Notes from Vietnam Study

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could we moUo°otf i ior arrangements with Hanoi t half wouTcf^heftP BS HH^^abo^l tfte col¬
lapse of the present GVN, but «wH permit a mutual withdrawal of/forces? .

4. Given the success of our current military strategies, do we need to
maintain current force levels (549,500 men in Vietnam) to continue present ef¬
fectiveness, or can we maintain comparable fighting capability at a lower troop

1evel?

'*T

5. Should we in any case firmly commit ourselves, accepting the attendant
risks, to a continuing withdrawal of U.S. forces over the next several years in
order to aofch reduce our own costs and to prod Saigon,into negotiating with the
aking the necessary steps to increase its own political and military

_

We hare said we would de whatever is needed.

I hare visited SVN te determine what is needed.
Mere US cembat treeps are needed.

Why are they needed, new?

Whe xilfccidiiqcxMatxjdotfc will they be fighting fer?
Whe will they be fighting?

What will they be fighting fer?

Overall requirements.

SPEECH POINTS

1. Oar aim and intention remains what it has been under three Presidents:
to preride whatever is necessary te assist South Vietnam in preserving
its freedem.

2. It is new inescapably clear that the current

and unfolding situatien makes necessary an enlargedcemmitment ef US combat treeps
te SVN.

3. President Jehnsen has alse pledged that "we would do only what is needed"

te achieve that aim. The added measures we shall be taking meet that test alse.
Neither the GVN ner the USG were willing te see US treeps cemmitted te cembat in
SVN till abselutely necessary; in the eyes ef beth governments, that time has ceme.
likely

4. The/altemative te the prempt deployment ef add US reinfercements weuld be
the grewing cenvictien by the DRV and VC, dBrxnjpcfckinyxummggy<±kak-~-and perhaps,
the armed ferces and public ef SVN—that ddm a victery by the Hanei-directed VC
bawed en armed ferce and terrerism was inevitable and near. The current
unwillingness ef the DRV te enter discussiens ef a negetiated settlement guaranteeing
the freedem and independence ef SVN weuld be confirmed and extended indefinitely
inte the future. The ultimate requirements fer achieving our aim would be even
larger?:. Indeed, ffaxlairmx^x±iwrire 1mxw»mfry±ha xfcw*t») rfc kTrKymin nBirryTgrre^wxir ymwwfrb

if the VC continue their present strategy, the outcome ef the military confrontation
this summer could be decisive te the erespects ef success.

5. It has been increasingly clear that the VC ferces had built up, by infiltration
and by forced draft in areas ef their control, to levels that weuld enable them

te held the initiative in offensive actions against the ARVN and te inflict
data k g u destructive losses on isolated ARVN units: if they were willing—as they
have rarely been willing in the past—te commit their regular treeps te battle and
te accept large casualties themselves. That is what the VC have new begun te do.

They have been attacking, in many cases, in regimental strength. In order te
inflict heavy losses en outnumbered ARVN units—ever 2000 ARVN k KIA in May and
June—the VC have been willing te suffer still knxxx greater losses themselves
at the hands ef the dsfismbcKX ARVN defenders and their US air support: ever 5000
VC KIA in these same two months. The hope that makes these looses acceptable
te the VC is clear: by inflicting piecemeal dmkeats tactical defeats en the ARVN,
they hope finally te bxgakxxtA-:effmwstrxxs 3 d^t>^andx>d±i break its offensive spirit
and will to fight. By the same means, and by increased terrerism both in the
countryside and in the cities, they hope te crack the confidence ef the SVN public
in the ability *f their government and armed ferces te meet the VC challenge.

