Shooting The Front Allied Aerial Reconnaissance And Photographic Interpretation On The Western Front — WW I ( 2007)

Colonel Terrence J. Finnegan,
USAF Reserve (Retired)

Shooting

the Front

Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and
Photographic Interpretation
on the Western Front —

World War I

with a foreword by General George A. Joulwan
Former Supreme Allied Commander ; Europe

CHAPTER 1

AUGUST TO LATE 1914:

THE EVOLUTION OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER

Aerial Reconnaissance at the
Commencement of the War

Aeronautical reconnaissance from the first
five months of war clearly demonstrated the ac-
ceptance of aerial observation as an integral part
of modern warfare. Both sides made significant
advances through reconnaissance, thanks to the
array of uniquely designed aeroplanes that pro-
vided the battlefield commander with a view
from the “higher ground.” The opening weeks
of combat established patterns that became the
foundation for one of the most important roles
of aviation in the 20th century. Information be-
came an integral part of aeronautics. Observation
became both science and art as aeroplanes ma-
neuvered with ground forces, contributing data
to commanders that helped reveal enemy inten-
tions. The ability to detect the movement of forces
meant that whatever was on the ground was now
accessible to reconnaissance. These lessons were
quickly learned by aviators and commanders
alike. Confidence in the aeronautical arm was es-
tablished. However, the initial salvos of the first
months of combat also demonstrated the need for
technology to reinforce aerial observation.

The roots of aerial reconnaissance for mili-
tary purposes go back to the 18th century. Then
the French demonstrated that a balloon was be-
yond novelty and could support military objec-
tives. With each trial the aerial proponent discov-
ered that an aeronautical advantage correlated to
a combat advantage. The powers of Europe had

the resources to leverage aeronautics for their
standing militaries. Pioneer British aerial histo-
rian Sir Walter Raleigh observed in 1922, “The
pride of Germany was in her airships, and the
pride of France was in her aeroplanes.” 1 Britain
dabbled with both, albeit not to the extent of be-
ing competitive. It was preoccupied with the na-
val race against Germany. However, it was not
blind to the advances achieved through military
aviation. British assessments in 1911 concern-
ing French aviation acknowledged it equated
to national power projection. As Raleigh stated,
“There is no doubt at all but that the Germans
have suddenly realized that the French Army
since the general employment of aeroplanes with
troops has improved its fighting efficiency by at
least twenty per cent.” 2

Early aerial reconnaissance introduced a
unique technology. Fragile prewar aerial plat-
forms were incapable of sustaining meaningful
sorties of long duration. Yet the opportunity to
alert infantry and artillery to the advancing en-
emy provided the impetus to integrate aviation
within the standing forces. The French were
keen on this idea: “The aeronautic mission was

1 Sir Walter A. Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the
Air, Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by
the Royal Air Force (6 vols., Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1922-37; reprint, London: The Imperial War Museum, and
Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1998), I, 75. Raleigh
authored the first volume and Jones the others. Hereafter
cited as Raleigh for references to vol. 1, and as Jones for
vols. 2-6 and Appendices.

2 Raleigh, 1, 177-178.

SHOOTING THE FRONT • 7

FIGURE 2. Capitaine Saconney,the
French Aviation Militaire's visionary for
aerial observation platforms. Source:
SHAA, photo contained in Charles Chris-
tienne and Pierre Lissarague, A History of
French Military Aviation (Washington, DC:
Smithsonian Institute Press, 1 986).

initially fixed, strategic reconnaissance against
a rapidly advancing enemy.” 3 Aerial photogra-
phy at this moment was an experiment, con-
sidered by many in the military to be another
minor novelty of technology. However, pho-
tography was a well-established part of the cul-

ture of the day and was soon recognized as a
medium that could contribute to the conduct of
a campaign. Advances in aeronautics over the
fifty years since the American Civil War had
demonstrated observation roles for lighter-than-
air balloons and the later-designed dirigibles.
In France, the means to capture the aeronauti-
cal dimension for military purposes was accom-
plished through ongoing experimentation with
man-carrying kites for observation.

During this vibrant period of experimenta-
tion, the roots of aerial photographic reconnais-
sance took hold. Public awareness of aviation’s
potential for acquiring information was demon-
strated in unique ways prior to powered flight.
Innovative aerial platforms for photography
went beyond balloon units. In 1896, the public
was entertained by the potential of aerial photog-
raphy through publications describing successful
coverage from parakites and pigeons armed with
miniature cameras. 4 Throughout the latter half
of the 19th century, photography and aerial plat-
forms proved their military usefulness. As early
as the late 1860s, the Prussian General Staff or-
ganized a corps trained in photographic meth-
ods to conduct aerial military surveys, aiding its
planning for military operations in the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870. 5 Campaigns were employ-
ing aerial platforms to commence initial plan-
ning. Innovations experienced by balloonists in
the U.S. Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War of
1870, and the Spanish- American War confirmed
the utility of balloon-hosted aerial observation
and photography.

Experimentation blossomed as existing tech-
nologies were applied to aviation. In 1906, a
British inventor, Samuel Franklin Cody, built a
man-carrying kite that was accepted by the Brit-
ish Army. A year later, Cody built the first Brit-
ish-designed aeroplane, which was subsequently
identified as Army Aeroplane No. I. 6 In 1910
Robert Loraine, in a Bristol aeroplane fitted with
a transmitting apparatus, succeeded in sending

3 “Aeronautics,” June 1921, 1, Part XXXVE, sec. 3, in
American Mission with the Commanding General, Allied
Forces of Occupation, Mainz, Germany, “A Study of the
Organization of the French Army Showing its Development
as a Result of the Lessons of the World War and Comprising
Notes on Equipment and Tactical Doctrine Developed in the
French Army, 1914-1921,” NARA, RG 120, Box 819.

4 Gilbert T. Woglom, Parakites (New York: G. P. Putnam’s
Sons, 1896), 41-44.

5 James W. Bagley, The Use of the Panoramic Camera in
Topographic Surveying (Washington, DC: GPO, 1917), 12.

6 Roy C. Nesbit, Eyes of the RAF: A History of Photo-
Reconnaissance (Phoenix Mill, UK: Alan Sutton Publishing,
Ltd., 1996), 9.

