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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 

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AMERICA PROMISES TO COME BACK: A NEW 
NATIONAL STRATEGY 



BY 



JAMES J. TRITTEN 



AUGUST 5, 1991 



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Director, Net Assessment and 
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Kit 

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Rear Admiral Ralph W. West, Jr. Harrison Shull 

Superintendent Provost 



The research reported here was sponsored by the Director, Net Assessment and 
Competitive Strategies Office and Strategic Planning Branch, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC; the Defense Policy Office, National 
Security Council Staff, Washington, DC; and the Defense Nuclear Agency 
HQ DNA/NASF, Alexandria, VA. 

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1 1 . TITLE (Include Security Classification) 

AMERICA PROMISES TO COME BACK: A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY 



12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) 
JAMES J. TRITTEN 



13a. TYPE OF REPORT 
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from SEP 90 TO AUG 91 



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AUGUST 5 ,1991 



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16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 



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18. SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) 



National Security Strategy 
Aspen Strategy 
Base Force 



Reconstitution Strategy 
Military Strategy 



ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) 

Additional Funding/Sponsor: Defense Nuclear Agency, HQ/DNA/NASF, 7801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, VA 
22301, MIPR 90-581. Additional Sponsors: Competitive Strategies Office and Strategic Planning Branch within OSD 
and Defense Policy Office, National Security Council Staff. This is an updated version of original report issued 
December 26, 1990 and revised by May 13, 1991. A revised version will appear in issue #2 of Security Studies (Winter 
1991/1992). 

An analysis of President Bush's new national security strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990, 
involving a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's "base" force. If 
implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental 
U.S. where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the U.S. would rely on active and reserve forces 
for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation DESERT SHIELD. The new strategy is based upon a 
revised Soviet threat, and new international security environment which assumes a two-year warning of a major ground 
war in Europe. During this period, the U.S. would reconstitute additional military capability. Outline of all sources of 
new strategy and force structure, the "base" force, transportation requirements, and whether or not the U.S. will retain a 



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JAMES J. TRITTEN 



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DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR 

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6. Abstract 

unilateral capability for overseas intervention. Discussion of parallel NATO initiatives. 
Discussion of major issues resulting from this proposed strategy and force structure, including: 
is the new strategy real, defining new goals and objectives in both programming and war 
planning, the effect of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, new requirement 
for intelligence, requirements for decision-making, setting technological requirement research & 
development, investment strategy and industrial conversion, reconstitution stockpiles, impact 
upon DoD organization, a transition period, arms control, and new requirements for military 
operations research and analysis. Concludes that there are four major critical factors upon which 
the new strategy depends; (1) the behavior of the USSR (2) the behavior of allies and the 
Congress (3) the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges, and (4) the ability 
of industry to meet new demands. Conclusions that, even if it can be shown that industry cannot 
meet new demands, the strategy may still be useful. Section on specific impact on the Navy 
Department. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or 
strategy but rather a fundamental revision to the way the U.S. has approached defense since 
1945. 



AMERICA PROMISES TO COME BACK; A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY 

by 
James J. Tritten 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Sources of the New Strategy 3 

The President's New National Security Strategy 12 

The "Base" Force 20 

The Strategic Force 21 

The Atlantic Force 2 3 

The Pacific Force 2 6 

The Contingency Force 2 8 

Transportation 3 3 

Unilateral Capability? 35 

NATO Initiatives 39 

The Soviet Threat 4 5 

Issues For Discussion 55 

Is the New Strategy Real? 55 

Defining Goals & Objectives in Programming & War Planning 59 

Impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM 67 

New Requirements for Intelligence 70 

Requirements for Decision-Making 7 5 

Technological Requirements 84 

Research & Development 88 

Investment Strategy and Conversion 9 

Reconstitution 94 

Stockpiles 102 

DoD Organization 104 

The Transition Period 109 

Arms Control 110 

Military Operations Research and Analysis Ill 

Critical Success Factors 115 

Impact on the Navy and Marine Corps 12 

Submarine Force 123 

Surface Forces 125 

Naval Aviation 126 

Amphibious Forces 12 9 

Special Operations Forces 130 

Reserve Forces 131 

Sealift . 132 

Joint Commands 132 

Defense Business as Usual? 138 

Notes 145 



AMERICA PROMISES TO COME BACK; A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY 

by 
James J. Tntten x 



President George Bush unveiled a new national security 
strategy for the United States in his August 2, 1990 speech at 

9 . . . 

the Aspen Institute. In the audience was Britain's former Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher. Although Mr. Bush spoke about the 
United States and United Kingdom "standing shoulder to shoulder," 
and "when it comes to national security, America can never afford 
to fail or fall short," the national security strategy concepts 
he unveiled at Aspen would be revolutionary and have direct and 
dramatic impacts on NATO and the rest of the world. 

Essentially, the President opened the door to a total reex- 
amination of America's role in the world and its overall military 
capability. The historical parallel is the British reorientation 
in the first decade of the 20th Century from strategic focus on 
colonies to Europe. As Clausewitz wrote, war has "... its own 
grammar, but not its own logic." The old political logic and 
lexicon of the Cold War has changed - it is now time to change 
the military grammar. 

U.S. defense policy will be based upon four major elements: 
deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitu- 
tion. Rather than deploy forces at the levels maintained since 
World War II, under this new national security strategy the 
United States would maintain a much smaller active and reserve 
force mix primarily focused on world-wide major contingency 



operations — not a Europe-centered global war with the USSR. If 
forces were required to fight a major war against the Soviet 
Union, the U.S. assumes that there would be sufficient time to 
reconstitute them. Specifically, the President has apparently 
accepted the consensus of his intelligence community that the 
Soviet Union would need "at least one to two years or longer to 
regenerate the capability for a European theater-wide offensive 
or a global conflict." 4 The U.S. assumes, therefore, that it 
will have two year's warning for a Europe-centered global war 
with the USSR. 



Sources of the New Strategy 

Instead of a single or even a few documents to which we can 
refer to understand the new national security strategy and its 
associated force structure, there are a series of speeches, 
articles, and reports that must be consulted to get the complete 
story. To understand these documents, they must be read in 
sequence to see how the concepts evolved over time. Since publi- 
cation dates differing from dates on which some articles were 
written, they are placed in chronological sequence. This section 
provides the proper chronology and full documentation for all 
primary source documents. 

The sequence starts with the President's speech at Aspen on 
August 2, 1990. Generally ignored by media due to Iraq's inva- 
sion of Kuwait on the same day, the concepts outlined in the 
President's Aspen speech were brief and visionary - destined to 
be fully developed by official spokesmen in the following months. 
The New York Times covered the new strategy and force structure 
in depth on the same day, but based its story on leaks of a 
confidential briefing of the plan to the President in late June, 
and subsequent briefings to the Defense Policy Resources Board 
(DPRB) . Aviation Week & Space Technology covered the new na- 
tional security strategy and force structure in depth - in their 
August 13, 1990 issue. 6 

General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) , provided details on the new national 



security strategy and associated force structure in two speeches 
to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) 7 and the American Legion, 8 
late in August. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, spoke at the 
3 2nd Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strate- 
gic Studies (IISS) on September 6th, and explained that the new 
strategic concepts outlined in Aspen would form the basis of 
programming documents to be made public in early 1991. Cheney 
noted that a series of Congressional and other briefings were to 
have followed the Aspen speech, but that he and General Powell 
were able to meet only once, on August 2nd, with the chairman and 
ranking members of the four major Congressional armed services 
committees. 

Moscow's Pravda reported Cheney's remarks at the IISS meet- 
ing and that President Bush had ordered changes in American 
security strategy. Cheney followed up his IISS address with a 
similar speech at the Comstock Club/Air Force Association (AFA) 
in Sacramento on September 13, at the Bay Area Council in San 
Francisco on September 14, another briefing to AFA on September 
17th, an address to the National Association of Business Econo- 
mists on September 26th, and a talk to the Pittsburgh World Af- 
fairs Council on October 30th. 

The former Joint Staff Director for Strategic Plans and 
Policy (J-5) , Lieutenant General George Lee Butler, U.S. Air 
Force, gave additional detailed information late in September at 
the National Press Club. 14 The essence of this speech appeared 
subsequently in the Spring 1991 issue of Parameters , 15 the jour- 



nal of the U.S. Army War College. From the tenor and content of 
General Butler's address and article, it appears that he had a 
major hand in developing the new national security strategy or 
force structure. 

Secretary Cheney's visit and remarks in Moscow this past 
October, about the new national security strategy and future 
force structure, were widely covered by the Soviet press 16 but 
generally not reported in the U.S. General Powell authored an 
article in the October 1990 issue of The Retired Officer . 17 This 
article, however, was based upon his presentation at the National 
Press Club immediately preceding the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait — 
hence it should be placed ahead of the Aspen speech. Similarly, 
General Powell's February 1991 article in the magazine of the 
Reserve Officers Association 1 should be read from the perspec- 
tive of currency through October. 

General Powell gave two December 1990 speeches: one to the 
Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) , 9 
the other at the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics 
Association (AFCEA). 20 The Chairman's RUSI remarks also appear 
in the Spring 1991 issue of The RUSI Journal but these should be 
read assuming a December 1990 currency with superficial updating 
for the obvious. 

Vice Chairman of the JCS, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, U.S. 
Navy, echoed General Powell's concepts in another December speech 



to the President's National Security Telecommunications Committee 
(NSTAC). 22 The Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) , U.S. Space Command, 
General Donald J. Kutyna, U.S. Air Force, told a San Diego Space 
Day audience in January, 1991 that General Powell had asked each 
of the C-in-Cs to examine their forces and present that minimal 
"base" force structure necessary to maintain our superpower 
status. 23 

Only limited commentary about the new national security 
strategy or force structure appeared in the U.S. media, 24 other 
than the reports in the New York Times and Aviation Week & Space 
Technology , until the February Department of Defense (DoD) testi- 
mony to the Congress. The U.S. press had been otherwise engaged 
in major defense-associated reporting of events in the Middle 
East. In 1991, the testimony to the Congress by the Secretary of 
Defense and the Chairman of the JCS preceded the delivery of the 
annual DoD report to the Congress. 

The first testimony was presented by the Secretary of De- 
fense and the Chairman of the JCS before the House Armed Services 

Committee (HASC) on February 7, 1991. 25 Their second testimony 

• • • ft 

was before the House Appropriations Committee on February 19th. 

Two days later, on February 21st, they testified before the 

? 7 • • • 

Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) . Following this testi- 
mony, the 1991 Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the Presi- 
dent and the Congress was actually issued, although it is dated 
January. This report specifically addresses the new national 
security strategy and provides a force structure designed for 



budgetary and political give and take. For those who still did 
not understand that national strategy and force structure were 
changing, a copy of the President's Aspen speech was appended. 

In mid-March, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the Principal Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Resources) and Admiral 
Jeremiah appeared before the HASC and provided the first UN- 
CLASSIFIED details on future force structure. Later in March, 
Paul Wolfowitz, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, also 
appeared before the HASC and testified with General Butler, now 
C-in-C of the Strategic Air Command, on the strategy and how it 

• • • T 1 

would affect strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces. 

Secretary Cheney prepared an address on the new national 
security strategy for delivery at the Georgetown University. 
By the end of March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued their 1991 
Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) which included a Foreword by 
the Secretary. On April 3, General Powell once again spoke on 
the new national security strategy and force structure in an 
address to the American Defense Preparedness Association 
(ADPA). 34 Powell also made some remarks on reorganization in 
mid-April, reported in Army Times . The Chairman of the JCS 
made the "base" force the centerpiece of his testimony before the 
Defense Base Closure Commission at the end of April. April 
also saw major recognition of the Administration's efforts by a 

37 

Soviet academic writing in Kommunist . 



In his May 29th commencement address at the U.S. Air Force 
Academy, President Bush mentioned his previous announcement of a 
shift in defense focus, but did not expand on his original vi- 
sion. 3 "Scooter" Libby returned to Congress in early June, 
accompanied by the Deputy Director for Force Structure, Resource, 
& Assessment Directorate on the Joint Staff (J-8), Brigadier 
General William Fedorochko, Jr., U.S. Army. Both testified 
further on details of the strategy and force structure. General 
Powell made note of the "Base" Force and reconstitution forces in 
his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
July. 41 The DoD's Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An 
Interim Report to Congress , published in July 1991, makes specif- 
ic reference to the new national security strategy and links it 
to the Gulf war. 42 

Reviewing the list of primary source documents, a number of 
substantial characteristics stand out. First, there appears to 
be a very "top-down" re-direction in defense strategy and force 
structure. 43 From the public record, there were only a handful 
of individuals who orchestrated the new concepts and there were 
few authorized spokesmen. The usual indicators of a debate 
were absent - discussion by other senior military officials does 
not appear until well after the new concepts were articulated in 
public. 

The second point is that, despite their obvious concern with 
Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the Secretary of 
Defense and the Chairman of the JCS were simultaneously fashion- 



8 



ing the new national security strategy and force structure. The 
Secretary has stated repeatedly that there were two major ele- 
ments underway with defense in late 1990 and early 1991 - the 
military buildup in Saudi Arabia and the new national security 
strategy and force structure. Secretary Cheney and General 
Powell were two of only a few people who were involved in both. 

A third obvious matter is that the new national security 
strategy is nameless. Inside the Washington beltway, the strate- 
gy is known as the "new strategy," the "new Defense Strategy," 
the "President's strategy," and "the U.S. military's new regional 
contingencies strategy." It has also been referred to, informal- 
ly, as the "Aspen Strategy," the "reconstitution strategy," and 
the "strategy for the new world order," but it appears that the 
Administration will let academia, or the press, select the title 
that will appear in the history books. In this paper, the 
strategy is uniformly referred to as the "new national security 
strategy. " 

Although it has taken some time, the new national security 
strategy and force structure now appear in the oral and written 
testimony and other writings of additional officials in the 
Pentagon. For example, Christopher Jehn, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Force Management and Personnel) appeared before Congress 
on April 9th and used General Powell's concept of four- force 
package with four supporting capabilities. Similarly, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood expanded upon the Aspen speech 



in his address to the American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics (AIAA) on May 1st. 



Air Force Chief of Staff, General Merrill A. "Tony" McPeak, 
made public reference to consolidating air forces into the new 
"base" force structure. The U.S. Army Posture Statement re- 
flects a thorough understanding and support of the new national 

48 • 

security strategy. Similarly, the Secretary of the Navy, Chief 
of Naval Operations (CNO) , and Commandant of the Marine Corps 
jointly authored an article in the April 1991 U.S. Naval Insti- 
tute Proceedings that makes specific mention of the Aspen speech 

4 Q 

and the new national security strategy. The CNO also made spe- 
cific reference to the Aspen speech and strategy in his April Sea 

so 
Power article. 



By the beginning of August, enough details of the Presi- 
dent's new strategic concepts were available to make an in-depth 
assessment of the new national security strategy's impact. The 
one major document that has not yet appeared is the White House's 
1991 edition of the National Security Strategy of the United 
States . This document must be evaluated for differences from 
what has been published elsewhere. 

Perhaps the reason this document has not yet appeared, and 
the strategy lacks a formal name, is that the internal debate and 
discussion within the Administration has not ended. Rather than 
a "bottom-up" product of endless hours of staff work involving 
all the major defense and industrial participants, the new na- 

10 



tional security strategy is analogous to recent shifts in mili- 
tary doctrine in the USSR - with perhaps even more debate in the 
USSR that has yet occurred in the United States. 



11 



The President 1 s New National Security Strategy 

The major factor underlying the reexamination of America's 
role in the world, and its basic national security strategy, is 
the belated recognition by the Congress and Administration that 
the level of resources devoted to defense in the last decade 

R 1 

cannot be sustained. If the United States consciously attempt- 
ed to outspend the Soviet military in a competitive strategy 
designed to bankrupt the Soviet economy, then the strategy suc- 
ceeded. Unfortunately, American defense spending contributed to, 
but is not a principal cause of, the U.S. budgetary deficit. 

Apparently, American defense spending will be reduced on the 
order of 2 5 percent under the new national security strategy and 
the "base" force. This reduction is not simply the low end of a 
periodic cycle of fluctuating defense expenditures — it is a 
recognition that the total resources devoted to defense need not 
be as high so long as the current political climate remains. 

Another fundamental component of the President's new nation- 
al security strategy is that, assuming a two-year warning of a 
Europe-centered global war with the USSR, the U.S. can generate 
wholly new forces - rebuild or "reconstitute" them if necessary. 
Specifically, current forces deemed unnecessary, will be disband- 
ed, not put into the reserves, since the risk is deemed accept- 
able. 



12 



Reconstitution is not the same thing as mobilization or 
regeneration - it is more like what the United Kingdom had 
planned during the interwar years, when it assumed that up to ten 
years of strategic warning would be available. New defense 
manufacturing capability and new forces and military would be 
built; essentially from the ground up. Preserving this capabili- 
ty means protecting our infrastructure and the defense industrial 
base, preserving our lead in critical technologies, and stockpil- 
ing critical materials. Preserving our alliance structure is 
another element of our ability to reconstitute a more significant 
forward-based military presence when, and if, it is ever again 
required. 

Secretary Cheney said shortly before his departure from 
Moscow in October, that "We are changing our strategy and our 
doctrine as a result of changes in the Soviet Union and changes 
in Europe. We no longer believe it is necessary to us to be 
prepared to fight a major land war in Europe. . ." The shift in 
focus from the Soviet threat and a European centered global war 
is a major change in both program and war planning. We will 
justify procuring defense programs for reasons other than those 
routinely used since the end of World War II. We will also need 
to immediately review existing war and contingency plans for 
their responsiveness to the new political realities. 

The estimated two-year warning is predicated upon the as- 
sumptions that all Soviet ground and air forces will withdraw to 
the homeland, that a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)- 

13 



like parity will exist from the Atlantic to the Urals, that the 
Soviet Union will remain inwardly focused, and that NATO and its 
members intelligence services are functioning. After events in 
the Soviet Union this past Winter, Secretary Cheney adopted a 
more cautious note on expected Soviet behavior in his testimony 
to the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee on February 
19th, and in subsequent discussions and reports. 

Cheney told the Congress, in February, that the Administra- 
tion was disturbed at untoward events in the USSR and reserved 
the right to return before Congress and change the assumptions 
that underlay the new national security strategy and "base" 
force and, therefore, the programs that were requested from the 

CO 

Congress. In his February 21st SASC written statement, General 
Powell tied the removal of a "short-warning attack by massive 
Soviet conventional forces" to the ratification of the CFE 
Treaty. This was repeated during his July 1991 Senate testimony. 
In the meantime, Soviet forces are slowly being withdrawn to the 
homeland, conventional arms control agreements have been signed 
drawing down forces drastically, and the USSR remains inner- 
focused. 

Another element in the new national security strategy is an 
emphasis on technological breakthroughs that will change military 
art. Secretary Cheney first addressed this in his February 
remarks to the SASC. Changes in military art occurred during the 
inter-war years with the development of blitzkrieg , carrier-based 



14 



strike naval air, and amphibious warfare capabilities. The 
Soviet military has long discussed the "Revolution in Military 
Affairs" that occurred after World War II and the advent of 
nuclear weapons and long-range means of delivery. Senior Soviet 
military officers have been warning of another "revolution" in 

53 

the near future. After the splendid performance of U.S. weap- 
ons during Operation DESERT STORM, it appears that their worst 
fears were justified. 4 The coming revolution will present 
enormous challenges and opportunities in doctrinal and strategy 
development. 

Among General Powell's more frequent themes in his writings 
and speeches over the past year were enduring realities and 
emerging defense needs. Under the category of enduring reality, 
the Chairman lists Soviet military power, vital interests across 
the Atlantic, in Europe and the Middle East, and in the Pacific, 
and the unknown threat - the crisis that no one expected. The 
new national security strategy and the associated "base" force 
are designed to meet these challenges by providing a less 
Soviet/ European-centered and more flexible military capabilities 
which will meet America's security requirements as we enter the 
next Century. 

The cornerstone of American defense strategy will remain 
deterrence of aggression and coercion against the U.S., its 
allies, and friends. Deterrence is achieved by convincing a 
potential adversary that the cost of aggression, at any level, 
exceeds any possibility of gain. To achieve this goal, the U.S. 

15 



will continue its modernization of strategic nuclear forces and 
associated command, control, and communications capabilities. 

The U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy will remain committed 
to fostering nuclear stability, an environment in which no nation 
feels the need to use nuclear weapons in a first-strike. The 
U.S. is committed to improving its strategic nuclear defensive 
capabilities. One new area for strategic nuclear warfare will be 
to respond flexibly to lower levels of aggression. Strategic 
defenses can be effective in countering the growing threat of 
ballistic missiles from nations other than the USSR. 

Deterrence is often thought to involve only nuclear weapons, 
but under the new national security strategy, we should expect to 
see further investigation of deterrence of conventional warfare 
without the explicit threat to use nuclear weapons. Other major 
elements of the new national security strategy include forward 
presence, crisis response and collective security. Although the 
strategy acknowledges solidarity with existing allies, the U.S. 
is likely to have enduring interests with perhaps more ad hoc 
coalitions and friends than inflexible alliances. Such coali- 
tions or allies are vital for the reintroduction of formidable 
American military power overseas. 

There is a risk that the end of the Cold War may bring an 
increased risk of regional conflicts and greater unpredictability 
in the international security environment. Today's crises are 



16 



extremely dangerous due to the proliferation of advanced weaponry 
and weapons of mass destruction and the demonstrated willingness 
of Third World nations to use them. General Powell reminded 
Congress in February about Operation DESERT STORM where: "We are 
clearly at the 'high end' of technology in a conflict with a so- 
called 'Third World' nation." 

High technology weapons in the hands of Third World nations 
include: modern tanks, ballistic missiles and artillery, air 
defenses, tactical air forces, cruise missiles, and diesel subma- 
rines. These make conflict in the Third World increasingly 
destructive and lethal. U.S. crisis response forces will provide 
presence, and the ability to reinforce with adequate forces to 
prevent a potentially major crisis from escalating or to resolve 
favorably less demanding conflicts. 

For ease of budget discussion, the U.S. often has used an 
illustrative planning scenario. Any planning for contingency 
responses by the U.S. should include the ability to react to more 
than one "canned" predicament or a single scenario. The JCS have 
now developed a family of likely (and perhaps even unlikely) 
events for which the U.S. may elect to commit military forces. 

The conventional conflict scenarios now used by the JCS are 
contained in this year's JMNA. They range from peacetime engage- 
ment to war escalating from a European crisis with full mobiliza- 
tion. Contingencies include: (1) counter-insurgency/counter- 
narcotics; (2) lesser regional contingencies, with two sub-cases 

17 



(2,000 and 6000 nautical miles from the U.S.); ( 3 ) a major re- 
gional contingency in Korea; and (4) a major regional contingency 
in Southwest Asia. 

The JCS recognize that not all crises will evolve in the 
same manner. The JMNA outlines four possible types of crises: 
(1) a slow-building crisis; (2) a fast-rising crisis; (3) immi- 
nent conflict; and (4) conflict. The length and intensity of 
combat, for planning purposes, is assumed to be 450 days for 
counter-insurgency/counter-narcotics, 90 days of low-mid inten- 
sity for lesser regional contingencies, 120 days of mid-high 
intensity for major regional contingencies, and more than 50 days 
of mid-high intensity for a war escalating from a European cri- 
sis. 

Responses to these contingencies are contained in a series 
of measured response options. Responses could include a flexible 
minimal force deterrent response, a major deterrent response 
(Operation DESERT SHIELD) , and more worst-case responses where 
combat begins soon after the insertion of troops or simultaneous- 
ly. This program of contingency types and measured responses 
appears to be a building-block and force sequencing approach to 
crisis management. 

According to Secretary Cheney's February Congressional 
testimony, the U.S. will also devise a peacetime strategy to 
deter low intensity conflict, struggles threatening international 



18 



stability. A dynamic "peacetime engagement" strategy to promote 
democracy, nation-building, justice, free enterprise, economic 
growth, and to counteract local violence, terrorism, subversion, 
insurgencies, and narcotics trafficking can be accomplished 
primarily by security assistance programs as well as other in- 
struments of U.S. national power. 

In his Aspen speech, the President alluded to maintaining a 
forward presence by exercises. General Powell stated at RUSI in 
December that forward presence includes military assistance 
programs. In his February testimony to Congress, General Powell 
expanded his definition of presence to include, but not be limit- 
ed to: stationed forces, rotational deployments, access and 
storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian 
assistance, port visits and military-to-military relations. The 
JMNA adds combined planning, nation-assistance, peacekeeping 
efforts, logistic arrangements, supporting lift, and exchanges to 
the list of forms of military presence. These expanded defini- 
tions should be viewed as attempts to ensure that all planned 
future activities will satisfy the requirement to maintain an 
overseas presence with a smaller force. 

After assessing the military threats and the recommended 
Defense Program, the JMNA concludes that ". . .the Defense Pro- 
gram provides minimum capability to accomplish national security 
objectives." It is to this program that we will now turn. 



19 



The "Base" Force 

Although details of the President's new national security 
strategy are still being debated, active duty and ready reserve 
forces are likely to decrease significantly. According to the 
initial report in the New York Times , the "bottom line" numbers 
discussed in June at the White House were: 

• Army : 12 active, 6 ready reserve divisions (currently 18 
active & 10 reserve) , and 2 "cadre" or reconstitutable 
reserve divisions 

• Air Force : 25 active & reserve tactical air wings (cur- 
rently 36) 

• Navy : 11-12 aircraft carriers (currently 14) 

• Marine Corps : 150,000 personnel (currently 196,000) 

Subsequent reports in the media and the force levels deliv- 
ered to the Congress by the Administration are slightly higher, 
and reflect budgetary negotiations that parallel the developing 
new national security strategy. Force levels discussed in more 
recent reports included: a Navy of 451 ships (down from 545), 
including 12 deployable aircraft carriers and one devoted to 
training, 13 carrier air wings (CVWs) , 150 surface combatants, 
with no battleships; a three Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 
Marine Corps of 160,000 personnel with simultaneous amphibious 
lift for the assault echelons of 2% Marine Expeditionary Brigades 
(MEBs) ; fifteen active and eleven Air Force tactical fighter 
wings (TFWs) , and 181 strategic bombers (down from 268) . As the 
U.S. government attempts to complete a new budget cycle, we will 
see numerous other force levels suggested and debated. The 
initial New York Times report should be viewed in the context of 
a minimally acceptable force that probably was agreed to by the 
participants before events in Iraq and Kuwait. 



20 



Sometimes termed the "base" force, the new force structure 
advocated by General Powell will be organized into four basic 
military components: Strategic nuclear offensive and defensive; 
Atlantic; Pacific; and a Contingency Force; and four supporting 
capabilities: Transportation, Space, Reconstitution, and Research 
and Development (R&D). This force structure and supporting 
capabilities are not contained in the President's speech but were 
developed parallel to and in support of the President's new 
national security strategy. What constitutes those forces will 
be debated throughout the next year. These "Forces" are not 
meant to represent new commands, but rather force packages much 
the same that "Tactical Air Forces," according to the annual DoD 
posture statement, includes aviation forces assigned to the Air 
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. 

The Strategic Force 

The Strategic Force would include those offensive forces 
that survive the START process, where numbers like 4500 and 3 000 
warheads for each side have been discussed openly during the past 
year. In their February Congressional testimony, Secretary 
Cheney and General Powell stated that they were prepared to 
reduce strategic bombers from 268 to 181, halt the construction 
of OHIO class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at eighteen, 
not retrofit all of those submarines with the more advanced 
TRIDENT II (D-5) missiles, and consider only the PEACEKEEPER (MX) 
rail garrison intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and small 
ICBM as R&D programs, without plans for their deployment. 

21 



General Powell added that PEACEKEEPER should be funded through 
its first developmental test. Admiral Jeremiah told Congress in 
March that we would end with 550 ICBMs. 

Reducing the offensive threat dramatically to such lower 
numbers suggests revisiting the suitability of strategic de- 
fenses. General Powell included the strategic defense initiative 
(SDI) in his American Legion, RUSI, and AFCEA speeches and his 
February 1991 article. Admiral Jeremiah outlined the need for SDI 
in December: " . . .against an attack by a major power. . . " and 
"also against Third World weapons of mass destruction delivered 
by ballistic missiles." 