The VC have chosen this as the summer ef dxKXsxnm decision, the time te achieve—
at whatever cost—a decisive shift in the balance ef morale between the non—

Communist majority ef the population and the armed, insurgent minority whose success
weuld impose, eventually. Communist dictatorship mpen SVN. They have made it,
inescapably, a summer ef decision fer the US. We shall net fail that test. We
shall net wishfully mmskparae put off recognizing that the demands upon us have gene

1. We hare said we would <1* what is needed in SVN te assist them in Maintaining
their independendence. (

2. Mere US troeps are new needed.

3. They are needed because: a. VC buildup.

b. VC menseen effensire: willingness te commit, aims.

c. Inability ef ARVN te stretch, er expand fast enough

4. Need is urgent; eutceme ef menseen cenfrentatien may ultimately be decisive
en morale; but need will remain fer seme time. Te ensure ability te meet

eur werldwide respensibilities and alliance commitments, need te call up reserves

and expand regular ferces.

5. This calls fer a significantly higher effert and higher sacrifice b the
American peeple. This is the tiwe te review why these efferts are justified:
hew eur aims in SVN are related te eur larger U.S. interests.

6. First, what is the nature of cenflict in which eur treeps will be
participating? Whe will they be defending, and whe will they be fighting?

What will they be fighting fer: in SVN, and in terms ef the larger interests ef
the US?

7. In SVN, they will helping te defend—alongside the 550,000 SVN

regular and paramilitary ferces and police—the great majority ef the peeple
ef SVN, whe are net Communist, whe do net want the Viet Ceng te win, who

do net want te be ruled like er by the Communist regime in the North.

—True ef the major religious greuns, the sects, the major factional
groups: the Buddhists, the Catholics, the sects , the students, the unions,
iA«xpaiitiKai the armed ferces;

—They would like the war te be ever: but net at the price ef a VC
victory, that would bring bring a model ef the Hanoi regime and eventually,
domination by the Lae Deng Party, the Communist party ef w erth Vietnam.

—They would like te see their country united, like the ether divided
countries ef the world: but net at the price ef...

—No government in Saigon has supported such a development.

No leader ef any major group has dene so.

No xxgxiaac figure ef any public er political significance—whether
sympathetic te er deeply critical ef the Saigon government—has joined the
VC. ShKx±Kzbsrsxm£xfchK<3im*Kadt±KdxNLRxa3K<XMKx

Sxsxxxaxt Even applies te many or most ef those in areas now dominated
by the VC; though in presence ef VC regular units, assassination squads and
guerrillas and a highly-organized system ef informers there is no km way fer
them te register their protest excent with their feet. 350,000 hage come out
ef these areas as refugees; and there has been no such movement ef villagers
te VC-deminated areas.

— fr/~~ <*vtV.

A whole range of US national Interests Involved In the Independence
of South Vietnam can be suggested by the various Conrounlst Interests In

overthrowing It. To begin with, the rulers of the Communist state of

c ~

North Vietnam wish to extend their

to the l4 million people of South
Vietnam; and eventually to the 5 million people of Laos and Cambodia. Tile

rulers of Communist China wish to see Thailand outflanked, subjected to
the same pressures of subversion, terrorism, infiltration and guerrilla war,
and added in turn to the Communist Bloc. They wish the same fate for the

, { . . . —a

neighboring nations of Southeast and South Asia. /And they wish. In theV' 0

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interests of increasing their prestige, influence and control In the

Communist Bloc and throughout the underdeveloped or vulnerable areas of

the world, to demonstrate the Invincibility of their tactics of

war; to undermine faith In the word, and the resolution, and the power of

*

the United States as a guarantor; to show up the caution of the Soviet
Union as ©f'even; to demoralize potential victims and to win the active

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support of the opportunists. It Is ♦'^fW^hatlonal Interest of the United
States to frustrate each one of these objectives, *

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QUICK FtttL WITHDRAWAL

This course involves U.S. public commitment and actions to withdraw
all U.S. forces from SVN in one year whether or not an agreement is reach¬
ed in Paris.

4*/rtfs r> J .■

Q Assumptions of -Proponents

1. The war is unwinnable.

a. No matter what statistics might indicate or official reporters feel,
our efforts cannot in the next five years or more get at the political prob¬
lems that are at the heart of this war.

b. We should, therefore, cut our losses while we can.

2. The Nixon Administration can successfully explain this course to the
American people and to other nations.

a. The American public will be receptive both because many are disenchanted
with the war and because U.S. domestic priorities require a quick full with-
d rawa1.