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

8 • SHOOTING THE FRONT

radio messages from a distance of a quarter of
a mile. 7 The French Aerial Photographic Ser-
vice conducted research in both aerial photog-
raphy and restitution (analysis of photographic
images applied to developing and enhancing in-
formation on a map) under the command of Cap-
itaine Jacques Saconney. 8 French military trials
in February 1910 used man-bearing kites to sup-
port artillery observation and attempt aerial pho-
tography. Saconney developed and employed a
man-bearing kite to an altitude of 560 meters.
The three-kite configuration allowed various pas-
sengers to both observe and photograph the area.
Despite the apparent risk, Capitaine Saconney’s
commander General Joly went aloft in the kite. 9

Aeroplane reconnaissance quickly ceased
being a concept and became reality. The com-
mand staff of the French Armee, the Grand
Quartier General (GQG), supported aviation’s
role in several instances. They put the idea into
practice, demonstrating aerial reconnaissance for
military purposes on 18 September 1911. During
a military exercise, Capitaine Eteve and Capit-
aine Pichot-Duclas flew a 42-kilometer track in
a Maurice Farman north from Verdun to Etraye
and west to Romagne at an altitude of 1,000 me-
ters, providing in-depth observations of activ-
ity. 10 The next year, four Bleriot Type XI aero-
planes deployed to Morocco, providing aerial
reconnaissance for the French Armee. These air-
craft were not just a novelty; they were now part
of the operational scheme. 11 At the same time,
the French reinforced their traditional forces by
establishing a Bleriot Cavalry (BLC) unit with
three Bleriot aeroplanes. 12

7 Wireless and radio were interchangeable terms. Radio
will be the primary term used in this book. Raleigh, I, 170.

8 “Lecture on Aerial Photography, Centre d’ Etudes de
l’Aeronautique,” 25 April 1923, NASM A30.2/36.

9 Rapport du Capitaine du Genie Saconney , au Sujet
des Experiences de Cerfs-Volants Ejfectuees avec Nacelle
Lestree a bout de Cable , 21 February 1910, SHAA;
Marcellin Hodeir, “La Photographie Aerienne: ‘de la Mame
a la Somme,’ 1914-1916,” Revue Historique desArmees ,
No. 2 (1996): 108 (translation by Commandant Marc
Riviere, French Air Force).

10 Manoeuvres du 6* me Corps d’ Armee, Flight Log, 18
September 1911, SHAA.

11 James J. Davilla and Arthur M. Soltan, French Aircraft
of the First World War (Stratford, CT: Flying Machines
Press, 1997), 55.

12 Davilla and Soltan, 1.

FIGURE 3. General Joly observes
a 1 91 0 French military exercise from a
Saconney-designed kite. Source: SHAA,
B76.224.

However, despite the progress through ex-
perimentation, aviation’s potential was not fully
understood. While attending an air race in east-
ern France in 1910, General Ferdinand Foch
commented, “Flying, you must understand is
merely a sport, like any other; from the mili-
tary point of view it has no value whatever.” 13
His attitude was echoed by another future se-
nior commander of the coming conflict, General
Sir Douglas Haig. Haig spent his career in the
cavalry, and as “the Apostle of Cavalry,” he ex-
pressed his bias in 1911 on the technology that
was being introduced. “Tell Sykes [Colonel F.H.
Sykes, soon to become the first British chief of

13 Foch, quoted in Georges Blond, The Marne (trans.,
London: Macdonald and Company, 1965), 163.

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

SHOOTING THE FRONT • 9

staff for aviation] he is wasting his time, flying
can never be of any use to the Army.” 14 As the
war proceeded, both became recognized advo-
cates of aviation’s potential.

Though critics were wary, influential propo-
nents saw potential value, and aviation became
more legitimized. On 19 March 1912, Aviation
Militaire was recognized by the GQG as an in-
tegral part of the French armee. 15 Ten days later,
French Aviation Militaire units were formed
under Colonel Hirshauer, comprising an aerial
force strength of five escadrilles. 16 The British
also commenced structuring their aeronautical
force. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) was con-
stituted by a Royal Warrant on 13 April 19 12. 17
In 1913 the French Aviation Militaire was placed
under the command of French Corps d’ Armee
(CA) commanders, or local administrators, to
diminish the authority of the permanent inspec-
tor for aviation. Military maneuvers that year
showed reconnaissance information from Avia-
tion Militaire was extremely useful. On 4 April
1914, Aviation Militaire became a separate de-
partment of the Ministry of War, making it an
independent French military service. 18 Army
sponsorship for aviation also occurred within
the U.S. Army Signal Corps. This arrangement
existed until the U.S. Air Service was created as
a separate entity in 1918.

14 Maurice Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters , 1914-
1918 (London: William Blackwood & Sons, Ltd., 1968),
306.

15 “Report on Aeronautical Matters in Foreign Countries
for 1913,” 16, TNA, PRO: AIR 1/7/6/98/20.

16 Davilla and Soltan, 1.

17 Raleigh, I, 199.

18 Davilla and Soltan, 1-2.

FIGURE 4. Prior to the war, French avi-
ation actively exercised aerial reconnais-
sance in military operations and exercises.
A Bleriot pilot is in the process of debrief-
ing the reconnaissance to an intelligence
officer. Source: Claude Grahame-White, The
Aeroplane in War (London:T. Werner Laurie,
191 2), 192.

The French and British militaries both devel-
oped coherent aviation organizational structures.
The French promoted homogeneity of aircraft
types for the various escadrilles to save on main-
tenance while promoting a diverse collection of
craft primarily used in observation and reconnais-
sance missions. Along with infrastructure came
development of a specific air doctrine for obser-
vation and reconnaissance missions. By 1913
Aviation Militaire comprised eight companies for
aerostat (ballon/dirigeable) work and ten sections
for aviation work. 19 British aviation worked with
both resources. RFC squadrons comprised a mix
of aeroplanes, while the Royal Navy deployed a
dirigible fleet for naval missions. 20

Military staffs also started to refine the
routing of information from their aeronautical
sources. French officers were encouraged to be-
come familiar with aviation and its reconnais-
sance potential. Staff officers were expected to
make passenger flights, and some were even de-
tached for a period as observers. Absolute famil-
iarity with the maneuvers and formations of all
arms was considered essential. The French also
realized early on the potential for having aero-
planes observe artillery fire. A British intelli-
gence estimate described the process:

Two white lines are marked on the
ground to show the observer where
the battery is in position. The aero-
plane ascends behind the battery and
rises to a height sufficient to be clear of

19 “Report on Aeronautical Matters,” 12, TNA, PRO: AIR
1/7/6/98/20.

20 Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarague, A History
of French Military Aviation (Washington, DC: Smithsonian
Institution Press), 59.

10 • SHOOTING THE FRONT

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

the trajectory of the shells. The battery
commander then fires his bracket. The
observer is provided with a sheet of pa-
per across which two parallel lines are
drawn indicating the two extremities of
the bracket. Having observed the first
rounds he marks on the paper the po-
sition of the rounds with reference to
the space between the two lines repre-
senting the extremities of the bracket.

