect three-point ^dmg rig
beside the Federal Army camp in I.odar, thirty miles due south and
feet lower than his destination. Immediately realising his mistake the pi
re-revved his engines but it was too late. A British Army captain raced

i r0 \ er onto the strip and blocked the take-off. The Egyptians came out
/The aircraft in some embarrassment, the pilot pausing only to smash the
Vols They staved in Lodar for three days making conversation with the
£aib and politely side-stepping gentle questioning by the astounded

Br AftSr some courtesies on each side, the Egyptians led by a suave and
h-rmina major called Hamuda were repatriated. The aircraft, however
c 'wed It was repaired bv the RAF and parked on Khormaksar airfield
whore "in the spring of 1967 it was still causing the Egyptian government
unou"h embarrassment for plans to be hatched to blow it up. *

Down in the steamy nationalist circles of Aden the People's Socialist
P'irtv had not beer, able to make all the capital it wished out of the Radfan.
This was presumably because most of the leaders, including al Asnag, were
in detention following the airport bomb when the operation was at its
height. A campaign to raise money for the 'Radfan Martyrs' gained little
support as the Adenis were becoming chary of contributing to the PSP's
frequent appeals. Rumours of embezzlement seemed to be supported by
the apparent affluence of many union leaders. Asnag was finding it
increasingly difficult to remain at the head of the trades union movement.
The man who preached democracy in I -ondon was reluctant to pract ise it in
Aden. Elections within the unions and the Trades Union Congress were
overdue and there was every indication that were they to be held Asnag and
his supporters would have been thrown out. A second generation of
unionists eager for the known prestige and money which office would give
them were on their vvav up. For the next year Asnag. increasingly
concerned with maintaining his position, found little time to provide
co-ordinated opposition to the British and the Federation. The PSP
collapsed soon after Asnag's release from detention, like its predecessor
the United National Front the main cause of dissension amongst its
members seemed to be money.

The discontented unionists began to find political expression in another
organisation. The Free Officers of the South' occupied a wooden shack in
the depths of Crater; it was a qat chewing club whose founder members
were an uninspiring bunch drawn mainly from the criminal fringe.
Sometime in early 1963 the club underwent a dramatic change. The drunks
and addicts moved out and a dozen or so earnest young men, some of
whom were minor union leaders, others officials struggling for a place in
. the sun on the Asnag dominated ATIX. Under the leadership of Abdul
Malik Ismail of the Petroleum Workers' Union they affiliated themselves to
the Arab Nationalist Movement and the party of George Habbash in Beirut.

! 3

rhe aircraft was held bv the British in exchange lor some British army vehicles lost some two
months before. A iiartv of service men irnrl women mainlv clerks from Middle Hast Command
ni ,7 ,"!,'., un » weekends adventure training, inadvertently straying across the Yemeni border at
Srm h , e Yemenis believing that thev were being invaded shot up the convoy, killing two.

0,110 1)1 'lie servicemen were taken to Taizand eveoUiallv repatriated hut the vehicles were held.

This group soon joined a Nasserist cell made up of ex-Aden Coll
students led by a schoolteacher Muhammad Ali Haithem and with ot^
support from the Badhib brothers who were well known as Aden's n i
avowed Marxists. m V
In the autumn of 1963 Zaki Fraij, a young Jordanian insurance salesman
arrived m Aden with the purpose of indoctrinating the Aden branch in th
principles of Arab nationalism. In the meantime the group had been in
touch with Qahtan al Shaabi in the Yemen, probably through his nephev
Faisal who was employed in the Aden Co-operative market. Al Shaabi had
been under pressure from the Egyptians to start terrorism in Aden Colonv
He was hampered by a personal dislike of al Asnag which may have none
back to his South Arabian League days, in any case al Asnag was still
recovering from his detention, grappling with his own political problems
and in no position to organise a terror campaign. Al Shaabi first relied on
the odd tribesmen to come down to Aden, throw a bomb and disappear
This was hardly satisfactory and the emergence of a fully formed cell with
strong union connections must have been a godsend. Messages passed to
and fro between his cell and Yemen. The Arab Nationalist Partv
disappeared, went underground and began to call itself the 'National
Liberation Front'. Arrangements were made for the passage of arms* when
suddenly the whole group was betrayed and arrested.

Somehow the Aden Special Branch had got onto Zaki Fraij and as a result
of papers found in his possession most of his colleagues, including Abdul
Malik Ismail, found themselves in prison. From the authority's point of
view it is perhaps unfortunate that they pounced a little too early. As there
was nothing concrete to connect their prisoners with terrorist activity they
were released, Abdul Malik Ismail promptly leaving for Cairo," Fraij
repatriated to Jordan but murdered a year later. According to the Aden NLF
this was because they believed that he had betraved them to the British.
The arrest and subsequent release of the NLF leaders gave them increased
prestige which enabled the movement to penetrate many of the sports
clubs as well as the unions. These sports clubs were especially useful in
recruiting terrorists as they provided a pool of the young and idealistic-
more easily persuaded to risk their lives than their elders. In the final weeks
of 1964 they were ready once more to mount an offensive against the
British and their allies in Aden Colony.

In the meantime the Federal government had been grappling with the
problem of its constitutional evolvement, particularly its relationship with
Aden Colony. The conference due to take place in December 1 963 had been
postponed because of the airport bomb and it was not until the following
June that the delegates gathered in London. The purpose of the conference
was to agree on a date for independence which brought into focus the

* It may he that some of these arrived and the Aden branch of the KLF were responsible for a
number of "renarie incidents which occurred in Little Aden during the summer and autumn of

iSSttmr,

whole, question of British sovereignty in Aden and the Colony's
relationship with the rest of the Federation. Circumstances had changed
since the conference had been planned eighteen months before. Following
the airport bomb the British were no longer agreeable to handing over the
internal security of the Colony, so putting il on a par with the other states.
The leadership of the Adenis had changed. Hasan Bayumi had died
suddenly of a heart attack and had been replaced by ZainBahroon. The latter
was a merchant who had travelled extensively in the Middle Fast. Affable
but prickly he was liable to retire into long silences behind a pair of dark
glasses, and although pro-Federal by instinct he knew little about the
country outside Aden and consequently there was little communication
between him and the Federal ministers which led to many
misunderstandings. The delay in holding the conference had also
seriously weakened the position of the Aden government. The life of the
Legislative Assembly like that of the Conservative government in Britain
was drawing to a close. Elections already twice postponed were due to be
held the following October and like politicians elsewhere the Adenis
found the temptation of playing to their electoral gallery back home
irresistible. They could best do this by raking over all the old ground
covered in the 1962 Conference which had settled the conditions for
Aden's entry. Federations in general were unpopular in Britain at the time
and the South Arabian one was suffering from skilful lobbying by Asnag,
the publicity engendered by Radian and the 'Harib Affair'.

In the spring when the Radian campaign was at its height the Egyptians
in the Yemen had won what was to be their greatest victory of the war
Smashing through the Royalist-held mountain massif of al Jauf in Central
Yemen they broke out in the eastern plain capturing the two towns of
Manb and Harib, sealing off the border with South Arabia. During the
operation a Yemeni Republican force had occupied the border village of
uar at b u l uhaif. The village was in disputed territory and despite pleas
from the Sharif of Baihan the British were understandably reluctant to
wive the occupying forces out for him. Egyptian air attacks on Baihan
nidges soon followed, including one napalm stack in the Wadi Ayn on
March 1964. The Sharif demanded protection under the terms of
nam s Defence Treaty with the Federation. The British prevaricated,
act iT ! y , p0SSiblc defellce a g aitlst atta ^s of this kind was retaliation, an
Nntinn T"' 0 ^ be considered far less sympathetically in the United
TheK il elsewhere than the Egyptian attacks which provoked them.
tarepinF 5 f ™' msters fel1 that in supporting Britain they had become the
thev h *' ldes P road criticism and both individually and collectively
undent 1 thrca,ened with death because of it. Now thev were the
had th " cnms nf outright aggression and Britain did nothing. They
caused 6 " t0 , GXpeCt Bri,ain t0 honour her undertakings even if it
broader ,T embarrassment in Whitehall. To London contemplating the
kerned •> m °? com P Iex P icture of international politics this may have
«» Parochial argument but when a few days later a helicopter

blatantly ml
inside Baiha
and demolis
warning leaf
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1966. Presidi
avenge Haril:
their bags an
avenging Kg;
made the ex
the reprisal,
rumours ncv
British press
British lives
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allies'.''

So when
Bahroon kic
Federation w
a sympathet
dramatic wa
threats from
encouraged
month's liar
reached and

The agree:
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conference fi
1968 and of (
retain her r
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meeting of re
arrangement
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A few ho
conference:
"'ember of t
Cairo. The n
implex as t
be «n one of t
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fjfPort bomb

Kh oni U tksar.
driving at tr

blatantly machine gunned the Federal Guard fort at Jebel Bulaiq well
inside Liaihan territory, they could delay no longer. Hunter jots attacked
and demolished the Republican fort a few miles south of Harib. The
warning leaflets were read but for some reason not acted upon and over
a dozen Republican soldiers killed. The local purpose was achieved.
There was to be only one more Egyptian air attack, on Baihan in July
1966. President Nasser made a dramatic appearance in Sana and swore to
avenge Harib. Yemenis living in Shaikh Uthman suburh of Aden packed
their bags and moved out of the town expecting it to be flattened by the
avenging Egyptian air force, but nothing happened. The United Nations
made the expected noises. Ignoring the Egyptian attacks they deplored
the reprisal. In the academic corridors of the Foreign Office there were
rumours never acted upon of resignations and a significant section of the
British press were highly critical of the action. Was it not enough for
British lives to be lost in Radfan than to compound the mistake by
jeopardising British policies abroad in support of such questionable
allies?

So when on the opening of the conference in its public first session
Bahroon kicked off with an unexpected speech strongly critical of the
Federation which he described as having been 'born paralysed' he received
a sympathetic press. This, together with advice from Aden to stage a
dramatic walk-out if 'Aden's rights' were not granted in toto, and dire
threats from Cairo about the fate in store for 'traitors to Arabism'.
encouraged the Adenis to be at their difficult worst. Nevertheless after a
month's hard and patient negotiations islands of understanding were
reached and agreement arrived at.

The agreement was not spectacular but laid the foundations for future
development. It was agreed that the British government should convene a
conference for the purpose of fixing a date lor independence not later than
1968 and of concluding a defence agreement under which Britain would
retain her military base in Aden. With regard to the surrender of
sovereignty in Aden Colony it was agreed that 'as soon as practicable after
• ne forthcoming election in Aden the British government would convene a
meeting of representatives of Aden and the states of the Federation to agree
arrangements for the transfer of sovereignty.' There was also agreement on
the future constitutional shape of the Federation and elections.

A tew hours before the agreement was signed a bombshell hit the
conference: Sultan Ahmad bin Abdullah, the Ruler of Fadhli. founder
"lumber of the Federation and its Minister of Information, defected to
ano. The reasons for the defection can only be guessed at and are as
^ m plex as the character of Ahmad himself. A man of great energy he had

en one ot the driving forces in the Federation, and the subject of some of
airn" 10 ^ hi 'ter diatribes from Cairo Radio. He had been injured by the
^ Port bomb, and on return to his state had revived an old Fadhli claim to
arn° rnU1 ' CSar ' ^' nen next ne travelled by air he created a sensation by
vm 8 at the airport surrounded by tribal guards. The release of Asnag

and his followers whom hefelt to be responsible for his wounds, theattitude
of the British press, the Labour MPs who had visited his state and the
apparent reluctance of the British government to honour its commitments
to the Federation convinced him that he would be left in the lurch. The
Sultan was also subject to more private pressures. He had recently married
Kamila. the beautiful daughter of Ali Ismail Turki. an influential Aden
hotelier, and she in turn was influenced by her brother Ismail studying in
London and a prominent member of the PSP-dominated South Arabian
Students' Organisation. It was Ismail who arranged the Sultan's flight to
London airport and then to Cairo where he was received, not as a feudal
despot, but a nationalist hero. In Fadhli the dolfl were 'persuaded' to
depose Ahmad and appoint h is brother Nasir ruler in his stead.

The excitement of Ahmad's defection had barely died down when
campaigning for the Aden State elections got underway. The election was
fought on a narrow franchise, only Aden-horn males having the right to
take part. This pleased neither the Federal government who considered
that its narrowness encouraged separatist tendencies in Aden and
excluded their own nominees, nor the militant opposition who wanted to
include the Yemeni immigrant labour. As usual Asnag called for a boycott
but it was an utter failure. His People's Socialist Party had already broken
apart at the seams and some ignoring their leader's plans offered
themselves as candidates. These included Fuad Barahim the lawyer and
'Grenadier' Khalifa still held in detention following the airport bomb.
Sixteen seats were contested and after the election six more members
would be nominated bv the High Commissioner. The principles of
democracy were not strictly adhered to and votes were quite blatantly put
up for sale and bid for by most of the 43 candidates who evidently
considered it to be worth a great deal of money to secure a seat m the
Assembly. The Khudabux Khan brothers Hasan and Hussain had brougnt
this kind of electioneering to a fine art, transforming their constituencies
of Crater North and South into rotten boroughs. They were immensely
wealthy having made their money from properly interests as well as more
doubtful activities. Although they usually took a militant line (Asnag was
later to marry Nadhira, daughter of Hussain), they were heartily detes tea
by most sections of the community. Nothing loath they entered tne
elections with enthusiasm and secured votes by the simple expediency or
inviting a potential voter to swear on the Qur'un to support tnei
candidature, then cutting the required number of notes in two they wouj
give one half to the voter and tell him to return and collect the rest wne<
the brothers were elected. Owing to the complications of the elector
svstem the voters in Crater North were entitled to send three member*
the Assembly. It was in this constituency that Abdul Qawi Mackaw
supported by Besse, the powerful shipping firm of whom he i was
director, stood alongside 'Grenadier' Khalifa. For Khalifa it was his °
backyard and he was supported by the vast Khalifa clan w
campaigned on his behalf. Every voter having three choices insureu

ccess. They would not have been human if many had not been taken
SU »h the romantic lure of voting for the detained local boy and taking a
swipe at authority at no cost to themselves.

Despite the boycott there was a 76% turnout and no incidents. Most of
the old stalwarts were returned. Khalifa gained over 1.000 votes and came
top of the poll. Bahroon, Husain Bayumi brother of the late Hasan, Ali
Luqman who had succeeded his father as leader of the People's Congress.
Mackawce and needless to say the brothers Khudabux* got in without
difficulty. In Little Aden a local pro-Federal fisherman, Salim Ahmad
N'aiqa, easily defeated his PSP opponent, and in Shaikh Uthman a young
airline executive. Hashim Umar, already a secret member of the NLF
'entered public politics for the first lime. Amongst those nominated were
Abdul Rahman Girgirah, leader of the United National Party and Sayid
Hasan Sohbi, lawyer and one-time member of the PSP. An attempt was
made to offer a place to al Asnag but he refused.

Although bis boycott had failed al Asnag could take comfort that seven
of the new members were sympathetic to his party. The Federal
"overnmont were also quite pleased, noting that not one of the candidates
had demanded the withdrawal of Aden from the Federation. Bahroon
formed the new government.

Elections had also taken place in Britain and the Labour Parly under the
leadership of Harold Wilson had gained a small majority in the House of
Commons. Duncan Sandys was replaced as Secretary of Slate for the
Colonial Office by Antony Greenwood who as a gesture of goodwill
released Khalifa from detention.

The new Secretary of State, with the disarming simplicity born by long
years of exile from office, believed it was more the actions of his
predecessors rather than the facts of the case which had caused so many
difficulties. He came to office determined to clear up the mess in South
Arabia. He had been in contact with Asnag for some time and saw the issue
as not one between Egypt and Britain but between Asnag's blue collar
socialists and the reactionary Federal rulers. There was no doubt as to
W'here his sympathy lay. He was a leading member of the Committee for
Liquidation of Colonialism and a Vice President of the Society for the
Abolition of Blood Sports. In many ways a brilliant politician he can be
forgiven if the harsh realities of power politics in South Arabia were not
his metier.

The first change made by the new Labour administration was to retire the
High Commissioner. Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, who had been the chief
architect of federation, and was fell to be too closely identified with the
federal government to give credence to the new look policy which

'embers ol the Legislative Assembly were allowed to carrv weapons for their personal
In the case of Hasan Khudabux this led (o personal misfortune. One day his pistol
11 o't as h 0 was putting on his trousers. His secretary telephoned Government House to
>est the urgent assistance of an armv doctor to 'sew on Mr Khudabux's penis'.

Greenwood envisaged. For his part Sir Kennedy frankly expressed his
disquiet at the plans shaping in the Minister's mind. The new High
Commissioner was Sir Richard Turnhull who had the reputation of being
one of the finest administrators in the Colonial Service and had recently
retired as High Commissioner in Tanganyika where his tact and diplomacy
had ensured asmoothtransferof povvertoNyerere. In Sir Richard theLabour
government felt ihey had a man of immense prestige who was sympathetic
to nationalist aspirations.

At the end of 1964 Greenwood arrived in South Arabia to see things for
himself. He had talks with Federal and Aden ministers as well as
independent bodies. His visit reached a climax when the Federal and Aden
governments issued a joint statement in favour of a 'unitary sovereign
state". Manv Adenis had long sought the development because they
bel ieved that the Federal system perpetuated the authority of the rulers. In a
unitarv stale they felt it would be easier for them to attain political power.
Not unnaturally the Federal ministers had always opposed the suggestion.
The impasse vvas resolved by the Sharif of Baihan who suspected that the
purpose of Greenwood's visit had been to take Aden out of the Federation
and seized the concept of the unitary stale as a method of preventing this.

The Federal ministers were inadequately briefed on the implications of a
unitarv state and to some it only seemed to be a mere statement that they
were 'united', a condition which along with all other Arabs they always
claimed hut never achieved. This lack of comprehension was underlined
when the proposals came up for formal consideration by the Federal
Supreme Council. It vvas approved in five minutes flat whilst the other item
on the agenda, the interminable border dispute between Wahidi and the
Upper Aulaqi Shaikhdom vvas not resolved in two hours' intense
discussion. In a unitary state all stale borders arc necessarily abolished.
Greenwood went ahead with plans for a new conference scheduled to take
place in March 1965 to bring the new state inlo being.

As 1964 drew to a close the Federation was faced with new threats to its
security both in the Protectorates and in Aden. The Egyptian Major
Hamuda had at last installed himself in Baidha. I Ic was an astute and clever
intriguer. Backed bv substantial quantities of arms and money he quickly
raised the tribal Caliban throughout the central area. Dathina was soon the
nightly scene of attacks on Government forts and administrative
centres.The usual pattern of minelaying and attacks on livestock and
i rrigation works was repeated and in August the rebels were strong enough
to trv and storm Mudia fort in broad daylight. They were beaten off with
heavv losses by the Federal Guard and this proved lo be a turning point.
The lesson of Radian had been learnt and British troops were not called in.
Disheartened by their failure more of the rebels returned to their homes and
the hard core to the Yemen. „
In Audhali Hamuda's tactics had their most spectacular success, n-
concentrated on the Naib, the same Jaabil who had so effectively trounce
the Imam's agents back in 1958. Jaabil's headquarters, the Audhali town o

Mukaiiys facing Baidha across the border, came under regular attack from
,hel' bunds who concentrated their efforts on the Naib's house. Ilamuda
backed up the physical attack by threats on the Naib's family steadily
reducing his morale. Soon Ilamuda established a dialogue with Jaabil and
. u .rocsted that it was all a misunderstanding, if a man of Jaabil's standing
would only come and speak to President Nasser personally he Ilamuda
believed that the whole thing would be called off. It worked, the little man
fell for it and on 8 November crossed into the Yemen to join the other
Federal rebel Ahmad bin Abdullah of Fadhli in exile.

The Federal government was deeply shocked. Jaabil was one of their
oreatest supporters and was regarded as something of a champion in the
fioht to maintain control. His defection lowered their morale at the crucial
period of Greenwood's visit. In the event Jaabil was to prove more of a
liability to the Egyptians than an asset. He realised that ho had been tricked.
The Egyptians never tried lionising him as they had done Ahmad bin
Abdullah. His attempts with the former Fadhli Sultan to raise tribal
rebellion were at best half-hearted and in the end both returned to the
Federal fold. For Hamuda it was a hollow victory. The Rassas of Baidha
were already asserting their traditional dislike of central government from
Sana be it Republican or Royalist and were beginning to work it off on the
Egyptians' presence. Hamuda himself came under daily attack, a
development which was not discouraged by Naib Nasir. who had
succeeded Jaabil in Mukairas and Hamuda was soon forced to return to
Tfl v/

In Aden the NLF carried out their first significant assassination. On 27
December Inspector Khalil of the Aden Special Branch was gunned clown
in the Crater qat market. The murderers escaped. Hash im Umar, the recently
elected memberfor Shaikh Uth man North in the Legislative Assembly , took
a prominent part in the killing.

Such was the position at the close of 1964. The Federation faced an
uneasy future. To survive much would depend on the successful outcome
of the conference scheduled to take place in the following spring. The
Federation would have to arrive at a meaningful agreement with the
Adonis and gain a significant measure of independence from the British,
including internal security power in Aden as well as obtain full British
support against Egypt. The NLF in Aden was still only a tiny minority. The
militants were in disarray. Al Asnag was fighting for political survival and
al Shaabi was shortly to be packed off to Cairo by the Egyptians exaspcraled
at his penchant for dipping his fingers into the till and his refusal to
co-operate with al Asnag. The Radfan operation was as good as over and
the rebellion in Dathina defeated. Terror in Aden could be halted if the
authorities took decisive measures lo combat it. 1965 represented Britain's
'ast chance to bring South Arabia to successful and friendly independence
and save her face in Aden. Unhappily for South Arabia and for Britain none
°f these desired developments took place. The road to ruin is paved with
good intentions and the new British government took it with scarce a
backward glance.

Chapter IV

Funeral in Aden

1 January 1965-28 February 1967

Myself against my brother. My brother and J against my Father. My
familv against mv uncles. My tribe against the stranger.

Arabian Proverb

The first victim of 1965 was the constitutional conference scheduled to
take place in March. Following Anthony Greenwood's visit to South
Arabia the Federal ministers had found time to explore the concept of the
unitary state to which thev had so flippantly committed themselves. What
they saw thev did not like, and when it became clear that the coming
conference was not just another get-together with the Aden government,
but that political parties, which presumably meant al Asnag would be
invited to take part on equal terms they prevaricated and raised every kind
of difficulty. Briefly the Federal government felt that the gains made under
Duncan Sandvs had been abandoned, that their own position was being
undermined, and that if Asnag wanted to be represented then he should
have stood in the Aden elections and accepted the responsibility o
oovurnmcnt liko everybody else. Further, it must be said that they were still
deeply suspicious of Greenwood and the 1 .abour government. The Co onia
Secretary's previous associations with the PSF and other 'colonial
liberation movements' were not forgotten. And any favourable
impressions ho mav have made during his tour of the territory were diluted
when it became known that al Asnag had received a Christmas card horn
the Secretary of State addressed to 'Aden Occupied South Yemen I was
an error probably made by Greenwood's secretary as she noted down
al Asnag's address from a piece of ATUC or PSF notepaper. but in the
suspicion-racked world of South Arabia it was an incident given
significance it did not have. m „nnt
In the course of their manoeuverings the Federal government came new
unnaturally into conflict with Bahroon. Insults were exchanged and wn
Bahroon proposed to issue a strongly worded statement critical ot -
Federal government. Sir Richard Turnbull banned its broadcast a
Bahroon tendered his resignation. The threat of resignation was
accepted part of South Arabian politics and was rarely meant to ™
seriously. It usually came after a rebuff and was offered mcre \ as * 7L as
of saving face and obtaining consolation. During the year that ne

Father. My

nan Proverb

scheduled to
sit to South
mcept of the
selves. What

I he corning
government,
ig, would be
id every kind
! made under
m was being
an he should
onsibility of
hey were still
The Colonial
ner 'colonial
- favourable

were diluted
las card from
emen'. It was

noted down
er, but in the
dent given a

lent came not
? ed and when
critical of the
iroadcast and
ation was an
nt to be taken
sly as a means
r that he was

iWs Chief Minister Bahroon must have tendered his resignation on half
^ Vn o casions and consequently he was much affronted when thus time
f h l°Sf"r was snapped up. When the news reached London Greenwood
,h nstp red his conference to allow a new team to play itself m. A first
S wanted the job of forming the new government but eventually
\ h i Qavvi Mackawee allowed himself to be persuaded that he possessed
\t ecessarv qualities to face the task ahead. Girgirah and Bahroon who
had boen much irritated by Mackawee's dog in the manger criticisms ot
i r actions from the safety of the opposition bench, rather ™Uc.ously
; L -d him on. Mackawee was a naturally pleasant and affable man,
t iest when at home with the wife and children. He was to rue the day
S he ever left them. Coming from a leading Adeni family he neverthe ess
d more than a dash of Indian blood which made him defensive wto i
endencv to extremism. Mackawee's greatest achievement was that he h ad
been appointed local director of Besse, the Aden Stopping and frad ng
lo nv Although thev retired him early the company made a great deal
of S o Mackawee. perhaps to veil the fact that they had no other Arab
lector, and gave him help in furthering his political career. Yet despite
0 , nmercfal success even his closest friends agree thai one of the
outstanding characteristics of the man was his inability to take a decision
o ever hold an opinion of his own, in business or out of it. A few months
fater when his notorie.v as Chief Minister was at its height and after some
particularly successful twisting of the lion's tail Mackawee met his closest
fates and admirers in the newspaper office of Muhammad Basharatol,
who was the influential 'al Ayyam' and until that point had su ppor ed him.
As he entered those present gave Mackawee a standing ovation W ben the
applause died down somebody asked the Chief Minister what he planned
to do next. With obvious sincerity Mackawee replied, '1 was rather hoping
that vou would tell me.' .

Mackawee took three weeks to form a government, an uncommonly long
time bv Aden's standards. Kven on the day of the swearing-in ceremony
there was a most undignified squabble between two of the members both -
of whom assumed that he had been promised the valuable portto ho ot
Lands. The disappointed aspirant had to make do with the lesser
distinction of becoming the Minister of Wnq/s (Religious Endowments
and Tourism. Other members included Hashim Umar as Minister of Civ.
Aviation. Savid Hasan Sohbi with a delicate task as Minister ot labour ami
Welfare, and 'Grenadier' Khalifa whobecame Minister of Finance, hven the
Adenis who had voted him to power were taken aback at the last namec .
Before his arrest Khalifa's chief claim to fame had been as a local football
star. His unpredictabilitv was well known. At one memorable match m the
Crater Stadium, booed bv the crowd for some foul or other, he retaliated by
dropping his pants and exhibiting his own disapproval in startling
fashion. His onlv executive action in seven months as Aden's Minister ot
Finance seems to have been to order the removal of the Queen's portrait
fr °m his office.

Once in the saddle Mackawcc soon realised that the task, was beyond
him. The day to day administration was ignored as the Chief Minister and
his colleagues got down to the serious business of baiting the British. The
twenty-four Adeni representatives in the Federal Council were withdrawn
and the British troops accused of organising terrorism themselves.
Terrorism in the Colony was increasing as the NLF gained ground. One
month after taking office Mackawee disassociated himself from the
curfews imposed by the security authorities and followed this up by
demanding an end to the state of emergency and the formation of a
provisional government which meant dissolving the existing Federal one.
Mackawee soon found the United Nations Resolutions which it will be
remembered called for the removal of both the British base and the Federal
government. The demand for the implementation of these resolutions
hecame the answer with which he rebuffed any Federal or British initiative
to seek a formula along which ordered constitutional development could
take place.

Most of Mackavvee's government was made up of former members of
follow travellers of the FSF. There is strong evidence to suggest that
al Asnag. keeping prudently in the background, influenced many of the
decisions. 1 le at least had a policy. In an attempt to answer the challenge of
the NLF he had in February merged his now defunct PSP with the South
Arabian League and a group of tribal dissidents, the most important of
whom were Muhammad Aidrus and ex-Sultan Ahmad bin Abdullah of
Fadhi. into the Organisation for the Liberation of the Occupied South
(OLOS). Asnag's object was to bring about a breakdown of British policy
and the 'democratic' form of government in Aden. Having done so he
hoped that his influence in the lobbies of Westminster would ensure that
he was invited to step in and fill the vacancy. In Mackawee he had found a
willing tool.

Sir Richard Turnbull who had been so successful in dealing with
nationalists elsewhere made effort after effort to coax the Chief Minister to
adopt a more reasonable path. Each succeeding interview seemed to hold
out the promise of success but as soon as Mackawee returned to his friends
and other opinions his mood changed and he took the line of least
resistance by playing to the mob.

In an effort to gain his confidence Greenwood suggested that a two-man
constitutional committee should visit South Arabia to advise on what steps
should be taken to prepare the territory for independence. This was sailing
close to the wind with the Federal government which was demanding a
return to the course proposed by the 1964 conference, and only acquiesced
after hard lobbying by the High Commissioner. Mackawee promptly
rejected the proposal but Greenwood persisted, appointing as members Sir
Evelyn Home, a former Chief Secretary of Aden, and a distinguished
Sudanese judge. The Sudanese soon withdrew under pressure from Cairo
and Mackawee brought off a spectacular coup de grace by declaring Sir
Evelvnan illegal immigrant, so preventing his arrival.

This farce had been watched with fascinated attention in South Arabia.

Nobody gave the British, or for that matter, the Federal government any
nlit for trying to come to a reasonable accord. It was seen as a clear
Tctory for Mackawee and everybody awaited the next round with interest.
V1 Nothing loath. Greenwood hurried out to Aden in an attempt to
ierS uade < all parties to gather round the conference table. At first the
Federal government insisted on the principle established in London in the
irevioussummer. which confined seats at the conference table to members
0 f the Adeni and Federal governments. It says much for Greenwood's
diplomacy and tact that he achieved a compromise and managed to
persuade them to sit alongside al Asnag and an OLOS delegation as well as
representatives from the three states of the Eastern Aden Protectorates, in a
•working party" which was to draw up an agenda for a future conference,
the same conference which had been postponed in the spring.

The 'working party' assembled in London during August and achieved
nothing. Asnag and Mackawee remained obdurate in their insistence on
the full implementation of the UN Resolutions and, encouraged by Gairo,
refused to budge. Perhaps during their talks Greenwood realised for the
first time what he was up against and that not all men were as reasonable
and gentle in their approach to the problem as he was. Muhammad Salim
Basindwah. a member of the OLOS delegation, shocked the delegates by
his hysterical outbursts and insults, some directed personally at the
Secretary of State. It had long been the wonder of the people of Aden as to
why Asnag tolerated his baby-faced henchman with his mincing ways and
little to recommend him except an enormous capacity for spite. Like the
shark with its attendant pilot fish the two were inseparable although they
had the occasional tiff. Two years later, in a fit of temper. Basindwah was to
make an unsuccessful attempt to abandon Asnag for the NLF, but in the
event they proved to be the most durable duo in Yemeni politics.

The talks had one result in that they convinced Asnag that the British
were not so willing to desert the Federal government as he had thought. He
had other plans in mind and a few days later arrived in Gairo to take an open
part in the direction of terrorism. Mackawee returned to Aden where
coincidentlv terrorism had taken a vicious turn lor the worse. On the first
day of September Sir Arthur Charles, the Speaker of the Legislative
Assembly, was mortally wounded as he left the Crater tennis courts by the
NLF commando' Hasan al Zaghir. The murder shocked both the Arab and
British communities alike as Sir Arthur was a universally respected figure.
He was also a man of habit and his routine of leaving the tennis courts at
6.30 p m gave his assailant the chance he wanted. Routine also played a
lai'ge part in the downfall of the next victim, Harry Barrie, Deputy Head of
f h(> Aden Special Branch. F.very Sunday the former Palestine policeman
urove to work al 7.15 am and on Sunday 4 September the NLF were
wailing for him. They shot him dead as his car stopped at a halt sign. A
third killing, that of Bob VVaggitt. the Head of Special Branch, was only
avoided when the would-be assassin found himself unexpectedly
Confronted by an enormous British soldier bodyguard who was sitting in

the policeman's lounge pouring himself a beer. Unfortunately for the
authorities the soldier had removed the magazines from his sub-machine
gun as a safety precaution and before he could refit them the man escaped

Under Mackavvee's leadership the Legislative Assembly formalh
regretted the murder of their Speaker but intentionally refrained from
condemning the killers. The situation hatl become intolerable and a few
days later the long-suffering Hritish government suspended the Aden
Constitution, dissolved the Assembly and the High Commissioner
assumed direct rule in the Colony.

13 y any standards this was a retrograde stop, but Mackavvee's behaviour
had made his removal inevitable il'any ordered constitutional progress was
to be made. Unhappily the timing of the British decision was
unfortunate. Ever since the Labour government had come to power
one of the ambitions of its foreign policy had been to come to terms with
President Nasser. After careful diplomatic overtures it was arranged that
George Thompson, now Minister of Slate at the Foreign Office, should visit
Egypt and endeavour to reach agreement on a number of issues including
South Arabia. As the Minister arrived in Cairo the BBC announced the
removal of Mackawee, an act which the Egyptians not unnaturally
construed as an intended slight. Thompson never even saw the President.
He went back to London empty handed whilst the Egyptians exploited
another propaganda victory at the expense of the British.

It is inconceivable that the British Cabinet were not aware of cither the
decision to remove Mackawee or Thompson's mission. The Mackawee
government had lasted for nearly seven months* and a few more days
would not have mattered. If Thompson had managed to bring off a deal
with the Egyptians then Mackawee would have been brought to order and
his dismissal unnecessary. If he had failed then the dismissal could have
gone ahead as a sign that the British meant business. As it was, Thompson
had no chance of success and suffered an unnecessary humiliation.

Shortly after his dismissal Mackawee fled to Cairo where he joined
al Asnag". No demonstrators had come into the streets to protest against his
downfall, in fact most Adonis seemed relieved that the pantomime had at
last been brought to a halt. The whole thing took place with the minimum
of fuss. The onlv painful incident occurred when one of the Mackawee
ministers, listening to Sir Richard Tumbull reading the instrument ot
dismissal, had a fit and had to be carried screaming out of the conference

r ° The Federal government was reassured. They saw the removal ot
Mackawee as a sign that Britain intended to go back to the 1964 charter.
Direct British rule in Aden would not be expected to last lor long ana
seemed at the time to be a first step towards handing over sovereignty to the
Federation. In London the F.arl of Longford replaced Antony Greenwood as
Colonial Secretary.

* a March-25 September

... „ ac lvanta°e of the breathing space, the Federal government took a
f'rd look at its constitution. In August it had obtained the services of
long . Um(} and Sir Gauain Bell to 'consider and recommend suitable
SlP tnents to the constitution . . . as a result of consultation with all major
am °i" sts in South Arabia, to prove acceptable as far as possible to their
■"tomsMnd satisfv aspirations.'

" \ Hone md Bell settled down to their task Lord Beswick. Parliamentary
rt Ipr Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies.

' ed South Arabia, lor which he had assumed responsibility, and took
the opportunity to repeat that it was Britain's aim to establish a United
nnublic which included the three eastern stales by 1908. He also had
another mission. The British had decided to remove Ihcir military base
from Aden and Beswick was to probe possible Federal reactions to the
decision In fact the Federal government did not so much mind the removal
of the base which would be a political liability and detract from their
independence What thev did nol realise was that Britain also intended to
rule out anv notion of a defence treaty yet, at the same time, hang on until a
'broad based' government was established. In short from the British side
the 1964 agreement was forgotten. Beswick misunderstood the Federal
.reaction just as thev misunderstood the true nature of his mission. If this
had been appreciated then there can be no doubt that the Federal ministers
would have raised hell even before the Minister had returned to London at
the end of his first visit, and before the public announcement was made.

The impl i cations of the British Defence Review February 1966 have been
discussed elsewhere, but suffice it to say that the announcement came at a
moment when the militants were in disarray and the fortunes of their
Egyptian sponsors at their lowest ebb.

In March 1965 the Royalists in the Yemen had recaptured Ilarib and
beaten off a counter-attack by strong Egyptian and Republican forces.
Throughout the summer the Royalist offensive gained momentum. One by
one Egyptian-held towns in Eastern and Central Yemen fell to the
tribesmen. 15,000 Egyptian troops surrounded in the Jauf by the Amir
Muhammed bin Hussain were allowed lo march out only after they had
surrendered all their stores and heavy weapons. Other smaller Egyptian
garrisons were cut off and in |une the Royalists had captured the strategic
Sirwa Pass and were threatening Sana. The Egyptians could draw little
comfort from, the performance of the Republican government. The
enthusiasm which followed the revolution had quickly passed away and
the factions within the Republic multiplied, turning it into a political
ant-heap. Basically thev were divided inlo those who wished to come to an
accommodation with the Royalists and those fervent Republicans,
including some whose deeds had placed them beyond the reach of
reconciliation, who would accept nothing less than the complete removal
of the Imamate and exile of the Royal family, the Uamid al din. The
%'ptians had long supported the second party led by President Sallal
and his Prime Minister Hassan al Amri. The conciliators were initially

()•«

led by the venerable Qadhi Zubairi who was murdered in obscure
circumstances in the spring of 1965. *

Faced with military disaster the Egyptians removed al Amri, shipped
Sallal off to Cairo for a year's exile, and appointed as Prime Minister
Ahmad Muhammad Muman who had been Zuhairi's deputy. In June
President Nasser made a dramatic trip to Jedda to meet King Faisal where
the two leaders reached agreement for an immediate cease fire in the
Yemen, the withdrawal of Egyptian troops, and arranged for peace talks to
be held between the two sides in the Northern Yemeni village of Haradh.

The talks began in November and dragged on without sign of agreement
before breaking up for Ramadhan. The visit of Lord Beswick to Aden and
the announcement of British withdrawal came soon afterwards. President
Nasser let out a cry of joy, proclaimed his intention of staying in the
Yemen 'to liberate South Arabia' and reversed his plans to withdraw. The
Yemeni war once again spluttered into life.

When Mackawee joined Asnag in Cairo as a leader of OLOS the
Egyptians put into action their plans for uniting the organisations with the
NLF so creating one revolutionary body. They realised that the NLF were
the more effective terrorists but at the higher political level they had
nobody possessing the international reputation of either Asnag or
Mackawee.

Qahtan al Shaabi had been removed from the scene of operations. He had
proved expensive, quarrelsome, and did not have the tribal standing to
obtain the co-operation of fellow rebels such as Muhammad Aidrus or the
ex-Sultan of Fadhli. Al Shaabi was first installed over the Reuters Office in
Cairo. Journalists tell how he got into the habit of asking if any news had
come over the ticker and if the answer was in the negative he would potter
back upstairs, write a communique and a few minutes later deliver it as
news from the front, in the end the exile proved the salvation of al Shaabi.
His followers forgot their leader's defects and the passing of time built him
up into a legendary figure in the imagination of the people.

With al Shaabi safely out of the way living on an Kgyptian pension the
Egyptians proposed that OLOS should merge with the NLF to form a single
organisation, the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY).t as a
first move towards forming a 'government in exile". The suggestion met
with a mixed reception. Many of the NLF leaders agreed, those who had

"The murder took plate ;i( Barat tribal tenia- ul the Uhu Muhammad in Nurllierii Yemen. Both
Republicans and Royalists accused each other of the killing. Three tribesmen confessed in an
interview with an Egyptian magazine fo have carried out the deed on Kovalist instructions. They
were later reported to have escaped from a Republican prison.

The Rovulists maintain the killing was arranged bv Abdullah CJuzai lan. later Depulv President
and then head of Republican Intelligence on the orders of ihe Egyptians who feared Zubairi's
growing campaign for peace. Cuzailan hailed (ram Barat.

tThe speedy dissemination of the English abbreviation FI.OSY for Hie Arabic jubha Arabiyo
fi tnhrir junub al Yemen ill muhlui gave the organisation a vaguely ridiculous taint at the outset
and was one of the subtler strokes of Federal propaganda. The sponsors preferred to be known
as The Liberators'.

ctions with the trades union movement in Aden being the most
C ° n "fl am i exceptions. Amongst the rank and Hie — especially those who

sigmr

'uerilia attacks — there was general feeling

, ( 1 ta ken part in terrorist or ;
tl at they were being taken over by Adenis who had sat on Iheir backsides
•hilst others were risking their lives in "the struggle for independence'. In
Edition. Mackawee was openly accused of being a capitalist' and
receiving a British salary. Indeed until mid-1967 his eldest daughter
remained at school in Britain on a Federal government scholarship.

Opposition to the merger was well known to the principals who kept the
matter quiet until the last moment.

The announcement was made in Taiz on 19 January 1966 during a
dinner at the Republican Palace in honour of President Sallal who had
just returned from Cairo and consented to grace proceedings with his
revolutionary presence. Mackawee and Asnag spoke for OLOS and Ali
Ahmad Sallami for the NLF. The speeches were not without interruption
from some NLF members who thought that they had been invited along
for a free meal and had no inkling of what was in the wind. The most
raucous of these were removed by the guards. Further interruptions were
caused by the frequent failure of the electricity which at the best of times
only produced a dull glow.

Before long the Yemeni President had had enough am) went off to bed. In
the morning the merchant who held the electricity concession was thrown
into jail.

If the Egyptians had thought that by forming FLOSY they put an end to
union rivalry in Aden they did not have to wait long to realise their
mistake. The pro-NLF unionists in Aden were incensed by the merger
which they felt to be a betrayal. Where Asnag was once undisputed king he
was at first disliked and then hated. The unions opposed to the Aden
Trades Union Congress (ATUC) had been careful to avoid an open clash.
The frustration produced by the formation of FLOSY to which as NLF
sympathisers they nominally owed allegiance enabled extremists lo expoit
the situation. Ali Hussain Qadhi. the ATUC President and the most able of
Asuag's lieutenants in Aden, was their first target. He was shot dead as he
answered the door of his Maalla house barely three weeks after the
emergence of FLOSY.

The murder created a sensation in Aden. The pistol which had been
dropped at the scene of the crime was soon traced to Anwar Khalid, a
federal agricultural officer, who subsequently turned out lo be an
important figure in the NLF. He had obtained the weapon on loan from the
British Under Secretary to his Ministry. In turn he passed it on to Abdul
'atah Ismail a schoolmaster who had taken part in the murder of Barrie in

R Previous autumn with instructions lo carry out the killing. The post of
kroner was held by Ashraf Khan a close friend of Asnag. He issued a
Warrant for the arrest of Anwar Khalid who had fled, but disguised the
Fl°nQ RS '° r " 1U crimu by^ accusing British Intelligence of plotting it. As a
JSY sympathiser it was hardly politic for him lo reveal a split in the

organisation so soon after its birth. Retribution was close at hand. Qadhi
was a Yemeni from Baidha and his brother a major in the Republican Army
The major made his way to Aden and shot a pro-NLF unionist — the blood
feud had arrived. 'I'ension between the rival parties ran high. Then came
the announcement of British withdrawal and the implication that they
would shortly abandon the Federation to its fate. The militants received a
much needed shot in the arm. In the euphoria which followed
reconciliation was soon effected. It was a patchy truce at best but it lasted
for a vital eight months during which time terrorism increased and the
sound of exploding grenades and gunfire became a common occurrence in
Aden's streets.

For their part the Federal ministers complained bitterly that 'Britain-is
leaving them at the mercy of Egyptian aggression and Russian
penetration.'* For the next twelve months they continually lobbied the
British government in the hope of obtaining a reversal of the decision on
the defence treaty. By the time their efforts met with success it was far too
late. The Labour government were still chasing the mirage of a compromise
with the militants and now that the base was going they prodded the
Federal government into accepting the United Nations Resolutions, t only
to be told by FLOSY that these were no longer a basis for agreement.

The High Commissioner had the thankless task of trying to persuade
Adonis to fill the twenty-four seats on the Federal government. FLOSY
threatened to murder any who did. In spile of this five agreed, including
Girgirah, Hussain Bayurni, Salim Ahmad Naiq and Muhammad Hassan
Obali, who were made Federal Ministers.

Throughout the long hot summer the morale of Federal supporters fell
steadily in face of increasing attacks by the Yemen based FLOSY. Then
suddenly the Federal government sprang to life. The ministers were
anxious to put their draft constitutional amendments as prepared by Hone
and Bell to the Federal Council so that they could get on with the job of
working out the details. With only negligible Adeni presence in the
Federal Council its approval would be politically meaningless, both inside
and out of South Arabia. The ministers realised that if they were to rectify
this unhappy state of affairs and persuade Adenis to come forward then an
answer to FLOSY intimidation would have to be found. The Federal
government therefore broadcast a warning to the Yemeni Republicans,
threatening that if there was further terrorism in South Arabia and the
militants continued to receive shelter on Yemeni soil and continued to
have use of Taiz and Sana Radio stations then the border would be closed. If
further outrages continued, Yemenis working in Aden would be deported.
A grenade exploded — a man was shot and the Federal government good as
its words closed the frontier.

* The Sunday Times. 12 March 1966.
1 13 May 1»66.

. . s n0 emptv gesture but a telling blow. Roughly three-filths of the
i imports came through Aden. Closure o/the border meant that the
Ye Ti eI rn hi\i of the country suffered a serious shortage of such basic
soutfiftr i ^ petroleum. The cost of bread in Taiz trebled and a
pr ?l n drum of kerosine for stoves went up by 400%. and soft drinks
i ie i luxury that onlv the rich could afford. Local decrees were
•induced to prevent hoarding and the Egyptians were compelled to
Hivert much needed grain ships to Hodeidah. Yemen's only significant
wrt to South Arabia was qat. The price of a bundle shot up in Aden as
forrv loads of the stuff queued up on the other side of the border. The
Yemeni rival whose only real exchange market was Aden Suq fluctuated
wildlv dropping from around 6 to between 2-3 shillings. It never
recovered Nor did the closure do much direct harm to Adeni merchants.
Most of the Yemen trade was in the hands of Yemenis who had opened
offices in Aden to run it. Their voices joined the chorus of protest which
assailed the ears of the Republic administration from Yemeni families who
relied for their livelihood on assistance sent home by relations working in
Aden.

In Aden the decision dramatically changed the political atmosphere.
There has always been an undercurrent of animosity between the Adenis
and the Yemenis whom some felt to he interlopers and parasites exploiting
Aden's prosperity. Whereas a few weeks before the High Commissioner
and the Federal government had found it virtually impossible to attract
any Adenis of standing outside the old guard into the Federal council they
now flocked in. ELOSY threatened death and one Abdul Rahman
Basindwah* was assassinated the night before the Council was clue to
meet. However, such was the faith in the Federal government's intention to
restore its prestige that two more councillors allowed themselves to he
sworn in before the session began, bringing the total Adeni membership in
the Federal Council to twenty-two.

South Arabia looked to the Federal government to revenge Basindwah
and carry out its threat to deport Yemenis. Several systems had been
proposed to carry the policy out. amongst them was the suggestion that the
nearest fifty Yemenis to any incident would be deported and the
householders of the street fined. To carry out this policy the Federal
government had to have the co-operation of the High Commissioner and
through him the British government. Although an initial 14H
u nemployed Yemen is of no fixed address were shipped over the border, the
British government declined to continue the policy. The deportations

wgi-p minmal,1(!l1 in some circles that the N'l.F carried out Hie killing on orders from Taiz. They
seli.rt 81 | V u n u ft llalul as tfl lv ' licn victim thev chose from amongst the councillors and
Asnv n' si i''° ,ratl because he was closelv related to Muhammad Salim Basindwah. al
Kedera? '■'eutenant in FLOSY . fiv doing so thev achieved a double blow against the

had be 80 , v . < f,' nmonl antl FLOSY. Asnag is reported to have been furious when he learnt who
within FI OSY mciliunt aggravated the already uneasy relations between the factions

offended a basic principle of the rule of law in that those punished h
received no trial and had committed no crime. The prevailing view f
South Arabians was that though this was perfectly reasonable in Whitehall
K was a pity that the British did not uphold the law of which they were
proud in other ways. No terrorist or murderer had been punished since th°
Emergency began and the militants were able to attack British troops with
impunity safe from a judicial deterrent. The Federal ministers complained
that the conditions which had thrown up the policy to close the borders
and deport had been largely created by British inability to implement the
laws. The bluff had been called and once it was realised that the Federal
government was helpless in the face of British opposition, FLOSY soon
regained the lost ground and the terror continued. Few incidents did more
harm to the Federal government in the eyes of their people. They felt it was
a puppet indeed, tied to Britain's apron strings and smacked' down if it
showed any initiative of its own.

Before the full extent of the Federal humiliation became clear thev
chalked up another victory. Muhammad Hassan Obali the AdeniMinisterof
Education confounded the critics and brought off a feat considered
impossible by even his closest colleagues. For more lhan a vear the schools
had been closed. Encouraged by FLOSY the students had stayed away from
school and had formed the nucleus of many a pro-FLOSY demonstration
The schools were due to re-open in September. FLOSY told the students to
stay away, the Federal government told them to go back. On the first day of
term there was a 95% attendance. Obali succeeded bv brilliantly exploiting
the momentary upsurge of Federal prestige and the frustration felt by the
bulk of the students who saw their future threatened by continued absence
frou the classroom. He also initiated his opportune tactics bv forming his
own bands of pro-Federal students who routed and eventually took over
theFLOSY-inspired'ArabStudents'UnionfortheOccupiedSouth'.British
officials at the Ministry of Education made prim noises about the ethics of
the Minister's tactics yet there can be no doubt that without them
thousands of young South Arabians would have lost another vear's
schooling through no fault of their own.

The border remained closed until December when it was re-opened as a
conciliatory gesture to the United Nations. For the last two months the
effectiveness of the sanction was seriously weakened bv the activities of
smugglers. Many thousands of pounds worth of Yemeni qat was seized and
burnt by the Federal authorities but enough got through to brim- the Adeni
market back to normal.