(1) Public opinion has responded favorably to every peace move and
every act of deescalation by the Johnson Administration.

b. Other nations will understand our actions because we can maintain
convincingly that we have met our commitments to our SVN ally by the invest¬
ment of 30,000 plus lives and the expenditure of $100 billion.

3. It is important to start the withdrawal process now and complete it quickly
because the longer the new Administration retains any forces, the more likely
it is to assume an open-ended commitment.

a-. It boils down to a choice of doing it now before the new Administra¬
tion assumes the obligations of the old

a. Because of logistical problems this could well take more
year, but we should aim hard at one.

V

2. We should immediately pull back our forces to base and embarkation areas.

3. U.S. turns over as much military equipment as GVN forces are able to use.

a. C(\f £VN forces could maintain their cohesion, this equipment would
be of significant value.’

C. Paris

)

1. U.S. tries to negotiate mutual withdrawals with possibility that Hanoi
might be willing to save our face since we would in fact be withdrawing.

2. U.S. maintains a strong declaratory policy against NVN aggression and
reaffirms U.S. interest in Asian nations willing to help themselves.

P GVN

1. Say that we have helped them directly as much as we can, and that we
will continue to provide economic and military assistance.

-a. We could keep small non-combat advisory group.

2. Apply no pressure for reforms and actions and be friendly toward what
GVN says it wants to do.

r Cost

1. Fastest and cheapest way to approach 1964 levels of Defense expenditures,
but still actual budgetary savings would take 1 to 2 years.

2. U.S. casualties go down to zero rapidly.

/ Consequences

1. Probable collapse of present SVN and communist takeover, but some possibility

of a non-communist coalition governme nt, j __ “

a. SVN countryside quickly taken over by VC.

2. Paris Talks become much less important and are unlikely to lead to a
negotiated settlement.

3. Initial concern on part of some Asian nations, but no domino process.

a. Laos would probably go communist quickly and Thais might hedge their
ties with us.

4. Would be attacked domestically for a pull out, but cannot predict depth
or dimensions.

IV. Negotiate Political Compromise

Seek to negotiate in Paris a compromise political settlement
that would make possible:

a) a withdrawal of U.S. and NVN troops from South Vietnam;

b) a policy of national reconciliation between all
political forces present in South Vietnam including
the NLF.

Beliefs of Advocates

1. There are sufficient elements of common interest among
all South Vietnamese to warrant the search for a formula of
political compromize that would create an independent, neutralist
state in the South supported by all its political forces.

2. There is sufficient interest among all Vietnamese, Communist
and non-Communist, in the South as well as in the North., t

IV/2

to continue negotiations as long as necessary without being
forced into unwanted concessions or a hasty settlement by the
impatience of the American people.

2. Continue reconnaissance operations and deployment of air
and naval forces which would give weight to the threat that
we will attack North Vietnam if they fail to make compromise
stick.

Paris Negotiations

1. Negotiate mutual withdrawal of forces with DRV, on the
basis of Article 29 of the Manila Declaration. >

2. Encourage direct discussions between the GVN and the NLF
concerning the terms of a political compromise (which would
involve amendment of Article 4 of the 1967 Constitution of the
Republic of Vietnam which prohibits Communism "in any form").

3. Offer suggestions for procedural safeguard^
freedom of political expression,

2. Threaten GVN with withdrawal of U.S. support (which
could immediately increase the likelihood of a coup against
the present team) or even with unilateral withdrawal from
South Vietnam, if it does not negotiate in good faith with
the NLF and obstructs our efforts to arrive at mutual with¬
drawal of U.S. and NVA forces from South Vietnam.

Cost

1. Decrease in financial cost over next twelve months depends
on how force levels and patterns of military operations are
adjusted.