He then drops the paper near the bat-
tery commander's position . 21

In another maneuver, a suitable landing
place for the dropped information was selected
by marking it with a large white sheet. A party of
two non-commissioned officers and eight troop-
ers were permanently on duty so as to be ready
to take messages to the proper quarter. 22 Addi-
tionally, the French started realigning their com-
mand centers to areas where aeroplanes operated.
Messengers were stationed at designated land-
ing zones to transfer reports to the various units.
Over time the landing zones became the rendez-
vous point for military commanders to dissemi-
nate their own information. 23

The French proceeded to develop an aerial
camera, commencing development under strict
conditions of secrecy. 24 An aerial camera was
developed by the French Telephotography Lab-
oratory prior to the outbreak of the conflict. 25
By August 1914 the laboratoire des recher-
ches aeronautique (Aeronautical Research Cen-
ter) at Chalais-Meudon had three wood-frame
prototype cameras for aerostat observation.
They employed 100 cm, 60 cm, and 50 cm fo-
cal lengths. However, despite the progress, the
laboratory encountered a lack of interest as their
cameras were demonstrated to artillery staffs. 26
By the time the French mobilized for war, they

21 “Report on Aeronautical Matters,” 16, TNA, PRO: AIR
1/7/6/98/20.

22 “Report on Aeronautical Matters,” 16, TNA, PRO: AIR
1/7/6/98/20.

23 “Report on Aeronautical Matters,” 16, TNA, PRO: AIR
1/7/6/98/20.

24 Raleigh, 1, 177-178.

25 Raleigh, 1, 170.

26 Gaston Labussiere, “La Photographie Aerienne,”
in Maurice de Brunoff, ed., 1914-1918: L’ Aeronautique
pendant la Guerre Mondiale (Paris: M. de Brunoff, 1919),
183 (translation provided by Commandant Marc Riviere).

had established three photographic sections to
work with the aerostat units. The Paris section
was led by Capitaine Georges Bellenger (chef
d’ avion VP me Armee). He was an artillery officer
whose aviation career had an auspicious begin-
ning. He served as advisor to a leading French
parliamentarian, Senator Reymond, on aeronau-
tical matters. 27 Bellenger became the catalyst for
creating the aerial observer’s role in the upcom-
ing first weeks of the war. The Verdun sector was
led by Lieutenant Maurice Marie Eugene Grout,
another French artillery officer by training who
proved to be the most successful transformer for
the French military’s adaptation of aerial photog-
raphy. 28 Lieutenant Grout was a brilliant and ex-
tremely hard-working staff officer. Educated at
France’s elite Ecole Poly technique, he was a key
member of the staff at Chalais Meudon, devel-
oping aerial telegraphy and photography before
the war started. 29 The third photographic section
supported the eastern French region headquarters
at Toul. 30

The British did not strongly emphasize aerial
photography prior to the war, although they did
experiment with balloons during the Boer War in
South Africa at the turn of the century. However,
their attempts to combine aerial photography
and aeroplanes remained experimental well into
the first months of the war. In the first year of its
existence, the RFC dabbled with taking photo-
graphs from the air (airships, balloons, and kites)
at Farnborough using the “Panros” (Pan-Ross)
hand-held camera and showing the results at the
Annual Exhibition of the Royal Photographic So-
ciety. Before the outbreak of the war, an exhibi-
tion at Farnborough featured “Photographs from
Aeroplanes.” 31 The Pan Ross was a press camera
with a 6-inch lens using 5 -inch and 4-inch glass
plates. 32 Interest in aerial photography generated
a call for volunteers to join the Military Wing of

27 John H. Morrow, Jr., The Great War in the Air: Military
Aviation from 1909 to 1921 (Washington, DC, and London:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993), 34.

28 Hodeir, 108.

19 Lieut Maurice Marie Eugene Grout, Personnel Records,
SHAA.

30 Hodeir, 108.

31 Original spelling of the Pan Ross was Panros. Lieut
Charles W. Gamble, “The Technical Aspects of British
Aerial Photography during the War 1914-1918,” TNA,

PRO: AIR 1/2397/267/7; Raleigh, I, 250.

32 Nesbit, 11.

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

SHOOTING THE FRONT • 11

the RFC. One volunteer was Frederick Charles
Victor Laws. He transferred from the 3rd Battal-
ion of the Coldstream Guards and became a First
Class Mechanic Air Photographer. Laws im-
proved the photographic laboratory at the Farn-
borough test grounds shortly after his arrival. He
subsequently was promoted to sergeant and be-
came the RFC’s first noncommissioned officer
in charge of photography. 33 Laws made RFC his-
tory by serving as aerial photographer using the
first British-designed aerial camera, the Watson
Air Camera. In 1913, Laws flew on a dirigible
and took aerial photographs of the Basingstoke
Canal. It was an auspicious start. Laws became
the leader of many British initiatives in develop-
ing aerial photography for the remainder of his
military career. 34

RFC No. 1 Squadron became the initial aero-
plane unit to explore aerial photography. In 1913,
the British transferred all dirigibles from the RFC
to the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS). No. 1

33 Nesbit, 10.

34 Nesbit, 11.

12 • SHOOTING THE FRONT

FIGURE 5. CapitaineBellengeivan
early French aviation pioneer, directed
the French Armee photographic section
for the Paris sector at the outbreak of
the war. Source: SHAA, B84.3023.

Squadron served as an “Aircraft Park” to experi-
ment on new aerial capabilities. 35 While assigned
to No. 1 Squadron, Laws proved the capability
for developing a photograph in-flight. In early
1914, RFC No. 3 Squadron took the lead in de-
veloping British aerial photography. The officers
purchased their own cameras and commenced to
learn the art of photography on their own. They
even learned Laws’ technique for developing
negatives in the air and had them ready for print-
ing upon landing. On their own initiative they

35 The Royal Naval Air Service was the naval counterpart
of the RFC until the RAF was established in 1918; Nesbit,
11 .

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

photographed the defense of the Isle of Wight
and the Solent at an altitude of 5,000 feet. 36

In June 1914, Sergeant Laws flew as aerial
observer in a Henri Farman (HF 7, “Longhorn”)
with the Watson Air Camera mounted on the nose.
The sortie ended when the engine motor cut off
and the plane crashed. Not to be dissuaded, two
days later Laws took off as observer in a Maurice
Farman (MF 11, “Shorthorn”) and photographed
a military review and parade in progress. What
caught Laws’ attention as the photographs were
developed was the difference in light reflection
on the adjoining grass from personnel walking
through the area. It gave reason to further explore
the potential that aerial photographic interpreta-
tion could offer. 37 Despite the amazing effort un-
derway, the prevailing attitude among military
circles was mixed: “If that young fool likes to
get himself killed, let him do so.” 38 With each
demonstration of aerial photography, “those who
came to scoff remained to pray.” 39