The prest ige of the Federal government was wan ing fast and many of the
mm isters were losi ngheart. Even the news that part of the NLF had formally
broken with FLOSY in November failed to cheer them up. British control
had made them look foolish and had isolated them from the people. British
civil servants provided much of the cement which held the Federation
together yet their presence so necessary to put Federal administration on
its teet was fast becoming self-defeating. A traditional and important

punished had
liling view 0 f

0 in Whitehall

1 they were so
shed since the
:h troops with
•s complained
is the borders
nplement the
at the Federal
FLOSY soon
ent.s did more
hey felt it was
ed down if it

ie clear they
niMinisterof
t considered
ir the schools
ed away from
monstration.
ic students to
ie first day of
ly exploiting
in felt by the
nied absence
' forming his
1 ly look over
juth'. British
the ethics of
ithout them
other year's

-opened as a
months the
activities of
is seized and
lg Ihe Adeni

many of the
lad formally
itish control
yple. British
t Federation
istration on
1 important

aspect of Arab rule is that the ruler should be accessible to the people high
or low, and it is through the personal contact that he takes decisions and
maintains his influence. In their states the Federal rulers were able to
continue the custom. The complicated machinery of Federal government
with its finance votes and committees made it impossible. Even its most
basic decisions especially those concerning security which as often as not
also involved the British Services and Aden Police became bogged down in
endless exchange of minutes and meetings. One example will suffice. Two
shanty towns of perhaps five hundred people had grown up on the
outskirts of the Federal capital of al Ittihad. They had both provided cover
for bazooka attacks on ministers' houses and were obvious security risks.
They should have been cleared away. The decision was soon taken in
principle but never tarried out due to interminable haggling over
compensation to the inhabitants. One, Hiswa, was jusl inside Aden
Colony. Federal servants driving through it to work one morning were
appalled to see two large NLF flags flying from the gables of huts on either
side of the road immediately next door lo an Aden Police Post. The Federal
authorities asked the Aden Police to remove them. The Aden Police
demurred: no offence had been committed. The talks went on until one
man driving back stopped his car and pulled them down himself. Such acts
of initiative were few and far between.

By the time the ninth anniversary of the Federation's inception arrived
on 11 February 1967 little enthusiasm was left for what most now regarded
as a lost cause. The outward appearances were still there. The Federal Hag
flew from al Ittihad and there was no part of the country which the rebels
could claim to hold. The Federal forces still gave an appearance of loyalty,
and the administration appeared to work. Yet the facade was' fast
crumbling as the cancer of revolution spread outwards from Aden into the
army, the police and the very Councils of the Federation. On the day of the
celebrations Aden was paralysed with a general strike, al Ittihad had been
rather ineffectively mortared and a battery of projectiles timed to go off
during the parade discovered and disarmed. A mine was found on the
helicopter pad where Sir Richard Turnbull was scheduled to alight and it is
small wonder that the attendance was unusually small. The faint-hearted
, trie d to persuade the High Commissioner to stav awav as there was real
tear or an attempt on his life. He refused and carried off his part with
Plomb. Although the 'festivities' passed off without further incident and
ere was a good deal of forced jovialitv. evervbodv was glad to gel back
™ sate and sound. * "

the Atlen su k urD °* a ' Mansura lies some eight miles across the bay from
towi"T n P ° rt ' n a W ' de ex P anse of br °vvn desert. It was built as a model
i 1 , ! p m the early sixties, with an extravagantly designed market and
out jail. The British administration regarded it as the major

well laid

^ThT a" ? d " Ve t0 solve tne Sony's chronic housing shortage,
desert Ff iokirigl - v caI1 al Mansura 'City of Sand'; the surrounding
otters no protection and the high monsoon of summer brings

smdstorms which make life unbearable in the narrow streets. Sand i s
everywhere in a vellow fuzz that cloaks the town, making it almost
invisible from the nearbv coast road to Little Aden. Nevertheless with the
cheap government rents and modern conveniences the square, gaily
painted houses, proved a great attraction. Demand soon exceeded supply,
and it was no surprise that at least one member ol the Aden government
earned himself a considerable amount of money and great popularity by
ensurin" that his constituents and friends secured the best houses. Later,
when the "oing became harder he wisely abandoned public office and
opened a bar instead. This was in the good old days: by the evening of 27
February 1<J67 things were different. Al Mansura had already achieved that
air of studied neglect common lo most Arab cities: ihe effect heightened by
the presence of rival slogans daubed on walls and bullet scars which
disfigured many of the houses.

Scarcely a night went bv when the silence was not broken by the crump
of a "renade or the chatter of machine-guns as su pporlers of the FLOSY and
NLF carried out their attacks on British patrols. Men were often killed or
injured: some unluckv enough to be at the scene of an incident were struck
down bv splinters from a grenade or answering fire from British troops-
others found bv relatives lying in the street labelled as an mpenalist
stooge" shot bv the obsequious unknown gunman, or rubbed out as a result
of some dark Arabian feud. Law and order almost completely broke : down.
A man could be arraigned before the courts on a parking offence, but the
most he could expect for murder would be a well paid stay in the Al
Mansura jail used as a detention centre for captured terrorists. In the .Aden
of 1967 murder was commonplace and alter dark sensible folk stayed

It was the time of evening meal and the streets were almost deserted. A
few urchins played Arabian hop-scotch at a street corner while the
occasional black and vellow taxi cruised by hopefully '«°k'^ f ° la J^
By 7 pm most families settled down for the night, preferring the delights
Aden television to the uncertain dangers of the streets.

In one of the grander houses on the outskirts of the town a ™ddle-agea
woman preparing supper for her family happened to glance out o *
window. Two men had climbed over the h.gh purdah wall «h>
surrounded the house and were struggling to place a large «
explosives on the windowsill. The woman screamed. As the men tie
three sons of the house came out to see what all the no.se was about
eldest was despatched to the house of the family fnend and
Aden's Assistant Commissioner of Police. Hamed Khan ^ J» C e
returned with two constables. A brief discussion fo lowed and ^one o
policemen, helped by an old and sleepy tribesman who was suppose?
he watchman, gingerly carried the explosives out into the roaci.

•January- 12 killed. 82 wounded. February- -M killed. 146 wounded.

explosion could be heard twelve miles away in Government House where
Sir Richard Turnbull was about to have dinner: when the dust settled, three
sons of Abdul Qawi Mackawee, political leader of FLOSY, lay dead
together with their watchman and police companions.

Mackawee, charming, personable and ineffectual. How many times in
the previous two years he must have regretted leaving his comfortable
job. By this time Mackawee was way out of his depth. His book-keeping
methods, learnt in the quiet of an Aden counting house, proved a dismal
failure when applied to the ways of up-country tribesmen — he had never
in his life been far out of Aden and was baffled by the complex and
unsophisticated nature of the people with whom he had to deal. It was
small wonder that he preferred the cool of his air-conditioned villa in
Cairo to campaigning in the rugged mountains of the Aden Protectorates.

In Aden people liked Mackawee, they sympathised with him and
considered him harmless, a victim of circumstances beyond his control.
All were deeply shocked by the murder of his sons and if some felt that he
had brought the disaster upon himself by giving unspoken consent to
cold-blooded killings carried out in the name of his Front, then they kept
their thoughts to themselves.

Adenis dearly loved a good funeral: they have an almost Irish attitude to
death and in the past have sometimes put on the most convincing displays
of grief for the most unlikely people. On this occasion there was no doubt as
to a genuine feeling of sympathy for Mackawee, and FLOSY agitators were
quick to take advantage of it. The party was already competing on the
ground for su pport with the breakway KLF and this was a not-to-be missed
chance of rallying an impressive d isplay of public solidarity.

Throughout the night white-shirted young men slipped from house to
house organising and co-ordinating the morrow's procession while their
mothers and sisters sat up sewing banners and painting slogans on
placards. Not to be outdone, the NLF condemned the killings and promised
to send a delegation while the pro-FLOSY Aden Trades Union Congress
declared a general strike and a day of mourning.

Of course, the British were blamed. Cairo Radio declared that it had
positive proof that British Intelligence was responsible for the killings, and
Mackawee himself seized the microphone in the Yemeni capital of Sana to
threaten revenge against the 'Imperialist murderers'. Despite all the noise
and propaganda, most people had more than a sneaking feeling that the
real culprits were amongst the hard faced men. who gathered under the
banners of the NLF for the funeral in the steaming Arab town of Crater on
the following day.

For some time past the FLOSY High Command and its Egyptian backers
had been desperately striving to unite all the extremists in one organisation
and in the process had been quietly liquidating some of the more
recalcitrant NI.F supporters. In consequence, the NLF had private y
warned Mackawee of retaliation unless he put a stop to this policy: they
had intended the fatal charge to underline this, not anticipating the tu
results.

f those who gathered in Crater on that hot afternoon must have
MaIl | > cd the truth: although one prominent FI.OSY supporter* had been
suspect ^ on , v Uv0 (lays beforc it was s tjll heresy to suggest differences
8Unn ?olutionary ranks. Both sides made strenuous efforts to preserve the
facade of u ni, >' : in yny caSe there WCr ° m ° re vulnorable scy Pegoats on
ha "f Sollt [ 1 Arabian League had never been happy as partners with Asnag
nmS The marriage was short-lived as Presidenl Nasser did not look
kindly upon the League's habit of accepting money and advice from Faisal

° f \n 1966 [hev decided to return to Aden. The real leaders held back to see-
how things worked out, and instead sent the garrulous Shaikhan al Habshi
to look after their affairs. Things worked out badly; unwilling to share the
responsibility of ruling with the Federal government, yet at the same time
openly consorting with the British and Saudis, the party fell between two
stools They were hated by the extremists for having 'betrayed the
revolution' and regarded by the Egyptians as being Saudi stooges. On the
other hand, the League were mistrusted by the British and Federal
authorities as they could never bring themselves to climb down off the

fei Thus after the death of Mackawee's sons the day before, the arrival of a
tense little group of SAL supporters to take part in the funeral procession of
'revolutionary martyrs' infuriated the extremists. High words were soon
exchanged, scuffles broke out and a SAL banner was ripped down and
trampled underfoot. Enraged, two SAL men drew pistols and fired a
number of shots at their tormentors before fleeing to the sanctuary of a
nearby mosque. The mob howled in pursuit and cornered the luckless
Arabs in the minaret. There, after a brief struggle, they were both hurled
down to the waiting crowd below and savagely beaten to death with wood
torn from nearby packing cases. The Aden Civil Police looked on. Still
twitching, the bodies were then triumphantly displayed to the
international press before being dragged around the streets of Crater: a
swift eddy in the stream of the procession, spat upon by the women and
kicked by the urchins.

These excitements threw out the well-planned organisation of the
procession so that it was not until after four o'clock that the head of the
crowd turned into the long straight road which leads to the Aidrus Mosque.
The oldest and most famous of Aden's holy places, the Aidrus Mosque with
jts ancient history and tall minaret standing out white against the sullen
backcloth of the surrounding hills had been a natural choice for the burial
ground. The six coffins draped in the red, white and black flags of Arab
revolution were slowly borne up the street to the accompaniment of a

2 8Pt'bru a S v ' ' S "" mli - Minister ot Ixiisil Gmfimmenl in (tie Mankaivcc Cabiii.il. shot in Ma.ilhi

steadily increasing chant of 'Mack-a-vvcc', 'Mack-a-wee' as the to 000
strong crowd responded to the expert direction of its cheer-leaders. Apart
from FI.OSY and the NLF most of the unions and sports clubs were
represented. Each contingent marched under its own banner and many of
their supporters held aloft pictures of Mackawee and his sons. Far and
away most impressive was the 500-strong block of black-cloaked* women
whose shrill voices screaming for revenge could be heard above all.

By the time the crowd reached the mosque, emotion was at its peak: the
sound of chanting and stamping of feet rose to a crescendo and the people
were ready for anything. A party of youths who had been biding their time
all afternoon flung themselves across the road in a cordon to prevent
anybody from dispersing and small boys scurried to and fro distributing
water to the thirsty marchers.

Suddenly, as the coffins entered the gloom of the mosque — there was
si lence, a moment of truth — a time when the whole world seemed to pause,
it was a chance which the agitators took with both hands. Anonymous
shouts of 'down with the League', 'death to the traitors' were immediately
taken up by thousands of voices, and with one accord the crowd turned and
headed back down the road for the SAL headquarters about half a mile
away.

The South Arabian League's Headquarters in Aden was a long, one-
storey building surrounded by a high wall on the outskirts of the town.
About twenty members who had been discussing the day's events heard
advance news of the crowd's intentions and now took up positions on the
roof. All means of escape were cut off so they were harangued by Shaikhan
al Ilabshi and, with a miscellany of weapons, prepared to defend
themselves to the last.

One of the more clear-headed rang up the Aden Armed Police to demand
protection, the rest contented themselves with firing random shots down
the street from which the crowd was likely to appear. The sound of firing
and the sight of two lorry loads of steel-helmeted, black-belted armed
policemen speeding towards the SAL bu ikling, had a sobering effect on the
advancing crowd so that in the event, only a hard core of KLOSY and NLF
supporters faced a hurriedly formed cordon of police outside SAL's
wrought iron gate. The hiatus which followed was quickly broken by SAL
themselves, who opened up a steady fire on their attackers, killing three.

Everybody then shot at everybody else and lor the next five minutes
confusion was compounded and only brought to an end by the timely
arrival of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers who briskly dispersed the
crowd and stopped the fighting. The NLF and FLOSY gunmen quickly
melted away so that when the mob had disappeared, the troops were
confronted with the amazing spectacle of what seemed to them to be twenty

* Exactly one year later on 28 February 1968 a party of some 30 women attempted to ma
to the mosque ami lay wreaths on .the' six graves. Within a few minutes they were pouni
upon by NLK militia and driven off in tandrovcrs. The wreaths were hurnt in the street.

7!)

(1 terrorists thanking AJ lah and the British for having saved their lives.
ar Grimly the troops moved in. The hapless South Arabian Leaguers were

mptly disarmed and lined up against the wall of their headquarters as
jhe soldiers commenced to search the building.

Twenty minutes later the telephone rang in the house of a British
D0 ]itica! officer: it was Shaikhan al Habshi.

Eventually the Arabian accent gave way to Northumbrian. 'What do yer
mean, he's allowed to carry a pistol, this bloody joker has got two
landmines under his desk! -

The list of other unlicensed arms and explosives sei/.ed at the SAL
Headquarters included: three 36 grenades, one clamp mine, three pistols,
one tear gas grenade, two tins of detonators, four pistol magazines and a
quantity of assorted ammunition.

The violence of the day was not yet over. That evening. Foreign Office
man, Tony Ingeldovv, and his pretty dark-haired wife were giving a
cocktail party in their spacious Maalla flat. They were a popular couple and
the party was well attended, so that a good cross-section of Aden's middle-
ranking British officialdom chatted gaily over their drinks while the two
children of the house slept peacefully in the next room. If the unexplained
absence of one of the white turbanncd Arab servants who unobtrusively
handed round the refreshments was noticed, il was only as a domestic
inconvenience, common enough in South Arabia, and the whole
atmosphere was relaxed.

Three wives working as telephonists at Government House swapped
notes on their charges, bronzed secretaries sipped their gins and flirted
with the younger men, whilst their seniors gossiped happily in the corners.

At precisely nine o'clock there was a blinding flash of light as a
landmine, hidden in the bookcase, exploded and cut a swath of destruction
across the room. Of the three telephonists, two lay dying and the third was
maimed for life; nine others were wounded to some degree. The uninjured
recovered quickly. Some went off to guide the ambulances which were
soon on their way. as the remainder gave rudimentary first aid to the
wounded. An RAF dentist who had himself been hit by flying splinters
made a valiant but futile attempt to save one of the dying women: Ken
Brazier, the BBC correspondent, who lived in the flat above, rushed down
to help b 0 f ore hurrying off to the cable office. *

The British community were stunned by the tragedy. Although attacks
were a daily occurrence, they were directed mainly against the troops and
casualties were relatively light. This was the first time that terrorism had
struck at the sheltered heart of British social life and it was the first time
•hat a trusted servant had turned against his employers.*

hi the next few days dozens of houseboys were given notice, families

bookcisp' 1 ^ n nidcle " in the cupboard of a bookcase. Tidying up before the party, the

onto its s i I i " su . 1 s lraighl and books arranged upright. This apparently knocked the mine
ue . otherwise tho destruction would havu been much greater.

making plans to bring their children out for the Easter holidays thou«h
again and some started arrangements to send their belongings home Th
security rule limiting twelve guests to a party which had already been *
force for some time, was from now on strictly applied and the era of the
Aden cocktail parlies was brought to a close.

The day's events had in various ways made an equal impression on the
people of Aden. " e

That night, forced to take the bodies of their dead to l.ahej. having been
prevented by the mob from burying them in Aden, the remnants of the
South Arabian League quietly packed their bags and moved their
headquarters to the strongly guarded residential area of Khormaksar. At the
same time, many of the parly's frightened supporters, using the allegation
that the men had fired on the funeral procession from the mosque, so
breaking Muslim traditions, as an excuse, faded away.

On the other hand, Fi.OSY were jubilant: I he success of the procession
had exceeded their wildest expectations and they openly accused the NLF
of being responsible for the Mackawee crime, boasting that the murderers
would shortly meet their just deserts.

Over the water in the NLF stronghold of Little Aden they took the hint.
Meeting in darkness lit only by the eerie glow given off by burning waste
from the massive oil refinery. NLF leaders concluded that the way to
survive was to cam' on an all-out campaign of murder and intimidation
against their FLOSY rivals and so regain control of Die revolutionary
movement.

In Aden Pandora's box had been opened with a vengeance and from this
day on the various communities which had at one time combined to make
it a prosperous and happy place, finally broke apart. The final descent into
chaos and bloodshed had begun.

* A seventeen your old girl was killed as a result of a tjronadc thrown at a children's Christmas,
party in Christmas 1904 but few of the British in Aden in \m? were around at that time.

Chapter V

Federal Government at Bay

Autumn 1966-Spring 1967

Often able politicians in South Arabia, six arc in the present Fee/era J
Government. Un/orlunoteiy 1/iey all seem to hold different views.

Visiting British Official March 1967

Dr Haatgcldi is not tin Arab — he is impartial.

Bcncnson

President of Amnesty International
19 October 1066

The Federal government wore worried. In their half-built capital of al
Iltihad the Shaikhs watched events in Aden across the bay with increasing
alarm. The mounting tide of terrorism in the Colony meant that the
Fedcralis were losing their grip and much of the armament being used
against the British in the streets of Aden had either passed through Federal
territory without the rulers' knowledge, or with their tacit consent.

The fundamental weakness of the Federal government coincided with
that ol the territory as a whole — there was no leader. South Arabia had no
Nkrurna, Kenyatta or Nehru to lead it to independence and it was forced to
fall back on lesser fellows. Predictably, the dominant personality in the
Federal government, the black bearded, bespectacled Hussain bin Ahmad
al Habili, Sharif of Baihan, had retired to his stale I wo years previously and
had steadfastly refused to return to al Ittihad. The Sharif was the one man
whose prestige, intellect and experience could have held his quarrelsome
colleagues together. Instead he preferred to stay in Baihan watching events
V a ^.Vniral eye and amusing himself by plotting with the Saudis and
nrowmg hard-boiled eggs at visiting journalists. All the while he kept his
ands firmly on the valuable portfolio of Federal Minister of the Interior,
.ack ot a leader was one problem, the ramshackle Federal constitution
^<js another. Under the existing system the offices of President and Prime
cha'i' Stfir i"' ' 10t exist ' lnsteai1 on f,,e eleventh dav of each month a new
gove' 1 dcd the Supreme Council, which was the cabinet of the
result' lm ? nt ' and eacn of tne four leen ministers took the chair in turn. As a
one ° the exiJerts could say who led the Federal government at any
iealou" 710 system was initially introduced to dampen the tribal

nine ^ nuinuu suspicion rarely absent from Federal Councils. After
- fia rs it had become ridiculous. The constant change at the top not

only reflected the Federal government's lack of leadership but -it
prevented the ministers from doing themselves justice. The inartieul a t°
fisherman Naiqa prepared to lace the United Nations: Ihe brilliant but
immilitary Obali found himself scampering along lines of immaculatel
turned out Federal soldiers with the brigadier in hot pursuit: Nasir bin
Aidris. the young chain-smoking Sultan of Lower Aulaqi, grappled with
the intricacies of protocol, while others more suited to the tasks in hand
shuffled in the background.

The Federal government readily appreciated the harm done to them bv
their own constitution and as previously mentioned had invited two
experts, Sir Ralph Hone and Sir Gawain Bell, to adjust it. These eminent
gentlemen suggested a two-house system, rulers being members of the
upper and less powerful house while elected members would eventually
sit in the lower, which would provide the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
The President was to be a member of the upper house with the privilege of
selecting the Prime Minister. No ruler could be a member of the lower
house — if he wanted to be, he had to resign his position within his state.
There were other suggestions concerning state representation and the
elevation of Aden as the capital city which, although hotly debated at the
timu, had little bearing on the course of future events.

The Federal government rejected the idea of an upper house, principally
on economic grounds: South Arabia was not a rich country and members of
parliament drawing large government salaries had to be kept to a
minimum. After some debate they agreed that no ruler could be a member
of the Cabinet. They then set about selecting their President and Prime
Minister and defining their respective powers. No ready solution being
available, a plethora of committees to study the matter sprang up. As
expected they decided to offer the Presidency to the Sharif of Hainan and as
expected, the Sharif declined.

The Sharif's refusal left the field wide open. The main contestants for
office were Sultan Salih, Minister of Interior — conservative, endlessly
patient and vastly knowledgeable of tribal affairs— and his rival,
Muhammad Farid al Aulaqi, the Minister of External Affairs, whose
excellent English and dapper exterior cloaked relentless ambition. The
root of the trouble was that Muhammad Farid could not make up his mind
whether he wanted the power of Prime Minister or the glory of the
President. He would not risk serving under Salih who had the theoretical
power to dismiss him and at the same time could not bear the thought o
somebody else pulling the strings. Farid dreamt of the day when the Aulaqi
nation would once again dominate South Arabia and concentrated his
efforts to this end. He had found common cause with the shy retiring Fadh
bin Ali of Lahej. Minister of Defence, as both had long standing feuds with
the South Arabian League whom they rightly suspected Salih of arming^

As Sultan of Lahej. the largest and richest State of Aden, Fadhl bin A
should have dominated Federal politics. lie always dressed in the sty a
an Indian Maharajah and had been brought up in a world where the Au aq

spoke onlv to Lahej and Lahej spoke only to Got!— represented in South
Arabia by the British Governor in Aden. The Sultan vvas therefore put out
by ihe small fry with whom he rubbed shoulders in the Supreme Council
and could not bring himself to engage in the necessary social and political
activities which would have brought him more prominence. He contented
himself by throwing his not inconsiderable prestige behind Muhammad
Farid.

Sultan Salih was supported by Abdul Rahman Girgirah, the Minister of
Information who, as the longest-serving Adeni, could normally control the
votes of his three Aden colleagues on the Supreme Council. Girgirah was
President of the United National Party and a man of considerable political
experience. When his interests were not involved he could be relied upon
lo give sound advice. Girgirah had been suggested as a compromise for
both posts but he settled for deputy President and Minister for Aden
Affairs, a new portfolio which had been proposed by Hone and Bell.

The dispute wrangled on. By mid-March it was politically important for
the Federal government lo produce their new constitution due to the
imminent arrival of a United Nations' Mission lo investigate the territory's
progress to independence. Eventually a meeting of the Supreme Council
was called to decide the matter. Sir Richard Turnbull, the High
Commissioner, who had been getting more and more impatient, was to
attend later to hear the Federal decision.

The meeting was opened by Shaikh Ali Atif. the pedantic and grubby
Minister of Health from Lower Yafa'.

'Well,' ho said, pushing his turban to one side, 'this is an Arab country
and we must abide by Arab traditions.'

Naturallv evervbodv present nodded in solemn agreement.

■It is well known', the Shaikh continued, 'that the most successful Arab
monarch i n recent history was King Abdul Aziz bin Saud of Saudi Arabia.

This was old ground and again everyone agreed.

•He uniled Saudi Arabia and the way he did it', said the Shaikh, was to
rnarrv from each of the tribes. If the President of South Arabia is to unite the
country then he must rnarrv a girl from each of the seventeen States.

All might have been well if Salim Naiqa had not overheard Muhammaa
Farid remark. -Well that lets out our Adeni friends— they can't manage on .
woman, let alone seventeen.' ■ I

Naiqa. a baldheaded bull of a man from Little Aden, normally sai
nothing, hut now he was furious. Rising from his seat he seized a tied
glass ashtray which he bashed on the table shouting, 'I've got tourtee
children from one wife! Can anybody beat that?'

Somebody replied that it vvas performance and not production tnai

required. , „,,ttins

Taking advantage of the laughter. Shaikh Ali went on. M am not pun »
myself forward but I should like it to be put on record that I am M
capable of this. Furthermore, in order that everything should ° e ' Df
board, the girls should be inspected regularly.' He then suggested

mnes his Permanent Secretary, be appointed to take on the task.
Ce r e rtainly not." roared his colleagues. "We must have a neutral doctor.

on ^™|?ah intS^n A ed toteing the meeting back to practical lines, but
feelings had been ruffled and the problem of the constitution was never

rCS , 0l l£ meantime the Federal government had other things on its mind
hi less than the arrest of the Sultan of Wahidi and the Federal
?r„,ctPr of Agriculture for complicity in mass murder.

i ein the afternoon of 22 November 1966 a Dakota of Aden Airways left
Jill town of Maifah. the Wahidi capital, on a routine flight tor Aden. As

fll s a crew of three it had on board twenty-eight passengers including
Muhammad bin Said, the Prime Minister of Wahidi. Major Tim Goshen, a
British political officer. Graham Macglashen, a young representative o
Shell arid Kventv-five other passengers including one carrying a faded
Aden Airways bag. Some fifteen minutes later the plane crashed and all

ab ?SSors arriving at the scene of the crash soon found irrefutable
evidence that it had been caused by an explosion in the passenger cabin.

• The Sultan of Wahidi. Nasirbin Abdullah, was in al Ittihad at the tmieof
the disaster. He was a small man in stature and intellect, perpetually
dwarfed bv a large mauve turban. His brief moments of animation were
usually confined to conversations about fishing with Ins friend Salim

Ma when the news of the tragedy was first broken to the Sultan there can be
no doubt that he was deeply shocked and later when the implications
became known he made an emotional speech vowing to do anything in his
power to bring the murderers to justice-it was a speech which profoundly
impressed his colleagues in the Supreme Council and convinced some ot
his innocence. Investigations soon revealed that Muhammad bin Said was
a bitter personal enemv of the Sultan who feared his growing influence in
the state. The Sultan had as his naib in Wahidi a younger brother, the Amir
Muhammad, whose hatred of the Prime Minister verged on mania and who
had made two previous attempts to assassinate him. Just after the Dakota
left the Amir remarked that the plane would crash. Witnesses would later
testify to seeing him hand a package to a passenger about to board the
aircraft in Maifah.

The Amir Muhammad and two close associates were arrested and
brought to Aden, but the case got no further until the arrival of two
detectives from Scotland Yard. Questioning of witnesses was difficult
because of fear of retaliation but slowly the bare facts of the story began to
emerge. The Federal government was later told that the Sultan's animosity
f or his minister was well known and Kgyptian Intelligence, over quick to

l,v T xf ! lor >' of ,tlG meeting seems improbable but it is as described to the author ami a colleague

• Muhammad Hasan Obali. Minister of Education, who was present.

seize the main chance, saw a way in which it could got rid of an outstandi
opponent and at the same time discredit the Federal government
Sultan was contacted and an agent visited his house in al Ittihad and mad 6
up the fatal charge in an airlines bag. The charge was then taken hy air to
Ataq and thence to the Amir Muhammad in Maifah. Almost certainly th
Sultan had no idea that his brother would place the charge in an aeropl ar , e
and probably intended it for the Prime Minister's house: the circumstantial
evidence against him convinced the majority of his colleagues that at anv
rate he was morally responsible.

At a heated session of the Supreme Council it was decided to place the
Sultan under a form of house arrest, the chief dissenters being Salim Naiqa
for reasons of friendship and Sultan Nasir of Fadhli who. as Minister of
Justice, saw he might have some nasty decisions to make.

After the meeting the Sultan was called to the office of the Ministry of
Internal Security and Sultan Salih lold him thai he was to be held under
arrest pending further investigation. The Wahid i emphatically reiterated
his innocence and there was a slight moment of tension" when his
bodyguard, standing outside the glass door, lowered a sub-machine gun
and for a moment looked as if he would take matters into his own hands.
He was efficiently disarmed by a Federal Guardsman who had been
standing by waiting for just this moment.

A few days later the Sultan was replaced as Ruler of Wahidi by Ali, son of
the murdered Prime Minister.

The Federal government never brought Sultan Nasir lo trial, mainly
because they were engrossed in other problems and the machinery for
trying him did not exist. He stayed under house arrest until October when
he was joined by his brother the Amir Muhammad, released from detention
in al Mansura. Doth informed the Red Cross that they had carte blanche to
leave the country but in tended to go to Wahidi. When the NLF took over the
Sultan was arrested and charged with high treason and helping to set up
'the bogus Federation'. He was given a ten-year sentence to be spent 'in
construction work for the benefit of the people'. As far as is known the air
disaster was not mentioned in the court. Three months later the Sultan was
released.*

The interrogation and detention of the Amir Muhammad was similar to
that undergone by several hundreds of Arabs between December 1963 and
October 1967. The State of Emergency empowered the High Commissioner
to arrest and detain without trial any person suspected of being connected
with terrorist activities. However, nobody could be arrested merely on
account of his political opinions— there had to be clear indications that he
was connected with activities of violence. Therefore, according to the
British, the inmates of al Mansura prison and the Fort Morbut interrogation
centre were not political detainees in the normally accepted meaning of the
term but suspected terrorists.

* The Sullun and his brother now live in Abu Dhabi, where the Sultan's eldest son is an officer
in the Defence Force and graduated from Sandhurst.

Under the State of Emergency no provision was made to deal with

rorist suspects except by trial by jury. In the prevailing conditions in
\den this was clearly out of the question. Any Arab sitting on such a jury
' -on Id have been an obvious target lor intimidation, as would be witnesses.
The chances of the authorities collecting either witnesses or a jury
prepared to bring in an unbiased verdict after the Khalifa trial * were nil.

Sir Richard Turnhull asked for further powers to deal summarily with
suspected terrorists but the Labour government always refused his
requests and it was not until the summer of 1967 that his successor. Sir
Humphrey Trevelyan. obtained permission for magistrates to pass severe
sentences in such cases.

The result of this policy, coupled with the knowledge of British
withdrawal, was a steady increase in terrorism. t There was no deterrent
and captured terrorists could look forward to a comfortable stay in al
Mansura and a regular allowance from the government. When the people
realised that no effective action was being taken to hall the spread of
violence, the flow of intelligence to the authorities dried up. Although it
was technically against the law to call a general strike, by March 19G7 at the
.merest hint from FLOSY or the NLF the shutters went up. the markets were
deserted and the bus and taxi services ground to a halt. The Aden is wore
not willing to risk property, life and limb for a government which was loo
feeble to enforce its own laws. In the four years of Emergency no terrorist
was executed or even brought to trial, with the solo exception of Khalifa.

Very early on the NLF appreciated that if they were to survive then the
Arab Special Branch officers working with the Aden Police would have to
be eliminated. During 1965. by assassination and intimidation, the Arab
Special Branch was wiped out. The intelligence organisation which
remained consisted solely of Britons, many of whom had newly arrived in
the territory and few of whom could speak Arabic.

After 1965 the principal source of information on terrorist activities left
to the British was the Fort Morbut interrogation centre. The interrogation
centre was a narrow, (wo storey building situated within an army
cantonment perched high upon Ihe cliffs overlooking the harbour
entrance. It commanded one of Ihe most beautiful views in Aden.
Originally it had been the headquarters of the Military Special
instigation Branch but was now surrounded by barbed wire. The upper
oor was used for interrogation and offices, the lower contained six cells

1 jcn opened out onto a small exercise yard. The interrogators were

airily drawn from the army which alone could provide men with the

s «-' Chapter m.

'ii'ul 'm 4 tl! ' ri - ,risl aotivitv resulted in A killed and 32 wouncJud. In 1HB5 this had risen In killed
Aden -Ym oundwl - >" ' !JWi H'cro were H I killed and 426 wounded |lh is included 2« killed in Ihe
'axtnl'iv I T l;r:,s ' 1 )- first lour months of 1H67 claimed 60 dead and ,'ifi-l wounded and Ihe
killed in l' MKS "'iiclii'd twin neaks in |un«j (112 killed and 200 wounded) and Ocluher |2K()
' around 400 wounded). The total killed lor 1967 exceeded 900 with 2.000 wounded.

necessary training and linguistic ability. Strict instructions weredrawnu
prohibiting the use of violence or physical force. This was not only fo r
humanitarian reasons but experience has shown that information gained in
this way is usually unreliable. From the outset the interrogation centre had
considerable success and provided information which led to the recovery
of caches of arms and thearrestofa large number of terrorists.

Egyptian Intelligence soon realised the danger posed by Fort Morbut
and cast about for ways to reduce its effectiveness. Surrounded as it was bv
a heavy guard, physical destruction was out of the question and in any case
only a temporary measure. So they hit upon the ingenious method of
interfering with the centres work by propaganda. Terrorists undergoing
training in Cairo and Taiz were instructed that if captured they were to
complain at the earliest possible moment of ill-treatment and at the same
time told that if they kept silent no harm would come In them. Before long
lurid tales of torture and brutality began to appear in the Egyptian press and
on Cairo Radio. The cry was quickly taken up by the Afro-Asians and the
Kastern Bloc in the United Nations.

The stories also reached the ears of Amnesty International, the
organisation concerned with the welfare of political detainees throughout
the world. The Swedish branch of Amnesty appointed Dr Salahdin
Rastgeldi. a gynaecologist of Kurdish origin, to investigate the matter. Dr
Rastgeldi, supported by Peter Renensun, a founder member and President
of Amnesty in Britain, applied to the Foreign Office for permission to go to
Aden and carry out an investigation. In a letter later published, Walter
Padley. Minister of State at the Foreign Office, refused. The Minister
pointed out that Andre Rochat, representative of the Ked Cross, was
making regular visits to both al Mansura and Fort Morbut, that a mission
such as the one suggested would amount to a judicial inquiry and 'would
lead to demands from parties less disinterested than Amnesty'. Further, as
the detainees in Aden were not political detainees, Rastgeldi and Amnesty
had no locus standi.

Nothing daunted, Rastgeldi set out for Arabia. His first stop was at Cairo
where he spent a week conferring with FLOSY leaders and the Egyptian
Foreign Office before flying to Aden where he arrived on the 28 July 1966.
The doctor made an early call upon Sir Richard Turnbull to demand
permission to visit the detainees. lie hinted that unless his request was
granted he won Id see to it that a considerable 'international scandal' would
ensue. Armed with his copy of Padley's letter Sir Richard refused. His bluff
having failed the doctor stalked angrily out of Government House and back
to his room in the Rock Hotel where during the next five days he
interviewed Trades Union representatives, released detainees and FLOS*
lront organisations, returning via Cairo on the 4 August.

According to Benenson, the Foreign Secretary, George Brown,
approached him on the 19 September and asked him to prevent the
publication of Rastgeldi's report. He refused. There is no doubt that the
British government were worried about the reports coming out of Aden

and George Brown was considering the appointment of an investigator.
The announcement was scheduled for November but in the event was
brought forward by the precipitate action by Amnesty. On 17 October Hans
Frank, a Swedish lawyer, handed a copy of Rastgeldi's report to the British
Embassador in Stockholm together with an open letter to Harold Wilson.
The letter alleged that during his visit to Aden Dr Kastgeldi had
investigated three-hundred cases of torture. 'British troops', the letter went
0 n. 'had torn nails from hands and feet, extinguished cigarettes on
detainees whom they had also starved and beaten." In answer to questions
in the House of Commons on the following day the Foreign Secretary
announced his intention of appointing an investigator and later, on 24
October, it was learnt that this was to be Sir Roderick Bowen QC. a former
Liberal MP and Deputy Speaker.

Bowen, a Welshman of considerable wit and reputation, spent eleven
clays in Aden, during which he made exhaustive inquiries, and returning to
the United Kingdom on the 9 November he settled down to write his report

In the meantime the Rastgcldi allegations had given rise to considerable
controversy. Given that Dr Kastgeldi was an exceptional man, during his
seven day stay in Aden to interview the minimum of three hundred
persons he must have worked very hard indeed. Working a maximum
sixteen hours a day in the heat of Aden he must have been able to interview
three men an hour. Benenson. vyho supported the allegations, flew into
Aden in an attempt to gain more evidence. It appears that he was already in
disagreement with his colleagues in Amnesty over matters other tiian
Aden detainees. The details of the dispute are clouded with allegation and
counter-allegation, but it may be assumed that he badly needed to be
proved right on Aden to maintain his position.

During his three-day stay Benenson met the FLOSY 'Mayor' of Aden,
Hiad Khalifa, as well as members of the FLOSY front organisation
Graduates Congress'. On the second day, 15 November, he announced his
intention of giving a press conference. Accordingly the press trooped up to
the bar of the Kock I Intel where the Amnesty President sat, a small grey owl
°t a man. nervously nibbling peanuts and twiddling with his waistcoat
uttons. It soon became apparent that Benenson believed he had obtained
"e information which ho sought. He reaffirmed his belief in the veracity of
Jstgeldi's report and stated he had obtained new evidence to support it.
e also announced his intention to request the British government to
Ppomt an ombudsman, paid by the British but selected by the
oc . c e "\ at ! nruii Gonfederation of Jurists, to investigate allegations as they
cur r ' " Uas a ' so ::i PP aren t 'ha! Mr Benenson was no expert on the
• j_rent situation of Middle Eastern affairs in general.

gover VtSU 0ccurred at a timfi wne " tne best P art <>' ll,e Republican
cjetenti 1 " 611 ' ° f ne ' 8nbourin 8 Yemen had been taken to Cairo and placed in
Repuh'] 0 '' ' J " f; SVP tians who were supposed to be supporting it.
R oya]i lc:an refugees were flooding into Aden to join the hundreds of
s Yemenis already there. Vastly impressed by the interest and

propaganda created by Amnesty activities over Aden some of the
Republican exiles turned up at the press conference and attempted to
interest him in their affairs. Benenson appeared to be taken aback— the
kidnapping of a government, tales of the use of poison gas and the massacre
of hundreds bv the Egyptians in the Yemen was not what he had come for.
He seemed hard put to explain that while the prisoners of the British were
of 'interest, those of the Egyptians were not. Eventually, when the Yemenis
saw Mr Benenson was under the impression that their detained Prime
Minister, Hasan al Amri, was an Egyptian, even they realised that there was
nothing more to be done.

The Bowen report was published on the 20 December, Rastgeld. s a day
earlier Bowen criticised the Aden High Commission for 'a most
regrettable failure to deal expeditiously and adequately with allegations of
cruel " lie went on. -During the period from 18 October to 26 December
1965 serious allegations came to light as shown by the hies of the Legal
Advisor and Director of Medical Services. Both had pressed for
investigation following two cases, one of severe bruising and another o
torn ear drums. An officer of Special Branch investigated and reported hat
The complaints are more or less localised to two rooms o the interrogation
centre and circulate around three men.' Hicklmg. the legal adviser had
approached the Director of Army Legal Services who in a memorandum
Fated the complaints and medical reports did no. in the -m appear
substantiate the allegations but expressed the view that the allegations
no Id bf put to the three men if the Director of Intelligence agreed
Consent was not forthcoming. By that time the three men hac left .the
Command Mr Bowen added, 'I am satisfied that any suggestion that they
weTspi rited away because of the allegations would be unjustified. The
SS remain' that it investigations, had been carried out they would have
been readily available.' . f ., m

Bowen produced seven main recommendations Five of than,
concerned with the tightening up of procedure for mv t gating
complaints and the introduction of increased medical fac.ht.es to

detainee., were accepted: the ^-^"/H^J^^Staiy
interrogation centre to al Mansura and the replacemen to . m >
interrogators by civilians. Both recommendations J^^JU*
grounds of practicability. Al Mansura was under daily at ack rorn
Uthman-based terrorists and there were no civilian ^ le ^^ tth e
the army personnel. Mr Bowen went out of his way to ™P^» 0 „ the
latter recommendation 'was not intended to reflect m .any was
present members of the interrogation staff or to sug ges 1, thaMn ^
personnel are any less suitable than civilians for this «ork . bu ^ ^
Purpose is to make the interrogation team ^P ons * ,e .^„ 5 protecting
•High Commissioner'. Mr Bowen also said. 'The mam s tram °* E> r0 ljtary
the population and dealing with the terrorists falls upor i
personnel and the police. I certainly gained the ™press,on that
speaking thev discharge their onerous duties vv.th great restraint.

„-hat surprisingly Amnesty welcomed the Bowen Report and
S °"l that 'Wo completely consider that the report vindicates Dr
^'^pldi as a serious, impartial observer. -

Ra o g tat di's report in the main reflected Amnesty's open letter to Wilson.

h!Sn ''Many innocent people have been arrested since the
HC .Son of the State of Emergency' and continued to list alleged
Pr ° t rP and brutalities. His estimate of between two hundred and three
L°mdred detainees compares with Bowen's precise figure of one hundred
A»n \ copv of the report had been sen. to the United Nations
rmmittce on Colonialism where it became a matter of some concern tor
tv,°p Afro-Asian and Eastern Bloc members.

The nffair had a curious aftermath. Following the Mackawee funeral in
February. Benenson suddenly claimed that British troops had killed over
£ Arabs and that the press had been prevented from reporting this
because of strict censorship imposed by the authorities Every leading
newspaper in Britain with correspondents in Aden refuted Benenson s
rharees and denied that their dispatches had ever been tampered with. Ken
Brazier made headlines himself with his denial on the BBC pomtu^ou
that it would be impossible for fifty people to have been killed in a small
nlace like Aden without the press hearing of it.

That was that. A few days later Amnesty disclaimed Benenson s charges
and the former President, who had been resigning on and oft since
December, finally withdrew from the scene.

In the strained conditions of Aden; the heat of street fighting and raids
upon rebel hideouts, undoubtedly some people were roughly handled.
Equally the conclusion is inescapable that the methods of interrogation
and detention emploved by the British in Aden were the most humane in
the Middle East and compared favourably with those used in similar
circumstances anvvvhere else in the world.

Long before the controversy over the detainees became headlines in the
world press, a representative of the International Red Cross was making
regular visits to both al Mansura and Fort Morbut. Andre Rochat was a man
who had found his true vocation. He was a tall, spare Swiss, usually
clothed in a grev lightweight suit and tropical trilby which he raised
frequently with a grave continental courtesy. He possessed a deep sense ot
conviction and if he found anything which he considered either unjust or
unreasonable he did not hesitate to give the authorities, or for that matter
the detainees, the full benefit of his opinions. Rochat's Arabic was
. execrable and when excited his English was difficult to follow. This
sometimes led to misunderstandings and the ill feeling engendered by the
Rastgoldi affair did not make his task any easier. Nevertheless Rochat was
respected bv both sides and his mission was general ly successful. This was
Particularly so in the last few months before independence when the
situation in al Mansura became explosive. By August, the prison was
continuously under fire and the number of detainees had reached a record
Peak of around two hundred and thirty. The staff, mainly senior NCOs of

the army, were perilously thin on the ground. Incidents in which they were
insulted, spat at and attacked became frequent, only their discipline
prevented them making reprisals and so making matters worse. A surprise
search of the four blocks resulted in the discovery of an alarming
assortment of home-made weapons, including clubs and a form of Molotov
cocktail. The possibility of a full-scale prison riot was an ever-present
factor. Rochat and his elderly assistant, Francis Rais, bent their energies to
prevent this and the fact that the riot never came off must partly be due to
their efforts.

When on dutv Rochat appeared to be covered in red crosses. There was
one on his hat, his breast pocket and his brief case. His car, a white Renault
station waggon, was adorned with red crosses on every side and these were
splendidlv reinforced bv a large flag. Even so he never appeared to be
surprised when people asked, as they frequently did, who he was.

Although the Red Cross Aden Mission was important, Rochat is best
known for his work in the Yemen. The civil war between the Yemeni
Royalists and Republicans with their Egyptian allies began in 1962 and
continued with much slaughter on both sides in the succeeding years. The
Red Cross Mission mainlv concentrated on ihe Royalist side, providing
hospital and medical treatment in the remote areas. Early on in the war,
stories hegan to circulate alleging the use of poison gas by the Egyptian Air
Force in their attacks on Royalist tribesmen. This was always vehemently

denied by Cairo. ,
Towards the end of 1906 the number ol reports intensified and the Ked
Cross medical teams refused to continue their work unless they were
issued with gas masks. Because of the political neutrality ot the
International Red Cross they were withdrawn; to accede to the request
would have been tantamount to stating that the reports were true.

In January 1907 the Royalists invited a large party of the international
press to their mountain stronghold of Kitaf which they claimed had been
gassed three weeks before. On 5 January the American entrepreneur,
lushrod Howard, a remarkable figure with horned rimmed spectacles,
orchid, and flowing Arab cloak lined with golden sovereigns, chaperonea
the party of twentv journalists, including two women, who made m
formidable one hundred and twenty mile journey by donkey ana ro
across the mountains and sands from the Saudi Arabian border town

Na Onarrival in Kitaf with its brown buildings half invisible against the
mountainside, the press saw a remarkable sight. Animals f ""'"^
their stalls stone dead and the carcases of others strewn about tho s
and fields, over forty newly dug graves and a number of wide but sn
craters. The survivors of the raid, mostly children, illiterate tribesmen
the old, to a man described the same thing. The aeroplanes, th « bom ° nuth .
blue smoke followed bv the choking, the blistering, the frothing m ^
blindness and death. The journalists were particularly .mpressea y ^
fragments of bomb casing still in evidence. Having endureu

nforts of the journey, they knew too much about Yemen, powers of
diSC Sion to believe that this was a gigantic hoax. The Royalists claimed
orga Sred and twenty people had fallen victim to the attack and at the
0116 „ htKDital doctors said they had treated one hundred and eighteen
N T^ When Bushrod offered to have one of the graves opened so that the
Tl \t held could be inspected they refused; they had already seen
b y J In the light of this evidence it was obvious that wh.ch had
eI1 »v iouslv been considered rumour could quite well have been fact
. pr t °n husiastic was Bushrod to prove the existence of gas that he had the
° P of' a dead cow from Kitaf transported back to Jiddah tor
^amin-ition Unfortunately the sun and Arabian delay did their work and
£ stench when the cow eventually arrived at its destination was reported
rpmarkable even by local standards.

On the way back to Jiddah to file their stories, the journalists spent the
nioht in the Najran customs house. Early in the morning they awoke to the
«mnd of exploding bombs as the town was attacked by Egyptian planes.
Fortunately the bombing was inaccurate, the only immediate casualties
hein« two children. Several of the bombs did not explode on impact and a
German television team rolled them into position to take the necessary
nictures The team, led by Walter Mechtel (who was later shot in Aden)
learned afterwards that some of the bombs had been fitted with delayed
action charges and later had exploded, killing two Saudi policemen

Despite the press reports Egypt continued to stoutly deny the charges
and a certain amount of doubt remained because of lack ol reliable medical
evidence. The final expose was to be provided by Rochat.

In Mav 19fi7 reports reached Rochat. then in northern Yemen, ol a gas
attack in the Wadi Hiran, thirty miles east of the Republican-held capita ot
Sana. On 10 Mav. determined lo verify the facts for once and tor all, Rochat
set out together with two Swiss doctors and an Italian journalist for the
stricken area. On the second day of the journey the parly camped for the
night in the lower reaches of the Wadi. As was customary each ot the
vehicles carried prominent Red Cross insignia and. to make certain they
could be easily identified from the air, a twelve-metre square red cross was
laid out in the camping area. At 7.45 on the following morning Rochat
stretching his legs after breakfast, saw the first plane appear from behind
the screen of mountains. His instinct warned him that something was
wrong and with a cry of warning to his companions he dashed to the cover
of a nearbv grove. Guards, doctors and journalists were quick to follow but
•the head guard, Yahya Salih, stayed in the open gesticulating towards the
enormous Red Cross'flag on the ground. The plane had been joined by two
others: thev replied with a hail of machine-gun bullets. The guard fell to
the ground, his blood spattering the flag. Four times the planes returned,
m achm e -g Unning and bombing: luckily there were no further casualties. It
ma V be that the Egyptians believed they were attacking a disguised
Royalist arms convoy but the Red Cross presence in the area was well
known and thev did have reason to fear what the doctors would discover on

the following day.

Rochat and his party proceeded to the scene of the gas attack and (he-
investigation proved beyond all shadow of doubt that seventy-fiv^
tribesmen had been killed as a result of phosgene gas poisoning. The
Committee of the International Red Cross in Ceneva studied Rochat's
reports and for the first time in its one hundred and four year history the
Committee issued a public statement which indirectly accused the
Egyptians of using gas, a form of warfare forbidden by the Geneva
Convention to which the United Arab Republic is a signatory.

On his next visit to Cairo, Rochat personally protested about the attack
on his convoy to the Egyptian Foreign Office and was understandably
surprised when they blandly informed him that he must have been
mistaken.

In all, the Egyptians are thought to have made over seventy gas attacks
during their five-year occupation of the Yemen. The last known raid of this
kind was on the Bani Qais, a tribe living somesixtv miles due west of Sana
on the 17 June 1967, after the war with Israel.

After some political manoeuvring, the matter was brought to the notice
of the United Nations by Saudi Arabia but was not thought worth debate.
Similarly, the Bcrtrand Russell Peace Foundation, engrossed in
condemning American action in Vietnam, easily reconciled its conscience
on gas by considering that this was an internal matter in which it could not
interfere.

All classes of South Arabians were appalled by events in the Yemen.
Nobody wanted the same thing to be repeated in their country. The United
Nations enjoyed considerable prestige and everybody had looked forward
to the visit of a United Nations' Mission which they were sure that if all else
failed would bring a happy end to their troubles.

Chapter VI

This Month's Magicians

April 1967

It is outrageous, they are showing 'Bonanza' instead of our
statement.

Keila of Mali

The hloody British have been responsible for more bloodshed in the
world than anybody else.

Shalizi of Afghanistan

Towards the end of February 1967, Shaikh Muhammad Farid, the Foreign
Minister, who was internationally the most presentable member of the
Federal government, flew into London accompanied by Abdul Rahman
Girgirah, the Minister of Information. Their aim was to try and persuade the
British government that it was useless to fix a date for independence unless
there were cast-iron guarantees for the protection of the new state.

