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NO. 442 


The following is the State Department's release 
of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's news conference, which 
is authorized for direct quotation: 

SECRETARY RUSK: Good morning, gentlemen. 

I have no opening statement. I am ready for your questions. 

Q Mr. Secretary, Chancellor Erhard has 
indicated the United States and Germany might consider 
forming the multilateral nuclear fleet by themselves if 
the other allies decide not to go along. Would the United 
States do this? 

A Well, this is a contingency that has not 
yet arisen. We and tile German Government agree that the 
multilateral force should be a force which has the participa¬ 
tion of a considerable number of NATO countries. As you 
know, there is a working group of eight nations that has 
been meeting in Paris to look into this matter. Our own 
target continues to be that that was stated in the joint 
communique of Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson 


in June of this year, in which they said that they were 
agreed that the proposed multilateral force would make a 

PH 442 

significant addition to this military and political 
strength--that is of NATO--and that efforts should be 
continued to ready an agreement for signature by the end 
of the year. 

Now we are at the end of the first week in 
October. That group in Paris is working continuously. 

We still have the purpose of going ahead with that force 
with the participation of a considerable number of NATO 
countries, and I am sure that that is the objective both 
in NATO and both—and in Bonn and in Washington. Therefore 
I think that these contingencies, alternative contingencies 
have not arisen, our purpose continues to be the same, and 
I am optimistic about the outcome. 

Q Mr. Secretary, while we are on the subject 
of NATO and nuclear weapons, Senator Goldwater says that 
the NATO Commander-in-Chief has some authority to use 
nuclear weapons. Is that correct? 

A Well, I am not going to embroider on what 
the President has said in his Seattle speech. This is a 
matter for the President and for the Secretary of Defense, 
and my task as Secretary of State is to keep this problem 
very much on the hypothetical list, because my purpose is 

to try to work out our relations with other countries to 
protect the vital interests of the United States without 
having that issue come to the front. But I have nothing 
to add whatever to what the President said in his Seattle 
speech on that subject. 

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been reports from 
Saigon, in fact even some whispering here in Washington, 
to the effect that the Administration is now considering 
some major turn in its policy toward South Viet-Nam but is 
holding any decision off until after the election. I 
wonder, sir, if you have any comment on this? 

A Yes. I should like to hit that one just 
as hard as I possibly can. South Viet-Nam is a major issue 
of war and peace. The question of whether Hanoi and Peiping 
will leave their southern neighbors alone is a major issue. 
This is not a matter which any President of the United 
States can deal with in electoral terms, and I can tell 
you--and I hope it is not an indiscretion--that the 
President has made it very clear to his own principal 
advisers that the decisions that are required with respect 
to South Viet-Nam have nothing to do with the American 
elections. No President can take such a view on such a 

so our 

pR ijij-2 

far-reaching and basic issue of war and peace. And 
policy is to do everything that we can to assist the 
Vietnamese to meet this problem. We can not with 
certainty predict the future, because there are those in 
Hanoi and Peiping who are helping to write the scenario 
on this problem, but we are deeply committed to the 
secuiity of Southeast Asia and to the security of South 
Viet-Nam. This has nothing to do with our electoral 
process here. We are not concealing anything or postponing 
or marking time or refusing to make the decisions that are 
required by that situation because there is an election 
going on in this country. No President could do that, 
Republican or Democrats. and there is just nothing in that 
kind of talk whatever. 

Q Mr. Secretary, sir, with the UN session 
due to open in November, the United States and the Soviet 
Union appear to be headed on a collision course over the 
matter of the peace-keeping assessments and loss of vote. 

Do you see any prospect for resolving this issue? And, 
secondly, if this issue is not resolved amicably, would 
you anticipate that it could be a blockade to other East- 
West adjustments? 


PR 442 

A Well, Mro Marder, first let me emphasize 
that this is not an issue between the Soviet Union and 
the United States. This is an issue between the Soviet 
Union and certain other countries who have not paid their 
assessments in accordance with the decisions of the General 
Assembly and all the rest of the United Nations. The 
attitude of the Soviet Union on this matter is somewhat 
like the troika proposals. Their attitude deeply affects 
the constitutional structure of the United Nations. Now, 
the ability to assess contributions is the only mandatory 
authority which the General Assembly possesses, and this is 
the only mandatory authority in which the great bulk of 
the United Nations membership participates. Every small 
country member of the United Nations has a stake in this 
constitutional issue in the United Nations itself, so the 
issue here is not a bilateral issue between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The question is whether the 
United Nations is going to continue on the basis of the 
charter, and Anticle 19 is very precise and specific on 
this point. 

So that we hope very much that some arrangement 
can be made by which this issue is removed. We are not asking 

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PR 442 

ior or looking for some disagreeable and bitter confronta¬ 
tion on this point. But we do recognize that this point 
is essential to the future integrity and structure of the 
United Nations, and that every member has a stake in it. 