General Kutyna discussed the need for SDI and the Third 
World ballistic missile threat in his January Space Day briefing. 
He specifically noted Libyan Colonel Quadhafi's April 1990 state- 
ment that he would have fired missiles at New York had he the 
capability, when previously attacked by U.S. forces. President 
Bush said in his State of the Union address in January that SDI 
would be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic 
missile strikes against the U.S., its forces overseas, and 

57 

friends and allies. 

In his February 199x testimony to Congress and subsequent 
written report to Congress, Secretary Cheney outlined a reorien- 
tation of SDI to a system of Global Protection Against Limited 
Strikes (GPALS) — indicating that it would be space, ground, and 



22 



sea-based 58 The initial objective of GPALS would be protection 
against accidental, unauthorized, and/or limited ballistic mis- 
sile strikes. The system should be only half the size of the 
Phase I plan associated with SDI. 59 It is likely that strategic 
defenses will at least continue as an R&D program. 



Although not specified in any speeches and media accounts, 
an obvious area that demands clarification is the possible in- 
creased nuclear role for naval and air forces replacing ground- 
based weapons withdrawn from Europe under current and future arms 
control agreements. General Powell stated in both speeches in 
December that the U.S. remains committed to a triad of offensive 
forces, but that we would probably increase reliance on sea-based 
systems. In addition, he stated in the AFCEA speech that 
" . . .we must make sure that our residual Strategic Forces are 
second to none." 

The Atlantic Force 

The conventional military forces of the U.S. appear to be 
headed for both reductions and restructuring. The Atlantic Force 
will include residual forces in Europe, those forward-deployed to 
Europe, and the continental U.S. -based reinforcing force (includ- 
ing heavy ground forces) . The Atlantic Force would contain a 
significant reserve component. This force would be responsible 
for Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia, recognizing that 
in the future the Middle East threat is on a par with that to 
Europe, thus demanding the same type of response. That this 
force is not called the European Force indicates both the shift 

23 



in emphas s of the new national security strategy and the appar- 
ent desire to alter the concept for employment, and perhaps com- 
mand, of the forces normally assigned to the Atlantic, European, 
and Middle Eastern theaters. 

General Powell stated in his December RUSI speech that the 
residual Atlantic Force retained in Europe would consist of a 
heavy Army component (defined as perhaps at Corps strength) with 
supporting air forces. In his testimony to Congress in February, 
General Powell stated that the European forward-based Atlantic 
Force would consist of mechanized and armored ground forces. 

In his March testimony to Congress, Admiral Jeremiah gave 
the first UNCLASSIFIED breakdown of exactly what was destined for 
the Atlantic and other Forces. These figures were later con- 
firmed by General Powell's testimony to the Defense Base Closure 
Commission. The U.S. would retain in Europe: 2 Army divisions 
and about 3 Air Force TFWs. The military prefers to discuss 
residual capability in terms of combat units, while others have 
suggested a force expressed in terms of numbers of troops. For 
example, the August 2, 1990 New York Times report discussed 
100,000 - 125,000 military personnel remaining in Europe as part 
of the Chairman's revised force structure, although a 50,000 - 
100,000 level was openly discussed at the IISS conference. 

In his AFCEA remarks, General Powell further stated that 
forward presence for the Atlantic Force means Marines in the 



24 



Mediterranean and strong maritime forces. In his testimony to 
Congress in February, General Powell stated that the European 
forward-based Atlantic Force amphibious forces should be capable 
of forced entry operations. According to Admiral Jeremiah, in 
March, the residual maritime forces in Europe will be one carrier 
battle group (CVBG) and an amphibious ready group (ARG) . The 
JMNA refers to an Atlantic Force with one CVBG and one Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployed continuously in the Mediterra- 
nean Sea or eastern Atlantic Ocean. The notional force size of a 
MEU is 2,500 personnel with fifteen days combat sustainment. 
This is hardly a residual European-based capability for signifi- 
cant forced entry. 

In his AFCEA remarks, General Powell stated that forward 
presence for the Atlantic Force means access in the Middle East, 
Allied interoperability and flexible command, control, and commu- 
nications systems, and military assistance programs. All spokes- 
men have told Congress that there will also be some residual 
presence in the Middle East. 

Atlantic Force forward presence will be backed by a powerful 
and rapid reinforcement capability. In his AFCEA address, Gener- 
al Powell stated that Atlantic Force reinforcement and sustaining 
forces capability would consist of a mix of active and reserve 
heavy Army divisions and tactical fighter aircraft. In March, 

Admiral Jeremiah identified that capability as consisting of 4 

ft o 
active, 6 reserve, and 2 cadre reserve Army divisions, 2 active 

and 11 reserve Air Force TFWs, 5 Navy CVBGs, 2 USMC MEBs, and the 

25 



USMC reserve component. Each MEB has a notional force size of 
16,000 personnel with thirty days combat sustainment. 

The Atlantic Force will be the backbone of America's future 
conventional deterrence for an area of the world that has domi- 
nated defense thinking for fifty years. Although there is no 
specific reference to dual-committing forces from one theater to 
another, it should be noted that Japan-based U.S. forces partic- 
ipated in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. It should 
also be obvious that if we reduce our residual force in Europe to 
those outlined above, it would strain them to be dual-committed 
to the Contingency Force. 

The Pacific Force 

In September, General Butler stated ". . .that the U.S. 
could undertake a prudent, phased series of steps to reduce 
modestly our force presence in Korea, as well as Japan and else- 
where." General Powell told Congress in February that " . . .we 
can initiate a gradual transition toward a partnership in which 
ROK forces assume the leading role on the Peninsula. However, 
should deterrence fail, in-place and reinforcing US forces would 
still be reguired to blunt, reverse and defeat the type of short- 
warning attack that North Korea is still clearly capable of 
mounting. " 

The Pacific Force will include a modest and chiefly maritime 
residual forward-based and forward-deployed force in Korea, Japan 



26 



and elsewhere in the theater, and reinforcing forces located in 
the continental U.S. Admiral Jeremiah outlined that modest force 
in his March testimony. In Korea, we will initially retain one 
Army division and 1-2 Air Force TFWs; in Japan, 1-2 Air Force 
TFWs and one home-based Navy CVBG. A MEU will operate in the 
Western Pacific for most of each year. 

General Powell stated in his December RUSI speech that "the 
bulk of American Army and Air Force power in the Pacific would be 
as reinforcements . . . using Hawaii, Alaska, and the continental 
United States as springboards." Admiral Jeremiah defined that 
reinforcement in Hawaii and Alaska as a light Army division 
(probably the 25th Infantry Division) , an Air Force TFW, and a 
USMC MEB. In the continental U.S., there would be an additional 
Marine Corps MEB and 5 Navy CVBGs. Modest reserve components in 
Alaska and Hawaii would be allocated to the Pacific Force. 

In his AFCEA address, General Powell stated that "In short, 
the Pacific Force would continue our very successful economy of 
force operation in this critical region." It is unlikely that 
the modest-sized Army and Air Force Pacific Force assets would 
have a dual-commitment to the European theater in a revitalized 
"swing strategy" but it is clear that any substantial land war in 
Asia would require "borrowing" forces from elsewhere. 

Is there a need to retain expensive overseas bases in the 
Philippines, and elsewhere, under the new strategic concept? If 
the Cold War was our original justification for the presence of 

27 



large forces in the Pacific, and if the Cold War is over, then it 
is ended in the Pacific as well. 1 If forces and bases are to be 
permanently retained overseas, it should be for other reasons, 
and those reasons should be clearly articulated and debated in 
Congress. The Congress and American public may well ask why the 
U.S. should remain unilaterally committed to defend nations which 
are not obligated to assist the U.S. in its own defense. If the 
U.S. significantly reduces its forces in Japan, there is a possi- 
bility that effective arguments will be provided to increase the 
size and/or capability of the Japanese Armed Forces. Any such 
possibility will be watched very carefully by China and many 
other Western Pacific nations. 

The Contingency Force 

Perhaps the most dramatic innovation of the Chairman's 
recommended force structure is the creation of a Contingency 
Force based in the continental United States. The Contingency 
Force, according to the guidelines in the President's Aspen 
speech, will be shaped by the need to provide an overseas 
presence and response to regional contingencies - not to return 
quickly to Europe. It appears that the Contingency Force will 
assume responsibility for those areas of the world not covered 
by the Strategic, Atlantic, or Pacific Forces. By inference, 
that would appear to be Latin America, Africa, and island na- 
tions, not the Middle East/ Southwest Asia. 



28 



Continental U.S. -based contingency response forces are not a 
new idea. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the JCS and the military 
services experimented with a series of similar schemes, eventual- 
ly abandoned by the Kennedy Administration. A U.S. Strike Com- 
mand existed from October 1961 - December 1971 as a Unified 
Command. Similar arrangements involved varying commands have, 
from time to time, been responsible for the Middle East and South 
Asia. 

Once the U.S. Army created a Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) 
consisting of two divisions. Air Force Tactical Air Command 
(TAC) as well as Navy and Marine Corps units, not otherwise 
allocated to other C-in-Cs, were assigned to the U.S. Strike 
Command. Similarly, the old Rapid-Deployment Joint Task Force 
(RDJTF) was another precursor to the proposed Contingency Force. 

General Powell stated in his December speeches that the 
Contingency Force would have a very small Reserve component. 
Later testimony and articles reveal that this is comprised pri- 
marily of airlift and supporting forces - not combat capability. 

6 A 

The Army and Air Force will apparently commit 4-5 divisions and 
7 TFWs to the Contingency Force. According to the Army Posture 
Statement, contingency response divisions will be structured to 
sustain deployments for about thirty days without augmentation by 
reserve components. 

The Navy and Marine Corps will apparently provide dual- 
committed forces from the Atlantic and Pacific. Most of the 



29 



rapid response sealift, all intertheater airlift, and all special 
forces would belong to the Contingency Force. The JMNA addition- 
ally included the following in their definition of the Contingen- 
cy Force: Army airborne, air assault, light, and highly mobile 
heavy divisions, Air Force long-range conventional bombers, and 
Navy attack submarines. 

General Butler provided the following detailed description 
of how the Contingency Force would function. The first stage of 
a Contingency Force to be used in what he termed a "graduated 
deterrence response," and, for program planning purposes, would 
consist of (in the order stated) : (1) Army light & airborne divi- 
sions, (2) USMC MEBs, (3) Special Operations Forces, and (4) 
selected Air Force units. At his AFCEA speech, General Powell 
used a different order: (1) light Army forces, (2) mixed Air 
Force and Navy units, (3) Marine Corps units, and (4) units from 
the Special Operations Command. 

According to General Butler, this initial component of the 
Contingency Force would be buttressed as necessary by: (1) 
carrier forces, and (2) amphibious forces. Normally the Navy 
prefers to promote the frequent call on carrier forces for imme- 
diate crisis response, and listing these forces in the second 
component of the Contingency Force probably reflects the land 
orientation of the concept. It would be wholly illogical to 
assume that the U.S. will require fewer responses by carrier 
battle groups in the future - indeed, a solid case can be made 



30 



that we will send the fleet more often in the future. The New 
York Times report listed carriers in the initial crisis response 
force but implied that they might not be forward-deployed. 

The listing of amphibious forces in the second tier seems 
appropriate, reflects recent employment of the Marine Corps, and 
is consistent with the Commandant's recent statement on maneuver 
warfighting doctrine and shift in identification of Fleet 
Marine Forces from "Amphibious" to "Expeditionary." Amphibious 
capabilities must be retained by the United States but in the 
context of contingency operations rather than a major assault on 
Europe -- General Powell's statement regarding the forced entry 
amphibious capability for the Atlantic Force will likely be 
clarified. If another D-Day type invasion were ever required of 
American forces, amphibious forces would be among the forces 
reconstituted and built, as during World War II. 

The third tier of the Contingency Force appears to be 
heavier forces with the capability for long-term sustainability . 
Again, we have seen this application in Operation DESERT SHIELD. 
From their annual posture statement, it appears that the Army 
would prefer to see heavy units more clearly identified with the 
Contingency Force. General Powell's position appears to be that 
the Contingency Force could, if necessary, "borrow" heavy forces 
from the Atlantic Force. He stated at AFCEA that the Contingency 
Force ". . .would draw as necessary from other larger Forces if 
it needed additional staying power and sustaining power." On the 
other hand, in June 1991, Brigadier General Fedorochko told the 

31 



Congress that contingency forces would include 1-2 heavy Army 
divisions. U.S. planning for contingencies should also benefit 
from the experiences of France's Force d' Action Rapide (FAR) — 
formed as an additional component to the French Army in 1983 — 
with a mission similar to the proposed Contingency Force. 

CNO, Admiral Frank Kelso, USN, told Congress in February, 
that a "base" force, 451-ship Navy, deploying about 30 percent of 
the available fleet, could provide an immediate response to a 
crisis anywhere in the world within seven days. It would com- 
prise one Amphibious Strike Task Force, consisting of one CVBG 
and an ARG with an embarked MEU. A second CVBG could be avail- 
able within fifteen days. A full MEB could arrive within thirty 

ft v • 

days. Hence, the most the sea services could deliver to a 

crisis area under this plan is a token force within a week, and a 
force about the size of one Army light division with an addition- 
al few squadrons of aircraft within a month. 

It would take the sea services a 4 percent deployment rate 
to respond to a regional conflict with a more robust combat 
capability: 3 CVBGs and a full MEF - notional USMC force size of 
48,000 personnel with sixty days sustainment. With the costs of 
providing such a high deployment rate, it is unlikely that the 
Navy will recommend such a posture - given its desires to replace 
aging hardware. Deployment rates in excess of 40 percent are 
necessary for the sea services to simultaneously respond with 3 
CVBGs and a MEF in one location and another carrier elsewhere. 



32 



Although the sea services logically could have been consid- 
ered the core of the new Contingency Force, the Array and Air 
Force can argue that they can provide faster airpower and combat 
capability anywhere in the world. Indeed, there have been arcane 
informal suggestions by Air Force personnel that their TFWs can 
be expressed in terms of CVBG equivalents! Assuming that the 
U.S. will involve itself in overseas contingency operations only 
with the cooperation of host nations, and with the support of 
coalitions, then the Air Force/Army response may appear more 
cost-effective . 

The clue to understanding the new crisis response portion of 
the new national security strategy is that it is not keyed to 
one service, or even to the active component having a unilateral 
capability. Future crisis response appears to be a joint respon- 
sibility with a mix of active and selected reserve units. 

Transportation 

According to General Powell, transportation is one of the 
major supporting components to the new national security strate- 
gy. Mobility programs proposed by the Secretary of Defense in 
his annual report included the ability to return to Europe with 4 
Army divisions, 3 Air Force tactical fighter squadrons, one USMC 
MEB, and their associated support within 10 days. Additional 
forces would be provided within 2-3 months. DoD will continue to 
build toward prepositioned equipment in Europe for 6 Army divi- 
sions and their associated support elements. 

33 



For contingencies outside Europe, the goal is to provide 5 
Army divisions, together with associated air and naval forces in 
about 6 weeks. Ground units would fly to a future crisis, much 
as forces assigned to Operation DESERT SHIELD did to Saudi Ara- 
bia. Personnel will then either be married with prepositioned 
equipment or with equipment that arrives via sealift. 

Prepositioning for ground and air forces is part of the 
complete package that must include intertheater lift. The equip- 
ment that must be prepositioned for even a light Army division, 
essentially a duplicate set, will probably make prepositioning a 
less attractive alternative to the Army than fast sealift. When 
addressing fast sealift, the military must make a tradeoff be- 
tween speed and tonnage. 

The U.S. is obligated to retain sufficient lift to support 
immediate contingency operations by either the Atlantic or the 
Contingency Forces. Lift requirements for the Pacific Force are 
less clear. Initial lift requirement will probably include the 
capability to continue concurrent operations but it is unlikely 
that funding will be provided for simultaneous crises, given the 
years of failure to provide lift for a 1% war strategy. The 
March 1991 JMNA states that the U.S. can deploy forces in all 
program scenarios except: (1), when two regional contingencies 
occur sequentially or concurrently; and (2), in the early weeks 
of a short-warning war in Southwest Asia. 



34 



Lift capability disclosed during Operation DESERT SHIELD 
will be studied and may result in new requirements and possibly 
additional assets. * The U.S. already has special lift assets 
and a robust prepositioning program, but may learn from recent 
experience that modest increments of additional lift or preposi- 
tioned equipment are required. 

Lift will probably include a modest government-owned capa- 
bility in a caretaker status and civilian air and sea transporta- 
tion assets engaged in normal peacetime trade. The U.S. general- 
ly met its lift requirements for Operation DESERT SHIELD with a 
combination of existing assets, those taken from trade, and 

• 70 

charters of foreign vessels. The new national security strate- 
gy will probably make similar assumptions. 

Air and sealift for a major NATO war in Europe is in the 
category of forces that could be reconstituted during the two 
years 1 warning that future program planning now assumes is avail- 
able. Reconstitution of lift should include: that provided by 
allies, charters from foreign non-aligned sources, and the acti- 
vation of assets in storage. It will be hard to justify the 
retention of older, World War II-era ships, as a part of a re- 
structured National Defense Reserve Fleet. 

Unilateral Capability? 

Among the more interesting questions regarding the Contin- 
gency Force, and potential intervention by the Atlantic or Pacif- 



35 



ic Forces, is whether the r .arming assumptions include a unilat- 
eral capability - or is the participation of host nations and 
allies understood? Although Secretary Cheney told the House 
Appropriations Defense Subcommittee in February that the U.S. 
"will retain the ability to act alone," the March 1991 JMNA 
assumes that host nation support and sufficient infrastructure is 
available for any major regional contingency. At the end of 
April, General Powell told the Defense Base Closure Commission 
that: "Frequently, access ashore will be contested or unobtain- 
able, requiring employment of sea-based forces." 

"Acting alone" must be viewed in terms of the level of 
warfare being discussed — strategic (a major war such as World 
War II) , operational (campaign sized similar to Operations DESERT 
SHIELD or DESERT STORM) , or tactical (similar to the invasion of 
Grenada or Panama) ; and whether such operations are essentially 
nuclear, maritime, or air/land warfare. The U.S. will probably 
reserve the right, and maintain the capability, to take unilater- 
al conventional forces military actions at the tactical-level, 
but probably not at the strategic or operational levels of 
air/ land warfare. In other words, the strategy only calls for a 
modest unilateral tactical capability, about that provided by an 
Amphibious Strike Task Force or Maritime Prepositioning Force 
(MPF) MEB. If the U.S. remains committed to maritime superiori- 
ty, then it could still mount a unilateral theater campaign at 
sea. 



36 



However, it should be assumed that the U.S. could not uni- 
laterally mount an opposed contingency operation or campaign such 
as DESERT SHIELD with the "base" force. Further, one could argue, 
that the U.S. probably does not have this operational level 
capability today. Both the Secretary of Defense 'and the Chairman 
of the JCS were careful in their testimony to the SASC in Febru- 
ary, to project that the "base" force could handle an Operation 
DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM but that it might have taken longer 
before the forces were prepared to go on the offensive. This 
answer assumes, however, that such operations are coalition - not 
uni laterally-based. 

The U.S. long has assumed that a major war (at the strategic 
level) would be pursued only as a part of alliances, such as NATO 
- hence there is no real change at this level of warfare. In- 
deed, continued good working relations with allies is a specific 
goal of the new national security strategy and a vital building 
block for the reconstitution of a substantial U.S. military 
presence in Europe. Similarly, the U.S. has always maintained a 
unilateral capability at the tactical level of warfare and there 
is no reason to assume that it will not do so in the future. 

The Administration may amplify its views on this issue once 
the Services point out the significantly different force struc- 
ture required for the varying assumptions. If the U.S. desires a 
unilateral capability to intervene in the world without host 
nation support, on the order of an Operation DESERT SHIELD, then 
the current force structure will remain high — perhaps too high 

37 



to absorb the imminent budget reductions. If the budget drives 
the problem, we are less likely to field a force that can inter- 
vene without the assumption of host nation and coalition support. 
This issue will probably be a major focus of discussion during 
the next budget year. 



38 



NATO Initiatives 

U.S. forces in Europe, and elsewhere, cannot be changed 
without considering long-term commitments to allies and the 
planned employment of American resources in combined operations 
under NATO command. Most Europeans initially assumed that the 
U.S. Army and Air Force would either remain as a major element 
in-theater, or maintain large standing active or Ready Reserve 
forces which could return to Europe within a reasonable period. 
This may not be the case, and America's promise to return may be 
only quickly with a smaller existing active and reserve force 
mix, and after two or more years with reconstituted additional 
forces. 

While the United States is considering major changes in 
strategy and forces, so is NATO. The July 1990 NATO London Decla- 
ration stated that "NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to 
build up larger forces if and when they might be needed." The 
July Declaration stated that the Alliance too was preparing a new 
"military strategy moving away from 'forward defense'. . .towards 
a reduced forward presence. . ." The declaration also stated that 
"NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces" and 
"will scale back the readiness of active units, reducing training 
requirements and the number of exercises." 

General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, NATO's Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR) , told the Defense Planning Committee 
(DPC) , in December 1990, that he envisages a change in his pri- 



39 



mary combat mission from flexible response and forward defense to 

7 ? 

crisis response. The centerpiece of this capability would be a 
standing Rapid Reaction Corps centered about a multinational 
corps and the existing Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Forces. 
Should these standing forces not be able to support political 
decision making, then additional forces will be mobilized and 

7 T 

regenerated or "reconstituted." 

Although NATO is attempting to reach an alliance-wide agree- 
ment on force structure, many NATO nations are undertaking uni- 
lateral force reductions. Germany is reducing its forces to 
370,000 personnel, about half of whom will be placed in the 
reserves. France is withdrawing all its 55,000 officers and 

7 S 

men from Germany. The U.K. announced a plan to reduce the 

• • 7 fi 

British Army on the Rhine by about 50 percent, demobilizing 
most of the troops but retaining regimental identifications. 
There are reports of additional unilateral cuts. These unilater- 
al decisions by member nations will have dramatic impacts on the 
NATO war-fighting C-in-Cs plans for military operations and 
campaigns in the event of war. 

SACEUR's realistic residual U.S. force for Europe apparently 
is one corps, several Air Force wings, and the Sixth Fleet (which 
includes around 20,000 personnel ashore). 77 Planning in Europe 
should include the possibility of an eventual total withdrawal 
of American combat units from the continent. Were this to hap- 
pen, would other allied NATO ground forces remain unilaterally 
forward-deployed, and if so, where? 



40 



The NATO London Declaration and General Galvin's DPC remarks 
indicate a new NATO war fighting strategy is being drafted to 
replace the current strategy of flexible response (MC-14/3) . The 
strategy perhaps may be identified as MC-14/4 or have a new 
series designation to signify the fundamental changes that it 
reflects. The new overall NATO strategy will be based upon newly 
calculated national commitment force levels. It is not clear if 
SACEUR, primarily a land theater and under the command of an Army 
general, will take the lead in the development of a new NATO 
maritime concept of operations, in his areas of responsibility 
(which includes the Mediterranean) , or leave that to his maritime 
counterpart - SACLANT. 78 

Unilateral programming actions for future forces being 
undertaken by individual NATO nations, like the U.S., will obvi- 
ously affect the warfighting strategy that NATO as a whole can 
implement as those programmed forces become operational. Current 
national programming actions may stem from revised national 
views on war, the threat, or the resources available for defense, 
or any combination of these. This has happened in the United 
States. 

NATO is attempting to obtain a quick consensus on its war- 
fighting strategy so that national programming actions will 
support its new strategy, rather than limit it. In October 1990, 
General Galvin reminded us that MC-14/3 took nearly six years to 



41 



write and be approved and that the General Political Guidance for 
the employment of Nuclear Weapons took fifteen years. 79 SACEUR 
stated, in addition, that the NATO process ". . .has to be com- 
pleted within a year, or at most a couple of years." The Sovi- 
ets, who have undergone a similar change in military doctrine and 
strategy, are anxious that NATO complete this process as soon as 
possible. 80 General Galvin told the IISS in February 1991 that 
he would present the new strategy before the Chiefs of Defense 
staffs of all the nations at their meeting in April 1991. 81 

The new NATO strategy will be based upon paragraph 20 of the 
London Declaration. According to General Galvin's remarks at 
IISS, NATO strategy will be responsive to peacetime, crisis, and 
wartime demands. Peacetime elements will likely include: enumer- 
ation of national prerogatives, maintenance of alliance cohesion 
by integration and multinational forces, intelligence and verifi- 
cation of arms control agreements, forward presence, active and 
reserve forces training, force generation preparation, and inter- 
action with non-NATO forces. 

The crisis response strategy will likely consider: readiness 
for the Rapid Reaction Corps, the quick reaction of the alliance 
to emerging crises, communication with adversaries, planned 
sharing of risks and burdens, escalation and deescalation, and 
preparations for controlled mobilization and demobilization. New 
political realities require an enhanced political component to 
crises that erupt in the NATO area. For example, the initial 
reaction to a crisis in the territory of the former German Demo- 

42 



cratic Republic might include the NATO German Corps deployment 
including avoiding contact with remaining Soviet troops. The 
political goals of a future crisis appears to be - control and 
deescalate. 

Initial plans for crisis response forces include a brigade- 
size mobile unit that could respond within 72 hours and a Rapid 
Reaction Corps that would become available in 5-7 days. 82 The 
latter would include a heavy armored British division, another 
light armored British division, two new multinational divisions, 
parachute forces, commandos, and marines. The U.S. might con- 
tribute as much as one division. 

NATO initiatives include more emphasis on mobility and 
multinationality . Multinational corps with two or three divi- 
sions from different countries parallel existing arrangements for 
multinational maritime forces. Multinational maritime arrange- 
ments may be expanded to other areas and to include other types 
of forces. General Galvin told the IISS that he would present his 
third draft of a revised force structure to the Chiefs of Defense 
staffs in April, 1991. He speculated that NATO would field about 
half of its existing force levels in the Central Region with 
about the same forces in the North and South. 

NATO strategies will likely not be so strongly based upon 
the threat; they will reflect the need to defend NATO member 
states territory or NATO interests. If interests are to be 



43 



defended, this involves NATO in out-of-area operations — some- 
thing the Allies have traditionally been reluctant to formalize 
as an Alliance role. There is an open debate on whether NATO 
should assume this role, or whether such a role should exist 
under some other umbrella organization - or at all? 

All of the following actions are necessary: national pro- 
gramming planning to deal with future national force levels; 
national war planning to outline current plans to commit forces 
to NATO and for actions by forces retained under national com- 
mand; and NATO war planning to deal with current and future 
forces they expect to commit to the Alliance. It is very likely 
that initially, there will be significant differences between the 
strategies articulated for each case. 



44 



The Soviet Threat 

Underlying any reexamination of America's role in the world 
and America's or NATO's basic national security strategy are the 
monumental changes in the international security environment in 
recent years. Strategies are designed to cope with implied or 
explicit threats; the profound changes in the threat, therefore, 
have direct bearings on the strategies that the U.S. and NATO 
need and will develop. Rather than enumerate the revolutionary 
events, it is appropriate to first analyze the impact of these 
changes on the Soviet C-in-C of the Western Theater of Strategic 
Military Actions (TVD) . 

NATO is aware of the capabilities of Soviet hardware, mili- 
tary exercises and deployment, and military-technical aspects of 
military doctrine, indicating a real strategy and capability for 
offensive warfare by the Western TVD Commander. Employing this 
offensive capability was termed, by the Soviets, a theater 
strategic military operation. The Manchurian Operation they 
fought against Japan near the end of World War II strongly resem- 
bled the theater strategic operation of which we believed the 

Q O 

Soviets capable of recently. 

In the Western TVD, initial offensive military operations by 
a front were assumed to achieve advance rates of 40-60 kilometers 
per day to a depth of 600-800 kilometers. 84 A normal frontal 
operation lasted about 15-20 days, meaning that overall, two 
fronts should have handled all of Western Europe in about 25-30 



45 



days. NATO took this threat seriously and prepared its own 
forces and counterstrategy accordingly. 

It is not clear whether the Soviets ever saw themselves as 
the fierce warriors the West did. They had a much clearer pic- 
ture of deficiencies in the military-industrial sector, that have 
only now become apparent to the West. They recognized the incip- 
ient problems if they attempted a theater-wide military operation 
with a simultaneous surge effort by multiple fronts. It is 
doubtful that they even felt capable of managing such a theater 
strategic offensive using seguential operations. 