French armees and aviation assets com-
menced mobilization when the war started. “At
the time of mobilization military aeronautics was
still in its earliest infancy. We may say it was as
the fighting went on that this science was evolved
and developed.” 40 French aeronautic units were
governed under Plan XVII (14 February 1914)
comprising both aerostation and aviation. 41 The
French aviation section now comprised 21 flights
of six aeroplanes. Two BLC flights of four aero-
planes were added at the start of the war. The
mainstay Bleriot XI was capable of flying for
two hours at 1,500 feet, providing a mobile aer-
ial platform that maneuvered over the country-
side and acquired vital glimpses of enemy forces.
Immediately after mobilization, new flights were
created from aeroplanes delivered or salvaged
behind the lines. Aviation personnel numbered
about 3,500, including 480 officers and non-

36 Raleigh, I, 250.

37 Nesbit, 13.

38 Unknown source quoted in Gamble, “Technical
Aspects of British Aerial Photography,” TNA, PRO: AIR
1/2397/267/7.

39 Unknown source quoted in Gamble, “Technical
Aspects of British Aerial Photography,” TNA, PRO: AIR
1/2397/267/7.

40 “Aeronautics,” June 1921, NARA, RG 120, Box 819, 1.

41 Christienne and Lissarague, 59.

commissioned officers. 42 Increased awareness of
the value of “higher ground” reporting resulted
in a support element to convey critical informa-
tion. Each escadrille had a “fast car” and a mo-
torcyclist assigned to rapidly disseminate air-
borne-acquired reports to the respective ground
commander. 43

French intelligence, known as the 2 e Bureau,
actively monitored the advancing German forces
with all the resources at its disposal. The fledgling
radio intercept function was effective in view of
the capabilities of the time. Established in 1909,
the French radio intercept specialists were rec-
ognized as experts in this field. 2 hme Bureau also
conducted cryptological analysis that served the
highest levels of the government. 44 The French
had committed their intercept service in full,
even before the beginning of the war, and were
following German Army traffic attentively. After
a few days, they had a perfectly clear picture of
the operational structure of the German Army in
the west as it marched through Belgium in the di-
rection of Paris. 45

The Commencement of Combat

French aviation was put to the test as bat-
tle commenced. Each armee included a flight of
aeroplanes. Order of battle for Aviation Militaire
comprised P me Armee (six escadrilles), lP me Ar-
mee (four escadrilles), IIP me Armee (four esca-
drilles), YV hme Armee (two escadrilles), W me Ar-
mee (five escadrilles), and two BLC escadrilles. 46
When the war commenced, the French used their
aeroplanes for daytime reconnaissance and di-
rigible fleet for nighttime observation. The first
French wartime reconnaissance mission was ac-
complished by a Maurice Farman (MF) 7 from
escadrille MF 2. 47

Like the French Aviation Militaire, the Brit-
ish Military Wing prior to the commencement of

42 Christienne and Lissarague, 58.

43 Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services: From the
Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War (New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 1995), 56.

44 Porch, 56.

45 Wilhelm F. Flicke, War Secrets in the Ether , ed. by
Sheila Carlisle (2 vols., Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park
Press, 1977), I, 23.

46 Davilla and Soltan, 3.

47 Davilla and Soltan, 219.

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

SHOOTING THE FRONT • 13

the war was designed for aerial reconnaissance,
with the squadron assuming the role of the basic
British aviation unit. 48 Five squadrons had been
established prior to the war. On 31 July 1914,
total operational aircraft from RFC Squadrons
No. 2, 3, and 4 numbered 22 BE 2a, five Bleriot
XI monoplanes, and six Henri Farman F.20. An
additional 24 aeroplanes were to be added prior
to deployment to France. 49 It was indicative of
the way aviation evolved between the French
and British that a common airframe was used in
the first years of the war. Both Bleriot XI and
HF 20/F.20 were flown by French and British
pilots. Of the two, Bleriot XI was a more rec-
ognized airframe due to the worldwide public-
ity gained from the first crossing of the English
Channel in 1909. However, as an observation
platform, the Bleriot design was not ideal. The
broad wings were a viewing obstacle to observ-
ers. 50 The British had yet to adopt homogeneous
airframe types for each squadron. It was not yet
practical due to the embryonic condition of the
British aircraft industry at the time. However,
despite the diversity of aeroplanes that compli-
cated ground maintenance, squadron operations
were effectively maintained. Sorties did not in-
clude formation flying. The standard procedure
called for each aeroplane to act independently. 51

The German adversary was no stranger to the
potential of aerial reconnaissance. This resource
had strong advocates within the senior headquar-
ters, the German High Command (Oberste Heere-
sleitung [OHL]). During the first month of com-
bat, successful aerial reconnaissance gave the
German armies an advantage in their initial oper-
ations on the Eastern Front. Each active German
corps and headquarters (8th Army) was assigned
a six-plane Feld Flieger Abteilung, comprised
of a composite of monoplanes (Tauben) and bi-
planes to provide timely information to German
battlefield commanders. Priority for the mission
and command of the two-seater aeroplane went to
the observer, not the pilot. The Germans also em-

48 Raleigh, I, 260.

49 J. M. Bruce, The Aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps
(Military Wing) (London: Putnam, 1982), xvi.

50 Paul-Louis Weiller, “The French Aviation of
Recognition,” in de Brunoff, 63 (translation provided by
Commandant Marc Riviere).

51 John Terraine, Mons: The Retreat to Victory (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1960), 31.

ployed Zeppelin craft for longer-range strategic
reconnaissance. 52 German aerial reconnaissance
gained favor in the war’s first major battle at Tan-
nenberg in eastern Poland. The OHL was person-
ally briefed by Flieger Abteilung crewmembers
as the Russians commenced the attack. German
reconnaissance provided locations of maneuver-
ing Russian units and aided planning for appro-
priate countermoves. 53 Intelligence information
proved critical in this first major battle of the
war. Success came to the Germans when they in-
tercepted Russian radio transmissions containing
exact force disposition and locations. Aerial re-
connaissance had reinforced German command
decisions, but not as decisively as the radio inter-
cept. Tannenberg became the first battle in history
where interception of enemy radio traffic played
the decisive role. 54 Intercepts included Russian
operational orders and, more significantly, the or-
ganization and destination of the Russian Second
Army. The Russian maneuvers were successfully
countered. 55 Modern intelligence technology had
validated itself on the battlefield.