Now we hope that somehow some arrangement can be made, 
some payments made, some solution found before the 
General Assembly opens in November. But we have no doubt 
whatever that there is involved here a basic constitutional 
issue for the United Nations as a whole. It is in no 
sense a bilateral issue between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. 

Q Well, sir, just to follow that up, on the 
second part of that question, while it is not essentially 
a bilateral issue between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, if in fact this issue is not agreed to in the 
United Nations, would the net effect of the disagreement 
be a general impediment to measures to reach further dimi: •• 
tion of tension between East and West. 

A Well, I think it is too soon yet to comment 
on that. You will recall that in the troika proposal 
when the Soviet Union found itself faced with the near 

PR 442 


unanimity of the entire United Nations, they found a way 
to modify their attitude. And I think that it is 

important for the overwhelming majority of the United 

■: - 

' . >. ■ • 

Nations to make it clear that on this issue, this basic 
constitutional issue, that some adjustment in the Soviet 
position will have to be found. 

I can't predict for you what will happen a month 
from now when the General Assembly opens, but of course 
this is an issue which will be there, unless it is solved 
before then--it will be there when the hammer falls for the 
opening of the General Assembly, because it will arise in 
connection with the first vote cast in the proceedings of 
the General Assembly. 

Q Mr. Secretary, some of the nonaligned coun¬ 
tries attending the Cairo conference suspect that it is the 
United States that is behind Mr. Tshombe's insistence upon 
being seated there. Would you care to comment on this, sir? 

A Well, the question—the precise answer to 
your question is that we are not behind anything in this 
particular situation. But we are quite a few thousand 
miles away in a situation that is changing from hour to 


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PR 442 

hour, and I would prefer not to comment on it any 
further. I think it is of some concern, some importance 
that in an international meeting delegates undertake to 
determine who shall represent governments invited to the 
meeting, because if that principle were followed very far 
it could go a very long way and give rise to a great many 
complications in the very structure of international 
But we are not involved in this particular 
episode and I think it is better for me not to say very 
much about it. 


PR 442 

Q Mr. Secretary, a moment ago in connection 
with this UN problem, you mentioned the--you used the words 
"arrangement" and "adjustment". Just to clarify your view 
would the United States support any solution that would be 
anything less than full compliance with the assessments 
and full payments? 

A No. I think there has to be an application 
and enforcement of Article 19 of the Charter. That is a 
basic attitude not only of our Government but of a great 
many others. 

Remember that the World Court decision on this 
subject was ratified, approved by a majority of something 
like I think 75 to, what was it, 15 or 17, in the General 
Assembly. And the World Court decided that these were 
proper assessments, they are part of the regular expenses 
of the organization, and that they were compulsory upon 
members. So that there is no question whatever about 
our view and the view of what we consider to be a very 
substantial majority of the United Nations on this point. 

Q Mr. Secretary, you have done a good deal of 
speaking within the country, I wonder if you could reflect 
upon that for a minute and tell us what parts of the 


PR 442 

Administration's foreign policy seem to puzzle or perplex 
people most as reflected in the questions that you get as 
you go around the country? 

A Well, I felt, as I have been around the 
country in the last three and a half years, that there 
continues to be a very broad public support for the main 
lines of the bipartisan policy of the United States in 
this post war period--support for the United Nations; 
support for our great alliances; support for foreign aid, 
although people would be glad to be relieved of that 
burden if it were possible to be relieved; support for 
trade expansion; for the Peace Corps; for the Alliance 
for Progress, and all these other great elements in our 
bipartisan policy. 

Now, it is true that we are carrying heavy 
burdens, but freedom has never been free and those burdens 
are necessary. And I have myself gotten the impression 
in my discussions with groups, both in public sessions 


and in private conversations that most of the American 
people understand the requirements of this present world 
situation. I have not myself encountered, shall I say, 
bitter partisan aspects on this matter. Although I'm 
sure that those with whom I have talked include supporters 

PR 442 

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of both principal candidates. But when you can sit down 
in a quiet conversation with people, I think you will find 
that reason normally prevails. 

I could illustrate that in another way, Mr. 
Frankel. I have attended now perhaps at,least 200 
executive sessions of Congressional committees to talk 
about difficult and complex and sometimes dangerous for¬ 
eign policy issues. Not once have the judgments of those 
committees divided along partisan lines, not once. 

Now, there have been differences of view because 
many of these problems involve on balance decisions, almost 
knife edge, hair-line decisions because they are compli¬ 
cated and difficult. But those differences of judgment 
have not followed partisan patterns in these executive 
sessions where you can talk out the full difficulty and the 
full agony of these situations. 

