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THE PHILIPPINES
PAST AND PRESENT
. \
^i«iniiiiii4-
1/ DgfcH C. WOECESTEB
ADTROX ov " THa rBiLirrDn iii.urM
^ //r TWO VOLUUBS—WtTH IK PLATES
THE HACMILLAN COHFANT
1914
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B( THK HAOmliLUI OOUFUrT.
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CONTENTS l/- I
VOL. I
6-
L TiKW Ponrr aitd SnajKcr^MATTKB • . . • 1
IL Wab IiTDmKDKNCE Phomibbd ? 18
HL IXBUBQBITT " COOPKRATIOK " 07
IT. The FaEMKDiTXTED Ikbtibqkkt Attack • . ■ 127
T. IifBintaxifT Rdls ahd thb Wilcox-Sakgbnt Bipobt ISS
TL IirainiQBMT Bulk ik tse Cagatak Valley 170
TEL IirenBOBin' Bitle in tbe Visatab and Blbbwhzri • 206
TUL Did We Debtbot a Repcbuc? 242 '
IX. The Conduct of the Wae 270
X. Mb. Bbtak akd ImBiutDBitoE 206 '
XL The First Phu.ippikb Commisbiok .... 801
XXL The EsTABi.iBHHBin' or Ctvu. Govebxmeitt , . 826
XQL Tbb Phiupfine Cini. Service 860
XIT. The Cokbtajbclart and Pitbijo Order . . . 878
XV. The Adhikistbation o» Justice 400
XVL Health Conditiohb .408
XVIL Saouio and the Benouet Road 440
XTin. Thx CoSsDiKATioa of SciEHTiric Wore ... 488
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CONTENTS i/- I
YOL. I
I. Turw PoiHT AKD Subjxot-Uattbs .... 1
IL Was Imdrpbhdinci Psomibzd? 18
HL ImUROEMT " COOPKBATIOK " 87
IV. Thi Pbbkxditatxd iHsrBOEKT Attack . 127
y. iKSDRQEifT RuiA ASS THB Wilcoz-Saboent Rxfokt 152
TL Iksdroxiit Buu n thx Caqatan Vaij.i:y . 170
TO. IxsnBOKHT Scut IK the Tisatab akd Eubwhksk . 206
Vm. Did Wk Dmteot a Bkpdblic? 242 "
IX. Thb Cohdcct of TBI Wab 270
X. UB. BbTAS Ajn> IlTDBFBKDENOB 206 '
XL Thb Fijut Philippine CoKHUBioir . . . .801
XTT- Thx EsTABLieaMENT or Cmi, Oovbbkhbnt . > S26
XnL Thb Phiuppinb Citu. Sxkvicb 380
XIT. Thb CoirsTABtiiAxT and Pubuc Obdbb . . . 878
XV. Thx ADininBTBATioii or Jdbticb 400
XVL Hkaxth Comditioms 408
XVn. BAOTnO AHD THX BHTGtTBT KOAD 449
XVm. TBB CotiRDUTATIOIl Or SojBKTtriO WoBK ... 488
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viu LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
One of the Fiist Bengcet Government Cottagea .... 240
Typloftl Cottages at Bagnio 248
A Baguio Home 260
The Baguio Hospital 284
Govemmeut Centre at Bagnio 272
A SoeDs in tbe Bagnio Teachers' Camp 280
The Bagnio Conntiy Club 288
The Bureau of Science Building, Manila 806
The Philippine General Hospital 814
The College of Medicine and Surgery, Manila 822
An Old-atyle Schoolhonw, with Teacherg and PnpUa . . . 880
A Modern Primaiy School Bailding SS8
Old-style Central School Building 84t
Modern Central School Bailding 840
Typical Scene in a Trade School 864
. An Embroidery Chua 882
Philippine Embroidery 870
Filipino Trained Nurses 880
A School Athletic Team 886
Filipina Girls playing Basket-bait 894
University Hall, Manila 402
Bakfdan 410
lu Hostile Country 418
Trarel under Difficulties 420
Dangerous Navigation 484
A Negrito Family and theii " Hoasa " 442
A Typical Negrito 448
Typical Kalingas 462
SeUling a Head-hunting Fend 468
Entertaining the Kalingas 444
An Ifugao Family 470
Ifugao Dancers *■■ 478
An Ifugao Dancer 484
Ifngao Bice Terraoea 492
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THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PBESENT
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THE PHILIPPINES
PAST AND PRESENT
CHAPTER I
View Point and Subject-Mattbb
It ifi customary in Latin countriefl for a would-be
author or orator to endeavour, at the b^tnnmg of his book
or his speech, to establish his status. Possibly I have be-
come partially Latinized as the result of some eighteen
years of residence 1q the Philippines. At all events it is
my purpose to state at the outset facts which will tend to
make clear my view point and at the same time brieSy to
outline the subject-matter which I hereinafter discuss.
As a boy I went through several of the successive
stages of collector's fever from which the young commonly
suffer. First it was postage stamps; then birds' nests,
obtained during the winter season when no longer of use
to their builders. Later I was allowed to collect eggs,
and finally the birds themselves. At one time my great
ambition was to become a taxidermist. My fandly did
not actively oppose this demre but suggested that a few
preliminary years in school and collie might prove useful.
I eventually lost my ambition to be a taxidermist but
did not lose my interest in zoology uid botany. While a
stud^it at the University of Michigan I specialized in
these subjects. I was fortunate in having as one of my
instructors Professor Joseph B. Steere, then at the head
of the Department of Zoology. Professor Steere, who
had been a great traveller, at tkaes entertained his classes
TOU I — B 1
DiaiiiiMbvGoOgIc
2 THE FHILIFPINBS PABT AND PRESENT
with wonderfully interesting tales of adventure on the
Amazon and in ttie Andes, Peru, Formosa, the Philippines
and the Dutch Moluccas. My ambition was fired by
his stories and when in the spring of 1S86 he announced
his intention of returning to the Phihppines the following
year to take up and prosecute anew zoological work which
he had begun there in 1874, offering to take with him a
limited number of his students who were to have the
benefit of his knowledge of Spanish and of his wide ex-
perience as a traveller and collector, and were in turn to
allow him to work up their collections after their retiim
to the United States, I made up m^ mind to go.
I was then endeavouring to get through the University
on an allowance of $375 per year and was in consequence
not overburdened with surplus funds. I however managed
to get my life insured for $1500 and to borrow $1200 on
the pohcy, and with this rather limited sum upon which
to draw purchased an outfit for a year's collecting and
sailed with Doctor Steere for Manila. Two other young
Americans accompanied him. One of these, Doctor
Frank 8. Bourns, was like myself afterwards destined to
play a part in Philippine affairs which was not then
dreamed of by either of us.
We spent approximately a year in the islands. Unfor-
tunately we had neglected to provide ourselves with
proper official credentials and as a result we had somO't.
embarrassing experiences. We were arrested by sus-
picious Spanish officials shortly after our arrival and were
tried on trumped-up chaises. On several subsequent .-
occasions we narrowly escaped arrest and imprisonment.
The unfriendly attitude of certain of our Spanish ac- -
quaintances was hardly to be wond^^d at. They could
not believe that sensible, civilized hiunan beings woiUtf
shoot tiny birds, pay for eggs the size of the tip of one's
little finger more than hens' eggs were worth, undeigo
not a few hardships and run many risks while living in
the amplest of aaJ^ve houses on very inadequate food,
Lr,,l,;.:M.,G00gIe
VIEW POINT AND SUBJECT-MATTER 3
unless actuated by some hidden purpose. At differ^it
times they suspected us of looking for gold deposits, of
designing to stir up trouble among the natives, or of being
political spies.
When Doctor Bourns came back with the American
troops in IjQ^ and I returned as a member of the first
Philippine Commission in 14^, this last supposition be-
came a fixed belief with many of our former Spanish ac-
quaintances who still remained in the islands, and they
frankly expressed their regret that they had not shot us
while they had the chance.
Over against certain unpleasant experiences with those
who could not understand us or our work I must set
much kind and invaluable assistance rendered by others
niio could, and did.
AH in all we spent a most interesting year, visiting
eighteen of the more important islauds.*
Throughout this trip we lived in very cloae contact
with the Fihpinos, either occupying the fynbuncdes, the
municipal buildings of their towns, ^ere they felt at
liberty to call and observe us at all hours of the day and
ni^t, or actually living in their bouses, which in some
instances were not vacated by the owners during our
occupancy.
Incidentally we saw something of several of the wild
tribes, including the Tagbanuas of Palawan, the Moros of
Jold, Basilan and Mindanao, and the Mangyans of
MindoTO.
We experienced many very real hardships, ran not a
few seriotis risks and ended our sojourn witii six weeks of
fever and starvation in the interior of Mindoro. While
we would not have cut short our appointed stay by a
day, we were nevertheless delighted when we could turn
our faces homeward, and Doctor Bourns and I agreed
* Cfiyo, I^U&waa, Balatwo, CagBTan de Joltf, J6\6 ptoper, BasUan,
Mindanao, Panay, Ouimaras, Nesros, Siquijor, Ceba, Bohol, Samar,
Ijeyte, Maabote, Marinduque and Mindoro. . .
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
4 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
that we had had quite enough of Ufe in the Philip-
pines.
Upon my arrival at my home in Vennont a competent
physician told my family that I might not live a week.
I however recuperated so rapidly that I was able to re-
turn to the Univeisity of Michigan that fall and to com-
plete the work of my ficnior year. I became a member of
the teaching staff of the institution before my graduation.
Little as I suspected it at the time, the tropics had fixed
their strangely firm grip on me during that fateful first
trip to the Par East which was destined to modify my
whole subsequent life. I had firmly believed that i£
fortunate enough to get home I should have sense
enough to stay there, but before six months had elapsed
I was finding life at Ann Arbor, Michigan, decidedly
prosaic, and longing to return to the Philippines and
finish a piece of zoological work which I knew was as yet
only begun.
Doctor Bourns, like myself, was eager to go back, and
we set out to raise $10,000 to pay the expenses of a two-
years collecting tour, in the course of which we hoped to
visit regions not hitherto penetrated by any zoologist.
Times were then getting hard, and good Doctor Angell,
the president of the university, thought it a great joke
that two yotmg fellows like ourselves shoiild attempt to
raise so considerable a sum to be spent largely for our own
benefit. Whenever he met me on the street he used to
ask whether we had obtained that |10,000 yet, find then
shake with laughter. One of the great satisfactions of
my life came when, on a beautiful May morning in 1890,
I was able to answer his inquiry in the affirmative.
He fairly staggered with amazement, but promptly re-
covering himself warmly congratulated me, and with
that kindly interest which he has always shown in the
affairs of young men, asked how he cotdd help us. Through
his kindly offices and the intervention of the State De-
partment we were able to obtain a royal order from the
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
VIEW POINT AND SUBJECT-MATTER 6
Spanish government which assured us a very difiFerent
reception on our return to the Pfaihppines in August from
that wliich had been accorded us on the occasion of our
first visit to the islands.