2. Casualties may continue at current level (200 a week).

Consequences

1. Settlement may take more than 12-18 months, as progress
in Paris could be painfully slow.

2. Major issues to be solved invol>

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% policy of national reconciliation in the immediate

succeed eventual reintegration of the national community

can only take place dectawfcaaeii after the initial

victory of one side, followed in time by the growth of a new
spirit of mutual tolerance, <*-

IV. Negotiate Political Compromise

Seek to negotiate in Paris a compromise political settlement
that would make possible:

a) a withdrawal of U.S. and NVN troops from South Vietnam

b) a policy of ha ti on a l rer onrj1n a tion between all

political forces present in South Vietnam^ including
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Beliefs of Advocates

1. There are sufficient elements of common interest among
all South Vietnamese to warrant the search for a formula of
political compromise that would create an independent, neutralist
state in the South supported by ai-l its Apolitical forces.

2. There is sufficient interest among all Vietnamese, Communist
and non-Communist, in the South as well as in the North, to
secure the independence of their nation
prr^"inrrn J L ,.y\mri r i c n n, C . h i- n e ^e ^—Rt

zTe our leverage on GVN to induce rapidly a genuine policy

of accommodation with all non-Communist political forces in
South Vietnam, such as militant Buddhists, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai,
Montagnards in order to broaden support for the GVN in its
negotiations with the NLF. This policy of accommodation
should become visible immediately in a reshuffled cabinet

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which would include public figures who have the confidence of
the relevant political groups.

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and possibly after settlement, extended
economic assistance to the GVN, and eventually perhaps to a
South Vietnam organized on lines repugnant to American public

opinion.

3. Political compromise, even if successfully negotiated,
does not eliminate:

a) continued U.S. responsibility for maintaining political
arrangement negotiated through its active intervention;

b) ultimate Communist take-over.

plausible that a well-conceived plan will obtain the support
of all Vietnamese political forces.

Beliefs of Opponents

1. A policy of national reconciliation in the immediate
aftermath of a lengthy and violent civil war is not likely to
succeed and eventual reintegration of the national community
can only take place in such circumstances after the initial
victory of one side, followed in time by the growth of a new

i

spirit of mutual tolerance.

Military Activity in Support of Search for Compromise
1. Adjust force levels and pattern of military operations so
as to make it possible for the President of the United States

minorities, etc., and possibly American
assistance to international arrangements for such purposes.

Relations with GVN

1. Use our leverage on GVN to induce rapidly a genuine policy

of accommodation with all non-Communist political forces in

South Vietnam, such as militant Buddhists, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai,

Montagnards in order to broaden support for the GVN in its

negotiations with the NLF. This policy of accommodation

should become visible immediately in a reshuffled cabinet

%

which would include public figures who have the confidence of
the relevant political groups.

2. Threaten GVN with withdrawal of U.S. support (which

/L*-

tyfould immediately 4^er^3H»«--tfe«=likslihood- of a coup against
the present team) or even with unilateral withdrawal from
South Vietnam, if it does not negotiate in good faith with
the NLF and obstructs our efforts to arrive at mutual with¬
drawal of U.S. and NVA forces from South Vietnam.

CoSt>^^, 5

/^ ' ^ (1./^ecreas^in^fin^cial cost over-next- twelve months depends 1

on hm/^feh^l^Vels and patterns of military operations are,—

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f.. Casualties may continue at current level (200 a w e ek) ^

2

Consequences

IV / 2

to continue negotiations as long as necessary without being
forced into unwanted concessions or a hasty settlement by the
impatience of the American people.

2. Continue reconnaissance operations and deployment of air
and naval forces which would give weight to the threat that

iLes

we will attack North Vietnam if they fail to make^compromise
stick.

Paris Negotiations

1. Negotiate mutual withdrawal of forces with DRV, on the
basis of Article 29 of the Manila Declaration. >

2. Encourage direct discussions between the GVN and the NLF
concerning the terms of a political compromise (which would
involve amendment of Article 4 of the 1967 Constitution of the
Republic of Vietnam which prohibits Communism "in any form").

3. Offer suggestions for procedural safeguards concerning
freedom of political expression, elections, protection of the
rights of political minorities, etc., and possibly A merj
assistance to international arrangements fc

Relations with GVN

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Military Activity in Support of Search for Compromise
1• Adjust force levels and pattern of military operations so v

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