With the nagging self-doubt in their ability to manage a 
theater strategic military operation before the sweeping recent 
political changes in Europe, the problems are infinitely more 
complicated, with the reunification of Germany and the imminent 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany, Hungary, and the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic. Even if Soviet forces remain in 
Poland for a few years, the Western TVD C-in-C cannot count on 
Warsaw Pact nations committing their armed forces to Soviet 
command. Indeed, the Western TVD C-in-C probably assumes that 
Eastern European military forces would oppose a Soviet forced 
reentry. 

The Western TVD C-in-C cannot advise his political leader- 
ship that, under current or likely future conditions, it is 
possible to launch offensive military operations at the theater 
strategic level, against non-Soviet Europe with any degree of 

46 



confidence in successfully completing his assigned mission. The 
Western TVD C-in-C is probably driving his staff to develop new 
plans for the defense of the USSR from within their own borders 
and perhaps their forced and opposed reentry into Eastern Europe. 

These assumptions dovetail remarkably with the declaratory 
Soviet military doctrine and strategy evidence we observed in the 
past few years. They also parallel the new draft military doc- 
trine published in November 1990. We have often seen Soviet 
deeds belie Soviet words, when they previously spoke of a defen- 
sive doctrine but clearly maintained forces for an offensive 
strategy. The Soviet Union is moving towards re-positioning all 
its ground forces within its borders, absorbing the first blow 
from an adversary, then having the capability and military 

strategy to repel the invasion to the Soviet border but not cross 

07 
and continue the counterof fensive in enemy territory. 

It appears that the traditional strategic missions of the 
Soviet Armed Forces, and the criteria for successful completion 
of those missions, have undergone significant revision. Former- 
ly, total defeat of the enemy's armed forces in an armed conflict 
was demanded as the military's contribution to the overall war 
effort. Under the new defensive doctrine, the revised military 
requirement is to defeat the invading force and to prevent verti- 
cal and horizontal escalation, or the escalation of the conflict 
over time. 



47 



In a November 1989 interview, Marshal of the Soviet Union 
Sergei F. Akhromeyev, identified then as the military advisor to 
the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, offered some very specific 
views on how long this defensive period would last. He implied 
that the role of the defensive, during the first few weeks of the 
initial period of a future war, was to allow the political lead- 
ership the opportunity to terminate the crisis before it erupted 
into a major armed conflict and war. If the political leadership 
failed, Akhromeyev implied that the military would then be 
unleashed to perform their normal function of crushing and deci- 

Q Q 

sively routing the enemy. 

The new draft defensive doctrine attempted to deal with this 
issue of how long the defensive period would last. It states 
that "defense is the principal form of military operations with 
the beginning of aggression. Subsequent operations by the USSR 
Armed Forces are determined by the nature of the enemy's military 
operations and depend on means and methods of warfare he is 
using." The draft also reveals that the defensive mission of the 
Soviet Armed Forces in the event of aggression is to repel it, 
defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and create 
"conditions for the most rapid cessation of war and the restora- 
tion of a just and lasting peace." 

A previous debate within the framework of Soviet military 
science covering the initial period of a war may prove instruc- 
tive on the topic of initial defensive operations today. During 
1922 - 1941, questions arose regarding how long border skirmishes 

48 



and diplomatic exchanges would last prior to total mobilization. 
Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi Zhukov in his memoirs gives 
the interval as "several days" while Marshal of the Soviet Union 
Vasiley D. Sokolovskiy writes in his Military Strategy that the 
initial period might have lasted 15 - 20 days. 89 

The political/ideological goal of traditional Soviet war 
termination strategy was to ensure that the aggressor could not 
again threaten the USSR, and that progress was made toward even- 
tual peace ("mir") and a world socialist order. The political 
goals for war termination are now to prevent nuclear holocaust 
and simultaneously ensure the survival of the homeland (socialist 
or other) . 

We are receiving additional clear signals about "new think- 
ing" in the USSR. Army General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, Chief of the 
USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR First Deputy Defense 
Minister, announced, in November 1990, a series of significant 
Soviet military reforms that parallel actions being taken by the 

Q A 

U.S., NATO, and the general European community of nations. 
Moiseyev' s interview was followed by publication of the "USSR 
Ministry of Defense Draft Military Reform Concept." 91 

The first stage of the planned reform will last until 1994 
and will consist of the complete redeployment and resettlement of 
Soviet troops now based on foreign soil. The second stage (1994- 
1995) will consist of the formulation of strategic groupings of 



49 



armed forces on Soviet territory with a new system for training 
and mobilization. The third stage will last from 1996-2000. In 
this stage, further reductions, reorganizations, and reequipping 
of forces will take place. 

By the year 2000, according to the draft plan, strategic 
nuclear forces will be cut 50 percent (with additional cuts 
possible) , ground forces by 10-12 percent, air defense forces by 
18-20 percent, air forces by 6-8 percent, and administrative, 
research, and other combat forces by 3 percent. The number of 
generals to be cut is 1,300, officers - 220,000, and warrant 
officers and ensigns - 250,000. The overall armed forces will 
number 3-3.2 million personnel — down from 3.9 million in the 
active forces today. Military authors tend to tie such drastic 
reductions to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; 
rendering a military force incapable of conducting offensive 
strategic operations should not occur until the total worldwide 
destruction of all nuclear weapons. 

Perhaps the most startling signal about "new thinking" is 
the proposal contained in an August 1990 article by a Soviet 
general officer attached to the General Staff Academy. In this 
proposal, the Armed Forces of the USSR restructure themselves 
into three basic contingents, which show a remarkable resemblance 
to President Bush's new national security strategy and General 
Powell's "base" force structure. The proposal also appears to be 
entirely consistent with the subsequently published draft Soviet 
military doctrine. The USSR appears to be discussing its own 

50 



version of an active, reserve, and reconstitutable force strate- 
gy and base force. 

The first contingent, in this new Soviet proposal, would 
comprise forces in a state of permanent high combat readiness. 
It would consist, in part, of new military services called the 
Nuclear Forces and Space Forces. The Nuclear Forces would com- 
prehend the existing Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as appro- 
priate units from the Air Force and the Navy. Space Forces would 
include existing Air Defense and Antisatellite Forces. These new 
services would remain under the direct control of the Supreme 
High Command. 

The first contingent would also consist of highly mobile 
Ground Forces, whose strength and composition could change de- 
pending upon the international politico-military situation and 
the economic potential of the USSR. This force size would be 
sufficient to resolve a conflict in an individual region until 
relieved by forces of the second contingent. The new draft 
military doctrine referred to such a concept and specified that: 
"the first strategic echelon consists of troops of the border 
military districts and fleet forces. Troops of internal military 
districts form the strategic reserve." 

Prior to the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, the USSR 
deployed slightly more than one-half (56 percent) of its Ground 
Forces divisions, some 170 divisions and 2 brigades (2,901,000 



51 



personnel) , to defense of the new state borders in the Western 
TVD. 94 The Soviets deployed 56 divisions and 2 brigades in the 
first echelon of its border-defense armies. Each first echelon 
division was responsible for some 100-120 km of the border when 
it followed mountains or rivers and 25-30 km in the most impor- 
tant axes. There were 52 divisions in second echelons and 62 
divisions in reserve deployed some 25-75 km from the state bor- 
der. The General Staff's May "1941 State Border Defense Plan" 
also provided for additional reserves in interior military dis- 
tricts. These reserve forces would be used to deliver counter- 
thrusts and man defensive lines 100-150 km from the new state 
borders . 

The requirement for the future first contingent of Ground 
Forces does not appear to include the capability for offensive 
military operations at a theater strategic level — hence it will 
be necessary to compare the Soviet experiences in the Great 
Patriotic War with future force levels. Initial estimates are a 
first contingent force of only 1.2-1.3 million servicemen allo- 
cated between the Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense and Space 
Defense Forces, and the Navy. Command and control would remain 
with the High Command of Forces in the TVDs. 

The second contingent, according to this proposal, would 
consist of an additional 630,000-man reserve force. Up to one- 
third the first contingent would form the nucleus of the second 
contingent. Hardware and weapons for these reserves would be 
stored at depots and bases. This contingent would form the large 

52 



strategic formations necessary for major military operations in a 
war. The second contingent could probably mount an offensive 
theater strategic military operation — but before it was organ- 
ized, strategic warning would be provided. 

The third contingent would embrace, in part, some 300,000 - 
350,000 additional men undergoing between five and six months 
training for national service. The men would then serve for an 
additional five-six months with either first and second contin- 
gent forces, or a longer period in newly organized republican 
units, probably similar to the U.S National Guard. Call-up will 
take place twice a year. These forces would augment troops in 
the field should war erupt. A second part of the third contin- 
gent would consist of these new republican units. The total 
strength of the third contingent would be some 600,000 - 700,000 
servicemen. Due to more recent events in the USSR, it is unlike- 
ly that there will be continued support by the Soviet Armed 
Forces for strong republican units. 

This proposal for reorganizing the Soviet military is but a 
proposal in a continuing internal debate over the programming for 
new forces. The debate is not over and may be immaterial to a 
discussion of the problems of current war planning guidance. 
Except to the extent that debates over future forces give us 
insights on current thinking, many military leaders today retain 
their "old thinking" from the days that they were first social- 



53 



ized into the Army and it is this type of thinking that we would 
have to face if there was a war today. 96 



The message for the West, however, is that if reorganization 
plans like this are implemented, and reductions in military 
capability include strategic nuclear and naval forces in the 
future, then Gorbachev's promise to eliminate the threat has come 
true. Even if the Soviets are found to be cheating on the margin 
with regard to CFE and other future arms control and confidence 
building measures in Europe, we should ask ourselves if they are 
in the position to once again mount the old theater strategic 
offensive operation? When confronted with that question, CFE 
"cheating" may more correctly be seen as an inability to provide 
exact numbers and locations which will be corrected when request- 
ed. 97 We must now consider the questions stemming from "what if 
peace?" 



54 



Issues For Discussion 

The issues raised in the President's Aspen speech are numer- 
ous, complex, and require discussion. Among the most important 
are: how likely is the President's new national security strategy 
to appeal and take hold; how do we define our new goals and 
objectives for both program and war planning; what are the last- 
ing impacts of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM; what 
are the new requirements for the intelligence community and for 
decision-making? What are the industrial aspects of the new 
national security strategy: technology requirements, R&D, invest- 
ment strategy, reconstitution, and the impact on stockpiles? 
Answers to these questions will certainly have an immense impact 
upon DoD organizations and the need for a special transition 
period. Finally, there are obvious implications for arms control 
and military operations research and analysis. This section 
responds to the obvious questions, and perhaps suggests what else 
might be included. 

Is the New Strategy Real? 

It may be instructive to review another Presidential unveil- 
ing of a major programming strategy to seek parallels. When 
President Ronald Reagan announced his concept for SDI in March 
1983 98 he explained how the U.S. and its allies planned to defend 
themselves against an attack by Soviet ICBMs. Both President 
Reagan's and Bush's speeches unveiling their new strategic con- 
cepts were just that; visions of a new strategy to be debated and 



55 



possibly adopted -- not necessarily an announcement of new gov- 
ernmental policy. 

The strategy associated with SDI would be possible only if 
the Congress purchased the weapons systems associated with it. 
It would have been wrong to assume that current U.S. or NATO 
strategy was immediately changed to defend the U.S. against 
ICBMs, since neither the U.S. nor its allies had defensive 
forces which could engage such missiles. 

Just as in 1990, in 1983 there occurred a series of brief- 
ings and speeches by supporting officials following the Presi- 
dent's vision of a new defense doctrine. Then-Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger delivered a major speech explaining the 
basic concept. A Blue-Ribbon panel of experts was commissioned 
to study the possible applications of technology to the strate- 
gy and initial results of their deliberations began leaking to 
the public in late 1983. Not until the programming documents 
were delivered to Congress in February 1984 was the strategy for 
defense of homeland and allies under SDI fleshed out in official 
documents. Indeed, strategic defenses in the previous set of 
programming documents provided no hint that a new initiative was 

1 0? 

being contemplated. 

Unlike the 1990 case, in 1983 the civilian academic communi- 
ty appeared to mobilize almost instantaneously and publish both 
supporting and critical assessments of the new doctrine, mostly 
newspaper Op-Ed pieces. It was months later before the public 



56 



saw more comprehensive treatments of the strategy and associated 
technologies. There was widespread interest in the technologies 
associated with SDI , primarily because of the opportunities for 
procurement business with the government and opportunities to 
work in the vanguard of science. What is less well recognized, 
however, was the great deal of "study money" used to flesh out 
the strategic concepts. 

We should assume that President Bush's Aspen speech will 
also lead to substantial "study money" to flesh out the concepts 
he discussed. What remains to be seen is whether the studies 
will be completed before 1991 budget actions or faster than 
significant international events unfold. 103 Recent events in the 
Middle East shelved or sidetracked much internal examination of 
the new national security strategy and the expected critical 
evaluation from those outside government. 

Under the American form of government, the announcement of a 
policy by the Administration is not necessarily an announcement 
of government policy. Indeed, SDI, although feared and attacked 
by the Soviet Union, and probably the cause for major decisions 
in the Soviet budget, never developed beyond an initiative, and 
full-scale evolution or deployment may not yet be feasible. On 
the other hand, the Bush Administration has been successful in 
working with the key power bases in Washington to push policies 
through with a minimum of debate. 



57 



Another case of a new strategic vision is also instructive. 
Both candidates George Bush and Michael Dukakis appeared to 
embrace the "competitive strategies initiative" during the last 
presidential campaign. The Annual Report to the Congress by the 
Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Years 1987 through 1989 included 
sections devoted to competitive strategies. Competitive strate- 
gies also appear in the 1987 edition of the President's National 
Security Strategy of the United States and in the United States 
Military Posture FY 1988, prepared by the Joint Staff. Competi- 
tive strategies, still an initiative, has never attained full 
policy status in the Executive branch of government and receives 
barely a mention in the 1991 annual posture statement by the 
Secretary of Defense. Despite having an extremely powerful 
weapon to use against the USSR today, the economic weapon, the 
West is not only not using this weapon but is actively trying to 
bail out the Soviet Union. 

In short, before any new initiative becomes a funded govern- 
ment policy, vested domestic interests and America's allies will 
have opportunities to make their desires known. Whether they 
succeed in becoming a player in America's new national security 
strategy and "base" force structure will depend upon their polit- 
ical prowess. 

Parliamentary governments, common among our NATO allies, may 
have some advantage in completing a comprehensive review of 
strategy and redirection of defense programs. Hence, it may be 



58 



easier for NATO nations to respond to this U.S. initiative and 
international events than it will for the U.S. to take action. 

A good example of the verities of parliamentary forms of 
government, compared to the American government, in making major 
defense policy changes, is the review of the master strategy for 
Australian defense forces conducted from 1985-1987. In February 
1985, the Australian Minister of Defense, Kim Beazley, employed 
noted strategist Paul Dibb to examine the current capabilities of 
the Australian Defense Force, describe the current strategic 
environment, set defense priorities and strategy, and define the 
appropriate future force structure. 

Dibb issued his report in March 1986 and, after an adequate 
period for analysis and criticism, the government issued its own 
version in March 1987. 104 Concepts first outlined by Dibb were 
adopted by the Australian government, after a serious but brief 
(by American standards) debate and adjustment. They were then 
carried out by the Ministry of Defense and the Australian Defense 
Forces. 10 Such a relatively orderly process seldom occurs in 
the United States, and we should not expect debate over the 
President's new national security strategy to remain either 
bloodless or limited to American domestic political actors. 

Defining Goals & Objectives in Programming & War Planning 

Political-military strategic planning generally commences 
with: (1) , a tabulation of the resources likely to be available, 
or (2) , an assessment of the threat, or (3) , an examination of 

59 



the goals and objectives to be attained. The planning process 
can start with any of these factors but it generally starts with 
different ones, depending upon the type of planning underway — 
war planning for immediate combat operations or program planning 
for forces to be delivered in the future. 

In wartime, planning often starts with a tabulation of the 
resources available - probably how the military started the 
process on December 8, 1941 — after the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor put significant portions of the Pacific Fleet out of 
action. Existing plans for war with Japan had to be revised 
based upon the numbers and types of surviving forces. Initial 
goals were limited by the resources available. 

In wartime, nations may also turn first to an examination 
and analysis of the threat, especially when faced with the need 
to create major strategic plans insufficiently researched before 
the war. The USSR likely did this after the Germans invaded on 
June 22, 1941. Prior to being invaded by Germany, insufficient 
attention had been paid to fighting the Germans on Soviet soil on 
the strategic defensive. The Soviet military was forced to 
develop plans in short order and execute them according to a 
revised threat scenario. 

War planning may also start with an examination, analysis, 
and reconsideration of goals and objectives. The U.S. and the 
Soviet Union had initial goals and objectives they attempted to 



60 



achieve in the initial stages of World War II. Generally these 
were limited by the newly revised resources available and the 
actual threat demonstrated by enemy capability. Later, however, 
the allies amassed sufficient forces to operate on the strategic 
offensive in all theaters and recognized that "unconditional 
surrender" was a possible goal. War plans could then be devised 
with primary consideration given to goals and objectives rather 
than resources and the threat. This also underscores that goals 
and objectives can, and often do, change during wars. 

Much of the literature devoted to defense planning does not, 
however, concern actual war planning, but rather program plan- 
ning, used to explain to legislators and the public why certain 
types of weapons systems and forces should be purchased and 
maintained. There is often some overlap between the initial 
program plans and subsequent program plans - but not always. For 
example, the USS MIDWAY was justified in 1940s programming plans 
to help defeat Japan. War plans in the 1980s included the USS 
MIDWAY defending Japan. Similarly, program plans after March 
1983 included SDI but war plans written that year could not. 

Program planning under the Planning, Programming, and Budg- 
eting System (PPBS) , in the United States, officially starts with 
an examination and identification of the threat. There have 
always been implicit unofficial discussions of the range of 
resources available and a general consensus on goals that preced- 
ed the threat examination. The consensus on goals is what is 



61 



being discussed in the President's new national security strate- 
gy. 

Current U.S. and Soviet program planning has been drastical- 
ly affected by the change in perceptions of the threat facing 
them. After decades of reliance on military preparedness to 
guarantee peace, each side apparently understands that what it 
considered reasonable steps for self-defense were perceived by 
the other side as evidence of aggressive intentions. 106 The 
American public, and therefore the U.S. Congress, has revised 
their world view, and let it be known that the levels of program- 
ming expenditure devoted to the Soviet threat are no longer 
required. It seems that the major driving factor behind the 
President's new programming strategy is the need to present a 
viable plan to maintain national defense in a climate of greatly 
reduced resources. 

Program planning logically should start with goals and 
objectives but, in the past, this has rarely occurred. In gener- 
al, a fundamental reexamination of goals and objectives has not 
been necessary given the generally stability of politico-military 
relations between the superpowers. Due to the major changes in 
the international political climate, we should also expect to see 
the U.S. debate whether its program (or even wartime) planning 
should include unilateral capabilities, or automatically assume 
standing alliance or ad hoc coalitions and host nations. There 
is a tremendous difference in programming based upon the assump- 
tions made on this question. 

62 



Although the U.S. and NATO never had the opportunity to 
develop war plans a milieu that included forces envisaged under 
SDI, there is no need to delay immediate revisions of war plans 
for existing forces. There are significant changes in the inter- 
national environment, especially the threat, and an urgent need 
to reduce defense expenditures - hence plans can be changed now. 
This includes our desire and ability to change now the planned 
employment of strategic nuclear forces. 

Do we need to target facilities and forces in nations that 
clearly are no longer enemies? It is a fair assumption that we 
once targeted Soviet nuclear forces deployed in Eastern Europe. 
Presumably, we have technical ways to preclude nuclear warheads 
from exploding in the former German Democratic Republic now that 
this territory is part of a NATO member nation. But have we 
applied common sense to the nuclear targeting of other national 
areas? 

What political benefit would be gained from targeting areas 
where restless nationalities are already struggling against the 
national government in the USSR? Will the Soviet military assume 
that these areas and Eastern Europe are "safe havens?" Will the 
USSR create targeting plans for areas in formerly allied nations? 
Can both sides change their targeting fast enough to respond to 
rapidly changing political events? 107 Do we have to render inop- 
erative certain warheads in missiles with multiple warheads to 



63 



both meet our objectives of destroying military targets yet 
avoiding collateral damage? 

Similarly, in the conventional realm, there is an obvious, 
immediate need to revise existing war plans - since NATO now 
controls both sides of the Fulda Gap. Indeed, General Galvin 
told the DPC that "it is clear that the old General Defense Plan 
is useless, and I have already rescinded it." NATO has now been 
asked for assistance to defend a member nation, Turkey, from a 
non-Warsaw Pact threat — Iraq. Did plans for that contingency 
exist? There are obvious components to conventional war planning 
that should be revisited and need not await programming deci- 
sions. 

Conventional war planners also should be changing the focus 
of their efforts, from the "big" war with the USSR, to the re- 
gional contingencies outlined in the JMNA. War planners have 
traditionally devoted most of their efforts to planning for the 
most demanding and least likely scenarios -- they should now 
devote the bulk of their efforts to the most likely and less 
demanding. This redirection will not come easily and may require 
different types of expertise. New contingency plans are needed 
soon so that program planners can have C-in-C inputs to force 
requirements, i.e. the forces desired for contingencies may not 
be the same as we procured for the "big" war. 

Conventional war planning in the United States, unlike 
nuclear war planning, has generally been done by professional 

64 



military forces, without significant direct civilian 
involvement. 108 The Chairman of the JCS and the warfighting C-in- 
Cs should reconsider this situation and seek active interaction 
with the civilian community to make meaningful contributions and 
immediate changes to conventional war planning. 

Specifically, strategists, political scientists, area stud- 
ies specialists, economists, etc. , probably can all provide the 
military immediate assistance and advice to adjust current plan- 
ning scenarios and war and contingency plans. The military tradi- 
tionally has performed this task in-house, but with the phenome- 
nal changes in the international security environment and the 
preoccupation of the bureaucracy with Operations DESERT SHIELD 
and DESERT STORM, assistance from the "outside" may be required. 

Left to their own devices, the bureaucracy may be tempted to 
ensure that current war plans support planned future programs and 
the existing organizational structure. Many civilian "outsiders" 
who could help are the numerous government employee faculty 
members at the war colleges, service academies, research labora- 
tories, and similar institutions. These individuals are not from 
"outside" the government and many have requisite security clear- 
ances and a great deal of expertise. 

The Chairman of the JCS already recognizes that a revolution 
has occurred in the international security environment which 
requires the immediate transfusion of expertise from the civilian 



65 



community to the military. We cannot afford the indulgence of 
waiting for new officers who recently studied these affairs, to 
cycle through the graduate education and War College processes; 
nor is the contracting and consulting community the government's 
best source for new ideas. This involvement by civilians in 
military affairs already occurs with nuclear program and war 
planning, and general forces program planning. Although propos- 
als for such involvement from individuals within the Pentagon 

1 no 

have been made before, they have always been defeated. 

NATO nations and the USSR should intermix their civilian 
academic communities with military planners. It is my experience 
that some other armed forces and perhaps even the intelligence 
communities are more comfortable with this model than is the 
American or Soviet military. This is not the time to draw dis- 
tinctions between who should be involved in the debate over 
fundamental goals and objectives. In World War II, the U.S. and 
allied armed services drafted, or otherwise secured, the services 
of academics who had years of area experience that the military 
lacked. The social, political, and economic upheavals in the 
world have not been seen by the existing bureaucracy. Now is the 
time to repeat the involvement of outsiders. 

An alternative model would be for the military to allow or 
invite the political leaders of their nations to dictate the 
revised goals and objectives. While there are some political 
leaders and many advisors available to discuss and decide nuclear 
strategy issues intelligently, most civilian leaders lack the 

66 



requisite background in conventional warfare to know what is 
possible and what is not. The military perspective is that the 
military must participate in the debate. The military should 
also involve civilian specialists in areas from which they tradi- 
tionally have been excluded. 

Impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM 

A decade ago, when the U.S. initially prepared contingency 
plans for its Rapid Deployment Force, many observers feared that 
the deployment of significant military forces to the Middle East 
would move forces simultaneously committed to the defense of 
Europe. War planners feared an outbreak of hostilities in the 
Western TVD at the same time U.S. forces were arriving in South- 
west Asia. That nightmare would tax America's capability to 
redeploy forces, or deploy forces remaining in North America, to 
Europe in time to influence the war. Despite some 541,000 U.S. 
personnel deployed in early 1991 to Southwest Asia, and the new 
force levels associated with CFE, there was a dearth of commen- 
tary from Europeans worried about this issue. If we could afford 
to place more combat troops in the Middle East than we had in 
Europe at the height of the Cold War, should we not assume that 
European NATO nations have accepted the diminution of those 
forces in Europe to deter a war today? 

Operation DESERT SHIELD demonstrated that the U.S. could 
muster sufficient assets from the continental U.S. to meet a 
major contingency where there were no forces in being. Indeed, 



67 



General Powell drew this parallel as early as December, 1990, in 
both his speeches at RUSI and AFCEA. 110 The initial deployment 
of forces in Operation DESERT SHIELD also seemed to demonstrate 
that such a force does not require basing overseas in Europe, 111 
although additional forces were redeployed from Europe and other 
locations to the Middle East. The developed ports, airfields and 
petroleum available in Saudi Arabia and the geographic vulnera- 
bility of Iraq may not be convenient at future contingency loca- 
tions, let alone such an exemplary villain or six unmolested 
months to build up forces — cautioning us to exercise caution in 
using these Operations as models for the future. It will take 
careful analysis of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM to 
make a definitive statement on the issue — but we should review 
the President's new national security strategy and the associated 
force structure now that these Operations have run their 

112 
course. 

Once DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM after-action reports are 

nil ■ • 

written, analysts will try to answer the question: which 

systems appeared to make a difference in the political and mili- 
tary outcome? Successful use of the PATRIOT anti-missile system 
has already suggested to many the value of anti-ballistic missile 
(ABM) systems for the continental U.S. The corollary to this 
old lesson is that events of seemingly little military import, 
i.e. the launching of an Iraqi SCUD missile, can have an enormous 
political significance that demands military action. 



68 



Systems that did not make a major contribution to Operation 
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM should be reevaluated for upgrad- 
ing, cancellation, or replacement. Under the new national secu- 
rity strategy to reconstitute capabilities useful in a Europe- 
centered global war with the USSR, there will be no need to 
retain systems that do not have a dual-use in the Contingency 
Force. 

There appear to be a number of obvious areas for research 
concerning lessons learned. Among the more obvious are whether a 
land campaign was truly required, or could our objectives have 
been accomplished with airpower alone? Since the destruc- 
tion of Iraq's nuclear weaponry figured so high in the American 
public's support for Operation DESERT STORM, should we continue 
to consider nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the same 
warfare category, or, single out nuclear weapons as the most 
important? Are reserve air forces staffs needed if they will 
never be deployed? 

What lessons do the Soviets claim they have learned from our 
experience? Both sides will obviously study the lessons learned, 
especially of the Air Campaign, and see if adjustments to mili- 
tary art are required. If the lessons are that significant, we 
can expect to not only see the U.S. consider revisions to the new 
national security strategy, but also the Soviet Union start their 
internal military doctrine debate anew. At least one major 
lesson should have been learned by the USSR - that the politico- 
military behavior of the U.S. cannot be predicted (responding to 

69 



the threat to Saudi Arabia with troops and public support for 
that response to include an offensive military campaign) . 

There is a significantly reduced life expectancy for the 
equipment used in the desert for the recent Operations. Should 
the reserves be reduced as a result of the new national security 
strategy and "base" force, what do we do with the excess equip- 
ment? 

Another significant impact of Operation DESERT STORM will be 
a significant alteration in the resources assumed to be available 
for defense programming. When the new national security strategy 
and "base" force were initially discussed by staffs in Washing- 
ton, planners simply could not have known the level of military 
activities that would be undertaken shortly in the Middle East, 
the need to replenish stocks of war materials and equipment, and 
the costs involved with cleaning sand from our equipment, mobi- 
lizing reserves and providing for post-conflict veteran's enti- 
tlements — to name a few. In essence, if the driving force for 
the new national security strategy was a realization that defense 
dollars will decrease, then DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM will 
add to the problem. 

New Requirements for Intelligence 

The changes suggested by the Bush Administration, if accept- 
ed by the U.S. Congress, will place an enormous burden on the 
intelligence community. Although one might argue that logically, 



70 



concomitant with such fundamental changes intelligence appropria- 
tions should increase, it is probable that they will decrease 
like defense spending. 