There was now revealed to us a pleasing side of Spanish
character which we had largely missed during our first
visit. Satisfied as to our identity and as to the motives
which actuated us, the Spanish officials, practically with-
out exception, did everything in their power to asust us
wid to render our sojoum pleasant and profitable. Our
mail was deUvered to us at {Mints fifty miles distant
from provincial capitals. When our remittances failed
to reach us on time, as they not infrequently did, money
was loaned to us freely without security. Troops were
urged upon us for our protection when we desired to pene-
trate regions considered to be dangerous. Our Spanish
friends constantly offered us the hospitality of their homes
and with many of them the offer was more than pro forma.
Indeed, in several instances it was insisted upon so
strongly that we accepted it, to our great pleasure and
profit.
Officials were quite frank in discussing before us the
aff'airs of their several provinces, and we gained a veiy
clear insist into existing political methods and conditions.
During this trip we lived in even closer contact with
the Filipino ' population than on the occasion of our first
visit. Our rapidly growing knowledge of Spanish, and
of Visayan, one of the more important native dialects,
rendered it increasingly easy for us to communicate with
them, gain their confidence and learn to look at things
' I employ the noun Filipinos to designate ooUeotively the ^K^t
civilized. Christianized peoples, otdled respeotively the CaKaT^ns.
Doeanoa, Pangaain&ns, Zambalone, Pampanganfi. Tagilofre, BiooLi
and Viaayana, or any of them; the adjeotive Filipino to designate
anything pwtaining to these peoplee, or any of them ; the noun Phil-
ippines to designate the coimtry, and the adjeotive Philippine to dang-
Date anything pertaining to the oountry as distin^niished from its
petite.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
S THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
from their view point. They talked with us most frankly
and fully about their pohtical troubles.
During this our second sojourn in the Philippines,
which lengthened to two years and ax months, we re-
visited the islands with which we had become more or
less familiar on our first trip and added six others to the
list.' We lived for a time among the wild Bukidnons
and Negritos of the Negros mountains.
After my companion had gone to Borneo I had the mis-
fortune to contract typhoid fever when alone in Busuimga,
and being ignorant of the nature of the malady from
which I was suffering, kept on my feet imtil I could no
longer stand, with the natural result that I came uncom-
monly near paying for my foolishness with my. life, and
have ever since suffered from resulting physical disabili-
ties. When able to travel, I left the islands upon the
urgent recommendation of my physician, feeling that the
task which had led me to return tiiere was almost accom-
plished and sure tiiat my wanderings in the Far East
were over.
Shortly after my retiim to the United States I was
offered a position as a member of l^e zodlogical staff of
the University of Michi^n, accepted it, received speedy
premotion, and hoped and expected to end my days as a
college professor.
In 1898 the prospect of war with Spain awakened old
memories. I fancy that the knowledge then possessed
by the average American citizen relative to the Philip-
pines was fairly well typified by that of a good old lady
at my Vermont birthplace who had spanked me when I
was a small boy, and who, after my first return from the
Philippine Islands, said to me, "Deanie, are them Philip-
pians you have been a visitin' the people that Paul wrote
the Epistle to?"
I endeavoured to do my part toward dispelling this
ignorance. My knowledge of Philippine affairs led me
* Busuaoga, Culion, Tawi T&vi, Tablas, Bomblon and SboTan.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
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VIEW POINT AND SUBJECT-MATTER 7
strongly to favour armed intervention in Cuba, where
Bimilar political conditiona seemed to prevail to a con-
siderable extent, and I fear that I was considered by many
of my university colleagues something of a "jingo."
tade«l, a member of the University Board of Regents
said that I ought to be compelled to enlist. As a matter
of fact, compulsion would have been quite unnecessary
had it not been for physical disability.
My life-long friend and former travelling companion,
Doctor Bourns, was not similarly hampered. He
promptly joined the army as a medical officer with the
rank of major, and sailed for the islands on the second
steamer which, carried United States troops there. As a
natural result of his familiarity with Spanish and bis
wide acquaintanceahip among the Fihpinos, he was
ordered from the outset to devote his time more largely
to poUtical matters than to the practice of his profession.
He did all that he could to prevent misunderstandings
between Filipinos and Americans. He assisted as an
interpreter at the negotiations for the surrender of Manila
on August 13, 1898, after taking part in the attack on
the city. Later he was given the rather difficult task of
suppressing a bad outbreak of smallpox among the
Spanish prisoners of war, which he performed with great
success. He was finally made chief health officer of
Manila, although he continued to devote himself largely
to poUtical matters, got numberless deserving Filipinos
out of trouble, and rapidly increased his already wide
circle of Filipino friends. Through his letters I was kept
quite closely in touch with the situation.
Meanwhile I decided that the Philippines were not for
me, asked for and obtained leave for study in Europe,
and in December 1898 set out for New York to engage
passage for myself and my family. I went by way of
Washington in order to communicate to President Mc-
Kinley certain facts. relative to the Philippine situation
which it seemed to me ought to be brought to his attention.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
8 THE PHIUPFINEB PAST AND FEIESENT
I believed that there was serious danger of an outbreak
of hoBtilitiea between Filipinos and Americans, and that
such a catastrophe, Faulting from mutual misunder-
standing, might be avoided if seasonable action w«%
taken. I have since learned how wrong was this latter
behef. My previous experience had been almost exclu-
sively with the Visayans and the wild tribes, and the
revolution against the United States was at the outset a
strictly Tag&log affair, and hence beyond my ken.
President McKinley very kindly gave me all the time
I wanted, displayed a. most earnest desire to learn the
truth, and showed the deepest and most friendly interest
in the FiUpinos. Let no man believe that then or later
he had the sli^test idea of bringing about the exploita^
tion of their country. On the contrary, he evinced a
most earnest desire to leam what was best for them and
then to do it if it lay within his power.
To my amazement, at the end of our interview he asked
me whether I would be willing to go to the islands as bis
personal representative.
I could not immediately decide to make such a radical
change in my plans as this would involve, and asked for
a week's time to think the matter over, which was granted.
I decided to go.
Meanwhile, the President had evolved the idea of
sending out a commission and asked me if I would serve
on it. I told him that I would and left for my home to
make preparations for an early departure. A few da^
later he annoxmoed the names of the commissioners.
They were Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell
University; Major-General Elwell S. Otis, then the rank-
ing army officer in the Philippines ; Rear-Admiral George
Dewey, then in command of the United States fleet in
Pbihppine waters ; Colonel Charles Denby, who had for
fourteen years served as United States Minister to China,
and myself.
Colonel Denby was delayed in Washington by public
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
VIEW POINT AND SUBJECT-MATTEB 0
buBmesa. Mr. ScfaurmflQ and I reached Yokohama on
the morning of February 13, and on arrival there
learned, to our deep r^;ret, that hoetilities had broken
out on the fourth instant. We reached Manila on the
evening of March 4, but Colonel Denby was unable to
join us until April 2. Meanwhile, aa we could not begin
our work in his absence, I had an exceptional opportunity
to observe conditions in the field, of which I availed
myself.
I served with the first Philippine Commission until it
had completed its work, and was then appointed to the
second Philippine Commission without a day's break in
my period of service.
The members of this latter body were William H. Taft
of Ohio ; Luke £. Wright of Tennessee ; Henry C. Ide
of Vermont; Bernard Moses of California, and myself.
Briefly stated, the task before us was to establish civil
government in the PhiUppine Islands. After a period of
ninety days, to be spent in observation, the commission
was to become the legislative body, while executive
power continued to be vested for a time in the military.
This condition endured until the 4th of July, 1901, on
which day Mr. Taft was appointed civil governor. On
September 1, 1901, each of the remaining ori(pnal members
of the commission became an executive officer as well..
Mr. Wright was appointed secretary of commerce and
police ; Mr. Ide, secretary of finance and justice ; Mr.
Moses, secretary of pubUc instruction, and I myself,
Secretary of the Interior. On the same day three Fili-
pino members were added to the commission : Dr. T. H.
Fardo de Tavera, Sr. Benito Legarda and St. Jos^ R. de
Luzuriaga.
Until the 16th of October, 1907, the Commission con-
tinued to serve as the sole le^lative body. It is at
the present time the upper house of the Philippine Leg-
islature, the Philippine Assembly, composed of ei^ty-
one elective members, constituting the lower house.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
10 THE FHIIJFPINES FAST AND PRESENT
I hare therefore had a hand in the enactment of all
legislation put in force in the Philippine Islands since the
American occupation, with the exception of certain laws
passed during my few and brief absences.
As secretary of the interior it fell to my lot to organize
and direct the operations of a Bureau of Health, a Bureau
of Government Laboratories, a Bureau of Forestry, a
Bureau of Public Lands, a Buicau of Agriculture, a
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, a Mining Bureau and a
Weather Bureau. Ultimately, the Bureau of Non-
Christian Tribes and the Mining Bureau were incorporated
with the Bureau of Government Laboratories to form the
Bureau of Science, which continued under my executive
control. The Bureau of Agriculture was traiisferred to
the Department of Public Instruction in 1909.
I was at the outset given administrative control of all
matters pertaining to the non-Christian tribes, which
constitute, roughly speaking, an eighth of the population
of the Philippines, and until my resignation retained such
control throughout the islands, except in the Moro
Province, which at an early day was put directly imder
the governor-general.
I participated in the orgfmization of civil government
in the several provinces of the archipelago, and myself
dr^ted the Municipal Code for the government of the
towns inhabited by Filipinos, as well as the Special Pro-
vincial Government Act and the Township Government
Act for that of the provinces and settlements inhabited
chiefly by the non-Christian tribes.
At the outset we did not so much as know with cer-
tainty the names of the several wild and savage tribes
inhabiting the more remote and inaccessible portions of
the archipelago. As I was unable to obtain reliable in-
formation concerning them on which to base legislation
for their control and uplifting, I proceeded to get such
information for myself by visiting their territory, much
of which was then quite unexplored.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
A
VIEW POINT AND BUBJEGT-UATTER 11
Aftei this territory waa orgaoized into five so-called
Special -Govenunent Provinces," some of my Filipino
friends, I fear not moved solely by anxiety for the public
good, favoured and secured a legidative enactment which
made it my official duty to visit and inspect these pro-
vinces at least once during each fiscal year. I shall
always feel indebted to them for ^ving me this oppor-
timi^ to become intimately acquainted with some of
the most interesting, most progressive, and potentially
most important peoples of the Philippines.
When in 1901 I received the news that a central gov-
ernment was soon to be established, I was in the Sub-
province of Lepanto on my first trip through the wilder
and less-known portions of northern Luzon. During
each succeeding year I have spent from two to four
months in travel through the archipelago, familiarizing
myself at first hand with local conditions.
I have frequently taken with me on these inspection
tripe representatives of the Bureaus of Forestry, Agricul-
ture, Science and Health to carry on practical investiga^
tions, and have made it my business to visit and explore
little known and imknown regions. There are very few
islands worthy of the name which it has not been my
privilege to visit.
The organization of an effective campaign against
diseases like bubonic plague, smallpox, Asiatic cholera
and leprosy in a country where no similar work had ever
previously been imdertaken, inhabited by people pro-
foxmdly ignorant of the benefits to be derived from
modem methods of suiitation, uid superstitious to a
degree, promptly brought me iuto violent conflict with
the beliefs and prejudices of a large portion of the Filipino
population.