By this time Girgirah was nearing the end of his lether. He was a firm
believer in the Federal system and had taken part in the negotiations from
the start. For nine long years he had borne the abuse of his fellow Adenis
not to mention Cairo and Sana Radios and the pressure was steadily
increasing. Two of his cousins, leading members of FLOSY, were actively
plotting his assassination and family insistence that he leave South Arabia
grew as threat succeeded threat. Slowly it became apparent to his
colleagues in the Supreme Council that Girgirah would far rather be sent on
missions abroad than sit in his Ministry at Steamer Point. The break was to
oome later, but for the present he was content to accompany Shaikh
Muhammad on his talks with the Foreign Office and Members of
janiament. They were promised nothing in the way of material aid but
^ r ere successful in compelling the British government lo acknowledge that
im ° U . Araoia u ' as to become independent by the end of the year, it was
Fe ? eratlve f o find a government for it. The only one available was the

c eral government. Although the British regarded it as too narrow in its
P -sent state they felt at least it would form the nucleus of the future
■no-opendent government.

British p /5Ua '~ )ia WaS uecornin 8 atl increasing embarrassment to the British.
f he U ■, f S T erfi being lost t0 1,0 Purpose; British diplomats castigated at
v vorld i ^ ations and British relations with the remainder of the Arab
unduly complicated bv the issue. From 'the maintenance and

15 Minister of State, George Thomson (the only Labour Minister to be trusted b
the Arabs).

security of the base' through to 'the intention to guide South Arabia to
peaceful independence and leave behind a strong and stable government,'
the aims of the British South Arabian policy had been abandoned one by
one. By the time Farid and Girgirah arrived the aim was 'to get out as
quickly as possible'.

On the 17 March George Thomson, Minister of State at the Foreign
Office, was sent out to try and do a deal with the Federal government.
Independence in November with the promise of air cover for six months
afterwards. Thomson's visit came as a complete surprise to the Federal
government.

He arrived on a Friday, the South Arabian rest day, so that many ot
ministers had left for a weekend in their home states and heard the news c
the BBC. They returned hurriedly to al Ittihad.

The Federal government were shocked by the proposals and the speed
with which they were expected to decide. Shaikh Muhammad Fand
complained 'You have come here without any warning and expect us m a
few hours to make a decision of this importance which will profound y
affect the future of our country. Sir, this is not reasonable.' With this ne
accurately reflected the views of his colleagues. Despite his inauspiciou
start, Thomson made a great personal impact. He was the only Labo
minister to meet the Federal government whom they actually Ii* e ^
Afterwards several expressed the hope that he would be put in ch ^ rg ® te
their affairs. By the vigour of his personality Thomson kept the de
going until long into Saturday night but to no avail. The Fecie

the

; on

nment sensed a weakening in the British attitude and felt that if they
SuKld out for longer then they would get more. Thomson went back

6in n ^iTthe Minister's visit the Federal government took the opportunity
°S Lme P oposals of their own. They demanded to be allowed to take
t0 fntemal security in Aden S.ate. As a colony the secunty was the
° VCr lib itv of the High Commissioner as Governor of Aden. It was in the
[ CSP ? n f he Xdon Police and Armed Police, the latter an armed mil it ia and
rtuad supported by British troops who provided the main interna
r v force The Federal government argued that in the vast majority of
fases the British troops, although highly competent neither knew the
£ nor the customs of the people with whom they were dealing
This- lid the Federal government, is the chief reason for the lack of
Zl able intelligence. Arab troops know Arab people better than any Briton
r 'n ever hope to know them so let our Federal army begin to take over and
u " " n end to this matter, With every day that passes the toll of terrorism
tnH MI F/FLOSY influence increases, let us in before it is too late.

For 'their part the British government believed there was every
' possibility the Federal army would use violently repressive measures
S orts of which would do the British no good in the work! at large. They
did not therefore, wish to remain in the picture once the Federahs moved
in This concern, the attempts by the British government to appease world
opinion, was often in practical conflict with its efforts to leave behind a
stable and friendly government. In the end neither of these objectives were
achieved. The continual sacrifice of the second to conciliate the first was a
major reason for the failure of Britain's policy in South Arabia.

The Federal government had vet another reason lor wanting the Federal
forces to get to grips with the militants on the streets ol Aden. They were
beginning to suspect the loyalties of several of the Federal army units and
wanted to put the matter to tost while there were still the British to rely on.

The Federal government also brought in the vexed question ot the
Eastern Aden Protectorate. In any debate with the Federal government,
whenever the fateful words -Eastern Aden Protectorate' were mentioned
the whole conversalion would veer into the land of make-believe. The High
Commission sometimes felt that the Supreme Council primed a member to
bring up the subject whenever agreement seemed about to be reached on
some crucial matter.

The three Sultanates of Qaiti, Kathiri and Mahra, comprising two-thirds
• of the area and three-fifths of the population of South Arabia, had never
been over enthusiastic about joining the Federation. The Hadhramis of
Qaiti and Kathiri were an adventurous and talented people, far in advance
of their brethren in the west. The people of Vfahra on the other hand were
Primitive Bedouin, men of the vast deserts and barren mountains,
descendants of an ancient people who held the land before the coming of
the Arab. Thev spoke their own language and only accepted the rule of
their Sultan Isa on the condition he kept to his island of Socotra and did not

set foot on the mainland. They were deeply suspicious of all foreigners and
that meant anybody nol hailing from their own barren soil.

All three states looked askance at the troubles of the Federation. They
wen: conservative at the best of limes and were not encouraged by what
they saw. A typical I Iadhrumi attitude was succinctly expressed by 'Major
General' bin Sumaidhia, head of the Qaili Regular Army, during a visit to
Aden in 1966. 'We have got three sultans ourselves and this is trouble
enough; we don't want to inherit another seventeen. '

The 'Major General' had obtained his exalted rank through a mistake in
translation. It was intended he be promoted Colonel. When the application
lor the new badges of rank were sent off to a military outfitters in London a
misunderstanding arose over the translation of the Arabic word Jiwa and
badges for a major general were sent back. Nobody had the heart to tell him
and it did nol matter really as he was the senior officer in any case. Even so,
it caused quite a flurry during a subsequent tour of the United Kingdom.

The Qaitis. who were by far the largest of the three and whose territory
totally enclosed that of Kathiri. had another motive for not wanting to join.
The Pan American Oil Company were exploring lor oil in the territory and
the Qaitis feared that if they joined in some form of Federation they would
have to share their oil revenues with everybody else; the other rulers were
notoriously poor. In point of fact Pan American's activities were centred
deep inside Mahra territory but this did not worry the Qaitis. They
promptly claimed the land as their own.

The sea port of MukalUi was the capital and chief town of Qaiti. In 1967 a
traveller arriving via the airport of Riyan faced a bumpy fourteen-mile
Landrover journey across sand and rock before turning a bend in the cliffs
to come suddenly upon one of the loveliest sights in all Arabia. The town,
situd on a narrow strip nestling under lowering brown cliffs, looked an
oriental dream come true. Minarets and tall buildings which glistened
white in the mid-day sun wore offset by the deep blue expanse of the
harbour with its majest ic dhows and h igh prowed fishing boats. Only when
the traveller got closer did the stench and corruption of the place rise up
from the verv streets.

The old palace, then the British Residency,* was set back in its own
compound and built in the style of an old world country house in New
England or Virginia. It was complete with nineteenth-century cannon,
which the British seem to leave behind in abundance wherever they go.
Opposite and by far the biggest building in the city stood the Rulers
palace. One of the last outpourings of Indian Gothic architecture in the
classic stvle. its resemblance to an enormous iced cake was startling. r
the top floor of this monstrosity the young Sultan Ghalib strived to come to
grips with the problems of his realm and. when things became too muc •
plaved with his collection of swords. Sultan Ghalib was only nineteen an

* Visitors knew it as Dysentery Hall.

16 SuJlan Ghalib of Qa/ti

just back from an English public school where he obtained four A levels.
He never stood a chance.* His father, the Sultan Awadh, had died a few
monlhs before. A descendant of a long line of Yafai mercenaries, he had
been bom a spastic and developed hypochondria. The drugs used to cure
his often non-existent illnesses turned him into an addict so that for the last
decade of his reign be had been little more than a human vegetable and bis
power had passed into the hands of his wazir. Ahmad al Atlas. Al Attas was
a tall and imposing figure with powdered cheeks and painted bps: a
malevolent influence in Qaiti affairs and a born intriguer in the pay of
Egypt. He controlled the creaking machinery of Qaiti government from the
Secretariat overlooking the harbour. L.ike many buildings in Mukalla it was
white and imposing from the outside. Inside the layers of dust, piles of files
and stains of human excrement in the corners told their own tale.

Under Al Attas the factions in the state multiplied. For several years the
South Arabian League formed the chief opposition to the government.
Gradually their influence declined under the impact of fresh waves oi
revolutionary ardour provided by the Arab Social ist Party and FLOSY who
were busy organising taxi drivers and labourers into trades unions. By
September 1966 all factions had combined to destroy the South Arabian
League. On the 12 September a grenade exploded amongst a crowd, mainly
school children, demonstrating outside the League offices in Mukalla. One
schoolboy was blown to pieces and twenty other people injured. The
grenade was thought to have been thrown by a South Arabian Leaguer. The

n,„ , was assisle i! bv his younger brother Umur who wanted to become a pilot. Umar was
popular in the su<| and had taken an early opportunity to impress his character on the
EJ""?; Al ll,e "Se «f four. Riven a tricycle by the' British Resident he rated around
Kate it, WUh , a lar R° Q uiti "as strapped to the handlebars. As he pedalled throuuh the main
s ie in e j, uard was obliged t0 |um ou( amJ |)resem amis.

100

League was also a target for demonstrations at Sai'un, the capital of
neighbouring Kathiri, where Abdulla Jabiri, a member of the League, was
held on charges of firing shots at a crowd of demonstrators. The excuse was
taken to round up all the leading members of the party and force them to
stand trial. This trial dragged on for months as no-one wished to face the
responsibility of passing sentences and in the meantime tension between
the various factions increased.

The situation in the town was further complicated by an influx of some
thousands of refugees from Zanzibar who could be seen hanging around
the streets discontented and unemployed. The condition of the
countryside was as bad. Two years of severe drought had had a devastating
effect on the crops and herds of the tribesmen, many of whom were on the
point of starvation and depended on supplies dropped by the Royal Air
Force from Aden to keep alive.

In January 1967 a chieftain of the Saar, one of the great nomadic tribes of
the desert, was on a rare trip to Mukalla to purchase supplies. Under the
impression he was being cheated by a merchant in the market, a furious
exchange ensued. 'By God.' he shouted, 'when the British and their
aeroplanes have gone you shall pay for this thieving. We shall come and
take what is rightfully ours and none shall hinder us.'

When asked what good would come of loot and plunder, the chieftain
turned his wizened face, with its kohl-rimmed eyes and tufted beard, and
cracked into a smile. 'Why then we shall be back to the sands and away for
will we not be richer than before?'

Such was the lladhramaut which the Federal government so much
wanted to join: some would have said they had trouble enough.

Ever since he became Foreign Secretary, a major objective of George
Brown's Middle East policy had been to re-establish diplomatic relations
with Egypt. He was personally on good terms with President Nasser and in
March wrote to him asking him to call off the terror campaign in South
Arabia.

President Nasser must have smiled at George Brown's letters. He
probably had neither the desire nor the ability to do as he was asked. He
flatly turned down the request and the letters gave the Egyptians an
opportunity of playing their favourite game of twisting the lion's tail at no
cost to themselves. George Brown was undoubtedly sincere in these efforts
to bring peace to South Arabia but in Aden his letters were regarded by the
British as a humiliation and by the Arabs as a further sign of weakness.

George Brown had another card up his sleeve. After months ot
exhausting effort and debate a United Nations' Mission was on its way to
South Arabia to solve the territory's problem. In retrospect the hope ana
importance which all parties attached to this Mission seems incredible. Its
arrival in April was awaited with relief and expectancy.

The United Nations had interested itself in the affairs of Aden and South
Arabia since 1962 and in May 1963 the Special Committee of 24 on
Colonialism decided to send a Mission to investigate the problem. Sir

101

, n««n the British delegate in New Yorkat the time, reaffirmed that it
PatF v Ssh intention to bring Aden to 'independence at the earliest
was the an i . ^ (hen wfis , ha( thfJ Mission amounted to

possible cui . . domestic affairs [t was consequently refused

interference ^'^.^ It vvenl t0 Cairo instead. There it naturally
admission ^ adverse picture of the British presence so that the

obtainea i - * n , rcport described conditions in the territory as
Committee ^ intemationa ) peace and security' The

' ^trbimed that there was a stong desire of the people for union with the
report cu ^ elcctions Qn , he basis of imiv crsal adult sutterage. It

TIV^ usual noises about British repression and the imprisonment of
ml a prisoners. All this was duly denied by the British delegates but the
ffneral Assembly in its autumn session of 1963 approved the report and
railed for the carl'v removal of all British forces. This was not accepted by
Hi British who appeared to he intent on keeping their base or by the
Federal government who wished to retain the British presence in some

form or other. .

On the other hand the Aden rnilitanls quickly appreciated the political
oossibilities and from 1963 onwards 'acceptance of the United Nations'
Resolutions' became their parrot cry. During the period of Mackawee s
premiership in Aden State 'United Nations' Resolution!' was his
oovernmenl's replv to any querv concerning constitutional advance.
° Gradually the British and Federal governments gave ground. After the
announced" British withdrawal from the base the main obstacle to
acceptance was removed. On the 13 May 1966 the Federal government
formally accepted the Resolution in the hope of bringing all the parties
together. In turn, on the behalf of FLOSY, Mackawee announced the
decision as a farce and a mockery': terrorism continued.

Both FLOSY and the Federal government had sent delegations to the
United Nations' autumn session of 1966. Apart from Mackawee the FLOSY
delegation, the composition of which had been the subject of much
squabbling in Taiz and Cairo, included Muhammad Salim Basindwah, the
babyfaced "henchman of Asnag, and Sail' Ahmad al Dhalai of the NLF. When
the time came for them to appear before the Committee of 24 they were one
short as Basindwah had vanished into the depths of Harlem. The Federal
government were represented by Shaikh Muhammad Farid and Hussain
Bayumi. the courageous if muddleheaded brother of the founder of Aden's
United National Party, who was serving as Federal Minister of Aviation.

Under the system of procedure adopted by the Committee of 24 the
Petitioners from the territory under discussion are heard first and
questioned, then the matter is debated by the member countries.

Mackawee. suave as ever, said the usual things. He condemned the
British, demanded the instant withdrawal of British troops, the release of
f he detainees and the removal of 'the Federal Sultanic and puppet
government.'

102 ;

Shaikh Muhammad and Bayumi.had a cool reception. Bayumi i n
particular came under fire from several of the members. Eventually his
formidable wife Adilla caused a minor stir and brought to light an odd
practice. Wandering around behind the delegates as her husband was
being questioned she noticed the Sudanese delegate reading a question
from a piece of plain paper . Similar pieces of paper were in the possession
of the Somali and other delegations. Being a down-to-earth no-nonsense
woman she asked the Sudanese where he had got it. The diplomat replied
that an Egyptian friend had asked him to put the question. A complaint was
promptly "registered with the Sudanese Ambassador and other pieces of
paper quickly disappeared. Similarly, messages from state councils and
South Arabian organisations in support of the Federal government and
intended for circulation amongst the committee members somehow never
got there. Later, when the British delegate complained, he was assured
that there had been an administrative error which prevented their
distribution.

The British also accepted the United Nations' Resolutions but with
certain reservation concerning the State of Emergency. Their case was that
they were quite prepared to raise the stale of emergency and release all the
detainees if and onlv if FLOSY. the NLF and the Kgyptian government
called off the terror campaign. Lord Caradon, the chief British delegate,
reversed the earlier British objection to the United Nations' participation
and called for a UN Mission to facilitate South Arabia's advance to
independence. British policy towards the United Nations had changed
because it was appreciated that by ensuring UN participation in the state-
making process she also ensured international recognition of the new state
and she hoped the United Nations would provide a focal point where the
contending parties could meet without loss of face. They were tobequickly
disillusioned on the success of the second of these aims. As soon as the
Trusteeship Committee of the United Nations had agreed in principle to
send the Mission on 2 December 1966. Mackawce denounced the move as
an 'Imperialist plot'. He and his backers realised that no fairmmded
mission would impose FLOSY as the sole representative of the people oi
South Arabia which was the Front's constantly-avowed claim. FLOSY a s
appreciated, as did all the Arabs, but the British and the United Nations a.a
not that no 'coalition' or 'broadlv based' South Arabian government maae
up of the different parties would work. They would spend their oner ^
destroying each other. Individuals could change sides but only a sing

partv could rule. ahians

FLOSY did not stop at merely denouncing the Mission. Soutn >\ M "'
were warned on pain of death not to contact it and Taiz Radio, which *
FLOSY controlled, assured the Mission that they 'would not leave bo
Arabia alive' if they dared to set foot in Aden. The threat was prooa j
made bv an over-zealous announcer without the consent of Macka >
Asnag or the F.gvptians, but it nevertheless underlined the cornp ^
reversal of traditional FLOSY policy. The NLF. once again maKu „

» followed the FLOSY line in as much as it totally
separate appr^^manded the lifting of the State of Emergency
prejudged the issue- rh, ^ undertaking by the Mission that ,

Se release ol P° l ^^ona concerned with the Federal government
would refuse ,u ' . et tbe Mission.

before they wouk 1 agree to ^ find . bcrs t , h

Meanwhile U Than" « ° and lobb ing beh ind the scenes it was

Mission. Aft«r considerable dc Pe rez-Guerrero, head of the

finally decided it would b e led b> knowledge of Arabic

Venezuelan de leg. ™' ante far the Yemen in 1963. The members
who l»d v ;sited^

t0 be Abdul Sattar Sha 1. . an ^ ^ ^ des( , nbed b

Afghanistan, and Mussa Lc o m i diplomat trying to sell

? h 8 e Observer as 'gentle an ^loas^a and lastly by

him to the Federal gov^merrt ^ ^ ^ in ^ bar of A(1
an American journalist over ms do ^ w ond [Q

C ^^£-^V^^^ -ere not best pleased at the
T St ^ ; del u le on S who they though, would optically side
choice of a delegate uom h f , th t it WHS Keita who was

with the militants, but drew c^ some vjdous

coming and not Amadou Mo1 ^™^

The portents for the Mission's success were ^'^ ^/ ^It a a wizard
which it was regarded by the South Arabian man m the st r« t a a «iz-
which would cure all evils within the space of a ev ^ ^
undiminished. For years the NLF, FLOSY and then : Predece o , s had been
calling for "the implementation of the United Nations Kesolut ions and
latterly the British and Federal governments had joined m too « lor the
most part it was reasonable to assume that the troubles we o ^ most ove r
thev were to be disappointed. Even before the Mission left . Nav York its
task was made virtually impossible. Us terms of reference
themselves for although the General Assembly were »™.nmoust at tne
members should not go to Aden without pre-conditions for ™W e f^
at the same time it endorsed recommendations of the Commit te . of 24 on
Colonialism which were wholely anti-British and anti-Federal «
terms of reference presented the three members ot the Mission with a.
insurmountable problem and were a principal cause ot the subsequent
failure of their task. Thev described the Federal government as
•unrepresentative'. This meant that if the Mission stuck rigidly to its
charter thev would be unable to deal with the Federal government m any
way. The problem was insurmountable. Technically if the Mission wan tod
to move out of Aden Colony then it could only do so with the sanction ot

105

, j government, '['he use of a Federal army truck or escort or any
thG , | oovernment facilities including the Aden-based radio station,

M he tantamount to recognition of a government which by virtue of
"'■'brief the Mission had already condemned. The Fedejal government
th T med the Mission in the hope that once it arrived then it would treat
h f°cts as they were and not as they were viewed from New York. They

d (o be sadly disappointed. The fact that the Mission was sent on these
^is must go down as a defeat for British diplomacy and a government
Hliohted'toliave made it with the United Nations on South Arabia at last
was°complacent enough to believe that everything could be sorted out on
the "round.

In Aden preparations went ahead for the Mission's reception. The first
nroblem of the High Commission was accommodation. For the purposes of
neutrality, comfort and access, a hotel was the obvious choice. No hotel in
Aden was desirous of the honour. The choice finally fell on I he Seaview
and the High Commissioner used his emergency powers to lake it over
from a pairof Italian restauranteurs who had recently moved in and were
already famous for their mussels and spaghetti. The hotel was the largest
building in the area, facing Khormaksar beach, well away from the
trouble centres.

Because of the threats by KI.OSY and the N'LF security was taken
seriously. The beach road was blocked off and a barbed wire compound
soon encircled the building, a searchlight was mounted on the roof and the
whole area was guarded by a contingent of the Aden Civil and Armed
Police. The British services provided the cooks and catering services. Other
than the fact that the Mission was interested in archaeology and ancient
remains the High Commission was unable to find out much about them.
There was some speculation concerning how long they intended to stay or
what sort of programme they wished to undertake.

Assuming that the three diplomats wished to see as much of the country
as possible a special committee produced a plan which took them into all
the states of the Federation and the Kastern Aden Protectorate as well as
Aden itself. It was a difficult administrative problem, not only clue to the
state of unrest but because it also involved the co-ordination of security
arrangements in dozens of Arab towns and villages. Whilst the Committee
went about its labours, others were planning a totally different kind of
reception.

In the pink and blue Pluzu de Toro-like structure that was the Aden
Hades Union Congress headquarters, the mosques of Crater and the
shacks of Shaikh Uthman. the young men of FLOSY were planning their
" 10s [ ambitious scries of demonstrations and attacks to date. FLOSY was at
ie height of its power in Aden. The wave of popular support which
o owed the Mackawee murders had not yel spent itself. Moreover, the
fo 6 ?'. the mem hers had been strengthened by the emergence of armed
ice which had begun to make its appearance in the streets. The People's
ganisation of Revolutionary Forces (PORK) had been formed by the

1 06

19 The funeral of a FLOSYguerilla gunned flown by the rival NLF. FLOSY'shabi
o/givingelaborate/unerals to theirsupporters allowed (heirrivalstoidenti/ythe:
next lorget.

Egyptians as the militant wing of FLOSY. It was directly supervised, paid
and trained by Egyptian Intelligence officers from a special barracks at
Salah. the Imam's former palace, fourteen miles from Taiz.

The Egyptians had formed the new organisation for a variety of reasons.
They had always aimed to produce a Liberation Army on the lines oi t
Mgerian FLN and to this end cadres of South Arabians had been receiving
military training, nol only in the Yemen but Egypt as well. It was hoped
that these men would prove a unifying force for the discordam
revolutionary groups and bv the beginning of 1967 a protection forr-LLtoi
members against their more ruthless NLF rivals. Lastly and by no means
least the Egyptians had despaired of distributing arms through ne
political heads of either FLOSY or the NLF. Mackawee always seemed ij
distribute them to the wrong people and Qahtan al Shaabi had been JOCBJj
up more than once on the suspicion of selling them on the si de
Egyptians soon appreciated an old proverb well understood by
British counterparts— 'You cannot bribe a man ol the South, only tiir ^
for the afternoon/ Arms were still given direct and in liberal quanta
both organisations but the main effort was steadily diverted to 1 UK _ {
The NLF saw PORF as a direct threat to their survival and the outD . ^
inlerfront killings which began in the first weeks of April was spar*
by a PORF attempt to encroach into their preserves. hit were

' The Mission dulv arrived in London on the 10 March and aftervv n <
officially described as 'useful talks" and a round of clock gol \wiW j
Brown it headed for Cairo where it arrived on the 25th. 'he f

107

, were in a quandary. They had voted lor the Mission to visit
aovernmcm ; ,

governn.cn « ere 1 c ^ ^ enc()Uraged KLOSY l0 boycott .«
^uth Arab"- > L ^ h Egyptian capital. 'Voice ol the Arab

* ven l^'^u ia. controlled radio stations were calling or, the faithful*
and other t.g« L Nevcrtheless . wi ,h an admirable disregard for the
boycot >%* X 2Zssmv<>\v expressed regret for the FLOSY attitude and

factS ' ' 1R , E o the British. Some unconfirmed reports state that contact
blamed it all : nto me n ^ Mackawfie am) the {act rcmains that

was made between ^ ^ Qn , he ev(J ot

3fl f th T ( nee he members appeared to be solidly pro-FLOSY.
'"t^ 6 C iro thev journeyed on to Jiddah where the Saudi Arabians
F, ' 0 H t£m it was all the fault of the Egyptians. Here the Mission met its
ass ured tkm - ^ ^ had strong support

firS nn 2 Tt th c fih^ni merchant community of Saudi Arabia and a
amongst the man petition. Another figure who, rather

>n"h X S o n The scene was Abdul Rahman Girgirah. In hi,
S i t o President of the United National Party he was clutching a sheaf
™S^ ? s views on the problem, a copy of which was sent to the
Ui«ion although its arrival was never confirmed.

I Ade. hin«s were warming up. The main trouble centres were as ever
ShiiWi m man md Crater but W had commenced its assault with an
attack on al Ittihad. the Federal capital. The weapon used was a curious
Saption wh ich became known as a 'drainpipe mortar' U consisted of a
five foot length of ordinary drainpipe, blocked off at the base end and
containing a mortar bomb. The open end of the pipe was then aimed at he
target and a simple timing device detonated the charge , which sent the
bomb on its wav at the appointed time long after the crew had disappeared.
Although ingenious the -mortars' were usually a failure Often the timing
device failed to detonate the bomb and even when it did, the bomb raielv
hit the target. However, this attack on al Ittihad achieved its object.

On the 30 March two batteries of six drainpipes were lined up i under
cover of sand dunes facing the white box-like residences o Federal
ministers. At around twelve midnight they went off, the bombs tailing
around the houses of Abdul Rahman Girgirah and Muhammad Hasan
Obali. Little material damage was done and nobody was injured but tor
Girgirah it was the last straw. Terrified, his wife implored him to leave and
ho consented, departing for Jiddah the following day. It was the end ot a
long career. Never again would Girgirah play a meaningful part in South
Arabian politics. The first crack had appeared in the facade of the Federal
government. The attack had quite a different effect on Obali, who, late as
the hour was, rang up his friends all over Aden to recount the details ot
something he appeared to regard as a joke. On the following morning he
found his five-vear-old daughter plaving with the bomb which had fallen
°n the roof and onlv half exploded. This he proudly placed on the
mantelpiece and it was onlv with some difficulty that a bomb disposal
squad persuaded him to part with it.

108

20 The Lancashires struggle through the flood

1 April was the eve of the Mission's arrival in Aden. The militants made
their final preparations, the British troops in the streets looked to their
guns the High Commission had a last look at their schedules, the federal
government and others to their petitions. God had a surprise lor everyone.

For more than anything else Aden is a byevvord for heat, barrenness a a
lack of rainfall which, even in a good year, seldom exceeds an
on the morning of 1 April it started to rain heavily and to the aslomshmjj
of all. the shower continued unabated for six hours. Aden was not geare
for this sort of thing. There are no proper drainage facilities and soon
streets were under two and three feet of water. Worst hit vvere Crate .
Maalla and Steamer Point where the water, streaming olf the rui is. ^
aside the packing case shacks that housed thousands of immigrant ib
and Somali labourers. In Crater the torrent was so fierce that d ° z *j n , n
were piled one against the other in the narrow streets and cut- ae- ^
Steamer Point the RAF used canoes to cross the lake which on me i g
day had been their cricket pitch. Normal activity quickly d , 0

stop. Few people attempted to get to workand most who did were,
abandon their cars on the way. For Arab and Briton alike t hougn i Qut
and insurrection were forgotten as they struggled to dry tnems
and clear up the mess.

109

Perhaps the only -nan who was thoroughly pleased « A he nxn o
events was an old Indian in Steamer Point who stood up to hi taees i n
water happily tolling tales of Aden's last visitation m 1943 and proudly
holding aloft'tho umbrella he had prudently bought alter it.

The following day, as Aden concentrated on getting back to norma 1, Jthe
Mission slipped in almost unnoticed. The next morning they had what « as
to be their firs, and only formal meeting with the High Commissioner It
quickly became apparent that the Mission's approach to the problem was
very different from the High Commissioner's. The first casualty was me
programme which the Mission would not even discuss. Further, may
refused to deal with the Federal government except through the Hign
Commissioner and turned down flat a suggestion that they should meet
Federal ministers and other leading South Arabians informally over lunch.
Instead they elected to return to the Seaview to discuss matters between
themselves and promptly vanished for two days. Press enquiries and. more
important. Arab petitioners were brusquely turned aside. The Federal
government received no acknowledgement to a letter of welcome Mm this
was later found, together with several other letters setting out l edera
Policy and a copv of the ill-fated Hone and Bell report, in the hotel
bathroom.

Meanwhile the Mission grappled with the problem of fitting i ts
conflicting terms of reference lo the realities of the situation. Their
knowledge of both the geography and the current situation in the territory
appeared skimpy. Shalizi. who liked lemon in his tea but did not approve
of the lemon provided, asked the caterer to go out and buy some more. On
learning there was a general strike in progress he told the cook to use his
i nitiati ve and 'take a five-minute drive to the next town'. The next town was
either Lahej, thirty miles away, or Zingibar, forty-five miles up the beach
and which some of the UN staff who accompanied the Mission insisted on
calling Zanzibar with resultant confusion.

Sir Richard Turnbull, suspecting that the bill of fare at the Seaview was
not all that it might be, sent down a hamper of luxuries together with
champagne and fresh lime. This was indignantly rejected by Shalizi who
seemed to think it was a brihe and the wine a studied insult to his Muslim
faith. An offer of a boat trip around Aden Harbour was similarly turned
down on the grounds that the Mission was 'not interested in Aden's
economy'. The lack ol a common language added to the Mission's
difficulty. Keita spoke excellent French but little English, Shalizi spoke
oood English but little French; Perez-Guerrero spoke a bit of both. For two
days the Mission studied the problem, their sole relief being a film show
provided bv the Armv Information Team.

Outside "in the streets the battle was raging. The main trouble centres
were Crater and Shaikh Uthman. The militants, their plans disorganised
and their spirits dampened bv the rain, took two days to get into swing.
FI OSY was at the height of its power in Aden and this was to be its big
effort against both the British and the recalcitrant NLF. In the event it was
the NI.F who struck first. After a clash between their supporters in Crater,
two FLOSY men were found riddled with bullets in a back street.

The battle between the two fronts which had been going on
inlermittentlv since the 16 March broke out with renewed vigour, the
funerals which FLOSY supplied for the dead provided the NLF with an
opportunity to identify their enemies. There was a murder a day as
supporters" of the rival organisations pursued their v f ldet, f a ^ G ^^' ad
FI.OSY had the worst of it. Salim al Amudi. father-in-law of Muhamrnaa
Salim Basindwah, was shot and died in hospital. Abdul Rahmirr U assi "; d
former minister in Mackawee's Aden government, a top FI.OSY m ^
senior executive of Aden Airways, was gunned down as he returned
from visiting the dying Amudi. . ri ]

Crater was essentially the FLOSY stronghold. By Monday the J n
crowds of its supporters were out demonstrating, tearing up tne ^
mains and burning piles of tyres in the streets so that a black pal ° ^
hung over the town. FLOSY command intended to use the crowds
to draw the British troops so they could be attacked with g"f acle *' ^
to fire back at their assailants from fear of injuring unarmed dem0 ", en Lt
The troops involved. Northumberland Fusiliers led by their ou ts P oS y
ColonolBlenkinsop.learntquicklyand refused tobedrawn. Several

113

(acks backfired and .he grenades fell amongst their own people, on one

'"iSS British troops at this time won a great deal of praise
Thedi.sr.Lplu.c ortnc num bers. Loading articles in

fcom ^ C p i ted out that feu- armies can match the British tor
sev(; ral new ron(exl dis(;iplinc (:ame into its own and

< SB ; S dv under extreme provocation. The press were
the soldiers h M j - of them had jus( u . ilncsS e,l French

P« rtk : uU t V s m ar d clstances. In Djibouti, the capital ol the French
reaCt 7ihnd oppot te Aden on the other side of the Red Sea. the Soma
^T? nn riotin" Or, 3.) March French Legionnaires advanced .nio the
h8d ? ?nd opened fire on the crowds, killing eighteen no tors. The
^Tufssne sTthoir action shocked many correspondents although the
f X Z wont ,o point out that there were no more riots ,n DpbouU.
Fr6 A hnoToh tl ev m ade a lot of nose. FLOSY attacks were rarely pressed
Although tn n commandos were young and

h ° mC '|3 he bHter-nai 1 concentrated its efforts on the Nl F.

tath of fis an 1 was studiously avoided by his colleagues tor sovera days
IZ^L These FLOSY tactics produced a record number o men e ;
1.078 during the period of the Mission's five, ay s toy. bu only seventeen
soldiers were slightly wounded as a result After he 4 - Apr. e
disturbances in Crater died down and the trouble centre ransfen d j tl e
dusty desert town of Shaikh Uthman on the other side ot the Colony . where
something of a takeover bid was in progress.

In the meantime the Mission had come to a decision. At around mid-day
on the 5 April thev informed the High Commission that they washed o v sit
the al Mansura jail, which at this time held one hundred and twelve
detainees. The arrangements were duly made and at about 5 pm three cais
flying UN flags and escorted bv Aden Civil Police arrived outs.de the
prison gates. The sound of firing from nearby Shaikh Uthman could he
heard in the distance. The inside of al Mansura was arranged in live
one-storev blocks. Each block was built in the shape of a hollow square and
surrounded bv wire. As soon as the three diplomats arrived in the prison
the detainees crowded to the wire and began howling abuse and
obscenities, having been ordered bv their parent organisations to have
nothing lo do with the United Nations. The diplomats, whose knowledge
of the local idiom was weak were under the impression that this was some
f orm of jovous Arabian welcome and advanced accordingly, waving with
ci, gnity to the detainees on either side. Kifai. their pleasant Syrian
"Uerpreter. quir.klv disillusioned them and the three men retreated into a

114

hurt huddle.

Appeals to the detainees to come forward and present their views onlv
brought forth further invective. The detainees were beginning to enjov
themselves and were encouraged by the sound of firing which was drawino
over nearer the prison gates. Kventually to their delight the 'camp idiot"
announced that be was prepared to address himself to the Mission. After
much palaver a sack was placed over his head to conceal his identity and he
was led to the three men. What he said and whether they gained any benefit
from it remains a mystery, although later the Mission claimed to have
interviewed a member of FLOSY. A grenade exploded four hundred yards
down the road and men of the Anglian Regiment guarding the prison were
coming under increasing fire. In such circumstances it was decided to lift
the Mission out by helicopter. A Wessex arrived. The Mission climbed
aboard and were fired on as the aircraft flew over the prison. The Mission
appeared to have been badly shaken by their experiences but their only
recorded comment was that they 'would not fly in the machine again' since
they said it was smelly and had poor vision through its windows.

As the United Nations' Mission was leaving al Mansura the fighting in
Shaikh Uthman was reaching its height. All day the Anglians, supported
by armoured cars, had been rooting out snipers. By early evening all
resistance was over except for a pocket holding out in the Al Nur mosque.
Under the rules, mosques could not be searched or attacked by British
troops whose infidel presence in the holy places would have given offence
to the Muslim population and provided ammunution for Cairo
propaganda. Federal Army troops were therefore called in to clear the
mosque and a company arrived from the nearby Lake Lines training camp.
Without any hesitation the Arab troops raced to their positions and in a tew
moments had assaulted and occupied the mosque. The defenders escaped
over the back wall. Keen observers noted that as the Federal troops
approached the white walls the firing died away and there were no
casualties.

When the Mission had had iheir meeting with the High Commission
thev had asked that broadcasting facilities be arranged for them. 5>ir
Richard explained that the local Arabic radio and television station, me
South Arabian Broadcasting Service, was under the control of the FBCle
government but foresaw no difficulty. Their first communique, a tw
statement of arrival, was broadcast the same day. On their return trom
Mansura the Mission let it be known that they wished to address .
people of Aden and South Arabia' on the following day. A o ^
television camera team and a representative of the High Commissto
Federal Ministry of National Guidance were lold to report to the £>ea\ ^
9.30 am to record the statement, but it was not until 12. :K) pm < ^
Mission eventually appeared and delivered Iheir statement. 1 he tap ^ g
then taken to Husain Bavumi. the Federal minister concerr ' cd - . tJjd
request that it be broadcast at 8 pm that night. For the moment Bayi
nothing. Later i n the afternoon, when joined by Obali and Naiqa, •

1 15

laved

, the tape. Alreadv upset at the lack of acknowledgement to
mi "'Tt?ors and" the fact that the'rcquesl for broadcasting had been made
the " oh the High Commission, they were deeply outraged by what they
thr0 j°Obali realising that the British would try to bring pressure to bear to
h : fs broadcast took the tape off to al Ittihadand hid it undera cushion.
f ° r if s interesting to studv the statement because it reflects the Mission's
rff ' iltv with their terms of reference which endorsed the Committee of
ol on Colonialism calling for the -abolition of the puppet Federal
rnvernmenf. After giving the United Nations' background to the
M ssiotvs task t he statement went on: 'In the territory we have been in touch
•ith the Hi°h Commissioner and his staff as representatives of the United
Kingdom which is responsible to the United Nations as the administering
nower It is with them that we will deal officially in the territory and not
with the Federal Government. We insist oil having assurance from the
administering power that wc will have full opportunity of free and
unimpeded contacts with representatives of all shades of opinion. It is in
this manner and onlv so that the Mission will be able to discharge its
responsibilitv. To this end the Mission has let it be known by Press and
Radio and we repeat it here that wo would like to encourage anyone who
wishes to get in touch with the Mission to do so — '

The statement wont on 'Our visit yesterday to detainees at al Mansura
was another reminder of how important it is for this country to be liberated
from colonial rule. Once this goal has been achieved the energies of this
young people and their brothers outside the prison walls will be available

to build up their own independent country in unity and peace '

On the first point the Federal government felt that to broadcast this
would clearly reveal them as 'the puppets of the British - that the United
Nations claimed they were. It would he a clear admission that they had no
power of their own and would completely undermine their authority . They
also regarded the Mission's call forall shades of opinion to come forward as
blatantly insincere.

liver since the Mission had arrived in Aden. Federal ministers,
supporters of the Federal government and representatives of various
moderate parties still in existence such as the South Arabian League and
'he United National Party, had been ringing up the Seaview to obtain a
hearing and had been rudely turned away.

On the second point, the Federal government felt this was clear
encouragement to FLOSY and the N T LF with whom they were engaged in a
fight for survival. The 'energies of those outside the prison walls' was
Presumably a reference to the terrorists who were daily trying to ki 11 British
and Scleral troops and their supporters. Lastly the Federal government
n °ted that there was no appeal for an end to the violence which had
Dr °ught the territory to a virtual state of civil war and had seriously
m Pairod the Mission's own chances of success.

Only in the late afternoon did the High Commission learn of the Federal
government's intention. Desperate efforts and telephone calls were made

11(>

to regain the tape but it was loo late. Obali had it hidden under the purple
and gold cushions on his sofa. Back in the Seaview the Mission had settled
down in front of the television waiting lor themselves to appear. At 8 pm a
notice appeared on the screen to the effect that this was the Federal
Television Station and any announcement on it could only he made with
the consent of the Federal government, then the programmes continued
w ith a popular cowboy serial. The three members of the Mission were
furious. They regarded the affront as a del iberate plot by the British to force
them to deal with the Federal government and have never accepted any
other explanation. They pointed out correctly that nobody had bothered to
inform them of the trouble although on the other hand Obali later claimed
to have tried to contact them by telephone three times but had had the
receiver slammed down on him on each occasion as soon as he revealed his
identity. Very shortly after the non-broadcast they decided to pack their
bags and leave. On the following morning they received a telegram from U
Thant telling them to remain and Sir Richard Tumbull expressed hisregret
at the decision, but they remained obdurate. Later at a press conference in
Geneva on the 10 April. Perez-Guerrero stated 'nobody had prevailed upon
them to stay' and complained that the security restrictions had effectively
cut them off from the people. In reply to a question as to why they did not
see the Federal government 'as one of the varying shades of opinion' he
recalled that the United Nations' Resolution had described this
government as 'unrepresentative' and added that it would therefore 'have
run counter to the Resolution if the Mission had had any official contacts
with the Federal Government'. 'The Mission had had discussions with the
South Arabian League representatives in both Cairo and Jiddah but in Aden
the position was different'

The Mission issued no statement about its impending departure but the
news had quickly leaked out so that as they lefl the hotel they were forced
to give an impromptu press conference to about fifty correspondents
gathered outside. The throe diplomats, who had already struck a new low
in the art of publ ic relations, attempted to fob off their quest ions with a few
photographs and a bald statement of departure. Then matters were made
more difficult by an unexpected intervention. ,

Ever since the Aden Airways explosion the previous autumn the Roya
Air Force had tightened up security. No passenger was allowed to board *"
aircraft without having his baggage thoroughly searched. Because ot e
suddenness of the Mission's departure, this procedure had not pe
explained and a squad of RAF Police turned up to search the Miss ^ e
baggage in private at the hotel. For a moment Guerrero looked as 1
would comply but his two more volatile companions soon made it p
that thev considered it an insult that the suggestion had ever been ih °^" h
of. let alone applied to them. Keita pointed out that in any case the u
would look foolish if something had been placed amongst the l ^ ( f he
Shalizi declaimed that if his suitcase was touched 'then the baggage _
British Ambassador in Afghanistan would be searched seven days a v

117

•« time the press had caught on and began crowding around asking
By c This infuriated Shalizi, who blamed them for the Mission's lack
questions- ■ ^ ^ suitcasc he staled lhat ,he search

° f '"'hf into question his honour as a diplomat. The RAF MCO in charge,
br0U ght in find , ng himse , f in the front Une 0 f a diplomatic

'"MS and secure in his regulations, took this opportunity to interrupt:
!° , U the <\f«han that his honour was risking the lives of one hundred and
, ? npoolp 'Mv honour, my honour above all.' was the response.
,h !I^ P too much for the press who had been watching proceedings
]\ , n orv delight: even to those who had observed United Nations' antics
■ V ' 1p f'nn°o thts was to be something of a collectors piece.

2nd vour honour.' a voice shouted. 'It's not only my honour but my
nrinciplcs are also at stake,' retorted Shalizi. «F... your principles, the
Zmo voice came back. Then followed a heated exchange in which some
^ unkind things were said about Venezuela. Mali and Afghanistan and
Mr Shalizi let himself go with some equally unkind remarks about the
United Kingdom.

•Can we quote you?' howled the press.

'Yes vou bloodv well can!' bellowed Shalizi, and quote him they did. For
the first and perhaps onlv time in his life the Afghan made world headlines,
destroying completely the assertion that the Mission was or had at any time
been impartial. , ,

Up to this point, Keita had appeared lobe enjoying himself but now with
a flourish of his leopard skin briefcase he entered the arena.

'I am not a terrorist.' he announced with dignity.

'Well vou look like one,* somebody told him.

Pandemonium broke out. but suddenly everybody realised that things
had gone far enough.

A considerably embarrassed Guerrero stepped in. The baggage was
searched and the other hundred or so passengers who had spent ninety
minutes sweltering in their seats on Khormaksar airfield were relieved to
hear that the three were finally on their way.

The Mission s topped off in Rome to pour out their troubles to U Thant
and then to Geneva for further brushes with the press and a return to
comparative obscurity.

Chapter VII

Change at the Top

May-June 1967

Not only have we every confidence in Sir Richard but we also have a
profound admiration for him.

Lord Shackleton
Aden, 13 April 1967

The echoes of the United Nations' debacle resounded through the corridors
of Whitehall. George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, quickly denied
allegations by the Mission that British non-co-operation had led to it
failing its task and tried to placate the members when the Mission arrived
in London on a second visit. Quite obviously something was wrong with
Britain's South Arabian policy. The Cabinet acted immediately and
appointed Lord Shackleton. a senior Labour peer and son of the Arctic
explorer, Minister with special responsibility lor South Arabia.

The concern of the Cabinet was reflected in subsequent exchanges in
Parliament. George Brown informed a crowded House that he was puzzled
hv rumours of British non-co-operation.

Philip Noel Baker sprung to the defence of the Mission. 'Who', he
demanded, 'launched the lying rumours which were deliberately designed
to make the Mission look anti-British and ridiculous?' He then called for a
complete reappraisal of the situation and consultations with all parties,
including FLOSY.

The Foreign Secretary, why at this time had not seen the Mission since
their trip to Aden, could only repeat the bare facts of departure. He
acknowledged that the United Nations' Resolutions prevented the Mission
from dealing with the Federal government and that this had given rise to
some difficulty even before they had ever set foot in Aden. The For ^Jj
Secretary went out of his way to affirm confidence in Sir Richard Turn u
and his staff and at the same time announced the departure ot lo
Shackleton. i( j

For the Conservative opposition. Sir Alec Douglas Home also p_
tribute to the High Commissioner but pressed for Lord Shackleton s e ^
of reference. George Brown seemed unwilling or unable to give them rove
stressed the need for having a senior minister on the spot to ,m ? he
communications with the government and confirmed his confidence 1 ^
High Commissioner. Yet it was clear to all that Shackleton's appoint

11!)

26 Sir Richard TumbuJI with Lord ShuckJeton

was an affront to the High Commissioner. At the very least it suggested that
the Cabinet considered that Sir Richard could not cope on his own ian y
longer. It also made things very difficult for him. He would be obliged to et
Shackleton make all the decisions although he would still bear the
responsibility for the results. II was explained that Shackleton s
appointment was on the same lines as Macmillans mission to Algeria
during the Second World War. although this did little to dispel speculation
that the Cabinet was unhappy about its High Commissioner and
particuarlv his handling of the Mission. Sir Richard could have countered
but didn't, that the blame if anv lav with Lord Caradon and the British
Delegation at the United Nations who had foisted upon him a mission
whose charter was unworkable and whose members impossible. A
scapegoat had to be found for the fiasco and there was not much doubt as to
who it was going to be.

Not unnaturally rumours about the future of the High Commissioner
began to appear in the press. Reports of impending resignation were firmly
rebutted bv the Foreign Office shortly after the Mission had departed. Sir
R| chard himself never considered it: he considered that he was the best
man lor the job and that it was his duty to soldier on. Both Lord Shackleton
a "d Ceorge Brown in their public statements encouraged him to believe
•hat the government at home still had every confidence in him. Just the

120

same, whispers that all was not well continued to circulate.

Personally Sir Richard had nothing to gain by continuing i n 0 ffi Ce
except added lustre to an already distinguished career. A tall benign
fifty-eight, as a colonial administrator he had played a major role in
crushing the Mau VJau. Later as governor in Tanganika he had guided that
country to successful independence. In South Arabia the task was more
difficult. He had the complex job of holding the ring whilst the government
decided whether it wanted to support the Federal government or not, to
crush terrorism without the political backing which might have enabled
him to do it effectively and to bring to the conference table militants who
plainly would not come.

To the outside world the High Commissioner wore his troubles lightly.
He relaxed by going for long treks over Aden's hills and by teaching his
parrot the Lord's Prayer. Sir Richard had his own particular brand of
humour which may not have been appreciated or even understood by his
political masters in London.

Shackleton wasted little time. He gathered together a team of civil
servants led by Samuel Falle, an Arabist specially borrowed from the High
Commission in Malaysia and arrived in Aden on 12 April, From their
headquarters in the 'Princess Alexandra' suite at Government House 'the
team' as it became known, set about trying to contact and assess the various
South Arabian parties who were struggling for power.

Shackleton was not the only British emissary to appear in Aden at
around this time. That stormy petrel of politics and outspoken critic of the
Federal government, Tom Driberg. MP for Barking, had preceded him by a
fortnight. As a socialist he has espoused common cause with socialists the
world over and in the case of South Arabia the party he had chosen to
support was FLOSY. Presumably with at least the unofficial blessing of the
Foreign Secretary he set out to contact Abdullah al Asnag in the guise of a
reporter of the Evening Standard. Arriving in Aden via Khartoum where he
made contact with Grenadier' Khalifa he was soon to be seen in the
company of FLOSY personalities. The High Commission knew nothing of
his arrival until he was found in a bar by a political officer on the day of the
Mission's departure. Using his FLOSY contacts Driberg made the trip to
Taiz and saw al Asnag. According to Hussain Bavvazir, a leading FLOSY
commando and Trades Union leader, who escorted him. the conversations
were brief. What astonished Bawazir most of all was the aplomb with which
the Member of Parliament had driven with armed 'commandos' throug
road blocks manned by British troops. Nothing seems to have come of the
visit and Uriberg contented himself with an article and speculation on
future of the High Comrn issioner. .

When he arrived in South Arabia Lord Shackleton may have snar
Driborg's views on FLOSY. but he had gone to South Arabia with an op ^
mind and as he and his team pursued their inquiries they slowly cam
tho reluctant conclusion that the High Commission were right after a

121

The general calibre of the Federal government appalled most visitors but
as one High Commission official, paraphrasing a famous remark, pointed
out. The Federal government are no great shakes but they are the best
government we've got.' There was nobody to take the places of the Federal
ministers who. together with their advisers, pressed their case hard. Both
militant organisations. FLOSY and the NLF. had taken up extreme
Positions and would only negotiate if everybody else was left out.

Taiz Radio underlined the militants' position. 'FLOSY refuses to hold
any official or unofficial talks with the British Government unless the
P u PPet South Arabian Federal Government is abolished. British
Occupation forces pulled out and FLOSY recognised as the only
representative organ of the people in the South.' This moved Lord
ahackleton to replv. 'It's time we stopped exchanging remarks at long
range.'

. FLOSY was also losing the battle with the NLF. Further. Shackleton's
5*yesligators soon exploded the myth that Asnag was all-powerful in the
I e ' n tr «des union movement. One by one the Aden trades unions had
awa y ""oni the FLOSY- dominated Aden Trades Union Congress.
- b>lft r.ted their own leaders and declared for the NLF. This was not

122

because they necessarily supported the NLF, most had only the vagu es t
idea of its organisation. The reason was, it provided a revolutionarv
alternatve to Asnag. FLOSY was also losing popularity among the ordinary
Adonis.

On the 29 April seven children were killed and thirteen others injured
when their school taxis exploded on a mine. It had been laid on a dirt trac k
near the Federal army training camp at Lake Lines in Shaikh Uthman and
may have been intended for British observation vehicles that often parked
near the spot.