President Bush's Aspen remarks are programming remarks and 
do not reflect changes in the current defense plans for the U.S. 
or U.S. forces which would fight today under NATO. The intelli- 
gence community should provide all of their traditional services 
until the new international security environment takes hold. 
This action should satisfy critics who will complain that we are 
overlooking the Soviet threat or that the events that we see in 
the USSR are simply a ruse or represent an attempt to secure a 
breathing space prior to a massive rearmament. In short, there 
is a current intelligence reguirement that remains well focused 
on the existing Soviet threat. 

In addition to providing intelligence products concerning 
the USSR to support current war planning, the intelligence commu- 
nity must also provide new products to support programming for 
the future Atlantic Force. For example, we need quick, rough 
answers to approximations of how much the USSR will devote in the 
future, or is devoting, to defense, given other needs. Naturally, 
the intelligence community has been attempting to provide this 
information all along but, with new information available, we can 
perhaps refine our assessments. Similarly, we need to identify 
the new international goals and objectives that serve as the 
requirements for future Soviet forces. Perhaps the time has come 

117 

to game jointly, with the USSR, the deescalation of crises. x/ 

71 



If we do this, we will need to "game the game" before hand to not 
give away more than we expect to learn. 

Most of the U.S. and NATO national intelligence communities 
are oriented toward understanding and countering the Soviet 
threat. Although it took many years, the West eventually grew 
sophisticated at understanding the Soviet perspective on doc- 
trine, strategy, arms control, and the like. Our intelligence 
agencies and associated policy offices are substantially less 
competent at analyzing, predicting behavior, and conducting net 
assessments for the rest of the world. Obviously that situation 
is already remedying itself vis-a-vis Irag, but there remain many 
areas of the world for which this conclusion is true. The Con- 
tingency Force will need strong supporting intelligence capabili- 
ties. 

We need more in-depth intelligence capabilities for wide- 
ranging areas of the world. Deficiencies should be corrected, and 
guickly. Can the intelligence community prepared to provide 
players in seminar and war games who can represent the behavior 
of nations other than our traditional enemies? We recently 
felt comfortable enough with our knowledge of the USSR to create 
artificial intelligence-like models to represent Soviet behavior 
in expert systems that substituted machine actions for human 
behavior. Are we ready to do this for non-Soviet actors? 



72 



Flexibility is essential in shifting intelligence assets 
from one set of collection targets to rapidly emerging priority 
targets to support the contingency response element of the Presi- 
dent ' s new national security strategy. Continued unimpeded 
access to space underlies support for the use of American mili- 
tary forces and has been identified by General Powell as one of 
the key supporting capabilities. 

Intelligence activities include more than collection and 
analysis. There is the arcane area of counterintelligence; ac- 
tions taken to thwart the activities of foreign intelligence 
services. As the Soviet military withdraws from Eastern Europe, 
their overt military intelligence collection efforts will suffer, 
forcing a shift to covert programs. For many reasons, the U.S. 
prefers to categorize its own covert action; i.e. intelligence 
support to foreign intelligence services, political actions, 
propaganda, and paramilitary actions, as an intelligence function 
rather than within the routine province of statecraft. Are the 
Western intelligence services ready for expanded counterintelli- 
gence and covert action in areas that have traditionally not been 
in the limelight? 

As the U.S. withdraws its military forces from overseas and 
reduces its presence, there also will be a concomitant reduction 
in available military intelligence. The loss of these sources 
must be matched by new collection efforts. The Director of Naval 
Intelligence told the Congress in March, 1991, that: "It is time 



73 



to rediscover classic intelligence collection using legal travel- 
ers, emigres, elicitation, the attache system, industry, acade- 

1 1 Q 

mia, area expertise, and 'open sources'." 

As the intelligence community re-enters areas, it will have 
to make some adjustments in how it does business. Formerly, when 
intelligence analysts differed, the debate could be settled by a 
re-assessment of the data. With political and economic intelli- 
gence, it is often the methodology rather than the data that 

IPO 

settles disputes. 

We have to build capabilities to match our stated need for 
new types of information. Economic and other forms of strategic 
intelligence, for example, may become relatively more important 
than extremely costly technical intelligence systems designed to 

19 1 

provide tactical warning. The net impact of the President's 
new national security strategy is that the intelligence community 
may have to undergo a fundamental reexamination of its missions 
and priorities. 

The U.S. possesses an excellent intelligence community which 
will need fine tuning and some redirection but is capable of 
providing the government with all the necessary assessments. To 
involve the intelligence community with additional tasking in 
economic analysis will challenge the community, and it should be 
done only with the full cooperation of existing organizations 
outside of government. The challenges of providing two years and 
other forms of warning should not be allowed to degenerate into a 

74 



debate over the track record of the intelligence community. The 
nation will need a discrete list of data required to provide such 
warning, and the political process will determine whether the 
resources can, or will, be made available. 

Requirements for Decision-Making 

NATO used to talk in terms of a few days warning (the time 
to detect an invasion) and another few days for decision. Mobi- 
lization and return of initial American troops and air forces 
from the continental U.S. to Europe would take around 10 days. 
Hence the canonical 14-day scenario arose, with enormous effort 
devoted to the assessment of theater-strategic operations and 
campaigns to be fought by forces that could be brought to bear. 
We became adept at calculating theater-wide force ratios for the 
first thirty or forty-five days of a war in Europe. 

The question arises: how long would it take the Soviets to 
regain a position to cause the U.S. worry about a European crisis 
that could escalate to warfare and perhaps be over within a month 
and a half? Similarly, how long does the Soviet military feel 
that it would need to respond to an unanticipated rebuilding of 
Western military potential in Europe? 

The March 1991 JMNA asserts that in the event of a superpow- 
er crisis, the prime programming assumption is that armed con- 
flict will not occur for at least 24 months. This is not equiva- 
lent to assuming that we will have two year's strategic warning 



75 



and response time; warning might be provided and ignored, or 
warning signs might not be recognized. For programming purposes, 
however, U.S. planners should assume that the old theater strate- 
gic operation, or a surge operational-strategic level attack 
across the old inter-German border with the Pyrenees as goal, 
could not be mounted without the U.S. intelligence community 
obtaining and understanding indicators two years in advance. 

For program planning, we also assume that during this two 
year period, the U.S. can reconstitute forces for defense of 
Europe while the Soviets are doing the same for their offensive 
capability. During that time, we assume that we can re-build 
forces and materials instead of maintaining them on active duty, 
in the Ready Reserves, or prepositioned in Europe. U.S. forces 
reconstituted for a major war in Europe need only be adequate to 
deter or defend against a Soviet attack - not launch a theater 
strategic offensive operation. 

In short, the need for the old, massive, short-term (14-day) 
mobilization has diminished. The threat planning assumption that 
once drove NATO toward a two-week mobilization requirement has 
been replaced with a threat assumption, for programming purposes, 
that now gives the alliance two years to respond. 

We need to expand our discussion of this two year period. 
For example, should we assume that we will have two years to 
reconstitute forces from the instant that strategic warning is 
provided and accepted by the intelligence community? If so, 

76 



which intelligence community - the U.S., NATO, all NATO nations, 
or some new international command? Could it be two years follow- 
ing the government's acceptance that "something is wrong" that 
should be redressed? Which government or governments, and must 
NATO, collectively, agree to react? Is it two years, assuming 
that we detect something significant and recognize it at the 
time? 

Two year ' s warning does not mean that the USSR cannot launch 
an intercontinental nuclear strike against the continental 

1 TO 

U.S., or an attack at the tactical, or perhaps even the opera- 
tional level in Europe, in less time. There is probably some 
period of time associated with still realistic, but lesser, 
threats from the Soviet Union that is less than two years and 
more than two weeks. A major regional contingency involving the 
USSR in Europe should be, and is, in our program planning contin- 
gencies. 

Indeed, the U.S. should include in its family of programming 
scenarios a major regional contingency involving the USSR in 
Europe, but limited to that theater. This will be new for 
navies. Program planning for a major single region contingency 
involving another global seapower will involve new thinking — in 
war situations, navies could hardly be expected to keep the fight 
limited to a single theater. That program planning assumption 
will now also need to be made by the sea services. 



77 



Even accepting the ability of the intelligence community to 
provide a two year's strategic warning, there is controversy over 
what governments will do when faced with the initially, perhaps 
inconclusive, evidence provided. In October, General Galvin told 
a group of former NATO headguarters officers that two years 
warning time should be viewed in the context of the warning 
provided to, and the response made by, the United States from 
September 1939 to December 1941. 123 Post-Stalin Soviet military 
authors are never reluctant to remind readers that, despite over- 
whelming intelligence evidence of an impending invasion by Nazi 
Germany, and despite the recommendations for mobilization from 
his military staffs, the USSR was not prepared for the invasion 
that began in June 1941. 

If Western history is a guidebook of non-reactions to rear- 
mament by totalitarian nations and violations of arms control 
agreements, we should assume that democracies will: (1), delay 
decisions to rearm for many reasons - such as different interpre- 
tations of ambiguous intelligence data, the desire to deescalate 
a crisis, etc., (2), deny that a change in a former opponent's 
behavior has taken place or, if it has, is strategically insig- 
nificant or not precisely a violation of an agreement, and (3) , 
even suppress the intelligence and findings of facts that do not 
support government policy. 

A major lesson from previous arms control agreements is that 
they not only limit necessary preparations for deterrence, but 
also deter democracies from exposing totalitarian nations openly 

78 



violating such agreements. During the inter-war period, Germany, 
Italy and Japan built many warships exceeding limits set forth in 
arms control and other treaties - clear violations, actively 
hidden by at least one major democracy. For example, Britain had 
an Italian cruiser in its Gibraltar drydock, weighed it, found it 
in excess of the 10,000 ton treaty limit, and hid its 
findings. 24 In yet another case, the Admiralty continued to 
record the incorrect but treaty-compliant tonnage for the German 
battleship BISMARK, even after it was sunk and the Royal Navy's 

Intelligence Division had examined the surviving ship's logs and 

125 
crew. X * J 

Linking the behavior of a nation to a formal agreement, such 
as arms control, takes the reporting and interpretation of data 
away from the intelligence community and makes it the province of 
lawyers and politicians. For years, these bureaucrats debated 
whether a Soviet radar was in compliance with the ABM Treaty, 
despite no apparent changes in the data provided by the intelli- 
gence community. We sensed that there were differing interpre- 
tations of ambiguous data, that the violation was not strategi- 
cally significant or not a precise violation, or that, even if 
true, the fact should not have been reported since it undermined 
the arms control process. In the end, the Soviets admitted that 
the radar was a violation. Had this radar not been linked to an 
arms control treaty, it is most likely that the assessment of its 
intended purpose would have been the routine province of profes- 
sionals. 



79 



We must make a serious study of the decision-making patterns 
of nations faced with decisions similar to that which NATO gov- 
ernments will face when presented with ambiguous evidence which, 
some might argue, constitutes "proof" that the USSR, or the 
Russian Republic in a new USSR confederation, is violating the 
"understandings" or treaties that codify the new international 
security environment. NATO reactions will be inhibited by the 
arms control and confidence building measures we adopt over the 
next few years. 

War planners, unlike program planners, are not required to 
use "best case" assumptions and are, therefore, authorized to 
formulate their plans on less optimistic suppositions. Hence, 
redirection of programming planners to the "best case" (two years 
warning) does not necessarily influence war planning for current 
forces. Nor does it necessarily deny government decision-makers 
access to alternative intelligence assessments based upon current 
capabilities rather than program assumption intentions. 

The military should include in their family of actual war 
plans, plans based upon the track record of their governments 
acting courageously in response to provocation. For example, the 
military is not barred from drafting internal war plans which 
assume that authorization for the mobility of existing forces and 
the mobilization of reserves will not be granted until hostili- 
ties begin. 



80 



Decision-making studies to support program and current war 
planning should span the gamut of possible scenarios. At one end 
of the spectrum is the "worst case," of NATO reconstituting its 
forces within the two years predicted, but withholding the au- 
thority to mobilize forces out of garrison and responding to 
tactical warning until an attack by the USSR takes place, is 
verified, reported to the national and allied command authori- 
ties, and an authorization to respond is communicated to the 
field. In this scenario, we assume that the Soviet military 
machine came back strong and went back into Eastern Europe. 126 

The related "best case" would be if all forces could report 
to their NATO-assigned positions, ready for a stillborn Soviet 
threat generated during two years of economic and political 
chaos. Perhaps in this situation, NATO might have an option for 
offensive tactical and even operational-level warfare against the 
USSR. 



At the other end of the spectrum is the other "worst case," 
of a USSR that takes a full two years to rearm in such a manner 
that it obtains a significant advantage in its estimation of the 
correlation of forces and means. The scenario would assume that 
NATO nations failed to make bold decisions when faced with ambig- 
uous evidence by the intelligence community. The associated 
"best case" would be a NATO that made the bold decisions and 
matched the Soviet regeneration with their own. Both sides would 



81 



then be fully reconstituted and on a wartime command and control 
footing and deployment. 

Numerous other scenarios need investigation. Despite the 
lack of credibility accorded a "bolt-from-the-blue" ground attack 
by the USSR during the new international security environment, we 
should analyze this scenario to develop intelligence indicators 
to monitor as insurance against such a possibility. 

It is even conceivable that Eastern European nations might 
ask Soviet, or Russian, troops back into their nations 127 to 
counteract what they perceive to be a threat from Germany. That 
scenario can build upon existing studies. Differences with 
today's scenarios might include reconstitution at national loca- 
tions but failure to deploy forces from home garrisons and allow 
their transfer to NATO. Other possibilities include using por- 
tions of the programmed Pacific and Contingency Forces, in addi- 
tion to the Atlantic Force, to respond to a European crisis. 

War planners will also wrestle over how much time, and what 
type of decisions, are required during the initial combat actions 
in a crisis, before forces are either called up from the reserves 
or reconstituted in full. During this period, presumably both 
superpowers would act defensively. How long should we assume 
this period will last? Should we have one set of assumptions for 
programming and another for war planning? It is very likely that 
programmers will assume a longer defensive period than do opera- 
tional war planners. 

82 



NATO exercises and simulated military decision-making usual- 
ly has assumed that the alliance political structure would make 
decisions, which would then be executed by near-simultaneous 
actions taken by all member nations. In a restructured NATO 
alliance more political than military, in a new international 
security environment, alliance and national military commanders 
might have to devise future plans based upon a likely decision- 
making process which has member nations taking unilateral actions 
prior to those of the Alliance. 

National decisions taking preeminence, in turn, would re- 
quire Alliance planning for sequential rather than simultaneous 
military operations. Similarly, planning for allied, or combined 
forces, military operations may take second place to national 
planning. Future military planning by NATO may stress combined 
or joint operations but with forces under national command. 
These topics are all being discussed by the appropriate military 
commands . 

Crisis decision-making should also be reviewed carefully, 
with the lessons of the post World War II era firmly in mind. 
Not all crises will require decisions at the same pace; some 
crises are slow to build, others are more fast-paced. Some 
crises occur with armed conflict imminent while others occur 
after the outbreak of hostilities. Measured responses need to 
include the full gamut -- from a minor show of force to a major 



83 



insertion of all types of troops. Scenarios should include a 
favorable outcome to a worst-case response. A building-block 
approach appears an appropriate analogy. 

These and other scenarios should be augmented by the most 
sophisticated techniques available, to learn lessons of wars and 
campaigns yet to be fought. An artificial history could be writ- 
ten of alternative futures. Then the military can better advise 
the political leadership on the most suitable courses of action 
for impending decisions. 

Technological Requirements 

In the new politico-military environment, the American 
public predictably is unlikely to support a major overseas mili- 
tary presence, or combat in foreign lands. If future crisis 
scenarios assume host nation and coalition support, we must also 
plan to resolve these crises quickly, then withdraw. Hence, 
requirements will demand high technology weapons systems using 
robotics and artificial intelligence so that, if engaged in com- 
bat, American casualties are minimized and the crisis resolved 
rapidly. As Admiral Jeremiah reminded us in December, without the 
Soviet threat to spur continued investment in hardware, obsoles- 
cence in deployed systems will slow down - perhaps permitting us 
technological leaps instead of concentrating on marginal improve- 
ments. America's smaller armed forces should be provided with 
the most technologically advanced equipment. 



84 



Perhaps it is time to revisit President Reagan's dream of a 
defense-dominant world. 129 Deployment of the ABM Treaty-compliant 
antiballistic missile system should be a first step, instead of 
the Administration arguing for both strategic defenses and the 
available technology reguired for GPALS. Once there is a nation- 
al consensus on the value of defenses, and a Treaty-compliant 
system is actually fielded, the U.S. can move toward more costly 
programs - but incrementally. 

Technologies formerly considered less useful under the old 
political and international security environment may prove more 
interesting in the brave new world. For example, with adeguate 

overseas bases, offshore basing technologies received only modest 

i on ... 

interest. With the possibility that many American forces may 

return to North America, the U.S. should investigate carefully 

the realistic capabilities of offshore basing concepts. 

With the demise of the old NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario and the 
prospect of numerous arms control agreements, the reguirement for 
certain technologies may diminish. For example, if the Soviet 
Union accepts mutual assured destruction, demonstrated by aban- 
doning strategic air and missile defenses, we may not need to 
invest in countermeasures to penetrate those defenses and attack 
strategic offensive forces. Similarly, if warhead numbers are 
driven low enough, we might abandon the search for increased 
missile accuracy. 



85 



With NATO armies on both sides of the old inter-German 
border, some systems designed for AIRLAND Battle should have 
lower priorities. Conversely, some technologies identified with 
NATO follow-on forces attack (FOFA) may still be useful in 
out-of-area contingency operations. An integrated joint task 
force, comprised of all the services, might benefit from technol- 
ogies designed to conduct simultaneous operations over the full 
breadth and depth of the battlefield. 2 The intelligence commu- 
nity should provide an assessment of world areas where such 
technologies might prove useful. An unbiased review of the tech- 
nologies and systems associated with the AIRLAND Battle and FOFA 
will decide which are appropriate under the new national security 
strategy. 

The U.S. government is concerned with maintaining its edge 

, -i -i -i ... , 

in defense technologies. It has identified key technologies 

that should be protected, and routinely tracks our relative 

standing in these areas vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. We have 

recently expanded the comparisons of our technological standing 

to include allied nations, developing countries, and Eastern 

Europe. 

Expanded technological comparisons call for new analyses 
from the intelligence community, and demand new national efforts 
to ensure that the appropriate technology is protected. Technolo- 
gies available for what remains of military competition could 
improve so dramatically in the next few years that the fundamen- 
tal nature of warfare may also change. Competition in military 

86 



hardware could shift from the nuclear arena to the non-nuclear 
and, as non-nuclear weapons become ever more capable, they may 
substitute for nuclear weapons at the tactical, operational, and 
even strategic levels. Nations will attempt to retain their tech- 
nological leads in key areas, including sectors which formerly 
did not reguire protection. If protection of emerging technolo- 
gies is too restrictive, it can stifle initiative and progress. 
A balance should be maintained between the need to protect tech- 
nologies and that to ensure growth. 

Economic technological competition with other nations will 
continue despite the new international security environment. 134 
While there have been efforts to limit the spread of technologies 
to the Eastern-bloc, we will likely see wholesale changes in the 
management of militarily significant commercial products by the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) . 
Existing national legislation reguires reconsideration and amend- 
ment, while new legislation is clearly needed to deal with the 
myriad of guestions arising when former socialist states apply 
for access to technologies forbidden them for outdated ideologi- 
cal and military reasons. Governments must fundamentally revise 
policies to transfer key technologies to certain nations for 
economic advantage, not military balance of forces. 

The nation would benefit from a Presidential Blue-Ribbon 
Panel synthesizing key technologies to explain and validate their 
importance in the new politico-military environment. The panel 



87 



might attempt to resolve the difficult question of balance be- 
tween protection and growth and perhaps many we thought critical 
can be downgraded. Still, if we are to reconstitute a signifi- 
cant combat capability against a world-class adversary, we should 
to identify those technologies that we must still protect. 

Research & Development 

Considering the records of nations producing major weapons 
systems, it is obvious that a fundamental restructuring of the 
defense procurement processes is long overdue. Industry often 
sought, or took the leading role in exploring, technological 
opportunities and charged that research to overhead for major 
programs. With the major programs likely to be severely reduced, 
a new mechanism is required for basic research and initial devel- 
opment. To change the leading role in military R&D, governments 
may be compelled to reverse a major downward spiral in this 
category of spending. Indeed, General Powell stated in his 
December speeches that defense R&D is one of the four underlying 
support capabilities of the new national security strategy. 

Another possibility is to set up major government design 
bureaus, and internalize R&D responsibility itself -- perhaps 
specializing in areas devoid of normal civilian spin-offs. The 
Navy did this in the 1930s, when its Naval Aircraft Factory did 
prototyping, and both the Aircraft Factory and shipyards provided 
"yardsticks" by which to measure contractor performance. An 
alternative strategy is to continue those operations in the 
private sector and provide nourishing government subsidies. Per- 

88 



haps stati; and local governments can be persuaded to invest in 
R&D as well. The objective is to retain technology capabilities 
in numerous areas and the production capability in a few. 

In any case, the output cannot be a family of senescent 
designs, curing on the shelf, but rather fully operational proto- 
types which normally never enter full scale development. In some 
cases, limited production runs may be necessary to ensure that 
production experience is maintained. In most cases, product 
improvement programs should be included in the prototype program. 
A prototypes development program should ensure that both the 
capability of assembly and a dynamic R&D program continue. 

The Soviets also have worried about the same issues as they 
convert former military industries to civilian production. Rear 
Admiral Yu M. Khaliulin, Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, 
told Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev at a November 13, 1990 
meeting with military people's deputies, that a naval ship should 
be built every year or two at newly "converted" shipyards, just 
to retain the capability to do so. 

Such a shift in USSR defense procurement will offer new 
challenges to our intelligence community. How do we classify 
evidence of new hardware when we cannot predict whether it will 
be followed by a procurement program? Keeping multiple products 
on the shelf is also a good competitive strategy that will force 
an enemy to match all possible threats, instead of just a few. 



89 



This, of course, works both ways and may prove justification for 
otherwise unwanted armaments. This shift to worrying about 
possible "breakout" is not altogether new, but will alter the 
emphasis of our collection efforts. 

The new programming environment will reflect a new under- 
standing of the partnership between government and industry. It 
will require major changes in the charters of many R&D and pro- 
gramming agencies to allow easier adaptation of commercial tech- 
nologies into the defense sector and the continued flow of de- 
fense technologies into the civilian world. It is also likely to 
require changing defense regulations to allow profits on R&D and 
prototypes. 

Investment Strategy and Conversion 

The major implication of the two-year big war warning of a 
Europe-centered global war with the USSR is that American pro- 
gramming strategy will shift its focus to the more immediate 
threats presented in other areas of the world. Until now, the 
unstated relationship of the threat to programmed forces was, 
generally, that U.S. forces would meet the challenge of the most 
demanding threat, the USSR, and assume that they could also cope 
with lesser contingencies. That basic assumption was not entire- 
ly true and now will be essentially reversed: forces will be 
acquired to meet the challenges of the more likely, less demand- 
ing, threats assuming that they are also useful against the more 
unlikely but greater threat posed by a Soviet Union that decides 
to rearm. 



90 



This will be a new planning assumption for America, new for 
its allies, and somewhat impractical for the near term - or until 
we see substantial changes in Soviet maritime and nuclear force 
structure to match what we know for certain are reductions in the 
ground and air forces. The intelligence community is tasked to 
advise Western governments when their strategic nuclear and 
maritime postures can be relaxed. Can it meet the challenge? 

There will be a fundamental restructuring of the near-term 
programming already contracted, and there may be extraordinarily 
high penalties incurred as industries move from the defense area 
to others. Programs like the B-2, A-12, the YF-22A, and other 
advanced technology aircraft, the SSN-21 SEAWOLF submarine, the 
follow-on to the TRIDENT II (D-5) missile, and other programs 
such as TACIT RAINBOW, tied to the AIRLAND Battle, appear related 
to an international security environment that no longer exists. 

There will be last-ditch attempts to salvage certain pro- 
grams, arguments that previously programmed forces are needed in 
the new "base" force, and bids to simply keep people employed and 
legislative districts satisfied. This will be a great challenge 
to the new Congress — which should play its larger role instead 
of responding only to narrow constituent interests. 

An obvious next step for the DoD is to provide incentives 
for the services to stop rejustifying old programs under the new 



91 



national security strategy and, instead, to actually perform a 
zero-based needs assessment. An obvious second step is to plan 
for the divestiture of unnecessary forces, equipment and indus- 
trial capability. There will be a great temptation to tie the 
reduction in capability to arms control - both for reasons of 
merit and to delay, or perhaps derail, reductions. 

Implicit in the reconstitution portion of the new national 
security strategy is the retention of capability to produce 
equipment and supplies that have not been maintained. Not all 
firms must convert, nor should they be allowed to convert to the 
civilian non-defense sector. Government could regulate the 

decline but appears prepared to allow the market to determine 

137 
survivors. 

Some firms will manage to convert to the civilian sector. 
The assisted conversion of defense businesses to the civilian 
sector is a highly charged process. If a firm can produce tanks 
and another automobiles, why subsidize the uninitiated to do what 
there are competent firms already doing? Conversion assistance 
schemes abound, with proposals to use independent R&D funds for 
everything from non-military ventures to fully-funded programs. 

For those firms which can convert, with or without assist- 
ance, there will be significant cultural adjustments. Government 
contractors often have the customer providing capital for spe- 
cialized facilities and equipment. This is not normal procedure 
in the commercial market. In the defense industrial world, re- 

92 



quirements often advance the state of the art whereas in the 
commercial market, state of the art is limited by costs and 
competition. The two environments have drastically different 
financial structures and supporting infrastructures capable of 
preparing proposals. 

Defense contractors are often organized along narrow com- 
partmentalized, functional lines with little awareness of the 
overall program. Many firms do business in both worlds but there 
is little interconnection of personnel. Government and civilian 
contractors both agree that there is a significant problem con- 
verting personnel from one culture into successes in the other. 
It is also likely that management cannot make the transition. 

After Vietnam War production ended, a downsizing of the 
defense industry was followed by massive displacements of pro- 
fessional and technical specialists. Conversion efforts then 
consisted largely of acquiring non-defense firms and attempting 
to expand into new markets. Most conversions failed, but pri- 
marily at the plant level. The cultural shock was either too 
great or the technologies offered by the defense firms were not 
needed. 



The wholesale demobilization of military personnel into the 
civilian job market has taken place several times in the United 
States, with mixed results. Appropriate temporary programs are 



93 



needed to ensure that we manage the transition smoothly to sup- 
port new national industrial and business goals. 

Some industrial and military facilities inevitably will be 
idled, even made obsolete, by the new national security strategy. 
We can anticipate massive environmental cleanups at particularly 
dirty facilities, such as industrial sites used for the manufac- 
ture of weapons grade plutonium. The staggering costs of these 
efforts will make them economically unattractive for private 
peaceful use. Clearly, the government will have to assume these 
costs. 138 

The conversion of defense plants, and other government capa- 
bilities, should be studied by a Blue-Ribbon Panel assisted by 
industrial and professional associations. This effort goes beyond 
similar panels that have suggested acquisition reform since, in 
this case, the government must ensure that defense-critical 
industries are identified and make certain the capability to 
produce is retained. 

Reconstitution 

Reconstitution has three essential sub-components: mobiliza- 
tion, military force reconstitution, and industrial reconstitu- 
tion. Mobilization will provide the ability to respond to crises 
with an active duty and reserve force mix. Much more attention 
should be paid to ensuring that the reserves can respond, then 
return to their disrupted civilian occupations without loss of 
families, homes, and jobs. Existing legislation should be re- 

94 



viewed following the completion of Operations DESERT SHIELD and 
DESERT STORM. 

Military force and industrial reconstitution, however, are 
areas in which the U.S. has not had active interests for many 
years. Reconstitution must provide, primarily in the European 
theater - but not only there, additional forces and military 
hardware for a major war, assuming that no major combat takes 
place for two years. Reconstitution time goals can be somewhat 
vague; since what is required is that we need only convince the 
Soviet Union, and European nations, that we can reconstitute a 
credible deterrence/defense faster than the USSR can reconstitute 
a offense. Reconstitution in Europe is possible only with a 
continued alliance structure such as NATO. 

According to Admiral Jeremiah's March Congressional testimo- 
ny, the new Army cadre reserve divisions will reach combat-ready 
status in 12-18 months. Marine Corps reserve divisions have not 
been included in this new cadre status. The individual ready 
reserve or conscription are low cost methods of managing the 
necessary manpower pool required for reconstitution. Additional 
goals for reconstitution will be provided as staffs become famil- 
iar with the concept - but some initial areas to investigate 
might include: sealift and intertheater airlift, strategic air 
and missile defenses, and short-range and naval nuclear weapons. 