A aunilar result followed the inauguration of an active
campaign for the suppression of surra, foot and mouth
disease, and rinderpest, which were rapidly destroying
the horses and cattle.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
12 THE PHILIPFINE8 PABT AND PRESENT
From the outset I was held responsible for the enforce-
ment of marine and land quarantine regulations, which .
were at first very obnoxious to the genertd public.
When the Pure Food and Drugs Act adopted by Con-
gress for the United States was made applicable to the
Philippines without any provision for its enforcement,
this not altogether pleastmt duty was assigned to me.
I did not seek appointment to the Philippine service
in the first instance. The political influence at my com-
mand has never extended beyond my own vote. During
a period of twelve years nly removal was loudly and fre-
quently demanded, yet I saw President Schurman, Colonel
Denby, General Otis, Admiral Dewey, Commissioner
Moses, Governor Taft, Governor Wright, Governor Ide,
Governor Smith, Secretary Shuster, CommiBsioner Tavera,
Commissioner Legarda and Governor Forbes, all my col-
leagues on one or the other of the Philippine commissions,
leave the service, before my own voluntary retirement
on September 15, 1913.
I had long expected a request for my resignation at
any time, and had .often wWied that it mi^t come.
Indeed I once before tendered it voluntarily, only to have
President Taft say that he thought I should wi^draw it,
which I did. I am absolutely without political ambition
save an earnest desire to earn the political epitaph, "He
did what he could."
During my brief and infrequent visits to the United
States I have discovered there widespread and radical
misapprehension as to conditions in the Philippines, but
have failed to find that lack of interest in them which is
conmionly said to exist. On the contrary, I have foimd
the American public keenly desirous of getting at the real
facts whenever there was an opportunity to do so.
The extraordinary extent to which untrue statements
have been accepted at their face value has surprised and
deeply disturbed me. I have conversed with three col-
lege presidents, each of whom believed that the current
DiailizMbyGoOgle
^N.
VIEW POINT AND SXmjECT-MATTBR 13
racpenses of the Philippine government were paid from
the United States Treasury.
The preponderance of false and misleading statements
about the Philippines is due, it aeems to me, primarily to
the fact that it is those persons with whom the climate
. disagrees and who in consequence are invalided home,
> and those who are separated from the service in the in-
terest of the public good, who return to the United States
I and get an audience there ; while those who successfully
' adapt themselves to local conditions, display interest in
^ Uieir work and become proficient in it, remain in the
idands for long periods during which they are too busy,
* and too far from home, to make themselves heard.
Incidentally it must be remembered that if such per-
sons do attempt to set forth facte which years of practical
experience have taught them, they are promptly accused
of endeavouring to save their own bread and butter by
seeking to perpetuate conditions which insure them fat
jobs.
When I think of the splendid men who have uncom-
plainingly laid down their hves in the military and in the
civil service of their country in these islands, and of the
lai^er mrniber who have given freely of their best years
to unselfish, efficient work for others, this chai^ fills me
with indignation.
The only thing that kept me in the Philippine service
for so long a time was my interest in the work for the
non-Christian tribes and my fear that while my successor
was gaining knowledge concerning it which can be had
only through experience, matters might temporarily go
to the bad. It has been my ambition to bring this work
to such a point that it would move on, for a time at least,
by its own momentum.
I am now setting forth my views relative to the past
and present situation in the islands because I believe
that their inhabitants are confronted by a danger graver
than any which they have before faced »nce t^e time
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
14 THE PHILIPPINES PABT AND PRESENT
when their fate wavered in the balanoe, while the ques-
tion whether the United States ^ould acquire sover-
eijpity over them or should f'^'^w Spain to continue to
rule them was imder conside. ' ' n.
It is my piupose to tell the plain, hard truth regard-
less of the effect of such conduct upon my future carcOT.
It has been alleged that my views on Philippine prob-
lemswere coloiu^ by a desire to retain my official position.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, no
man who has not served for long and sometimes very
weary years as a public official, and has not been a target
for numerous more or less irresponsible individuals whose
hands were filled with mud and who were actuated by a
fixed desire to throw it at something, can appreciate as
keenly as I do the manifold blessings which attend the
life of a private citizen.
I trust that I have said enough to make clear my view
point, and now a word as to subject-matter. It is my in-
tention to correct some of the very mmaerous misstate-
ments which have been made concerning past and present
conditions in the Philippines. I shall quote, from time
to time, such statements, both verbal and written, and
more especially some of those which have recently ap-
peared in a book entitled "The American Occupation of
the Phihppines, 1898-1912," by James H. Blount, who
signs himself "Officer of the United States Volimteers in
the Phihppines, 1899-1901 ; United States District Judge
in the Phihppmes, 1901-1905."
Judge Blount has indulged so freely in obvious hyper^
bole, and has made so very evident the bitter personal
animosities which inspire many of his statements, that it
has been a genuine siu^rise to his former associates and
acquaintances that his book has been taken seriously.
It should be sufficiently evident to any unprejudiced
reader that in writing it he has played the part of the
special pleader rather than that of the historian. He
has used government records freely, and as is usually the
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
:dbvGoogIe
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
VIEW POINT AND SUBJECT-UATTEB IS
caae when a apecial pleader quotes from such records, tlie
nature of the matter which he has omitted is worthy of
more than passing attention. I shall hope to he able to
fill some of the gaps that he has left in the documentary
history of the events which he discusses and by bo do-
ing, very materially to change its purport.
As pubUc documents have been so misused, and as a
new administration is bestowing on Filipinos political
offices, and ^ving them opportunities, for which they are
as yet utterly imprepared, tfius endangering the results of
years of hard, patient, self-sacrificing work performed by
experienced uid competent men, it becomes necessary to
strike home by revealing impleasant facts which are of
record but have not heretofore been disclosed because of
tiie injury to reputations and the woimding of feelings
which would result from their publication. In doing
this I feel that I am only disohai^ng a duty to the people
of the United States, who are entitled to know the truth
if ike present possibility of Philippine independence is to
be seriously considered, and to the several Hlipino peoples
who are to-day in danger of rushii^ headlong to their
own utter and final destruction.
At the outset I shall discuss the oft-asserted claim that
the Filipino leaders were deceived and betrayed by Ameri-
can officials whom they assisted, and that this unpar-
donable conduct led to the outbreak of active hostihties
which oodured just prior to the arrival at Manila of the
first Philippine Commission.
I shall then show that these leaders never established a
government which adequately protected life and property,
OF gave to th«r people peace, happiness or justice, but
on the contrary inaugurated a veritable reign of terror
under which miu-der became a governmental institution,
while rape, inhiimftn torture, burying alive and other
ghastly crimes were of common occmrence, and usually
went unpimished. The data which I use in establishii^
these contentions are for the most part taken directly
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
16 THE PaiLIPPINBS PAST AND PRESENT
from the Insurgent records, in refenii^ to which I employ
the war department abbreviation "P. I. R." followed
by a mmiber.
I next take up some of t^e more important subsequent
historical events, describing the work of the first Philip-
pine Commission, and showing in what manner the
government established by the second Philippine Com-
mwsion has dischai^ed its stewardship, subsequently dis-
cussing certain as yet unsolved problems which confront
the present government, such as that presented by the
existence of slavery and peonage, and that of the non-
Christian tribes. For the benefit of those who, like Judge
Bloimt, consider the Philippines "& vast straggly archi-
pelago of jungle-covered islands in the south seas which
have been a nuisance to every government that ever
owned them," I give some facts as to the islands, their
climate, their natiiral resources and their commercial
possibilities, and close by setting forth my views as to
the present ability of the civilized Cagayans, Ilocanos,
PampaugauB, Zambals, Pangasinflns, Tagdlogs, Bicols
and Visayans, commonly and correctly called Filipinos,
to establish, or to maintain when established, a stable
I government throughout Filipino territory, to say nothing
I of bringing under just and effective control, and of pro-
Itecting and civilizing, the people of some twenty-seven
non-Christian tribes which constitute an eighth of the
(1 population, and occupy approximately half of the terri-
, tory, of the Philippine Islajids.
I wish here to acknowledge my very great indebtedness
to Major J. R. M. Taylor, who has translated and com-
piled the Insurgent * records, thereby making available a
very lai^e mass of reliable and moat valuable information
without which a number of chapters of this book woiild
have remained unwritten. Surely no man who bases his
I I use the word " Inaui^eats " as a proper noun, to deei(piate the
Filipiooa who took up arms agaiast ihe United States, h«aoe (ja.^t&lize
it, and the adjective derived from it.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
VIEW POINT AND SUBJECT-MATTER 17
statements concemlng Filipino rule on the facts set forth
in these records can be accused of deriving his inform&-
tion from hostile or prejudiced sources.
Of them, Major Taylor says : —
"No one reading the Insui^eDt records c&n ful to be im-
pressed with the difference between the Spanish and the TaglU
log documents. Many of the former are doubtleea written
with a view to their coming into the hands of the AmericsDB, or
with deliberate purpoae to have them do so, and are framed
accordingly. All TagfUog documents, intended only for flU-
pinoe, say much that is not sud in the Spanish documents.
The orders of the Dictator * to his subjecta were conveyed in
the latter series of documents."
■ Oeneral Aguinaldo.
ib,GoogIe
CHAPTER II
Was Indbpendbncb Promised?
It has long been the fashion in certain quartera to
allege, or to insinuate, tiiat American consuls and naval
officers promised the Insui^nt leaders that the inde-
pendence of the Philippines would be recognized by the
United States. It has been claimed by some that the
cooperation of the Insurgents in the military operations
against Manila was sought for and secured. Others say
that they were at least de facto allies of the United States,
and that they were in the end shamelessly betrayed and
wantonly attacked.
These are very serious charges. I Bhall prove, chiefly
by the'Insurgent records, that each of them is false. I
ask the forbearance of my readers if, in the three chapters
which I devote to these matters, I quote documentary
evidence at length . When original docxmients or extracte
from them tell a clear and reasonably concise story, I
sometimes insert them bodily in the text. In other
cases I give my own version of the facts which they set
forth, but give the full text in foot-notes. In nearly all
instances references are given to sources of documentary
information. I greatly regret that Taylor's narrative,
with its very numerous supporting documents, is not
readily accessible to the student of history. It ought to
have been published, but never got beyond the galley-
proof stage. In referring to it, I am therefore obUged to
use the word Taylor followed by the letters and figures
designating the page of this g^ley proof on which the
passage referred to is found. Whenever possible I ^ve
L.,,l,;.:M.,G00gIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED T 19
the War Department numbers* of Insurgent documents,
but in a few cases can give only the exhibit numbers
assigned by Taylor in printing the documents.
As his exhibits are serially arranged it is easy to find
any one of them. Copies of his work may be found in the
War Department and in the office of the Chief of the
Kiilippine Constabulary.
Referring to the charge that the Insiirgents were
deceived, even had deceit been practised as claimed,
Aguinaldo would have had no just ground for com-
plaint, for he himself not only frankly advocated its
use, but deliberately employed it in his dealings with the
Americans, as clearly appears in records hereinafter cited.*
However, most Americans hold to a standard very dif-
ferent from his. Was it departed from in this instance ?