The crime was loudly denounced by FI.OSY. Kurmarianos, an Egyptian
Greek who was running the Taiz Radio English Service, accused the
British, pinpointing an official in the High Commission as the man
responsible. Few believed the fiction, certainly not the womenfolk
searching the wreckage for the satchels and plimsoles of their children.
One of these, contorted with grief, began to tear at her clothes, screaming
curses at FLOSY and the Egyptians before being led sobbing from the scene
by her family. This mine incident, which took place in 'FLOSY territory',
highlighted the indiscriminate nature of terrorism.

Similarly, out of Aden in the Protectorates, traditional enemies of the
rulers and other dissidents all tended to support the NLF because FLOSY
was becoming more and more identified with the urban Adenis. The old
rivalry was assorting itself. Tribesmen would take arms and money from
FLOSY but resented any attempt at control. The NLF, with most of its
loaders under house arrest in Cairo, made little attempt to do so. This
appealed to the independent tribal spririt so they called themselves NLF.
NLF stood lor complete change but had no visible leaders and few
Spokesmen. Nobody, whether it was Qahlan al Shaabi in his Cairo villa, the
union leaders in Aden or the tribal rebels, realised the full extent of its
power or the magic of its name. Because of its lack of organisation it was
impossible for the British. FLOSY or the Federal government to crush. It
was also impossible to contact the NLF as there was nobody with the
authority to speak on its behalf. Gradually a brotherhood was born. The
success of the Aden branch against FLOSY earnt the NLF considerable
prestige in the Colony and support for it grew steadily.

On 7 May Shackleton. Turnbull and Caradon arrived in London for talks
at the Foreign Office concerning the role Britain wanted the United Nations
to play. The three-man mission was at last reported to have told Britain the
terms under which it would return to Aden. The same day the leaders ot
FLOSY and the NLF were reported in Cairo ironing out their differences.
The Mission never returned, the differences were never ironed out u .
oven as he reached London Airport. Sir Richard's fate had been fina 3
decided. , of .

There are various versions of how Sir Richard was dismissed. C* 00 ^'
Brown gave his in an article in The Sunday Times on 7 April ^'"^.^
another point in the Aden saga when I felt that I had to make the s ^ sir
from Sir Richard Turnbull. the very distinguished Governor of Aden, o

123

'Hilary
dinary

28 Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, Britain's last High Commissioner in South Arabia

Humphrey Trevelyan, I doubt that it could have been done as easily in any
other atmosphere. One of (lie most painful things that I ever had to do was
to tell Sir Richard that I had decided to make the change. I remember telling
him over the side of the fire, over a very relaxed drink, after he had clearly
come to tell me how successful he was. He left the room nobly, whereas he
and I know that he must have been the most disappointed, perhaps the
most stunned man on earth. I then called Trevelyan in round the same fire. . .'

This is a curious story as even the Foreign Secretary must have known
that the news had already been leaked and the newspapers were full of
rumours. When the Foreign Secretary eventually made his statement to the
House ol Commons he "very much regretted the leaks'.

There was considerable sympathy in Aden for the High Commissioner
and anger at the summary fashion in which he had been treated. On Sir
fhg c ard ' S r0t . Um from London he **as met by all heads of department and
support " e C:hif!ts Wh ° lurned U P ;lt thc airport to greet him in a gesture of

that h 6 0n '" V rCas0n George Brown ever gave for dismissing Sir Richard was
Treveltr a v rc !P ladn " an administrator with a diplomat. In Sir Humphrey
statu/ 3 ciiplomat Par excellence. Early in his career his small

He U^ nd [Jromi nerit ears earned Sir Humphrey the sobriquet of 'Jumbo'.
Khrus h U0SSeC ' swords 10 arivan lagc with both President Nasser and
^osco Tl U ' 1Rrl ,lnldin 8 the P° sts of British Ambassador in Cairo and
fos mind W8S nothing va C'Hating about Sir Humphrey. He made up
quickly and decisively. Moreover, he possessed an uncanny

124

diplomatic sixth sense which enabled him to forecast the trend of events
and adjust his mood to thai of the people with whom he dealt. These
qualities quickly won him the confidence of his staff.

On arrival in Aden Sir Humphrey called for the formation of a 'central
caretaker government, broad based and representing the whole of South
Arabia'. To this end ho proclaimed himself ready to talk with any South
Arabian party. He added 'It is clearly necessary that all violence should
stop, it is intolerable that all efforts to make progress towards
independence should be threatened by a handful of people acting in a way
totally opposed to the true interests of South Arabia.' This was a clear
invitation for the militants to come forward. There was no response. This
utter lack of co-operation on behalf of the militants was a further factor
which helped persuade t.ord Shackleton to support the Federal
government; another was the Arabs' June war with Israel.

Only people who have lived amongst the Arabs can really appreciate the
intensity of emotion with which they regard the problem of Palestine. Over
tho years it has become more than just a question of 'occupied' land. For
centuries Jews have lived amongst Arabs and have generally been treated
as an inferior race. The very existence of Israel is not only an affront to Arab
self-respect but is regarded by them as a slur on Arab manhood. Every
subsequent defeat only intensifies the feeling. Jews were seen as merchants
and artisans, rarely soldiers, a community useful as a source of wealth and

The opening moves of the crisis, the withdrawal of the United Nations'
troops, the Egyptian occupation of Sharm al Shaikh and the closing of the
Straits of Tiran, were closely followed in South Arabia. The unexpected
pact between President Nasser and King llussain was hailed as a victory
for Arab unity and both the Federal government and the Aden Trades
Union Congress proclaimed their support and called for volunteers to
fight bv the side of the Arab armies.

As soon as news of the fighting broke out all else was forgotten. The first
reports from Cairo claiming the destruction of four hundred Israeli planes
were greeted with cheers and crowds formed in the streets to listen to
transistors. Slowlv other reports filtered through and as the days passed tn
overwhelm ing extent of Arab disaster became known. The early jubilation
was replaced bv a fierce anger. Much of the bitterness was directed again*
the Egyptians. For years the Arabs had been deluged with propagan^^
proclaiming Egyptian military invincibility. The reputation 01
Egyptian armv had been more than a little tarnished by its P Brforinan ' kets
the Yemen, but the innumerable photographs of tanks, aircraft and ro
had convinced many people that only a smali portion of their forces e.
be involved there. . , ut in

The undeniable fact that this magnificent army had been wipea ^
three days was unbelievable. Stories that the rockets were m< -
cardboard and the Egyptian officers had deserted their men abo ^
Reports, never confirmed, said two battalions of the FLOSY l

125

wimt) three hundred Yafais under training in Egypt, had been sent to
Arm ( ' ' nt -md annihilated south of the Mitla Pass when they refused to
the t havin» been deserted bv the Egyptians on either side of them, were
re -Hv believed and increased the conviction that the Kgyptians had not
It is well as thev might have. Scapegoats had to be found. President
f< ? er's assertion that British and American planes had aided the Arab
j foal received a mixed reception. Some believed it because they wanted
Others wanted to but were unable to reconcile the truth of the claim with
!h evidence of their own eves. The British were not slow in giving
maximum publicity to the presence in Aden Harbour of the aircraft earner
HMS Hermes which the Egyptians alleged had supplied many ot the
aircraft which had helped the Israelis. The people's anger turned on the

l0< In 1948 Aden had a colony of over ten thousand Jews. The founding of
[snel riots and the ever-present threat of violence at the hands of their
Arab neh'hhours hud steadilv reduced the Jewish community. In June 1967
only around six hundred remained. Shortly after the crisis broke two
elderly jews were attacked and beaten to death by a mob in Crater. The
remainder rushed to sell their shops and businesses and the High
Commission, realising that thev could no longer guarantee their safety,
made arrangements for them all to leave. Charter aircraft, some laid on by
the British Zionist Association, ferried the Jews of Aden to new lands and a
new life. There were harrowing scenes at the airport where families refused
to part Willi great bundles of household goods, not believing they would be
forwarded on. By the middle of June only one Jew remained— an old man
who steadfastly refused to leave the land of his birth.

The Adonis did not seem to be aware of the Jewish exodus and the
destruction of Jewish property continued. In desperation Arab merchants
who had bought Jewish businesses hung large notices outside such as 'This
property is owned by Muhammad Ahmad Bazara, an Arab and a patriot',
often to no avail. One of the first targets was the Marina Hotel in the
Crescent area of Steamer Point. It was soon reduced to a smoking ruin by
incendiaries. Looting was prevalent. British troops, later replaced by Aden
Armed Police, stood guard over the property concerned. In the latter
instance this only tended to regulate the looting as the policemen were not
unknown to pocket a fee to allow a looter a -lucky dip' amongst the debris.
In Crater the Armed Police themselves looted a Jew's house in Section A
and openly auctioned the contents in the street.

In the Protectorates there were anti-Israeli demonstrations, and from the
"ills of Haushabi came a macabre story of a tribesman who burnt his wife
alive because her grandfather had been a Jew.

The Federal ministers, who could barely conceal their satisfaction at the
reversal to Egyptian arms, were deeply shocked by President Nasser's
subsequent resignation. They had little reason to love the man whose
actions were largely responsible for bringing their country to the edge of
ru 'n. He had caused each of them to be 'sentenced to death' and day by day

126

Cairo Radio had heaped instills upon them. But such is the charismaf
appeal of Nasser that, like many other Arabs, the Federal ministers ha'd
difficulty in reconciling a great Arab leader with the deeds of the Fevm; 1
government.

News of President Nasser's return was received with a mixture of relief
and jubilation amongst the ordinary people. Curiously, although the
Egyptians began to be despised and hated by those who had lived under
their rule in the Yemen, the reputation of the President was not seriously
affected until the affair of Hakim Amcr's 'suicide' two months later.*

A lasting effect of the June War on South Arabia was the closing of the
Suez Canal. Aden bad founded her prosperity on bunkering ships passin"
up and down the Red Sea. With the Canal closed there were no ships, the
great harbour was empty except for a few dhows and trade brought to a
standstill. Even before the war terrorism had seriously affected the
economy. In 1962 over 203,000 tourists had stepped ashore to purchase tax
free bargains, in 1966 this had dropped to 120.000, the first five months of
1967 brought 6,000. June brought 2.

The Arab-Israeli War also had a profound effect on the Yemen. The
Yetnen civil war had been in one of its periodic stages of stalemate, the
Royalists controlling most of the north and east. The Republicans had forty
thousand Egyptian troops holding the coastal plain and the main cities of
the south and west. Shortly after hostilities commenced Egyptian Air Force
units in the Yemen left forSinai. Numbers of troops were also withdrawn,
Some of those Egyptian soldiers were captured by the Israelis. They
complained they had no knowledge of where they were, no maps and no
idea of whom they were fighting.

Despite the warnings of their leaders the Royalist tribesmen thought the
Egyptians had gone for good. Breaking out of their mountain strongholds
they swarmed down the coastal plain, over-running the town of Haradh
and nearby port of Maidi. Whilst laying siege to the fishing port of Lialiya
some five thousand were caught in the open by remnants of the returning
Egyptian Air Force and an armoured column operating out of the Egyptian
base at Abs. The tribesmen were decimated and driven back to
their hills with great slaughter. Egyptian bombing of the tribes
recommenced with redoubled ferocity. There were reports of gas attacks
from all parts of Royalist Yemen. One report spoke of three hundred and
seventy five casualties in the village of Maibar near Hajja, which had been
occupied following the Egyptian withdrawal. None the less, the majority of
the Egyptian Army units lo survive the Israeli holocaust were in the Yemen
and their return home became a matter of necessity. Continued Egypt' 311

' Field Marshall Hakim Amer. Deputy President of the United Arab Republic and ''^"^J
friend of Nasser, was d ismissed following the June War. He was later arrested on 2 Sep t - {g
charged with negligence leading lo the Egyptians' defeat and being involved in a I . j( j e
overthrow the President. On 15 September i'l was announced that ho had committed s " hoot
rather than face trial. A story widely believed was that tie had been poisoned with or w
the President's knowledge.

127

-pare in the Yemen was impossible. They were soon making plans for a
final withdrawal.

The British forces in South Arabia were also beginning their phased
■ 'thdrawal. The first combat troops to leave were the South Wales
Borderers and at the end of April the evacuation of service families.
■Operation Relative'. Iiegan with Ihe deparlure of a VClO from Khormaksar
,. irrv ing eighty-eight wives and children. Eight thousand were to be flown
out within the next three months.

For ten years the serviceman's wife and children had been an integral
part of the Aden scene, contributing much of its economy and adding to its
gaiety.

Soon ihe girls sunning themselves on the beaches of the Tarshyne Club
and the Lido were gone for ever. Gone too were the tedious guards kept day
and night on the service blocks in the Maalla Straight and the four while
buses, heavily protected with rnesh wireand armed escorts, which drove in
tight convoy twice daily from Maalla lo Steamer carrying the children to
school.

An official estimate pul (he direct contribution of service families lo
Aden's economy al fifteen million pounds per annum. The total
contribution of the services was around nineteen and a half million
pounds. Their departure considerably increased Aden's economic woes.
The base employed around sixteen thousand workers and several thousand
others depended indirectly upon it lor their monthly wage. Too late union
leaders such as Ali Abdul Rahman Aswadi. FLOSY leader of the Forces'
Union, realised that by demanding Ihe removal of the base they had talked
themselves out of a job. By the end of July the unofficial total of
unemployed had risen to about thirty thousand. For the moment Ihe effect
was cushioned by the granting of generous redundancy benefits and Ihe
departure of many of ihe workers to their homes in Ihe Yemen, the
Protectorates and Somalia. [I would be some months before the full impact
ol what was happening struck home.

After the end of the Israeli War the dockers, in obedience to Cairo,
boycotted British and American ships. For a shorl while this seriously
|mpeded the steady transfer of the British base to Bahrain. A large generator
•n particular was a problem because it was far too heavy to airfreight. The
uirticu It y was solved by a Russian cargo ship unable to get home because of

' blocked Suez Canal. Business being business, ihe world over, the
captain readily agreed to make two trips to Bahrain carrying Ihe generator
as well as other equipment.

Egyptian action in closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and the
Question of freedom of the seas which it raised highlighted the position of
Rr 'm Island at the southern end of the Red Sea. strategically placed in the
il! Mandeb, the 'Gate of Tears'.* Whoever occupies the island can

s'Vprsj'.'" 5 ! tr ! "'"I'ljon llifl Straits .sained their name because it was at this point that early Arab
■'"null thi.<r human cargoes across from Africa to the markets of Arabia.

128

theoretically control shipping passing through the Straits. George Brown
offered the island to the United Nations, envisaging some form 0 f
international control. On 31 August the thirteen Arab nations wrote to U
Thant vigorously opposing the offer and the matter was then dropped.

This was no surprise. Ever since the British first arrived in Perim in 1799
everything that they touched had been doomed to spectacular failure.

The island is two miles from the Yemeni mainland. It is flat and strewn
with black boulders, the desolation relieved only by a solitary tree, it is one
of the most forlorn places on earth. In 1H57 the British formally took
possession of the island and it became part of the Settlement of Aden. For
some time Aden sent a Commissioner to administrate the small fishing
village and the embryo coaling station which was growing up there. This
was not a popular posting. Legend has it that one incumbent was met by a
senior official of the Colonial Office walking down the Strand. It
subsequently transpired that for a number of years he had been
administering Perim through the agency of his Indian clerk from the
comfort of a London flat.

For a time the coaling station prospered and the island boasted an hotel
amongst its facilities. In the late twenties the manager of the coaling station
realised that greater profit could be gained if one hag in three humped
aboard ships bv the coolies was dropped over the far side into the sea. A
dredger prudently parked around the corner would emerge after the ship
had departed to recover the coal which would then be resold to the next
caller. Gradually' the word got around and the company went bankrupt.
The manager went insane, burning all records including those of the
government and departed together with what was left of the cash. The hotel
was abandoned and the houses of the workers fell into disrepair, giving the
island an added touch of eerie dilapidation.

In 1963 following the British withdrawal from Somaliland it was
decided to set up a relav station for the BBC Overseas Service which had
formerly been sited in Hargaisha. On 31 March 1963, shortly after _tne
station came into operation, it was burnt down in a mysterious tire, mis
project was then abandoned. . ,

Britain's plans to internationalise the island once more put Perim inn .
news and a partv of journalists accompanied Leslie V\.nk
Commissioner for Perim' on one of his last visits of inspection. 1 he pw
touched down on the rough landing strip and was greeted by *
electrician and the lighthouse keeper, who stood stiffly to atten ■
saluting with opposite hands. The Commissioner gravely returneci .1 ^
greeting. A few moments later a Landrover. one ol the is ana ;
veh icles. appeared bumping over the boulders flying the Union Jack 1 p
down. It carried Muhammad Shabir. a little round Adeni of uncertai. ^
who was our man in Perim' and had been on the island as long as any ■

could remember. . (our of

Muhammad was delighted with the unexpected guests- a ^
inspection began with a visit to the immaculately kept lighthous

129

■ omnor dutifullv signed an exercise book which had been in
the COm vo l sinr^ th ighthoJse had begun its operations in 1924 La.er
service eve since i « , vided by the island s Armed

, he Commissioner t . hc £ fullv in(licat(!(J the spot where a

P° lice8a T^ P nre the last Englishman to command it. had been
LiCUtC Td toSbv his troops. 'Then as now,' Muhammad beamed in
bay onet cd to cleat ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . fi , h(J Y e „ e „.

mad also told the tale of the coaling company and confided that »n
KjSo^ol manager's clerk he had though, up the scheme. 'Since then.
i.,innd disarminglv. 'I've had promotion.
Much imp resstid I he par t y moved on to the ramshackle village. Here the
m nhab tant a reputed one hundred and four years old who had
° l f H s t d e in 1918. was wheeled out for inspection. This ancient
t'etn o' l^occainal 'praise be to God' and dribbled fitfully into his
Sard vvhist the press stood around drinking lukewarm peps, cola and

" NoSo^" m is complete without a study of the graveyard and the
visit was rounded off with a look at a £30,000 recreation centre. I was
ompleted three months or so after the station was burnt down and had
bei intended for the staff of the relay station. It stands today as a
monument to the British taxpayer.

Lord Shackleton returned to London from Aden on the 30 May. his
mission completed. George Drown then studied his report and the
recommendations of the new High Commissioner. On 19 June he r ore.gn
Secretary announced to the House of Commons that the British
government could supply £10 millions' more aid in the lorm ol
monev. armoured cars and field artillery for the South Arabian Army and a
military mission after independence to help with advice.

The announcement was a supreme example of a decision taken loo late.
Years of vacillation and indecision had taken their toll. Kven as the Foreign
Secretary was speaking events were in train that would make his efforts a
useless exercise. On the following day, 20 June, the South Arabian Army
mutinied. The Federal government were doomed and British influence in
South Arabia with them. Empires are not lost or made by momentous
decision but by the smallest changes in policy. The margin of error is often
no wider than a minister's pending tray.

Chapter VIII

The Mutiny

19 June-2 July

! am sonv but something appears to have gone wrong.

Colonel Sharif I laidar apologising to the
Federal Supreme Council on 4 July 1967.

Mr Fuad Mahfudh Khalifa (who) is a progressive intelligent young
' DrHastgeldi in his report, December 1966.

'Power" mused the Sharif of Baihan. -grows from the edge of a sword' and
with that succinctly summed up his fellow countryman s attitude to
politics. South Arabia is basically a tribal society which has been at war
with itself for centuries. The people have learnt to be canny and cautious^
In the event of any struggle they hold back unti l .hoy see which su , h» he
most strength and the most guns before joinmg . . Once the Br tish f
South Arabia they assumed that the strongest force m the area would ^ he
South Arabian Army. These soldiers were the real kingmakers . he par£
which gained their allegiance would have the strength to crush their
opponents, that which lost it was doomed. riril f,rtions
' .ike the rest of South Arabia the armed forces were riddled ^ ^
and rivalries and although it kept itself in the background during Bnhsn
residency the dominating influence remained tribalism

To understand the history of the force one must go back to 192 1 «
Colonel Lake raised a local Aden militia and with a sl 'P^ ^£ trv .
future political implications named his orce the hirst Yemen Mnfa.
The Colonel had a strong Indian Army background and th oughou ^
historv the force which he raised has been endowed with In .an - $ ,
traditions. liven in 1967 the headquarters were known as Seedasec
after an obscure battle fought by the Maharatta Rog'inen.. «hc buU of
The turbans of the immaculate camel troop seemed to come strain ^
Hyderabad, and polo playing enthusiasts were never lack u g <m H
seconded British Officers. Initially the force had been < les gned to ^
the Governor and political officers on their visits into tl e ™ fron ,
uive support to British and Indian regiments in the event ot >™°* 0 f
The Yemen. In those clays Aden and the Protectorates were , .he p ^ fl
the Roval Air Force and the deterrent threat ol the.r bombing poue q{
rough 'and readv peace. At the same time British policy vv

131

Men o/the Federal forces, mercenary, impulsive and unreliable.

minimum intervention in Protectorate affairs and the number ofoocBMffl*
that the Governor left Aden to visit his charges upcountry wererare mdee*
So Colonel Lakes force had very little to do and was eventually disbanded
in 192:,, only to he reformed in 1928 as the Aden Protectorate , Lev es (APL)
For the next twenty years most of the officers were provided by Ae Royal
Air Force and other lhan exchanging long range l.rc wit h tr. bal < Jssid .its
the force saw little active service. During the Second World War. some
elements were sent to help the British in their Somahland campaign
against the Italians but they arrived too late for the fighting. Around tnc
same time an anti-aircraft battery shot down an Italian bomber during a
raid over Aden. Called into Aden for the first time by St Reginald
Champion during the 1948 Jewish riots the new force behaved so badly mot
the Governor then requested a British battalion be sent to the Colony to
control anv further disturbances.

In early 1955 an APL convoy was ambushed by the Ahl Shams Rabiz. a
dissident tribe in Yemeni pay in theWadi Hatib. Two British officers, an
Arab officer and five Arab soldiers lost their lives. A year later a battalion
was sent to help the Trucial Oman Scouts eject the Saudis horn the Burami
Oasis. They succeeded in their task only to later mutiny, murder two ot
their British officers and be sent home in disgrace. Shortly after this the
administration and training of the force was taken over by the British Army

r.\2

although RAF officers continued to be attached. They showed improved
form in 1958 when after two attempts supported by the Shropshire Light
Infantry and British airpower, a battalion stormed the precipitous Jebel
Jihaf and drove a strong force of Yemeni troops and rebel tribesmen back
over the Yemen Dhala border.

The formation of the Federation, Kgyptian presence in the Yemen and
the subsequent troubles in Aden and the Protectorates gave added
importance to the force. It already had good supporting and ancillary units
including a first class signals regiment. RAF-run hospital and a squadron
of Ferret armoured cars. The force changed its name in 1961 and became
tho Federal Regular Army and in 1964 a fifth battalion was raised.

Parallel to the evolution of the Federal Army was that of the Federal
Guard. In the late 1930s, when political officers were concentrating their
efforts on bringing peace to the tribes and opening up the roads, the
choleric but occasionally brilliant Lord Belhaven realised the need for a
local force to help maintain internal security. As a result the government
and tribal guards were formed. Al the birth of the Federation these two
forces were handed over to the control of the Federal Ministry of Internal
Security and renamed Federal Guard I and Federal Guard II. Federal Guard
I was based on Champion lines and operated throughout the Federation
except, of course, Aden Colony. The Federal Guard II operated only within
their own state borders. Aden Colony had an unarmed Civil Police which
wore supported by the two hundred and fifty strong Aden Armed Police
who acted as a riot squad and guarded banks and government buildings.
The chief difference in training between the Federal Guard and Federal
Regular Army was that the former were an armed police force while officers
and men of the latter received a more sophisticated training. Another
important difference was the system of promotion. Officers of the Federal
Guard were nearly all commissioned after training and drawn from the
tribal aristocracy. All Federal Regular Army officers worked their way up
through the ranks. Promotion was by merit only and reduced nepotism toa
minimum. Consequently a middle class of men who had reached their
positions by their own skill and determination came into being. To a
certain extent they became detribalised and their traditional allegiances
were worn thin by the passing of time. The social differences between the
Federal Army officer and his Federal Guard colleague was otten
demonstrated when he went back home on leave. It was not unusual to find
a Federal Army Major sitting below the salt whilst a Federal Guard
Lieutenant enjoyed the conversation of his tribal elder of Shaikh. Ihe
thought that the Federal Army might one day assert itself never seemed to
occur to their aristocratic brethren. ,

In the beginning of the Emergency, Federal Army and Federal Guar
units took part in several savagelv fought skirmishes with rebel ban s,
particularly in the Radfan and Dathina. After Lord BesWlc m g
announcement of withdrawal in February 1966 their enthusiasm for
Federal cause began to wane. Nevertheless despite the constant urging

133

30 The Federal forces relied on British air support

Cairo Radio to revolt there were no signs of trouble and the number of
desertions remained insignificant. Whilst they continued to draw their pay
Federal soldiers were content to give lip service to the Federal government,
getting in touch at the same time with NI.F and FLOSY elements. The
Federal Guard in particular were not slow to profit fron the situation.
Manning lonely and remote forts they were difficult to supervise. 'The fort
of Waalan was attacked by the corrupted ones from the north and cast and
firing continued fiercely for four hours. There were no casualties. Please
send forty thousand rounds to replace our ammunition'* was typical of
many telegrams received from Federal posts from the Ministry of Internal
Security at al Ittihad. The ammunition was usually sold and Federal Guard
were not unknown to arrange the 'attacks' or fire on their own fort to get it.
Undoubtedly from the middle of 1966 Federal Army and Federal Guard
officers, whose vehicles were absolved from search, were engaged in
smuggling arms into Aden.

In their search for greater security the Federal government had asked for
British help in increasing the strength of the armed forces. The role of the
Federal Army was extended to include a battery or artillery previously
supplied by British troops. A South Arabian Air Force with jet Provosts.
Uakotas and helicopters was formed with Barry Atkinson, a Royal Air
orce Wing Commander who had previously seen service with the Sultan
Or Muscat's Armed Forces, at its head with maintenance provided by
Airwork and pilots on special contracts. Similarly a South Arabian Navy
Harb ^''''^ ' nsnore minesweepers began to make its appearance in Aden

' Apocryphal but typical.

134

As part of its expansion and co-ordination of the armed forces \U
Federal government increased the size of its army by merging f 0 ^
battalions of Federal Guard with it. The remainder of the Federal Guard I
together with Federal Guard II and later the Aden Civil and Armed Poli ce
were to merge into a single police. The amalgamation took place at^
ceremony attended by Fadhl bin Ali of I.ahej. the Federal defence Minister
on 1 June 1967. the two forces becoming the South Arabian Army and the
South Arabian Police.

The South Arabian Army was commanded by a British officer, Brigadier
Jack Dye, and the problem of who was to succeed h i rn had much exercised
the minds of the Federal government. When the British first raised the Arab
forces they wisely paid strict attention to the tribal balance within them
recruiting was done on a tribal basis and theoretically no tribe was allowed
to exceed its quota. Over the years social and political circumstances had
gradually brought about a breakdown in the system. In 1948 Haidara the
Amir of Dhala, was removed and Dhalais were considered subversive, so
no Dhalais were recruited that year, in the 1950s it was the turn of the Yafais
and so on. Other tribes such as the Baihanis and Lahejis tended to serve for
a short time only and then leave, so reducing their tribes' influence in the
force.

The result was that at the time of the amalgamation the South Arabian
Army was dominated by the Aulaqis who represented 33% of the officers
and 28% of the men.

Under Brigadier Jack Dye, the senior Arab officer was Colonel Nasir
Buraiq Aulaqi, a small pug-like figure who presided over the Seedaseer
Lines headquarters staff. Nasir Buraiq had never commanded a battalion
and rarely moved upcountry. He was a born intriguer and kept a firm hold
over army administration. There was little which escaped his keen eye and
despite the limitations imposed by the British system of army accounting
he contrived to make himself a fortune. Rumour had it that every sweeper,
every contractor employed by the army and many of its soldiers paid the
Colonel his dues. A large block of flats in Shaikh Uthman stood as
testimony to his financial acumen. The British had tried to get rid of him for
years. Brigadier Dye had even gone to the extent of refusing to take up his
appointment until the Colonel resigned. Nasir Buraiq hung on and the
Brigadier was forced to give in. The secret of 'the Colonel's success was
two-fold. Firstly as an Aulaqi he automatically had the support of
Muhammad Farid, the Aulaqi Foreign Minister, secondly he had won the
confidence of Fadhl bin Ali, the Minister of Defence. Fadhl bin Ali was a
shy man and his elevated position in South Arabian aristocracy was a
further barrier to mixing with the hoi pvhi of army officers. Nasir Buraiq
was not deterred. Although he was a man who had risen to a high position
from nothing he made a determined and successful attempt to get on well
with the Sultan. Sultan Fadhl was at first flattered and then interested in the
Colonel's attentions and the two became firm friends. Scarce a night went
by without the Colonel railing upon the Minister in his palace at DarSaad

135

•it and a bunch of qat. Sultan Fadhl fell he knew and trusted Nasir
for a c ia s{aunch j v re f use d to countenance his removal.
BU Q a 'rolonel Nasir Buraiq. as a senior Arab officer, automatically became
u Lander-designate of the South Arabian Army. The choice of
C n H in command was equally difficult. There were two candidates in
S f C °fi Id Lt Colonel Muhammad Ahmad Aulaqi, an able and sophisticated
ffirer who had won the Military Medal in the Wadi Hatib. and Lt Colonel
i rif Haidar the senior Arab officer of the Federal Guard and nephew ol
ft f Sharif of Baihan. Colonel Haidar had long intimated that he would be
re red t0 serve as second in command but not move down into third
nlace Colonel Chaplin, the British Military Secretary in the Federal
Defence Ministry, who had already had a frustrating time trying to get rid
of Nasir Buraiq, threatened to resign unless his recommendation that
Muhammad Ahmad Aulaqi get the job was accepted, on the grounds that
he was a better qualified soldier. The Federal government reluctantly
agreed and an unfortunate compromise was reached. Both men would hold
the appointment of second in command, Colonel Haidar in charge of
administration, Colonel Muhammad in charge of operations, but in the
absence of the commander Colonel Muhammad would take over. In other
words both men were equal bul the Aulaqi was more equal than the other.
In effect not only did the Aulaqis provide the two most senior South
Arabian Army officers but the quartermaster and seven out of ten battalion
commanders were Aulaqi as well.

Colonel Haidar was not taken in by his high-sounding title and set to
work gathering support for a 'redress of grievance' to be submitted to the
Federal Ministry of Defence along with a request for a redistribution of
senior posts. He had little difficulty in his task. The rest of the army was
alarmed and jealous of the Aulaqi predominance and the three most senior
non-Aulaqi colonels agreed to add their names jointly with Haidar on the
petition. *

As was Arab custom the petition went the rounds of the battalions and
others less prominent also appended their names. Behind the scenes
support for Haidar was for thcoming from Colonel Ali bin Ahmad, nephew
of the Minister of Defence and commander-designate of the South Arabian
Police, who did not wish to annoy his uncle by coming into the open.

Armed with their petition and convinced of the justice of their case the
four colonels presented their demands to the Federal government.
Brigadier Dye had just returned from Malta and on the advice of his staff
took firm action and persuaded the Federal government to suspend the
colonels from duty pending investigation. Rumours went through the

AshaP' Y Ure - L ' C '" lo,1 °' Ahmad Muhammad Hassaini of Dathina; LI Colonel Hussuin Uthman
a few , i °'i UaWaa - and l.l Colonel Muhammad .Said of Yalu'. The last named left the army
folWi,!; e . ,0 re,,Jr " "«'»« and look after his brother Haidar released from Broadmoor
u! »g a tribal murder in a .Sheffield factory in 1954.

136

31 The Minister of Defence with his loyal officers, 2 February 1967.
Back row Jeff to right: Col. J.B. Chaplin DSO, QBE (retdj, PS to Min of Defence, now
bursaro/ a giris' school in Kent; Qaid Salem Abdullah Abdalli, CO 4 FRA, supporter
of the NLF, murdered shortly after independence; Qaid Abdullah Ahmed Aulaqi
MC, CO 2 FRA, supporter ofFLOSY, now in exile; Qaid Abdul Qaivi Muhammad
MafJahi, CO 1 FRA. supporter of the NLF, killed by landmine in Dhala; Qaid
Muhammad Said Yafai MBE. CO Trg Bn FRA, retired /rom the army before
independence to look after his brotherreleased from Broadmoor, active supporter
of the NLF and now coordinator of transport in the Third Covernaie; Qaid Ali
Abdullah Maisuri, CO 5 FRA, the NLF's chief organiser in the Federal Armed
Forces, prime instigator of the mutiny, made commander in 1 968 but murdered on
the orders of the NLF High Command.

Front row left to right: Aqccd Ahmed Muhammad 1 Jassani, Comd Area East, active
member of the NLF who became close supporter ofQahtan ai Shaabi.fled abroad
on his overthrow and died in mysterious circumstances in 1974; Aueed Muhammad
Ahmed Aulaqi MC, Deputy Comd ( Designate}, late convert to the NLF, rode in the
independence cavalcade with the President, but dismissed shortly afterwards and
is now confined to a smallholding in his" tribal area ; His Highness Sultan Fadhl Bin
Ali al Abdali, Minister of Defence, now in exile in Jeddah; Zaim J.B. Dye QBE, MC,
Comd FRA, became a general and now retired; Aqeed Nasser Buraik Aulaqi MBE,
Deputy Comd FRA. now in exile in Jeddah, the occasional Generalissimo of armed
resistance to the present regime.

137

, jjj^y u iklfire- The colonels had been dismissed, the colonels had been
arm ^.j sonec j; their supporters planned demonstrations with the object of
ojtin 0 their leaders reinstated. How deeply the colonels themselves were
^volved in the events which followed is obscure. Certainly they knew that
something was being planned on their behalf and on Monday the 19 June,
the ni°ht before the demonstrations were due lo lake place, they visited
Fadhl bin Ali in his Daar Saad palace and warned him that the only way to
avoid trouble was to have them reinstated immediately. The Sultan refused
and in any case it was too late, men with motives more sinister than mere
tribalism had taken a hand.

Lt Colonel Hussain Uthman Ashal, of the Federal Guard, was deeply
involved with the NLF as was his friend and opposite number in the
Federal Army. Lt Colonel Ali Abdullah Maisiri. It was this man who set
about organising and co-ordinating the demonstrations which were
envisaged to be of a peaceful nature. During a final meeting of fellow
plotters at the Lake Lines Training he was interrupted by a telephone call
from I.t Colonel Coles, a British officer with the Middle Kast Command
under whom he had previously served. Coles asked him if anything was
wrong and if he could visit Lake Lines. Colonel Maisiri answered shortly
that a visit was out of the question and 'it was too late to stop anything.'
Forty -eight hours later when everything was over Colonel Coles was sitting
in his office. The telephone rang, it was Colonel Maisiri. 'I am sorry,' that
was all he said.

The British had already had indications of the impending trouble. That
night the Aulaqi orderly officer at the BirFuqum training camp had learnl
of a plot to seize the armoury. Locking the store he sent his orderly running
with the keys across the volcanic hills to 24 Brigade headquarters in Little
Aden from where they were eventually delivered to Brigadier Dye. This
was the first splut tur of the mutiny which on the morrow was to spark like a
jumping jack to and fro across Aden and destroy forever the unity of what
on paper was one of the finest Arab forces in the Arabian Peninsula and at
that time, apart from the Kuwait Army, the best paid in the Middle East.

Like every other morning in South Arabia, 20 June dawned bright and
clear. Fi rm action had been taken by the Arab officers in Bir Fuqum. felt to
be the main centre of possible trouble, and all was quiet.

At 7 am troops on muster parade at Lake Lines suddenly broke rank and
surged through the camp shouting slogans in favour of the suspended
colonels, breaking windows and setting fire to two of the office blocks,
jjioroughly a ' a mied. South Arabian Army headquarters in Seedasccr
a " es u ' n 'ch was quiet under the tight control of Colonel Masir Buraiq. sent

equest to the South Arabian Police in Champion Lines to stand bv to
eS ^ ro ord er. This was a fatal mistake.

salt r! a " lpion Lirles ''es about a mile to the south of Lake Lines across the
and th ^ ° ccupied land between the Khormaksar-Shaikh Uthman road
C an , e . air Port. On the opposite side of the road was the tented Radfan
P. hen garrisoned by the Lancashire Fusiliers, and looking towards

138

the sea stretched a vast expanse of marshy brown sand where the rifl e
farther to the north, bombing ranges were situated. The South Arabi
Police were in the middle of their own protest when the order came f 1 "
them to stand to. They could hear the noise of the Lake Lines riot and w ° T
in no mood to stop it. Rumours that British troops would be used to rest^
order abounded. The policemen became very excited and milling about
began to fire shots in the air. A bren-gunner was despatched to the moso
tower which, although only thirty feet high, dominated the area. Bv'th' 6
time Arab officers in Lake Lines had themselves restored order The
disturbances in the South Arabian Army were over, they had been enough

Random shots from Champion Lines began lo fall in the civil airport area
behind the camp, bringing all traffic to a halt, and across the road into
Radfan Camp. The first casualties occurred at about 10 am when an Aden
Police officer apparently wondering what the noise was all about, stopped
his car at the camp gate. He was promptly shot dead along with his driver.
A few minutes later a Briton working for the Federal Public Works
Department was killed passing the barracks in his car. British army trucks
could be seen driving towards the camps from the rifle range opposite.
Whether the bren-gunner on the mosque thought they were coming to
attack will never be known but he took no chances and opened up. Caught
in the open at a range of four hundred yards without a vestige of cover the
British soldiers, men of the Royal Corps of Transport returning from their
annual range classification, stood no chance. Might were killed and for the
next three-quarters of an hour the machine gunner kept himself amused by
firing bursts at the survivors hugging the ground for cover whenever he felt
he saw them move. The youngest subaltern of the Lancashire fusiliers in
Radfan Camp was also mortally wounded by a stray shot.

Nobody knew what was happening, least of all the Federal government
who hurriedly reinstated the colonels, who in turn immediately withdrew
their petition and despatched Colonels Ali bin Ahmad and Sharif Haidar to
Champion Lines to see what (hey could do. At the same time, Fearing for the
safety of British officers attached to the South Arabian Police, they asked
British troops to help restore order. The King's Own Borderers moved into
Champion Lines and with the help of loyal Arab officers quickly brought
things under control with the loss of only one soldier and killing tour
policemen including the machine gunner on the mosque. The focus of the
mutiny now transferred to al Ittihad.

The Federal capital had a small garrison of South Arabian Police tor
guard duties and until 1 1 .30 am all was quiet. The Federal ministers and
their senior military and civil advisors had met for their normal weekly
meeting in the map-line operations room, concluded the trouble was over
and returned to their offices. Shaikh Muhammad Farid was the first to hear
of further trouble. While giving the BBC 'Panorama' television team the
Federal views on George Brown's speech the previous day he heard
developments in Champion Lines. He quickly finished the interview an

139

f 0 r°etting that ' 10 " ac ' another witn the South Arabian Broadcasting
Service, left.

Around this time the South Arabian Police heard their colleagues were
bein" attacked by British troops. Panic fed on rumour and was reinforced
bv the sound of gun fire which could just be heard over the roof of the
Secretarial. The officers promptly bolted and the troops began to run wild.
Thev had no motive other than fear: no direction and their uncertainty of
what to do was quickly illustrated. Major Peter Bartlett a British officer
with the South Arabian Army was driving his blue Renault down the dual
carriageway to the main road where he was approached by three of the
policemen. The first pointed his rifle, the second waved his arms and the
third presented arms. Bartlett drove on.

Meanwhile the troops poured into the Secretariat. Some pushed up and
down the corridors shouting and smashing everything breakable: others
lined the roof and. pulling down the Federal flag, prepared for the arrival of
the British troops. Not all the ministers had fled. Kadhl bin Ali together
with Colonel Chaplin locked themselves in their office and oblivious of the
sound of breaking glass telephoned round in an effort lo restore order.
Sultan Salih. who as Minister of Internal Security, was responsible for the
South Arabian Police, remained calm and tried lo contact the officers. He
gathered two English secretaries and some English officials into his office
where they were later joined by the Minister of Defence. Obali, M inistcr of
Education, also distinguished himself. While working in his office he
heard a rifle butt go through the outer windows. Peering round the door he
saw his staff had left and. wisely concluding that Ibis was no lime to be
walking abroad, lie returned to his files.

1 he atmosphere was explosive. For a space it seemed as if the scene was
set fora general massacre but the disturbances fizzled out as quicklv as thev
had begun and nobody was hurt.

When at last the officers were found they returned and persuaded their
men to go back to barracks. When those on the roof saw the British had not
Put in ihe expected attack they wandered off to lunch and that was that,
bultan Salih described the events as "the blackest day in the history of the
f ederation'. He was right, but the most tragic and far-reaching incident was
still to come.

t | le rh ° ( r J ' ralGr p ass is one of the highest points around Aden. The view from
e 'Wide car park, once famous as the most romantic spot in the Colony.
the°l I ) nPa ' S i SeS th ° fowns °f Maala and Khormaksarand stretches awav over

of th T tf rb0 ' lr t0 31 " ttihad on thc other si(,e of thc bay 10 ,tlt; mountains
an e in the distance. It is a focal point of thc old fortifications and

Bord"° rmOUS mul, '- coloure d I'laque pays tribute to the South Wales
tower t erS U helped 10 build them - A solitl roundhouse of Ihe Martcllo
untiHt' Pe perched ni 8 Q 011 tne sio" 0 of the crater guards the pass which,
handful Was . vvidened h >' a dual carriageway, could have been held by a
1 against an army. From thc pass the road drops steeply into the

240

town of Crater. To the left blocks of flats back onto the mountains - 1

(he right houses sink below the level of the road and give vvav to th a* ° n

Police barracks and civil prison at the bottom of the hill. ' e Ar med

In times of trouble it was British army practice to use the police ba
as their headquarters. Throughout the morning of the twent ,f acks
disturbances were reported from Crater, but because of the T " 0
uncertainty it was decided to man the operations room in the barrack" 01 " 31
in case. A mixed patrol of Northumberland Fusiliers and ArevH '"!!
Sutherland Highlanders in two Landrovcrs moved down from the
What they did not know was that the Armed Police had received'
mysterious telephone call to the effect that British troops were att u-ki *
the South Arabian forces, which in the case of Champion Lines wa
partially true. As usual, rumour bred rumour and the police had quickk
convinced themselves that the whole of the South Arabian forces wer
locked in a death struggle with the British. They also decided that an
attempt would be made to disarm them. Prom the very start of the
Emergency the Armed Police had been a centre of terrorist activities, so
FI.OSY and NLF elements were soon and easily contacted. About fifteen
'commandos' together with some thirty policemen, took up positions in
the flats and behind walls facing the junction whore a patrol would have to
turn to enter the barracks.

Unaware of the danger the patrol drove on. It was not until a burst of gun
fire hit the lead Landrovcr, instantly killing its driver and front seat
passenger, that they realised they had been ambushed. In a few minutes it
was all over. Caught in their vehicles at point-blank range the soldiers in
the Landrovcrs were quickly killed. Only one escaped.

Fusilier John Storey was travelling in the rear of the second Landrover
when the vehicles were hit by a hail of fire from the Armed Police
supported by insurgents. The lead vehicle swung out of control and
exploded against the wall of the police barracks. A bullet struck Storey
across the ribs and he was shot in the arm as he ran across the dual
carriageway and took shelter in the doorway of a block of flats.

Looking back, he saw that none of his companions had survived and
made his way up the stairs to the roof. There was silence in the street
below, the whole action had taken about three minutes. The time was 12
noon. Retracing his way down the stairs, he tried each of the flats in turn,
they were locked. A new burst of firing brought him back to the roof ten
minutes later. There, overhead, a solitary helicopter hovered, a silver
speck against a cloudless blue sky. On the other side of the road, two Arabs
were firing hopefully into the air. Placing the catch of his Sterling sub-
machine gun on automatic, the soldier took careful aim and emptied his
magazine. Both Arabs were hit and fell, and then like lightning, he raced
back into the shelter of the building. As the insurgents began to surround
the building, Storey waited on a landing. An Arab carrying a child came
up the stairs. Storey forced him to open his flat where the family of women
and old men were huddled. Storey divided the family and sat with the

141

m en and waited. Outside, the insurgents were searching the flats,
following the trails of blood up and down the stairs but were unable to
discover their quarry. Then came the unmistakable sound of flats being
searched one by one.

The men pleaded with him to leave. If he was found in their flat, they
all expected to be killed. The building was built against the side of the
crater and although Storey was on the fourth floor, the rock wall stood
eight feet or so from the rear balcony. He leapt out and slithered to the foot
of the slope below, lacerating his right leg. His flight was spotted and, in
no time, he was trapped in a narrow alley way between two buildings
which had been stocked up by breeze blocks as a security measure.
Families in the flats above leant over their balconies and directed the hunt.
Darkness was falling and, in the gloom, the police approached with great
caution not realising his ammunition was exhausted. Storey shouted for
an officer and offered to be arrested. This was accepted so he flung his
weapon over the wall and was taken by a sergeant to the police Landrover.
Bodies from the road were being placed in the back, Storey sat in the front.
The vehicle was soon surrounded by an angry mob, screaming for blood.
On the right of the crater far above the scene, British troops suddenly-
opened lire. The crowd dispersed, the driver of the Landrover leapt from
his cab and Storey was alone, but by this time faint from his injuries. He
remembers being taken into the barracks, his wounds tended and a little
while later, an ambulance took him to the safety of Khormaksar Hospital.
This was shortly after 6.00 pm, the longest six hours in John Storey's life.

Ominous radio silence and the sound of firing led to a second patrol in
two armoured vehicles of the Queen's Dragoon Guards led by 2nd Lt Davis,
being sent to investigate. On reaching the bottom of the hill they were mot
with heavy fire. The observers could see army Landrovers and bodies lying
m the road. They decided to return and left four men behind to investigate
further. Nobody knows for sure how these soldiers died. Five minutes after
their patrol returned for reinforcements a heavy burst of firing was heard
ana then silence. A third patrol again in two armoured vehicles returned
na engaged the mutineers in a short fierce gun battle. The armoured cars,

eir tyres shot away and machine guns bent by the bullets of their

of fn , WRre forcad t0 retire bul not before frev had claimed the lives
ot tour pohcemen and five 'commandos'.

eithe? B " t ' S, 1 l troo ' ,s wcre novv facefl with a crucial choice. Thev could
service 80 /" 1 ? PUl fl ° VV " the mutin y b >' force - or wait U P°" events. The
action^- h a ' ld ' he High Commissiotlier - believing that precipitate
forces an t SPark off wholesale mutiny amongst the South Arabian armed
involved U , ncertain of the exteut to which the Armed Police had been
"iticised t " S °- th ° latter course - Although the decision was much
were dead vr tlme ' events were to P mve thcm right. The twelve soldiers
tlle whole f t m ° re W0U ' d have bcen kiIled trying 10 rccover the b(,(1 ies;
mutineers It] Al med Police would have been forced to side with the
• • - 1 the British, intent upon revenge, had descended into Crater in

142

strength.

For the moment all was panic in the Armed Police barrarl™ r , ■>
was expected any moment and the mutineers abandoned their, f' ""^
and rushed to urge their stunned colleagues to join them Thl „ P ° S ' t,0, 's
that when the British returned their fury would „oh Stl 2 °»<
the m.nonty of mutineers and the majoritv of onlookers Thi, eiin
point and the others reluctantly agreed to take up defcnsS - their
Fortunately the .natter was never pot to the tes Th P ° slhon «-
schizophrenic behaviour of the Armed Police who on one lv nH apparent
to carry out their duties guarding banks, government b Zm ^
looking after a wounded British soldier and" worn o h tfl ^
shooting a. his lellows-.his puzzled the British for days early

At about 1 pm a turther incident occurred when a Siouxhelicopter lift:,,
off a picket of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers from the ruin ' f l 8
crater was h.l by rifle fire. The pilot. Sergeant Forde of the [ r
wounded in the knee but nevertheless was able to set hU TlS, w' ^

One suffering a broker, leg. the other Fusil ier Duffy returned into the flameS
to drag the m,ured pilot clear. He then went back again to re c e h
wireless ^ith .which he rad ,oed lor help. For this exploit TusilioS v Ja
awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal '

tooThoa^andt'' ** ^ in,1 r ireXpCClBda i )pearanc ^^niuti„eers
took heart and began lo snipe at the troops on the pass. Most of Crater

wSl'tZ M it ti ? 1 ei , r u hauses bol,in S " nd l ™8 their doors fearfully
awaiting the bloodbath that never came.

By nightfall lavy and order in the town broke down completely. Looting
was prevalent and some one hundred and thirty convicts held in the civil
prison broke out and made good their escape. In the evening an army
tifil .copter hovering above the town in the hope of spotting some clue as to
wnat was happening was hit by sniper fire and crashed into theside of the
mountains. Miraculously the crew of three escaped with injuries.

I hereafter Crater was given over to the mob and the night brought
lirebugs to the streets who set aflame cars and stal Is and shops in an orgv of
destruction. The first target was the Aden Legislative Assembly which
stood aloof on its rock, unused since the davs of Mackavvee. A former
cnurch and a permanent reminder of British efforts to indict their form of
democracy on an alien race. It was an irresistible temptation lo hooligans
and revolutionaries alike. By 8 pm troops manning the road block on the
beach road were watching the weird shadows plaving on the mountains
illuminated by the blaze. Some hours later the roof fell in in a shower of
sparks and by morning all that was left was a pair of blackened gables-a
gri m signpost of things to come.

That night, in the comparatively peaceful surroundings of the
conlerence room at Government House, the British administration met to
face the unpalatable fact that Crater, the heart of the commercial life of

143

were h.'imslrung
able to follow the

Aden Colony, was in the hands of insurgents. They
through lack of intelligence. Without it Ihey were unum- u „, :i .m in
course of events and distinguish between friend and foe. the altitude of the
South Arabian forces was of particular concern both in Aden and
upcountry in the Federation.