During the first days of combat on the West-
ern Front, the Germans employed dirigibles for
aerial reconnaissance and bombardment. Their
first aerial bombardment sortie targeted Liege
on 6 August 1914. During this sortie, a dirigi-
ble was hit by cannon and returned to the Ger-
man base with damage. Another dirigible was
hit over Alsace while on a reconnaissance mis-
sion. A third, dirigible ZVIII, was shot down by
French artillery. 56

On 13 August, the RFC under Brigadier-
General Sir David Henderson deployed to
France. The first unit to make the crossing was
No. 2 Squadron, with the first aeroplane depart-
ing early that morning and arriving at Amiens
approximately two hours later. The departure of

52 Dennis E. Showalter, Tannenberg: Clash of Empires
(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1991), 152-153.

53 W. M. Lamberton, comp., Reconnaissance & Bomber
Aircraft of the 1914-1918 War, ed. by E. F. Cheesman
(Letchworth, UK: Harleyford Publications, Ltd., and Los
Angeles, CA: Aero Publishers, Inc., 1962), 9.

54 Flicke, I, 3.

55 Flicke, I, 6-7.

56 Christienne and Lissarague, 61; Andre-H. Carlier, La
Photo graphie Aerienne pendant la Guerre (Paris: Libraire
Delagrave, 1921), 16 (translation provided by Commandant
Marc Riviere).

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

14 • SHOOTING THE FRONT

other RFC aeroplanes that day was not so for-
tunate. Several aircraft of No. 4 Squadron were
damaged while following their leader in a forced
landing on a plowed field. 57 The following RFC
squadrons and aeroplanes that flew to France on
13-15 August 1914 were: No. 2 Squadron, 12 BE
2a’s; No. 3 Squadron, 6 Bleriot XFs, a Bleriot
Parasol, 4 F.20s; No. 4 Squadron, 6 Bleriot XFs,
a Bleriot Parasol, 4 F.20s; No. 4 Squadron, 11
BE 2a’s; No. 5 Squadron, 4 F.20s, and 3 Avro
504s. 58 Those were the aeroplanes that arrived;
others were lost on the way. Two days later, a
British pilot met an unusual welcoming com-
mittee while landing near Boulogne-la-Grasse.
Lieut. R.M. Vaughan of No. 5 Squadron was ar-
rested by the French and held in prison for nearly
a week while local officials tried to determine his
true nationality and purpose. Lieut. Vaughan was
able to rejoin his squadron on the eve of the Bat-
tle of Mons. 59

These the were the state-of-the-art aero-
planes of the time. The BE 2a had a maximum
speed of 65 mph at 6,500 feet. It took approx-
imately 35 minutes for the aeroplane to reach
7,000 feet. 60 Aerial observation commenced at a
speed that fit available airframe and motor tech-
nology. Despite Sergeant-Major Laws’ success-
ful demonstration of aerial photography, the RFC
did not employ his talents when the British Expe-
ditionary Force (BEF) arrived in France. Instead,
Laws was assigned to an antiaircraft unit as an
aeroplane spotter and identifier. 61

Initial RFC attempts to commence aerial re-
connaissance operations against the Germans
were precluded by weather. The heat of summer
brought thunderstorms, mists, and haze. Flight
logs described these conditions as “unsuitable
for reconnaissance.” 62 Aerial reconnaissance op-

57 Henderson was a career intelligence officer who was a
recognized authority on reconnaissance. His work, The Art
of Reconnaissance, provided vision to the use of aeroplanes
in a reconnaissance role; Terraine, 3 1 .

58 Bruce, Aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps (Military
Wing), xvi.

59 Boulogne-la-Grasse is located southeast of Amiens;
original text says only Boulogne; Terraine, 31.

60 Bruce, Aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps (Military
Wing), 353.

61 Nesbit, 14.

62 Lyn Macdonald, 1914: The Days of Hope (New York:
Atheneum, 1987), 74.

FIGURE 6. The first RFC aerial recon-
naissance in wartime was flown by Cap-
tain Philip Joubert de la Ferte. Source:
Bleriot No. 260 Netheravon, 1913 (Crown
Copyright reserved). Sir Philip Joubert de
la Ferte, Air Chief Marshal, The Fated Sky, An
Autobiography (London: Hutchinson & Co.,
1952), 33.

erations got underway on 19 August with the first
RFC aerial reconnaissance flight flown by Cap-
tain Philip Joubert de la Ferte, No. 3 Squadron,
and Lieutenant G.W. Mapplebeck from No. 4
Squadron. Joubert de la Ferte flew a Bleriot XI-
2 (without observer) while Mapplebeck took off
in a BE 2a from Maubeuge (south of Mons) that
morning. Mapplebeck flew to the north while
Joubert de la Ferte was ordered to inspect the
Belgian country west of Brussels and report on
any evidence of enemy troops. Shortly after take-
off, the pilots struggled with cloudy weather and
a general unfamiliarity with the region, resulting
in their getting lost. Both considered it “rather
bad form to come down and ask people the way,”
but discretion was soon applied. 63 Joubert de la
Ferte recalled:

I wandered round Western Belgium
for some time and then seeing a large
town over which the Belgian flag
seemed to be flying. I landed on the pa-
rade ground. I discovered that this was
Tournai, still in Belgian hands, and I was
given a most excellent lunch by the
commandant of the garrison. Leaving

63 Bruce, Aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps (Military
Wing), 131-132; Terraine, 61-62.

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

SHOOTING THE FRONT • 15

an hour later, I lost myself again very
quickly. Finally I recognized the Bruges
Ship Canal, flew south from there, and
landed near Courtrai. Here my recep-
tion was not at all cordial. The local po-
lice threatened to put me in jail. I was
saved by the kindness of a little North
of Ireland linen manufacturer, who was
visiting Courtrai, where there are a lot
of spinning mills. He placed a Union
Jack on my aircraft, and the tone imme-
diately improved. I got what I wanted,
which was petrol, and the directions
how to find my way back to Maubeuge,
and flew off very thankfully, completed
my reconnaissance, and landed back at
Maubeuge at 5.30. 64

As for Lieutenant Mapplebeck in the BE 2a,
he flew over Brussels itself without recognizing
it. The result of both reconnaissance missions was
negative. Joubert de la Ferte and Mapplebeck re-
ported with assurance on where the Germans
were not, but had nothing to say about where
they were. 65 The time had come for aerial observ-
ers to be included on reconnaissance sorties. 66
Mapplebeck’ s aerial legacy included a narrow
escape. While conducting aerial reconnaissance
over German lines near Lille, he experienced en-
gine problems, landed, and two German soldiers
literally grabbed one of the wings. Mapplebeck
escaped into Lille wearing peasant clothing that
he found on the way. He found a French busi-
nessman who cashed a London cheque that pro-
vided him with French notes bearing a German
stamp. Mapplebeck proceeded to buy a new suit
and walked from Lille through Belgium to the
Dutch border. He obtained passage to London
and reported in at Farnborough. The Air Minis-
try provided him with a new aeroplane to fly to
France. When he showed up at the squadron in
France, Mapplebeck reported for duty “just as
though nothing unusual had happened.” 67

64 Capt. Philip Joubert de la Ferte quoted in Terraine,
61-62.

65 Terraine, 61-62.

66 Nesbit, 16.

67 Account related by J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon to Frederic
Coleman, quoted in Frederic Coleman, With Cavalry in
1915: The British Trooper in the Trench Line (Toronto:
Wilbam Briggs, 1916), 130-132.