95 



Most difficult will be maintaining a cadre of leaders. How 
will they obtain the necessary military leadership training at 
appropriate levels of command, when there are fewer forces to 
command? Schools are an obvious solution for the officer corps 
and senior non-commissioned officers, but will the services fund 
schools when faced with giving airmen flight time or sailors 
actual time at sea? Service schools may have to be consolidated 
for efficiency but there may be even more novel solutions. 

If the officer corps is to be significantly reduced below 
current levels, eventually a level is reached at which it is no 
longer efficient to maintain military-run graduate schools, war 
colleges, and individual service flight training. A similar 
problem exists with special and limited duty, non-commissioned, 
and warrant officers, technical schools, and some government 
laboratories. Suggestions to consolidate DoD facilities are al- 
ready under consideration but other government agencies might 
consolidate with defense. 

The Department of Energy maintains laboratories, the Federal 
Aviation Agency has aviation facilities, inter alia. Expanding 
the student body may even take the form of training and educating 
military students from former socialist nations — attempting to 
provide them with the technical details and structural framework 
for a military operating within a democracy. The intelligence 
community could take advantage of this opportunity to learn more 
about the capabilities of the Soviet and other foreign military 
services. Increasing the number of foreign students attending 

96 



military schools may also improve our own language training 
capabilities. 

One solution, other than consolidation, or expanding the 
student base, is an affiliation of defense schools and laborato- 
ries with select civilian institutions. The innovation would 
provide mixed civilian-military educational and research institu- 
tions that can be "reconstituted" to pure military or government 
facilities within two years. We may not need large numbers of 
officers and technical specialists trained during peace, but the 
model for the reconstitution of industry might well be applied to 
military training and education. 

Another solution is to broaden and raise the level of re- 
search conducted at these institutions so that a substantive 
faculty remains onboard, and can shift to teaching duties when 
required. Keeping special and limited duty, non-commissioned, 
and warrant officers active in research at industry, or mixed 
government-industry design bureaus, can maintain the nucleus of a 
capability that may be required on short notice. Similar ar- 
rangements can be made with government graduate schools to in- 
crease their research and still return quickly to teaching. 
These suggested solutions beg for a Presidential Blue-Ribbon 
panel to study the options and make non-partisan recommendations. 

Some of the military capability that America and its allies 
must retain should be contained in existing active duty and ready 



97 



reserve forces. On-hand equipment and supplies are needed for 
those ready forces, while some should be stockpiled and preposi- 
tioned. Maritime prepositioning offers great flexibility, re- 
cently demonstrated in the Middle East. However, not all the 
materials for all types of war need be readily available. 



Implicit in the President's new national security strategy 
is the capability of tooling-up for wartime production within two 
years for a major war in Europe and less than that for lengthy 
contingency operations. General Powell stated in December that 
this ability to reconstitute was one of the critical underlying 
support capabilities of the new national security strategy. This 
capability will consist primarily of the knowledge, skills, and 
tools to respond within the time limits specified. This 
concept is not new. We should review the 1930s history of plan- 



ning assumptions and industry's ability to respond 



141 



Dr. Fred Ikle, former Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), 
was a proponent of preprogrammed crisis budgets and industrial 
responses to bridge the gap between peacetime and wartime. 
Industrial mobilization, instead of military mobilization or the 
deployment of troops, might form the basis of an adequate govern- 
mental response to ambiguous warning indicators. Ikle proposed a 
series of industrial alert conditions, similar to those used in 
the military, which would trigger specific actions. These would 
be less threatening because they would not immediately increase 
military capability. 



98 



A "graduated deterrence response," the term used by General 
Butler, could well involve a "graduated industrial response." 143 
This is not the same type of response that the government ordered 
in 1987 under the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) concept 
-- that program being used to support national mobilization for 
crises and war with existing forces and strategies. 144 GMR 
remains a high priority program to support regional contingency 
response. There is no reason contracts cannot be let ahead of 
time for both a response to a major war and for contingencies. 

Although we speak abstractly about devising plans and pass- 
ing budgets ahead of the need to do so, economists must help 
government ascertain how much money would be required to recon- 
stitute the defense industry. If that money is earmarked for 
other purposes, then financial planning should include tracking 
sufficient governmental short-term money which can be quickly 
diverted to defense — if the GMR and reconstitution part of the 
new national security strategy is to have teeth. 

Industry and government should decide on a basic strategy 
consonant with our ability to support a defense industrial base 
and invest in new technologies; and both must be comfortable with 
their new, nonconf rontational, roles. Government should ensure 
that industry is capable of retooling and delivering military 
products within two years or less. 



99 



The government record of abandoning major production pro- 
grams is a travesty, and it is likely that - unless consciously 
addressed - we will permit the destruction of most capability. 
Notable examples include the Apollo and Saturn 5 programs, where 
facilities, equipment, hardware, stores, instrumentation, data 
files, test stands, etc. were destroyed and all technical teams 
were dispersed. 

Many military contractors have been provided government- 
owned equipment, or have charged the development of facilities 
and equipment to military contracts. If the federal government 
wants these facilities retained, mothballed, or perhaps even 
improved, then it should provide incentives. Ownership of gov- 
ernment equipment can be transferred to industry, or management 
of facilities can be turned over to government. If retained by 
industry, federal, state, and local tax laws must be revised to 
reduce or eliminate taxes on idle property and land. 

Industry will work, meanwhile, on projects that have no 
direct defense application and simultaneously be asked to main- 
tain the expertise necessary to produce military equipment within 
specified time limits. Keeping this expertise will require 
innovative measures — perhaps even joint government and private 
repositories of knowledge at taxpayers expense. This, in turn, 
requires new and innovative approaches to intellectual property 
rights. The Department of Defense has allowed defense contrac- 
tors to retain title rights for inventions while reserving the 
right of license-free use. If we mix federal and private sector 

100 






research, we may have to allow federal employees to benefit from 
royalties for work that is produced while on government time. 

Making the two year response time a reality may require 
abandoning military design specifications (MILSPEC) in many 
areas. We may have to acknowledge that, to meet deadlines, 
available commercial products may be substituted. For areas that 
clearly require specifications, the old system should be re- 
tained. 

The reconstitution of industrial capability appears the 
single most demanding element of the new national security 
strategy. The March 1991 JMNA states that "it would likely be 6 
to 24 months before industrial base mobilization or surge produc- 
tion could begin to deliver critical items. . .by the end-FY 
1997, it is estimated that it would take 2 to 4 years to restore 
production capability to 1990 levels for items whose lines have 
gone 'cold'." Fortunately, the Soviet Union is accorded the same 
capability. Clearly, the U.S. will have to monitor the ability to 
meet reconstitution targets, to test capabilities, to enhance the 
credibility of our response and to monitor the Soviet ability to 
do the same . 

Reconstitution is fundamentally oriented toward the U.S. 
contribution to the defense of Europe in the face of a regenerat- 
ed Soviet conventional threat. The U.S. need not reconstitute 
the 1990-era conventional force it had forward-deployed to Eu- 



101 



rope. New technologies, especially in air breathing systems, may 
offer the same or even increased combat potential with fewer 
ground troops. 

Nuclear weapons, especially those based at sea, and maritime 
forces, offer the U.S. an ability to fully meet its military 
commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty without the extensive 
deployment of any ground or air forces on European soil. Simply 
put, if the U.S. Army was to totally withdraw a combat capability 
from the European continent, the U.S. could still provide routine 
extended deterrence with its nuclear forces at sea. A rapid 
response to any European crisis can be met with our forward- 
deployed carrier and Marines as well as new Air Force composite 
wings and rapidly deployable Army units. 

Stockpiles 

Technologies are not the only economic assets whose protec- 
tion has been justified for military reasons. Our National 
Defense Stockpile is guaranteed to provide the U.S. with guaran- 
teed access to critical strategic minerals for three years. We 
feared both disruption during a long war with the USSR, and 
curtailed access during the so-called "resources war," that never 
occurred. Interestingly, although we can claim that certain 

critical finished components should have been stockpiled, no such 

14c 
program ever existed. 

Our National Defense Stockpile of strategic minerals had its 
genesis well prior to the Cold War, but can it be justified 

102 



economically? Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, maintain similar 
reserves for economic reasons but, some years ago, a major study 
of the goals and objectives of our stockpile concluded that a 
less costly option to ensure access to materials included inter- 
national development agencies and diplomatic efforts to ensure 

stability of major minerals producers, without significant budge- 
14 6 

tary costs. 

Perhaps maintaining strategic reserves had more to do with 
domestic politics than true defense needs. In any case, the 
entire program should be reexamined and one of the options should 
be a carefully controlled sale of major portions of the stockpile 
to reduce the federal deficit. 

The U.S. strategic petroleum reserves have been justified 
for economic rather than military reasons. On the other hand, 
the Rapid Deployment Force and numerous military programs have 
also been justified to ensure America's access to oil. Given 
competition for tax dollars, it seems a prudent planning assump- 
tion that the Congress may not fund both a refill of the petrole- 
um reserve and General Powell's Atlantic Force to ensure we have 
access to oil. 

It is equally appropriate to review the goals and objectives 
of our capabilities to provide sufficient quantities of oil -- 
but to fund only one. If, instead of the current unmet goal of 
90 days, we had an oil reserve capable of supplying all economic 



103 



and military needs for one or two years, would we also have time 
to mobilize additional military reserves for, or reconstitute, a 
more capable Atlantic Force? If our oil reserves were this high, 
would we have intervened in Kuwait? 

DoD Organization 

If changes of this magnitude persist, it is obvious that the 
Department of Defense is about to undergo another soul-wrenching 
military services roles-and-missions reappraisal. From a reading 
of this year's Service Secretary's and Chiefs of Staff posture 
statements, it is obvious that the Army was more attuned to the 
new strategy and "base" force than were the other services. The 
absence of serious discussion of the new national security 
strategy by the other services in their posture statements is, 
frankly, remarkable - given the fact that the Aspen speech oc- 
curred almost six months earlier. 

No matter how painful, the review of roles and missions will 
occur, implicitly with budget decisions or explicitly if we dare. 
Should new services be created - such as space or special opera- 
tions forces - or do we instead field the recommended four new 
forces, made up of multiple services operating under joint mili- 
tary strategies? 

Even more interesting is the question of should the bulk of 
the Marine Corps remain as a part of the Department of the Navy 
and keep its already-identified primary focus in the Pacific; or, 
dedicate forces to the continental U.S. -based land warfare-ori- 



104 



ented Contingency Force and play a greater role in the Army-heavy 
Atlantic Force, and concurrently move most of its assets to the 
Department of the Army? Some argue that the Navy/Marine Corps 
team is already an existing contingency response force - implying 
why do we need another? 147 The new strategy assumes that we need 
a unilateral modest tactical capability, which we already have 
with our Amphibious Strike Task Forces and MPF MEBs. 

If the Marine Corps casts its lot with the Army, it might be 
able to successfully shift the bulk of its fighting potential 
without loss of its special identification. Other armies have 
amphibious troops and the U.S Army already has five amphibious 
assault ships and is building 35 assault landing craft. A 
very small independent Naval or Marine Infantry might be retained 
under the Navy for at-sea duties such as: evacuation of non- 
combatants, piracy suppression, the at-sea recovery of maritime 
assets, drug interdiction, and guard duties. 

On the other hand, staying with the Navy Department means 
that planned programs and personnel actions will not undergo the 
scrutiny associated with a shift to a new military department. On 
the whole, although one can make a case that the bulk of the 
Marine Corps could and even should shift to the Army, it is 
doubtful that neither the Administration nor the JCS will tackle 
this issue in the near term. Hence the Marine Corps should not 
oppose the new strategy and "base" force - they assume that under 
it, no one will question their "right" to exist. 



105 



Since the Air Campaign was so successful in Operation DESERT 
STORM, can we finally bury the recurring suggestion to revisit a 
separate Air Force? Recognizing the success of the Air Campaign 
in Operation DESERT STORM, can we explain why naval aviation 
appears to have been assigned so many support, instead of combat 
missions; and why the integration of naval aviation in the Air 
Campaign was handled in the manner that it was? 

The Chairman of the JCS told his ADPA audience and Army 
Times in April that the new four military forces do not neces- 
sarily represent new C-in-Cs, but unanswered is the obvious 
question: whether we need the current number and geographical 
disposition? Probably more than any other issue associated 
with the new national security strategy and "base" force, the 
review of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) , dividing the world into 

C-in-C areas of responsibility, has more flag and general offi- 

i so • 

cer's attention than any other item. Similar concerns in the 

NATO command structure also need to be addressed. 

The new national security strategy and "base" force suggest 
that we revisit the existing wartime command and control struc- 
ture for theater and functional C-in-Cs. 151 Do we need warfight- 
ing C-in-Cs for the entire world? With asymmetrical reductions 
in force structure should come a loss of organizational influ- 
ence. 152 Such changes will obviously affect all joint military 
and intelligence organizations. 



106 



Even after we settle the UCP, there are other obvious impor- 
tant questions. For example, if we retain the existing plan, 
should SACEUR automatically be an American? A good case can be 
made by some Europeans that he should not. If we shift to the new 
structure for an Atlantic Force to replace the Commander-in- 
Chief, U.S. Forces, Atlantic (USCINCLANT) , then should this 
commander automatically be a naval officer? Can he be a Marine? 
If a majority of strategic nuclear offensive forces are sea-based 
and if all strategic nuclear forces will belong to a single 
command, should its commander be a Navy officer? If the Pacific 
is destined to remain a maritime theater, it obviously needs 
maritime leadership. 

In addition to these obvious organizational questions, we 
should address the type of individual involved in this major 
overhaul of the defense planning assumptions? The military 
should provide individuals who can both represent service inter- 
ests and capabilities and appreciate the task at hand. This 
exercise cannot be just another interagency meeting, with compro- 
mise likely and one service holding the entire process hostage to 
their threats or objections. 

This review will have serious repercussions in existing 
force structures and established plans for future forces. It is 
going to hurt, and will require officer participants willing to 
place their allegiance to country ahead of combat arms or service 
parochialism. These individuals exist in the peacetime services, 



107 



generally already networking outside of official channels. 153 
Perhaps W2 could review our entire system for training and edu- 
cating weapons systems acguisition managers, and more fully inte- 
grate basic political science type issues that were assumed 
constant in the past. 

Problems with the guality of existing DoD strategic plan- 
ning, or politico-military, personnel have been discussed fre- 
guently. They should have been solved by the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act and two administrations committed to implement this legisla- 
tion. The fundamental review of national military strategy will 
severely test this assumption. The low level of inter-service 
infighting made public over Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT 
STORM indicates that there has been success in this area. 

Past problems occurred at all levels: with political ap- 
pointees, within the services, or both. Some political appointees 
have caused problems because of their relative inexperience, high 
turnover rates, and lengthy vacancies. The position of Under 
Secretary of Defense (Policy) during the Reagan Administration 
remained unfilled for an extended period following the resigna- 
tion of Dr. Fred Ikle. Past friction between the experienced 
military and the relatively inexperienced political appointee 
could be exacerbated when those political appointees preside over 
the wholesale dismantling of a military machine that senior 
officers spent their entire careers building and defending. 



108 



The Transition Period 

Before we attain the "new world order," we must manage a 
smooth transition period that gets us from here to there. There 
are numerous problems of consensus on what this new world will 
look like; but assuming such a consensus is possible, a plan 
needs to be devised for the journey. The new national security 
strategy and the "base" force are the Administration's first 
attempts to articulate the goals. They are not yet a plan for 
the transition. 

With the Administrations 's goals, American social scientists 
must quickly provide rough answers to approximations of how much 
can be devoted to defense, considering other pressing national 
needs. The initial answer has been provided by the Administra- 
tion and the Congress - a 25 percent reduction is in order. This 
is not necessarily final, however. We may find that there are 
compelling reasons to defer such deep cuts so quickly (Soviet 
recent behavior is one such reason) or, that such success follows 
our initial reductions, that we should reduce even more. 

The intelligence community and civilian academics outside 
government should rapidly provide assessments of all threats to 
U.S. interests in areas of the world traditionally relegated to 
official indifference. Initially, planning for non-Soviet con- 
tingencies will be assessed in terms of Operations DESERT SHIELD 
and DESERT STORM, but recent actions in Southwest Asia may prove 
to be the exception rather than models of the future. 



109 



When President Reagan outlined his visions of a world with- 
out nuclear ballistic missiles, or a defense-dominated security 
environment, it was necessary to look not only at those individu- 
al scenarios but also to think through the painful transition 
from the current state of affairs to the new one. One scenario 
that should have been considered was a USSR that attempted to 
militarily "prevent" deployment of strategic defenses because of 
Soviet fear of the new security environment. After looking at 
this scenario, analysis should have yielded conditions necessary 
to make the USSR secure during this transition. 

We will need to evaluate carefully Soviet reaction to our 
rosy view of the "new world order." Although the Soviet Union 
appears to be an economic basket case, incapable of influencing 
external events, it does retain a massive military capability 
that cannot be ignored. In short, we should work closely with 
Soviet leaders to ensure that they are comfortable with the 
transition to a non-confrontational world that may be even less 
stable than the past. 

Arms Control 

Governments should have an integrated defense and arms 
control agenda. We should not attempt to delay planned military 
cuts in order to achieve an arms control agreement. Parallel 
unilateral actions by both superpowers is an acceptable model for 
action. Arms control should only be engaged in if it can be 
demonstrated that the agreement will contribute to the defense of 

110 



the United States, the decreased likelihood of war, the reduced 
consequences of war if one were to nevertheless break out, or a 
concurrent reduction in costs. 

The new national security strategy will present some inter- 
esting challenges to traditional arms control wisdom. For exam- 
ple, although both sides may wish to significantly reduce their 
nuclear arsenals, they may also desire to reconstitute additional 
capability. Indeed, a "quick fix" for an unseen or unchallenged 
Soviet regeneration or reconstitution is that of naval and air 
force nuclear weapons deployed to Europe. We may find military 
commanders even recommending retention of empty ICBM silos in 
order to reconstitute land-based nuclear capability within two 
years. These empty holes would offer verification difficulties 
and if this recommendation is made and accepted, it would require 
revisiting the SALT I Interim Agreement. 

We are currently engaged, or will likely soon engage, in 
arms control negotiations or unilateral steps in lieu of arms 
control, in almost every warfare area. Yet virtually none of 
these agreements reduces the threat to the U.S. in theaters out- 
side of Europe - the very area that we say is our primary focus 
for defense programming! 

Military Operations Research and Analysis 155 

The operations analysis and political science communities 
must cooperate as they never have before. 156 Military operations 



111 



analysis previously concentrated on investigating issues posed in 
a politico-military environment that was not subject to debate. 
Those assumptions are no longer valid. The old European-based 
war scenarios with two weeks warning and mobilization are simply 
not of very much interest anymore. 

The military operations analysis community has to reorient 
itself to measurements of regeneration and reconstitution where 
the timelines are measured in months and years, not days or 
weeks. Strategic warning, decision making, non-NATO battlefields 
(ashore and at sea) , manpower and personnel planning, resource 
allocation, test and evaluation, combat models, and gaming and 
simulation are all areas that will need fundamental readjustment 
in the new international security environment. 

One technique for viewing alternative futures is that of 
path gaming. These are politico-military games that identify 
interesting alternative paths to a desired future, and examine 
them simultaneously with different groups of players. Gaming, 
naturally, is no substitute for solid analysis. Gaming, however, 
can provide new insight, and supplements more traditional methods 
of dealing with alternative futures. This technique was recently 
used by the Naval War College to explore the politico-military 
environment under President Bush's new national security strate- 
gy. 158 

Governments will become more adept at using means, other 
than military forces, to influence the behavior of other nations 

112 



- hence these tools will also need to be studied as a part of our 
"graduated deterrence response." A recent Soviet forum "Civic 
Control Over Security," sponsored by the magazine Mezhdunarodnaya 
Zhizn and the School for the Strategy of Socio-Intellectual 
Enterprise in Rostov-on-Don, highlighted the vulnerability of the 
USSR to economic sanctions as the USSR becomes tied into the 
world economy and less self-sufficient. 159 In short, the mili- 
tary operations research community will need to integrate itself 
into analysis involving other tools of statecraft rather than 
considering itself a discipline that can exist unto itself. 

For example, new research may evaluate how successful eco- 
nomic sanctions have been in the past x v and as a supplement to 
Operation DESERT SHIELD. Apparently, sanctions were not as 
successful as some desired, since the U.S. and allied coalition 
nations launched Operation DESERT STORM. What is the appropriate 
mix of economic sanctions as a precursor to military operations 
and a follow-on, once the military campaign is completed? Econom- 
ic tools are even more difficult to use than in the past, as 
multi-national corporations become less responsive to national 
governments. The intelligence community will have to provide new 
types of information to decision-makers to allow them to assess 
the capabilities of economic and other sanctions. 

In short, military operations research and analysis will 
become more complicated and require the cooperation of special- 
ists in other disciplines. This will mean that the government 



113 



should devise a strategy to direct and manage all the studies 
that will be done as we learn what is required of our transition 
to the "new world order." 



114 



Critical Success Factors 

There appear to be four main problem areas in which solu- 
tions portend success for the President's dream. The first is 
that everything depends upon the responsible, good behavior of 
the Soviet Union. It may not be desirable to have your fundamen- 
tal national security strategy so dependent upon the behavior of 
the once "evil empire" but, for any of this to work, the Soviets 
must return to their homeland, remain inwardly focused, and 
continue the serious reductions in military capability they have 
only started. 

Specifically, what is meant by the continued "good" behavior 
of the Soviet Union will be debated. Clearly, additional draw- 
downs in naval and strategic nuclear systems must follow soon. 
Their inability to mount an offensive theater strategic offensive 
operation in Western Europe should be the key determinant. 
Internal behavior of the Soviet Union toward its own population, 
and marginal "cheating" or non-compliance with arms control 
measures, should not be grounds to derail the new national secu- 
rity strategy. 

It appears that Soviet behavior can be modified to allow the 
transition but recent (December 1990 - January 1991) events 
suggest other possibilities. Without continued inability of the 
USSR to directly and seriously threaten Western Europe - with a 
theater strategic offensive military operation with existing 



115 



forces - the President's new national security strategy is simply 
not appropriate. 

The second critical area demands that the intelligence 
community be able to surmount the new challenges. If funding for 
intelligence follows defense downward, then the reconstitution 
portion of the new national security strategy is bankrupt. The 
intelligence community should move into spheres they have tradi- 
tionally avoided or under-emphasized, such as the Third World and 
economics. They will also have significantly increased burdens 
demanded by the monitoring and verification of compliance of arms 
control agreements. This is possible only if decision-makers 
recognize this crucial underpinning of the new national security 
strategy. 

The third area that can undermine a successful transition to 
this new world will be the international behavior of allies and 
the U.S. Congress. Clearly, without Congress onboard, none of 
this is going to happen. Secretary Cheney's efforts to articu- 
late the new national security strategy are designed to ensure 
that the Department of Defense is ahead of Congress and that the 
new policies are adopted. 

Defense cuts have normally been performed in a "salami"-like 
fashion — across the board. The new national security strategy 
strongly suggests asymmetrical cuts. Reductions in all govern- 
ment programs have been made in the past without reference to 
existing or suggested government policies. Without an articulat- 

116 



ed national security strategy by the Bush Administration, the 
Congress would probably: (1) cut across the board, or (2) decide 
on their own version of a new national security strategy, and 
make asymmetrical cuts in accordance with that strategy. Clearly 
the Bush Administration has no choice but to present to Congress 
an articulate strategy for the defense of the U.S., then partici- 
pate in the normal budgetary and political debate that will 
result. 



If our European and Asian allies attempt to keep our forward 
presence there, and their contributions to their own defense 
lower than they should be, they will likely attempt to exploit 
our separation of governmental powers. The debate over retaining 
a forward overseas presence for U.S. forces has generally assumed 
presumptions made by each side; unquestionably we need to main- 
tain a permanent presence, or we can now return all the troops 
home. In the debate over retaining an overseas presence, all 
sides should explain the rationale, the benefits, and costs of 
their points of view. 

The final and most demanding, critical factor in the success 
of the President's new national security strategy is the ability 
of private industry to deliver during the "reconstitution" proc- 
ess. What is visualized is not industrial mobilization from a 
"warm" start: rather, industry will be asked to deliver military 
equipment and supplies from a "cold" start - assuming that many 



117 






of our current defense industries shift to the non-defense sec- 
tor. 

The Bush Administration is attempting to both save our 
defense industrial base under very trying conditions, and simul- 
taneously reduce defense spending - a dubious prospect, when it 
is not yilling even to address the need for a national industrial 
poUcy? Reconstitution of U.S. industrial capabilities will be 

xr . . . . ... 

<y insufficient — international reconstitution will be necessary 
for overseas suppliers of finished goods and raw materials. 161 

, y ... 

/ ./ Ma] or changes are required in the way we do business, to 

retain both our technological position in the world and the 
personnel necessary to meet newly defined defense needs. By 
withdrawing forces from overseas and promising to reconstitute 
within two years and return, the United States will have funda- 
mentally changed its international politico-military posture. If 
after internal investigation, we cannot fulfill this promise, 
then the U.S. government should keep this conclusion under 
wraps, endure the open-source critical debate and criticism it 
will face, and keep this declaratory strategy operational. 

The President's new national security strategy is a program- 
ming concept that supports the continued reliance on deterrence 
of war as the cornerstone of American security. There are those 
who doubted that the U.S. would ever use centrally-based nuclear 
weapons for the defense of Europe — perhaps a President never 
would have decided to actually do that. Deterrence strategies 

118 



are influenced greatly by perceptions; under the new national 
security strategy, it will be important to maintain the percep- 
tion of our ability to reconstitute. Just as in the past, evi- 
dence of programs, deployments, exercises, and literature must 
be provided to support deterrence. 



119 



Impact on the Navy and Marine Corps 

From this look at the Presidents 's new national security 
strategy and the Chairman's recommended "base" force, it appears 
that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps will change the least. The 
fundamental maritime approach of our new national security 
strategy should logically result in asymmetric loss of military 
influence in favor of the sea services. This does not mean, 
however, that the Navy and Marine Corps can sit out the debate on 
roles and missions since they will not be effected by either - 
they will. 162 

The Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps have obviously internalized the new national 
security strategy and the "base" force ideas and indicated their 
willingness to become partners in the new directions that the DoD 
are taking. The Secretary has even suggested that: "Given 
continued changes in the Soviet Union, we eventually expect to 
see a diminished open ocean anti-submarine warfare 
threat. . .With changes in the world order and our own strategy, 
it is appropriate to re-examine the top-priority emphasis we have 

164 

previously placed on countering the Soviet submarine threat." 

The Secretary of the Navy and the CNO told the Congress in 
February that a 451-ship Navy could provide 2-3 aircraft carri- 
ers, 2-3 amphibious ready groups, 25-30 surface combatants, and 
14 nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs) on permanent forward 
deployment. 165 The CNO's 30 percent deployment rate means that 



120 



he used around 50 available submarines to maintain 14 subs rou- 
tinely on deployment - a far cry from the recent goal of 100 SSNs 
or even the fallback position of 80-90. 

The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS have 
been using the most supportive Navy missions in their public 
pronouncements — maritime superiority, power projection, and sea 
control. If Secretary Cheney and General Powell truly agree with 
these concepts, then the sea services should capitalize on that 
and not focus on second-order issues involving specific programs 
or the UCP. Unfortunately, it seems apparent that elements 
associated with the Navy have fired a series of broadsides at 
both the strategy and the "base" force - due to programming and 
UCP issues. On the other hand, there is every indication that 
the Marine Corps is taking a more statesmanlike approach and 
carefully trying to ascertain its place in the "new world order." 

The May 1991 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings /Naval Review 
1991 contains a series of articles that make it clear that the 
authors understood most, but not all, of the new concepts and did 
not embrace them. Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, U.S. Navy (Ret.) 
wrote a brief commentary entitled "Head's Up, Navy" 166 in which 
he essentially told the Navy to circle the wagons and defend 
itself against the attack it faced from the Air Force, the Army, 
and specifically the Chairman of the JCS. 167 The commentary is 
placed prominently as the first substantive article. Another 
article enumerates Navy weapons systems that are in serious 
jeopardy because of the new strategy and "base" force. 168 

121 



Another article by a retired flag officer critical of the 
"base" force concept appeared in the August 1991 Proceedings . 169 
Rear Admiral William J. Holland's commentary "Strategic Command - 
Who Needs It and Why?" denies that a roles and missions feud is 
on-going but encourages the Navy to "lock up its daughters and 
put its wallet in an inside pocket." Again, this commentary is 
placed conspicuously as the first significant article of that 
issue. 