Nowhere was I he unpredictability of the South Arabian Army better
illustrated than at al Anad. a tented camp between Lahej and Radian at the
junction of the main Yemen and Dhala roads. In the morning a company
had been detailed to move down into Aden in case it was required to restore
order in hake Lines. It left without a murmur or anv sign of trouble. Later in
the day after odd pieces of news had filtered through the company that had
been left behind suddenly took off and headed down the road in their three
tonners to join in the fray. Behind raced a l.androver full of officers
beseeching them to return. They were met half wav hv Major Bartlett who
was having an exciting day. He told them that all was well and persuaded
them to return to camp.

The colonels' petition had been circulated amongst the upcountry
garrisons and demonstrations of support had been planned. Slogans were
shouted in Dhala and for some time a company was out of control In
Mukairas British and Arab garrisons confronled each other across the air
strip but the moment of danger soon passed. While in Hainan the men
refused to parade until the Sharif himself came down to the camp and
adjusting his spectacles, quietly informed thorn that unless Ihev obeved the
order h, s tribesmen would slaughter the lot. Thev did as thev were told and

Aden for thedav '° ^ '° E " 8 " sh * ,8l,d up from

heafed T !T °u er bV ' 0Ur °' clo<:k 011 lhc ^v«mi«th but the scars never
healed. In most Arab eves, when British troops were called in to restore

alotsl ' a T n J'" 1 " 8 ' " 1H Feti0ral « overnme »t had ranged ilself
B S t 7 f °i f ISracl againS ' (heir ldlmv Arabs - F(,r *eir P^' 1 the
Itti a I V r e ° P y d 1 lsappoinUjd that nono of ,hc Fftdcral ministers in al
ir he F 7 3 1P(0 f ° Padfy the ,ro °P s «"d H'eir remaining confidence
tie Federal government diminished accordingly.

defeat in of* tlX ; Bri,ish wilhd ""™l Crater was a humiliating
Iwttle Jl I n \ a " n moun,ains - bv ™«n««ess camp fires and

the ZZ i, T ,H ! ,y ' k was ,he sam «- th « British were finished and
the u , u " Th VOrU m,Shftd Wi,h them ' Thc tribcs ,00k no «« and looked to
anarch" Th i am,V , a ? d the ° f South Arabia was " n 'he march to
'hat from th t r (i,vls,ons the army had broken into thc open so
tu ke anv H lonvard 't was commanded by a committee unable to

mutineers ' e f Ct> ° n ht fear ° f doin{? itself irreparable harm. As the
Supreinfi C'nirVf u gh the mockorv of apologising to the Federal
youn« er offi , m| sdeeds and otherwise went unpunished the

t0 carry on, T " sold ,ors realised the extent of their power and refused
orders unless they personally agreed with them. The sh ield of

144

the Fed oration*, as the army was hopefully called bv the Aden Radi

stand aside and watch the government which had lathered it ,->-,, °;) vast o

collapse. ' ' t( ' rilmb 'eand

The political effects of the mutiny were not immediately apm
Aden wh ich was undergoing a period of increased terrorist acti vity ^
fillip by the loss of British control in Crater. At dawn on the twentv fi^
Fl.OSY •commandos' who had occupied the Turkish fort on the hei«l t
the pass during the n ight, began firing random shots at traffic nassimf \ S ° f

the Khormaksar-Maalla road below. Royal Marines were called '•
winkle them out and found themselves seeking cover beneath the car" 1
wall. Their automatic weapons made little impression on the six foot uYk
walls which would disappear behind clouds of dust and smoke but when
everything had cleared remained to all intents and purposes intact
Eventually the troops obtained permission to use a Saladin armoured car
with its powerful 70mm gun. One shot was enough. The 'commandos-
tumbled out of the fort like weevils out of cheese and were cut down by the
supporting smal 1 arms fire. The heights were then occupied by the Marines
for the duration of the siege. A Carl Custav anti-tank gun' was used to
demolish the nearest house in Crater which was being used by snipers.

In Crater two days later the mob moved on to sack the Supreme Court. At
about the same time Government House received an irate telephone call
from the Chief Justice, Sir Richard le Gallais. It seems nobody had informed
that gentleman of the British withdrawal and he had been intending to
attend Thursday Court as usual. Only with difficulty was he persuaded°not
to journey to complain personally. The private reason given was that Sir
Richard's temper would ignite the thousands of gallons of oil flowing
across the Tawahi-Maalla road following a bazooka attack on the BP
storage tank. In a day eighteen thousand tons of crude oil flowed into Aden
Harbour. Large tanks are easy targets and a few days later a similar attack
was made on the Caltex tanks across the harbour.

In answer to appeals from Cairo the militants turned their attention to
government buildings and foreign business establishments. In the
following fortnight Mitchell Cotes, Bata and other foreign companies
suffered from their incendiaries. In a fit of revolutionary passion FLOSY
burnt down the immigration offices and the Maalla customs house. A
current FLOSY pamphlet explained after freedom there will be no need for
these badges of colonialism."

On 30 June an Aden Airways Viscount was blown up on the runway. The
incident was somewhat surprisingly described by the airport officer as 'a
triumph for security'. As the plane was destroyed in a departure area and
not actually in flight he may have been right.

The saga of Aden Airways is a book in itself. They served South Arabia
wel 1 for eighteen years before they were destroyed by their own Arab stair-
They had more than their full share of nationalists, including al Asnag.
'Grenadier' Khalifa, Abdul Rahmin Qassirn of FLOSY and the NLr
terrorists Tawfiq Ubali and Hussain Duqmi. By their unreasonable and

145

e r increasing demands over the years these revolutionaries made il
f^ossible for the company to continue. The wrecked Viscount was their

' dS The revolutionaries who had so quickly and unexpectedly gained
■ontrol of Aden's main commercial and trading centre soon found
themselves divided into hostile camps.

The root of the trouble was the murder of a KI.OSY gunman. Haidar
Shamshir. by the NI.F in the previous April. The dead man's widow had
been imploring her family to take revenge and had shamed them by-
refusing to discard her black dress of mourning until they did so. After the
destruction of the British patrol the NLF had taken to walking openly
around the streets and this gave FLOSY their chance. Led by al Baihani, a
convict who had escaped from jail the previous day. a group marched into
the Maidan where they found the NLF leader Ahdulla Mudram sitting in a
cafe. After a brief exchange Baihani shot Mudram dead and the triumphant
party then dragged the body through the streets to where pretty Fawzia
Shamshir waited at her window.

With a cry of anguish the girl spat upon the corpse, tearing off her robe.
Family honour had been satisfied but the NLF were furious and were soon
clamouring for vengeance. The presence of the British soldiers on the hills
- was temporarily ignored as the revolutionaries sel about liquidating each
other. At the end of throe days of intermittent fighting the ever-present
threat of British re-occupation compelled the leaders of both sides to meet
under the shadow of the Aidrous Mosque. The NLF delegates were
adamant. The fighting would continue unless Baihani was surrendered.
FLOSY agreed and the luckless ex-convict was dragged screaming from the
slaughterhouse where he had taken refuge.

Having succeeded in this the NLF promptly increased their demands.
They pointed out their prisoner was an ex-convict, a person of no
consequence, hardly a worthwhile exchange for the dead Mudram. The
NLF claimed the way to keep the balance was for the FLOSY leader to
surrender himself as a hostage for the future good behaviour of his party.
1 he demand was refused and both sides settled down to an uneasy truce,
he silence which hung over Crater was intermittently broken as the
revolutionaries amused themselves bv sniping at the British soldiers on the
Pass above.

KfUT FL0SY leuder in Crater was none other than the Mayor. Fuad
the ' T t al '• dark ' urbane and speaking impeccable English, he came from
same family as 'Grenadier' Khalifa of the airport bomb fame and like
n, ^"' assI i«htly unbalanced.

immeT '\ became obv '°us 'he British had left Crater and were not
and ai v retur rmig. Fuad hoisted the red flag above the Municipality
annni !?° L T ed the birttl of the 'People's Democratic Republic of Crater r .
Tel 8 himsR,t as its first President.

•ocal C » UI1 | Ulation " f u ' ca,tri vvas ln « prime motive behind involvement in
Politics and Fuad used his position as chairman of the Aden

146

Municipality lo amass as much as possible. Over the years his name had
become a byeword for bribery and extortion on the grand scale. Sometime
in 1965 Fuad hit on the idea that terrorism could be used as a cover for
armed robbery. Employing his family and official position he soon became
a senior FLOSY member whose gangs he used to raid banks and merchants.
At a conservative estimate they netted over £1 million. Some of the money
was used to finance FLOSY. the rest salted away. The NLF were well aware
of Fuad's reputation and hatched a plan to kidnap the FLOSY leader and
hold him to ransom in exchange lor a share of his loot.

Perhaps because Crater was predominantly FLOSY Fuad became
careless and over-confident. F.very Sunday it was his custom to drink beer
and chew oat with cronies in a secluded cafe on Crater's Sira Island. The
fact that the town was besieged and in a state of virtual civil war made no
difference. The Mayor was a man ol'habit and liked to keep up appearances.

By five o'clock on 27 June the party was in full swing so that a dozen
heavily armed NLF had little difficulty in holding his friends at bay. Fuad,
together with h is chief lieutenant, was bundled into his own Mercedes and
driven away down the short causeway that connects the island to the town.

Fuad Khalifa has not been seen in Aden since. After his kidnapping he
was drugged bv Ba Faqih, a pro-NLF doctor, and smuggled out of Crater in
an ambulance.' He was then taken lo the NLF stronghold in Wadi Buran
near the Yemen border with Dhala. Here he was forced by his captors to run
barefoot over sharp rocks and was last heard of working with a road
construction gang for the good of the people.

Two davs elapsed, then paratroopers on patrol in Shaikh Uthman heard
shots coming from the first storey of a terraced house. Bursting in, the
soldiers were just in time lo glimpse an NLF gunman escaping over the
roofs Ho had been thwarted in the attempt to murder the prisoners who lay
bound and gagged on the floor. One of the men was dead, two others
suverelv wounded: the fourth was unhurt but speech less with terror.

The dead man turned out to be none other than al Baihani last heard ot in
besieged Crater: sealed off by British troops who gave passage only to
police and ambulance vehicles and these received more than a cursor)
inspection. Not surprisingly the discovery gave the authorities food i
thought. Ba-ihani and most NLF prisoners had been taken out ot Urarer
fire engine. It clanged its bell imperiously and, preceded by a pone - .
was alwavs speedily waved through the mad blocks and past the
civilian cars which sweating soldiers searched fruitlessly to the in
irritation of the occupants. v,oH been

The paratroopers, at their headquarters at the police station,
alerted bv an anonvmous telephone call from a FLOSY supporter. man
in turn were tipped off minutes before the raid by a shalKn their
policeman and preferred to kill their captives rather than ano
rescue. , , the most

After the High Commissioner it was generally agreed in * befor e
difficult post in Aden was held by the Commissioner of Police, l.

147

, f Emergency the Aden Civil Police has possessed an unhealthy
the State o ■ ^ corruption on a wi dc scale. No sub-inspector was

reputation • ^ ^ ^ . ( waj . commo[1 knowledge that the pirate
without a < ^ i er of the [aw (o swejjp com p et i ku -s off the streets,

taxis weit * e ^ hablv eyen bcfbrei the p0 | it;e saw ,he British had no

, A S of upholding the law they buckled under the threat of terrorism
1 iqfi? the. -Vlen Police harboured more than its fair share o
By n i wnrs fellow travellers and. most dangerous of all. men who would
j rhino for a quiet life: a number of active terrorists sheltered in Us
tk^ad he force was split from top to bottom between NI.K and FLOSY
'Z nvovears policemen had been actively engaged in the smuggling of

L nto Aden, the FLOSY cell in Steamer Point, for instance, relied for
Sr supplies on the police launch which ferried their arms across the
Sour Yet at the same time the police still had the appearance of an
organised force and its record of apprehending common criminals

re TheM$t 0( of Commissioner was held by Peter Owen, a large genial
Fnalishman who had come to Aden straight from the race riots ol Guyana.
On arrival ho faced a crucial decision, either to clear up the police, which
virtually meant disbanding (he lot and starting again, or trying to hold the
force together so there would be something to hand over to the new
government. At the same time, the vast extent of 'revolutionary
penetration was not appreciated and with independence just round the
corner, Peter Owen soldiered oh.

After the withdrawal of the British from Crater the only means the
administration had of keeping in touch with events in the town was
through the Civil and Armed Police both of which, in the main, continued
to report for dutv. Through the police, electricity and water supplies cut
during the siege and subsequent riols were restored and arrangements
made for ambulances to pass freely in and out of 'besieged' Crater.

A week after the mutiny Owen considered that things had quietened
down enough to permit a tentative reconnaissance and. accompanied by an
adventurous television team, became the first Englishman back into Crater
with a short visit to the Armed Police. On the surface all appeared normal
and there was little sign of the ferment underneath. The streets had been
cleaned up and barricades set up by enthusiasts to resist the expected
British counter attack had been dismantled. Armed Police were going
about their duties normally and arrangements made by which a large
amount of money to pay the rest of the Colony's salaries was taken out of
one of the banks went off smoothly. What Owen did not realise was that the
Armed Police were taking time off to snipe at the British road blocks on the
Marine Drive, taking part in the interfactional fighting which normally
f ared up as soon as night fell and during daytime rounding up 'stooges' for
the benefit of FLOSY's 'kangaroo courts'. This last practice died out with
the kidnapping of Mayor Khalifa.

The presence of an insurgent Crater in the heart of Aden Colony was a

148

continuing embarrassment and humiliating to the British but the probl
remained of how to regain control without precipitating bloodshed 6 " 1
further mutiny amongst the South Arabian forces. At first it was sues *°a
that the South Arabian Army should take on the job themselves but th
wore in no condition to accept and turned down the offer. The problem
further complicated by the presence of Laheji State Guards in the Sultan^
Crater palace, a large brown gothic pile of indescribable ugliness that
looked out onto Front Bay. The Sultan's guards had come to an
understanding with the militants so that a state of armed truce prevailed
between them. The Sultan himself, not unnaturally fearing for his
property, sought assurances from the military that they would not attack it
As snipers were clearly firing from cover of the corners of the buildin° the
soldiers were not inclined to give the required guarantees and charged that
the guards themselves were not above taking the occasional pot shot at the
Argylls across the bay. The Sultan reiterated that his guards were likely to
defend the palace against all comers, militants and British troops alike. In
an attempt to solve the difficulty one staff officer went so far as to suggest
that the Laheji should only fire upon Ihe British if the troops entered the
confines of the palace. His more clown to earth colleagues were not slow to
point out that anybody under any circumstances who fired on them was
liable to get a hot reply. There the matter was allowed to rest.

From the very first day of the siege hundreds of families streamed out of
Crater for other parts of Aden. After the first few days the flow decreased
but. with ihe continuing three-cornered battles between the NLF, FI.OSY
and the surrounding troops, it stepped up again. Almost fifteen thousand,
mostly women and children carrying all manner of household goods,
passed through the road blocks in search of peace and security.

From his headquarters on a rise in the centre of die town Abdul Hadi
Shihab, the senior Arab police officer, watched events in Crater with
practised eyes. A bom opportunist. He had long been in contact with the
NLF and appreciated its lack ol co-ordination and aspired to become its
leader. Although the majority of the Aden Police sympathised with
FLOSY. Abdul Hadi did not hesitate to use his position and resources to
further the cause of the NLF. Despite this the balance of interactional
fighting was beginning to favour FLOSY so as ihe days passed Abdul Hadi
saw the increasing possibilities of his organisation being wiped out and
h i msolf with it. 1 le therefore began to work for the return of the British. As
chief police officer he was in daily touch with the High Commissioner and
Headquarters. Middle East and meaningful dialogue began to take place
between him and Brigadier Dunbar, the dour Chief of Staff.

On the night of 2 July when the 'siege* was thirteen days old. Dunbar let
the time was ripe for an exploratory probe. A company of troops v. .
landed by helicopter at Ras Marshag. a rocky promontory on the far sic «
the town and one hundred and twenty men of the Argylls moved in to
the Marine Drive. The two forces joined up at the crossroads near scv ^ (1
banks. One party smashed down the door of the Chartered Bank and rus

149

32 General Philip Tower, accompanied by Police Commissioner Abdul Hadi
Shihnb, inspecting tile Armed Police as a gesture of reconciliation following
the mutiny.

to the roof from which they had a commanding position over the southern
part of the town. The surprise had been complete. Only one sniper had
resisted a fierce exchange of gunfire: he had been shot dead. The citizens of
Crater awoke in the morning to ihe sound of Scottish pipers playing the
reveille from the hank roof. The people of Crater were nol the only ones to
be surprised. The security of the operation, code named Stirling Castle'
had been excellent. The High Commissioner barely knew of it and the
Federal government had received notice ten minutes before it took place.
The ease and panache with which the British look Crater astonished
everybody, even ihe planners themselves. The Armed Police, who would
have been the backbone of possible resistance, had remained in their
barracks although they must have heard ihe initial shots.

In the following three days the Argylls. unopposed, took over control of
the rear of the town and Crater was once again in British hands.

The extent of Armed Police involvement was still a mystery to the
British and efforts were made to renew co-operation with them. It was
decided that an inspection by a senior British officer should be carried out
as a gesture to mark the reconnection. Initially it was envisaged thai LI
Colonel Colin Mitchell, the commanding officer of the Argylls. take the

ISO

parade. In the event he deferred to General Philip Tower. * In the prevailing
political atmosphere the parade may have been a sensible suggestion but
the more emotional British correspondents who turned up for it did not
think so. 'On the barrack square (sic) where a fortnight ago twelve British
troops were killed in a mutiny . . . General Tower inspected . . .' was typical
of several reports. In the coming weeks Colonel Mitchell's feel forpublicity
was to prove surer than his general's.

So the 'mutiny' came to an end and with it the Federal government
staggered on to final disintegration: the South Arabian Army, having felt
its strength, became a law unto itself; the tribes were finally convinced of
British departure: the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders settled down to
their controversial occupation of Crater. With sinking hearts political
observers had noted that the whole time Crater was in the hands of the
insurgents no leader had emerged— as time went on the chaos had only
compounded itself.

* General Tower had succeeded the able and popular Sir John Willoughby.

Chapter IX

The Fall of the Sultans

3 July-3 September 1967

The Federal Government— it has gone with the wind.

1 ne t ccitiu. Hussain Bayumi

28 July 1967

ThP Federal <>overnment were stunned. Privately many of them had
S (Xd tl e reli.bil itv of the armed forces for some time. For the most part
fht Ste ontent lo keep their suspicions .Irmly under the, turbans
Ind ore bn-ed not to look too closely at what to many must have been o very
Sptt m5h. The events of the 20 June had finally confirmed aH their
worst suspicions. The South Arabian torces, the pr.de of the Federal
Government and its main pillar of support, was revealed ruldled with
£ u.terlv UI1 predictahle and master unto themselves. U. during .ho
confusions of -he mutiny, a Federal minister had had th^^o
himself and try to pacify the rebellious troops or later the Hedera
government as a whole had possessed .he will to purge the forces ot
unreliable elements, then events may have turned ou d.t ter cntl , To
embark on the last course would have been to take the bull by the horns. 1
rnav have precipitated further disturbances and even resulted in the
immed iate overthrow of the government. But it was the Supreme Council s
last chance. Rv accepting the empty gesture of apology and by avoiding the
principle issue at stake-the assertion of its authonty-the Federal
government surrendered the right to lead and the right to govern

The South Arabian forces recognised the signs of weakness and realised
that there was no fear of being held to account for their actions. In the
coming weeks either bv standing aside or by direct intervention they were
to assist in sweeping their former masters from power and from South
Arabia.

While the Federal government were reluctant to take firm action against
their armed forces, the mutinv did impel them to take the initiative in
trying to obtain a political solution with the militants. For many months
'he phrase 'broad based government' had been aired and now the Supreme
Council realised that to survive they must widen their representation m an
effort to present a more favourable image, both internally and
'nternationallv. For their part the British had been urging this course on the,
Federal government for some time. Appreciating the importance ot
recognition for the new regime thev still hankered after participation in the

152

state-making by the United Nations. In order to convince the UN Mission
sulking in New York of the sincerity of Britain's intentions, it was essentia!
for the Federal government lo put on a new look.

The decisive meeting of the Supreme Council was held on 5 |ul v
Muhammad Farid. the suave Foreign Minister, began by carefully
explaining the position and revealing that with a little wheeling and
deal i ng a number of FLOSY members with whom he was in touch could be
attracted into the government. He had reckoned without the bellicose
Hussain Bayumi. The bull in a political china shop, Bayumi lacked
understanding on the liner points of diplomacy and prided himself on his
'contacts' with militants in Aden. 'Empty talking.' he kept on shouting. 'I
can bring in the NLF and FLOSY within a fortnight.' Eventually his
interruptions had the effect of causing the Foreign Minister to lose his
temper. 'All right,' he snapped back, 'you prove it— you do it.' It was a test
of wills and not wishing to back down and look foolish Bayumi agreed. The
Supreme Council promptly voted him Prime Minister designate with the
task of forming a committee which would select the broad based
government to accept independence from the British, and gave him twelve
days in which to do it.

Bayumi set about his task with cheery optimism. In Aden his courage
was greatly respected, lie had known most of the FLOSY leaders all his life,
although ho had been on the worst of terms with most of them for the
greater part of it. His chief hope lay in the NLF whose amorphous quality he
recognised. Taking advantage of his position as Minister of Information,
Bayumi issued appeal after appeal over the radio asking 'honest citizens' to
come forth and join him in a bid to unite the country and save it from ruin.

His Khormaksar house with its high wire fence and sand-bagged gunpits
became a campaign headquarters. Innumerable meetings were held,
usually in the middle of the night, and a trail of prospective ministers,
hangers-on and journalists trooped in to gain audience with the 'Prime
Minister designate'. All were welcome but before obtaining their objective
each had to brave a courtyard full of stray dogs, chickens and guards.
Visitors were uncertain which peril was the more deadly, the snapping
dogs or the South Arabian policemen who lolled around chewing qat and
watching events with bored indifference, nonchalantly cradling their
machine guns and occasionally breaking off to frisk a visitor or slaughter a
goat for lunch. The names of every visitor to the Bayumi household a? tn
time were carefully passed on to the militants. . ,

Both the NLF and FLOSY were taken aback by the speed with vvhii:^
Federal government had commissioned Bayumi. Consequently they w
some davs in preparing a replv and this hesitation gave rise to hope 1 1a
move had been successful. Elements of the Shaikh Uthman NLF, conIU oe g
bv the organisation's delay went so far as to contact Bayumi and ATTati ° d
midnight meeting. FLOSY were the first to make their position de * ckt0
denounced the move as the usual 'Imperialist plot'. The NLI' were qu ^
follow, the Shaikh Uthman branch as if to make up for their apparen

• .olutionary ardour, were the most violent in their denunciations.
°! re tenin" death to anv South Arabian taking the offer up'.

r vumi'did have some takers. Amongst the first to come forward were
•Lriblc twins'. Naih Jaabil of Audhali and ex-Sultan Ahmad bin
th . c , [| a 0 f 'r-adhli. Since their defection from FLOSY in the previous
nmn these two had dreamt up something called The Front for the
f t eration of South Arabia' which had the right sounding title but little
Shaikh AH Mussaid Dabakri of Wahidi who had recently entered the
FederaU'Overnment as Minister of Aviation was the third recruit. A former
nior political officer, he was described by a fellow minister as having the
head of sheep, the brain of goal and the heart of lion. With that serious
support ended.

Bavurni tinkered with the idea of bringing in the South Arabian Army.
The officers refused, although they promised him their support. The
prospect of one of their number being elected to ministerial rank with its
unlimited opportunities for graft and nepotism tilled them with alarm and
threatened the already precariously balanced rank structure.

So Bayumi was forced to concentrate on his fellow Adenis. The cards
were stacked against him. He suffered from the handicap of being a Federal
minister. More important were the vociferous threats by the NLF and
FLOSY and the fact that he could offer scant protection to any supporter.
Consequently onlv the stupid and the recklessly ambitious came forward.
One of these was promptly kidnapped by the NI.F. A second, British
trained lawyer Husain Aulaqi. for several days held forth in his braces to
captive audiences in the Bayumi household but withdrew quickly at the
first threat. Maurice Cent, who had succeeded Kenneth Brazier as Aden's
BBC correspondent, was rung up at 2 am by a terrified Aulaqi who pleaded
that news that he had withdrawn from Bayumi be broadcast as quickly as
possible. 'Please.' he wailed, 'give your word as an Englishman that the
announcement will be made as soon as possible.' Gent demurred and
explained that he had no power over what the BBC did and did not put out,
but Aulaqi was lucky— the BBC considered his resignation news and
broadcast it the following morning.*

Several ministers who had confidently expected Bayumi to invite them
to join him were much piqued when he didn't. It did not take them long to
realise that in their haste they had given Bayumi the power to put them out
of a job. Hurriedly they consulted the minutes of the Supreme Council and
their fears were confirmed. Then cooler heads look over. Muhammad
Obali, together with Muhammad Farid, ordered another set adding a vital
Paragraph to the effect that Bayumi's men had to be approved by the
Supreme Council before they look power. Technically, as the minutes had
not been passed, thev wore within their rights in doing so. Bayumi was
'"nous and took off to confer with the Sharif in Baihan. On his relum he

*2l lulv

was handed a message at Aden Airport from the Supreme Council fort
withdrawing his mandate on the grounds that he had overrun hisr
limit. Bayumi promptly banned the announcement from being broad" 116
over Aden Radio. He was then summoned to al Ittihad and alter tortu^
discussions persuaded to withdraw. He was granted permission to o\y US
press con Terence. ' o 'e a

The Prime Minister's' press conference had been something of a six-d- ,
wonder in Aden. Every morning for a week Bayumi had let it be known h
would 1 ike to see the press al 2 pm every lunchtime. having been dissuaded
by Federal representatives who rightly suspected he planned to produce
the two sets of unfortunate minutes, he cancelled the appointment. The
press, who had appreciated that his chances of forming a 'committee' were
diminishing, were at first intrigued and then frustrated so that the final
invitation on 28 July came as something of an anticlimax.

Bayumi received the correspondents in his ornate lounge in which
monkey skin rugs vied for prominence with brass ornaments. He had
promised his Federal colleagues that the whole thing would be buried as
decently as possible but the presence of an interested and sympathetic
audience proved too much of a temptation.

After reporting the failure of his mission he said. 'I have stepped down to
save the Council's reputation and to avoid a further deterioration of the
situation." Then suddenly with a flourish he produced the two sets of
minutes.

'No,' he said in answer to questions, 'I do not think that my colleagues
have behaved dishonourably, they have merely forged the minutes.'

'Yes, I do consider that they (the Federal government] were a major
obstacle in preventing the fulfilment of my mission.'

'No, I shall not bring the matter of forgery to the attention of the United
Nations. I think that I have done enough for one day.'

All the while, an etching of Hussain Bayumi's brother Hassan, the Adeni
pioneer of Federation, glowered down blackly at proceedings; doubtless he
was turning in his grave.

When the Supreme Council heard of their Information Minister's
outburst they were not surprised. 'We always said', they shrugged, 'that
Bayumi was no good.' If the Federal government treated the Bayumi fiasco
with equanimity then the High Commission did not.

Using the Bayumi move as evidence thai Ihe Federal government was
willing to change its image. Sir Humphrey had left for New York to
persuade the UN Mission to resume its good offices in South Arabia. His
journey to New York had the additional advantage in that Mackawee was
already there in surreptitious touch with the Mission, but in the event the
two men did not meet.

FLOSY were increasingly worried about the influence of the NLF and as
the time for independence drew nearer hoped to use the UN Mission to
break into the government. To this end they were also continuing desultory
contacts with the British but never seemed able to bring themselves to enter
serious negotiations. As George Brown had pointed out, the times an

255

places at which FLOSY were meant to turn up were legion. Unfortunately
they never seemed to arrive.

Alarmed at the FLOSY presence in New Yorkand indications that things
might be moving to a settlement with Britain, the NLF followed suit and on
25 July cabled the Mission announcing that it too was prepared to send a
delegation to New York. Only a few days previously the NLF had
condemned the High Commissioner's trip as 'an empty gesture' and on 21
July had cabled the Mission to say that it was unable to attend meetings in
New York and vowed to continue the revolution. This change of heart was
in itself a minor diplomatic triumph for Sir Humphrey who followed it up
by exerting his not inconsiderable charm in persuading the Mission of
Britain's sincerity in desiring a broad based government which included
NLF and FLOSY participation. The three men then undertook to renew
their mission and set off to Geneva to hear the evidence. No sooner did they
arrive than the NLF changed its mind again and withdrew their earlier offer
protesting against the presence of the sultans and stooge parties.

As can be imagined, Sir Humphrey was not best pleased when he heard
the details of the Bay u mi shambles and bl untly told the Supreme Council
that they could not hope to exist on their own. His suggestion that they
should go to Switzerland and present themselves to the UN Mission
received a mixed reception. The Supreme Council's previous experiences
with the Mission wore no recommendation that they would receive a fair
hearing on this occasion. Even so some of the rulers were secretly relieved.
Odd things were happening in their states and the journey would provide
the all important opportunity to save face and avoid trouble when it came.

Throughout the months of June, July and August the British troops
upcountry were being withdrawn into Aden. One by one the garrisons at
Baihan, Dhala, Makyras and lastly Ilabilain hauled down their flags and
drove off down the dusty roads to Aden. They were never to return. The
timing of their departure could not have been more unfortunate for the
Federal govern rnent who were at their lowest ebb. Their British allies were
going and above all were seen to be going. It only needed a spark to set the
land aflame. The first one was to come from a totally unexpected quarter.

Apart from 'cabinet forming' Hussain Bay u mi had other problems. As
federal Minister of Information he was responsible for the Aden Radio and
elevision Services. There had never been any question of these organs
F e 'ng impartial. Right from the start of the Emergency they hud beaten the
Weral drum and roundly condemned terrorism, the NLF, FLOSY and
especially the Egyptians. Throughout British and Federal propaganda had
ciVl liantIy orchestrated by Tony Ashworth, a former colonel turned
V] servant. The militants were furious. Many attempts were made to
in?!' radi ° stalion 11 P- ln J anuar y 1967" PORF were successful
Vital? 11 1? 8 . explosives which demolished most of the inside of the station,
of f 0 t fi ' Cal equipment was v i rtua Hy unharmed and after a brief interval
attent , VU nii nutes the broadcasts continued unabated. Particular
tfi leph'° n ,Jeen !Jaki t0 the staff ' Ano "ymous letters, threatening
°n« calls and the ever-present possibility of assassination were the

156

lot of the announcers, but surprisingly all survived. Slowly the strai
began to tell. At first commentators had declined to read the more violent
denunciations* then, after April and the United Nations episode staff
began to join the innumerable strikes. To counter the threat, Bayumi had
turned a room in his house into a makeshift studio. Here, during strikes
news and commentaries were taped by loyalists and played out over a
radio station manned by a skeleton staff. In these activities as in most
Others Bayumi was greatly assisted by his wife. Adilla Bayumi was a star
broadcaster and TV personality in her own right. Her steady voice was
famous throughout the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula and never
quavered as she denounced her husband's enemies.

The most enthusiastic broadcasters were the Yemenis. Nearly all of them
were or had been Republicans, full of disillusionment and bate at (he
Egyptian occupation of their country. The flood of refugees to Aden had
increased during and after the purges of October 1966. Amongst those to
arrive were Abdullah Abyadh, the former Republican director of Sana
Radio turned Royalist, and Muhammad Yazili. former director of Press and
Publications who remained a supporter of Republican General Hassan al
Amri. These two immensely tough and ruthless little men organised two
programmes. Voice of the Yemen' and 'Cry of the Yemeni Revolution',
which for six months daily castigated the Egyptian presence.

By their sheer violence, variety (there was never any shortage of
Yemenis coming forward with harrowing talcs of gas and torture) and
wit.t the programmes soon had a wide audience. Vulgar, crude, but with
that magic spark which compels listening, the programmes were amongst
the most effective anti-Egyplian propaganda to be produced. Eventually
President Nasser was moved to refer to them in one of his many speeches,
and it seems that more privately he instructed his intelligence chiefs to
deal with the matter. PORF were given the job. From the end of April to
mid-July twenty-four of these broadcasters were assassinated and Bayumi
was helpless to protect them. Still the volunteers came forward. Sadly
Uayumi turned them away. The June war had called a pause in the Arab
propaganda war and in any case the game was lost.

On 4 July the Qadhi Ghazzali was shot dead outside his Maalla House. A
tall, imposing old man with a dyed red beard, he was never without his
rosary and a brace of revolvers. A leader of the squabbling Aden Royalist
Community, the most arresting feature about him was his English. For

'One; of tin: first commentators lo decline was UmaiGirgirah. a nephew of Itie Acleni politiciun-.
As the voung man was steadfast in his refusal he was eventualiv hauled before the Shunt o
Bailian at that time acting us Minister of Information. The Shunt was sitting in his office quiet >
smoking a Gauloise. i understand, niv son. that von have refused to read a ro,nm £ nt ?i l fi t :||
defence of your country. Why is this?' Because father.' the voung mat) replied, 'the NLFwili m
me.' The Sharif blew a smoke ring and leaning forward tapped him on the knee. 'You m< -
umlerstand.' he said gently, 'it's not only the NI.F that can shoot people.' After that. Aden Kuo
had a no more enthusiastic announcer than l.'marGirgirah.

t A poem punning the name of the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief. Talat Hassan, which
roughly translated means 'he who mounts well" became particularly famous.

157

venteen years Ihc Qadhi had followed the calling of a 'Muslim Hot
s , e DC [] er ' in the Deep South of America. He never lost the idiom, inevitably
referring to his enemies, and there were many, as 'Dem damn trash people'.
The murder completely demoralised the Aden Royalists, following as it
did hard upon the heels of that of a more famous companion.

The best known and most flamboyant of the Yemeni broadcasters was
Rovalisl Major General" Shaikh Salih Ali Fidama. He had been at it for
vears. His raucous voice and frank expression had infuriated Nasscrists
and heartened their opponents since his defection from the Republic in
1963. Still a handsome man at fifty, he cut a striking figure and always
dressed from turban to toe in startling black or white set off by an enormous
da°°er. His colourful appearance matched his career. Not least amongst the
Shaikh's achievements was the attainment of the rank of Major in the
German Army and winning an Iron Cross on the Russian Front in 1944.
Quarrelsome, boastful and utterly fearless, he never bothered to hide his
contempt for lesser beings and strode through the Adenis like a
magnificent peacock amongst off-colour chickens. The Shaikh's refusal to
take normal precautions brought about his end.

At the beginning of July be prepared to travel from Aden to Royalist
Yemen and made no secret of the fact that he was carrying a large amount of
money. The Shaikh broke his journey and spent the night at the Dathina
village of Urn Qulaiytch. In I he morning Fidama bade bis host farewell and
ten minutes later was ambushed at point blank range as the Landrover
struggled around a rocky outcrop. Within seconds the Shaikh's bullet-
riddled body and that of his younger son and driver were dumped
unceremoniously by the side of the road. The attacking tribesmen, cousins
of Abdul Qadir al Sha'a, Naib of Dathina, quickly seized the cash and drove
off in the Landrover. only to run into Fidama *s late hosts who had come to
find out what all the shooting was about. The attackers fobbed them off
with an excuse that they were carrying out the orders of the federal
government and hurriedly departed.

A complaint was duly registered with the Naib and justice demanded. A
guest had been murdered and the deed had taken place on the 'sacred' road
and by tribesmen from another territory. The killing of this Royalist
chieftain who nobody much cared for led directly to the collapse of Federal
rule in Dathina and its takeover bv the NI.K.

Naib Abdul Qad ir was in a quandary. The Federal government to whom
he owed al legiance demanded an inquiry, a major tribe threatened to start a
blood feud unless he took action, yet blood is thicker than water and the
South Arabian Police on whom he had to rely thoroughly approved of the
murder. The Naib prevaricated and at length the issue polarised into one
between the Federal government and 'the people'. The people won.

Dathina was a hybrid, brought into being by the British in 1944 because
he three main tribes refused to give their allegiance to anybody else. They
were administered bv a naib and bv a feat of historical gymnastics called
themselves the 'Oldest Republic in the World'. Hundreds of Datfiinis went

158

down to Aden to work and many were attracted into the revolutionary
movements. Dathinis shared with their Audhali neighbours the reputation'
of being the principal centres of NLF and FLOSY support outside Aden.

Consequently it was easy for the NLF to exploit the discontent caused by
the Fidama affair. On 14 August several hundred tribesmen demonstrated
in Mudia. the capital, storming the prison, they released the prisoners and
helped by the South Arabian Police raised the NLF flag over the fort. Naib
Abdul CJadir. who seems to have had foreknowledge of events, resigned
and went back to farming. Significantly, four Federal ministers* left the
same day for Geneva. The NLF in Dathina were emboldened in their action
by reports of stirring events coming in from the west.

The Federal rulers had long considered Shaikh Qasi rn bin Abdul Rahman
('Muffles' to his friends), ruler of Muflahi State, as something of an odd
fellow. Elderly, grizzled and forever trying to adjust a Wizard of Oz turban
spangled with its galaxy of stars and crescents, he rivalled even Nasir,
Sultan of Fadhli, for his performances in the marriage stakes. Here to all
intents and purposes his usefulness ended. From his remote and
mountainous little state he viewed all politics from the narrow standpoint
of Upper Yal'a's tangled tribal feuds. He had once defected to the Yemen
and on return had been made to stand down in favour of his son Faisal.
Unfortunately Faisal was almost as bad as father and the light of Federal
administration and progress shone but dimly in their rocky eyrie of Khalla.

When news broke in Aden that Shaikh Qasim had been kidnapped, it
was at first dismissed as one of his escapades. The day was Sunday, 13
August and the NLF had seized power in its first state. The South Arabian
Army in Dhala, the nearest military base, was ordered to send a patrol to
investigate but delayed an ominous four days before reluctantly carrying
out its instructions. They installed Faisal and once again raised the Federal
flag over Khalla Fort. A few days later Faisal too disappeared bound for an
eventual fate working on a road gang 'for the good of the people'.

By this time events in Muflahi had lost their impact. The revolutionaries
had struck much nearer home.

Of all the states in South Arabia Lahej was the biggest and its sultans the
proudest. In perhaps no other state had the ruling family drifted so far apart
from their people. They lived in shabby splendour and could not conceive
a time when sultans would no longer exist. Consequently their political
vision was introspective and concentrated on intrigue within the family-
Over the past decade Lahej had been unfortunate in its rulers. The young
Sultan. Fadl Abdul Karim, was a megalomaniac, a character defect which
caused him to tie two cousins to stakes in his garden and use them tor target
practice. For this outrage he was deposed by the British and exiled to
Jiddah. He was succeeded by his brother. Ali Abdul Karim. Sultan Ali was
personable, intelligent but recklessly ambitious and aspired to become t ie

* Naiqa, Obali. Girgirah and Bayumi.

159

, 0 f a l| South Arabia through the agency of the South Arabian League
"'ci when these plans tailed he went off into exile. Thoroughly alarmed at
?h > qu irks of their young rulers the Lahej electoral college played safe next
time and selected the steady middle-aged Fadhl bin Ali. In a quieter age

! ■ ' c ) w ice would have been excellent but these were times of trouble and u
tou"h resolute character was needed at the helm. Sultan Fadhl never

soired to be more than he was: a country landowner, and like his forebears
before him. he treated Lahej as a personal fief. In the spring of 1967 of two
hundred and twenty irrigation pumps at work in the Lahej Oasis, a
hundred and ninety belonged to the Sultan.

Sultan Fadhl soon upset his family. Lahej's palaces were filled with
unmarried daughters of the ruling house who were considered to be too
highly born to bo married to any old shaikh. So they were far from pleased
when Sultan Fadhl married Halla, a pretty Jordanian schoolteacher whose
progressive ideas did not include that traditional diversion of sultans,
polygamy.

Because of the threat to his position from nephew Ali Abdul Karim the
Sultan, together with most of his family, had a fixation about the South
Arabian League. They did not hesitate to take advantage of the League's
long periods of unpopularity with other militants operating from the
Yemen. A glance at the map shows Lahej to have bv far the longest border of
any state with the Yemen. Yet throughout the Emergency the number of
attacks on Laheji forts were few and ineffective. An attempt to blow up
Sultan Fadhl as he drove to his Dar Saad palace, a bazooka attack in Lahej
and the Shaikh Uthman ambush of the Lahej police chief. Colonel Ali bin
Ahmad, were all the work of the South Arabian League who returned the
Sultan's feelings with interest.

In March 1966 the Lahej government were rumoured to be donating
useful amounts of money to the FLOSY war chest and a year later senior
member:, of the ruling family met FLOSY chiefs in a secret meeting in the
village of Wahl. By force of geography all arms reaching Aden from the
Yemen had to pass through Lahej territory. After the Beswick
announcement in February 1966 none were ever captured. The villages of
VVaht and Dar Saad, just over the border from Aden, were notorious as
terrorist arms stores and bolt holes. Raids on these places by British and
Federal troops always produced negative results. It almost seemed as if
they were expected.

The precise details of what happened in Lahej are unclear On the 13
A u 8»st demonstrators first appeared on the streets, apparently protesting
against a decision of the civil court. As the days passed the demonstrations
•ncreased in number and violence. The prison was stormed and its
occupants released while the court itself was sacked. The two hundred
strong Laheji government militia who dignified themselves with the grand
title of 'The Lahej State Police', tied up their officers and went on strike. The
Sultan's naib in Lahej. the clever grasping Amir Abdullah bin Ali, realised
'hat the game was up and fled through the night to Aden.

160

The mob and the militants took over. As alw ays there wore too many
contenders to the claim that they had overthrown the sultans. Within a day
fierce little gun battles were being fought up and down the state between
the supporters of FI.OSY, the NLFand SAL.

The man chosen to restore order in Lahej was Colonel Ali bin Ahmad.
Assistant commissioner of the South Arabian Police and nephew of the
Sultan. Of a younger generation, quick to point out the defects of the old.
Colonel Ali bluntly told his uncle that he did not intend to restore order to
place the sultans back in power. The Colonel who had a well earned
reputation for being ruthless and decisive had been called in months too
late.

A battalion of the South Arabian Army was sent to Lahej to reinforce the
South Arabian Police and help the Colonel. They did neither.

Other than impose a truce amongst the warring factions the Army
declined to arrest malefactors, or seize stores of -illegal' arms. Within a few
davs Colonel Ali realised his task was hopeless. Compelled to drive
through streets bedecked with NLF and FLOSY Hags and powerless even to
remove a large notice hung over the gate of the empty prison which
proclaimed him to be a 'stooge and tail of imperialism' the Colonel became
hollow-eyed and his normal healthy complexion turned grey with fatigue.

At this stage lie was found by the press louring the Federation at the
request of the Federal government.

On the IB August the BBC broadcast a Renter report that the NLF had
seized control in four states, Shaib, Muflahi. Dhala and Lahej. The Federal
government were most upset. They were advised that if the reports were
untrue as they maintained the best way to disprove them was to send a
party of journalists en tour to each of the states concerned. Although most
of the rulers present, which included the Sultan of Lahej. must have known
that there was some foundation in the reports, they readily agreed. A
helicopter was obtained and three journalists* accompanied by a British
major with the South Arabian Army, a member of the High Commission
and two boxes of ammunition, set off for the last trip by Britons around the
western area of the Federation before i [dependence.

First stop was Habilain. Strangely forlorn, the last British units had
departed a fortnight before. Traffic at the huge airstrip, once the busiest in
the Federation, was almost at a standstill. Even the giant Beverley transpor
which some months previously had struck a mine on take off and had a
at the end of the runway likesome giant silver bird with a broken wing, n

" The South Arabian Army's Commander in the West, Col °"^
Muhammad Ahmad Hassan i. received the journalists, treated them to
obligatory soft drinks and explained that all was quiet. And it was, dea
quiet.

" S Bonner. AP. M Gent. BBC. K Ludlow. VicNcws.

161

Tliu partv flow on to Avvaabil. administrative centre of Shaib. The
. , iroP ter left the Dhala Road behind. Climbing higher and higher into the

minlains the passengers peering through the windows had a bird s eye
" L of some of the roughest country in the world. Black brown hills with
" ynr sharp ridges stretched as far as the eye could sec, bisected by deep

rrou- wadis. Occasionally there was a flash of green where cultivation
h»d been attempted or a glimpse of a tiny fort with a hamlet huddled for
protection around it. This was Halmain. never administered even by the
venturesome British and the home of people as old and hard as their

'"Tvaabd is a pleasant surprise. Sprinkled high on the edge of a cliff
overshadowed bv another, local legend has it that this is the lirst town that
God made and although the irreverent add that it doesn't seem He has been
back since it is not easy to understand how the place has survived. Unable
to scratch a living from their own barren soil, hundreds of Shaibis have
emigrated abroad to seek their fortunes. Thriving communities can be
found in Cardiff. Sheffield and Birmingham. Others have gone lurther
afield to the United States and South Kast Asia. Only rarely does a Shaibi
settle permanentlv in the land of his work. Most return to Shaib.

Awaabil is dominated bv the Naib's Castle. A large brown lort whose
grim visage seems to promise tales of dark deeds and deep dungeons. This
contrasts with the BeauGesto headquarters of the South Arabian Army just
up the road whose mortars point purposefully towards the Yemen a tew
miles away across the gorge. _

The press were enchanted. The clean air. champagne to Aden s bail
burgundy, was in itself enough to cheer them up. They trooped ott happily
into the town to chat with friendly people who as always mostly consisted
of women, children and old men. The younger men were either abroad or
with the rebels. What the journalists did not know was thai the day belore
the South Arabian Army had politely told the Naib that it could no longer
support him and that even as they wandered around Naib Yahya was
franticallv packing his goods and chattels. Neither did they realise that the
polite man in the Robin Hood hat and revolver who had greeted them by
the Army fort had quicklv stuffed an Nl.F flag into his shirt to avoid giving
offence to these unexpected guests. The helicopter overflew Muflahi being
unable to land as (he South Arabian Army had only that morning tound
time to carry out its orders and send a patrol to investigate the kidnapping
of Shaikh "Qasim. The helicopter flew low over Khalla Fort and the
journalists were reassured by the sight of a Federal flag being raised fron
the tower.

After Awaabil. Dhala was a return to the normal atmosphere of tension,
suspicion and doubt. The party landed and were driven straight to army
headquarters where thev were entertained in the officers' mess and later
taken to the house of Muhammad Qasim, the young NI.F-inclined political
officer. Their requests to visit the Amir and the town were Firmly refused.
T o put it mildly the situation had been delicate for some time.

162

Th e town of Dhala clusters around the skies ol Fa small hill
i w™l hv the magnificent bulk of Jebel ihaf. The squat brown
r su^outcd" fe the imposing white palace of .he ruler The
v 1 'of this building bore the scars of over forty bazooka shells-the A mir
,1 v ,vs d vlv referred to these as 'South Arabian air conditioning .

S haa f u 1 b i u A 1 i CMG. Amir of Dhala. was a small slight man with
sou u I in wn eves and tremendous pluck, for nearly .wen y years he had
u 11 " state with skill and energy. He was only too well aware o he
necessi v of keeping a balance between the tribes, who were amongst the
IsTfer ious and vfcious in all Arabia. The biggest ol these the Sham had
r»nienviable reputation for treachery and violence and did not hesitate at
Se murder of holv men or the robbery of any untor.una e p.lgnm who
into their ^ands. They ^ ^Z^^^^

he was personally popular. f . f the

It was in Dhala on the day of Iho mutiny lha t t he h ™ s] & {
impending break up of the Federal government : appe red-
buzzed with rumours ol what wus happen ng - Aden ^ P

2S officers could

regain control of them. - i„H hv one Ali Anlar.*

The chief Shairi rebel gang in the area was led by one. At
Grasping and completely ruthless, ho was a born eader and ful %
Piqued at having been summoned to far, to ex,. » n ^ oSY t0 the

of a rival.t he had recently trans erred Ins al leg an cm *

town should be made to leave that day. ition to

With the army still arguing in their camp tteAm^* ^quickly as
refuse and messages were sent to the two men to get d*aj
possible.

• Amor is .he nickname of Ali Ahn»d N«ir al Bishi, now (1983) the Minister of Defend for
the People's Democratic Republic of the Yemen.

TAli bin Ali Hadi.

163

Major Paxtoa an a c: aPtf B S — Sly

VC S uncertain of the a.t.tu J °^^hhi had their wives living with
nmnlv Until a few weeks prev '° u ^J h fl h ~ 0 the lJnion Jack. New they
Xn n the square stone houses d efia> t jfl>^, ^ ^ ^ (ak , y

diorwav of the house returned to his village.

% days passed it became X^S^^los^
, ou ,d do -thing positive to keep ^ By mid . August the

placed the soldiers in a f oi on tte other hand, due ,o the
the Amir who was under the. protec on ^ ^ {o (anglfi

uncrirtalnlies of the general po l.t.c a o u ^ Ant

with the rebels who might ^"P^J^ attackc a the army they would
and his men readily appreciated that tncy

almost certainly come oft worst on a visit to Aden to
The hiatus was broken vh 1st the Amir iq (hfi amy

ask for help. His bro^ cond ui„n was that the

camp and compelled to agree " 'ea enfo i k an d possessions.

army would give protection to <h Am w om D n the way

A convoy of three-tonners wound up ■ > e ™^ . ;C and lhe so ldiers

bock the drivers stopped the trucks ond pipped his

stood hv whilst the mob looted the Amir 0

womenfolk of their ornaments. , m hol a ing out

At the time of the press visit on 1/ August the

in his palace. „i„Hpd their trip in hahej where they

After Dhala the journalists conclu de h 0 ^ over as a military

interviewed a tired Colonel Ah Ahmad in a garden

headquarters. Then they returned to Aden. although there

Reports were duly written and broadcast < t and
had clearly been trouble in the our states ^ stU1

under the control of the South Arabian Ar m t nc ^
identified with the Federal go vernment. i ul . itdklthcm
government's last gamble and although t had pa.t J ^° area and

little good. In fact thev had lost control over the whole
thev were shortly to be toppled from power in the ^ their

As the hot and tired journalists were le av g tea u. heK ^ ^

despatches, another blow was struck at Federal power,
Ittihad itself.