. Aguinaldo has specifically and repeatedly chained that
I Pratt and Dewey promised him the recognition of the
^ independence of the Philippines by the United States.*
Judge Blount has referred to the "de facto alliance
between the Americans and Aguinaldo," and has dwelt
at length on "promises, both expressed and implied,"
which were subsequently repudiated by Consul Pratt,
Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt,
constantly suggesting, even when he does not specifically
charge, bad faith on the part of these officers of the
United States.* ,
On analyzing his statements we find that he is dis-
creetly non-committal as to exactly what were the ex-
pressed promises, nor does he make it so plain as might
be deedred what legitimate inferences were deducible
from the acts of the Americans in question. He quotes
■ Beeuming with the letten "P. I. B."
■ See pp. 53, 55, 68.
> See pp. 27, 47, 49, 63 of tluB book for repetitions and variations
of this ehMife of A^naldo.
* See p. 31 of his book, "The American Oooup&tion of the Philip-
pinee," in Tetening to which I will hereafter ijse the word Blount, fol-
lowed by a page number.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED? 21
their residence outside the islands. Their deportation
was duly provided for, and Aguinaldo and twenty-aix of
his companions were taken to Hongkong, on the Spanish
steamer Uranus; arriving there on December 31, 1897.
V On January 2, 1898, $400,000 were deposited in the
Hongkong Bank, to the credit of Aguinaldo and Co.
The Insurgent leaders remaining at Biacnabat6 had a
meeting under the presidency of Isabelo Artacho, an
Ilocano ' who was the ranking officer iu the absence of
Aguinaldo, and requested that the second instalment, of
$200,000, be paid to them. The Spanish governor-
general, Primo de Rivera, acceded to their request, and
they divided the money, although Aguinaldo denied their
right to do so, claiming that it should have been sent to
Hongkong.
The third payment of $200,000 was apparently never
made. Primo de Rivera, says that he turned over a
check for $200,000 to his successor, General Augustin,
ID April, 1898 ; giving as his reason for refusing to pay
it to the Insurgents that there seemed to him to be no
prospect of its being equitably divided among those who
were entitled to receive it imder the agreement.
Aguinaldo and his associates claimed that certiun re-
forms were promised by the Spanish government at the
time the treaty of Biacnabatd was negotiated, and as
these measures were not put into effect, they organized a
junta or revolutionary committee at Hongkong. It in-
cluded in its membership a number of Filipino political
exiles, then residing at that place.
The men who composed this organization soon fell to
quarrelling and it became necessary to come to a definite
understanding as to its aims. Under the arrangement
finally reached, the junta, as a whole, was charged with
the work of propaganda outside of the archipelago ; with
' The Iloeanos ore one of the eight civilized peoples who oolleotivelir
DuJce up the fWpinoa. The? number 803,942, and inhabit oertaia
proviooei in northiem Luzon.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
22 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
all diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments;
and with the preparation and shipment of such articles
as were needed to carry on the revolution in the Philip-
pines. It was to be allowed voice by Aguinaldo's govera-
ment in any serious question which might arise abroad,
and would aid that government in bringing the civil ad-
ministration of the Phihppines to the level of that of the
most advanced nations.
Trouble soon arose amoi^ the former Insui^nt leaders
over the division of the fimds deposited at Hongkong.
Taylor gives a trustworthy and concise account of the
events of this period, and as it is of historic interest, and
makes clear just how Aguinaldo came to go to Singapore,
meet Pratt, and enter into negotiations with him, I quote
extensive extracts from it.'
"From January 4 to April i, Aguinaldo withdrew from the
banks 5786.46 pesos in part interest on the money he had de-
posited. This was used to pay the expenses of himself and his
companions in Hongkoi^. These expenses were kepf at a
minimum ; the money was drawn and spent by him. If one
of the men with him needed a new ptur of shoes, Aguinaldo
pud for them ; if another wanted a new coat, Aguinaldo bought
it. Minute accounts were kept, which are on file among his
papers, and it is seen from them that his expenses were exceed-
ing his income, which could only be 12,000 pesos a year, while
he was living at the rate of ^,000, with constant demands
bdng made upon him by men who came from the Philippines.
Life was not easy under these conditions. Aguinaldo's com-
panions were entirely dependent upon him. Their most trivial
expenses had to be approved by him, and he held them' down
with a strong blind. They were men living in a strange land,
among a people whose language they did not speak, having
nothing to do but quarrel among themselves, exiles waiting for
a chance to return to their own country, which they watched
mth weary eyes while they guarded the embers by which they
hoped to Ught the fires of a new insurrection.
' I h&ve not felt at liberty to correat spelliiiK. oapitaJization, punotn-
ation or grammar in quotatione, except in the case of perfectly evident
printer's errors. It should be remembered th&t tlie results of Taylor's
work were left iu the form of galle; proof.
:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED? 23
" The meo who had accompanied Asuiaaldo to Hongkong
were not the only Filipinos domiciled there ; a number of men
had taken refuge in that British colony after the events of 1872,
and Bome of them at least had proepered. Some of them, like
the membere of the Cortes family, seem to have had almost
no relations with the followers of Aguinaldo ; some, like J. M.
Baaa, knew them and took part in some of the meetings of the
governing groups, but were probably not admitted to their
full confidence, as Aguin&Ido and his immediate following
wanted and were working for independence and independence
alone, while the Filipinos who had long lived in Hongkong
wanted to see the archipelago lost to Spain, but had no con-
fidmce in the ability of the country to stand alone or in the
fitness of Aguinaldo and [his following to direct the councils '
of a state. The character of the new refugees did not inspire
confidence in these older men, who hoped for a protectorate by
or annexation to the United States.
\" On May 6, 1898, l^e consul-general of the Ignited States there
informed the State Department that D. Cort^, M. Ck>rbSs,
A. Rosario, Gracio Gonzaga, and Jos£ Maria Basa (50), all
very wealthy land-owners, bankers, and lawyers of Manila,
desired to tender their allegiance and the alliance of their
powerful families in Manila to the United States, and that they
had instructed all their connections to render every aid to the
Umted States forces in Manila. \ On May 14 he forwarded state-
mtnta of other flhpinos domiciled in Hongkong, not members
of the junta, that they desired to submit their alliance and
the alliance of their families in the Philippine Islands to the
United States. One of Aguinaldo's followers, writing somewhat
later, spoke with bitterness of the rich old men who went about
calling their companions 'b^garly rebels,' but these men
were rich, and their names and their apparent adhesion to the
cause represented by Aguinaldo would inspire confidence in
him among men of property in the Fhihppines. They were,
accordingly, not to be lightly alienated ; therefore, at first, at
least, no open break took place with them, but their attitude
toward the leaders of the insurrection is qhown by the fact that
after the early sunmier of 1898 they took no, or very httle,
part in the insurgent movement, although they were fiving in
Hongkong, the seat of the junta, which conducted the propa-
ganda for the insurgrait government of the Philippines.
" But, in fact, Aguinaldo had no just conception of the con-
ditions and of the opportunities wtuch were about to open be-
:dbvGoogIe
24 THE PHIUPPINEa PAST AND PRESENT
fore the Hongkong junta, for although war between Spun and
the United States was imminent and a United States squadron
was in Hongkong threatening Manila, Aguinaldo was chiefly
concerned in finding how to avoid losing the money which had
been received from the Spanish government as the price of his
surrender. The importance of his presence near the Philippines
In case of war did not occur to him, or if it did occur to him any-
thing which he could obtain there from the aid of the United
States probably seemed for the moment of litUe consequeoce
compared with escaping from his wrangling companions with
enoi^h money to live on in Pans.
" Artacho, who had received 5000 pesos as his share of the
second payment, arrived in Hongkong and on April 5 demanded
200,000 pesos of the insurgent funds, probably under the
agreement that he should establish a company in Hongkong
for the benefit of the former leaders and not merely of those
who had accompanied Aguinaldo. But the leaders in Hong-
kong had denounced that agreement, and refused to pay. He
then entered suit before the supreme court of Hongkong, callinx
upon Aguinaldo for an accounting of the trust funds deposited
in his hands for the benefit of Artacho and others, and asked
for an injunction restrainii^ Aguinaldo or any member of the
junta from handling or disposing of any part of said funds. He
filed as evidence copies of the Biacnabat6 agreement and of
the f^reement made by the leaders on December 19. This
suit was brought not merely in the name of Artacho, but in
that of all the exiles who were described as living in exile in
Hongkong in accordance with an agreement made with the
Spanish Government. Artacho probably had adherents among
these men, some at least of whom were utteriy weary of waiting
in Hongkong and of living upon what was doled out to them.
Some at least saw no chance of any other fate than indefinite
exile spent in dependence upon the inner group for even the
means of existence.
" The suit was in equity, and called for an accounting for the
tniBt funds which the complainant recognized were l^ally in
the hands of Aguinaldo. It could be carried on only with great
difficulty without his presence and without his account books.
Meetings were held, and Artacho was denounced as attempting
to extort blackmail, but he refused to yield, and Aguinaldo,
rather than explain the inner workings of the Hongkong junta
before a British court, prepared for flight. A summons was
issued for his appearance before the supreme court of Hongkong
on April 13, 1898, but he was by that time beyond its juriadiction.
:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISEDT 25
/" He drew out the 50,000 pesos from the Chartered Bank,
much had become due according to the terms of the deposit,
and pwhaps such other sums as could be drawn upon by check,
mga^ed passage for Europe by way of Singapore for G. H. del
Filar, J. M. Leyba, and hiniself under assumed names, appointed
V. B^armino to succeed to his functions, and gave him checks
mgned in blank to draw the interest of tiie sums on deposit to
provide for the support of the exiles. He gave as his reason for
departure that he was going to remain under cover until Artacho
could be bought off, but he intended to go far afield for this
puipoee, as he gave his destination as Europe and the United
States.
" Aguinaldo and his companions probably s^ed from Hong-
kong on April 8, 1898, and arrived in Singapore on April 21, after
stopping in Saigon. War between the United States and Spain
had be^ rendered inevitable by the resolution of Congress
demanding that Spain should withdraw her forces from Cuba,
and was declared on April 21. Although Aguinaldo and his fol-
lowers did not appreciate the influence which conditions on the
other side of the world might have upon the future of the Phiiip-
pioee, it happened that in Singapore at that time there was an
Knglinhrrn^n named Bray who did. He had been a member of
the civil service in India, and had lived for some years in the
Phihppines, but he had fallen upon evil days and was engaged
in writing letters to the Singapore Free Press upon the Philip-
pines, and in retailing such information as was in his possession
concerning them to the United States consul-general in Sii^a-
pore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, for transmittal to Commodore
Dewey. Bray heard of the arrival of Aguinaldo and reaUzed
what could be done with him, and that if the matter were well
handled it might be to his own advantage. He went at once to
see Aguinaldo and informed him that the United States consul-
general was anxious to see him. He went to the consul-general
and informed him of the importance of Aguinaldo, and that he
was in Singapore. Aguinaldo had to be persuaded to agree to
a meeting. The consul-general was anxious for it, and it took
place, according to Aguinaldo, on the night of April 22 (accord-*
ing to Pratt, on the morning of April 24). The statement made
by Aguinaldo is probably correct. According to his account
book, he paid $11 on April 23, 1898, for a tel^ram to the Hong-
kong junta concerning the negotiations 'with America.'