Although elements of the retired flag officer community have 
taken exception to the new national security strategy and "base" 
force, the leadership of the active duty Navy has publicly em- 
braced both. Additionally, a parallel, but very related, debate 
is ongoing over the degree of future jointness that the Navy is 
willing to accept. The current active-duty Navy leadership 
appears to have internalized the Goldwater-Nichols Act and agree 

170 

that "jointness is here to stay." 

One strategy to deal with the jointness issue is to not just 

• 1 7 1 

"embrace it, but capture it, take it over and run with it." 
This recommendation attempts to use jointness as a vehicle to 
perform traditional maritime missions with traditional forces. 
Another strategy is to accept jointness, accede to nationally- 
mandated roles and missions, and modify the Navy's traditional 
self-image as the victor in the Pacific theater in World War II. 
This approach would necessitate refuting the retired flag officer 



122 



community's criticism of the new national security strategy and 
"base" force. 172 

The rationalization for naval programs should be first: what 
are the national missions 173 that require: submarines, aircraft 
at sea, etc. This will lead to the number of submarine or air- 
craft capable units that the nation needs. Second, we should ask 
what types of submarines should be built (nuclear or diesel) or 
ships to carry airpower (conventional or vertical takeoff) recog- 
nizing the tradeoffs that are inherent between numbers and capa- 
bility. Only then should be decide what type of submarine hulls 
or specific aircraft models are needed. Saving the industrial 
base is not a reason that the nation will build a significant 
number of very expensive formerly programmed naval units. The 
future budget climate for the military will simply not allow the 
Navy to retain programs it took for granted in the past, or that 
it would rather have. 

Submarine Force 

For the submarine community, the shift in top priority front 
antisubmarine warfare means that the goal of 80-90 or 100 SSNs, 
previously justified assuming a European-centered global war with 
the USSR, must find a new rationalization. 175 The U.S. Navy 
faces an extremely difficult task over retaining the full SSN-21 
SEAWOLF program in a new international security environment 
focused on regional crises. Since it currently is the only 
submarine shipbuilding program (OHIO class ballistic missile 
submarines are considered national systems and exist quite apart 

123 



from attack submarines), attempts to cut the SSN-21 will be 
interpreted as an attempt to cut the submarine force. Indeed, 
the April 1991 issue of the Journal of the Naval Submarine 
League, The Submarine Review , contained a series of articles 
which sought to defend the submarine building program despite the 

17 6 

new strategy. 

The CNO told Congress that he has ordered studies to explore 
a new, lower cost option for a successor to the SEAWOLF. Since 
it would likely take 10-15 years to launch the first "SSN-X, " 177 
we may see a maximum of some dozen or so SSN-21S built before a 
newer and less-capable class would be available. The U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings reported that the SEAWOLF program may stop 
with five or six boats. 

Certainly there will be those who question whether we need 
even 14 deployed submarines at sea in our new crisis response- 
heavy strategy if we are going to have only the capability to 
quickly respond with one carrier task force and a MEB. Even if 
the submarine community today can justify 7 deployed submarines 
on each coast, the question is whether such deployments are too 
ambitious in the future given the paucity of surface and aviation 
units that will be routinely available for crisis response? In 
other words, is there a higher political payoff for the nation by 
forward-deploying 14 submarines but only 2-3 CVBGs or fewer 
submarines and 4-5 CVBGs? Which type deployments better serve to 
meet nationally-mandated missions? 



124 



If the submarine community can make the case that it needs 
14 deployed units, then the second-order question is whether all 
of these need to be nuclear powered or some can be diesel-elec- 
tric? Third-order questions should be what specific hull design 
is used. Saving the industrial base is not a reason that the 
nation will build a significant number of very expensive SSN-21S. 

New justification for the submarine force might include 
substituting for carriers called away for crisis response and 
direct integrated response in crisis areas performing: surveil- 
lance, power projection, delivery of special forces, combat SAR, 
evacuation of nationals or hostages, blockade interdiction of 
surface traffic, etc. 1 Rationalization for SSNs also involves 
GPALS since submarines are high leverage platforms that can carry 
ICBM/submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) interceptors 
which can catch missiles in the boost phase of flight. Perhaps 
we should consider ready reserve submarines. Using these and 
other more traditional missions, the submarine force can justify 
a total number of hulls that it needs before it proceeds to the 
specific types to be built. 

Surface Forces 

In addition to the obvious programs on which the Navy has 
traditionally placed less emphasis (sealift, mine warfare, diesel 
submarines, etc.), there are some other candidates for review. 
In this "new world order," is there a place for major fleet vs. 
fleet engagements, or will it be primarily fleet vs. shore? If 

125 



long range weapons make it less likely that major fleet forces 
will ever engage, there are probably some significant changes in 
order for our surface and other forces. If we renegotiate the 
ABM Treaty, naval surface ships, such as the TICONDEROGA class, 
may perform GPALS interceptor duty. 

If a principal reason for deployments is to maintain over- 
seas presence, under the new expanded definition of presence, 
perhaps we do not need such highly capable submarines or surface 
warships. It has been standard practice for the French Navy to 
maintain low-capability forces on permanent forward deployment in 
many areas of the world (e.g. the Indian Ocean) while the U.S. 
and Royal Navies generally cycle through high-capability forces 

17 9 

on a scheduled basis. The U.S. Navy used to do this before 
World War II. When faced with extremely tough budget decisions, 
the U.S. Navy may consider whether the French naval deployment 
system has any merit and adopt the less-capable forces as substi- 
tute for the fully-capable CVBG. Response to a crisis involving 
forward-deployed less-capable fleet assets may be with long-range 
CONUS-based Air Force units rather than naval aviation. 

Naval Aviation 

Naval aviation programs are also in serious trouble - being 
referred to in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings as being in 
"Chapter ll". 180 The goal of 15 deployable CVBGs, the A-12, and 
upgrades for existing aircraft, previously justified by assuming 
a European-centered global war with the USSR, have already gone 



126 



by the wayside. With transportation goals of only 1% contingen- 
cies and a unilateral intervention capability requirement at only 
the tactical-level of warfare, it is likely that we will soon see 
studies stating that the need for big-deck aircraft carriers is 
perhaps as low as nine and the nation can afford some smaller 
less-capable aircraft carriers. 

We should expect to see less support for traditional naval 
aviation programs and planned upgrades for existing forces as 
well. Naval aviation programs need to be justified in terms of 
future contingency operations in the Third World - not using the 
scenarios that have been of interest in the past few decades. 
Under the new program planning assumptions, justifying the need 
for air defense assets in terms of the threat of regiments of 
BACKFIRES is liable to create the impression that the Navy is 
unaware of the changes that have occurred in the world recently. 
The Navy still needs to defend itself against air threats but may 
not be allowed to procure active and ready reserve forces to 
defend itself against the "old" Soviet threat -- those forces 
will be "reconstituted," if necessary. 

New justification for a modified carrier force might in- 
clude, however, some roles against the revised, but still credi- 
ble, Soviet threat; antisatellite warfare and defense against 
ballistic missiles. The Air Force has proven that aircraft can 
carry missiles that can reach into space — why should some of 
these not be sea-based? Might not carrier aircraft carry GPALS 



127 



intercept. ors which can catch ballistic missiles in the boost 
phase of i light? 

Maybe this is the time to again consider re-integrating the 
aircraft carrier into the Single Integrated Operations Plan 
(SIOP) and adding cruise missiles back into its arsenal? Per- 
haps we should borrow an idea from the USSR and integrate air- 
craft carriers into continental air defense? There are strong 
bureaucratic and strategy reasons that we did not do these in the 
recent past - but perhaps these conditions no longer apply. 
Deterrence and defense of the homeland will always remain mis- 
sions for the U.S. Armed Forces. The ability of naval aviation to 
supplement missiles and land-based air and extend the air defense 
envelope should not be ignored. 

Another idea that we should also consider is ready reserve 
aircraft carriers that can be reconstituted with reserve air 
wings within 1-2 years. Reserve forces may not be as appealing 
as active ones, but as the budget ax falls, consideration should 
be given to naval aviation capabilities that can respond to the 
threats posed by a regenerated USSR or other similar high end 
threat. Our new training carrier, USS FORRESTAL, should be dual- 
committed to the Atlantic and/or Contingency Forces, much as the 
USS LEXINGTON was once considered a back-up antisubmarine warfare 
(ASW) carrier. Budget cuts may even force the Navy to accept 
additional common or joint elements to flight training for its 
aviators. 



128 



Power projection in the new international security environ- 
ment may not require advanced strike aircraft operating from 
large deck carriers but rather Army and USMC helicopters operat- 
ing from Navy surface warfare ships and civilian cargo ships 
taken up from trade in conjunction with land-based Air Force 
fixed wing assets. Let us not forget the tremendous success 
enjoyed by the nation when Army aircraft flew off a Navy aircraft 
carrier and struck Tokyo in the early days of the World War II 
Pacific campaign. Since ASW is no longer going to be the Navy's 
primary mission, there is no reason that Navy ASW warfare heli- 
copters cannot also have an anti-tank mission. This suggests 
that interservice, in the new era, is much more important than 
allied interoperability - a major Navy priority and strength in 
the past. 

Amphibious Forces 

The Marines have already seen the Navy's battleships moth- 
balled and may see the reduction or total redesign or mothballing 
of major amphibious assault ships. Power projection for primari- 
ly contingency response in the new international security envi- 
ronment may not necessitate large numbers of advanced amphibious 
assault ships but rather only enough to handle the assault eche- 
lons of one MEB in each major theater. Additional Marine units 
would arrive by air and would be supported by MPF. The amphib- 
ious assault ships that we retain could also be dual-committed as 
sea control or ASW ships. Forward-deployed marines in Europe 
could operate in multinational task groups as a part of the new 
NATO Rapid Reaction Corps. 

129 



It unlikely that the modest-sized Army and Air Force assets 
dedicated to the Pacific Force should have a dual-commitment to 
the European theater in a revitalized "swing strategy" but what 
about Pacific Marines? These forces are supposed to be loaned to 
the Contingency Force, if needed, unless the Marines decide to 
dedicate assets to this new force. In this case, a substantial 
land war in Asia would necessitate "borrowing" forces from else- 
where, including Atlantic or Contingency Force Marines. In 
short, the dual-commitment of sea services to the new force 
commanders will have to be carefully negotiated. 

Special Operations Forces 

The sea services will have to decide upon their desired role 
in regard to special operations forces, presumably to be all 
assigned to the new joint Contingency Force, and in riverine 
warfare. The Marine Corps has avoided assignment of its forces 
to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) but it also 
claimed that its MEU-sized forces were normally special opera- 
tions capable - earning the designation as MEU(SOC) . This force 
is ideally suited for coastal raids but "brown water" is an area 
of the world's oceans of general disinterest to the Navy. This 
is obviously an area that needs to be ironed out. 

Does the Navy want to take more interest in "brown water" 
operations, or will USSOCOM continue to purchase hardware for 
Navy special forces? Perhaps the Marine Corps can also rely on 



130 



USSOCOM to purchase amphibious ships and craft for them? Does 
the U.S. Coast Guard desire a piece of the "brown water" action? 
If so, what arrangements can be made with the Department of 
Transportation to involve the Coast Guard as a part of the Con- 
tingency Force? 

Reserve Forces 

As a cost-cutting measure which allows retention of the 
industrial base, perhaps some Navy hulls might remain uncompleted 
and, instead, put into deep storage where they could be "recon- 
stituted" for a war with the USSR. It has been announced that 
some naval surface escort forces necessary for more robust power 
projection will be put into a new Innovative Naval Reserve Con- 
cept (INRC). 181 The Navy plans to use eight FF-1052 KNOX class 
frigates as training ships with an additional thirty-two in a 
Reduced Operational Status (ROS) which would be available within 
180 days. These forces are not reconstitution forces but rather 
reserve forces available in a lengthy contingency. We might also 
consider reconstitution of additional amphibious capability by 
placing amphibious assault ship hulls in deep storage. 

It is likely that a robust shipyard capability, to repair 
battle-damaged fleet assets, may be part of the defense industri- 
al base to be reconstituted and not fully maintained in peace- 
time. Reserve forces might be assigned to plan for and manage 
these capabilities. 



131 



Sealift 

We are headed toward an overall force structure and opera- 
tional tempo (OPTEMPO) that will permit the U.S military to 
respond to only 1 or perhaps 1% contingencies (not wars) with 
active-duty forces. Could a more innovative approach be taken 
with lift requirements? Government has already provided subsi- 
dies and other incentives to ship and aircraft owners and opera- 
tors to maintain a military lift capability while operating their 
fleets in commercial trade. Perhaps future arrangements will 
include the government purchasing commercially inefficient but 
militarily useful shipping and allowing rotating commercial 
operations of this fleet by a contractor? Contractors could be 
subsidized to operate ships while performing routine maintenance 
and modifications to modernize the fleet. 

Joint Commands 

At his speech to the Comstock Club in September, Defense 
Secretary Cheney twice spoke of the need for naval superiority. 
In his testimony to Congress in February, the Chairman of the JCS 
(an Army General) discussed the need for maritime superiority. 
Secretary of the Navy Garrett's testimony to Congress in February 
alluded to the possibility that maritime superiority may not be 
affordable in the future: "Fiscal realities have also made af- 
fordability an important factor to be considered in sustaining 
maritime superiority." 183 These sentiments were echoed by the 
CNO as well: "There should be no doubt that, if the continued 
decline in Navy funding, force structure, modernization, and 



132 



personnel persists, we will reach a point where this nation will 
no longer be capable of maintaining the maritime superiority so 
vital to the support of our global interests." 184 

Retaining maritime superiority does not mean that the United 
States will adopt an overall national maritime strategic outlook, 
positing heavy reliance on maritime forces to the exclusion of 
others, since the sea services can contribute to attaining polit- 
ical goals, but they cannot achieve them all. On the other hand, 
defense cuts under this new national security strategy should be 
asymmetrical and favor the sea services. Within the sea serv- 
ices, resources should also be allocated asymmetrically to favor 
those capabilities that are reguired under the new national 
security strategy. 

Commands, however, will obviously not be allocated on a 
basis where the Navy has the majority. The Pacific theater has 
been declared a maritime one and the assumption is that it will 
retain a Navy C-in-C. If there is no serious maritime opposition 
to Navy forces at sea in the Pacific area of responsibility, is 
this assumption valid? Regarding the possibility of a new 
Strategic Force, although a majority of strategic nuclear war- 
heads may be sea-based in the future, it is unlikely that the Air 
Force will be dethroned from command. At best, command of a 
future Strategic Force will rotate with the Navy. 

Initial indications from the Vice Chairman of the JCS 
indicate that the sea services do not have forces dedicated to 

133 



the a future Contingency Force, except for lift and special 
operating forces. The Marine Corps should rethink this and 
consider if they would like to participate. The Army and Air 
Force have already indicated they would dedicate serious assets 
to contingency response, making them the current leading candi- 
dates for command of a Contingency Force. This alone should 
cause the Marine Corps to seriously consider consolidating exist- 
ing flag officer billets in order to gain one new four star 
general who would be a contender. If the Navy dedicated standing 
forces to a future Contingency Force, it would logically lead to 
a full rotational command policy. 

Perhaps the most serious debate will occur over the proposed 
Atlantic Force. By dedicating most U.S. Army heavy assets to 
this force, one could conclude that the Army sees the Atlantic 
Force as a land-oriented command with seapower as a significant 
but supporting element. The Navy will probably focus on the word 
"Atlantic" and argue that it should obviously retain its maritime 
character and command. The Navy might even be willing to surren- 
der cognizance over the Caribbean and South American waters in 
order to retain the Atlantic command. Major fleet elements of 
the U.S. Navy operated under the command of Army generals during 
World War II and have routinely done so in the Mediterranean 
since then. 

If the Atlantic Force is in fact primarily focused on re- 
gional response power projection in Europe and the Middle 



134 



East/Southwest Asia, then perhaps the major peacetime commander 
should be oriented toward ground warfare with air and maritime 
commanders playing a subordinate role. After all, is there any 
serious threat to our maritime forces in this area of the world? 
If the Soviet (or some other) threat returns, it will be rela- 
tively easy to split the Atlantic Force into its land and sea- 
based components as a part of our reconstitution for a major 
global war originating in Europe. 

On the other hand, in the new era of jointness, it can be 
argued that all the C-in-C positions could be filled by the best 
candidate from any service with no one single service having a 
lock on any specific job. Even if this would mean, in reality, 
rotation, the objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act may be more 
fully realized than if we retain current practices. 

The uniformed services response to the new national security 
strategy reflects what can be found in a 1987 RAND Corporation 
assessment of their self-identification and cultural biases, from 

1 ft 6 

which I have extracted segments below. The U.S. Army is 
described as having "its roots in the citizenry ... service to the 
nation, and... utter devotion to the nation. . .taken greater pride 
in the basic skills of soldiering than in their equipment ... the 
most secure of the three services ... aimed at getting a single 
answer (often a number) rather than illuminating the alternatives 
in the face of recognized uncertainties. . .not shown any particu- 
lar strong affinity for strategy ... unique among the services in 
its acceptance of national strategies in peacetime which it is 

135 



both utterly committed to execute and unlikely to be able to 
successfully prosecute in wartime." "What is the Army? It is 
first and foremost, the nation's obedient and loyal military 
servant." The U.S. Army appears to be very comfortable with the 
new national security strategy and the "base" force. 

According to the RAND study, the U.S. Air Force is "said to 
worship at the altar of technology. . .by far the most attached of 
the services to toys. . .always the most sensitive to defending or 
guarding its legitimacy as an independent institution. .. supremely 
confident about its relevance. . .the most comfortable of the three 
services with analysis ... the most comfortable with strategy and 
things strategic. .. but not irrevocably committed to their execu- 
tion in war." "Who is the Air Force? It is the keeper and wielder 
of the decisive instruments of war." Although the U.S. Air Force 
has always had strong analytic support, they are only beginning 
to study the implications of the new national security strategy - 
instead preferring to address strategy and force structure, to 
date, in terms of their pre-Aspen speech White Pan^r, "The Air 
Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach - Global 
Power." 187 

The Navy is characterized by the RAND study as being "far 
less toy oriented. . .more likely to associate themselves with the 
Navy as an inst itution . . . the hypochondriac of the services, 
constantly taking its own temperature or pulse, finding it inade- 
guate, caught up in an anxiety largely of its own making... su- 



136 



premely confident of its legitimacy as an independent institu- 
tion, but with the advent of long-range aviation, and again with 
nuclear weapons, its relevancy has come into question ... has 
little tolerance of analysis for planning or evaluating the 
Navy... may advocate strategies in peacetime to their advantage, 
but they are not irrevocably committed to their execution in 
war." "Who is the Navy? It is the supra-national institution that 
has inherited the British Navy's throne to naval supremacy." 

All of this discussion over roles and missions might reopen 

• • • • i ft ft 

old debates between maritime and continental strategies, but 

the Navy should recall that it forms but one component of triadic 

IRQ 

forces that ensure U.S. national security strategy. Under the 
President's new national security strategy, we are clearly march- 
ing to a drumbeat that will probably mean the end of unilateral 
naval intervention overseas. Naval and Marine Corps forces are 
viewed under the new national security strategy and "base" force 
as being a part of a larger package - they are not going to be 
able to advertise themselves only as the Navy /Marine Corps Team. 
The new team is a leaner but more powerful U.S. Armed Forces. If 
the sea services are going to argue for the existing command 
structure and autonomous military capabilities, then they have 
the burden of proving that off-shore airpower, "can-opener" 
capability, and maritime C-in-Cs are still required in this "new 
world order." 



137 



Defense Busines s as Usual? 190 

Major changes to the international environment have led 
planners -co significantly shift the manner of addressing problems 
ana issues. The first order questions, such as "what is Ameri- 
ca's role in the world, or the business and purpose of the 
Department of Defense," now demand answers prior to consideration 
of second order programming or efficiency issues, that have 
dominated the traditional defense debate. 

America's new role in the world will widen strategic plan- 
ner's horizons to considering issues more befitting planners of a 
major international superpower; such as the long-term competi- 
tion between nations, the economic, political, legal, scientific- 
technical, and cultural aspects of competition, and uses of the 
military for other than a Europe-centered global war with the 
USSR. The U.S. cannot afford to indulge itself with "gold-plat- 
ed" strategies capable of successfully dealing with all possible 
contingencies by itself. 

The world may move to a more integrated political structure, 
or, at least parts of the world will move in this direction. The 
U.N. Charter still contains the framework for national armed 
forces acting on behalf of the Security Council. Perhaps this 
is the time to consider regional and global cooperation as 
alternative models to the nation-state. The nations of the world 
rejected this direction when they failed to adopt the U.N.- 
sponsored Law of the Sea Treaty and its "Common Heritage of 



138 



Mankind" approach to certain types of "common" ocean resources. 
True, that approach was flawed, given the political realities of 
its day, but perhaps this is the time to amend international 
organizations, and see if they can do better than before. 

Changes in the international environment likely will be more 
significant in the next twenty years than in the last twenty. 
Planning for the long-term requires a 10-20 year planning hori- 
zon. We cannot afford to lock up our strategic options with 
political and military assumptions or force structures that were 
developed in a political world which no longer exists. 

The fundamental shift in the way programming planners look 
at the world will lead to less emphasis on the USSR and Europe, a 
redirection toward other areas of the world, and managing day-to- 
day competition with other powers. All this will occur while the 
U.S. has significantly less capable tools in its kit. Rather than 
acting as a "Chairman of the Board" with our allies, America's 
appropriate future role may be that of "first among equals" if 
it does not withdraw to the North American continent in splendid 
isolationism. If we elect to stay engaged in the world, is it 
likely that we will engage in "winning" the peace as we once 
prepared to "win" war? If so, it implies the creation of a truly 
integrated and nonconf rontational governmental and commercial 
planning process. 

Problems in American defense planning have, for some time, 
provoked calls for more and better planning. Evidence of plan- 

139 



ning problems is abundant in four major areas of Department of 
Defense planning: strategic goals and objectives that lacked 
clarity; a functional organizational design which impedes mission 
integration; overemphasis on budgets and programming needs to the 
detriment of overall policies and strategies; and ignoring other 
agencies, competitors and the external environment. We have the 
opportunity to, and should, improve the guality of our national 
strategic or long-range planning while we answer the call made by 
the President at Aspen. 

A major planning problem was a lack of a coordinated effort 
to integrate the government's primary goals, policies and action 
sequences into a cohesive whole. Analysis and review of Ameri- 
ca's fundamental role in the world should force the DoD to solve 
this basic problem, at least temporarily. Sound strategic man- 
agement, of which strategic planning is but one component, inte- 
grates an organization's principal goals, policies and action se- 
quences into a cohesive whole. It marshals, allocates, and 
shapes an organization's resources into a unique and viable 
posture based on its relative internal competencies and shortcom- 
ings, anticipated changes in the environment, and contingent 
moves by intelligent opponents. Strategic management is con- 
cerned with the management of the whole enterprise, not just its 
functional components or sub-parts. 

The U.S. government has not developed truly successful and 
coherent defense, industrial, scientific, engineering, oceans, 



140 



etc. policies since the end of the Second World War. Yet, we do 
have a successful agricultural policy and supporting programs. 
The federal government has also successfully managed complicated 
programs for space exploration, rural electrification, and trans- 
portation. Now is the time to again exercise leadership and 
provide guidance and support for success. 

It is a challenge for the organizational leader to combine 
and direct the efforts and activities of other members of an 
organization toward the successful completion of a stated mission 
or purpose. It is this type of effort that we will see the Bush 
Administration attempt to perform while it undertakes a fundamen- 
tal restructuring of America's role in the world, and missions 
for its military forces. It will be this effort, not the old 
roles and missions, that NATO political leadership will have to 
understand to deal effectively with the United States as it 
undergoes internal self-examination. 

In contrast to most other types of planning, strategic 
management also analyzes an organization's external environment 
and internal climate, searches for new trends, discontinuities, 
surprises, and competitive advantages. Since its scope is broader 
than other types of planning, it typically embodies more qualita- 
tive shifts in direction than might be anticipated from the long- 
range planning process. Also guided by an idealized vision of 
the future, strategic management is much more action-oriented. 
The organization attempts to keep its options open, considering 



141 



a variety of alternatives to respond promptly to unforeseen 
contingencies as it seeks its ideal. 

On the other hand, long-range planning, which has typified 
NATO planning in past decades, on the other hand, focuses more on 
specifying goals and objectives, translating them into current 
budgets and work programs. The objective of long-range planners 
(and short-range planners for that matter) is to work backward 
from goals to programs and budgets to document the seguence of 
decisions and actions required to achieve the desired future, 
embodied in the goals. Hence, long-range planning assumes that 
current trends will continue into the future and plans tend to be 
linear extrapolations of the present. Clearly, this is no longer 
feasible since our objectives appear to be changing. 

To be effective, strategic management assumes certain neces- 
sary conditions. Among these are: agreement, or at least consen- 
sus, on goals and objectives; a process by which the organization 
can scan its environment, monitor trends, and assess its competi- 
tors; a management information system based on an integrated 
communication and control system; and a review and monitoring 
process to determine whether the current strategies are viable or 
should be revamped. 

The top-down vision of the future, outlined by the President 
in Aspen, will usher in new governmental politico-military goals 
and objectives. The major players will be both domestic and 
international, and it is likely that a consensus will be reached. 

142 



It is uncertain which group or groups will dominate the debate 
but the American public's willingness to sustain heavy defense 
burdens concurrently with large domestic programs (including the 
Savings & Loan bailout) should not be assumed gratuitously in the 
absence of a clear and present danger. 

Effective strategic management is not possible without 
responsive and timely feedback. The debate over the President's 
new national security strategy should include an analysis of the 
U.S. political goals sought by the forward deployment of U.S. 
forces, and the political environment that compelled the formula- 
tion of America's alliance structure. If those goals have been 
attained, if the international environment has drastically 
changed, then it should be obvious that the fundamental strategy 
and resulting force structure are subject to wholesale renegotia- 
tion. That this is being done in a thoughtful and comprehensive 
manner, with the full participation of domestic interests and 
allies, should be comforting. 

New legislation will be required as a result of the changes 
in the international system - so this exercise is not confined to 
the Executive Branch of government. The two government branches 
can cooperate or they can assume an adversarial relationship. 
Congress will cut forces and programs - with or without a care- 
fully considered plan. The Executive Branch must present every 
possible option for cuts to the legislature - even those that 
wrench the very souls of the leaders of a particular combat arm 



143 



or military service. The Administration appears prepared to meet 
this challenge. 

The assumption of two-year's strategic warning will be 
debated endlessly and perhaps never fully resolved. What the 
Administration has accomplished with this assumption is to make 
it explicit that to absorb a 25 percent cut, we must make an 
assumption of this magnitude. If nothing else, it will force the 
Congress and the American public to recognize exactly what we are 
buying into with the new national security strategy and "base" 
force. One hopes that the dramatic changes are recognized in the 
USSR as well. 

Should the services refuse to present realistic plans to the 
DoD, or play end-around games with Congress, the cuts will be 
made anyway. The services could find themselves playing catch-up, 
and redrafting strategies with whatever forces the resulting 
legislation permits. The looming debate should be about cfoals 
and objectives, realizing that these do not have to be what they 
were in the past. If we are realistic about these goals and 
objectives, there is every likelihood that we can reach a consen- 
sus on force requirements. If we engage in acrimonious debate 
over force structure, we may stumble into a strategy that will 
not serve our national interests in the 21st Century. 



144 



Notes 



(1) The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not 
necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Navy. An edited, earlier, and smaller, ver- 
sion of this report will be published by the journal Security 
Studies . Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 1991/1992. 

(2) "Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium" 
(as delivered) , Office of the Press Secretary (Aspen, Colorado) , 
The White House, August 2, 1990, 6 pp. 

(3) Karl von Clausewitz, On War , trans, by O.J. Matthijs Jolles, 
New York: The Modern Library, 194 3, Book VIII, Chapter VI, p. 
596. 

(4) Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress . January 1991, p. 3. 