164

Captain Jeff Jefferson was well known in the corridors of al Ittihad where
ho worked as an administrative officer with Federal Intelligence. Stolid
and capable, he was one of the most cautious men in Aden. On the daily
fourteen-mile drive in his battered red Dauphine he would never stop to
pick up Arab hitch-hikers and as he passed through the squalid little
shanty village of al Hizwa one hand never strayed far from a loaded
automatic in the pocket. As usual al 1.20 pm Jefferson left work, drove
down to the main road, passed through Hizwa village and was never seen
alive again. When he did not arrive home for lunch his friends became
worried and organised a search. In time his body was found slumped in the
seat of his car. He had been killed instantly by a burst from a machine gun.
From information gathered later il is almost certain that the Dauphine was
followed out of al Ittihad by an open blue sports car which overtook it on
the other side of Hizwa village, a passenger letting fly with a burst of light
machine gun fire as itdidso. It was over in a flash. The Dauphine ploughed
off the road into the desert while the sports car passed on its way. So
quickly and efficiently was the murder carried out that colleagues of
Jefferson's passing the scene not more than three minutes later noticed the
car well off the road, mused thet it might be Jefferson, but dismissed the
thought as the car looked too dirty and knew that the Captain would not of
his own accord have left the road.

The reason for the killing was not hard to find. A few weeks previously
the Intelligence Office driver Hassan had been unmasked as a senior
member of PORF. He was responsible amongst other things for laying the
mine for Sir Richard Turnbull's helicopter on that last Federal Day* parade
back in February and the 'drainpipe* mortar attacks on the Federal
ministers' houses at the time, of the UN Mission. t Hassan had been
whisked away to Fort Morbut. His friends presumably sought revenge,
accomplished by the murder of Jefferson.

With the death of their administrative officer coupled w ith the fact that
the Supreme Council to whom I hey reported bad ceased to function, the
Federal Intelligence apparatus folded up.

Professional terrorism with lone Britons as targets was on the increase.
Two days afterwards an RAF sergeant was shot while being served with
petrol in Maalla's Esso station. A few minutes later two other RAF men
suffered a similar fate as they wheeled their l.ambretta in for repair to the
BP station opposite, one, not more than twenty, managed to gasp 'he wore
black trousers' before he died. For some lime lone killers had been loose in
Steamer Point.

On the 12 July Norman Pritchard, the British manager of an Aden
shipping company, was shot in the back of the head; within a few days Bill
Curtis, an information officer, was killed in the same way whilst on a lone

* See Chapter IV.
t See Chapter VI.

165

-I oping expedition before returning home: Michael Booth, an accountant
'th the British Bank of the Middle Fast, was lucky to escape with a bullet
"'the fa'^c- and 011 ,he 21 Au 8 ust :l soldier of the Prince of Wales' Own was
"hot in the back in the liny bookshop opposite the High Commission as he
s selecting magazines for his friends on guard. A day later twenty
"minds of gelignite was discovered in the Aden Government Secretariat
^t'ter an anonymous telephone call. If it had exploded it may have caused
areat loss of Arab life, and as always it was the Adenis who suffered most for
the continuation of terrorism. In the months of July and August fifty-eight
adenis. including four women and four children, were killed by the
revolutionaries, and a further forty-eight 'terrorists' were shot by British
troops, as opposed to a total of eleven British deaths.

As a result of the August killings Middle Kast Command tightened up
security instructions, virtually confining their men to camp and the High
Commission withdrew its officers still living outside the wire into secure
areas.

Whilst the NI.F and its associates had been seizing power in the states.
FLOSY had not been idle. In the firsl week in August Asnag, Mackawee and
Basindwah. amongst others, had held an important meeting in Taiz and
decided to take advantage of diminishing Federal control with an armed
invasion across the border. First they had to deal with trouble amongst
their own supporters.

Fgvptian instructors training the "FLOSY Liberation Army", presumably
because they did not know what to do with their charges, suggested they
practise digging trenches. The six hundred South Arabians replied hotly
that they were not workmen and the only holes they were prepared to dig
were Egyptian graves. With that the Egyptians boiled. The real cause of the
trouble was that the troops hadn't been paid for two months and many were
deserting. Asnag had brought the necessary cash from Cairo and after brief
negotiation the matter was solved.

FLOSY were unfortunate in their military adventures. Their first probe
was a raid by sixty heavily armed men against the border village of al
Hazza. Almost the lasl remaining supporters of the Amir of Dhala. the
villagers Hung back their attackers in a fierce night battle. They were
Helped at the decisive moment by pro-NLF elements who thereafter
claimed their allegiance.

FLOSY's next venture was more ambitious and led by Asnag and
Basindwah themselves. Acting against the advice of their military
advisers, on the 14 August they moved over the border and seized the
Laheji border post of Kirsh. Two clays later Taiz Radio issued a manifesto
Irom 'Liberated Territory' but by this time FLOSY had already been driven
°ut In response to a Federal request. Hunters of the Royal Air Force had
swept low over Kirsh. This was enough for Basindwah who leapt into a
Landrover and together with £14.000 worth of Federal customs dues led
the retreat back over the border. His men were not slow to follow. A similar
invasion into Audhali also failed. The next FLOSY effort, carried out

33 Abdullah al Asnag, the leader of FLOSY, [left), with supporters.

mninivhvPORF was to be more successful. ,

rldhl \ uhsin the Naib of the I iaushabi Sultanate, was much distu bed

trouble actually occurs, by shooting up h.s 0W ^ F '^^ cam9 in
a sharp halt with the establishment o a permanen Fu e . Army P
the area. There were, however, other practices i hich _x e.c ^
lucrative. With the full co-operation of his young smas.erju Un T-J -
Sarur he opened negotiations with everybody-Yemen s i.g
Rov a lis FLOSY and the NLF. to facilitate the passing of amis across
So^hrough which ran the main road from A en to = J
These machinations certainly involved the most n a it. I f j
the state-lhe Sultan's mother. Sharp as a needle w. h a k en ^
anything connected with money from a rifle to a tractor, th.s old dame
held in awe by both her son and his naib. „. rontTW the „ it was

if the rulers of Haushabi were to be considered c ^ cn ^ , ™J slopin
J5 they shared with their people. ^^ ^^ ^
foreheads give a profound impression of he, ■ nt ice
Haushabi ran several dissident gangs. A great deal ^"™ U rar
and many fierce battles fought but the percept.ve noted there

167

'■

:h disturbed.
;o learnt that
ed like many
ys out when
ctice came to
rrny camp in
vere equally
:un Faisal bin
>, Kgyptians,
ms across his

ial person in
keen eye &>'
old dame was

then it was a
; and sloping
ual capacity-
add be caused
re were rarelj

„• -.nH then one of these gangs would surrender a
any ^^ZZS^ «*« « — * tr " m '

„ ciis dent of the old sctoo 1 h.s so 1 J hobia ()t tho Holy Man
h tTnndelfronUhesacre^

Appealed to his ^^^^S^ n exten<le<l .he principle to the
the foreign^ and much « ; rSavknJ b a id found it necessary to

Lvptians-The story goes that " he "^ r ^ - wouW onlv consent to do so
Averse with h. o^-s P hu^ ^ ^ ^ (hc fa(;es ol tl
throU «,h a curtain sc t a ' h ^°, u!rc hav(3 been recorded cases, espec, tl v
mo,;:rlS S'dirihuted. that Say,. Ubaid contnved to

Muhsin. The slow tempo ot ^ T f^ ^f vmn up . More and more he
S too quickly and he toond dfi,uHy n kjepm ^
recoursed to the bott Ic , oi ■ J * ^ ^ Wow ^ vh

and blue cushions o fhis re « cpt.on c ^ ^ m()UIltalns „ th

heard that a strong force ot NLr v Lit n " H aushabi lor the NLF.

c avowed intention of suizmg him °"f ifl d ^ l ^ 0 „ d the news that they
fho Naib had been conh den. ly cxpec ^:^ h {he d(!Sertion of half
had been driven out ot nearby Ki«h tome <J m d _ , md senl an

his guards ^VV? rf ^ e h J^*^5^ Si filing U but either forgo,
incomprehensible telegnm o al un ^ ^ Aa

or couldn't bring himsell to rnc1 , ^" ° theNa , b prepared to scuttle,
puz/.ledarmvofficersporedoverthetelcg amt^^ led bv none other than
He had left i. too late, .he NLF we c up J • - Muhammad al
Faisal al Shaabi. the hard-eyed nep l eu ol Qahtan. ^
Bishi. organiser of the Dhala stronghold ot t^ Musaiymir
Fifty NLF 'commandos' swarmed m. the ^Ha ^ I ^ fort:0(l his
and after a short, sharp \ ^^X-atively easy victory the

remaining guards to surrendei. Attci t us V - [h , he Naib and

NLF left a few men in the fort and marched m og tl c ^ ^

several other prisoners. As they -ere cro^ m the fay
Musaivmir stands like a., island, the NLF « ere taken ^ - | - rhe rKS ,
PORF and were completely routed. Perhaps a <lo x w ^ pQRI ,

fled or. together with the two leaders we. • taken p ^ ^

column, some one hundred strong had was sec. ( ^

previously and headed straight tor Musa.vm r. 1 hue s ^
suspicion tha. thev had made some arrongemen s w t , r

wh 1 thev had long been in touch. At al 1 events it thev had. v

* Kstimattw varv l»mvum snai am. litti'iMi.

168

Here they made a lata! mistak*. following the FI.OSY

The South Arabian Army had 1^"^ had Ulkcn up posilio ns
ta k«, over and subsequent ^ ' - d t0 break through back to
commanding the road along u hid PORF plan ^
,he Yemen. There was no need to PORI to atlarX
slipped round. Perhaps they were ove .„ the dark , nobod ,
success, perhaps they merely bumper n to the a - u h ; ,

^■^^f^^^X^ ouf the two leading
Saladin armoured oar and this qi c > scattered bands

Landrovers. PORF then . wisely aban lo cd A e oad . ^
fought their way to safely acros t ho b order takm e I ^ ^
them, in the morning the sun rose o rc e w ^ ^

between them and the NI.F. , thc W est had

So bv 20 August the traditional rule o : albnajor st ^
been overthrown. Other than the abortive r LOSV ' disCT edited
was made anywhere to set up an ac minis r . on to e place ^ ^
Federal government. In.ertnba hgh ng * M being

broke out almost immediately "« the ne. i aUhough
particularly bloody in Dha la I he am, J— ^ one facti on or
nanv of its soldiers were taking time o t to i n h as it

a other. The west had always been turbu lent an Idee ,pm ^ rf

w08 had not changed the lives of the peop 1 aT ^jn Wd « much as ^
Audhali, Lower Yaf^Fadhh and Datm a development,
state administrators were more /''P ,l ' s 1 " tt J lU and Lower Yafa
Particularly in agriculture, more ^ ^JX ^w'enty years the
between them share the new iert.le Ah >< n BoMrn he h
oonius of British administration had transtom '" .^bia becoming the
cotton land, some of the poorest tnbesmen m S > Ambu ^ ,„
richest as a result. This development was to a certain

. v jiiag(! ol

- oth-r PORF men arc nortec, tohavu ia.erdierl D f their uou.kIs in .he Yemen,
Uiihiila.

169

P U,UiaU i-ecl and most ably governed of aU thc country

ad!n 1 n 1 l a i ruler, were strong and capab e a 1 mo ^

Th °.i; i dU -Vdea into plateau and ptan. At the. he ^ sh()ring up the

, i Vnm the market town of MaKairas ' , ■ L H e was a

rU led t ,om tnc n Ymcn soon found to t g ^ of

intrigues had

ttll e tannlV, position in the state. mm;id held sway.

" On 'the plai n below his cousin the Na b Ms bm ■ ^ ^

NO od "I o has ever seen this ^^Xg^vmiL of an Aden dawn,
aciss the tarmac of Khormaks^^ slung acrossh,

T dne or machine gun wrapped in a poi ruth l CS sness. Cold

shoulders could even doubt lus X e was perhaps the most

survived had it not been for une man (he AudhaUs had

F< r vears laabal Aqil ot the Am Shaa n s.ij j rBason {or his

be an implacable enemy of the . ruhng tanu b 1 h J ^ ^
hatred is lost in the dark recess es of b » P< ^ and ever y waking
fioure gave off an odour ot al, -««?^™ to encompass their downfall,
hour seems to have been ^^^tu,ly complaining ot some
His high rasping voice was o e. i heard qi am sho - oiTi the advent

injure, real or imagined at then hand^ to) ^ ^ - n c tac:t w th
of the revolution was a godsend. ^ ^ q{ arms and men down he .
the Egyptians, facilitating he <}« f /^fere outside Aden did the NUF
Audhal i cliff beneath which he Nou he ^ |he mln of , he

have a more effective leader and lew did more

Federation than this embittered old man. uridc r-estimated as

His activities had long beer, s u *d ™ hvand itsaysa great deal
mere tribalism because of his we 1 k^Sii. months a rebel leader,
for Egyptian security that Naib Jaabil. tor ugme

* See Chapter HI.

171

his namesake's importance. Apart from the orgamsa lion ot
ne ver guessu s na M[Qwms m Aden t0 mdu l gP in

arn.s snu.ggl n!, - » shou , d lh ever bc forced to flee.

NaturalK his ma ,n ^ dcs iroved ihcre. the odd mme was laid

P un | P " Tris Sm d U kept at hav bv the competence of feib Nas.r and
0,1 ' J" '' H 'if e ho ad his hand too much the retribution to,- the Aq, of
the tear that it he M . f , violent W hen Dathina declared tor the
ASS Hill^ S ,o,ne. threw off his mask and cailed for

* h h 1 "tcHV turns'on'small things. One may wonder if the course of events
td havXen changed if the ruling family had been more ge nerous to
would ax e nee « f h violls J( . Instead of handing out

thcir tribesmen on t e occas oa o h p ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ de

thB ""I he" S i^s ?h yTad nested on selling them althou gh there

SBSKbesssBSBW

"^ tZ^ to his orders. Sir Humphrey suggested he order J.
army to make the request. No request was forthcoming. ™c B"Ush v u , e
not in the habit of bombing villages without due wa.m ng a nd v e,c no
convinced that the Federation was done tor. rh.s was the deci n o moment,
if they had succeeded they may have pu back the com, k e uctor
for reVolu.ion until alter independence. The leelmg preva ed .
manv British lives had already been lost to no purpose. The oh, J v a to
get as manv out as possible and avoid further mv olveme, t The l « a a
risk. The traditional authorities provided the only proper ad lm ms a ti .
■ the chaos which was taking its place may well have engultecl the British
leading to far greater casualties. That it didn « is a tribute to h
Commissioner's diplomatic sixth sense. Even so the incident doe t ie to
encourage those who persist in the belief that Britain always stands bv her
friends in their hour of need. . .

If N-aib Kusir had returned to Audhali immed.ately alter hea ■ g he
High Commissioner's refusal all may still have been well. 1 h x. ul.n.
tarn ilv alone numbered more than three hundred men, their capita 1 ^ara
was virtually impregnable and they were wcl supplied with a ms an
ammunition. The blow bad been psychological rather than n.atei.al and

•AlilaljriAuilhali.tlirmi.n wspmisibl.; for tlu> Maulla tioniliaiiionxst iIuhii.

172

the Naib resigned himself to defeat and sulked around Aden for a vital
throe days. By tho time ho had regained heart his followers had lied, the
rebels had seized his capital and captured the arms which his family had
been at such pains to preserve. When the tribesmen broke clown the Zara
arms store they found several hundred rifles and over a million rounds of
ammunition as well as a Few machine guns. Henceforth Audhuli was to be
the centre from which the NLF were to extend their influence to the East.

The fall of the Audhalis was the death blow to the Federal government
and the repercussions were immediately felt in the neighbouring states of
Lower Yafa' and Fadhli.

Before Sultan Nasir of Fadhli had left for Geneva he had given orders to
release the leading rebels held in his jail. The reason for this gesture is
unknown. He may have already been coming to some agreement with the
militants and hoped to stave off personal disaster by a quick
accommodation. When the news of the Audhal i debacle reached Zingibar,
the state administrative capital, the former Sultan Ahmad realised that his
only chance was to try and gather support from the tribes in the north east
of the stale. He knew' that the de-trihalised Abyan delta was riddled with
NLF cells and he could expect little help from them. Travelling fast in a
convoy of Landrovers Ahmad held a tribal meeting at Am Surra near the
border with Audhali. He declared himself for FLOSY, the first sultan to do
so and gained promises of support. Turning back, the former ruler and his
party were ambushed on the Urqub Pass by the Qashmimis. a band of
semi-political bandits who had long been a thorn in the side of the
administration. What happened is lost in legend. According to some
Ahmad leant out of his Landrover and personally shot the leader ol the
attackers. Ali Lahman Qasmimi, dead. It seems more likely, however, that
Ali Lahman was firing a bren gun from behind cover when the bipod
collapsed and the bullets ricocheted off the rocks striking him in the lace.
At all events he was killed and his men dispersed. Ahmad, learning for the
first time that Zingibar had declared against him and the Audhali NLr in
force were coming down the road fast with the avowed intention ol
stringing him up, wiselv decided to cut across country to the safety ^ot
Aulaqi and Baihan. Afterwards even pro-NLF Fadhli tribesmen boastea
of his exploits, contrasting the performance of 'their sultans' with those
of Audhali. , ,

The much maligned Shaikh Ali Atif was at this time Chairman ot me
Supreme Council. Hearing rumours of the NLF' takeover ol fadhli n
decided that his place was at the side of his young master. Sultan M, "
bin Aidrus of Lower Yafa', when many of his more illustrious colleagu
had taken themselves abroad: he never got there. As his I. and rover turner
bend on the road to Jaar it found a roadblock. A partv of twenty-live am ■
men stepped out from their hiding places and the Minister's guards liu b
up their hands in surrender. He had been betrayed by his driver, vv •
annoved at a refusal for a pav rise, had sent word ahead to the Fadh !" The
Shaikh Ali Atif was the first Federal minister to fall into NLF hands.

1 73

vtiun

, sultan Mahmud was taken the same afternoon. TlKMapture oHhese
"ylh otablos.oacbvFadhlis.carriedtheseodsoffuturetroublswhich
,w0 £te hidden, by the general chaos. The Yafais are probably the
* \ int nselv tribal people of all South Arabia and although they said
r H n lie first flush of revolutionary triumph, they did not forget that the
' u lie of all people had laid hands on one of their chieftains.
h u- h he NI.F takeover in the central area they held nine of the states
rh, s' s ill in the hands of the Federal authorities were in the east and
< isted of M-laqi. Wahidi and Baihan. Muhammad Fond, the Aula.,,
r" ' e n Minister, en route to the United Nations, had broken his journey ui
S l a nd come to some agreement with F..OSY. From the,, on t he Auloq.s
i o rnL.lv remained loyal to. heir rulers and included a bloc^cot
S, h Arabian Arm v officers, counted themselves as supporters of r LOSY.

The Federal government was finished. In a desperate attempt to save
something from the wreck. Shaikh Ali Musaid Buhakri. who succeeded the
unfortunate Shaikh Ali At if as Chairman, asked the army to take over. They
o,p o dceplv divided themselves to accept. Shaikh Ali MusaLd hex, left
Aden for U'ahid, where he too declared for F..OSY and rallied the
tribesmen to fight the local South Arabian Police who had turned NLP

The onlv Federal minister left in Aden was the Sultan ol Lahe, and he
had gone into hiding. Bayumi. ebullient as ever, returned *™<£™* to
join him. announcing that he was willing to stay m office un .1 the u 1 o
he people was implemented." He had no illusions as to he ate ol he
Federal government, and his views were shared by the High

Commissioner. . . . . n

Sir Ilurnphrev Trcvelvan flow to London to explain the position. Un
his return on the 4 September in a broadcast over Aden Radio he put the
official seal on the end of the Federal government of South Arabia,
declared that Britain recognised "the nationalist forces as representatives
of the people' and was ready to have immediate discussions with them.
The subject of these talks would, he said, include British recognition o
'an effective Government formed by the nationalist forces', withdrawal or
British forces and the carrying out of the United Nations' Resolutions for
the area. , , . , .

In the few duvs before Sir Humphrey made his historic broadcast.
FLOSY and the NLF were in a state of open warfare. Qahtan Ash Shaab.. the
legendary M.F leader released from detention in Kgypl. had given Ins lust
press conference in Zingibar. the east was in turmoil and away in the noit i
the Sharif of Baihan. last of the traditional leaders, had departed lorbaucii
Arabia.

Chapter X *y»

War with Two Fronts

4 September-November 1967

There is no such thing as the N/.F— we ore one revolutionary body.

Abdullah al Asnag. f lead of the Fl.OSY politician body

Taiz, April 1967

Showing openmindedncss and tolerance KLOSV has always treated
the NLF like a vounger brother.

Abdul Qauee Mackawee, Secretary-General of FLOS Y
to UN Mission in Cairo, September 1967

FLOSY are a gang of Zionists.

\'LF leaflet— Shaikh (Jthman
October 1967

The small stockv man in turban and sunglasses didn't look like a leader of
revolution. Onlv when he began to speak did the intensity of his words,
accompanied hv dramatic gestures, give a hint at the fanaticism which tor
most of his fortv-two vears had made Qahtan al Shaabi a dedicated
dissident. Journalists had been called to Zingibar forty-five miles along the
beach from Aden and recently taken over by the NI.F. Here the NLF leader
had chosen to make his headquarters and for the first time address the press
in South Arabia. Surrounded hv three hundred vvel l-armed tribesmen and a
wildlv enthusiastic crowd in which South Arabian Police were prom men ,
the NLF leader let it be known that he was willing to meet the High
Commissioner provided that the British first publicly announced that n
NLF was the true representative of the people. FLOSY would be allowed!"
live in peace in an NLF state— no more— and the United Nations Mission
had no right to interfere. c-

Qahtan al Shaahi's press conference took place two days botore .
Humphrey Trevelvan's broadcast offering to negotiate with
national ists. When the offer came the NI.F rejected it outright. They had n
been accepted as the only party with whom the British were prepare
talk and also thev were not yet strong enough to accept.

Although Qahtan al Shaabi appeared confident enough ' r

privately he must have been worried and not a little perplexed. The r ^
Director of Agriculture had come a long way since the days when ne The
been driven to fabricate 'news items' in his dingy Cairo office.

175

nrovious two years had boon spent in semi-detention in Egypt, tar rom the
c n t a tioru and he had only been released in the aftermath of the une
Wa He can have had no idea of the extent of his movement^,* unwell
acceptance of his leadership was based on the resul o early Egyptian
propaganda Ud his own efforts at public relations which had made him
E known of NLF figures. I Us enforced absence Iron, the Yemen and
South Arabia had blurred a reputation for quarrelling and alone ,of to *M
leaders had at no time come to an accommodation with ^SY^rom oii
over South Arabia, tribesmen, trades unionists Students and „ l n with
cause to fear headed for Zingibar to assure their "leader how they bad long
supported the NLF and helped it to victory. Al Shaab. had little means of
telling which of his wellwishers were genuine and which were inot. _The
members of the NLF High Command steadily expanded from the ft fteen
announced in Zingibar to an unwieldy forty-three by the end of October
and nobodv. not even the leader himself, seemed able to agree on he
names. In the event this proved to be a decisive strength ior the NLF as the
better-organised FLOSY knew quite well who their supporters were and
gave short shrift to any fairweather pretenders. The uncommitted, the
isolated, the junior civil servants and the ordinary men in me street who
wanted nothing more than to be left alone, soon caught on and flocked to
swell the ranks of their rivals. , VT P

The Zingibar press conference was not the first to be given by the NL ■
For days before Nagwa Mackawee (once graphically described as Sou h
Arabia's answer to Rosa Kleb). whose dislike for her uncle had led her to
become a vociferous leader of NLF women in Aden, had gone to the

3 76

Crescent Hotel and invited pressmen to DarSaad. Here they met 'Naqib'a
voung schoolteacher flanked by two 'commandos' carrying Russian sub-
machine guns. The crowd outside the police station cheerfully chanted
NLF slogans whilst Naqib' explained thai he and his men had taken over
the village from the Lahej authorities. A week later the press returned, this
time to a FLOSY conference. 'Maqib' had been driven out and perhaps
killed: of his headquarters one wall remained standingand thesame crowd
shouted lor FLOSY with equal enthusiasm. The lighting was the first
pitched battle to be fought between the two factions in Aden and was an
indication of things to come. Over the next six weeks efforts were made by
organisations as divergent as the South Arabian Army, the United Nations'
Mission and the Arab League to bring the two Fronts together. All failed.
Often when a successful solution appeared to have been arrived at in Cairo
or elsewhere bursts of violent fighting would break out in South Arabia and
destroy the efforts of the peacemakers.

Both sides were evenly matched. FLOSY were generally stronger in
Aden although the oil refinery workers of Little Aden and the powerful
dockers' union represented an impressive bloc of NLF support. Upcountry
the west was almost entirely in the hands of the NLF although the
tribesmen of Radfan and Hausiiabi and the Jebel Jihaf continued to support
FLOSY. This gave FLOSY control of the main road from the Yemen which
enabled it to continue to send reinforcements to its forces in Aden forsome
time to come. The important central area was completely under NLF
control but in the east former Federal rulers held most of VVahidi, the Upper
Aulaqi Shaikhdom. the Upper Aulaqi Sultanate and Baihan in the name of
FLOSY. The NLF had two other advantages, not immediately apparent but
nonetheless important. Their leaders had nearly all returned to the south
while apart from the renegade Federalis those of FLOSY preferred to
expend their energies in Cairo and Taiz. II is said that Abdullah al Asnag
paid a brief visit toal Mansura but left before the fighting with promises to
return with aid which were never to be fulfilled.

So the NLF were seen as a national party, something indigenous to South
Arabia, and had survived despite Kgyptian opposition. Alternatively,
FLOSY were seen as an Egyptian and therefore foreign creation. The
sii pport of most South Arabians for President Nasser is qualified. They had
been critical observers of Egyptian performance in the Yemen and
interference in South Arabia. They were prepared to pay lip service to the
great man only so long as he didn't come to South Arabia. Later, when a
known anti-Egyptian commentator on Aden Radio, Abdul Rahman
Haideri, was brought before an NLF tribunal and asked ,'Why did you
speak out against our Egyptian brothers?' he replied with some courage,
'Because they have caused great harm to our country.' The president o
the tribunal said, 'He is absolutely right' and instead of being taken out
and shot as he expected, the man was reinstated in his position.

The Egyptians were amongst the first to realise the weakness o
FLOSY position and made strenuous efforts to persuade the two factions

177

„ oocrate. The release of Qahtan al Shaabi was not the least of these 1 hey
, h-md icapped bv their consistent efforts in the past to impose FLOSY
lVC nv rrvbodv else and because at one time or another they had supported
° r v mrtv'in opposition to the British. For years the white-robed
f/ Mmmad Ali al Jilri of the South Arabian League had been lionised by
S ue and as Rgypt wished to gain maximum Arab supp.n-t for
her South Arabian Policy. Muhammad Ali al Jitn had perforce to be
in'r-luded in the peace talks.

The \rab League stumbling upon something everybody else had been
)rv n2 to bring about for years, called a conference of all contending parties
in South Arabia to bring about a form of coalition government Jo receive
dependence. Much to his surprise even Bayumi found himself invited.
The conference, held in Cairo, never really began. Bayumi was the first
' u a,,- In typical fashion he Hung away whatever chances he had by
msulting his Egyptian hosts. Sitting drinking coffee with Colonel Izzat
Sulaiman who u'as organising the meeting for the Egyptians and a host of
'journalists in Cairo's Hilton Hotel. Bayumi heard the rumble of Israeli
mortar fire from across the canal, something which had been tacitly
ignored bv everybody else.

Well ' he said, jovially addressing himself to the company at large.
-ban<> bang, bang-just like home. Reminds me of Mansura and Shaikh
Uthman but of course we have Egyptian mortars there and being of our
Arab brethren so to speak, they rarely hit the target. Still, how the world
turns, who would have thought of it in Cairo ol all places.

The Egyptians were furious and that was the end of Bayumi. 1 hat was
also the end of the conference as the organisers sooo realised that the only
parties who counted were those with men and guns in South Arabia.

In the earlv days of September, KLOSY leaders in Cairo were sanguine of
coming to an agreement which would give them the bulk of control m
'revolutionary government'. They believed that they held a trump card in
the persons of Faisal al Shaabi and Muhammad al Bishi. captured in the
fight at Musaivmir a month previously.

Several days were spent negotiating an agreement with these two but it
was announced onlv to be instantly repudiated by the NLF in South Arabia
and through their spokesmen in Beirut. As Mackawce rather querulously
complained to the United Nations' Mission, he had discovered that those
who claimed to speak on the behalf of the NLF Supreme Council had no
authority to commit that body. The British could have told him some
stories about that.

For their part the NLF cleverlv announced that it was willing to meet
FLOSY on any part of 'liberated' South Arabian soil, knowing that territory
still held bv the pseudo-FLOSY rulers could hardly be termed 'liberated in
the best revolutionary sense of the word and that anywhere else they would
he able to bring intolerable pressure on any FLOSY delegates. FLOSY
declined and suggested a list of Arab capitals as possible meeting places. In
the middle, the South Arabian Armv issued an ultimatum to both sides and

178

when this expired without result on the 20 September extended it until ,u
c "d°f the month. Suddenly and to thosurpriseofmanv. including * e
of the NLF, Qahtan al Shaahi announced that he would take I
delegation to talk with Fi.OSY and on 4 October he led a fc ,^
delegation plus two advisers to Cairo. f °ur-man

Whilst they were away, engaged in their desultory negotiations matt
were taken out of their hands by the course of events back in South Arab

In the final analysis, victory for cither party rested on Ihe attitude J?L
South Arabian Army. It was divided on what were essentially tribal linl
Most of to Aulaqis, although by no means all. supported FLOS Y the ^
the NLF. The FLOSY chances of success rested therefore on [he ext t tn
wh.ch the Aulaq, officer corps could maintain their positions in the ace S
rising opposition. Because of their divisions, the army, logether w tlu he
South Arabian Pohce, tried to keep up a formal position „f neu.ralitv and
use their influence to bring the two sides together. At the same time
Colonel Basir Buraiq. ,he Commander-designate, was sending hs

on-Aulaq commanders upcountry were actively assisting the NLF For
no sake o appearances a committee of seven colonels had been formed

Sduih s n h dul Hadi Shihab ' lhc N, - F hftiid 0f the Ade " Poli ' IS
Abdulla Sahh, his opposite number in the states. Colonel Abdulla, known

as number seven was an Aulaqi-a minor member of the ruling family
u ho considered hat his cousins had no. given him his dues in the past and
was consequently a fanatical member of the NLF. The majority of the
colonels sympathised with the NLF but for a while the power remained
with their rivals. Following the taking of Dar Saad the armv took its first
steps to try and keep (he peace in Aden. Appeals were made over the radio
calling upon the factional forces to withdraw from the areas around the
borders ol Aden Colony, winch would become a military area. On the next
day. / September, they mounted -Operation Victory' and entered Dar Saad
just in time to .prevent three thousand pro-NLF tribesmen who were
gathering to counter-attack the occupying FLOSY -commandos' from
carrying out their intent: but they were unable to prevent further violence
in Aden itself.

Tempers between (he factions were running high and when in Shaikh
b tnman PORF erected a lookout post in what was held to be NLF territory it
was enough to start widespread fighting. A bitter and prolonged gun battle
continued throughout most of 10 September as the two sides struggled for
supremacy. Over forty people, mostly non-combatants, were killed and
kidnapping was carried out by both sides on a major scale Although some
units ot PORF deserted to the NLF early on. FLOSY were again victorious,
driving their opponents from all but a corner of the town.

Throughout this time Shaikh LFthman was under the nominal control of
the British. The Parachute Regiment which normally patrolled the area had
strict orders to keep out of (he fighting and onlv returned when it was over
to help clear up Ihe mess. This brought into locus the usefulness of British

179

troops who were daily risking their lives to no purpose and whose
continued presence may have been preventing the South Arabian Army
from intervening to save further bloodshed.

Their phased withdrawal to redoubts guarding (he Government House
area in Steamer Point and the vital Khormaksar airfield was speeded up and
the decision made to hand over the control in the various townships to the
South Arabian Army.

Utile Aden was selected to he the scene of the first transfer of internal
security for a pari of Aden. The great base which cost an estimated £17
million had only recently been completed. The modern workshops of
Fallaise camp, the long lines of soldiers' accommodation, the swimming
pools and the army church. Perhaps this last was constructed with an eye
to the future as it was shaped like a mosque and very shortly the crescent
was to replace the cross on its whitened dome. All was overshadowed by
the bulk of the oil refinery, the reason for Little Aden's very existence and
whose British staff would remain behind after the troops had gone.

The handing-over ceremony was short and took place around the
Queen's Own Hussars' flag pole. The Hussars' flag was lowered and the
South Arabian Army flag raised as the band played marches. The South
Arabian Army's ceremonial camel Iroop, adorned in green and yellow,
dipped their pennants as the British troops drove out, a regimental dog
howling in the back of a truck.

Hardly had the dust settled behind the retreating British vehicles than
the NLF were on the streets. Landrovers and cars full of cheering youths,
some openly carrying weapons, careered around the streets, NI,F flags
appeared everywhere and looting over the vacated British camps began
almost immediately. The South Arabian Army Commander was Colonel
Ali Abdullah Maiseri who had been chosen for the task on account of his
known NLF sympathies. Within two days he had contacted the local NLF
command and had brought conditions back to normal. From then on until
the British finally left there was no quieter and more secure place in the
whole of the Colony than Little Aden.

One Union Jack still flies in Little Aden where a white cross stands as a
landmark over the military cemetery of Silent Valley. One hundred and
twenty eight men and women lie here, guarded by the two volcanic peaks
of Aden's hills which seem to pierce the sky. By strange coincidence there
is one grave for every year of British blood, sweat and tears in South Arabia.

1'herc were no bands playing when the troops pulled out of Shaikh
C' thmart and al Mansura, last held for the British by the Parachute Regiment
and the Royal Lancashire Fusiliers. Of all districts of Aden Shaikh Uthman
"■ as the most difficult to control. From a central core of stone buildings the
shanty town spews out into the desert in all directions. The accessibility
and active participation by Aden Police and South Arabian Army units
made gunrunning impossible to prevent. The nearby Lahej border and
Milage of Dar Saad into which the troops could not pursue without
authority, provided the easiest of escape routes. The wood and cardboard

180

huts housed an ever-shifting population of Yemeni immigrants Sornal'
tribesmen down from the hills to seek work and criminals fleein° fro'
justice. To keep a check on them would have required a division. A patrol 'at
n ight through the streets was an eerie experience, aptly described as a walk
down a street with a thousand watching eves.* The Paratroo
headquarters, named Fort Walsh after their commander, hacked onto
Shaikh Uthman Zoo. Never amongst the most magnificent of spectacles
wh ich Aden had to offer, the coming of war. lack of visitors to the gardens
and regular feeding reduced the few animals to a pitiful condition so that
the Paras added their care to their many other duties. Once when a shell
shocked python escaped from captivity, the whole town, used to daily
sounds of battle, was almost paralysed with terror until the thins;
disappeared. h
The Lancashire Fusiliers in al Mansura had an equally thankless task It
consisted mainly of escorting convoys to the al Mansura jail which thev
had also made their headquarters. Scarce a convov got through without
being sniped at. Each column of Ferret scout cars and personnel carriers
had to pass around the roundabout on which stood the al Mansura picket.
Looking out across a wide stretch of open ground broken by a few half-built
houses whoso construction had long since been given up, the picket post,
surrounded by a high wire fence to ward off bazooka shells, claimed with
justification to be the most shot-at place in Aden. A notice which read,
'Please do not fire rockets at this structure which is unsafe', seemed to have
little effect.

Towards the end the Lancastrians were beginning to have suspicions,
never proved, that they were being used lor target practice by the South
Arabian Police. Often in the late afternoon two or three truckloa'ds of police
in civilian dress would pass through the Lancashires' check point and
disappear into the town. A few minutes later the trucks would drive out
empty and sniping would commence at the British positions. Then, just
before darkness fell, the trucks would return, colled their load of police
and head back for barracks. About this time the firing would cease.

During the night of 23 September the British troops withdrew from both
townships, handing over their positions to the South Arabian Army. Most
ot the detainees had been released over the previous weeks but some
forty-five were shifted to the Royal Air Force guardhouse in Steamer Point
before the prison was abandoned.

On the clay of withdrawal a hand of Paratroopers were climbin" onto a truck near the
municipal market place. A tribesman slipped out of the stone doorway and flung a grenade at
them. I he author, some distance away, flung himself to the ground, but a private of the
I aratroopers knelt and shot the fleeing man dead- this while the grenade was still in the air
and apparently coming straight at him. The soldier rolled out of the wav and the grenade
exploded harmlessly.

Another man to have a miraculous escape was Captain Ciwain Hawkins of the Royal Army
Urdmance Corps. Leading .1 patrol one night through the darkened streels ho was struck in the
face by a grenade tiling Irom a rooftop. The grenadeliouiiced away and IheCaplain escaped with
a bruised law.

37 British troops leave Aden. The last pickel: men of the Royal Marines board a
Wessex helicopter on Ihe Khormakeat salt flats.

The following day there was dancing in the streets to celebrate the
British withdrawal, the blind Shaikh Muhammad al Daihani. the most
prominent religious figure, asked the mosques to hold special sessions to
recite passages from the Qur'an in thanksgiving. Kor the first time in two
years shops, restaurants and coffee houses did not close down their
shutters at dusk. Some proprietors even went SO far as to give their
customers free coffee to mark the occasion.

The Paratroopers now took up positions around the airfield and the
Lancashires left for home. The British still controlled a large part of the
Colony. The Marines held Maalla and the Prince of Wales' Own patrolled
the dusty streets of Steamer Point.

In Crater the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders maintained a brooding
peace. Ever since their re-occupation of the town following the June 'siege'
'he Scots had been a regiment apart. Thev were the only regiment ever to
approach the problem of maintaining internal security in Aden as
occupying troops in a hostile country and to a large extent it paid off. The
Scots soldiers shared the talent in common with many another British
regiment, of being tough yet at the same lime getting on with the local
Population at street level. In Crater the Argylls were hard, perhaps they had
'o be. Houses were searched with scarce regard for the occupants or their
Property, men waiting to be searched were forced to stand for hours in the
sun. machine guns had a fixed line on the door of every mosque, a favourite

182

sanctuary for grenadiers, and would open up after an incident.

The Argylls claimed an impressive 'bag' of 'terrorists' although in some
quarters this was thought to be a little too good. The citizens of Crater were
not long in complaining of the Scots' severity. In July two hundred had
signed a petition alleging brutality by the soldiers which they presented to
the High Commission. They received scant sympathy from John Wilton,
the Assistant High Commissioner. In a passionately worded letter to Ali
Muhammad Maqtari, one of the eleven leading Adenis who had visited
him iti his office, Wilton wrote 'It is not the British who have paralysed and
destroyed the administrative, commercial and industrial life of Aden. It is
not the British who have burned and wrecked property worth thousands of
pounds and placed hombs in the houses of innocent people and reduced
Aden's Port, the source of most of its wealth, to such a condition that the
shipping lines of the world are anxiously looking for an alternative. How
many people were killed and kidnapped when the British withdrew from
Crater? The answer is that probably nobody knows.' Mr Wilton said that he
was not raising these points in any spirit of bitterness or reproach. 'I say
these things merely to point out that many of the evils which Aden is
suffering from will not end with our departure.' Britain would do
everything she could until independence to bring Aden to a peaceful and
happy future. It was up to the respectable citizens of Aden to play their part
in achieving this aim.

The Argvlls were not unopposed in Crater. A careless or otl-guarded
moment usually resulted in an attack. Two Scotsmen were killed by a
grenade and a lookout was shot through the head by an armed policeman
from the parapet of the Crater police station . A clutch of well-aimed mortar
bombs fell on the roof of the heavily guarded Chartered Bank building
which they used for Iheir headquarters, killing a corporal and injuring
others. The mortar was used again and despite the most intensive
searching the Argylls never discovered the identity of their assailants.
Their intelligence officer. Major Nigel Crowe, was on the point of guessing
when they eventuallv pulled out. He and his men must have seen the
red-painted fire engines of the Aden Police dozens of times hurrying to and
from scenes of incidents as they made way for them at the road blocks; a
brief inspection would have revealed the mortar pipes in the holes where
the hoses should have been.

Although thev have been strongly criticised for their methods the tac
remains that Crater under the Argvlls never blew up as Shaikh Uthman, a
Mansura and. to a lesser extent. Steamer Foint did. When one considers
that the town, packed with weapons, had been in a state of open rebeJLio
for a fortnight immediately previous to the Argyll entry then tn
subsequent bloodshed was remarkably light and much less than the mo
optimistic had predicted at the time. .

The Arabs were not the only ones with whom the Scots were u n P°P u 'j n
Contrarv to the hallowed traditions of the services the regiment had gon -
for some aggressive publicity. It seemed as if the senior officers \

283

„„,red to hold forth at any time on any subject, preferably in front ot the
S n cameras, an officer was delegated to look alter the regimen s
tG hi ! tv requirements and the regimental photographer was never far
PU 5 whenever the colonel, Colin Mitchell, went abroad. These activities
8 ; ide ablv irked Middle East Command and other units equally worthy.
C " JkTt home in the United Kingdom to the public, sickened by the
T; lv news of squalid death and British retreat, the Scots explo.ts came as a
,.lrornu relief, a rav of sunshine on a uniformly dull day.
W ht the British were withdrawing, the politicians arguing and the
South Arabian forces making up their minds the NLF were winning
J D acular victories in the east. After the fall of the central area there had
a pause and it was thought thai Shaikhdoms east of the Aulaqi hr e
cod chance of survival. The South Arabian Army commando rs ,,
SlarT and Ataq. second .own of the Upper Aulaqi S a, hdom. ad o h
ideas Both men. non-Aulaqis and strong supporters of the NLF. did all
their power to overthrow the remaining sultans.

Their first success came in the Lower Aulaqi Sultanate. 1 he local South
Police had got together with the foo.bal. loom to force .he
resignation of the two naibs.t who were dc jacto rulers o the state. Ihe
voung Sultan Nasir bin Aidrus, who had spent much of his time m al
Shad and was not unpopular, they left alone and he continued o live ,n
house Shortly after the coup a loyal officer of the police left tor Aden
an British authorities that unless they ac.ed ^thero ^

possibility of bloodshed. The Ba Kazan. Lower Aulaq^v-arhto
mercenary tribe, were reported to be on the march. ^ ™" ^ f
unknown, but whatever it was the likelihood of it ending vvith h sack of
Ahwar. the state capital, was a distinct possibility Apparency the
presence of the two naibs was embarrassing the reyolutionar.es w ho had
no desire to kill them bul may have been torced to do so in order to placate
the Ba Kazan if thev appeared. The decision was made to try and htt he
naibs off to a mi nesweeper and I IMS Yarton left Aden for the two hundred
mile trip up the coast with Bill Heber-Percy. lately the Senior Adviser for
the Kastcrn Area, to carry out the necessary nogot.at.ons Heber-Percy
landed on the coast and spent a gloomy hour waiting whilst a man was sent
to the town with news of his arrival and mission

Whilst sitting on the beach he met a group of fishermen with whom a tew
weeks previously he had arranged to set up a local co-operative society.
Thev were friendly and he asked how the society was gelling on The
fishermen grinned shvlv and pointed to a large NLh flag flying

nVhils. most Briton., approval Colon,.! Mitchells ^^-^^ |^"a
critic. Fred Halliwell. tlieVw commentator wrote: ^^^h^mc imporialist
surreal relic of Britain's colonial past: a crazed fusion ot a Celtic mailman, ncingcr v
anil cantankerous military commander.'

1 Ali Aidrus. Hubakcr bin Ahmad.

184

ostentatiously from a nearby police point. The revolution has come.' they
said, 'we no longer have need of societies as we now have the Sultan's
money to spend.'

A few minutes later an emissary from the NLF appeared and another
meeting was arranged further down the coast. The NLF. led by the former
assistant State Treasurer, appeared on time in two l.androvcrs together
with the two naihs. The Sultan, believing himself safe, had declined an
offer to leave. Saying 'This was my father's home and his father's before
him, I see no reason why 1 should leave.' The local NLF saw no reason
either and he stayed. They may have been happy about the Sultan but were
obviously perturbed at letting the naibs go scot-free. To cover themselves
they endeavoured to persuade Heber-Pcrcy to sign a paper to the effect that
Britain was responsible for all the money 'which the Naibs had stolen from
the people over the past twenty years.' Heber-Percy demurred and tactfully
pointed out that unless the parly were soon back on board the minesweeper
there was a 1 ikelihood of il opening up with its large guns on Ahwar's small
fort. This was thought reasonable enough and everybody had a good laugh
when the two naibs tripped over each other as they clambered into the
dinghy which was to carry them to the minesweeper and safety.

A few days later the Ba Kazam, organised by fellow tribesmen in the
South Arabian Army who had heen sent down from Ataq for the purpose,
arrived on the outskirts of Ahwar. They were met by a delegation from the
town who thanked them for coming but assured them that the revolution
had already triumphed. A few of the leaders then went into Ahwar and paid
their respects to the Sultan and, much to the surprise and relief of the
townsfolk, left. The news of these goings-on shortly reached the ears of
Qahtan al Shaabi in Zingibar. A cadre of 'indoctrinated' NLF were
despatched to take charge. The Sultan was whisked off to captivity, the
local committee mostly replaced and the rest reprimanded for not acting in
the true spirit of the revolution.

Although a breach had been made in the Aulaqi wall, the real fighting
was yet to come and the NLF were not able to repeat this easy and bloodless
victory elsewhere. In the neighbouring State of VVahidi the situation was
confused. Towards the end of August the Hakim Ali bin Muhammad, son
of the man murdered in the Dakota aircrash the year before, was in Beirut
when news came through that some of his tribes had declared for the NLF .
The Hakim hurried for home but when he arrived in Ataq he found that the
Aulaqis deeply suspicious of the garrison, were manning the hills ana
preventing movement to the south. As the Hakim had to pass through their
territory to reach his capital at Maifah he was stuck and, not being so
politically astute or well informed as his neighbours, appealed to the army
for help. After a lot of prodding from Aden the army reluctantly agreed to
place a Sioux helicopter al his disposal.

Karly on the morning of 3 September the Hakim began his fifty-mile
journey accompanied only by Major PeterGooch, a Briton still serving ;wit
the South Arabian Army, and the pilot, a sergeant in the Army Air Corps.

285

The South Arabian Police in Mait'ah had been alerted of the Hakim's
imminent arrival and asked to make the necessary preparations. However,
the Commander, Mahdi Muhsin, correctly forecast trouble and decided
that it would be more diplomatic if he took his men out on patrol. Thus
when the helicopter circled the town it was unable to land as usual on the
football field because of a mass of people moving across it with nobody to
c ontrol them. Consequently the pilot was forced to put his aircraft clown in
a nearby wadi bed. What happened next is uncertain. According to eye
witnesses the tribesmen gathered on each side of the wadi which served as
a border between those who still supported the Hakim and those who did
not. A band of schoolboys stood on the edge of the crowd clutching an NLF
banner, a few slogans were shouted by both sides but otherwise there was
little sign of imminent violence as the Hakim, accompanied by Gooch,
moved towards a small committee which had moved into the wadi bed to
greet them. There was a brief exchange, Gooch was seen to shake the
Hakim's hand and walk back towards the helicopter. At this juncture a
single tribesman ran down from the other bank waving a sub-machine gun.
Gooch quickly climbed aboard and the helicopter began to lift off. Then the
Major appeared to reach down beside his seal as if for a weapon or grenade
and as he did so the tribesman fired a burst into the cabin. The Sioux
continued to lift. Other bursts followed and the cabin was smashed. About
forty feet up the stricken Sioux staggered in the air before crashing to I he
ground and bursting into flames, both occupants perishing.

The firing then became general. Utterly dismayed by the turn of events,
supporters of the Hakim fled taking him with them. He first moved to his
house in Azzan and then, together with Shaikh Ali Musaid Bubakri. held
out against his enemies for several weeks before being forced to retire to
Saudi Arabia due to the general collapse around him.

The NL1'' supporters were equally dismayed by the disaster for the very
good reason that they were fearful of British air retaliation. A bulldozer was
quickly brought into action to bury the remains of the Sioux. This was
successful in hiding it from the aircraft which came out to search lor the
missing helicopter and it was several clays before the authorities in Aden
learnt what had happened.

Even as the Hakim of VVahidi climbed aboard the helicopter on the start
of his ill-fated journey, a far more significant event was taking place further
north. The Sharif Hussain bin Ahmad al Habili. CMG, founder member and
elder statesman of the Federation, terror of the revolution and the most
powerful personality in all South Arabia, was departing for Saudi Arabia
together with his son Salih, the Ruler.* and seventy Baihani leaders. Why

Hy a quirk of tribal tradition the Sharit Hussain was nut the ruler in his ow n state. He. was the
youngest of his father Ahmad and w hen the old man lav dying he realised thai ot all his sons
Hussain was the most fitted to rule. To nominate him directly as successor would have caused
Woodshed so he nominated his eldest grandson. Salih. then about a year old. so that the child s
lather. Hussain. automatical^ became Regent during his minority.

186

he left is not least of the riddles of South Arabia but in doing so he made the
greatest mistake of his life. There is no doubt that the party intended to
return. Valuable chattels were left behind and the daughters whom the
Sharif adored above all living things remained at the family seat of Naqub
some twenty miles north of Baihan. It seems probable that having observed
the chaos around him the Sharif hoped to come to some arrangement with
King Faisal whereby Baihan became an autonomous province within the
Saudi Arabian Kingdom. He took the tribal leaders with him as a token of
his support and also to ensure that they got up to no mischief in his
absence. If this was so. then he grossly underestimated the situation. Kino
Faisal, relieved that the Egyptians were finally withdrawing from the
Yemen, was concentrating his efforts on seeming disengagement and was
in no position to aid Baihan. hundreds of miles away across some of the
worst desert in the world.