"Aguinaldo knew but little English, Pratt knew no Spanish,
so in their interview Bray acted as interpreter. An interpreter
trho is interested in the subject of the discussion may be a
:dbvGoogIe
26 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
dangerous man. It is impossible to say what he told Agni-
naldo. Certainly Pratt did not know ; but whatever was said
during these conversationa it is within the Umita of possibility
that Pratt may have been made to eay by the interpreter more
than he intended, and that bia statements of what would prob-
ably be granted by the United States Government and his ex-
preasion of good wishes for the cause of Filipino independence
may have been translated as assurances and as promises. Bray,
who, according to his Pihpino former friends, was apt to taJk
too much, may have talked too much on this occasion, and so
the myth of the formal agreement between Aeuinaldo on be-
half of the Filipino insurgents and Pratt on beb^ of the United
States grew up, a fiction which Bray himself, with a natural
desire to add to his own importance, did his best to circulate.
"Bray did not ask for his reward at the time, but probably
reckoned upon making himself indispensable as an adviser, so
that later he could make bis own terms. For a time he wrote
letters of advice to Aguinaldo, which may have had some in-
fiuence upon the line of conduct which he adopted, and later
was employed in furnishing from Hongkong news to various
newspapers of events and conditions in the Philippines. His
cablegrams shortly before the outbreak of hostilitiee between
the United States and the insurgents were more picturesque
than veracious, but they were apparently considered effective,
as Aguinaldo ord^^ that he should be given $5000. He
wanted more, but the Hongkong junta did not trust him, and
he ceased to be in their employment." >
'^ As we shall see, Bray did not do all of the interpreting
at Singapore, and we shall be able to determine wi^ some
accuracy what actually transpired there.
We can now consider understandingly the chaises made
against Pratt and Dewey.
It has been claimed over and over again, that Pratt
promised Aguinaldo recognition of the independence of
the Philippines if he and his people would co6perate with
the United States forces against Spain.
Aguinaldo himself made the charge in his '
Veridica" * in the following words : —
' Taylor, 42 F Z-43 P Z.
* For the hiatory of this document, see p. 51.
ib,GoogIe
WAS inden:ndence promised t 27
"In this interview Consul Pratt told me that because the
Spaniards had not complied with the agreement of Biac-nB^batfi,
the Filipinos had a ri^t to renew their interrupted revolution
and advised me to take up arms anew against Spain, assuring
me that America would give the Filipinos the greatest advan-
tages (mayores ventajas). Then I asked the Consul what
advantages the United States would concede to the Philippines,
suggestii^, when I had the proper opening, the propriety of
making an agreement in writing, to which the Consul answered
that he would report, by telegraph, on the subject to Mr. Dewey,
who was the chief of the expedition against the Philipfmes,
and who had ample powers from Presidetat McKinley.
" On the following day, between 10 and 12 in the morning, we
again took up the matter. Consul Pratt saying that the admiral
had answered my inquiry oy saying that the United States would
at least recognize the independence of the Philippine govern-
ment under a naval protectorate, but that there was no neces-
nty to put it in writii^, as the words of the admiral and the
American consul were sacred and would be fulfilled, not beii^
like iiime of the Spaniards, and finally, that the Government
of North America was a very honourable Government, a very
just and very powerful one^'V
On April 27, ti^^ Pratt telegraphed tte Secretary of
State as follows : —
"Gcaieral Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange
with Dewey cooperation insurgents Manila.
" Pratt."
On the 28th he wrote the Secretary, explaining how
he had come to meet Aguinaldo, and stating just what he
had done. He said : —
"At this interview, after leamii^ from General Aguinaldo
the state of an object sought to be obtained by the present in-
surrectionary movement, which, though absent from the Philip-
pines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself, whilst ex-
plaining that I had no authority to speak for the Government,
to point out the danger of continuing independent action at
this stage; and, having convinced him of the expediency of
cooperating with our fieet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the
aaeurauce of lus wiUingness to proceed thither and confer with
»P. I. R.. 1300.2.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
28 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Conmiodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so deore, I
telegraphed the Conunodore the same day as follows, through
our consul-general at Hongkong : —
" ' Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong
arrange with Conimodore for general cooperation inauj^^ts
Manila if desired. Telegraph.
"'Peatt.'"
The Commodore's reply read thxis : — -
'"Tdl Aguinaldo come soon as possible.
"'Dbwbt.'"
Pratt adds: —
" I rec^ved it late at night, and at once communicated to
General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and privat«
secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off
by the British Steamer Malacca, which left here on Tuesday
the 26th.
"Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last intw-
view with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which I shall
give you by next mail.
"The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability,
and courage, and worthy the confidence that had been placed
" I think that in arranging for his direct codpotition with the
commander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict
of action and facilitated the work of occupying and adminis-
tering the Phihppines.
" If this course of mine meets with the Government's approval,
Bs I trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied ; to Mr, Bray, however,
I consider there is due some special recognition for most valu-
able services rendered.
" How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to
decide.
" I have, etc." *
It will be noted that Pratt explained to Aguinaldo that
he had no authority to speak for the government ; that
there was no mention in the cablegrams between Pratt and
Dewey of independence or indeed of any conditions on which
Aguinaldo was to cooperate, these details being left for
I Senate Document 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congresa, Third Session,
P. P. 341 el teq.
:dbvGoogIe
r
'"li"
p
1
II
.s'S
hi
115
i I
."SI.
■^I
j'-^^fig^: •:■
:dbvGoogIe
WAB INDEPENDENCE PROMISED T 20
future arrangemeDt with Dewey ; and that Pratt thought
that he had prevented possible conflict of action and
facilitated the work of occupyii^ and adminifitering the
Philippines.
The particulars as to the second and last interview
between Aguinaldo and Pratt were embodied in the fol-
lowing letter : —
"No. 213. Consdiatb-Gbnebal or the United States.
" Singapore, April 30, 1898.
"Sm: Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th iniitant,
I have the honor to report that in the second and last interview
I had with Gen. Rmilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his departure
for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the necessity, under Commo-
dore Dewey's direction, of exerting absolute control over his
forces in the Philippines, as no excesses on their part would be
tolerated by the American Government, the President having
declared that the present hostilities with Spain were to be car-
ried on in strict accord with modem principles of civilized war-
fare.
" To this Genial Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that
he intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to hold
his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them as our com-
mander should direct.
" The general stated that he hoped the United States would
assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to
allow the inhabitants to establish a government of thmr own,
in the organization of which he would desire American advice
and assistance.
"These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss.
" I have, etc.,
"E. Spencer Prait,
" United States ConsulrGenertU,"
In a subsequent communication written on July 28,
1898, Pratt made the following statement : —
"I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the ques-
tion of the futiure policy of the United States with regard to the
Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him of any kind, com-
mitted the government in no way whatever, and, in the course
of our confidences, never acted upon the assumption that the
Govemm^it would cooperate with him — General Aguinaldo —
bvGoogli
le
30 THE PHIUFPINia PAST AND PRESENT
for the furtherance of any plans of his own, noi that, in accc^
iog his said cooperation, it would comider iteelf pledged to
recognize any political claims which he might put forward."'
What reason if any is there for denying the truth of this
allegation ?
I will ^ve in full Blount's statement as to what occurred
at a meeting held at Singapore, to celebrate the early suc-
cesses of Dewey and Aguinaldo, as it constitutes his
nearest approach to a direct claim, that any one at any
time promied independence : —
"First there was music by the band. Then followed the
formal reading and presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos,
representing the Filipino community of Singapore. The ad-
dnss plet^ed the 'eternal gratitude' of the Filipino people to
Admiral Dewey and the honored addressee; alluded to the
glories of independence, and to how Aguinaldo had been enabled ;
by the arrangement so happily effected with Admiral Dewey
by Consul Pratt, to aroiue ei^t millions of Filipinos to take
up arms 'in defence of those principles of justice and liberty
of which your country is the foremost champion ' and trusted
'that the United States . . . will efficaciously second the
programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo
in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence
under the protection of the United States.'
"Mr. Prattarose and 'proceeded, speaking in French,' says
the ne^rapaper — it does not say Alabama iVench, but that is
doubtless what it was — 'to state his belief that the Pllipinos
would prove and were now proving themselves fit for self-
government.' The gentleman from Alabama then went on to
review the mighty events and developments of the precedii^
six weeks, Dewey's victory of May 1st, 'the brilliant achieve-
ments of your own distinguished leader, General Emilio Agui-
naldo, cooperating on land viith the Americans at sea,' etc. ' You
have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being ac-
complished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen
under his command. 'When, six weeks ago, I learned that
General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore, I imme-
diately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me
that he was the man for the occasion ; and, having communi-
cated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to
join the latter, which he did at Cavite. "The rest you know. ' " '
> Senate Document 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Sesdon;
also P. I. R., 496. ■ Blount, pp. 11-12.
WAS INDEPENDENCE PBOMISEDT 81
Nov, it happens that Dr. Santos himself forwarded his
speech, and his verdon of Pratt's reply thereto, in a letter
to Aguinaldo, dated Singapore, June 9, 1898. As he
served as interpreter, he, if any one, shoxild know what
Pratt said. After describing the change in tone of the
Singapore Free Press, with which strained relations had
form^y existed, and the subsequent friendliness of the
editor of this paper and that of the Straits Times, he says
that on the previous afternoon he went with the other
Filipinos to greet Pratt. He continues : -~
" Tias occasion was unusually opportune by reason of ours
having been victorious and immediately after the cry of our
worthy chief which found an echo in this colony. For tbia pur^
pose M or more fWpinoe — 9 of the higher class, 15 musicians
and the remainder of the middle class — went to greet Consul A.,
here, and on the invitation of Mr. Bray we ascended. He
received us in his private office, and it was imposing to see that
the only decoration was the American flag which covered the
desk, and in its centre, a carved wooden frame holding the por-
trait of our worthy chief. He shook hands with all of us, and I
introduced them all. We found there also, and were introduced
to, the Editor of the Straite Timea and the Free Press of here,
and after being thus assembled, after a musical selection, I read
tiie following speech in IVench ; —
'"His Excellenct, thx Consul Gbnkbal or the United
States of Auebica in Sinqapobe :
" ' YoTTR Excellency ; The Filipinos of all social classes
residing in this port, have come to greet Your Excellency as
the genuine representative of the great and powerful American
Republic in order to express to you our eternal gratitude for
the moral and material support given by Admiral Dewey to
our General Aguinaldo in his campaign for the liberty of eight
million Filipinos. The latter and we ourselves hope that the
United States, your nation, persevering in its humanitarian pol-
icy, will without cessation and (with) decided energy continue to
support the programme (^eed upon in Singapore between Your
Eitcellency and Gwieral Aguinaldo, that is to say, the Indepen-
dmce of the Piiihppine Islands, under an American protector-
ate. Accept our cordial acknowledgments and congratuJa-
tions on b«iig the first one in accepting and supporting this idea
which time uid events have wdl developed to the great satis-
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
32 THE PHJLIPFINES PAST AND PRESENT
faction of our nation. iFlnally, we request you, Most Excellent
Sir, to expreee to your worthy President and the American
Republic, our sincere acknowledgments and our fervent wishes
for their prosperity. I have concluded.'