That same day, the French committed their
dirigeable (dirigible balloon) forces to reconnais-
sance missions. The French dirigeable Fleurus
became the first Allied airship to fly over Ger-
many by successfully flying over the Saar and
Treves while on a night reconnaissance sortie. 68
The irony of early French dirigeable experience
was they suffered more from friendly fire than
from German antiaircraft artillery. Two dirige-
ables were damaged. One French dirigeable,
the Dupuy de Lome, suffered casualties (the pi-
lot was killed) as well as being shot up fairly se-
verely while heading toward the French city of
Rheims. Following these mishaps, the French
delayed dirigeable operations until April 19 15. 69
For the remainder of the war, French dirigeables
played a secondary role serving the armee. They
were eventually discontinued from serving ar-
mee objectives in 1916 and were eventually
transferred to the navy. 70

On 20 August British cavalry were on the
move in Belgium. They pushed forward as far
as Binche (16 kilometers east of Mons) with-
out encountering the enemy. At the same time,
RFC aerial reconnaissance was ordered to find
the German Army, pinpoint its position, and esti-
mate its strength. The RFC discovered elements
of the German Army heading through Louvain
(approximately 25 kilometers southeast of Brus-
sels). Aerial observation estimates of strength
proved too difficult since German Army columns
went beyond the visual horizon. That day the
German Army moved into Brussels. The main
echelon was heading toward France. 71 On the
morning of 21 August, aerial reconnaissance was
incapable of operating due to ground mist. Re-
connoitering squadrons and patrols were pushed
out toward Soignies and Nivelles in southern

68 Christienne and Lissarague, 62.

69 Christienne and Lissarague, 63.

70 Christienne and Lissarague, 64.

71 Macdonald, 1914, 75; Raleigh, I, 298-300; Constance
Babington-Smith, Air Spy: The Story of Photo Intelligence
in World War II (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957),

9; Brig-Gen Sir J.E. Edmonds (general editor), Military
Operations: France and Belgium , 1914, 3 rd ed. (2 vols.,
London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1922-25; reprint, London:
The Imperial War Museum and Nashville, TN: The Battery
Press, 1996), I, 50. Hereafter, titles in this series, 1914-1918,
will be referred to as Edmonds, followed by the war year;
see bibliography for complete citations for each title.

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

16 • SHOOTING THE FRONT

FIGURE 7. German Advance on Paris
22-23 August 191 4. Source: The West Point
Atlas of American Wars. Vol. 2, 1 900- 1 953. Ed.
Vincent J. Esposito (2 Vols., New York Fred-
erick A. Praeger, 1 959), map 6. Courtesy, De-
partment of History, U.S. Military Academy.

Belgium. 72 Once the weather cleared, RFC re-
connaissance commenced and quickly acquired
significant observations of German cavalry and
artillery maneuvering southeast of Nivelles. 73

Aerial activity assumed a more dynamic role
as the armies came in contact. On 22 August Brit-
ish cavalry engaged the Germans for the first time
near Soignies. 74 That day the RFC flew twelve
reconnaissance sorties from Maubeuge, France
(on the French-Belgian border, 15 kilometers
south of Mons), reporting on extensive German
maneuvers and the presence of large masses of
troops. One critical RFC reconnaissance revealed
a long German column estimated at army corps
strength marching along the road from Brussels

72 Field-Marshal Viscount French of Ypres, 1914 (London:
Constable and Company, Ltd., and Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1919), 47.

73 Edmonds, 1914, 1, 52.

74 Terraine, 77-78.

due west to Ninove. Upon reaching the town, the
German forces turned southwest to Grammont.
RFC aerial reconnaissance reported that the Ger-
man infantry was in close support of the advanc-
ing German cavalry heading south. 75 Soon the
German Army’s maneuver brought it outside the
British left flank. This critical issue was person-
ally brought to the attention of the British Com-
mander-in-Chief Field-Marshal Sir John French
by the RFC commander, Brigadier-General Hen-
derson. French was initially skeptical until he re-
ceived further verification from his French coun-
terparts. 76 The first losses from aerial combat then
occurred. An Avro 504 from No. 5 Squadron was
shot down while performing aerial observation.
The downed aeroplane provided the Germans
with their first positive confirmation that British
forces were now engaging them. 77 The signifi-
cance of the occasion was recalled by German
commander General Alexander von Kluck, ob-
serving that a British reconnaissance aeroplane
from Maubeuge was shot down. 78 Aerial com-
bat now commenced in earnest. One RFC pilot,

75 Edmonds, 1914, 1, 63; Baring, 22.

76 Terraine, 77-78.

77 Brace, Aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps (Military
Wing), 112.

78 Gen Alexander von Kluck, The March on Paris and the
Battle of the Marne 1914 (trans., London: Edward Arnold,
1920), 40.

SHOOTING THE FRONT • 17

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

Lieutenant Louis A. Strange, fitted a Lewis gun
on his F.20 and took off in pursuit of a German
aircraft discovered in the area. However, it was
to no avail since the German simply out-climbed
the Farman. 79 Additional opportunities for the
first aerial combat occurred when two British BE
2a’s armed with Lewis guns chased an Albatros
biplane for 45 minutes. 80

The German Advance on Paris

With the campaign now under way, the ben-
efits of aerial observation were beginning to take
hold among senior commanders. In his post-war
reminiscence, Field-Marshal French described
his view of aerial reconnaissance during the Ger-
man advance on Mons:

The opening phases of the Battle of
Mons did not commence until the
morning of Saturday, 22 August. The
intelligence reports which constantly
arrived, with the results of cavalry
and aircraft reconnaissance, only con-
firmed the previous appreciation of
the situation, and left no doubt as to
the direction of the German advance;
but nothing came to hand which led
us to foresee the crushing superiority
of strength which actually confronted
us on Sunday, 23 August. This was our
first practical experience in the use of
aircraft for reconnaissance purposes. It
cannot be said that in these early days
ofthefighting the cavalry entirely aban-
doned that role. On the contrary they
furnished me with much useful infor-
mation. The number of our aeroplanes
was then limited and their power of ob-
servation were not as developed or ac-
curate as they afterward became. Nev-
ertheless, they kept close touch with
the enemy, and their reports proved of
the greatest value. Whilst at this time,
as I have said, aircraft did not altogether
replace cavalry as regards the gaining
and collection of information, yet, by

79 Lieut. Strange flew a French-designed, British-built
aeroplane called the Henry Farman F.20; Bruce, Aeroplanes
of the Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing), 233.