As the Sharif drove away on his desert journey he may have given
thought to the hundred or so dissidents that lurked in the mountains but if
so it was only a passing thought. They were a fairly wretched lot and he had
never experienced much trouble keeping them at bay. He may have more
deeply considered the problem posed by the South Arabian battalion
sitting in Baihan. He must have known that he was taking a gamble but
then his nephew, Colonel Sharif Haidar. was high in the command, he had
personal assurance of loyalty from the local commander as well as many
seniorofficerswhomhisyoungerson.Qaid.hadassiduouslycultivatedover
the past two years and he knew his not inconsiderable prestige ensured an
awe amounting to fear of the consequence should anyone make so bold as
to kick over the traces. After all. had not his mere presence been enough to
quieten the troops on the day of the mutiny? *

To ensure against trouble the Sharif left his nephew Faisal behind with
adequate guards and supplies to hold out if attacked. This was the worst
mistake of all.

As soon as the Sharif had left the army officers got in contact with the
dissidents, who were mostly drawn from the Masa'bin, but for a time
nobody could bring themselves to take action. Then Colonel Haidar
decided to pay a visit to his home state.

Two days after the Colonel's arrival the Sharif Faisal invited the army
officers to the palace for lunch following the Friday prayers. He wasn't to
know that they had also planned a party at the same time and the same
place. As they were sitting down to eat a small demonstration, mostly
composed of soldiers, formed up outside the palace shouting pro-NLF
slogans. Faisal went out and spoke to them and they dispersed. When he
returned he asked the officers to take steps to arrest the ringleaders.
Somehow the resu It of this was a larger demonstration which made its way
to the jail and, with the help of South Arabian Police, released the

* See Chapter VIII.

187

prisoners. Colonel Haidar then left for the camp and spent the next hour
and a half arguing furiously with the local commander, Lt Colonel Nagi
Abdul Qavvi Mahlai and his officers before he succeeded in persuading
them to call off their men. Haidar then returned to the town and was
astonished to find that Faisal together with his guards and loyal members
of the South Arabian Police had decamped to Naqub. Haidar followed in
their wake but was unable to persuade them to return. There was nothing
more to be done and within a few hours the NLF flag was flying over
Baihan. The army then produced the dissidents, who proclaimed a
People's Government' and look up uneasy residence in the palace.

The Sharif's younger son Qaid, who had been to Geneva for talks with
the United Nations' Mission had returned to Aden the same day and Haidar
flew from Baihan to see him. Both men tried to return to Baihan the next
day but failed due to unscrviceability of the aircraft. Haidar alone at length
succeeded and when he arrived on Baihan airstrip he found himself
surrounded by yelling soldiers shouting, 'Wc wan! Qaid', whom they
believed to be on the same aircraft having received a signal to this effect
from their headquarters in Aden. Qaid not forthcoming, the soldiers settled
for his cousin Haidar and for some minutes it seemed as if the Colonel was
in danger of being lynched. Eventually he was rescued by his fellow
officers and lodged in the officers' mess. The next day, 12. September, he
was flown back to Aden.

Hussain Uthman Ushal solved the problem of Naqub. Even as Haidar
was on his way back to Aden, he sent a messenger to the Sharif Faisal and
arranged a meeting under flag of truce. He brusquely told the Baihanis
that the British had abandoned them and that unless they moved out of
Naqub into Saudi Arabia they were to be bombed. When the Sharif Faisal
refused to believe the story, the Colonel pointed dramatically to his
watch. 'In ten minutes', he said, 'the RAF will be here.' Sure enough,
exactly on time, RAF jets flew low overhead. The Ashraf, convinced,
packed their belongings and in vehicles lent them by the army they made
their way into exile. The RAF, oblivious of the role they had played, flew
back to Aden. They had been asked by the South Arabian Army to fly a
routine patrol of the Naqub area because of possible frontier trouble.
Whether any of the British officers at Secdaseer Lines guessed the real
purpose of the operation remains a mystery but it seems that at least one
may have done and played a large role in conceiving it into the bargain.

So Baihan, stronghold of the sultans, fell without a shot being fired. The
Colonel's ruse had succeeded. For the NLF it was a remarkable victory, for
the rulers still in the field and by inference, FLOSY, a crippling blow.

On hearing the news the Sharif hurried back to the borders of his state
convinced ho could win back what his family had so easily surrendered.
On arrival at the Royalist town of Harib he received the message that
dashed his hopes. Sir Humphrey Trevelyan warned the Sharif and his
Saudi allies that British policv was to support the South Arabian Army and
that in accordance with previous practice the Royal Air Force would

1H8

support thorn against any attack across the frontier.

The Sharif of Baihan was the oldest and staunohest of British allies in
South Arabia. He was still under British protection and could protest that
the South Arabian Army still nominally under the command of a British
officer and paid and armed by the British had overthrown his government
and taken his property. The rebels were no friends to the British and
constituted no political entity as such. Yet in the interests of a peaceful
British withdrawal Sir Humphrey felt he made the right decision.

The Sharif fully realised that it is far more difficult to get back into power
than to stav in it. Wisely he decided that the time was not ripe for a
comeback and withdrew,' sending his shaikhs home to make their peace
and biding his time for the day when British air power could not be
umplnvod to oppose his plans.

Thenows of the Sharif's downfall spread like wildfire, causing dismay
or elation, depending upon the recipient's politics. For one man above all
others it was ospeciailv welcome and he hastened lo send word to Baihan
of his impending arrival. This news was greeted with mixed feelings; the
army had known of and feared their visitor lor years and the 'NLF
Government', until a few davs previously, had been his pensioners.

Out of the west came a cloud of dust and three trucks filled with
Yemeni tribesmen lurched to a halt outside the palace. The tribesmen
amused themselves by firing shots of welcome in the air whilst their
leader stalked inside.

The man who swaggered into the Sharif's hall was none other than the
Awadi Shaikh, known throughout the Yemen as 'the contractor' for his
habit of telling the Republican government he would take such and such a
town or subdue such and such a tribe for so much hard cash. His present
mission was the recapture of Harib. a small border town held by the
Royalists more easilv approached from the Baihan side of the border.

It must have given the Shaikh considerable pleasure to be in Baihan as he
was a bitter personal enemy of the Sharif arid had long intrigued against
him. In addition he bore a special grudge against the Baihanis for giving
refuge to the Ahl Muqbil. the only section of the Awadhi's tribe to side with
the Royalists in the Yemeni war. Indeed, much of the Awadhi's grisly
reputation was founded on the manner in which he had dealt with those
dissidents. .

Some eighteen months before the Awadhi had enticed the leaders ot tne
Ahl Munbil to a peace conference in a small stone fort. After two days ot
fruitless discussion the Awadhi unexpectedly gave in to their conditions
and a celebration lunch was arranged to seal the bargain. In fact the Awadhi
had only been stalling until the arrival of an ancient Soviet armoured car
borrowed from the Republican garrison of Baidha to impose a nna
settlement of his own. ,

The Ahl Muqbil suspected nothing and twenty-six turned up tor lunc^
discarding their weapons on entering in accordance with custom. Unc
thev were all inside the hosts seized the rifles and withdrew. The building

189

« surrounded bv armed men and the armoured car emerging from its
I" r dace bcoan to shell the building. Very soon the luckless tribesmen
h,d l Shat*tc survive thev would have tobreak through their cnem.es and
'f o tnev rushed out. Only six managed to get away and seek refuge m
«; han "the rest were mown down by .ho waiting riflemen

The shooting finished, the Awadhi. accompanied by h.s brother
Muhammad, strolled over to inspect the bodies. . ( .

M Th "Shaikh of Ahl Muqbil had received a burst full .n the chest but m
J, "so had shielded his fourteen-year-old son who lay shamming dea h
C t s father's side. As the two Awadhi brothers approached the hoy eap.
t and pulling out a revolver shot Muhammad between the eyes . The , fc y
Ja nuicklv slaughtered and the outraged Awadh, offered to pay the Shaaf
o su ender the refugees, a request which the Shard flatly re used

It was this man then who. sitting in the Sharif's own chair m the palace s
,„ r c 1 chamber, set about persuading the South Arabian Army officers
a" he local NLF that it was in their intern* that they help him succeed in
n mission to oust the Rovalis.s from Harib. He pointed out. reasonably
no g S ^ uthcSharifwith'histremendousinnuenceamongsttheRoyahst
" I s m ig use the town as a base for the recapture of Baihan 1 he soldier
and ?h! local NLF needed little convincing. They lived m daily dread of the
Sharif's return and readily agreed with the Yemeni's sugges ion.

The Awadhi. well pleased with his success, drove ott in a boi rowed
arm landrover to view his objective and gather his forces, while he army
sent alarmist messages down to Aden claiming they were about to be
attacked bv 18.000 Royalist tribesmen. hnndrod-
Three davs later the Awadhi returned at the head of a five hundred-
strong tribal army which, passing through Baihan territory debouc ed
i„lo the wadi facing Harib. The town was held by about two unchc d
Rovalist irregulars who were expecting the assault and were well prepared.
As . soon as the attackers crossed the border thev came under accurate
mortar attack and suffered casualties. rtVw»hnmh«
In the event this proved to be the Royalists' undoing. Some ol the bombs
fell near or within South Arabian borders and the army, using the _ excuse
that thev were under attack, opened up on the town with their 2.
pounder field guns. As a result of their telegrams forecasting imminent
attack bv overwhelming Royalist forces they had received a plane-load of
shells the dav before and so were able to keep up t he bombardment for
several hours! reducing the .own to rubble. By noon the hist de endeis l ad
• been driven out and Harib. or what was left of it, was in Republican hands
for the first time in thirty months. For the time being Sou h Arabia s
northern borders had been made safe for the revolution and the South
Arabian Armv could be said to have gained its first battle honour.
" The Yemeni Rovalists protested vigorously about the incident through
their legations in Jiddah and London. King Faisal also let U be known ha
he was displeased and it came as no surprise a while later when ™
Saudi defence contracts thought at one time to be earmarked for the Bi itish

I !)()

wont elsewhere. The King had other reasons for being annoyed with his
British friends: by a neat piece of diplomacy over three thousand needy
South Arabian refugees, mostly members of the ruling class, had been
flown into Jiddah and dumped on his doorstep. Many of them were almost
penniless and others who were not would soon be so, depending for their
existence on Saudi charity and what they could get out of the British
Embassy, which wasn't much.

At times the three states which made up the Eastern Aden Protectorate
seemed far away from the strife which was ruining their western
neighbours. The people lived a sheltered existence far from Aden and
separated from the Yemen by vast stretches of desert and mountain. That is
not to say that trouble and discontent were absent. The young men and
intellectuals of the Hadhramaul had provided many of the 'nationalist'
leaders in Aden itself although on home ground, naturally quarrelsome
and influenced by family ties, they found difficulty in finding a common
cause or even a common target. So in time much of the leadership of
incipient nationalist movement in Mukallaand Seyun fell into the hands of
comparative newcomers. Young men. more Indonesian. Indian or African
than Arab, sons of immigrant Hadhramis forced lo return to their own
barren shores by the xenophobia of other peoples.

Hero economic discontent rapidly found its outlet in political
extremism. This was a comparatively late development and perhaps
because of this disturbances were minimal when compared to the rest of
South Arabia. There had been a few explosions in Mukalla and the
commander of the Hudhrami Bedouin Legion had been murdered by one of
his men, but otherwise the only major upheaval had occurred when the
nationalists joined the administration in liquidating the South Arabian
League. *

Qaiti was far and away the richest and most populous of the three states
and politically the most advanced. What was decided in Mukalla usually
went for Seyun and to a lesser extent Ghaida as well. Perhaps if the Qaiti
sultans had been stronger then they would have maintained their own and
their colleagues' positions. The spastic Sultan Awadh had only recently
died after years of ineffectual rule during which power had passed into the
hands of his competent but occasionally corrupt and unscrupulous civil
service which became the chief target of the nationalists and the mob. At
his succession the young Sultan Ghalib was welcomed by almost every
class. The majority of the people confidently expected his first act would be
to purge the administration, but the Sultan was too young and the advisers
too clever. He never ever got his hands on his own treasury. The people
soon grew tired of waiting, nothing ever seemed to change in Mukalla.

Worried by the general trend of events in the west the three Hadhrami
sultans met on 10 August to try and work out a common policy. Their

* See Chapter VI.

192

principal concern was the future and control of the Hadhrami Bedouin
Legion. This British-trained force was the South Arabian Army's
counterpart in the East and British prevarication as to whether it was to be
disbanded or subsidised after independence had greatly increased the
atmosphere of uncertainty. The sultans came to a working arrangement on
the problem and decided to continue their discussions during a trip to
Geneva where they had accepted an invitation to meet the United Nations'
Mission.

Far from being alarmed by the increasing reports of sultanic disaster in
the west the throe sultans made a leisurely progress back to the
Hadhrarnaut, enjoying the airs of Beirut and Cairo before taking a ship to
Mukalla. They eventually completed their cruise on 17 September when
the Saudi Arabian Steamship came to a rest in Mukalla roads. A surprise
was awaiting them. The customary delegation put out from the shore and
climbed aboard, but instead of the usual welcome the delegation brusquely
told Sultan Ghalih that 'the people now ruled in Mukalla' and persuaded
htm to sign an instrument of abdication. The ruler of Kathiri was offered
safe conduct to his state, this the old gentleman wisely declined and the
delegation left the boat as abruptly as Ihey had arrived, their business
completed in less than an hour. The boat was persuaded to turn around and
the three sultans sailed off to Saudi Arabia and exile.

When Sultan Ghalib had departed Mukalla for Geneva he left behind a
committee to carry on the work of government. Like many committees of
this kind it was composed of the ancient, the unscrupulous and the wary
and was quite incapable of reaching a decision on anything vital. In this
case, the trace of only one meeting, the inaugural, can be found. The British
in the Residency had packed up and left a month previously and the VVazir
al Attas had thoughtfully decided the time had come to resign and so had
left the country for a comfortable retirement in Bahrain. The nationalists,
seeing their chance and encouraged by NLF successes elsewhere,
contacted their supporters in the Legion and seized the armoury. Then
almost negligently they went around Mukalla arresting all of the
administration and their political opponents who were taken completely
by surprise. In no place were the insurgents opposed. As elsewhere it was
the honest who suffered most, the sly and corrupt had already come to
terms. Among the arrested was 'Major General' bin Sumaida, a staunch old
soldier whose involvement in politics was confined to conversation, and
Badr al Qasadi. the elderly Governor of Mukalla. Later, when the revolution
had turned sour, these two old men were forced to parade before the mob
and al Badr to shave off his moustaches.

After the taking of Mukalla, with the help of the Legion, NLF
Committees were set up in the town of the Wadi Hadhrarnaut. On the 2
October, the local football team announced that it had taken over Kathiri in
the name of the NLF. The tribesmen of Mahra soon followed suit although
what happened on the distant island of Socotra remains a mystery.

192

Nationalist control of the Hadhramaut was principally con hned to the
urban areas the tribes never declared themselves and watched upon
eve's Some, rather previously as it turned ou.. though, that the time had
™ for a return to the old ways and gathered to looi the northern towns
before being effectively dispersed by an RAF hrcpower demonstration
This incident was taken up by the three sultans, then ,n Jiddah, who cabled
the United Nations' Mission complaining of -unwarranted action by the
British Roval Air Force againsl loyal tribes which have so far retrained from
rero «n£n° the British-backed minority group of terrorists . pathetically
enSgthcTr message with a plea that any reply should be sent care of the
liddah Palace Hotel, Jiddah. .
' Control of the Hadhramaut by forces acting i n their na ™ »n».d^b y
strengthened the NLF and it was this which may have hna ly ed to Qahlan
a ShibTs decision to talk with FLOSY in Cairo instead ol msis ing on
home "round. He considered that he had more than adequate proof that the
VI F was in control of most of South Arabia and had no difficulty m
nnfn tainin- h front that he was the mastermind controlling a vast
oZ Son which stretched from one end of the .country to the other.
This he was convinced, should be enough to bring FLOSY to terms.
T S military position of the NLF was also «'nside™bly »t^tan« by
possession of the Hadhramaut. It meant that the pseudo-FLOSY forces o
IS rulers holding out in Wahidi and the Upper Aulaqi Sultanate could

M ^r.^.°h. 8i Xto«bor and October Shaikh Muhammad
bin Mu ^i Uhe grim old ruler of the Upper Aulaqi Shaik hdom Md be n
consolidating his position. From the family sea. of Said he had wa .I d the
disintegration of the rest of the Federation and took steps to ensure that no
a e u hat he, the chief of the Aulaqis. would remain when all othen had
fed away. Due to the predominance of "f^^T^^
was better informed on the South Arabian Army ban most of f is s haiWilj
col ea-ues He suffered from no doubts as to the true meaning o the r
■pr Son' and politely refused permission for a convoy ol supp -
pass through his territorv to the hard-pressed South Arabian
K! the south. As .he days passed the ^^^™^SZ
and when the army garrison at Ataq in the north of the state ri
detach the Ahl Khalifa from their allegiance, an unspoken state ot

existed between them. . tn c aic i a nd

From all over Aulaqi country tribes were summoned to Sai . a
despatched to defend Us borders. Tribesmen s.ood to the passe m he
o rft and south through which an enemy must com c Con.a <X v as
Sabli hod with Shaikh All Musaid. still fighting in Wah.di and » ^
Ahl Bubakhr bin Farid. rebels in the Yemen for a W™*™**'^*
home and mostly declared their intention to give up their quarrel

* Report UN Mission. Annos 111. page 181.

Kh °'! , "h M hTS "lgnrfioT^AuW«,l re b.l, S ..»dl.l.»r.
Fund, who led the nli , ahhoug h surrounded as they

The weeks went by and s ,11 t c M ^ ™ ^ v pr0 . NLF tri besmen
vve re on three s.des, h« ld J™* it seemed as if the rulingfamily of

Upper Aulaqi Sha khdo m uo u 0 , he only force strong

smi ^ t 7La P ^ l ^ ^Ung was likely to
P"f P ' tdt V h ^Sh remained adamant in his refusal to let patrols enter

of Arabia have been notor.ous throughout e ^ n0 exception.

a hyX first week in October «h« Pos^rede. ^ ^
in his village firmly believing ho had ea n h » J had
Muhammad bin Muhs.n stormed and raged o it e av a
almost run out and everybody seemed inlen o r '^^^ l0 nd
there were gardens to be tended and a man could not bo expec ea v
hislys away from his family ^Z2^Z^^ ^^
enemv that never came. Muhammad Bu ,b ing

! ife,i1 ^ 10 *> 'XeN^St litre ^Kw^iTough.oUk.
Ihe^run^Tna ^V^^UnuLJro r el^ on th. t.no honot.rod methods o,

supposed to be guarding the approaches to Sa had J t it J

labelled "spare parts for typewriters- 1 hese rifle ^ eruh. nded o rf
South Arabian Police for "Iraming ^'^^"JPf^ number already
Champion Lines where they were substituted im ■ * hk l nu r . fles
there. The exchange was necessary d ue to Br ..ish - ^ d
could be released only on the firm understanding that tticy

194

for the purpose stated and a subsequent inspection revealed that the
smuggled arms were in place although a full inspection would have
revealed the deficiency.

The rifles were forwarded to Lodar where only four hundred Audhali
and Dathini tribesmen had gathered to take pari in an expedition to
conquer their hereditary foes the Aulaqi. The force never set off although
the rifles got through. Alone they were not enough, money was needed and
here the NLF had their second stroke of luck.

When the NLF took Mukalla they seized the currency reserves held there
and this amounted to several hundred thousand pounds. This was more
than adequate although the problem remained as to how to get it to Ataq.
The Aulaqi Shaikh controlled all practical roads between Mukalla and
Ataq and even in times of peace the movement of such a large sum across
Arabia would have been a hazardous undertaking. The difficulty was
solved in spectacular fashion.

Since Aden Airwavs had folded up. Air Djibouti had flown a service
between Djibouti , Aden and Mukalla. Air Djibouti was one of the last family
airlines still in existence. The single Dakota flown by Pere Astroud, his
wife and daughter act as hostesses and another relative, reputedly his son,
is the engineer. On 1 1 October he landed in Riyan. the airport for Mukalla,
and found himself seized bv the local NLF who rushed him off to the town
where he was detained in the former British Residency. The money was
then loaded aboard the aircraft and the Pakistani co-pilot told to fly to Ataq.
Twice the plane set off and twice returned, the unfortunate Pakistani being
unable to find his destination. The plane was guarded on the airfield
between flights, a large NLF flag protruding from the cockpit. It was third
time lucky and the cargo was safely delivered. Having succeeded in their
mission Air Djibouti was allowed to retake possession of their aircraft and
Pere Astroud thankfully flew back to Djibouti never to return.

The army in Ataq were delighted, the tribes paid off and the Shaikh,
realising his position was untenable, pulled out with the remainder of his
supporters but not before he had personally mortar bombed the houses of
those in Said whom he believed to have gone over to his enemies. With his
fall resistance in Wahidi also ceased and both parties made their way
overland to Saudi Arabia. The rulers of the shaikhdom had been amongst
the most unpopular in the Federation and their resistance gives a hint as to
what may have happened if others had shared their determination.
Muhammad bin Rubakhr was installed as the NLF representative in their
place, so in a sense the Ahl Farid still ruled in Aulaqi.

To the east of the shaikhdom and south of Baihan in the armpit of Soutn
Arabia lies the Upper Aulaqi Sultanate. Here the rulers had easily defeated
the forces sent against them and stood cut off from everybody and forgotten
bv all until after independence.

" Wh i 1st the NLF were bribing their way into the shaikhdom their brethren
in the west were carrying out a similar operation with regard to the Radian
tribes. Not least amongst the ironies of South Arabia is the fact that the

195

tribes of Radfan whose revolt in 1963 had entered national folklore and 14
rtober, its anniversary, is enthusiastically celebrated by the Nl.K came
out in solid support lorFl.OSY. But everybody has a price and in this case i
u "s the arms handed over to the South Arabian Army when the British left
} fabilain that paid for the quiescence of the Wolves of Radian .

Meanwhile in Aden the struggle for power with.n the South Arabian
-\rn.v was resolving itself. At long last Colonel Nasir Buraiq had been
moved into a position where he was forced to retire. The I fall of the Federal
oovernment with the disappearance from the scene ol Fad hi bin All, the
Minister of Defence, and Muhammad Farid al Aulaqi. the Minister tor
Fxternal Affairs, had seriously weakened the Colonel's position He had
c-ause to complain that everybody was against him. The British had tried to
remove him time and time again: the NLF and non-Aulaqi faction within
he araiv rightlv saw him as the main obstacle to their ambitions and even
the vounger officers of his own faction regarded him as a symbol
ol everything old and traditional which gave them a bad name and had o
be "Ot rid of. Evervbodv combined and the Colonel was cornered. With
somewhat bad grace he agreed that if promoted brigad ier he won Id at once
go on leave and retire with of course a brigadier's pension and gratuity in

Hl AUheTast moment it seemed as if the old soldier would change his mind
but the announcement was made on 1 November without moident. I he
occasion was marked by a tea party in the officers' mess and was attended
bv all the senior officers. Aulaqi and non-Aulaqi. FI.OSY and NLF as well
as the few remaining British officers attached to the South Arabian Army.

It started off as a typically Arab affair with everybody saying nice things
thev did not mean about everybody else, but suddenly the atmosphere
changed. The Colonel rose to his feet, scowled at his audience and declared
•I must speak freely. I don't think enough has been said about my thirty-
three vera' service. I have been forced, yes. forced to resign by a lot of
political manipulators, some of whom are polluting the air with their
hypocritical presence. ' He paused for effect. 'They have even accused me o
meddling with politics.' His audience boggled and it looked as it the
Colonel was going to carry on in like manner when the situation was saved
from an unexpected quarter.

Throughout the party the blind preacher. Shaikh Baiham. had bee
sitting in a corner nibbling biscuits. Very much a Vicar of Bray, he had
weathered the Aden political storms well, going right through the
spectrum from cursing cinema-goers as idolaters in 1954 when a p. ar of
religion to cursing the High Commission in 1967 when he was a pillar ot
progression. He was the sole survivor of the old guard still allowed to
preach from his mosque and of late had come to play more and more the
role of conciliator. He now saw his chance and hobbling forward
proceeded to address the officers with all the considerable oratory at his
command. There is no language like Arabic spoken well to numb the
senses. The old Shaikh spoke it beautifully, after all that was how he earned

196

his livin* and within minutes everybody was entranced, the Colonel
momcntaTilv forgotten. His message was simple. It was a caller all tribes
and tor all political factions to come forward and re-decl.cate themselves to
the cause of an independent South Arabia. Emotionally ensnared by well
spoken and high flown phraseology the officers surged forward and each
one recited after the Shaikh a "great oath" in which they swore to torge their
differences. The partv then broke up and. emotionally exhausted, the
officers made their way homewards. In the bloodshed which was to come
only a few days later it is doubtful whether any of them gave a thought to
the Shaikh or to his oath. .

Earlv the following morning Masir Buraiq. appropriately dressed m the
uniform of a hrigadicr, inspected a farewell parade complete with camel
troop in Seederseer Lines. At precisely 8.26 am on 2 November the new
brigadier sulkily bade his brother officers farewe 1 and chmbed aboard a
helicopter which was to take him home to the Wad. Yashbum his pockets
bulging ominously with the proceeds of his gratuity and the pen S1 on
which he had wisely commuted. sf „u,

As the helicopter disappeared into the distance so did the last chances of
FLOSY fade away and the scene was set for the final phase ot the struggle.

COIT

befo
the!
timt
G
Con
nati
bel\
had
had
whi
gro
•ma
abl
wit
the
po:

Kii
go

Chapter XI

... So Depart

2 November-29 November 1967

In these circumstances some things which the United Kingdom
-Pacted to settle More ^^^f^Co^

2 November 1967

Oh mv people! The dogs are howling in the streets and the corpses of
my brethren are blocking th^er,^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

Aden Radio, 4 November 1967
When I come to toll the f all story of Aden and how we recovered from
the mess Sandys left us .n . . . ^ Sundfly TjmRS

10 April 1968

On 2 November 1967 George Brown rose before a Jd ^ se ol

Commissioner had declared his rea hncss o ^

who continued to press (or supremacy. <M> on
.roups ne a otia,in 8 in Ca.ro -"S*"-'

possible moment. _ nhiiontions which the United

He had little difficulty in ■ disposing of any o bl.«at. ons^ h k

198

quite clear that the British government had serious doubt about the
soundness and durability of the Federation of South Arabia. Since then
events had justified those warnings and reservations. He had also pointed
out that events in Yemen, South Arabia and the Middle Kast in general
could have effects which might make it essential to reconsider the
proposals he had announced at that time. However, the United Kingdom
retained the objectives it had so often stated, namely to withdraw her forces
in good order and to leave behind, if possible, a united, stable and
independent country, but events since June had caused it to reconsider
these objectives, therefore

1 The independence of South Arabia would take place in the second half
of November and all British forces would be withdrawn at that time. The
precise date of independence would be announced by the middle of the
month , in other words, a fortnight before it was d ue to take place.

Early withdrawal would reduce any danger that British forces might
become involved and sustain casualties in any renewed violence. Mr
Brown considered that radical nationalist and other groups (the rest of
South Arabia) must face and resolve their own problems. In these
circumstances some things which the United Kingdom had expected to
settle before independence might be left pending. Karlv withdrawal
would also help the South Arabian forces who were ready to take over
I ully now.

2 The changed circumstances (Egyptian withdrawal) in the Yemen had
removed the danger faced in June, thus the British offer of naval and air
forces for a period alter independence had become irrelevant.
Consequently the United Kingdom had cancelled its plans although a
substantial naval and air force would cover the withdrawal.

3 The offer of financial support to the Federal government for three years
after independence and the offer of support for forces in the Kastern
Aden Protectorate had always been subject to review if political
circumstance made their continuance inappropriate. These questions
would be left for a later decision when the future might be clearer. The
formation and attitude of the new government would be important
factors.

George Brown concluded by giving official burial to his plans to
internationalise Perim. The island would stay with South Arabia unless its
inhabitants against expectation were to demand otherwise.

Lord Shackleton underlined his government's view while speaking in
the House of Lords later the same afternoon. He declared 'We consider we
are not in a position to help South Arabia any more by our presence. We
still hope that there will be a government there but if there is no
government to hand over to. we can't hand over to a government.'

Humiliating as it all was there was nothing else for the British
government to do except pack up and go home.

The decision came as no surprise in Aden. Since September there had
been speculation that the dateof withdrawal was to be brought forward and

199

it seemed that it would depend only on how fast the services would remove
their remaining men and stores. Throughout the past three months the pace
of withdrawal had been gaining momentum. The remarkable assault ship
I IMS Fearless had been ferrying vehicles to Sharjah and Bahrain and
joined a naval task force gathering off Aden which was finally comprised of
twenty-four ships including the 54.000 ton carrier EagJe. the flagship
Intrepid and even a submarine in the biggest gathering of British naval
might since Sue/. It was a magnificent sight and one which must have
warmed the cockles of the admiral's heart as he gazed out over the wide
bay. His command normally consisted of a few minesweepers. The land
forces were also reinforced. On 5 October an advance party of 42 Royal
Marine Commando flew in, the main body arriving six days later aboard the
commando carrier Bulwark. They were to take over security duties in
Steamer Point from the Prince of Wales' Own who were being withdrawn.
Under the plan of withdrawal the Royal Marines would be the last troops to
leave South Arabia on the eve of independence.

Landmarks were passing quickly now. The headquarters of Middle East
Command at Steamer Point, once the nerve centre of a great base, was
abandoned, Lt General Tower moving with his staff to a temporary
headquarters on Khormaksar Airfield. Admiral Sir Michael I.e Fanu, the
Commander-in-Chief, went aboard his flagship whence he continued to
direct operations ashore. Government House, the traditional seat and
symbol of British authority, whence the decisions of the government
in London were passed down to the people and long the political and social
centre of South Arabia, was also given up and the High Commissioner and
staff moved down the hi 1 1 to a new embassy.

A stroll through the empty house was an eerie experience. True, from the
outside it looked the same. The bougainvillea still splashed scarlet against
the white walls, the two great cannons pointed impotently towards the
gates, the peacocks still strutted around the car park and preened
themselves in front of the long mirror which somebody had leant against a
wall. Inside the silence was oppressive. It seemed as if the ghosts had
walked in when Sir Humphrey walked out. Over the staircase the pictures
of past governors stared reproachfully at the present and the patio, scene of
so many memorable parties, was deserted. It was here that Sir Richard
Turnbull's guests, pistols tucked in cumberbunds. had played skittles, a
cabinet minister had got uproariously drunk and a Liberal peer announced
that he had come to put the 'Zionist point of view on Palestine to the South
Arabians'. The Duke of Gloucester, wiping a great expanse of white turn
with his napkin, had the last word on Aden. Eventually coaxed into
conversation by his hostess, he declared, 'It's damn hot.'

Fll Lt Morris, last of a long line of ADC's, remained behind to clear up,
pack away the Governor's crockery grandly stamped with the British
Crown and make arrangements for the occasional meeting which
continued to be held in the long council chamber. The furnishings
remained and the house was redecorated as a present to the new

200

government il it should emerge. New people, vastly different from the old
with other ideals, standards and way of life.

The new embassy was something of a come-down. A lot of thought had
gone into its selection and choice eventually fell on the headquarters of the
Public Works Department, planned on grandiose lines with every
mechanical comfort in the great days of the base and just completed in time
for independence. It is a long low block built around an air-conditioning
plant and overshadowed by the nearby cliffs. Light does not seem to have
been amongst the primary aims of the designers so as one official quipped,
'The British are spending their last weeks in South Arabia in the dark both
literally as well as metaphorically." No embassy is complete without a
statue and the requirement for the British Embassy in Aden is filled by
Queen Victoria. Sculptured by a little-known Briton, S C Tweed, she was
unveiled in 1911 on the occasion of a visit by the then Prince of Wales. She
had been forgotten in Steamer Point Gardens until August 1967, when it
was suddenly feared (hat the old lady might suffer indignities at the hands
of the mob. So one night, working under floodlights, a party of Koyal
Engineers unceremoniously heaved the 2-ton statue onto a truck and
dumped it onto a pedestal facing the embassy. Throughout the whole
operation the expression on Queen Victoria's face never changed but then
she was good at controlling her feelings.

Other bastions of British society were also being abandoned. For eighty
years membership of the Khormaksar Union Club had been a must for
aspiring socialites. The committee was once said to be the most powerful
body in Aden. According to legend, during the First World War when the
Colony was beleaguered by the Turks it had been responsible for impelling
the general to mount a long overdue offensive. The trouble had apparently
been caused when members enjoying their Sunday rounds of golf had been
disturbed by Turkish mortar fire based on nearby Shaikh Uthman.

Race meetings hud continued to be a feature almost up to the end and
even after the closure brigadiers and colonels continued to play on the polo
pitch, guarded by armoured cars. Once again history repealed itself. Much
to their fury the General banned his senior officers, and anybody else for
that matter, from playing polo after a game had come under mortar fire. The
attack was obviously intended for the nearby airfield but due either to
faulty aiming or the sight of a more attractive target several bombs fell near
the pitch. There were no casualties. One colonel stood up in his stirrups lo
get a better view and was promptly thrown. Another took advantage of the
interruption to score a hotly disputed goal. Afterwards the game
continued.

The withdrawal went on. A seemingly endless convoy of tanks, guns,
vehicles, equipment and secondhand furniture wound its way to the
dockside for shipment back lo the United Kingdom or to the new base at
Sharjah on the Gulf. Air traffic between Aden and the United Kingdom
was continuous, reaching its height on 2 November when forty transports
flew out under the protective cover of the naval task force.

201

Despite all these obvious signs of British withdrawal the militants still
vied with one another lo carry out at lacks on the British troops. Inevitably it
was the Arabs who suffered the heaviest casualties yet the madness
continued.

There had been no real rational reason for terrorism since way back in
1964 when the British had publicly declared their intention to bring South
Arabia to independence by 1968. Until Lord Beswick's famous visit in
1966 the base had been an obstacle to acceptance of the United Nations'
Resolutions but the battle, instead of diminishing as the Labour
government had hoped, intensified and entered its second stage: the
struggle for power after British departure.

On arrival in South Arabia Sir Humphrey Trevelyan had appealed to the
militants to join the government with no result but an intensification of
terrorism.

When the Federal government fell to British minds the last conceivable
incentive to terrorism disappeared yet still it continued unabated. The civil
war between FLOSY and NLF was certainly one of the reasons. Abdul Hadi
Shihab whilst Commissioner for the South Arabian Police and a known
member of the NLF explained at the lime that the NLF must continue to kill
British soldiers to keep up their nationalist image. Each side wanted to gain
the glory of having driven the British from the sacred soil. Since
independence a member of FLOSY has explained privately lhat the last
'offensive' by the organisation in Aden was an attempt to sabotage
independence! According to this man the FLOSY command, realising thai
they were losing the battle with the NLF. wished the British to stay and
retrieve the situation for them. What they had lost on the battlefield I hey
hoped to regain at the conference table, relying on their friends in
Parliament to help them. Apparently they did not believe that the British
would leave Aden in complete chaos. George Brown's speech on 2
November shattered these hopes.

Neither organisation had complete control over its followers. In the
areas given up by the British. NLF and FLOSY Haunted their weapons and
even opened offices. A gun or grenade could be had for the asking and
munv a voting man took advantage of the offer and went off lo prove
himself against a retreating foe. Not infrequently it was the last thing he did
and in the final weeks the militants suffered their highest casualties. The
troops, attacked several times a day by venturous bands, whom they were
politically prevented from destroying, were naturally edgy. In these
circumstances it was not always the guilty that suffered: an old man was
killed in Crater, in Maalla a laxi was accidentally shot up during a mortar
attack, the occupants slaughtered and so on.

In the middle of October the pattern took a sinister turn with a reversion
to indiv idual killings in Steamer Point. It is now known lhat at least three
terrorists specialising in the 'shot in the back of the head' technique were
active in the area and all three operated during the final period.

Ali Thompson, who had never forgiven his grandmother for marrying an

202

3« Ahmad Nnsir Khamati, the sniper of Steamer Point.

Rngl ish sergeant and whose red hair did not allow him to forgot it. ruled the
back streets from behind the facade of a Youth and Sports Club —
intimidating, extorting and occasionally to show off to other young men
went into the Crescent and shot somobodv in the back. Ali was a member of
PORF.

Of all the waiters in the Crescent Hotel. Abdullah was perhaps the most
cheerful. His gold teeth glinted in a friendly fashion as he doled out the
green pea soup. At night, and he always preferred to operate at night, he
was a 'lieutenant' in the NLF and afterwards wore his uniform to dispel
any doubts. In his case terrorism ran in (he family as his brother had been
responsible for the Maalla bomb outrage.

Finally there was Ahmad Nasir Khamati. Young and pleasant in a
mischievous sort of way, like many another 'commando' he was a well
known local footballer and something of a playboy, a familiar sight racing
around Aden in his blue VIC which he had prudently purchased with the
aid of a large loan from the government before independence. He had once
been a fervent supporter of the Federal government and worked as a news
announcer in broadcasting. Disillusionment had set in with defeat and he
first joined forces with Ali Thompson and later set up on his own with
vague connections with the NLF. His area of operation was between the
Prince of Wales Pier and the post office and it is hard to escape the
conclusion that Khamati killed for the sheer pleasure of it — it was so much
more exciting than football.

Derek Rose, the youngest political officer still serving with the High
Commission, was the first victim. A brilliant Arabist. Rose was one of the
last Englishmen still in contact with the Adcnis. He was immensely
popular with all races in the past two years and had seen it all. riols and

203

ounbattlcs as well as the seemingly endless political manoeuvring and
betrayal but his faith in the essential goodness of humanity remained
apparently untouched. .,„.,, n i

At 11.30 am on 20 October he bade goodbye to M. Rais. Ihe Red Cross
representative, in the Crescent Hotel and drove back towards the new
embassv a mile and a half away. Shortly after noon the Aden Police found
his car'smashed up against the wall of the pier and Rose inside shot
through the back of the head.

The remaining members of the British community were shocked and
saddened. It was not only that Rose was well liked, it was the waste and
futility of it all. As one man remarked, 'If I lost a son in Vietnam then
perhaps I would be comforted knowing that it was for a cause, in Aden it
would be for nothing.'

A week later a Danish Sea Captain. J S Thiesen, who was a regular caller
in Aden, was shot in the back after visiting his shipping agents whilst his
wife and daughters waited for lunch on board his 219 ton ship riding at
anchor in Aden harbour. There was no doubt that this was an Nl.r killing
and even they seemed to realise that there was no excuse for it. Publicly
claiming Thiesen was a 'spy' they privately apologised.

The evening before Thiesen was murdered Alan Macdonald. Ihe Public
Service Commissioner to the Federal government and a colonial servant o
many years standing, had finished his dinner in the Crescent Hotel as usua
and was walking the hundred yards from the main building to the hotel
annexe where he lived. He noticed that there did not seem to be anybody
around although he thought little of it. Half way to his destination at the
end of an ill-lit side street he heard somebody running behind him. He
turned quicklv and grappled with a small man who had been about to shoot
him in the back. Spare and strong. Macdonald was more than a match tor
his opponent who wrenched himself away and fled into the night, bul not
before shooting the Scotsman in the leg and stomach. Macdonald
staggered on into the annexe and was rushed to hospital. A tew days later,
backin the Roval Air Force hospital at Wroughton in Wiltshire, he was up
and ahout serving less hardy patients with their early morning cup ot tea
Then there was Walter Mechtel. former officer of the German Army turned
television reporter, eight vears a prisoner of the Russians. A veteran of
Stalingrad and Vietnam. One afternoon, sitting in the Crescent Hotel
lounge he complained of a headache and announced that he was going to
walkTthe half mile to the post office and post a letter to his wife of one
month Other journalists tried to dissuade him and Arabs on the hotel statt
hearing his intention, offered to go and post the letter themselves. Mechtel
brushed his wellwishers aside and stepped out into the sunlight. A quarter
of an hour later he was dead-two bullets in the back of the head in the
usual fashion as he turned away from posting his letter. He was the last
European to bo killed in South Arabia before independence. Nobody had a
grudge against him and his sole offence was the possession ol a white face.
The NLF disclaimed responsibility and arrested several people, including

204

the waiter and Khamati. Later all except Khamati were released, an NLK
spokesman alleging that he had carried out the murder on the "orders of
British intelligence' and would be charged and pul on trial. In fact Khamati
had recently taken it upon himself to execute what he believed to he traitors
to the NLF. including Faisal Luqman, a senior executive in the Aden Port
Trust, lie had become something of an embarrassment and the NI.F kept
him under guard where he could do no more harm. After independence he
was released.

British dead and injured were always taken to the large RAF hospital
al Steamer Point and when that closed down to the RAF hospital at
Khormaksar Beach which was also used by the South Arabian Army.
During the last lew weeks casualties were flown out to the naval task force.
Arabs went to the Queen Elizabeth I lospital. The five hundred bed hospital
was once the boast of Aden and one of the finest in all Arabia. Tribesmen
and their families from all over South Arabia, the Yemen and even Saudi
Arabia flocked to its doors to ask for the free treatment which they duly
received. Like every other government department or organisation in
South Arabia the staff were affected by the winds of revolution and towards
the end became bitterly divided amongst themselves. Aden had more than
its share of trained doctors although most of these preferred to practise
outside South Arabia in the Bayswater Road and elsewhere. Many of the
doctors and senior nursing staff at the hospital wore therefore Indian or
British. As the situation worsened the Indians gave notice, weakening the
already shaky morale of the staff.

The civil war between FLOSY and the KLF entered the very wards.
Casualties from either side had to be very careful which bed they were
placed in. The oath of Hippocrates was set aside and there is more than a
suspicion that some patients did nol receive the kind of treatment they had
a right to expect. The walls of the formerly spotless hospital were daubed
with multi-coloured slogans which shouted the political opinions of the
staff. 'British get out*. 'Death to Asnag'. 'Long live FLOSY' and so on. Despite
this, relations between the British staff and the Arabs had always been most
cordial. This happy state of affairs came to an end one day at the end of
August. Dr Charles Murphy, the Senior Medical Officer, was getting into
his"car in the hospital park when a male nurse passed by and tossed a
grenade. Fortunately the bomb rolled under the car. and exploded
harmlessly. A second nurse saw what happened, pulled a pistol out of his
pocket and shot down the doctor's assailant. Then frightened by the
temerity of what he bad done he fled the same day to Taiz to explain
himself at FLOSY headquarters.

A week later the first heavy fighting between the factions broke out in
Shaikh Uthman and the wounded poured into the hospital. Differences
were momentarily forgotten and the staff coped, but only just. The
experience had come as a shock and came in time to prepare them for
things to come.

205

As Delegate-General for the Red Cross, Andre Rochat was profoundly
inv ested in the problems of the Queen Elizabeth. The shortage ot doctors
S • e ".ore critical as independence approached and a fur her
nntb reak of filling would cause a complete breakdown ,n the hosp.ta s
eac h o ^ 0 strainc-d resources. Rochat therefore suggested putting he
ho u tal ut der Red Cross protection. The health authont.es needed 1, tie
" rs, ading. Muhammad al Bar, successor to Murphy, was enthus as u
M ho 1 up to that poinl discussions had been confidential a Bar at once
cabfthe world on behalf of his NLF-aligned Arab Doctors Assoc, ,
demanding that the Red Cross take over immediately, r ho I . gh
Commission agreed instantly. Rochat was reasonably cer a., that
Macfc «e and Asnag would consent to respect Red Cross neutrality on
betialf ot FLOSY. He therefore set off lor Zingihar to gain the agreemen o
O „ | Shaabi. The NLF leader harangued him tor two hours- -Bung
?u, V li" br ng doctors, mv people are starving. Do all you can. But when
Tea n t th t the Red Cross flag would fly over the hospital and that ,
wou ld become neutral terrilorv his attitude changed. Not one inch ot South
Arabian soil could he giver, up-the suggestion infringed ^U^ s
sovereignty but als<:> on the dignity of the NLF It was useless to. RochaUo
explain that 124 nations had signed the Red Cross Convention, al SI abi
Sulci have nothing of it. His answer was a Hat no. *
loader's derision the Arab Doctors' Association hastily withdrew their
irHer appro? du min«? that the hour of crisis had passed. This no more
Sin a week be te the most savage and bitter fighting of the whole pre-
Independence period was to erupt in the streets of Shaikh Uthman and al

M BvTll' logic the first few days of November should have brought
opt ml Sc. relief. The fighting seemed over. George Brow, had
announced British withdrawal in no uncertain tern s The d ™on,
between FLOSY and the NLF had seemingly come to a surxesstu
conch sion in Cairo and they were reportedly talking about a ,o.n
Sg ion to receive independence from the British. Even more ,rnpor ant
to some people Aden Port looked forward to the arrival of two Egypt.an
ankT v K crude oil for the refinery. Instead an air of tension lay across
Sen like a cloud Few people were on the streets and in the areas of Aden
^fS "ntrd no nis hand strayed far from his gu. The =
was not hard to find. With sweeping NLF successes ,n Ah« ^te Ito *d>
stronghold left to FLOSY were the Aden townships ot a Mansu a. S lha.k *
Uthman and Dar Saad. Since their tactical victory in the I rs t da>s ot
Se ember the FLOSY position had been seriously weakened. I hey had
be en unable to prevent infiltration and over three thousand armed
tribesn en mainlv Audhalis. roamed the streets. When asked why they had
tribesmen. nidini> awa it the new government

3S wiS ^^eTe^eT^ sultans.' Most of these tribesmen
were from states under the control of the NLF and it took little to persuade
them that FLOSY stood between them and their gold.

206

FLOSY also know that supplies had been cut off. Like the British in the
South, the Egyptians in the Yemen were also withdrawing. As they
retreated into a bridgehead around Hodcidah FLOSY were abandoned to the
Yemeni Republicans. The Republicans had nothing against FLOSY but
confiscated their arms dumps as like everybody else (hey needed them.
More important still with the removal of Colonel Nasir Buraiq from the
South Arabian Army the chances that it would side with FLOSY or even
remain neutral virtually disappeared.

If the delegates conferring in Cairo dreamt that the success of their
discussions would prevent a flare up in Aden they were mistaken. Neither
side could control its supporters and relations between the FLOSY and
NLF commando in Shaikh Uthman could not have been worse. They haled
each other. The NLF openly boasted that after independence their rivals
would bo put up against a wall and shot. FLOSY, nervous, trigger-happy,
yet confident in the knowledge that they were well armed, had plenty of
supplies and in every previous encounter in the area they had come out on
lop.

The South Arabian Army arbitration council which consisted of three
colonels, three members of the NLF and three of FLOSY, was at work every
day holding the two sides apart. The final break came at one of their
meetings. Tempers were unusually high as both parties considered that
they had been betrayed by the Cairo talks. According to FLOSY the NLF
tried to ambush their party on its way back from the last meeting. The NLF
have it the other way around and claimed that three of their supporters
were killed 'when a gangster hurled a grenade.' Whatever the truth of the
incident it was the spark which set the town alight. The battle started at
about 2 pro on 3 November and by nightfall over fifty lay dead and many
hundreds more wounded. FLOSY and the NLF alike shot at anything
which moved so that most of (he casualties were civilian. The army issued
appeal after appeal to both sides to slop the fighting but only achieved
limited success here and there. As before FLOSY at first seemed to be
winning. From three strong points— Dar Saad. al Mansura and Colonel
Buraiq's flats in the centre of" Shaikh Uthman they began to slowly
surround their enemies. At the decisive moment the South Arabian Army
took a hand.

The army was essentially NLF in sympathy and only needed an excuse
to interfere. This was soon provided. At about 10.30 on the morning of ihe
4th a patrol left al Mansura jail and moved through the town. Some minutes
later it reported thai it was under fire and requested permission to fire back.
It was given very quickly. An urgent message to headquarters and the
affirmative reply. From then on whether they liked il or not and most of
thorn did. the army was committed to the NLF. The fighting raged on
decisively all day with the army intervening more and more against
FLOSY. In the evening they were able to impose a truce and curfew. At the
same time they told both sides to withdraw all armed men from the area
within three days. Although the appeal seemed reasonable on the surface it

207

was ingenious. The NLF could comply with ease. FLOSY had nowhere to
go to and retreat into the desert would have been suicidal. During the night
senior army officers met the NLF command and concerted plans for the
morrow.

At first light the fighting was renewed with increased ferocity. At first
the army confined itself to skirmishing. The officers were still unsure of
their men and their position awaited the outcome of the political battle in
headquarters which controlled the situation and most of the Aulaqis were
had been dragging their feet. On the previous day one had refused lo bring
his battalion into Shaikh Utliman and were making a last minute bid to
save the situation. The current was too strong for them, it was the
headquarters which controlled he situation and most of the Aulaqis were
out of it commanding battalions. They were virtually unable to
communicate with each other and were leaderless. In the end ten senior
officers, including three battalion commanders, resigned. When the news
that the resignations were pending reached Shaikh Uthman the army-
open ly sided with the NLF and set about wiping out the FLOSY forces with
all the power at its command.

The first strongpoint to be assailed was their former colonel's flats
defended by strong forces led by his son, himself a lance corporal in the
army. The defenders put up a desperate resistance and even after Saladin
armoured cars with their powerful 76mm guns had been brought in I hey
still held out. Eventually the building was dynamited. A patrol of Hrilish
Hussars watching the battle through a telescope from a windmill on I he sail
flats saw it jerk into the air and crash into the street like a pack of cards. The
surviving defenders were shot down as they struggled out ol the dust, arms
raised above their heads. The body of their commander was later found
lying amongst the rubble. Some say that he had been slabbed.

The FLOSY defenders of al Mansura were equally stubborn. They even
sallied out and surrounded the army contingent in the jail. Late on the 5th
they were driven back onto their own strongpoints, which were
demolished one by one with the aid of Carl Gustav anti-tank weapons.
The fighting in Dar Saad into which most FLOSY remnants retreated, was
the most bitter of all. No quarter was asked or given as the army and NLF
hunted down their enemies house by house. By dusk the battle was over.
Few FLOSY survivors managed to escape and the NLF with the army at
its back were in complete control.

Early in the day a belated statement had been issued from Headquarters,
South Arabian Army.* lo (he effect that it recognised the NLF as the sole

" In Army I leadquarters, British influence was fast disappearing. The daily situation report had
always been produced in English and Arabic. Until 1 November the translation had always been
made from the Knglish. On this dato responsibility for the production of the report passerl into
South Arabian hands, and the procedure reversed.