" The Consul replied hereto in French, in more or lees the
following terms : —
'"You have nothing to thank me for, because I have only
futhfully followed the instructions received from my Govern-
ment ; the fact of the sudden departure of your General will
permit you to infer that I have done so. I shall in any case
mform my Government of your good wishes and I tbai^ you
in its name. You know that your wishes are mine also, and
for this reason at the last interview I had with Mr. Aguinaldo,
I repeated to him that he should observe the greatest humanity
possible in the war, in order that our army, our soldiers, our
nation and all the other nations may see that you are biunane
and not savages, as has erroneously been believed.'
" After this there was enthusiastic applause for the Consul ;
he offered us all cigars, glasses of very fine sherry, and lemonade
for the musicians and the majority. The toasts wra'e offered
with the sherry by your humble servant, Sres. Cannon, Enrf-
qucB, Celio, Reyes, the Consul, the editors of the Free Preaa,
Straits Timea and Mr. Bray. We drank to America and her
humanitarian work of redemption; to the Philippines with
America ; we gave thanks to the Consul, to Mr. Bray as an
important defender ; we drank to the Free Press for taking such
an interest in our affairs, and to the Straits Times (sarcastically) ;
but I was very careful not to propose a toast to our general,
which was done at the proper time by ' Flaco ' ' when we gave
three cheers ; for the sake of comtesy we cheered for England,
which bad been so hospitable to us, and when everybody had
become quiet, the Editor of the Straits Times took his glass in
his hand and cried in a loud voice, 'The Philippine Republic,'
to which we all responded. 'Flaco' disappeared a moment,
and when he returned he brought with him the Am^can flag,
and formally presented it to us in French, which I interpreted
to all in Spanish, as follows : ' Gentlemen : The American Consul,
■ with ills deep affection for us, presents us this Sag as the greats
est and most expressive remembrance which he can give us.
The red stripes stand for the generous blood of her sons, shed
to obtain her liberty ; the white stripes stand for her virginity
and purity as our country ; the blue background indicates the
i.,GoogIe
WM INDEPENDENCE PSOMISEDt 33
S 5°iS' °^d'?rr"" ,». ''f».»°<' indeprndent State:
1» our hSDZjT,',iT^^* l*^" "*'' ««P«<*. »"d may God
•o the mirSrf mZSiS ^ '°«°'' ' "urtesy.' Hereupon,
pleas, him vS/Z.1, S ,."" ^^ "''^"^ "•"=' ■""i"' to
»tMed withX^„,i„!"^y'/^'" "'S, "« left, very weU
I inert aboieSlI^^'/"' ""E '"* "' "J »P<«"1'. "Uch
-U'h I 3^i„ ^T^fS" '7".?" '^""^ "^ i^* text,
I am, ' " "*' ""S" »nd mstruotiona for the future,
/a- jx " YouTB, ete.
Wigned) Ismoso de los Sahtos."
note: ^ '^"" ''°'" Taylor hM appended the foUovring
AgJSdoOTj!;;^frr'° ° ■'*'»'• ™tten in TagMog to
kSSSj 12 ZtS °,riL^'"'", ^= 'l<«"tw tb. American o4.S
hurrah for tK! ^f!* "?' Hurrah for General Agumaldo,
"PparenUy tit» ElM f'," P^PPi""' and thm, having
FUipinoe (pT "eTS"?)' rf ''° *'"°* '' *" ""^ "''"'''"^
of "Slf U^^'°if^""' *« n"' present the representative
favourabfe^t h^ f7?T^,' " Singapore in a very
now we «i,r„ r,"' ' '^^ *« '»=<* »» I find them. If
with B W wi^' 'T-'' ^'"""y "^^ •'y D"-- S>ntos
exception™ thIT5 °' "■ "" ^'^ *°'' "»' 'rf* "le
which hee^cir; ; f'^"''^ ^atitude" the paasagea
at all T-iiAi''"'""""*''^*^'"'' in the original
nor is' there ^""''u"' "dependence are not alluded to,
been enabled t^ •" * suggestion that Aguinaldo had
up arms wlh K '™ "'«'" """""^ "' ™P™<« t" t^k^
P arms, which he certainly had not done.
' P. I. R.. 5ie. 4.
D,q,t,i.dbvGoogIe
34 THE PHIUFPINES FAST AND PBE8BNT
Dr. Santos in his speech did resort to a stereotyped
Filipino procedure so very commonly employed that
those of us who have dealt much with his people have
learned to meet it almost automatically. It consists in
referring to one's having said just exactly what one did
not say, and then if one fails to note the trap and avoid
it, in claiming that because one did not deny the alle-
gation one has admitted its truth.
Aguinaldo himself later repeatedly resorted to this pro-
cedure in his dealings with Dewey and others.
In the present instance Santos employed it rather
cleverly when he expressed the hope that the United
States would "continue to support the programme agreed
upon in Singapore, between your Excellency and General
Aguinaldo, that is to say, the independence of the Philip-
pine Islands imder an American protectorate."
Now if this was agreed to, Aguinaldo later constantly
violated his part of the agreement, for we shall see that
he stated over and over again, in correspondence with
members of the junta and others, that a protectorate
would be considered only if absolute independence finally
proved unattainable, but there is no reason to believe that
any such agreement was made.
Dr. Santos read his speech to Mr. Pratt in French.
Blount implies, whether rightly or wrongly I do not know,
that Pratt's knowledge of French was poor. At all events
Pratt in his reply made not the slightest reference to the
hope expressed by Santos that the United States would
continue to support the programme which Santos said had
been agreed upon between Pratt and Aguinaldo, and
claim of a promise of independence based on these speeches
must obviously be abandoned. There is no doubt that
Pratt personally sympathized with the ambitions of the
P^pino leaders, and openly expressed his sympathy on
this aod other occasions, but to do this was one thing and
to have attempted to compromise his government would
have been another and very different one. The shrewd
L,:,,l,;.d:,G00gIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED T 35
Filiimice with whom he was dealing understood this
difference perfectly well.
It is a regrettable fact that there exists some reason
to believe that his sympathy was not purely disinterested.
Aguinaldo claims that Pratt wished to be appointed
"representative of the Philippines in the United States
to promptly secure the official recognition of oxir inde-
pendence" and that he promised him "a high post in
the customs service." '
It will be noted that several sentences and phrases in
Blount's statement are enclosed in quotation marks.
From what were they quoted? The next paragraph in
his book tells us : —
"Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt
oration : At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech, refreshments
were served, and as the Filipinos, being Christians, drink alcohol,
there was no difficulty in arranging as to refreahmenta." *
The use of this clipping from the Singapore Free
Press illustrates admirably Blount's methods. The Free
Press had at first displayed a marked coldness toward the
iosui^nt cause, but its editor, Mr. St. Clair, was oppor^
tunely "seen" by Bray, who reported that as a result of
his visit, both the editor and the paper would thereafter
be friendly, and they were. In other words, the Free
'"The Consul — after tellin? me that, before arriving in Hong-
kong harbor, a launch would be sent by the Admiral to secretly take
ns to the North American squadron, a Becreoy which pleased me also,
as it would avoid giving publicity to my acts — then advised me thai
I should appoint him the representative of the Philippines in the United
Statea to promptly secure the offlctal reooKnitioa of our independence.
I answered that whenever the Philippine government should be formed,
I would nominate him for the office he desired, although I considered
that but small recompense for his aid, and that in case of our having
the good fortune to secure our independeaoe I would bestow upon him
a high post in the oustoms service besides granting the commercial
advantages and the participation in the expenses of the war which
the Consul asked for his Oovemment in Washington, eince the Filipinos
agreed in advance to what is here stated, considering it a proper testi-
monial of gmtitude."— P. I. R., 1300. 2.
'Bloiuit,p. 12.
ib,GoogIe
36 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Press became the Singapore organ of the insurrection, and
its editor, according to Bray, "a true and loyal friend" of
Aguinaldo.
Blount claimH to have made "an exhaustive examina-
tion of the records of that period." ' Why then did he use
as evidence a newspaper clipping from an Insurgent organ,
instead of Santos's letter 7
Blount endeavours to make capital out of the fact that
Pratt forwarded to the State Department a proclamation
which he says was gotten up by the Insurgent leaders at
Hongkong and sent to the Philippines in advance of
Aguinaldo's coming. He says that it was headed "Amer-
ica's Alhes " and quotes from it as foUoira : — ■
"Compatriots: Divine Providence ia about to place in-
dependence within our reach. . . . The Americans, not from
mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and the
lamentations of so many persecuted people, have considered
it opportune, etc. [Here follows a reference to CXiba.] At the
pres^it moment an American squadron is prepanog to sail for
the PhilippiQes. . . . The Americans will attack by sea and
j>revent any reenforoements coming from Spain ; ... we in-
surgents must attack by land. Probably you will have more
than' sufficient arms, because the Americana have aims and
will find means to assist us. There where you see ibe American
fiagfiying, assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers!"*
The translation that he used is that given in Senate
Document No. 62, L. 60, and is none too accurate. He
allows it to be inferred that this proclMnation was actu-
ally i^ued. It was not. Its history is as foUo^re : —
On May 16, 1898, J. M. Basa, a FiUpino, who had lived
in Hongkong since 1872, on account of his connection
with the troubles of that year, wrote letters * to a number
> Blount, pp. 8-9. • Ibid., p. 9.
* The foUowing is one of them : —
"H. KoNO, May 16, 1898.
"BsNOB Don Joes Enrique Baba:
" Mr DBAR Enriqdb : As ui Md to the American poliey in the Phil-
ipIHiL«B, — America being the moat liberal and bumanitariui oaticoi in
:dbvGoogIe
j:,GoogIe
:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED T 37
of friends reconunendiiig the widest pos«ble circulation
of a proclamation enclosed therewith, as an aid to the
American policy in the Philippines ' ' in the war against the
tyrannical friars and the Spaniards."
With these letters there were sent two different proclama-
tions, each beginning with the words "Fellow Country-
men." The first, which is the one referred to hy Blount,
continues : —
"Divine Providence places us in a position to secure our
independence, and this under the freest form to which all in-
dividuals, all people, all countries, may aspire.
" The Americans, more for humanity than for self-interest,
attentive to the complaints of so many persecuted Filipinos,
find it opportune to extend to our Philippines their protective
mantle, now that they find themselves obliged to break their
friendship with the Spanish people, because of the tyranny
they have exercised in Cuba, causing all Americans, with whom
they have great commercial relations, enormous damages.
" At this moment an American fleet is prepared to go to the
Philippines.
" We, your fellow-coontrymen, fear that you will make use of
your arms to fire upon the Americans. No, brothers ; do not
make such a mistake ; rather (shoot) kill yourselves than treat
our liberators as enemies.
" Do not pay attention to the decree of Primo de Rivera,
calling on you to enlist for the war, for that will cost you your
lives : rather die than act as ingrates toward our redeemers,
the Americans.
" Note weU that the Americans have to attack by sea, at the
same time avoiding reenforcements which may come from
Si>ain ; therefore the insurrection must attack by land. Per-
the world, — I eameatly reoommend the widest possible otroulntion
of the proolamation which I send herewith in order that the Amerio&na
m&y be supported in the war a^aiiuit the tyraimic&l friars &nd the
Spaniards who have connived with them, and that public order, bo
neocasaiy under the present oonditions, be preserved.