(5) Michael Gordon, "Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan," New York 
Times . August 2, 1990, p. 1. According to this year's DoD annual 
report to Congress, the Defense Planning and Resources Board 
(DPRB) apparently played a role in reviewing the new strategy. 

(6) John D. Morrocco, "New Pentagon Strategy Shifts Focus From 
Europe to Regional Conflicts," Aviation Week & Space Technology . 
Vol. 133, No. 7, August 13, 1990, pp. 25-27. This article has 
depth similar to that found in Michael Gordon's article in the 
New York Times . The President's Aspen speech and the "base" 
force were also reported, but without a great deal of depth, in 
the Washington Roundout section of Aviation Week & Space Technol- 
ogy . Vol. 13 3, No. 6, August 6, 1990, p. 15. The strategy was 
also covered in Europe in "The Defence Budget: Choice Cuts," The 
Economist . Vol. 316, No. 7667, August 11-17, 1990, pp. 28-30. 
Interestingly, Aviation Week & Space Technology reported on 
significant forthcoming cuts in forces prior to the Presidents 's 
Aspen speech. See: John D. Morrocco, "Cheney's 25% Force Reduc- 
tion Plan Could Spur Further Spending Cuts," Aviation Week & 
Space Technology . Vol. 132, No. 26, June 25, 1990, pp. 24-25. 

(7) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, at the National Convention of the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, Baltimore, Maryland, August 23, 1990," as deliv- 
ered, 13 pp. 

(8) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, at the 72nd Annual National Convention of the 
American Legion, Indianapolis, Indiana, August 30, 1990," as 
delivered, 21 pp. 

(9) "Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Homestead, Hot 
Springs, Virginia, Thursday, September 6, 1990," News Release, 
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) , 7 pp. , 
and notes made by author, who was in the audience, of additional 

145 



remarks. 

(10) "Review of Military Strategy," TASS Report contained in 
Moscow Pravda in Russian, September 8, 1990, 2nd Ed., p. 4 (FBIS- 
SOV-90-176, September 11, 1990, p. 16). 

(11) Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 
"Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, to the 
Comstock Club/Air Force Association, Sacramento, California, 
Thursday, September 13, 1990," No. 444-90, 5 pp. 

(12) Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 
News Release, "Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, San Francisco 
Bay Area Council, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1990," 

10 pp. 

(13) "Remarks by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to the Pittsburgh 
World Affairs Council," October 30, 1990, Reuter Transcript 
Report, 5 pp. 

(14) "Speech to the Center for Defense Journalism, The National 
Press Club, September 27, 1990, by Lieutenant General George L. 
Butler," 17 pp. General Butler was recently selected for his 
fourth star and as the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air 
Command. 

(15) George L. Butler, "Adjusting to Post-Cold War Strategic 
Realities," Parameters . Vol. XXI, No. 1, Spring 1991, pp. 2-9. 

(16) N. Belan interview in Tulan on October 18, 1990 as reported 
in "I Look Ahead With Optimism," Moscow Sovetskaya Rossiya in 
Russian, October 19, 1990, 2nd Ed., p. 5 (FBIS-SOV-90-208, Octo- 
ber 26, 1990, p. 4); A. Sychev, "'We Too Are Changing,' U.S. 
Defense Secretary Richard Cheney at the USSR Supreme Soviet Com- 
mittees," Moscow Izvestiya in Russian, October 19, 1990, Morning 
Edition, p. 4 (FBIS-SOV-90-203 , October 19, 1990, p. 7); M. 
Zakharchuk & A. Pershin, "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press 
Center - Yazov and Cheney: Discussion on Peace," Moscow Izvestiya 
in Russian, October 20, 1990, Union Edition, p. 4 (FBIS-SOV-90- 
205, October 23, 1990, p. 15); Major M. Zheglov, "Visit Over," 
Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, October 21, 1990, 1st Ed., p. 
2 and Moscow World Service in English, 1210 GMT, October 22, 1990 
(FBIS-SOV-90-205, October 23, 1990, pp. 16-17); TASS Report, 
"Secretary Happy," Moscow Pravda in Russian, October 26, 1990, 
2nd Ed., p. 4 (FBIS-SOV-90-211, October 31, 1990, p. 5); and TASS 
Report "Pentagon's 'Five-Year Plan'," Moscow Pravda in Russian, 
November 1, 1990, 2nd Ed., p. 5 (FBIS-SOV-90-212 , November 1, 
1990, p. 5) . 

(17) General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, "Enduring Defense Needs," The Retired Officer . Vol. 
XLVI, No. 10, October 1990, pp. 22-30. 

(18) General Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, "All Elements of Total Force Give Military Prowess," The 
Officer , Vol. 67, No. 2, February 1991, pp. 12-16. 



146 



(19) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, at the Royal United Services Institute for 
Defence Studies, Whitehall, London, 5 December 1990 - The Eisen- 
hower Centenary Lecture: Military Realities and Future Security 
Prospects . " as delivered, 19 pp. 

(20) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, to the Washington Chapter of the Armed Forces 
Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) — The Shore- 
ham Hotel, 14 December 1990," as delivered, 29 pp. General 
Powell's remarks were reported by AFCEA in their official publi- 
cation as well. See: Robert H. Williams, "New Defense Doctrine 
Explained By JCS Chairman," Signal . Vol. 45, No. 6, February 
1991, p. 102 and "Combined Force Leadership Wins Powell Sarnoff 
Award," Signal . Vol. 45, No. 9, May 1991, p. 133. 

(21) General Colin L. Powell, "The Eisenhower Centenary Lecture: 
Military Realities and Future Security Prospects," The RUSI 
Journal . Vol. 136, No. 1, Spring 1991, pp. 17-21. 

(22) "Remarks as Delivered by Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN, 
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the President's National 
Security Telecommunications Committee (NSTAC) at the Loy Hender- 
son Conference Room, Department of State, 13 December 1990," 10 
pp. 

(23) General Donald J. Kutyna, USAF address to the "12th Western 
Conference and Exposition - Space Day - San Diego, CA - 24 Janu- 
ary 1991," OASD/PA #91-0294, 23 Jan 91, p. 2. The "Base Force" 
appears on slides 1-2. 

(24) "Base Force Idea is 'Tailored to New and Enduring Strategic 
Realities'," Aerospace Daily . October 9, 199 0, p. 39; Jessica Eve 
Budro, "Military Feels Shut out of Planning; Service Resentment 
Brewing Over Powell's Base Force Plan, Say DOD Sources," Inside 
the Pentagon . October 11, 1990, p. 1; Stephen Aubin, "Analysis: 
Perestroika for the Pentagon," Defense Media Review , October 31, 
1990, p. 3; Rick Atkinson, "Stand Up, Sit Down, Fight, Fight, 
Fight," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition , December 21, 
199 - January 6, 1991, pp. 31-3 2; Charles W. Corddry, "Even as 
Navy Builds up its Middle East Forces, a Drastic Build Down is 
Being Eyed by Planners," Sea Power . No. 34, No. 1, January 1991, 
pp. 2-13. 

(25) "Statement of The Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Before 
the House Armed Services Committee, in Connection with the FY 
1992-93 Budget for the Department of Defense, February 7, 1991," 
13 pp. & 15 slides; and "Statement of General Colin L. Powell, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Committee on 
Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 7 February 1991," 
18 pp. 

(26) "Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Before 
the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, in Connection with 
the FY 1992-93 Budget for the Department of Defense, February 19, 
1991," 13 pp. & 15 slides. 

147 



(27) "Stenographic Transcript of HEARINGS Before the Committee 
on Armed Services, United States Senate, Hearing on the Defense 
Authorization Request for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 and the FY 
1992-1997 Future Year Defense Plan, February 21, 1991," 153 pp.; 
and "Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee in Connection with the FY 
1992-93 Budget for the Department of Defense, February 21, 1991," 
22 pp- & 15 slides; and "Statement of General Colin L. Powell, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Committee on 
Armed Services, United States Senate, 21 February 1991," 19 pp. 

(28) Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress . January 1991, 134 pp. 

(29) "Statement of I. Lewis Libby, Principal Deputy Undersecre- 
tary of Defense (Strategy and Resources) in Connection with the 
New Defense Strategy, HASC Defense Policy Panel, March 12, 1991," 
18 pp. 

(30) "Statement of Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Committee on Armed Serv- 
ices, United States House of Representatives, 12 March 1991," 15 
pp. 

(31) "Statement of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul 
Wolfowitz, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Pro- 
curement and Military Nuclear Systems and Research and Develop- 
ment," March 20, 1991, 9 pp. 

(32) Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) 
News Release No. 2 04-91, "Remarks by Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney, at Walsh Lecture, Georgetown University, Washington, 
D.C., Thursday, March 21, 1991 - 8:00 P.M. (EST)," 10 pp. The 
Secretary departed from his prepared remarks at this lecture and 
instead talked about Operation DESERT STORM. His prepared re- 
marks were submitted for the record and made available to the 
public. 

(33) Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment . 
March 1991. 

(34) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, to the American Defense Preparedness Association 
Board of Directors, Reception and Dinner, The Omni Shoreham 
Hotel, Washington, D.C., 3 April 1991" - As Delivered, 20 pp. 
Although ADPA reported on this speech in their official journal, 
they virtually ignored the aspects dealing with the new strategy 
and instead concentrated on Operations DESERT STORM and DESERT 
SHIELD. See: "General Powell Receives Top ADPA Award," National 
Defense . Vol. LXXV, No. 468, May/June 1991, pp. 25-27. 

(35) Jim Wolffe, Army Times . April 15, 1991, p. 4. 

(36) "Chairman, JCS Testimony to Defense Base Closure Commis- 
sion," April 26, 1991, 25 pp. 



148 



(37) Sergey Mikhaylovich Rogov, "What Kind of Military Reform?" 
Moscow Kommunist in Russian, No. 6, April 1991, pp. 88-99 (FBIS- 
SOV-91-137-A, July 17, 1991, pp. 5-13). This article directly 
criticizes the USSR Defense Ministry "Concept of Military Reform" 
for failing to take into account doctrinal, strategy, and force 
structure changes going on in the U.S. and other foreign nations. 

(38) "Text of Remarks by the President at United States Air Force 
Academy Commencement Address," Colorado Springs, CO: White House 
Office of the Press Secretary, May 29, 1991, 4 pp. 

(39) "The New Defense Strategy and Its Implications for Total 
Force Policy," Statement of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense (Strategy and Resources), I. Lewis Libby, Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Armed 
Services Committee, on The Total Force Policy and the Base Force, 
June 5, 1991, Advanced Copy, 2 pp. 

(40) "Written Statement of Brigadier General William Fedorochko, 
Jr. , Deputy Director for Force Structure and Resource, Joint 
Staff, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Manpower and 
Personnel Subcommittee, 5 June 1991," 14 pp. 

(41) "Statement by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, On the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe (CFE) , Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 16 July 
1991," 7 pp. 

(42) Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Con- 
flict: An Interim Report to Congress , July 1991, pp. 1-3, 2-1, & 
21-1. 

(43) For an interesting commentary on the absence of the JCS 
"during the development of a new national military strategy and 
supporting force structure," see Colonel Gordon D. Batcheller, 
USMC (Ret.), "Ideas and Issues: Defense Organization - The 
Eclipse of the Joint Chiefs," Marine Corps Gazette , Vol. 75, No. 
7, July 1991, pp. 32-34 (especially p. 34). 

(44) For an interesting commentary on a "miniature think tank" 
within the "Joint Chiefs," see Rudy Abramson & John Broder, 
"Four-Star Power," Los Angeles Times Magazine , April 7, 1991, p. 
20. This report generally focuses on General Powell but also 
contains references (p. 60) to the new "base" force and Powell's 
apparent attempt to get the issue "out on the table quickly, even 
before Cheney was ready to discuss it publicly." The reference 
to the think tank within the "Joint Chiefs" is probably a general 
reference to the Joint Staff. 

(45) "Statement of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force 
Management and Personnel, Honorable Christopher Jehn, Hearing 
Before the Defense Subcommittee, Senate Appropriations Committee, 
"Total Force Concepts," April 9, 1991, 7 pp. This basic testimo- 
ny was repeated in the House. 

(46) "Defense Deputy Secretary Donald Atwood Address to the 

149 



American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics," May 1, 1991, 
at the Hyatt Regency Crystal City, Arlington, Virginia, Reuter 
Transcript Report, 8 pp. 

(47) Casey Anderson, "New Conventional, Nuclear Commands Seen," 
Air Force Times , February 11, 1991, p. 3, reporting on GEN 
McPeak's remarks at an Air Force Association Conference in Lake 
Buena Vista, Florida, on January 31, 1991. 

(48) The Honorable Michael P.W. Stone and General Carl E. Vuono, 
Trained and Ready: The United States Army Posture Statement FY 
92/93 . February 15, 1991, 106 pp. 

(49) The Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III, Secretary of the 
Navy, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations, and 
General A.M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, "The Way 
Ahead," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 117, No. 4, April 
1991, pp. 36-47. 

(50) Frank B. Kelso II, "Charting a Course for the Future," Sea 
Power , Vol. 34, No. 4, April 1991, pp. 13-20. 

(51) Defense spending will actually go up due to Operations 
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, but this should be viewed as an 
aberration much as the war in Vietnam was viewed. 

(52) This was not unnoticed in the Soviet Union, see: Vladislav 
Kozyakov, Moscow World Service in English, 2300 GMT, February 11, 
1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-029, February 12, 1991, p. 5). 

(53) Indeed, this subject in mentioned in their new draft mili- 
tary doctrine. See: "On the Military Doctrine of the USSR 
(Draft)," Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in Russian, Special Issue, signed 
to press November 30, 1990 ( JPRS-UMT-91-001-L, January 3, 1991, 
p. 16). 

(54) General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, NATO's Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, apparently agrees. In a February 1991 address, 
he remarked after discussing Operation DESERT STORM that "preci- 
sion weapons have changed the whole face of battle. See: "Tran- 
script, SACEUR's Remarks, International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Commonwealth House, London, United Kingdom, 21 February 
1991," IISS.DR, p. 7. 

(55) These four supporting capabilities were not nearly as well 
articulated as the base force during the formative stage. The 
Annual Report to the President and the Congress serves this 
purpose. We can expect additional follow-on reports of how these 
capabilities fit into the "base force." For example, see General 
Donald J. Kutyna, USAF address to the "12th Western Conference 
and Exposition - Space Day - San Diego, CA - 24 January 1991," 
OASD/PA #91-0294, 23 Jan 91, 4 pp. and 58 annotated slides. 

(56) General Donald J. Kutyna, USAF address to the "12th Western 
Conference and Exposition - Space Day - San Diego, CA - 24 Janu- 
ary 1991," OASD/PA #91-0294, 23 Jan 91, annotated slides 54-57. 

150 



(57) "Text of the State of the Union Address," Washington Post . 
January 30, 1991, p. A14 . 

(58) When the Soviets first commented on a revised U.S. defense 
against limited nuclear strikes, they assumed that it would be 
ground-based. See: TASS report by Vladimir Chernyshev in English 
at 1805 GMT, October 17, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-202 , October 18, 1990, 
p. 7). After President Bush's State of the Union address, they 
quickly picked up on a New York Times report that the new system 
would consist of 1,000 land-based and 1,000 space-based intercep- 
tors. See: Vladimir Chernyshev report, Moscow TASS in English, 
1922 GMT, February 1, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-023 , February 4, 1991, p. 
1) and Vladislav Kozyakov commentary on Moscow World Service in 
English, 2300 GMT, February 14, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-033 , February 
19, 1991, p. 1) . 

(59) For additional details, see "The President's New Focus For 
SDI: Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)," distrib- 
uted by the DoD's Strategic Defense Initiative Office, June 6, 
1991, 8 pp. 

(60) Examples used by GEN Powell in his April 1991 testimony 
before the Defense Base Closure Commission included the: 1st 
Infantry Division (ID) from Ft. Riley, KS, 4th Mechanized ID from 
Ft. Carson, CO, 5th Mechanized ID from Ft. Hood, TX, and the 
194th Armoured Brigade from Ft. Knox, KY. GEN Powell used the 
new home bases for all units in his testimony. 

(61) Suggested also by former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze in his statement to the Second International Confer- 
ence on "The Asia-Pacific Region — Dialogue, Peace, 
Cooperation," in Vladivostok, carried by Moscow TASS in English 
at 0844 GMT, September 4, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-172 , September 5, 
1990, pp. 3-10) and carried by Vladivostok Domestic Service in 
Russian at 2309 GMT, September 3, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-175 , Septem- 
ber 10, 1990, pp. 4-6 notes the differences between the sixty 
minute Russian and the English versions) . 

(62) Soviet criticism of a unilateral U.S. crisis response force 
was to be expected. In unofficial commentary by political ana- 
lyst Yuriy Tyssovskiy broadcast by Moscow TASS in English as 1527 
GMT on December 7, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-237 , December 10, 1990, p. 
16) , the Soviets stated that: 

"No questions would be asked if the new fire 
brigade force were created within the frame- 
work of the United Nations and their military 
committee and manned by troops from different 
countries. Such a force could then act as a 
powerful factor in support of a new world 
order. " 

(63) It is also possible that the Contingency Force may be 
assigned with responsibility for South Asia. 

(64) Examples used by GEN Powell in his April 1991 testimony 

151 



before the Defense Base Closure Commission included the: 82nd 
Airborne Division from Ft. Bragg, NC, 101st Airborne Division 
from Ft. Campbell, KY, 7th Light ID from Ft. Lewis, WA, and the 
24th Mechanized Infantry Division from Ft. Stewart, GA. GEN 
Powell used the new home bases for all units in his testimony. 

(65) The Air Force has made a case for the use of U.S. -based 
airpower to respond to future crises. See: Department of the Air 
Force, "The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach 
Global Power," A White Paper, June 1990, especially pp. 8-11, 15. 

(66) "Warfighting, " FMFM 1, March 6, 1989, 88 pp. This docu- 
ment's lack of significant use of the word "amphibious" is indic- 
ative of a shift in service self-identity. On the other hand, 
General Gray claims that "this type of operation can achieve 
objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of 
warfare." See: A.M. Gray, "Leaning Forward," Sea Power . Vol. 34, 
No. 4, p. 67. 

(67) "A Report by Admiral F.B. Kelso, II, Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Budget of the 
U.S. Navy," 14 February 1991, Appendix, pp. 3-4. 

(68) Adam B. Siegel, "The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War 
Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 
1946-1990," CRM 90-246, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analy- 
ses, February 1991, 60 pp. 

(69) Francis R. Donovan, "Surge and Sustainment , " and L. Edgar 
Prina, "Jones Committee Focuses on Sealift Deficiencies," Sea 
Power, Vol. 33, No. 11, November 1990, pp. 39-50; and John G. 
Roos, "While DoD Sorts Out Sealift Shortfall, Army Planners 
'Packaging' the Force," Armed Forces Journal International , Vol. 
128, No. 4, November 1990, pp. 18-20; and "We Have Averted a 
World War: Interview with House Defense Appropriations Subcommit- 
tee Chairman John P. Murtha," Sea Power , Vol. 33, No. 11, Decem- 
ber 1990, pp. 10-11, contain initial attempts to provide "lessons 
learned" from Operation DESERT SHIELD. 

(70) Gordon Jacobs, "Desert Shield Sealift" and H.T. Lenton, 
"Maritime Aspects of Operation Desert Shield," Navy Internation- 
al, Vol. 95, No. 11, November 1990, pp. 387-390 & 396-399; F. 
Clifton Berry, Jr., "Massive Airlift Stabilized Situation," 
National Defense . Vol. LXXV, No. 463, December 1990, pp. 6-8; 
Charles W. Corddry, "Even as Navy Builds up its Middle East 
Forces, a Drastic Build Down is Being Eyed by Planners," Sea 
Power , No. 34, No. 1, January 1991, p. 10; and John G. Roos, 
"MAC, Reserve Air Fleet Pull Off 162-Day 'Surge' for Desert 
Storm," Armed Forces Journal International , Vol. 128, No. 6, 
February, 1991, p. 28. 

(71) "NATO Transformed: The London Declaration," Selected Docu- 
ments, No. 38, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, 
containing the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic 
Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participat- 
ing in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on July 5-6, 

152 



1990. 

(72) General John R. Galvin, USA, NATO Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe, "SACEUR DPC Remarks, Brussels, BE, 6 Dec 90" transcript, 
4 pp. 

(73) There appears to be a definite difference in the use of the 
term "reconstitution" by NATO and as envisaged by the President 
and Secretary Cheney. NATO officials have been talking in terms 
of mobilization over a longer period rather than the creation of 
wholly new forces. A similar problem exists even in the U.S. 
The U.S. Army uses the term "reconstitution" to mean both a 
return of operationally deployed units to pre-hostilities levels 
of capability as well as to rebuild forces as envisaged by Secre- 
tary Cheney. 

(74) General John R. Galvin, USA "Transcript SACEUR' s Remarks 
with Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 
D.C., 8 January 1991," CARNEGIE. TR, p. 13. 

(75) Yu. Subbotin, "Security is Trust," Moscow Sovetskaya Ros- 
siya in Russian, November 21, 1990, 2nd Ed. , p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-90- 
229, November 28, 1990, p. 3). 

(76) Philip A.G. Sabin, British Strategic Priorities in the 
1990s , Adelphi Papers 254, London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Winter 1990, p. 9. 

(77) General John R. Galvin, USA "Transcript SACEUR' s Remarks 
with Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 
D.C., 8 January 1991," CARNEGIE. TR, pp. 13-14, 15. 

(78) The maritime C-in-Cs appear to be eager to enter the de- 
bate. For example, Admiral Sir Benjamin Bathurst, Commander-in- 
Chief, Channel and Eastern Atlantic Area, "New NATO Strategy: The 
Maritime Element," NAVY International , Vol. 96, No. 5, May 1991, 
pp. 135-137. 

(79) "SACEUR' s Presentation and Question/Answer Period" at the 
3 0th Annual Reunion of the SHAPE Officers' Association, Saturday, 
October 13, 1990, SHAPE Officers' Association Newsletter . No. 84, 
December 1990, p. 8. 

(80) V. Peresada ' s report "Preparing for Changes — NATO Council 
Sessions Ends," Moscow Pravda in Russian, December 20, 1990, 2nd 
Ed., p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-90-249, December 27, 1990, p. 3), notes that 
NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner is reported to have stated 
that the new strategy will be "elaborated by the summer of next 
year. " 

(81) "Transcript, SACEUR 's Remarks, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Commonwealth House, London, United Kingdom, 21 
February 1991," IISS.DR, 9 pp. 

(82) Paul L. Montgomery, "NATO Is Planning To Cut U.S. Forces In 
Europe By 50%," New York Times , May 29, 1991, p. A6. 

153 



(83) General of the Army S.P. Ivanov, "From the Experience of 
Preparation and Conduct of the Manchurian Operation of 1945," 
Moscow Vo ^ennaya My si in Russian, No. 8, August 1990, pp. 42-48 
(JPRS-UMT-90-008-L, October 23, 1990, pp. 25-29). 

(84) The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General 
Staff Academy , Vol. I: Issues of Soviet Military Strategy, Com- 
piled by Ghulam D. Wardak, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., Gen. Ed., 
Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, June 1989, 
p. 273. Of note is the recent removal of the name Voroshilov 
from the General Staff Academy. See: Moscow TASS report in Eng- 
lish, 1218 GMT, January 8, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-006, January 9, 
1991, p. 27) . 

(85) Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay V. Ogarkov, then-Chief 
of the General Staff, Always Prepared to Defend the Fatherland in 
Russian, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982, pp. 34-35 (JPRS L/10412, March 
25, 1982, pp. 24-25) and after his reassignment, History Teaches 
Vigilance in Russian, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1985 (JPRS-UMA-85-021-L 
Corrected, November 13, 1985, p. 32). 

(86) "On the Military Doctrine of the USSR (Draft)," Moscow 
Voyennaya My si in Russian, Special Issue, signed to press Novem- 
ber 30, 1990, pp. 24-28 ( JPRS-UMT-91-001-L, January 3, 1991, pp. 
14-17) . 

(87) Andrei A. Kokoshin and General-Major Valentin V. Larionov, 
"Counterpositioning Conventional Forces in the Context of Ensur- 
ing Strategic Stability," Moscow Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhduna- 
rodnyye Otnosheniya in Russian, No. 6, June 1988, pp. 23-31 (SASO 
translation, 13 pp.); and "Re-Thinking Victory. An Interview 
with Andrei Kokoshin" (USA and Canada Institute Deputy Director) 
Leeds Detente in English, No. 13, November 17, 1988 (FBIS-SOV-88- 
238 Annex, December 12, 1988, p. 13). The new models of defense 
have also been explained further by Larionov in his presentations 
at a conference on "Soviet Military Doctrine in a Changing Era," 
at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, May 25-27, 1989 
and in the subsequent preparation of these presentations in draft 
chapter form (21 pp. undated) . For some reason, this chapter did 
not appear in the book of conference proceedings. 

(88) Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhro- 
meyev, contained both in "The Doctrine of a New Policy," Warsaw 
Zolnierz Wolnosci in Polish, November 9, 1989, p. 4 (FBIS-SOV-89- 
221, November 17, 1989, p. 108) and "Our Military Doctrine," 
Moscow Agitator Armii I Flota in Russian, No. 24, 1989 (FBIS-SOV- 
90-021, January 31, 1990, p. 115). 

(89) Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet 
Military Strategy , 3rd Ed., Ed. with an analysis and commentary 
by Harriet Fast Scott, New York, NY: Crane, Russak & Company, 
Inc., 1980 (first paper edition), p. 134. 

(90) Interview with Army General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, "Military 
Reform: Reality and Prospects," Moscow Krasnay a Zvezda in Rus- 
sian, November 20, 1990, 1st Ed., p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-90-225 , November 

154 



21, 1990, pp. 49-54) . 

(91) Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Yazov, USSR Minister of 
Defense, "USSR Ministry of Defense Draft Military Reform 
Concept," Moscow Pr a vi t e 1 s tvennyy Vestnik in Russian, No. 48, 
November 1990, pp. 5-10 (FBIS-SOV-90-239, December 12, 1990, pp. 
62-75; or JPRS-UMA-90-028 , December 17, 1990, pp. 52-70); or as 
published in Moscow Voyennaya My si in Russian, Special Edition, 
signed to press November 30, 1990, pp. 3-23 (JPRS-UMT-91-001-L, 
January 3, 1991, pp. 1-14). 

(92) General-Colonel A.N. Kleymenov, "On Certain Methodological 
Approaches to Solving Problems of War and Peace (Military- 
Political Aspect), Moscow Voyennaya Mvsl in Russian, No. 9, 
September 1990 (JPRS-UMT-90-009-L, November 21, 1990, p. 9) . 

(93) General-Major V. Ivanov, senior lecturer at the General 
Staff Academy of the USSR, "Radical Renewal or 'Cosmetic 
Repair'?" Moscow Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil in Russian, No. 15, 
August 1990, pp. 15-20 (FBIS-SOV-90-180-S, September 17, 1990, 
pp. 40-44) . 

(94) Colonel N.F. Azyasskiy, "On the Strategic Deployment of the 
Armed Forces of Germany and the Soviet Union in 1941," Moscow 
Vovennava My si in Russian, No. 8, August 1990 (JPRS-UMT-90-008-L, 
October 23, 1990, pp. 7-8). 

(95) An example of the continuing debate is Sergey Mikhaylovich 
Rogov, "What Kind of Military Reform?" Moscow Kommunist in Rus- 
sian, No. 6, April 1991, pp. 88-99 (FBIS-SOV-91-137-A, July 17, 
1991, pp. 5-13) . This article directly criticizes the USSR 
Defense Ministry "Concept of Military Reform" for failing to take 
into account doctrinal, strategy, and force structure changes 
going on in the U.S. and other foreign nations. 

(96) James J. Tritten, "Superpower War Termination: The Maritime 
Component," The Journal of Soviet Military Studies . Vol. 4, No. 
1, March 1991, pp. 1-29, further develops this concept. 

(97) SACEUR General John R. Galvin, USA, took this position 
recently in "Transcript SACEUR 's Remarks with Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 8 January 1991," 
CARNEGIE.TR, pp. 9-10. 

(98) "President's Speech on Military Spending and a New 
Defense," New York Times . March 24, 1983, p. 20. 

(99) Caspar W. Weinberger speech to the Aviation and Space 
Writers Association on April 11, 1983, contained in "The Adminis- 
tration's Policy on Strategic Defense," Defense Science & Elec- 
tronics . May 1983, pp. 21-23. 