Only four bi-lingual reports were produced, the last containing the following paragraph:
Little Aden. Throughout the morning the office of the Commander, Little Aden, was
surrounded by forty women who refused to go away until he bad personally satisfied each
one.' South Arabian Army Sitrep. 4 November, paragraph A.

20B

representative ol' the people and called upon the British to negotiate
independence with it straight away. To keep in with the times it also
renamed itself the Arab Armed Forces of Occupied South Yemen. The
purge of the Aulaqi officers, begun during the fighting, was completed a
few days later when seventy-four officers were asked to resign. They took
their commuted pensions and gratuities and left, mostly for the Upper
Aulaqi Shuikhdom. In many ways they were fortunate. The senior Arab
officer (the force was still under the nominal command of Brigadier Dye)
remained an Aulaqi. Colonel Muhammad Ahmad Aulaqi owed allegiance
only to the army and continued as Brigadier-elect.

By local standards the carnage was severe. There was no reliable count of
the dead who probably exceeded three hundred including twenty soldiers.
Hundreds were wounded. The staff at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital,
working night and day. soon ran out of blood and broadcast that it was
pointless to bring in wounded without a blood donor. Still bloodstained
the taxis turned in through the gate to dump their grisly loads of dead and
dying to get whatever treatment was possible. On the first day of the
fighting a gang of armed men had turned up and kidnapped two of the male
nurses under the eyes of the horrified staff. They were whisked away to
Shaikh Uthman to look after NLF wounded and later taken upcountry to do
the same there. After this more armed police were drafted in. ostensibly to
protect the staff from more intrusions. They soon made known their NLF
sympathies and those who si ill had any regard for FLOSY quickly forgot it.

Whilst the main contest was being fought out in the Shaikh Uthman. al
Mausura. Dar Saad complex there had been other outbreaks elsewhere. In
Steamer Point the NLF rounded up Ali Thompson and his men while the
Marines and pressmen had a grandstand view of the fighting from their
posit ion on Clock Tower Hill. In Li tile Aden FLOSY killers firing from a car
gunned down a pro-NLF policeman silling with his family outside his
home. Only Crater, soundly pro-FLOSY and under the tight control of the
Argylls. remained quiet. There was real fear that to gain conlrol the NLF
would have to turn Crater into another battleground. The danger was
removed by the South Arabian Army and Police who went from door to
door quietly arresting loading FLOSY personalities whilst the Argylls held
the ring.

Once in conlrol the NLF. often accompanied by army or police escorts,
went openly about the Colony arresting those suspected of being
sympathisers of the former regime. FLOSY or the British. Nobody was safe,
not oven the army. On 8 November about twenty officers and soldiers were
arrested during the night and taken to Zingibar for interrogation. Major
Muhammad Salih, a minor member of the Fadhli ruling family, was
standing outside the officers' mess in Sccderseer Lines when three armed
NLF civilians tried to bundle him into the back of a truck. Breaking away
the Major ran into the operations room, manned by two Arab and one
British officer. They stood aside as the Major was dragged away. With such
things happening in the army there was no hope for anybody else. Cen

209

gotiate [ones, the Director of Health Services and the last British civil servant still

it also at work with the South Arabian government, finally laid down his pen

n. The when armed police broke into his Khormaksar office and hauled off a

leted a member of the staff.

ay took Many of those questioned by the various NLF command were released

Upper after a few days but the fate of others is uncertain. Frison camps were set up

>r Arab in Zingibar and I.odar. At independence an NLF estimate put the number of

sr Dye) people held there as 1.500, including some four hundred in the Zingibar

igiance jail, built to hold fifty.

The fierce fighting in Shaikh Uthman and the general deterioration ol

ounlof conditions seriously alarmed the High Commissioner who produced a

ildiers. plan— code named operation -Figgis— for the crash evacuation ol the

ispital. hundred or so remaining British civilians. Most of these lived in two

it was guarded compounds at opposite ends of the Colony. Each individual was

stained handed instructions to pack a suitcase, collect twenty-four hours' iron

ad and rations and a blanket. As soon as the words 'Figgis Figgis Figgis' were

of the broadcast over the Forces - Radio they were all to head for assembly points,

lemale the whereabouts of which were passed by word of mouth for increased

way to security. From here they were to be airlifted by helicopter to the waiting

vlodo fleet.

iibly to The plan was greeted with calm and a certain amount of good humoured

arNLF cynicism as those with a nervous disposition had long since departed,

got it. Conversation mainly speculated at the odd code name,

nan. al ll was soon revealed that Figgis was a legendary political officer in the

lore. In Hudhramaut at the time when British paternalism in the area was at its

die the height. Figgis, so the story went, was wont to disappear into the desert with

n their a crate of gin and decline to answer any signals sent to him. Eventually in

ma car replv to persistent queries regarding his views on the situation he

ide his telegraphed 'AH Bedouins are bastards— Figgis' and was promptly

1 of the dismissed by a scandalised Governor. Ever after, when political officers

le NLF found life unbearable, the High Commission would receive a signal which

er was merely read 'Figgis was right.' By November 1967 most Britons still in

loor to Aden would have thoroughlv agreed with him.

Is held As soon as the extent of the Nl .F victory became known their delegation
in Cairo not unsurprisingly broke off discussions with FLOSY and

scorts, appealed to the British for direct talks. There was a throe day delay whilst a

being dialogue with the High Commission was established through Colonel

as safe. Abdullah Salih. The South Arabian Police Chief was fast becoming a

s were power in the land and was quick to use his not inconsiderable contribut ion

Major to NLF victory to consolidate his position. On 14 November it was finally

y. was announced that talks would begin a week later and the venue was to be

armed Geneva.

\ away During the three day wait for the announcement the last attacks on

id one British troops took place in Steamer Point. A young Marine was seriously

hsuch wounded, the last British casualty. Mechlel was murdered a week later,

e. Cen Throughout the final period Andre Rochat was in his element. He had gone

210

into Shaikh Uthman in the thick of the fighting to relieve the misfortunes of
the inmates of the lunatic asylum, abandoned by their nurses and without
water Now he turned his attention lo the remaining deta.ness. 1 hirty-one
were still held in the Steamer Point guardhouse, more as hostages to fortune
than anything else. They were by no means leading terrorists and were
mostlv amongst those captured by troops in the last skirmishes. Twenty-
one of these were members of FLOSY and unan.nuu.sly doc: ared they had
no intention of trusting themselves to an NLF-ruled South Arabia. Rochat
made arrangements for them to be flown to Egypt. On 1f, November the
prison «atos opened and the FI.OSY men boarded a United Arab Airlines
plane whilst the NLF were noisily feted through the streets ot Maalla.

Now the NI.F were in various ways acting as interim government.
Through the armv they issued a two-day ultimatum railing tor the
surrender of all weapons in l.ahcj and Aden. Anybody holding arms after ,
expired would be subject to dire penalties, including death. Here they met
their first difficulty. NLF commandos declined to comply and the
ultimatum had to be extended 'because it was proceeding so
satisfactorily^ Elsewhere difficulties were beginning to arise, n the
'liberated' states NI.F commissars, often young schoolteachers and even
students, had been sent to enlighten the tribes. At first they were received
with i nterest as possible bringers of gifts, afterwards when they began to ask
for taxes the attitude changed. The Audhalis of Aryab succinctly summed
it up 'We did not get rid of our sultans to pay taxes to the likes of you, they
declared to a young unfortunate sent to treat with them Some tribes were
completely bevond the pale. The NLF command at Fadhl, received a short
answer lo the letter sent to Salih Lahman al Qashmimi, the famed bandit of
Ahl Jabal demanding allegiance. 'I have received your letter, ran the reply,
•and as we have assisted you in ridding ourselves ot the false Sul ar please
be so good as to set aside his Zingibar house and a car. preferably the one
with automatic gears, as my just reward.' There were going to be no taxes

f Tot^s^

beginning to realise that the sultans had not been so rich after all and he
country was on the brink of financial disaster. Nearly three-quarters of the
Federal hudgett had been covered in one way or another by British
subsidies. Most of the rest came via Aden port, now lying idle. ™e armed
forces, large in proportion to the country's means, would have to be pa d
lest it turn against its new masters. Unemployment with the closing of the
base amounted to over thirty thousand and of course the tribes would
expect to receive their dues. No wonder NLF leaders meeting in Geneva
were deeply concerned with the financial problems of a United Kingdom
facing devaluation.

* Nl slutemmil 20 Novel) ibnr.
t£12'A million nut oi £17 million.

211

Those Problems were thrust into the background as Briton and Arab
pr ^ed 'to celebrate independence ^^'^up the naval task
P 0 P n 25 November the J^.' b ^ , uit and

force stood ,n revtew * r > r vvaving enthusiastically at

SS£SSS#asaas»

flags and slogans hail appeared as ?» ™ 8 £ ""p- A [ rttihad was
independence. withdrawal almost as if the other

was still one day to go. , „ iti u i e d hv Lord

Sultan Of Muscat as a birthday present and the British, alter c

s^s^t^sl^s ^^^^^^^

muttered ahout the consequences. The new flag had a blue tr.anglc
it to show the NLF concern for its 'overseas territories .

212

2Ui

i • . ,u,. ...a The Nl.F demanded £60
The other stumbling block was pre, the tBrritoiy over

million down ■«^; rS;E m -. They got £12 million
thB previous one hundred and - nt > ^ romise that furthc r aid would
mos , of which was ^adyjn Aden ana ^ ^ ^

N'ov-bor with Old ^ '^"^ i sh i p p cd Vi ome Early the next mornin, the

Amw to Colonel Muhammad Ahmo«l d dfmcing , n thc

in the evening there were t°rchh*ht process ^ ^

streets, rhythmic tattoos were bea* on rt.e mot c ^ rf

wero chanted by wildly exeded ^^^^ nd ^Hably the black
Qahtan Shaabi. There were w Id m o t n . de an ^ ^

veiled women were there beat ng tar bou ; ht

voices to the chorus There u as no , thc airport to greet
Fn the early mom.og a vast cro« d a^mW«« « jncvitably tho black
Qahtan al Shaabi. There ^^Z^ ^ ^
conference he started off on a * «> revolu(ion WBS victorious, the

prided „,«. «*. XritL» S™L. i »Hy.h, ! >«o„.y.

Epilogue

George /eels desperate because it's different to what he promised.

His (George Brown's) colleagues considered it a wonderfully lucky
and fortunate result. That the regime he backed should have been
overthrown by terrorists and forced our speedy withdrawal is
nothing but good fortune— chaos will rule after we've gone and
there'll be one major commitment out— thank God.

Richard Grossman's diary entries for 25-30 October 1967

on South Arabia

In the former British military camps the last air conditioner had been
prised from the walls and trundled away, and the police had sold every
stick of furniture looted from the houses of the former Federal Ministers.
The gala arches proclaiming independence still stood but the enthusiasm
which greeted its arrival soon ebbed.

In Government House, now renamed The Palace of the President,
Qahtan al Shaabi had formed his first government. By explaining that
world leaders did not respect statesmen under the age of forty, he
persuaded his younger colleagues to make him President and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces. The rest of the government were young
men in their thirties, all named had been known for years as NLF members
but dismissed as men of little importance. The Minister of Defence was
Ali Salim al Baidh, a Hadrami and a Marxist who had made his name with
mortar attacks on Government House. Foreign Affairs were handled by
Saif al Dhalai, a student surveyor. The Petroleum Union leaders, Mahmud
Ushaish and Abdul Malik Ismail, the real founders of the NLF in Aden,
were rewarded with the portfolios of Industry and Labour. The President's
nephew Faisal Abdul Latif al Shaabi became Minister of Economic
Planning, while the primary schoolteacher turned killer, Abdul Fatah
Ismail, became Minister of Information with special responsibilities for
relations with North Yemen. Muhammad Ali Haithem, a Dathini who had
played a role in bringing the army in on the side of the NLF, became
Minister of Finance and Adhil Khalifa, just out of school, became Minister
of Justice and together with Abdullah Khamari set about organising show
trials of Federal supporters who had fallen into their hands. There was,
however, to be little retaliation against those who had worked directly for

215

the British: but for friends, relatives and supporters of the former Sultans
and of FLOSY it was a different matter. Some two thousand of these were
thrown into jail and the number of political prisoners held without trial
has remained fairlv constant at around three thousand up until the time
of writing. The dead and executed were replaced by later opponents of the
regime. Judith Hart when Minister for Overseas Development used the
record of the People's Republic of South Yemen on human rights as an
excuse to cut off Britain's aid commitments. A Red Cross request to visit
them was rebuffed by the government and the International Committee of
Jurists has expressed disquiet without effect.

Internationallv the new state was recognised and took its place at the
United Nations' Administratively the country was divided into six
Provinces which roughly coincided with the cell organisation of the NLF
when it had been underground.

The economic situation was precarious. The troubles, combined with
the closure of the Suez Canal had cut the port of Aden's trade by 80 per
cent The evacuation of the base put another 10,000 out of work and the
virtual ceasing of British aid meant the loss of some 60% of the country's
income. Furthermore, as most of the merchant community had left, the
new regime did not scruple to hold relatives who had remained behind to
ransom. The minoritv communities, the Somalis, the Indians and even the
Yemenis felt that the time of troubles had come and quietly packed their
bags. In the six months after independence the population of Aden was to
drop by over 100,000.

Politically the NLF soon found itself divided between the traditional
nationalists led by Qahtan al Shaabi, who wanted to maintain the
traditional structure of society, and the Left led by Abdul Fatah Ismail who
wanted radical socialist change. The armed forces which held the balance
of power sided with the traditionalists.

Conflict was postponed by dramatic events in North Yemen. In
September 1967 Saudi and Egyptian representatives had reached
agreement in Khartoum. The Egyptian forces agreed to withdraw and
Saudi Arabia to cease giving aid to the Royalists. On VI October the
Kgvptians evacuated Sana taking with them all the heavy equipment,
armoured cars and field guns. On 5 November President Sallal left the
Yemen ostensibly to attend the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian
Revolution in Moscow: privately he had let it be known he would not
return and was retiring to Iraq. The next day in a quiet military coup he
was declared deposed.

The Royalists and the Zaidi tribes went onto the offensive and by
Decembc/some 20,000 were besieging Sana led by the Imam's cousin
Muhammad bin Hussain. Memories of the sack of the city by the Imam
Ahmad in 1948 strengthened the resolve of the 3,000 defenders. Al Amn
flew in to take command and issued arms to the citizens who were lormed
into special Republican brigades, the Popular Resistance Force (PRF). As
it was Ramadan, the Royalists were not too active in the first days of the

216

siege and this allowed the Republicans to bring in reinforcements. Algeria
and the Soviet Union carried out a massive air lift of aid and also gave
financial support. In January 600 volunteers came into the city from Aden
whilst further South Yemeni support was sent to Hodeidah together with
arms and ammunition. Around Harib and Baihan in the east, South
Yemeni and Republican forces co-operated in a diversion against Royalist
tribes. Muhammad bin Hussain launched three vain assaults but was
unable lo co-ordinate his forces who began to drift away, and on 8 February
1968 a force, including South Yemeni volunteer units, climbed up the road
from Hodeidah and relieved the city. Russian and South Yemeni aid had
contributed to the victory but the immediate success had been won by the
PRF.

No sooner had the siege been lifted than the Republicans split into two
opposing camps: the Republican tribalists led by al Amri and the Shaikhs,
and the Shafai Left, comprising most of the PRF, and encouraged and
supported by the South Yemenis. In Hodeidah Abdul Fatah Ismail had
organised a trades union and a People's Militia which in March 1968 tried
to seize a shipment of Russian arms. Al Amri, then in Cairo, hurried home
and gathering a tribal army, marched into the port, crushed the PRF and
shot their leaders. The final showdown came in Sana in August when the
PRF and the tribes fought a three-day pitched battle in which over 1,000
people were killed and much of the town destroyed. The Left were routed.
The tribesmen, much reinforced by Royalists who had been deserting the
Imam since the spring, were all Zaidis, the losers all Shafais. Once the
threat from the Left had disappeared al Amri opened negotiations with the
Royalist chiefs. The Saudis indicated they would stop supporting the
Imam if the Republicans held down the Left and adopted a foreign policy
in line with their own. The war ended in 1970. On 28 March a Republican
delegation to the Islamic Conference in Jcdda reached agreement with
King Faisal. Fighting would cease as would Saudi aid to the Imam. The
embryo Republican National Assembly was enlarged to include eighteen
Royalists and Royalist ministers joined the government. Only the Imam's
family, the Hamid al Din, were barred from returning. The Imam retired
to England where he still lives, deserted by all he trusted, a forlorn figure
known locally as 'the Squire of Chobham'.

In South Yemen independence had not brought the rewards which
many who had helped the NLF achieve power had expected. The first to
be disillusioned was probably Nagwa Mackawee, head of the NLF
women's movement in Aden. Reunited with her detainee husband she
soon found that marital bliss was not to be. On the day following
independence he threw a kettle of scalding water over her and appalled
colleagues quickly arranged for Nagwa to be flown to hospital in Cairo.
The Aden Police Commissioner, Abdul Hadi Shihab, who had done so
much to help the NLF in Aden was soon disabused of any remaining
thoughts he may have had of maintaining his power. Given the job of
clearing up the dumps of arms in which Aden abounded he found himself

217

Tia unable to resist the temptation to put aside one lot which had been

lve imported by a relative. Betrayed by a constable, he was thrown into his

len own jail. ,

ith On 19 December the NLF felt strong enough to purge the army. Colonel

Ith Muhammad Aulaqi was removed and Colonel Ali Abdullah Maiseri made

[ ist Commander, whilst another Dathini, Husain Uthman, took overthe former

ms Federal Guard and became Chief of Staff. Colonel Ali Abdullah was later

ary ' murdered on the orders of Abdul Fatah Ismail. By this time the final

)a d pockets of resistance had been overcome. The last remaining Federal

ta d Minister in the field, the Amir Muhammad bin Abdullah of the Upper

lh. e Aulaqi Sultanate, held out in Nisab for some months. The army moved in
but resistance was strenuous, the trihes inflicting severe losses before

wo being subdued by 25 pounder guns brought down from Baihan. The Amir

hs, was captured and thrown into jail. His uncle, the aged Awadh bin Salih,

nd nominal Sultan of the Upper Aulaqi, was turned out of his house and went

ia d to live in the suq. The old man had suffered from diabetes for years and

ied the illness had already cost him a leg. His supply of insuli n cut off he soon

me fell into a coma and died.

nd Still one Sultan remained, Muhammad Aidrous of Yafa' who ever since

the ^ 1958 had watched events from his mountain eyrie at al Qara. He was

100 suspicious but eventually flattery overcame his doubts and he went to the

ed. beach at Zingibar expecting to be greeted as a hero. Instead he was seized,

the disappeared into prison, and some say he was shot."

the The general policies of the Hadrami NLF, even if they were often

the proclaimed as more than rhetoric, were often in conflict with the Aden

the based leadership. Attempts by the NLF Secretary General, Faisal al Shaabi,

icy ' to discipline the Hadrami sector met with no success. A leading figure in

:an the disputes was the Minister of Defence Ali al Baidh, himself a Hadrami.

ith In January 1968 he flew to Moscow on receiving the promise of aid, and

'he on his return dismissed the British officers still serving the South Arabian

sen Forces. Qahtan al Shaabi was furious, he had not been consulted and

n's realised that the Russians were backing his opponents,

red The clash between the two wings of the NLF came at the Fourth

are Congress, 2-8 March 1968, called to agree on a programme for the future
of the country. The divisions within the Party now became public. The

ich President was opposed by the Left who demanded a Marxist state and by

; to tribal representatives who felt they had been insufficiently rewarded. The

LF Congress gave overwhelming support to the Left. Whilst the army

; he supported the President and saw the Loft as a threat to its power, especially

ing resenting the decision to raise a People's Militia and attach Political

led Commissars to the Regular Units.

ro. Later in the month the army broke up a NLF meeting in Aden and so

so prevented a Leftist coup. The nerve of the President failed, instead of

ing
of

;elf 4 He was machine-gunned to dealt, in the company of his two half-brothers on the beacli near
|a'ar.

218

supporting the army he issued a bewildering service of conflicting orders.
Faced with pro-Left demonstrations in Abyan and the Hadramaut he
ordered the arrest of the army officers responsible and as a further boost
to his image rushed through a land reform under which confiscated lands
were handed over to NLF supporters. The Hadramaut broke off relations
with Aden and announced de facto secession. Other groups decided on
rebellion but the plans for the uprising only partly materialised. On 14
May 400 extremists seized Ja'ar some thirty miles east of Aden in the
foothills of the Yafa'i mountains. They had the support of most of the tribes
but one, the Yafa'i Ahl Shams, who were reluctant. Their village was
promptly surrounded and the men massacred. In their mountains the
Yafa'is had felt slighted ever since Shaikh Ali Atif had been captured by
the Fadhli NLF the previous autumn, the arrest and murder of their own
Sultan, and they were further enraged by the attack on the Ahl Shams
which finally goaded them into action.

Apparently unaware of the hornets' nest that they had stirred up and
the storm gathering in the dark hills above the town, the rebels returned
to Ja'ar, where they greeted a fresh batch of supporters who had arrived
from Aden and gave themselves over to discussion.

One of the leaders, Hassan al Zaghir, the killer of Sir Arthur Charles,
was sent down the coast on reconnaissance with a bazooka and machine
gun party. Here on 22 May he was found by the first government patrols.
He put up a spirited resistance until deserted by his men. He was shot
through the head and his body dragged behind an armoured car.

The army, loyal to al Shaabi, advanced on Ja'ar. It took them no time to
discover that others had preceded them. The town was a smoking ruin.
Over 300 hodies, many of them women and children, lay in the streets.
The Yafa'is had taken their revenge and withdrawn to the mountains. All
that the army could do was to clear up. Some of the rebels escaped and
retreated up the Wadi Bana. Here they fell prey to the wolves of Radfan,
still stubborn supporters of FLOSY, and were decimated, only a handful
of survivors making their way to the comparative safely of the Yemen.

No sooner had the President dealt with the Left than he was faced by a
serious uprising in Aulaqi instigated by the former Rulers who had
recaptured Said. In August Colonel Abdullah Salih Sabah, who had done
so much to ensure the NLF takeover in the East, changed sides once again
and defected to the Yemen with 200 of his men and their armoured cars.
The army held firm and by the end of the month Said was recaptured and
the rebels driven out. The government's position now appeared stronger,
having dealt with serious challenges from both extremes, but the President
was unable to take advantage of the situation. Always unstable, his nerves
deteriorated and for some months past he had conceived an obsession
which blamed all the world's ills on President Johnson. The US Charge
d'Affaires, Eagleton, was more than once forced to listen to anti-American
tirades from al Shaabi who formed the embarrassing habit of giving vent
to his views in public.

219

The exiled Sultans kept up their pressure with uprisings iri iBaihan and
„ Jfan Fared with increasing discontent in the army, the President
?id5 come o an accommodation with the defeated Left.
r imieSlv led by Abdul Fatah Ismail who had sought refuge in
-"I Marxists once more joined the governor,
,nH determined to remove al Shaabi when the opportunity arose. As the
"esiden came under increasing pressure his behaviour became more
? ,!L„t in Anril 1968 he was forced to relinquish the post ot Mime
K5 "nd i i June the Left sided with Muhammad Ali Haithem in a
dl putTover the command of the armed forces. Al Shaabi was forced to
Sn all hTs posts in June, and was for a time imprisoned in the house a
S Mar Tag once J mansion of the Director of Aden Airways. He spent
Ms time in an empty room promulgating decrees and haranguing invisible
audircerCoIisideLd harmless, he was released and eventually died in
1 979 His nephew Faisal al Shaabi was arrested and shot

Thumbs become known as the 'corrective move' by the Marxists
an? given equal prominence in national celebrations with Revolution
Day 14 October, and Liberation Day, 27 November, The country now
became the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen (PDRY .

Once in power the Left soon ousted the remaining moderates.
Muhammad I li Haithem was replaced as Prime Minister in December an
a olane carrying Saif al Dhalai and others opposed to the Lett exp oaea
and crashed in mysterious circumstances during a tour of the Provinces
Th new ident was Salim Rubai Ali who had the rebels in a a
Ud he was supported by Abdul Fatah IsmaiL » ^J^* £
NI F Bv the time the Fifth Congress met m March 1973 the country naa
been sub ected to an orgy of Marxism. Government sponsored uprisings
^ ribesmen against landowners resulted in further land redistribution
and the ^collapse of commercial agriculture. In November 1969 all

Is insurance companies, trading houses and
nationalised. Private property was progress.vely, ^^.^^
timp Ahrilll Fatarl Ismail visited Moscow m 19/9 he could boast that an
Z, ^oftntpo't Tncluding bicycles, had been ^ appropriated by the
people. The country became a police state. The yellow car of he Secret
Police organised by the East Germans, became a symbol of terror. Those
£5 It of opposing the State were taken away, often to disappear
Conscrip 8 tioiAnd compulsory political education were ' *J
vouth of both sexes. To speak to foreigners was forbidden and a pass was
"reauired to travel from one town or province to another
T^e purity of South Yemen's Marxist attitudes sometimes embarrassed
bo^e Soviet Union and the ^M^^
international matters the PDRY stood far to the left of -anj jrtht .r Arab
oovemment On Palestine the PDRY opposed the UN Resolution ot
No^mber 967 which the Soviet Union had sponsored and criticised the
inu\ umuei ±a Vmnt an H Aleeria, to which the Soviets had

petty bourgeois character of E ^™£^^
given favourable encouragement. The PDRY also cnncisea

220

their continued support of the Sudan after the liquidation of the Sudanese
Communist Party in July 1971. They criticised both powers for their
attempts at detente with the United Slates of America which was
considered as the greatest threat to world peace.

These moves were not without opposition within the government. In
particular the President sought reconciliation with Saudi Arabia. He
agreed that i n return for massive economic aid PDRY would cease attempts
to export its revolution to Oman and the Gulf and give up assistance to a
group of Yemeni Army officers who had fled south following the
assassination of Ibrahim al Hamdi in October 1977. This policy was co-
ordinated through the new North Yemeni President, Ahmad Husain al
Ghashimi. Then the Left struck. Sometime on Friday 23 June 1978
President Salim telephoned his North Yemeni counterpart to say he was
sending a special envoy to Sana. The envoy arrived and was shown into
the North Yemeni President's office and they were both killed when a
bomb exploded in the envoy's attache case.

In Aden the NLF militia led by Ali Antar attacked the President's house
while Cuban flown jets strafed it from the air. The Regular Army attempted
to support the President but they were uncoordinated and defeated. That
evening Aden Radio announced that the President had been tried and
executed along with two of his Ministers. Abdul Fatah Ismail became Head
of State, styling himself Chairman of the Presidential Council. Links with
the Saudis Who had already paid some $50 million out of a promised $200
million were immediately severed. The Soviet Union quadrupled its aid
and sent crude oil for the refinery which the State had taken over from
British Petroleum in May 1977.

In October 1978 Abdul Fatah Ismail signed a Treaty of Friendship and
Co-operation with Soviet President Brezhnev foreseeing twenty years of
military and general co-operation between the two states. This was a mark
of great favour by the Soviet Union to its protege. Twenty years is longer
than the periods covered by similar treaties in Afghanistan and Ethiopia
and reflects the importance the Soviet Union attaches to the strategic
importance of PDRY. This was the summit of Abdul Fatah's achievement.
The strain of ten years' Marxist rule had cooled revolutionary ardour and
in April 1980 he was replaced by his Prime Minister Ali Nasser
Muhammad. Unlike his predecessors Abdul Fatah was allowed to retire
to Bulgaria.

Today there are signs that the PDRY is trying to mend its fences with
Oman and Saudi Arabia. A limited amount of 'free enterprise' is being
allowed and emigrants encouraged to return.

The departure of the British created a power vacuum. British aid which
had been running at about £12 million pre-independence was cut to £6
million of which over £3 million was paid. After the dismissal of the
Military Mission in 1968 Britain showed little concern for her former
possession. Western interests were ably represented by the Americans but
they received little encouragement from home, and in October 1969

diplomatic relations were severed altogether. Even if they had wished to.
the NLF had nowhere to turn but the Eastern Bloc. The Soviet Union
onsolidatcd its position after 1968. In 1972 the strength of the Army and
Militia was increased from 6,000 to 14,000 with Soviet aid and advisers
From then on the Soviet Fleet used Aden as its main base m the area and
was granted communication facilities on the island of Sooolra.

The apogee of their co-operation was in defence of the Marxist regime
in Ethiopia, which was assailed by neighbouring Somalia and riven by
internal rebellion. The Soviets launched a massive air bridge from Aden
which ensured the Ethiopian regime's survival. South Yemeni troops arc
said to have actively supported the Ethiopians in the field but this has
never been admitted. According to some, the Yemenis proved so
unreliable that thev had to be sent home— not for the first time.

As a matter of course the NLF support all radical groups, give them
sanctuarv and provide guerilla training. The infamous Carlos, members ot
the Baader-Meinhof, the Red Brigades, and especially extreme Palestinian
-roups, all passed through Aden. The NLF always maintained its links
with George Habbash so it came as no surprise when after Beirut lei to
the Israelis in 1982 the 1,000 commandos of the People s Front for the
Liberation of Palestine found sanctuary in the PDRY.

Western influence has not disappeared altogether. The Japanese run a
commercially very successful fishing concession alongside similar
Russian and South Yemeni projects. By 1977 the income from fish had
overtaken cotton and provided some 10% of the GNP The Japanese
provide aid, as do the Gulf States and the International Monetary Hind.
Britain remains a leading trading partner.

The achievement of the NLF is considerable. They snatched Powerfrorn
the British when most of the pressure had in fact come from FLO SY and
its sponsors. Furthermore they have held onto their power ever since They
have transformed a backward society and to an extent broken down tribal
divisions. The cost has been heavy. The country is amongst the poorest m
the world, most of the educated have fled, hundreds have died and untold
numbers are still imprisoned; the dream of a Marxist Utopia is fading fast.

A word must be said about Yemeni unity. By history, origin and
temperament, the Yemenis North and South deserve to become united m
one nation. However, despite the rhetoric and occasional declarations by
both governments proclaiming unity this is presently impossible if only
because of the difference between the two societies. In the past the two
have been under a single rule but rarely, and then it was always the
stronger North which has been able to impose its hegemony.

The years after independence held many ironies. Of the three parties
engaged-the NLF, the exiles, and the British-trie future prospects of he
NLF and the people they ruled were incomparably the worst. Many of the
NLF leaders who had won power from the British were killed, imprisoned
or exiled as the result of fratricidal strife. South Yemen became a land of
fear and poverty. The regime admitted in 1982 that between independence

222

and 1978 over a million Yemenis, nearly half the total population, had left
the country. *

The life of the former Rulers and their supporters, of the Adeni
intellectuals, of FLOSY and the myriad factions which make up the
Yemeni opposition in exile, is generally cosier.

Most of the Rulers are based in Saudi Arabia. Sultan Salih bin Hussain
al Audhali still holds court in a Jedda villa. The Naih Jaabil leads a
somewhat insubstantial Army of Liberation supported intermittently by
the Saudi and North Yemeni governments at 20 rivals per head per month.
The Sharif Hussain and his sons, lofty and disdainful to the end, live upon
a mountain in Taif.t The Amir Ghalib of Mukalla has taken up history as
a hobby. His brother Umar breeds horses and was married for some time
to a girl from Yorkshire. Ahmad Abdullah al Fadhli, now divorced from
the beautiful Karmila, is selling secondhand plant from Houston. His
forays into business being more successful than His Highness of Lahej who
left such matters to his wife with unfortunate results.

As a political force the Rulers count for little. When in power they would
not be persuaded that to maintain it opportunity had to be open to all. Now
in exile, relying on the crumbs of Saudi charity the disunity continues.
Some, the Baihanis, the Audhalis and Aulaqis still have influence with
their people, but this tends to be on a tribal rather than a national basis.

Those members of FLOSY slill active in politics congregate in Cairo. By
far the most successful is Abdullah al Asnag who was for several years
Foreign Minister of North Yemen. Muhammad Salim Basindwah followed
in his wake as a deputy minister. In 1980 Asnag was arrested and tried for
high treason. His apparent crime was to write a pencilled note to a friend
in which he described the President as insignificant (Ar. tafif). Sentenced
to death, this was commuted to ten years' imprisonment after many
representations by governments, including the British. He has since been
released to house arrest in Sana. Basindwah continues as adviser on the
affairs of the South but is out of favour. Abdul Qawi Mackawee is still
politically active and lives in Cairo where he teamed up with Muhammad
Ali Hailhem the former NLF Prime Minister. 'Grenadier' Khalifa prospers
and holds the prime job in Yemeni Airlines as their representative for the
Gulf and the Far East. Yemeni Airlines employs many Adenis including
Abdul Rahman Haideri as the Editor in Chief of its house magazine.

Husain Bayumi, Abdul Rahman Girgirah and Muhammad Hassan Ubali
have all died in Jedda. Bayumi's wife, Adilla, married a Swede and now
lives with her son in Taiz.

* MEED. 14.1. 83.

t The Sharif Qaid, however, has been estranged from his family and is allowed to live in A'
lending credence to the story that he was a supporter of the NLF and helped engineer
family's downfall.

223

Generally Yemenis inside and outside South Arabia are mystified by
British policy after 1964. How, they ask, could a Great Power expend much
effort and vast treasure to build up a base and promptly abandon it; a
countrv expert in the process of decolonising an empire leave a territory
for which it had been responsible for over 100 years to a government it
hardlv knew and which was hostile to its interests?

In 1964 the Labour government of Harold Wilson inherited their
predecessors' pro-Federal policy. Whilst in opposition members of the
Partv had given encouragement to the nationalists, especially the Aden
Trades Union Gongress. In truth the Party had paid scant attention to the
details of the problem. For their part the nationalists had nobody who
understood the nature of British politics. They had not mixed with British
intellectuals and had not received higher education in Britain. The Labour
Colonial Secretaries, Lord Longford and Anthony Greenwood had
expected to deal with a Nvererc or a Nkrumah, but instead were faced with
Mackawee and al Asnag. What little chance they had of dealing was
destroved by liming; by the time the British were ready to talk Asnag was
not in'a position to deliver. His power in Aden, considerable on paper,
had gone out of control and he was forced to try and win back support by
adopting even more extreme positions. In the end George Brown, finding
no socialists to talk to, was forced to go back to the policy of his
Conservative predecessors. By that time it was too late.

These were the days before the realism of Northern Ireland and the
explosion of oil prices. The Foreign Office, unnerved by memories of Suez
and anxious to shed the image of Imperialism, sought to appease wor d
opinion, especially in the Third World. They were embarrassed by South
Arabia The effect of these croakers was to tic the hands of the British forces
and their Federal allies. Consequently after the advent of the Labour
government no firm action was taken against insurgent bases across the
border The Federal government was given no opportunity to take matters
into its own hands and were sometimes actively prevented from doing so.
The rule of law was not upheld and legal means to prevent terrorism totally

'"The 0 British supporters of the Federal government also made their
contribution to the tragedy. Officers attached to the various Rulers, to the
Federal Army and the Police too often forgot whom they were supposed
to be serving, the interests of Britain or even of the Federal government,
and instead advanced the often conflicting interests of their princelings
and organisations.

Even to the end it was almost heresy to suggest the Federal forces were
engaged in acts of terrorism; whereas history and experience suggested
this was the area where these problems usually began. An NLF cell was
detected in the Armed Police in Crater as early as 1964 but no real attempt
made to follow this u p. The Aden Police were well known to be thoroughly
corrupt but it never occurred to their British officers that the fmancia
dealings of the men could have expanded into arms smuggling. Yet until

224

the British left, police vehicles passed through check points unsearched.

Those South Arabians who believed that the British government was
obsessed by the minutiae of their troubles must have been disappointed
by the published memoirs of the great men concerned, for judging by their
reminiscences, South Arabia and its problems could have occurred on
another planet.

Harold Wilson mentions giving lunch to 'the feudalist, almost pre-
biblical rulers of the South Arabian Federation'.* More significantly he
comments on the attitude of Duncan Sandys and the suggestion that his
government had broken British pledges to South Arabia. 'We had one
difficulty after another arising out of Mr Sandys's ministerial obsession
with Federation: Rhodesia was a problem deriving from the failure of the
Central African Federation, there had been the Malaysia break-up and now
there was the problem met in dealing with Ministers of more than one
country. "But Mr Sandys", they said, "had given us a pledge" that the
British Government would do this or that. The trouble was there was no
written record, note or minute, and we were more than once accused of
bad faith over an alleged Government pledge whose existence we could
neither confirm nor deny.'t This is misleading of the former Prime
Minister. In the case of South Arabia he only had to refer to the relevant
papers. The White Paper (Cmd 2414) issued after the 1964 Conference
states, 'The South Arabian delegates asked that Britain should agree to
independence for the Federation whilst continuing thereafter to assist in
its defence. They requested that as soon as practicable the British
Government should convene a conference for the purpose of fixing a date
for independence not later than 1968, and of considering a Defence
Agreement under which Britain would retain her military base in Aden
for the defence of the Federation and the fulfilment of her worldwide
responsibilities. The Secretary of State announced the agreement of the
British Government to this request.' This agreement was made by a
Conservative government according to several Federal Ministers and their
British advisors.* Harold Wilson, the Leader of the Opposition, met the
delegates after the 1964 Conference and assured them that if Labour won
in the coming election he would honour the agreement. No mention is
made of this in his The Labour Govemmczif 1 .964-1 970. A Personal Record.

George Brown, sometime Foreign Secretary, the man who promised to
reveal all,§ had clearly thought better of it when the time came to write
his memoirs. South Arabia gets an indirect mention through a tea party
and a round of clock golf which he gave to the unfortunate UN Mission.^

* The Lcibour Government 19fi4-19/0. page 128.
t The Labour Government ! 9G4-! 970, pase 232.

* Muhammad Farirl, Suloh bin Hussain. Donald Foster. Landscape with Arabs, page 159.
§ Sunday Times. 10 April 19G8,

r In My Way. page 158.

225

Richard Grossman's diaries, which give a candid insight into the
workings of the Labour Cabinet, mention South Arabia but briefly. Lord
Shackleton's appointment as resident Minister in Aden 'was a disaster as
he was a key figure in our reform group.'* For the entry of Friday 27
October George Brown started a discussion on Aden by apologising for
having to tell us that we'll be out in November instead of January. The rest
of the Committee couldn't be more pleased. Really we've been
miraculously lucky in Aden — cancelling all our obligations and gelling
out without a British soldier being killed (sic). But George feels desperate
because it's different from what he promised. 't

Of the last three High Commissioners, two have written their versions
of events. Sir Kennedy Trevaskis chronicles in detail the tribulations of
Federation until his replacement in 1964. Very different is Sir Humphrey
Trevelyan who stood by as all that his predecessors had striven for
crumbled away. Sir Humphrey was given a clear task to extract the British
from South Arabia with as little cost as possible. This he achieved despite
many difficulties. He was a man with a job to do. He may not have liked
it, and it was a curious end to a distinguished public career. It was his duty
and he did it. Outdated treaties and leaving behind a friendly government
were very much secondary considerations.

Sir Kennedy Trevaskis went into business and after some adventures
formed a partnership with Muhammad Farid and a Canadian oil company.
He is now rumoured to be a millionaire. Sir Humphrey Trevelyan went
back to the city, his directorships and to the House of Lords. Sir Richard
Turnbull hasn't written a book. After South Arabia he was never asked to
work again. The Socialists never forgave him for failing to achieve the
impossible, the Conservatives for trying. For the supporters of Federation
he was too liberal, and for those who believed that the answer lay in
accommodation with the Nationalists too tough. He has retired and lives
with quiet dignity in Ihe Scottish borders.

The last Commander in Chief of Middle Hast Command, Admiral Sir
Michael Le Fanu was appointed Chief of Imperial General Staff but,
tragically, ill health prevented him from taking up the post and he died
shortly afterwards. General Tower achieved a lifetime's ambition and
became Commandant of Sandhurst before retiring. Lt Colonel Colin
Mitchell failed in his campaign to preserve the Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders* as a separate entity, left the army, became a journalist, a
Conservative Member of Parliament, and now heads a management agency
in London. Colonel Richard Lawson, a staff officer with the Federal Army

* Crossman Diaries. Tuesday 11 April, page 341.
t Crossman Dion'es, 27 October 1 967, page 389.

t There was perhaps a darker side to the activities of the Argyll*. In January 1981 three soldiers
lrom the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were given life sentences for the killing of two
farmers during their service in Ulster. The convictions were obtained following disclosures by
a fellow soldier who was concerned that one of the men involved may have been the Yorkshire

(cont. on p. 2261

226

during the last days, leads the list of South Arabian veterans who have
succeeded. He is now Lt General Sir Richard Lawson, KCB DSO OBE, Nato
commander for North West Europe. Colonel George Coles still travels the
Middle East, now as an editor for an Arab trade magazine. Major Peter
Bartlett is export director for a company specialising in security aids.
Fusilier Storey left the army shortly after his adventures for a tough career
as a diver. When not working abroad he lives in Hull with his wife and
family.

Bill Heber Percy married King Hussain's secretary and worked for a time
as Development Secretary with the Sultans of Oman. He now farms on the
Welsh borders. Tony Ashworlh is another who has gone on to greater
things. British information chief in Hong Kong at the time of Vietnam he
is now personal adviser on information affairs to the Sultan of Oman and
divides his time between Muscat and Hong Kong.

Only in Palestine did the British leave a territory in such confusion. It
is too early to evaluate what harm, if any, was done to British and Western
interests by so abrupt a withdrawal. In any case the time had come for the
British to go and it would have been unwise to linger for long.

If the Federal government could have survived for a few more months
with the Egyptian withdrawal from North Yemen, it may have been
possible to establish a moderate pro-Western State. This would certainly
have been more benign than the para-Marxist regime which eventually
gained power. The biggest losers were the South Arabian people.

Kipper. His name has not been publicly revealed. During the investigation the informant also
gave details to the Army -Special Investigation Branch of alleged atrocities committed in Crater.
As far as can be ascertained no action was taken.

In the weeks following the trial the soldier, now discharged, approached the Glasgow Sunday
Moil who conducted a careful and comprehensive investigation. Scores of former soldiers were
interviewed and manv maintained that no impropriety look plane. Eventually a dozen men
signed sworn statements detailing robberv ami murder by officers and men. One soldier
admitted personally' shooting down five unarmed Arabs in different incidents. Several alleged
murder of men bv" morphine injections and shooting. Others claimed to be the distressed
witnesses to the brutal killing ol a teenager found in a cafe after curfew and hayonctted to death
on the orders of an officer. Road block duly, they claimed, was the opportunity for wholesale
theft. All this and more was published by the Sunday Marl in their editions of 26 April and 10
Mav 1981. In the davs follow ing publication the newspaper kept two telephone lines open tor
reaction from the public. A lot of calls were abusive but a significant number were from former
soldiers supporting the allegations, including some of those who had formerly denied them.

The dossier was sent to Ceorge Younger, then Secretary of State for Scotland and himself a
former Argvll. He passed it to the legal authorities for investigation. Then, after an interval of
22 months'the Crown Agent wrote to the Editor of the Sunday Mail on behalf of the Lord
Advocate: 'A full report has been submitted to the Lord Advocate who has decided that no
proceedings should be instituted. This investigation has taken a long time but as you will
appreciate there was difficulty in tracing some of the officers and men who were serving in
19B7 and who had since left the Arniv. The Lord Advocate instructed me to thank the Sunday
Mail for bringing the matter to his attention-' (Sunday Mail, 27 March 1983). The passage ol
time and the legal complications involved in prosecuting offences committed long ago in a
foreign land were also taken into consideration. . ,

Throughout the allegations there was no suggestion that the Commanding Oliicer, Lt Colonel
Colin Mitchell, knew of. or was involved in, any of the alleged atrocities and he steadfastly
refused to comment in public on the claims. , ..

The Argylls themselves asked for an enquiry. At the Regimental Headquarters in Stirling
Castle the'baltle honours and combat mementoes covering a long and proud history are
displayed; reference to Aden is much muled.

227

Were the British fortunate to get out with so little loss as Richard
Grossman suggests or did the withdrawal have a domino effect causing
British evacuation of the Gulf and the subsequent explosion in the oil
price? Does it matter that the Soviets are firmly entrenched on the Western
approaches to the Indian Ocean? They were equally well established in
Egvpt but left. Only time will tell.

Time is rapidly eradicating the memories of the British presence.
Outside Aden the country was hardly touched. On the road through
Radian the battalion signs remain cut into the rock but they are fading fast,
and the people remember with surprising affection the old times. Britons
are still welcome and a team organised by the Crown Agents is repairing
the old road to the Yemen.

In Aden the signs are more prominent, the port, the Prince of Wales Pier,
as it is still known, barracks and churches, and the old fortifications
persist. Yet the most permanent legacy is the widespread use of English
and the education of many of the Adenis who spread throughout the
Arabian Peninsula, particularly to North Yemen where they now provide
the infra-structure in government and commerce which is slowly bringing
that country into the modern world.

Postscript

In the winter of 1982 a traveller flew into Aden and discovered on arrival
that his baggage had been lost. Taking the limited compensation offered,
he set off to purchase some clothing. In all of Aden's markets, once the
most flourishing west of Singapore, nothing was to be found. Eventually
he found himself in a State Emporium where the only possibly suitable
goods on offer were a heap of serge suits, all the same size and cut,
produced for a figure both squat and portly by an unnamed factory of the
Eastern Bloc. .

On learning the nationality of his customer the assistant picked up a
pair of trousers as if for display, glanced around to make sure he wasn't
overheard and whispered behind the makeshift screen, 'It was so much
more comfortable when the British were here.'

Appendix
South Arabian Political Organisations

Free Yemenis Date /ormed: 1945

Plotted to reform North Yemen and behind the attempted coup of 1948. The leaders
were captured and executed but many of the survivors later played leading roles in
Yemeni and South Arabian politics. They used Aden as a base.
Leaders: Ibrahim Hnmid al Din, Abdullah al Wazir. Muhammad Ahmad Noman,
Muhammad Ali Luqman.

Muslim Association IJntefonned: 1946

Aden's first political party. Founded by a Pakistan lawyer; later merged with the
Aden Association.
Leaders: Pan Islamic

Aden Association Datc/ormed: 1 949

Aim: constitutional advance within the Commonwealth. Split and dissolved in
1957 over the issue of qat.

Leaders: Muhammad Ali Luqman, Hasan Bayumi, Muhammad Hasan Obali
South Arabian League (SAL) Dale/ormed: 1951

Aims: unity of South Arabia and the exclusion of foreign influence. Did not support
Yemeni unity, supported by Egvpt and later Saudi Arabia. Briefly joined OLOS.
Overwhelmed by FLOSY and NLF in the period before independence. Still in
existence in exile.

Leaders: Sultan Ali Abdul Karim ofLahej. the Jifri brothers, Shaikhan al Habshi.
Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) Dale/ormed: 1 954, Palestine

The Pan Arab Society of George Habbash from which the leaders of the NLF drew
inspiration.

United National Front (UNF) Date formed: 1954

Aims: unity of the Yemcns and all Arabia, and expulsion of foreign influence
combined with radical reform. Broke up in 1957.

Loaders- Shaikhan al Habshi (later with SAL), Aidrus al Hamid, Abdullah al ji/ri
(later with SAL), Abdullah al Asnag (later ATVC and FLOSY), Abdullah Badhib,
founder of the Yemeni Communist Party, in 1983 a leading figure in thegovernment
o/PDRY.

Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC) Date /ormed: 1 956

The organisation of labour, later the mouthpiece of radical nationalism. Initially
encouraged by the British TUC, it was later supported by Egypt, the Yemen and
many radical countries. Split up between NLF and FLOSY unions. Ceased to exist
after independence.

Loaders: Abdullah al Asnag, Ali Husain Qadhi, the brothers Asivadi.

229

United National Party (UNP) Dole formed: 1957

The PLO Federal Aden Party. The Federal government as such never had a political
partv This was a basic reason for its failure. Despite pressure from the British, the
Rule'rs could never commit themselves to such a radical conception.
Leaders: Hasan Btiyumi, Husain Bayurni, Abdul Rahman Girgirah.
People's Congress Daleformcd: 1958

Aim: independence for Aden. Faded on the approach of violence,
(.coder: Muhammad Ali Luqman.

Shaikhs of the South Date/ormed: 2960

Anti-Federal grouping formed by the Imam Ahmad out of dissidents living in the
Yemen. Dissolved in 1962.

Leaders: Amir Haidera, Muhammad Aidrus, Qohtan al Shaabi.

People's Socialist Party (PSP) Date/ormed: 1962

Political arm of the ATUC. Broke up in 1963.

Leaders: Abdullah al Asnug, Said Hasan Sohbi. Hadyu Isnnallah, Fuud Barahim,
Ashra/Khan.

Free Officers of the South Date/ormed: 1 963

Anti-ATUG'FSP nationalists who provided a forum for adherents of the Arab
Nationalist Movement and later the Aden wing of the NLF.
Leader: Abdul Malik Ismail.

National Liberation Front (NLK) Date/ormed: 1 963

Formed by K°ypl as a force to combat British and Federal interest. Quickly broke
away and turned to the far Left for the solution of social, political and economic
problems. Drew inspiration from several sources including Nasser, the ANM, the
Baath and Communist Parties. Victors in the Civil War, snatched power from the
British. The ruling party of South Yemen.

Leaders: Qahlan al Shaabi. Abdul Malik Ismail, Muhammad Ali llailhcm, Abdul
Fatah Ismail, Ali Abdulla Maiseri, Ali Snlim Rubaya.

Organisation forthe Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS) Date/ormed. 1 965
A shortlived combination of dissidents put together by al Asnag at the behest of the
Egyptians. Later merged with FLOSY.

Leaders: Abdullah al Asnug, Muhammad Aidrus, Ahmad bin Abdullah al Fudbli,
Jaabil bin Hussain.

Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY) Date formed : 1 966

Formed after the failure of OLOS and in attempt to gain co-operation between
various factions including the NLF. At sometime included all the major opponents
of Britain and the Federation. Losers of the Civil War between the factions members
did most to put political pressure upon the British and bring about the failure of
the Federal policy. After the disappearance of the Federal government many Rulers
and their supporters joined FLOSY.

Leaders: Abdullah al Asnug, Muhammod Salim Basindwah. Abdul Qawi
Mnckan-eo and many others.

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