I don't really believe, despite the fact that 
we are in a very, shall we say, lively electoral campaign, 

I don't really believe that the principal issues in our 
relations with the rest of the world are partisan in 
character or accepted by the American people as being 
partisan in character. 

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PR 442 

Q Mr. Secretary? 

A Yes? 

Q Mr. William Miller, the gentleman against 
whom for one brief shining moment you were considered a 
possible opponent, has brought up the issue of the Cuban 
situation again, saying that our policy doesn't offer 
anything to the people in Cuba who want freedom there. 

I wonder if you could review whether you believe our 
policy there is bearing fruit? 

A Well, that invites a considerable essay, 
because the present Administration was not responsible 
for the prevention of a Communist Cuba. We were con¬ 
fronted with the problem of cure, and the cure is more dif¬ 
ficult than prevention. 

But we felt that it was very important to work 
in harmony with and in solidarity with the other members 
of this Hemisphere, that this should not be treated as 
solely a bilateral problem, partly because to the extent 
there was a problem .it was more of a problem for many of 
our neighbors than it was for the United States, given our 
power and given the solidarity and integrity of our own 
political institutions. 


PR 442 

We have been very much encouraged by the atti¬ 
tude of the rest of the Hemisphere toward this problem. 

Whereas in the Autumn of 1960 it was not possible for 
the Hemisphere even to refer to Cuba as the source 
of a threat, in the meetings of Foreign Ministers at 
Punta del Este in 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile 
crisis and at the end of July in Washington of this year, 
it was very clear that the Hemisphere has moved to the 
full recognition of the nature of this threat to the 
Hemisphere and has taken steps to deal with it and meet it. 

Now, I think it's very important that we move on 
an OAS basis and I believe that has been suggested also by 
some of the candidates on the other side. But that carries 
with it the obligation to consult with and act in soli¬ 
darity with the other members of the Hemisphere in all 
aspects of this problem. 

Now, in the most recent meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers, we applied what might probably be considered 
the remaining peaceful measures with respect to Cuba, to 
make it clear to Castro that his attempt to interfere 
in other countries of this Hemisphere must stop and must 
stop now. We hope very much,a 11 of us in the Hemisphere, that 


PR 442 

that message gets through, and is taken seriously, because 
it was a most serious step. 

As you know, 19 of the 20 members of the 
Hemisphere have broken relations with Castro. Trade has 
been broken between the Hemisphere and Castro, except in 
foodstuffs and medicines. Sea transportation has been 
interrupted except as required for humanitarian purposes. 
And other countries in other parts of the world have been 
asked by the Hemisphere to consider what steps they can 
take to express their solidarity with this Hemisphere in 
dealing with this problem. 

Now, if the Cuban Government continues with 
any program of interference with other countries in this 
Hemisphere, then I think we shall have a very serious sit¬ 
uation and we shall have to deal with it on a hemispheric 

Q Mr. Secretary, within the last week India 
has said,in light of some possibilities of Chinese nuclear 
explosion, that it can change its policy and start develop¬ 
ing nuclear weapons within a year or 18 months if they 
consider it necessary. What would the United States 

PR 442 


attitude be toward this development if India does decide 
it was necessary to change its policy? 

A Well, it is my impression that the Prime 
Minister and other officials in the Indian Government 
have indicated that their attitude moves in the other 
direction. It is true, as I think all of us know, that 
India has the capacity to move, and to move fairly promptly, 
into the nuclear weapons field. They have the necessary 
capacity in nuclear physics, they have the necessary in¬ 
dustrial plant. But they have indicated that they do not 
intend to go down this trail. 

We feel that India's decision to direct its 
exploitation of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes only 
is a great contribution to world peace and to the welfare 
of humanity, both in India and throughout the world. 

India's policy, which was restated by Prime Minister 
Shastri just yesterday, sharply contrasts with that of 
Communist China, 

You see, here's a country that is among those 
who could move in this direction and they have announced 
that they do not intend to move in this direction. And 



PR 442 

that!- is a course of restraint and moderation which looks 
toward the longer range possibilities of peace. You see 
it's not just a cpestion of whether one other nuclear 
power comes into being. The question is what happens if 
15, 20, 25 nuclear powers come into being. And it is 
important that all governments look at this as a very 
sober problem, as to how we deal with this Pandora's 
box that was opened some 20 years ago. 


PR 442 

Q Mr. Secretary, particularly in the light 
of the talks here this week with President Macapagal of 
the Philippines, would you assess or reassess for us how 
you see the situation between Indonesia and Malaysia; 
and, also whether you share the concern of the Philippine 
Government that they, too, may become a target for 

Indonesian infiltration, or interference of some sort? 

A Well, on the first point, it has been our 
hope all along that such issues as exist between Malaysia 
and Indonesia can be settled by peaceful processes. We 
joined with eight other members of the Security Council 
in expressing our very deep concern about the armed actions 
taken by Indonesia against Malaysia. 