80 Raleigh, I, 327-328.

working together as they did, the two
arms gained much more accurate and
voluminous knowledge of the situa-
tion. It was, indeed, the timely warning
they gave which chiefly enabled me to
make speedy dispositions to avert dan-
ger and disaster. There can be no doubt
indeed that, even then, the presence
and cooperation of aircraft saved the
very frequent use of small cavalry pa-
trols and detached supports. This en-
abled the latter arm to save horse-flesh
and concentrate their power more on
actual combat and fighting, and to
this is greatly due the marked success
which attended the operations of the
cavalry during the Battle of Mons and
the subsequent retreat. 81

French was a career cavalryman. However,
his follow-on comments reflect the special sig-
nificance of military intelligence transformation:
“At the time I am writing, however, it would ap-
pear that the duty of collecting information and
maintaining touch with an enemy in the field will
in future fall entirely upon the air service, which
will set the cavalry free for different but equally
important work.” 82

With the Germans pressing in on Mons,
the need for more information on their ad-
vance became critical. On 23 August 1914 the
RFC launched 12 reconnaissance sorties with
key sightings of enemy activity and reports of
heavy rifle fire. One RFC pilot had been airborne
by half past four that morning and was hover-
ing over the German right flank by first light.
He was back at the landing ground with his re-
port by breakfast time. It was not a settling ex-
perience, for the RFC was on the move, trav-
eling south in a fleet of lorries to set up a new
headquarters near Mons (Casteau). Aerial obser-
vation did not operate from airfields as under-
stood in today’s terms. Aeroplanes and support
were totally mobile, operating from any suitable
area, known as the “landing ground.” It was well
past ten a.m. before the day’s vital information
reached General Fergusson, Commander of the
BEF 5th Division. RFC observers were now see-

81 Field-Marshal French, 43-44.

82 Field-Marshal French, 44.

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

18 • SHOOTING THE FRONT

FIGURE 8. Aircraft recognition
proved challenging for both sides in the
first days of the war; resulting in inci-
dents of friendly fire. A Maurice Farman
(MF) 1 1 is observed flying low over in-
fantry. Source: SHAA, photo contained in
Christienne and Lissarague, A History of
French Military Aviation

ing thousands of Germans moving southwest on
the Belgian plain. Some twenty miles to the north
of Casteau, long columns of troops were passing
through Lessines and veering westward. To the
west another large force snaked over ten miles
of road between Ath and Leuze-en Hainaut. The
Germans were now a few hours march away
from Mons. Over Elouges and Quievrain on the
Belgian-French border, RFC fliers saw signs of
more immediate danger. An entire German army
corps was there, split into four echelons like the
prongs of a fork and massing for an advance. Ma-
neuvering around smoke from burning villages,
the observers sighted entire batteries of German
guns moving up to cover the immediate attack.
German forces were at the same time digging in
along the Mons-Valenciennes railway and road,
covering the high ground to the north. 83

The RFC observers drafted their in-flight re-
ports on enemy movements and forwarded infor-
mation to commanders immediately upon land-
ing. Confusion reigned as the battle heated up.
Captain Joubert de la Ferte recalled, “We were
rather sorry they [the British soldiers arriving
on scene] had come because up till that moment
we had only been fired on by the French when-
ever we flew. Now we were fired on by French
and English. To this day I can remember the roar
of musketry that greeted two of our machines
as they left the aerodrome and crossed the main
Maubeuge-Mons road, along which a British col-
umn was proceeding.” 84

Aeroplane recognition posed a significant
challenge for the early aviator. Infantry on both
sides were not accustomed to aeroplanes and

83 Macdonald, 1914 , 118-119.

84 Raleigh, I, 288-289; Terraine, 31-32.

their role. The priority for establishing and as-
signing distinguishing marks of nationality be-
came a necessity to safely operate at lower alti-
tudes. “Union Jacks have been put on the under
surfaces of the lower planes. They are not large
enough and larger ones are necessary. The French
have a blue spot, surrounded at an interval, by
a red ring. The Germans have a black cross on
some of their machines.” 85 Confusion over iden-
tity eventually led to the British adopting the
French- style roundel with a blue outer circle and
red spot.

That afternoon of 23 August, the RFC made
further reconnaissance toward Charleroi (about
40 kilometers south of Brussels) and ascertained
that at least two German army corps (Guard Corps
and the Guard Cavalry Division) were attacking
the French V® me Armee on the line of the Sambre.
When the observers returned in the evening, they
presented grave news that the French center had
been driven back. 86 Field-Marshal French learned
in the evening when he returned to his headquar-
ters that the French armees on the left flank were
pulling back. Since the BEF was still advancing,
this news, coupled with further ominous reports

85 W. S. Douglas, “Notes on Equipment of Units of
RFC with BEF,” 27 September 1914, TNA, PRO: AIR
1/836/204/5/268.

86 Edmonds, 1914, 1, 66.

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

SHOOTING THE FRONT • 19

from the RFC that German movements were put-
ting his forces at risk, made it clear to French that
the BEF must fall back as well. 87

The next day, a German column the size of a
corps was observed moving due west on the Brus-
sels-Ninove road. It proved to be General von
Kluck’s Second Corps. Armed with this critical
information, the British senior staff was able to
map an accurate picture of the German advance. 88
That evening French met with his staff to discuss
the intelligence and determine courses of action.
The battle map showed the British Army’s posi-
tion in relation to the advancing Germans. RFC
aerial reconnaissance began to tell the story that
the German commander, General von Kluck, was
preparing to envelop British forces. The value of
aerial observation proved itself to senior staff. The
information gleaned enabled the British forces to
keep ahead of the German maneuver and avoid
a catastrophic situation. Decisions were quickly
made. The British now commenced the famous
“retreat” from Mons and headed south. 89

Aerial observation leading up to the retreat
from Mons exemplified a dysfunctional recon-
naissance routine. Lyn Macdonald described an
aerial operation in flux:

For the past week the Flying Corps, like
the Army, had been moving gypsy-
like round France sleeping wherever
chance had led them, in barns, in cha-
teaux, in lorries, under hedgerows,
even occasionally in hotels. Every day
they had spent many hours in the air
searching for the enemy and half as
long again searching to find their own
base, for there was no guarantee that
the makeshift airfield the patrols had
left would still be in the same place
when they returned. Standing orders
were not much help — Fly approxi-
mately twenty miles south and search
for aircraft on the ground . 90