" Thy relative, twenty-six years an emigrant.
(Signed) "J. M. Basa."
—P. I. R., 1204-10.
:dbvGoogIe
38 THE FHUJPPINBB fast and FRBSEStn
hspe you will have more than sufficient arms, as the Americans
have arms, and will find the means to aid you.
"Whenever you see the American fl^, bear in mind that
they are our redeemers." •
On the margin is written : "Viva, for America mth the
PhiUppinee I "
Apparently what Basa h&e means by independence is
independence from Spain, for it ia known ^lat he was
in favour of annexation to the United States, and in the
second proclamation we find the following : —
"This is the best opportunity which we have ever had for
contriving that our country (all the Philippine Archipelago)
may be counted as another Star in the Great Republic of the
United States, great because of its wisdom, its wealth, and its
constitutional laws.
" Now is the time to offer ourselves to that great nation.
With America we shall have development in the broadest
sense (of advancement) in civilization.
"With America we shall be rich, civilized and happy,
" Fellow patriots, add your signatures to those which have
already been given. Explain to all our fellow countrymen
the benefits of this change, which will be blessed by Se&v&i,
by men and by our children.
" Viva America with the Philippines ! ! 1" *
The letters were imdoubtedly given to Aguinaldo for
delivery on his arrival. They were never delivered, and it
is reasonable to suppose, especially as Basa, who was a
man of importance and means, was a member of the group
who desired annexation to the United States, that Agui-
naldo took the letters along in order to avoid a ruptmre
with him and then quietly suppressed them. Obviously,
however, he sent or gave a copy of the first one to Pratt,
presumably without the written words : "Viva, for Amer-
ica with the Philippines I"
And now comes a bit of evidence as to what occurred
at Sii^apore which I consider incontrovertible.
Aguinaldo rettuned promptly to Hongkong and on
» P. I. B., 120*-ia » Ibid., 1204r-ia
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED f 39
May 4, 1808, a meeting of the junta was held. The
minutes of this meeting,' signed by each of the several
IWpinos present, form a part of the ^urgent records
which have come into the possession of the United States
Government. They state among other things that : —
"The temporary Secretary read the minutes of the preced-
ing meeting, which were approved. The temporary President
reported that D. Emiho Aguinaldo had just arrived from
Singapore uid it became necessary for him to take possession
of the office to which he has been elected."
After the transaction of some further business Agui-
naldo was summoned, appeared at the meeting, and was
duly installed as President. Then : —
"The President described the negotiations which took
place during his absence in Singapore with the American Consul
of that En^h colony. Both agreed that the I^ident should
confer with the Admiral commanding the American squadron
in Mirs Bay, and if the latter should accept his proportions,
advantageous, in his judgment, to the Philippines, he would
go to aaid country in one of the cruisers which form the fleet
for the purpose of takii^ part in the present events. And as
he did not find the Admiral, he thought it well to have an
interview with the American Consul of this colony on the day
of his arrival, but was not satisfied with such intCTview.
" Considering the critical conditions in the Phihppines at
present, he b^ed the committee to discuss the advisability
of his going to said islands with all the leaders of prominence in
the last rebeUion residing in this colony, in case the Admir^
gave them an opportunity to do so."
Note that there is here absolutely not one word of any
promise of independence made to Aguinaldo by Pratt or
Miy one else. Is it conceivable that Aguinaldo in de-
scribing "the negotiations which took place during his
absence in Singapore with the American Consul of the
English Colony" would, by any chance, have tailed to
inform his associates in Hongkong of such an extraor-
dinary and fortunate occurrence as the promising by
» P. I. R., 53-2.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
40 THE PHIUPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Mr. Pratt and Admiral Dewey that the United States
would recognize, Philippine independence?
Sandico > thought that Aguinaldo ought to go, for —
"From conferences which he had with the Adnural of the
American fleet and with the American Consul m this colony,
he beheved that under present conditions it was absolutely
necessary for the President to go to the Philippines, since,
according to the American Consul, Manila had been taken by
said fleet, and a provisional government was now being formed
in that capital. The intervention of the President ui the for-
mation of that government is undoubtedly essential, since his
prestige, which everybody recognizes, would evidently prevent
dissensions among ^e sons of the country, and it would be
possible thereby to obtain a perfect organization both for the
miUtary and civil evolutiob of that country.
" Srs. Garchitorenft * and Apacible * expressed themselves in
nmilar terms. Notwithstanding the previous remarks, the
Presid^it inmated that he considered it reckless for him to go
to the Philippines without first making a written agreement
with the Admiral, as it might happen, if he placed himself at
his orders, that he might make him subscribe to or sign a docu-
ment contuning proposals highly prejudicial to the interests
of the country, from which might arise the following two very
grave contingencies :
" 1st. If he should accept them, he would undoubtedly commit
an unpatriotic act, and his name would justly be eternally
cursed by the FlUpinos.
" 2d. If he should refuse, then the break between the two
would be evident.
"And to avoid this sad dilemma, he proposed to the com-
mittee that the four parties (?) of the insurgents now here,
under charge of the competent chiefs authorized in writing by
him, should go to the Philippines to intervene, after a con-
ference with the Admiral, in these important questions ; such
means, m his opinion, should be first employed to ascertfun m
> Teodoro S&ndioo, an influential Tag&lc^ leader, who apoke Engiish
veil And afterward served as a spy while employed hj the Amerioaiu
aa an interpreter.
■ Sefior Gaivhitorena was a wealthy Tag&los of Manila, and, at
this time, a prominent member of the Hongkong junta.
' Dr. Qalicano Apacible, a very intelligent and rather conservative
TaK^log: physidan. After Aguhialdo left Hongkong, he was the
leading member of the junta.
:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED T 41
an authentic manner what the intentions of the United States
ta r^ard to that country are; and if his intervention is ab-
solutely necessary, he would not object to go at once to the
Philippines, endeavouring by all the means in his power to
remedy the critical condition of the country, to which he had
offered, and always would willingly ofTer, to sacrifice his life."
Why adopt means to leam from the admiral what the
intentions of the United States were in regard to the
Philippines if both he and Pratt had already promised
recognition of independence 7
"Srs. Sandico, Garcbitorena, Gonzf^a ' and Apacible re-
plied that they were fully convinced the Admiral of the Ameri-
can squadron would furnish the President all the arms which
he might desire, since the former was convinced that the fleet
could do nothing in the Philippines unless it were used in con-
junction with the insurgents in the development of their plans
of war against the Spanish government. . . . The authority
to treat which the President desired to give to the other chiefs,
without reflecting at all upon their pergonal qualifications,
they did not believe would be as efficacious as his personal
intervention which is necessary in grave affairs, such as those
the subject of discussion j there would be no better occasion
than that afforded them to insure the landing of the expedition-
ary forces on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense
of the Americans and to assure the situation of the Philippines
in regard to our legitimate aspirations against those very
peo[de. The Fihpino people, unprovided with arms, would
be the victims of the demands and exactions of the United
States ; but, provided with arms, would be able to oppose them-
selves to them, struggling for independence, in which consists
the true happiness of the Philippines. And they finished by
saying that it made no difference if the Spanish government
did demand the return of the P400,(X)0, and if the demand
wwe allowed in an action, since the object of the sum would be
obtained by the Admiral furnishing the Filipinos the arms which
they required for the struggle for their legitimate aspirations."
Here, then, was a definite plan to obtain arms from the
Americans to be iised if necessary "(gainst those very
people" later.
' &-. Ontoo Goniaga, a prominent Filipino lawyer of the provinoe
<tf Cagayan.
:dbvGoogIe
42 THE PHIUPPINB8 PAST AND PRESENT
"The Preadent, with hia presUge in the Philippines, would
be able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the
United States, if they colonized that country, and would drive
them, if circumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic
struggle for their independence, even if they ^ould succumb
in shaking off the yoke of a new oppressor. If Washington
proposed to carry out the fundamental principlea of its con-
stitution, there was no doubt that it would not attempt to
colonize the Philippines, or even to annex them. It was prob^
able then that it woidd ^ve them independence and guarantee
it; in such case the presence of the President was necessary,
as he would prevent dissensions among the sons of the country
who sou^t office, who might cause the intervention of Euro-
pean powers, an intervention which there was no reason to doubt
would be highly prejudicial to the interests of the country. . . ,
What injury could come to the Philippines, even if we ad-
mitted that the Admiral would not give ajms to the President
on account of his refusal to eaga a document prejudicial to the
country, after he had taken aH means to provide for her de-
fence? None. Such an act of the President could not be
censured, but, on the other hand, would be most meritorious,
because it would be one proof more of his undoubted patriotism."
Not one word of any promise of independence do we
find in this remarkable docmuent. On the contrary it
furnishes conclusive proof that no such promise had
been made and that the future relations between FlUpinos
and Americans were still completely uncertain.
And now comes some direct evidence. Bray and
St. Clair, the latter the editor of the Insurgent organ
in Singapore, were present on the occasion when inde-
pendence was said to have been promised by Pratt.
Bray subsequently declared in the most positive terms
tJiat it was promised. St. Clair wrote him a letter taking
him roundly to task for this claim, in the following very
interesting terms : —
" I felt it to be my duty to let Pratt know that you still hold
that you and Santos have evidence that will controvert his,
(and) he was, of course, extremely disappointed, because he (is)
quite aware of what took place in Spanish, and as to turning of
his conversation into a pretense of agreement he knows nothmg.
:dbvGoogIe
bvGoogle
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WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED T 43
He a&ys very truly : 'My own party, the Democrats, vill eay
if they read this book — If this man takes it upon himself to
be a Plenipotentiary without authority, we had better not
employ him any more — I franWy cannot understand youp
action, 'as to its unwisdom I have no doubt at all.
"Admiral Dewey goes home, it is believed, to advise the
President on Naval and Colonial Aff^rs, he knows exactly
what did take place and what did not, and I should know if he
had any ground to think that the slightest promise was made by
Pratt to Aguinaldo be would declare it unauthorized and de-
cline to sanction it. I am certain Pratt reported what he sup-
posed took place accurately; he had no surety on what you
might have said, naturally.
"And, curiously, you never mentioned to me anything of the
agreement as having taken place then, nor in the paper you
communicated to me was there any mention of one, nor did
Pratt know of any. It is only more recently that the fiction
took shape. ' The wish father to the thought,' or the statement
repeated till it has become believed by the — ,^ this ia conmion.
"Now I would like to urge you, from the practical point of
view, to drop any such foolfslmess. The vital thing, oad
nothing else counts, is what Dewey said and did when he at
last met Aguinaldo. That, that, that, is the thing, all else is
empty wind.