We see no reason, looking at it objectively from 
a distance, as to why these two countries need to be in 
any sort of armed conflict with each other. We think it 
is very important that the normal processes of peaceful 
settlement be employed for whatever disputes exist, and 
that all parties act in accordance with the Charter. 

On the second part of your question, I point out 
that our own defense arrangements with the Philippines are 
very far-reaching, are without qualification, and that if 

-18- ■ PR 442 

there is an attack on the Philippines from any quarter, 

that is an attack on the United States. And I would think 

I 5.1 1 

that it would be very reckless, indeed, for anyone to suppose 
that there is any doubt whatever about our commitment to the 
security of the Philippines. 


Q Mr. Secretary, it has been several years 
since the neutralists or nonaligned leaders have gotten 
together, as they are,now in Cairo., Can you s»ay whether 

t ' s> *7* " • * 4 • v ‘ ' • . ’: 

you see any new trends in the direction of that movement, 
or any new tone in the content of the discussions that are 
going on now in Cairo? 

A Well, quite frankly, I haven't had very much 
information yet on just how those discussions are going. 

They have not yet made public pronouncements in a communique 
or in resolutions passed, at least that I am aware of. And, 
as you know, a certain episode involving the Congo has taken 
the newspaper play away from the other things that might 
be considered by that conference. 


So that, perhaps, if this press conference were 

’ • . • ' ’’ • 7' ' ' ' • ’ *T. ' 


being held tomorrow, I might be able to he more responsive 
to your question. But it is too early yet, I think, to say. 

As you know, President Johnson sent a message to 


PR 442 

the conference which outlines our attitude toward it. We 
hope they have a good meeting, and that they deal responsibly 
with some of the very large issues that are before the 
world community. 

We may get some indication from that meeting as 
to attitudes on questions that will undoubtedly come up before 
the next meeting of the General Assembly. But it is too 
soon yet for me to comment. 

Q Mr. Secretary, yesterday, Prime Minister 
Shastri proposed that a delegation be sent to China to try 
to dissuade the Peking Government from detonating some kind 
of nuclear device. I wonder, sir, if it would be the posi¬ 
tion of the U. S. Government to support this kind of general 
approach to the Chinese, to dissuade them? 

A Well, this is a nonaligned conference. And it 

is not for me to get in the way of a nonaligned conference 
by expressing a view on this matter. 

But I do recall that almost all of the members of 
this conference now meeting in Cairo have, in times past, 
expressed their very great interest in the elimination of 
nuclear testing, and, particularly, nuclear testing in the 
atmosphere. This has been made clear at the United Nations. 

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PR 442 

Their spokesmen at the Geneva Disarmament Conference made 
this clear. I think all of them who were there, or 
practically all of them who were there, have signed the 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 

So I would suppose that the prospect of the 
resumption of atmospheric testing would be a matter of 
deep concern to them. How they would deal with it is for them 
to judge. 

Yes, sir. 

Q Mr. Secretary, going back to an earlier 
question on Viet-Nam, and forgetting the election date for 
a minute: do you foresee a shift in the Administration 
policy towards a deeper involvement in the political, mili¬ 
tary, and economic situation there; of course, assuming that 
President; Johnson is reelected? 

A Well, it is not for me to try to predict 
the future. 

As I say, on a day by day, and week by week basis, 
we make the necessary decisions in consultation with the 
South Vietnamese Government that we feel are required by 
the situation. 

But, since there are others who are writing the 

21 - 

PK 442 

scenario for the future, I don't want to undertake to be 
a prophet here* X do want to make it very clear, however, 
that we are not going to pull away from our commitments to 
the security of Southeast Asia, and specifically South 

Q Mr 0 Secretary, you have seen General 
Phoumi Nosovan this week., I wonder if you could tell us 
your evaluation of the situation in Laos, after the Paris Con¬ 
ference and what is going on there now? 

A Well, we regretted that the talks, which 
have been going on in Paris, have not thus far shown any 
determination on the part of the other side to comply with the 
Geneva Accords of 1962. As you know, deputies remain in 
Paris, and there is a possibility of additional contacts; 
and some of the principals are now back in Laos, and they 
might have contacts the re. 

But our policy continues to be in support of the 
Geneva Accords of 1962. It is our very deep conviction 
that if all the foreigners would leave the Laotians alone, 
they would work out their own affairs without violence, 
and there would be no threat to any of their neighbors. 

We see no reason why, if there is a modicum of good will 


PR M2 

on the other side, that we could not pick up the 1962 
Accords and bring about the full implementation of those 
Accords, because the underlying policy of those Accords 
must leave the Laotians alone so that they oould work out 
their own affairs in their own way. 


Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

A Thank you.