87 Terraine, 124-125.

88 Raleigh, I, 301-302.

89 Raleigh, I, 304, 314; Babington-Smith, 9.

90 Macdonald, 1914, 244.

20 • SHOOTING THE FRONT

Despite the confusion, the RFC was demon-
strating its potential. On 25 August Major Hu-
bert D. Harvey-Kelly and two other pilots from
No. 2 Squadron forced a Rumpler Taube to land
near Le Cateau. 91 Two RFC pilots from No. 5
Squadron demonstrated aviation’s liaison role
with the British command in a harrowing con-
frontation with German forces. In an effort to
deliver a critical message to General Haig, they
“landed between the firing lines in a field pro-
tected by a rise in the ground from the direct fire
of the enemy. With the aid of a cavalry patrol
they succeeded in delivering their message to
General Sir Douglas Haig, after which they re-
turned to their machine, started up the engine,
and flew away in the presence of two Uhlans,
who had just ridden into the field.” The quick-
ening pace of battle created a greater challenge
for successful communication within the British
Corps. Every possible means of liaison, includ-
ing the creation of new links with aviation as-
sets, was being put to a critical test. 92

On Friday, 28 August, du General Comman-
dant en Chef les Armees, General Joseph Jacques
Cesaire Joffre, asked French to undertake air re-
connaissance on the western flank of the Allied
forces covering French territory. 93 RFC aerial
reconnaissance during the day showed German
columns sweeping southward over the Somme
between Ham and Peronne, coming down on
the French VP me Armee and between the Oise
and Somme west of Guise. Aerial observation
reported several sightings of devastation as the
Germans continued south. 94 Meanwhile, the Ger-
man commander, General Alexander von Kluck,
continued to employ his own aerial reconnais-
sance near Albert-Doullens-Amiens, but his pi-
lots were unsuccessful in locating the retreating
British forces. 95

While the Germans were advancing on Paris,
the most pressing question on the minds of Al-
lied commanders was in what direction the Ger-

91 M. L. Skelton, “Major H. D. Harvey-Kelly,
Commanding Officer, No. 19 Squadron,” The Journal of the
Society of World War I Aero Historians 16, No. 4 (Winter
1975): 365.

92 Terraine, 150.

93 Field-Marshal French, 9 1 .

94 Edmonds, 1914, 1, 241.

95 Von Kluck, 73.

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

FIGURE 9. Battle of Le Cateau and Battle of Guise, 26-29 August 191 4. Source: West Point
Atlas, map 8. Courtesy, Department of History, U.S. Military Academy.

man forces were heading. Unbeknownst to them,
General von Kluck deviated from the original
strategy of advancing directly on Paris and de-
cided to go after the retreating Allied armies. Von
Kluck’ s solution was to annihilate the French
armies in the field without enveloping Paris. 96
Von Kluck was convinced that he had crushed
the BEF and considered the time opportune to
crush the French on the flanks away from Paris. 97
On the evening of 30 August, a message from
the overall German commander, General Karl
von Bulow, ordered von Kluck’s maneuver to
help von Btilow “gain the full advantage of vic-
tory” over the retreating French V 5mc Armee. Von
Billow’s request complemented von Kluck’s per-
spective and the decision was made to move to

96 Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York:
Ballantine, 1962), 443-444.

97 Michael S. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War: A Global
History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005),
26.

the southeast toward Noyon and Compiegne. 98
The next day RFC aerial observation began to
see signs of the maneuver. Despite the constant
flux of RFC operations as a result of continued
mobility, RFC sorties over the Compiegne region
managed to detect signs that the Germans were
changing direction. 99 On the afternoon of 3 1 Au-
gust, RFC pilot Captain E.W. Furse discovered
the lead German cavalry corps spearheading the
German Army in a new direction. A subsequent
sortie from RFC No. 4 Squadron flown by Cap-
tain Pitcher and Lieutenant A.H. L. Soames con-
firmed the maneuver. 100 This, combined with re-
ports from French cavalry, alerted the Allied
commanders that something significant was in
progress with the German forces. The Germans
had reached the limit of their western advance

98 Tuchman, 443-444.

"Macdonald, 1914 , 245.

100 Michael Occleshaw, Armour against Fate: British
Military Intelligence in the First World War (London:
Columbus Books, 1986), 56.

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier

SHOOTING THE FRONT • 21

FIGURE 10 . Western Front Situation 30 August to 2 September 1 91 4, Battle of the Marne.

Source: West Point Atlas , map 1 0. Courtesy, Department of History, U.S. Military Academy.

and were now heading southeast. 101 The French
yeme A rm £ e commander, General Charles Louis
Marie Lanrezac, and VP me Armee commander,
General de Maunoury, were provided the infor-
mation at the most critical moment, saving their
forces from a decisive German maneuver. 102 The
RFC was achieving tremendous credibility at this
climactic moment.

Throughout the campaign, the French were
equally aggressive in maintaining aerial observa-
tion on the advancing German forces. Unfortu-
nately for their aviators, they not only had to find
the Germans but also had to convince their se-
niors of what was observed. The French GQG
had a variety of intelligence sources to draw
from in determining the location and direction of
the German advance. French agents had reported
that the German campaign plan called for march-
ing from Brussels toward southwestern Belgium,
eventually heading to the Oise River. However,
by 1 September the direction of the German ad-
vance did not validate that intelligence source.

101 Robert B. Asprey, The First Battle of the Marne
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1962), 85;
Edmonds, 1914 , 1, 248.

102 Occleshaw, 56.

Aerial reconnaissance kept confirming the south-
east advance. At this critical moment, French
Armee headquarters staff became reticent, not
following up on the new information due to ap-
prehension that it contradicted the prevailing
opinion of the GQG. With indecision, critical
time was lost. French staff began withholding
information, afraid to admit possible mistakes.
Capitaine Bellenger, commanding the air sec-
tion of the French VP me Armee, became increas-
ingly alarmed at this state of affairs. He quickly
sent one of his observers, Lieutenant Andre Wa-
teau (a lawyer by training), to the GQG to make
the case for their aerial observation sighting of
the German maneuver in progress. Wateau suc-
cessfully explained the case and at the same time
took credit for the discovery. 103

The Allies’ aerial observation reporting on
the German maneuver received further substan-
tiation from a map retrieved from a German of-
ficer. 104 Armed with this more convincing infor-
mation, the Allies gained an advantage. German

103 Lt Col Georges Bellenger, letter to Francois Baban,
6 February 1954, SHAA (translation provided by
Commandant Marc Riviere).

104 Asprey, 86.

22 • SHOOTING THE FRONT

Chapter i: The Evolution of Aerial Reconnaissance as a Force Multiplier