(100) This was the group that produced the Future Security 
Strategy Study headed by Fred S. Hoffman, director of Pan Heuris- 
tics, and Defense Technologies Study Team, also known as the 
Fletcher Panel for its chairman, James C. Fletcher, former head 

155 



of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 

(101) Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report 
to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1985 . February 1, 1984, pp. 30, 193- 
194. 

(102) Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report 
to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984 . February 1, 1983, pp. 34, 22 5- 
228. 

(103) An initial look at nonstandard scenarios is contained in 
James A. Winnefeld & David A. Shlapak, "The Challenge of Future 
Nonstandard Contingencies: Implications for Strategy, Planning, 
Crisis Management, and Forces, Volume I," RAND/N-3098/l-DAG, 
Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, October 1990, 69 pp.; and 
"Volume II," RAND/N-3098/2-DAG, 182 pp. 

(104) John M. Kenny, "The Dibb Report: Three Years After," NPS- 
56-89-016, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School Tech- 
nical Report, August 1989, 68 pp. 

(105) Lieutenant T.R. Frame, Royal Australian Navy, "A Navy 
Grown Up and On Its Own," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 
115, No. 3, March 1989, pp. 116-123. 

(106) For examples of possible Soviet misperceptions of the U.S. 
military buildup of the 1980s, see commentary by ex-KGB Officer 
Oleg Gordievsky as recently published widely in the West. Oleg 
Gordievsky, "Pershing Paranoia in the Kremlin," London The Times 
in English, February 27, 1990, pp. 12-13 (FBIS-SOV-90-052-A, 
March 16, 1990, pp. 11-15) ; and an excerpt of the new book KGB: 
The Inside Story , by Christopher Andrew in cooperation with 
Gordievsky, was published in the U.S. by Time . Vol. 136, No. 17, 
October 22, 1990, pp. 72-82 (page 80-82 are of most interest). 

(107) The Soviet press covered a report in the April 19 Washing- 
ton Post that the U.S. Strategic Air Command and Pentagon have 
revised their "Strategic (sic) Integrated Operations Plan" (SIOP) 
to delete 1,000 targets in Eastern Europe. According to Soviet 
sources, the new plan, termed SIOP-7, "hastily" deleted these 
targets last year. See, Vladimir Bogachev Moscow TASS report in 
English, 1904 GMT, April 22, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-078 , April 23, 
1991, p. 1); CAPT S. Sidorov, "Attracted by the Cold?..." Moscow 
Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, April 25, 1991, 1st Ed., p. 3 (FBIS- 
SOV-91-081, April 26, 1991, p. 1); and Valentin Zorin commentary 
on Moscow World Service in English, 0000 GMT, April 28, 1991 
(FBIS-SOV-91-082, April 29, 1991, pp. 3-4). The story is also 
covered by Robert C. Toth in "U.S. Scratches Nuclear Targets in 
Soviet Bloc," Los Angeles Times , April 19, 1991, p. 1. 

(108) Keith A. Dunn, "The Missing Link in Conflict Termination 
Thought: Strategy," in Conflict Termination and Military Strate- 
gy, Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn, Eds., Boulder, Colora- 
do: Westview Press, 1987, p. 185. 

(109) Keith A. Dunn, "The Missing Link in Conflict Termination 

156 



Thought: Strategy," in Conflict Termination and Military Strate- 
gy , Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn, Eds. , Boulder, Colora- 
do: Westview Press, 1987, pp. 186-190. 

(110) Brigadier General Daniel W. Christman, USA, Director of 
Strategy, Plans, and Policy for the U.S. Army Staff, has also 
drawn a parallel between Operation DESERT SHIELD and our new 
contingency-based strategy. Interestingly, he credits former 
Chairman of the JCS, Admiral William J. Crowe, USN, with initiat- 
ing the current redirection of U.S. national security strategy. 
See his "Desert Shield: Test of a New 'Contingency' Strategy," 
Armed Forces Journal International , Vol. 128, No. 5, December 
1990, p. 50. 

(111) Most Europeans at the IISS conference, and those that the 
author has met with over the past nine months, have attempted to 
make the argument that the Contingency Force could and should be 
based in Europe. 

(112) James Blackwell, et. al., The Gulf War: Military Lessons 
Learned - Interim Report of the CSIS Study Group on Lessons 
Learned from the Gulf War . Washington, D.C.: The Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, 1991, 53 pp., purports to do 
just this in their last chapter (pp. 45-53) . The study authors 
criticize what they term as "the U.S. military's new regional 
contingencies strategy," without demonstrating that they have 
fully internalized the implications of the new national security 
strategy. Instead, the authors refer to a previous CSIS study 
and prefer to recommend it rather than analyze the consequences 
of what has been charted by the Bush Administration. 

(113) The first official DoD report on these Operations concen- 
trated on the military conduct of the conflict rather than the 
lessons for the new strategy. See, Department of Defense, Con- 
duct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress , 
July 1991. The first maritime lessons can be found in, Depart- 
ment of the Navy, The United States Navy in "DESERT SHIELD" 
"DESERT STORM," Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 15 May, 1991. 

(114) V. Gan, "United States: Boost for 'Star Wars'," Moscow 
Pravda in Russian, February 11, 1991, 1st Ed., p. 6 (FBIS-SOV-91- 
028, February 11, 1991, pp. 1-2). 

(115) See the Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf 
Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress , July 1991, p. 2-7: 

"...Coalition political leaders and command- 
ers may have held some hope that the air 
phases of the theater campaign plan might 
cause Saddam to agree to Coalition demands 
without the need to launch a ground offen- 
sive. . . " 

(116) Even in retrospect, most politically-aware American 
"experts" still would not have predicted the Bush Administra- 

157 



tion's actions and public support for those actions during the 
events in the Persian Gulf. 

(117) Suggested by General-Major Valentin Larionov in "Combat 
Readiness and Security: Will People Stop Playing at War?" Moscow 
New Times in English, No. 37, September 12-18, 1989, p. 14; and 
by General-Major Yuriy Kirshin in "Why is Military Reform 
Needed?" Moscow New Times in English, No. 12, March 20-26, 1990 
(FBIS-SOV-90-066, April 5, 1990, p. 69). Before dismissing this 
suggestion out of hand, the reader is reminded that General Colin 
Powell, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not 
rule out the possibility of joint exercises with the Soviet Armed 
Forces when he and Army General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, Chief of the 
Soviet General Staff, were interviewed by ABC newsman Ted Koppel 
on "Nightline," July 25, 1991. 

(118) The failure by the U.S. to capture North Vietnamese behav- 
ior with "red" team players in late 1960s - early 1970s politico- 
military war games has been addressed by General Bruce Palmer, 
Jr. in his The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam . 
Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984, p. 29. 

(119) "Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director 
of Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower, Strategic, and Criti- 
cal Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 
on Intelligence Issues, March 7, 1991," pp. 98-99. 

(120) Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelli- 
gence for American National Security . Princeton, New Jersey, 
1989, pp. 21-22. 

(121) This fact has not gone unnoticed by the Soviet Union. 
See: I. Kulkov, "Is the CIA Changing? U.S. Intelligence in the 
Era of Glasnost," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, January 3, 
1991, 1st Ed., p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-91-003, January 4, 1991, pp. 6-7); 
and Vladimir Kireyevskiy, "A Double Yardstick," Moscow Rabochaya 
Tribuna in Russian, April 26, 1991, p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-91-086, May 3, 
1991, pp. 5-6). On the other hand, from published U.S. reports, 
the DoD is avoiding any entry into economic intelligence. See: 
William Matthews, "Intelligence Reorganization Focuses on Cuts, 
Mergers," Navy Times . May 13, 1991, p. 13. 

(122) Soviet Military Power - 1990 . 9th Ed., September 1990, p. 
54 states that "...a short-warning or pre-emptive strategic 
nuclear attack against the continental United States for the 
foreseeable future... is judged to be unlikely." 

(12 3) "SACEUR's Presentation and Question/Answer Period" at the 
30th Annual Reunion of the SHAPE Officers' Association, Saturday, 
October 13, 1990, SHAPE Officers' Association Newsletter . No. 84, 
December 1990, p. 12. 

(124) Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars. Vol. II - 
The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930-1939 . Annapolis, Mary- 
land: Naval Institute Press, 1976, p. 371. 



158 



(12 5) Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intel- 
ligence for American National Security r Princeton, New Jersey, 
1989, pp. 99-100; and Barton Whaley, Covert German Rearmament . 
1919-1939 : Deception and Misperception , Frederick, Maryland: 
University Press of America, 1984, pp. 91-93. 

(12 6) According to a recent Soviet report taken from a Polish 
newspaper, the Polish military has already been "rehearsing 
operations on exercises" that included an offensive from an 
"eastern enemy." See LTC V. Petrukhin, "Poland Has New 'Enemy'," 
Moscow Krasnava Zvezda in Russian, March 5, 1991, 1st Ed., p. 3 
(FBIS-SOV-91-046, March 8, 1991, pp. 29-30). 

(127) As far-fetched as this sounds, it is interesting to note 
that this exact scenario was examined at a forum "Civic Control 
Over Security" that took place in Rostov-on-Don. The forum was 
sponsored by the magazine Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn and the School 
for Strategy of Socio-Intellectual Enterprise. See: Konstantine 
Ovchinnikov, "'Independent' War Games Described," Moscow New 
Times in English, No. 39, October 1, 1990, p. 32 (JPRS-UIA-90- 
017, November 6, 1990, p. 1). 

(128) The next four sections draw heavily upon discussions, 
presentations, and draft position papers from the "What if 
Peace?" National Science and Technology Policy Conference spon- 
sored by the California Engineering Foundation and Aviation Week 
and Space Technology . November 28-29, 1990, Costa Mesa, Califor- 
nia. Attendees at this conference explicitly addressed the 
issues related to industrial capability to respond to the new 
strategy. 

(129) Suggested recently by M. Aleksandrov in "Military Doctrine 
in Uncertain Perspective," Moscow Literaturnaya Rossiya in Rus- 
sian, No. 40, October 5, 1990, p. 9 ( JPRS-UMA-90-028 , December 
17, 1990, p. 50) . 

(13 0) John F. Peel Brahtz, "Modularized Ocean Basing System - A 

United States Option in a Strategy of Discriminate Deterrence 

(Circa 2000), R-928, Port Hueneme, CA: Naval Civil Engineering 

Laboratory Technical Report, November 1989 and J.D. Hightower, 

T.P. Rona, and H.R. Talkington, "Floating Stable Platforms: 
Concepts and U.S. Activities," San Diego, CA: Naval Ocean Systems 
Center, undated. 

(131) Contrary to customary use of the term "mutual assured 
destruction," MAD should only be used to describe a world where 
both sides have left themselves vulnerable to the other's at- 
tacks. Most authors and scholars emphasize the offensive aspects 
of MAD - true, each side has a powerful force of missiles and 
bombers, however, one side - the USSR - never abandoned its major 
defenses against bombers, actually fielded a limited defense 
against missiles, maintained a passive defense system, and an 
aggressive R&D program for antisubmarine warfare. Such a world 
is not in keeping with the philosophy of mutual assured destruc- 
tion. 



159 



(13 2) U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Tech- 
nology for NATO; Implementing Follow-On Force Attack . OTA-ISC- 
309, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 
1987, 230 pp. 

(133) U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Holding 
the Edge: Maintaining the Defense Technology Base . OTA-ISC-420, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1989, 
187 pp. ; and The Defense Technology Base; Introduction and Over- 
view . A Special Report of OTA's Assessment on Maintaining the 
Defense Technology Base, OTA-ISC-374, March 1988, 113 pp. 

(134) See: Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic . 
McNair Papers, No. 5, Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univer- 
sity, Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 1989, 89 
pp. 

(13 5) New Thinking and American Defense Technology . New York: 
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, 
August 1990, p. 11. 

(136) Comments of Rear Admiral Yu M. Khaliulin, Crimea Oblast 
Soviet deputy and Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, con- 
tained in excerpts of a TASS Report of a November 13, 1990 meet- 
ing between military people's deputies and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 
"The Army Will Not Be Separated From the People; USSR President's 
Meeting With Deputies Who Are Also Servicemen," Moscow Krasnaya 
Zvezda in Russian, 16 November 1990, p. 4 (FBIS-SOV-90-225, 21 
November 1990, p. 70) . 

(137) "Defense Deputy Secretary Donald Atwood Address to the 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics," May 1, 1991, 
at the Hyatt Regency Crystal City, Arlington, Virginia, Reuter 
Transcript Report, p. 7 ; 

"...I believe the free economic system is the 
system which should determine who wins, who 
loses, who merges. I believe in the free 
marketplace. I don't think we, the Depart- 
ment of Defense surely, have the capability 
to try to plan any kind of industrial policy. 
Quite the contrary. The free marketplace has 
to determine. Our role is to sponsor re- 
search and development and our role is to 
make sure people know what we're going to 
buy. And let the marketplace determine those 
in between. " 



(138) Initial costs of $30B for a Five-Year Plan represent only 
a fraction of the hundreds of billions of dollars that could 
ultimately be required. See: Office of Technology Assessment, 
Complex Cleanup: The Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons 
Production . OTA-0 484, February 1991, 212 pp. 

(139) The DoD has already started moving in this direction with 

160 



the expansion of International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) resource allocation courses at the Defense Education 
Resources Management Center (DRMEC) in Monterey, CA. This school 
saw its first contingent of Eastern Europeans in July 1991. 

(140) Congress is just beginning to explore its role in this 
process. The Office of Technology Assessment has just completed 
a background paper, "Adjusting to a New Security Environment: The 
Defense Technology and Industrial Base Challenge," OTA-BP-ISC-79 , 
February 1991, 16 pp. This paper accepts the emerging changes in 
the national security environment and attempts to provide a first 
look at "what form the future defense technology and industrial 
base might take; what form it ought to take; what government 
policies can do to draw these two together; and how the sweeping 
changes expected in the base can be managed to minimize adverse 
economic effects and ensure sufficient technology and industrial 
capability to meet the Nation's needs." This preliminary report 
from OTA at least makes mention of the "Base Force" and President 
Bush's proposed "Reconstituted Force," it is obvious that the 
authors either did not have a complete understanding of the 
implications of the new national security strategy or that they 
chose to not consider the probability that this proposed strategy 
would survive Congressional oversight. A final report is to be 
delivered in the Spring of 1992. 

(141) G.A.H. Gordon, British Seapower and Procurement Between 
the Wars: A Reappraisal of Rearmament , Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press, 1988, 321 pp.; and Thomas C. Hone, "Fighting on 
Our Own Ground: The War of Production, 1920-1942," unpublished 
paper, circa 1991, 17 pp. 

(142) Fred C. Ikle, "Industrial Mobilization Planning: Critical 
to National Defense," based upon remarks to the Society of Manu- 
facturing Engineers Conference, Detroit, November 9, 1987, print- 
ed in Defense 88 . January /February 1988, pp. 15-18. 

(143) A "Graduated Mobilization Response" system was investigat- 
ed by the DoD in the 1980s but largely as a component of our 
deterrent strategy vis-a-vis the USSR. On the general subject of 
industrial mobilization capabilities, see: Martin C. Libicki, 
Industrial Strength Defense: A Disquisition on Manuf actur ing , 
Surge and War , Washington, D.C.: National Defense University 
Mobilization Concepts Development Center, undated but printed in 
1986, 164 pp.; and John N. Ellison, Jeffrey W. Frumkin, and 
Timothy W. Stanley, Mobilizing U. S. Industry: A Vanishing Option 
for National Security? Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988, 126 pp. 

(144) James R. Gallaugher, "Graduated Mobilization Response 
Concept Overdue," National Defense , Vol. LXXV, No. 4 64, January 
1991, p. 23. 

(145) Such a stockpile would be very difficult to manage due to 
the transitory nature of "critical" components. 

(146) Congressional Budget Office, Strategic and Critical Non- 
fuel Minerals: Problems and Policy Alternatives , Washington, 

161 



D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, August 1983, pp. 75-77. 

(147) LTG Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.), "A Force 'Employment' 
Capability, Extract Marine Corps Gazette , May 1990, p. 31. 

(148) These are called Logistics Support Vessels (LSV) and Land- 
ing Craft Utility (LCU) . The former are ocean-going vessels, 273 
feet in length, a crew of 29 soldiers, and a cargo capacity of 15 
M1A1 tanks or 27 M2 Bradleys. See: The Honorable Michael P.W. 
Stone and General Carl E. Vuono, Trained and Ready; The United 
States Army Posture Statement FY 92/93 . February 15, 1991, p. 74. 
We should also remember that most of the U.S. European theater 
amphibious operations during World War II were conducted by the 
Army and not the Marine Corps. 

(14 9) On the other hand, it has been reported that GEN Powell is 
indeed considering changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) . 
See: Casey Anderson, "New Conventional, Nuclear Commands See," 
Air Force Times , February 11, 1991, p. 3, reporting on GEN 
McPeak's remarks at an AFA Conference in Lake Buena Vista, Flori- 
da, on January 31, 1991; and "The Air Force of the '90s," and 
interview with the Air Force Chief of Staff by COL Charles D. 
Cooper, USAF-Ret., Editor, The Retired Officer . Vol. XLVII, No. 
6, June 1991, p. 29. 

(150) In addition to the comments by the Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force, GEN McPeak, see also: VADM Bernard M. Kauderer, USN 
(Ret.), "From the President" & VADM Daniel L. Cooper, USN (Ret.), 
"Submarines and the Face of Change," Submarine Review , April 
1991, pp. 2, 7; RADM J.C. Wylie, USN (Ret.), "Heads Up, Navy," 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 117, No. 5, May 1991, pp. 
17-18; Barbara Opall, "Pentagon Irons Out Plan to Merge Nuclear 
Forces," Defense News . May 13, 1991, p. 48; Peter Grier, "US 
Military Chiefs May Combine Commands," Christian Science Monitor , 
May 15, 1991, p. 9; and RADM W.J. Holland, Jr., USN (Ret.), 
"Strategic Command - Who Needs It and Why?" U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings . Vol. 117, No. 8, August 1991, p. 13. 

(151) See: Eliot A. Cohen, "After the Battle," The New Republic , 
April 1, 1991, pp. 19-26. 

(152) Eliot A. Cohen, "The Future of Force and American Strate- 
gy," The National Interest , No. 21, Fall 1990, p. 13. 

(153) Perry M. Smith, "Long-Range Planning: A National 
Necessity," in Creating Strategic Vision: Long-Range Planning for 
National Security , by Perry M. Smith, et. al., Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 1987, p. 5 discusses the types 
of innovative individuals who will be reguired for this effort. 

(154) Opponents of the new national security strategy may em- 
brace arms control as a mechanism to derail the transition. 

(155) Portions of this section were developed for a precis of 
this report published in the professional journal of the Military 
Operations Research Society. See: "A New National Security 

162 



Strategy," Phalanx . Vol. 24, No. 1, March 1991, pp. 11-13. 

(156) The encouragement for operations research practitioners to 
delve into the world of strategy, and the perception that they 
often do not, was addressed in Craig W. Kirkwood's, "Does Opera- 
tions Research Address Strategy?" Operations Research . Vol. 38, 
No. 5, September-October 1990, pp. 747-751. 

(157) The Military Operations Research Society (MORS) addressed 
all of these subjects at their 59th MORS Symposium at West Point 
in June 1991. 

(158) Gerald F. Seib, "War Games for the New World Order," Wall 
Street Journal . Thursday, August 1, 1991, p. A12. 

(159) Konstantine Ovchinnikov, "'Independent' War Games De- 
scribed, Moscow New Times in English, No. 39, October 1990, p. 32 
(JPRS-UIA-90-017, November 6, 1990, p. 1). 

(160) John Train, "When can Sanctions Succeed?" Wall Street 
Journal . June 14, 1989, p. 14. 

(161) General Accounting Office, "Industrial Base: Significance 
of DOD's Foreign Dependence," Report to the Chairman, Subcommit- 
tee on Technology and National Security, Joint Economic Commit- 
tee, U.S. Congress, GAO/NSIAD-91-93 , January 1991, 26 pp. 

(162) The Air Force has accepted the coming debate over roles 
and missions. See, for example: LTC Gregory S. Parnell, USAF, 
et. al., "Methodology for Analyzing Global Reach — Global 
Power," Washington, D.C.: Air Force Center for Studies & Analy- 
sis, White Paper, October 11, 1990, pp. 2, 21-22. 

(163) The Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III, Secretary of the 
Navy, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations, & 
General A.M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, "The Way 
Ahead," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . Vol. 117, No. 4, April 
1991, pp. 36-47. 

(164) "The Secretary of the Navy's Posture Statement - A Report 
by The Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett, III, Secretary of the Navy, 
on the Posture and the Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Budget of the United 
States Navy and Marine Corps," undated but delivered February 21, 
1991, pp. 6, 19. 

(165) "A Report by Admiral F.B. Kelso, II, Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Budget of the 
U.S. Navy," 14 February 1991, Appendix pp. 3-4; and "The Secre- 
tary of the Navy ' s Posture Statement - A Report by The Honorable 
H. Lawrence Garrett, III, Secretary of the Navy, on the Posture 
and the Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Budget of the United States Navy 
and Marine Corps," undated but delivered February 21, 1991, p. 
10. 

(166) RADM J.C. Wylie, USN (Ret.), "Heads Up, Navy," U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings . Vol. 117, No. 5, May 1991, pp. 17-18. 

163 



(167) Another Navy study concluded that the recent review of 
strategy leading to President Bush's speech at Aspen was only 
possible due to: the fiscal crisis, the waning threat, and the 
new powers of the Chairman of the JCS authorized by the Goldwater 
Nichols Act - all of which did not come together until General 
Powell became the Chairman of the JCS. See: CDR William F. 
Hickman, USN, "Is the Maritime Strategy Dead?" Newport, R.I.: 
Naval War College, unpublished winner in the 1991 Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition, pp. 7-9. 

(168) John F. Morton, "The U.S. Navy in 1990," U.S. Naval Insti- 
tute Proceedings . Vol. 117, No. 5, May 1991, pp. 124-133. 

(169) RADM W.J. Holland, Jr., USN (Ret.), "Strategic Command - 
Who Needs It and Why?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings ,. Vol. 
117, No. 8, August 1991, p. 13. 

(170) VADM Stanley R. Arthur, USN, and Marvin Pokrant, "Desert 
Storm at Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings /Naval Review . 
Vol. 117, No. 5, May 1991, pp. 82-87; RADM Riley D. Mixson, USN, 
"Where We Must Do Better," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . Vol. 
117, No. 8, August 1991, pp. 38-39. 

(171) LCDR Sam J. Tangredi, "Comment and Discussion - A Strategy 
in the Navy's Best Interest," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . 
Vol. 117, No. 7, July 1991, pp. 14-16. 

(172) CDR Donald P. Loren, "Comment and Discussion - Heads Up, 
Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . Vol. 117, No. 8, August 
1991, pp. 16-19. 

(17 3) James L. George, "A Strategy in the Navy's Best Interest," 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 117, No. 5, pp. 114-123. 
Although this article is the Prize Essay in the 1991 Arleigh 
Burke Essay Contest, its placement in the Naval Review 1991 issue 
of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings indicates that the pub- 
lishers wished to focus more attention to other subjects than it 
did the recommendations contained in the essay. 

(174) Portions of this section were first developed in my precis 
of this report: "America's New National Security Strategy," The 
Submarine Review . April 1991, pp. 15-24. 

(175) Programming planning appears to have gone along, during 
much of 1990, without any recognition that the world has changed. 
See: James L. George, "The USNs Revolution at Sea," Navy Interna- 
tional . Vol. 95, No. 10, October 1990, pp. 378-383. There are 
signs that at least some parts of the Navy recognized the changes 
and worried about the implications for programming. See: Scott 
C. Truver, "Whither US Anti-Submarine Warfare, Now That the 
Threat Has Gone Away?" Naval Forces . Vol. XI, No. V/1990, pp. 8- 
21. 

(176) VADM Daniel L. Cooper, USN (Ret.), "Submarines and the 
Face of Change," Edward J. Campbell, President and Chief Execu- 
tive Officer, Newport News Shipbuilding, "Industrial Base," and 

164 



James E. Turner, Jr., Executive Vice President, Marine, Land 
Systems and Services, General Dynamics Corporation, "Maintaining 
the U.S. Submarine Industrial Base," The Submarine Review . April 
1991, pp. 4-8, 27-31, 32-36. 

(177) The study for this new submarine has been identified as 
the "CENTURION," but it is not clear if this will also be the 
name of the new class. 

(178) For an interesting series of articles addressing other 
roles and missions for the submarine force, see recent issues of 
The Submarine Review (the journal of the Naval Submarine League) 
— especially: "Address to Naval Submarine League Annual Symposi- 
um - 14 June 199 0" by VADM Daniel L. Cooper, USN, ACNO Undersea 
Warfare, "SSN's and Low Intensity Conflict" by James C. Hay, both 
contained in the July 1990 issue, pp. 5-14, 36-42; "Force Com- 
mander's Forum - Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet" 
by VADM Roger F. Bacon, USN, October 1990, pp. 83-87; 'The Case 
for a Submarine-Based Anti-Satellite System" by D. Nahrstedt, 
"The Use of Submarines in Small-Scale Conflicts" by MIDN Sean 
Osterhaus, and "The U.S. SSN in Third World Conflict (TWC) " by 
Jim Patton, all in the January 1991 issue, pp. 50-59, 73-78. 
Admiral Bacon's remarks are covered with additional depth in 
"Commander Says Sub Force Looks Back for Future" by Jack Dorsey, 
Norfolk The Virginian-Pilot , December 3, 1990, pp. Dl & D5. Also 
see Brent A. Ditzler, "Naval Diplomacy Beneath the Waves: A Study 
of the Coercive Use of Submarines Short of War," Master's Thesis, 
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1989, 
117 pp. for an excellent example of a submarine officer arguing 
that submarines have a role in naval diplomacy. 

(179) Rear Admiral J.R. Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Pow- 
ers , Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 1986, p. 97. 

(180) Ronald O'Rourke, "Congressional Watch," U.S. Naval Insti- 
tute Proceedings . Vol. 117, No. 5, p. 171. 

(181) "The Top Line of Tomorrow's Navy" Interview with Vice 
Admiral William D. Smith, Sea Power, Vol. 34, No. 2, February 
1991, p. 17; "A Report by Admiral F.B. Kelso, II, Chief of Naval 
Operations, on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Budget of 
the U.S. Navy," 14 February 1991, Appendix, p. 4; and "The Secre- 
tary of the Navy's Posture Statement - A Report by The Honorable 
H. Lawrence Garrett, III, Secretary of the Navy, on the Posture 
and the Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Budget of the United States Navy 
and Marine Corps," undated but delivered February 21, 1991, p. 
12. 

(182) It will be interesting to see if this changes given the 
recent issue of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . 

(183) "The Secretary of the Navy's Posture Statement - A Report 
by The Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett, III, Secretary of the Navy, 
on the Posture and the Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Budget of the United 
States Navy and Marine Corps," undated but delivered February 21, 
1991, p. 5. 

165 



(184) "A Report by Admiral F.B. Kelso, II, Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Budget of the 
U.S. Navy," 14 February 1991, pp. 12-13. 

(185) "Statement of Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Committee on Armed Serv- 
ices, United States House of Representatives, 12 March 1991, 15 
pp. 

(186) Carl H. Builder, The Army in the Strategic Planning Proc- 
ess: Who Shall Bell the Cat ?. R-3 513-A, Santa Monica, CA: The 
RAND Corporation, Arroyo Center - Prepared for the U.S. Army, 
April 1987, 102 pp. An expanded version of this study was pub- 
lished as The Masks of War; American Military Styles in Strategy 
and Analysis , Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1989, 240 pp. 

(187) Department of the Air Force, "The Air Force and U.S. 
National Security: Global Reach - Global Power," A White Paper, 
June 1990, 15 pp. 

(188) On the other hand, one might conclude that the maritime 
school has become clearly preeminent. 

(189) Recall criticism of the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s for 
failing to more emphasize the primary role of land forces in 
attaining political goals that reguired military forces. 

(19 0) Part of this section draws upon concepts first developed in 
"Strategic Management for the Defense Department," by James J. 
Tritten and Nancy Roberts, NPS-56-88-030-PR, Monterey, Califor- 
nia: Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report, September 1988, 
pp. 3-9. 

(191) "Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment," A 
paper by the Future Security Environment Working Group, submitted 
to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy," Andrew W. 
Marshall and Charles Wolf, Working Group Chairmen, April 1988, p. 
18. It can also be argued that this state also defines our future 
leadership in technology. 



166 



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