" Supposing that Pratt and Wildman had covered inches of
paper with 'Qauses' and put on a ton of sealing wax as consular
seals, what, pray, to any common sense mind would all that
have been worth ? Nothing I I NothiM! 1 And yet, where
is the agreement, where is the seal? where are there any
signatures ? And if you had them — waste paper — believe
me, that all this potter about Pratt and Wildman is ener^
misdirected. The sole thing to have impressed upon the public
in America would be the chaining of Dewey and Aguinaldo
together as participants in common action ; you surdy com-
prehend this means I Think and think again; it means
success as far as it is possible. The other work is not only lost,
but does not gain much sympathy, especially this criticism of
the conduct of American troops ; things may be true that tCte
not expedient to say. Sink everything into Dewey-Aguinaldo
cooperation, that was on both sides honest even if it did not
imi^y any actual arrangement, which, of course, Dewey him-
self could not make. That here you have the facts, — undenied
■ — incontrovertible." '
> Thwe is an illegible w<nd in the original. ' P. I. R.. 406-S.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
44 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
The following letter of Bray to Aguinaldo, dated Janu-
ary 12, 1899, seeniB to me to throw much light on the
question of how these claims relative to the promised
reci^nition of Filipino independence sometimes ori^nated
and were bolstered up : —
"With regard to your proclamation, there is still a trump
card to be played. Did you not say that the basis of any
n^otiation in Sii^apore was the Indepeodence of the Philip-
pines under an American protectorate 7 This is what Consul
Pratt telegraphed and to which Dewey and Washington ^reed :
as I figured up the 'price' of the tel^ram, I know very well
what occurred, and I am ready to state it and to swear to it
when the proper time comes. There are five of us against one
in the event of Consul Pratt receiving instructions to deny it.
Furthermore, Mr. St. Ctair knows what happened and I am
certain that he also would testify. St. Clair still has the rough
draft as an historical rehc, and St. Clair is a true and loyal
friend of yours, as is your humble servant," '
The utter unscmpulousness of Bray is shown by his
claim that St. Clair would confirm his false statements,
made as it was after receiving St. Clair's letter above
quoted.
But Bray did not wait for Aguinaldo to play this trump
card. He tried to play it himself by cabling Senator
Hoar, on the same day, that as the man who introduced
General Aguinaldo to the American government through
the consul at Singapore he was prepared to swear that the
conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate
with Dewey were independence under a protectorate.*
»P. I. R.,398. 9.
' " HoNQKONQ, 12 Jan. 1899, — 2 p.h.
"SxMATOR Hoar, WaBhinirtoa.
"As the man who introduced Oenertkl Aguinaldo to the Amerioan
government through the eonaul at Singapore, I frankly state that the
conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to oofiperate with Dewey
were independence under a protectorate. I am prepared to swear to
this. The mihtary party Bubomed correapondenta are deceiving the
American nation by means of malevolent lying atatements. If your
powerful influence does not change this insensate potioy there will be
a hopeless conflict with the inevitable results disastrous for the Ameri-
cans. " Bhat."
—P. L B., 863-4.
D,q,l,i.:d=;G00<ilc
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISEDT 45
Let US now trace Aguinaldo'e subsequent movementa,
and see what promises, if any, were made to hint by WUd-
man and Dewey. He had returned to Hongkong with
two companions, all travelling under assumed names.
Only his most trusted friends among the members of the
junta were at first allowed to know where he was living.
Bis situation was a difficult one. It was necessary for
him to come to some sort of a temporary ^rangement
with Artacho, if he was to avoid legal difficulties, and to
reestablish himself with some of his companions, who had
accused him of deserting with the intention of going to
Europe to live on money which belonged to them. When
harmony had been temporarily restored through the good
offices of Sandico, Aguinaldo had an interview with Con-
sul General Wildman. He has since claimed that Wild-
man, too, promised him independence, but the truth
seems to be that he himself said he was anxious to be-
come an American citizen. This being impossible, he
wanted to return to the Philippines and place himself
under Dewey's orders. He wanted to help throw off the
yoke of Spain, and this done, would abide by the decision
of tiie United States as to tdie fate of the Philippines.'
' " Then Aguinaldo had an interview with the United States conaul
in Hongkong, in which he told him that he was anxious to become an
Americiyi citizen, but this being impossible, he desired to be allowed
to letum to the Philippinee and place himself under the orders of
Commodore Dewey. Aooording to the brother of that Consul, who
certainly must have had opportunities for knowing the facts in the
ease, he made no demands for independence, but said that he hoped
that the Americans would not leave the Filipinos to their fate, but
would annex the Philippines and protect them against the Spaniards.
He promised the Consul that he would fight with the Americans and
not attempt to foment a revolution against the United States. His
highest expressed aim was to throw oS the Spanish yoke, and, that
once accomplished, he would abide by the decision of the United States
u to the ultimate disposition of the Philippines. If Aguinaldo had
expressed his real intentions of obtaining urns and using them only
tor his own purposes, and, if he found it expedient, against the United
BtatM, it is not to be thought that he would have been returned to the
IMippiuee on a United States vessel."*
•Taylor, 44 F Z.
:dbvGoogIe
46 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Any claim that A^uinaldo had been promiBed inde-
pendence by Wildman, or, indeed, that the latter had been
allowed to know that the Filipinos desired it, seems to me
to be negatived, not only by Wildman's own statements,
but by a letter from Agoncillo to Aguinaldo written on
Augiwt 5,Ci^^m which he says : — *--'
"The American consul left my house to-day at 3 o'clock,
as I had requested an interview with him before his departure,
and I was unable to go to the Consulate on account of the
awelling of my feet. From our conversation I infer that in-
dependence will be given to us. I did not, however, disclose
to him our true desires. . . . Sud consul approved my tele-
gram to McKinley, which has been sent to-day through him,
a copy of which is herewith enclosed. If they accept our rep-
resentative in the commission, we may arrive at a friendly
understanding, and it will enable us to prepare for the fight in
case they refuse to listen to our request. On the other hand,
if at the very b^inning they refuse to admit our representative,
we will at once be in a position to know what should be done,
i.e. to prepare for war." '
On May 4, 1898, the Hongkong junta voted that
Aguinaldo oi^t to go to the Philippines, and go he did.
It would seem that he at first gave up the idea of joining
Dewey, for on May 11 he wrote a cipher letter, giving
minute directions for the preparation of signals to assist
his ship in making land, by day or by night, at Dingalan
Bay on the east coast of Luzon ; directing the capture of
the town of San Antonio, just back of Capones Islands,
in Zambales, and ending with the words: "We will
surely arrive at one of the two places above mentioned, so
you mtist be prepared."
Something led him again to change his mind, and he
finally sailed on the McCvUoch.
In his "Resefia Veridica" written later for political
purposes, Aguinaldo has definitely claimed that Dewey
promised him that the United States would recognize
the independence of the FUipino people. I will let
• P. I. B., 471. 7.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED T 47
him tell his own stoiy, confronting his statements with
those of the admiral.
"May 19, 1898.
" The McCuUoch Bt&rted at eleven o'clock on the morning of
the 17th of May for the Philippines; we anchored, between
twelve and one o'clock on the t^temooo of the 19th, in the
waters of Cavite, and immediately the launch of the Admiral
— with his aid and private secretary — came to convey me
to the Olympia, where I waa received, with my aid, Sr. Leyva,
with the honors of a general, by a section of marine guards." ^
Relative to this matter. Admiral Dewey has testified : *
"The Chairman. You, of course, never saluted the flag?
" Admiral Dewej/. Certunly not; and I do not think I ever
called Aguinaldo anything but Don EmiUo ; I don't think. I
ever called him 'General.'
" The Chairman. And when he came on board ship was he
received with any special honors at the side?
" Admiral Dewey. Never."
The "Resefia Veridica" continues: —
"The Admiral received me in a salon, and after greetings
of courtesy I asked him ' if all the telegrams relative to m^^
which he had addressed to the Consul at Singapore, Mr. Pratt,
were true.' He replied in the affirmative, and add«Ml, 'that the
United States had come to the Philippines to protect its natives
and free them from the yoke of Spun.'
"He said, moreover, that 'America was rich m territory
and money, and needed no colonies,' concluding by assuring
me, 'to have no doubt whatever about the reccwiition of
Philippine independence by the United States.' Thereupon
he a^ed me if I could get the people to arise against the Span-
iards and carry on a rapid campaign." *
As we have seen, Dewey sent only one tel^ram to
Pratt about Aguinaldo. It merely directed that ^e latter
be sent.
'P. I. B., 1300.2.
* Admiial Dewey's teBtimony, from whJoh I quote eztraott, will b«
round in Senate Documents, Vol. 25, 57 Congreae, Irt session, pp. 2928,
2ML.
•P. LB., 1300. 2.
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48 TEE PHIUPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
"I then expressed to him my profomid acknowledgement
for the generous help which the United States was givii^ the
Filipino people, aa well as my admiration for the magnificence
and goodness of the American people. I also stated to him that
'before leaving Hongkong, the Filipino Colony had held a
meeting, at which was discussed and considered the possibility
that — after defeating the Spaniards — the FiUpinos might have
a war with the Americans, if they should refuse to recognize
OUT independence, who were sure to defeat us because they
should find us tired out, poor in ammunitions and worn out in
the war against the Sparuards,' requesting that he pardon my
frankness.
"The Admiral replied that he 'was delighted atmydncerity,
and believed that both Filipinos and Americans should treat
each other as allies and friends, clearly explaining all doubts
for the better understanding between both parties,' and added
that, 'so he had been informed, the United States would recog-
nize the independence of the Filipino people, guaranteed by
the word of honor of the Americans, — more binding than
documents which may remain unfulfilled when it is deared to
fail in them as happened with the compacts signed by the
Spaniards, advising me to form at once a Filipino national
flag, offering in virtue thereof to recognize and protect it before
the other nations, which were represented by the various
squadrons then in the Bay ; although he said we should con-
quer the power from the Spaniards before floating said flag,
so that the act should be more honourable in the sight of the
whole world, and, above all, before the United States, in order
that when the Filipino ships with their national fiag would
pass before the foreign squadronp they should inspire respect
and esteem.'
"Again I thanked the Admiral for his good advice and
generous offers, informing him that if the sacrifice of my life
was necessary to honor the Admiral before the United States,
I was then ready to sacrifice it.
"I added that under such conditions I could assure him
that all the Filipino people would unite in the revolution to
shake off the yoke of Spain ; that it was not strange that some
few were not yet on his side on account of lack of arms or be-
cause of personal expediency.
"Thus ended this first conference with Admiral Dewey, to
whom I announced that I would take up my residence at the
Naval Headquarters in the Cavite Arsenal." '
• P. I. R., 1300. 2.
L.,,l,;.:M.,G00gIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED? 49
Further on, in the same document, Aguinaldo advances
the cl^m that on the occasion of the visit of General
Anderson and Admiral Dewey the latter again promised
him independence.
He says : —
" In the same month of July, the Admiral, accompanied by
General AndersoD, presented himself, and after greetings <h
courtesy said to me: 'You have seen confirmed all of what
I pronused and said to you. How pretty your flag is. It
has a triangle, and it looks like Cuba's. Will you give me one
as a reminder when I return to America ? '
" I replied to him that I was convinced of his word of honour
and that there was no necessity whatever to draw up in docu-
mentary form his agreements, and as for the flag, that he could
count on it, even at that very moment.
" Dewey continued : ' Documents are not complied with
when there is no honour, as has happened with your agreement
with the Spaniards, who have fuled in what was written and
ragned. IVust in my word for I hold myself responsible that
the United States will recc^nize the independence of the country.
But I recommend to you [plural. — Tb.] to keep everytlung
which we have talked about and fureed upon with a great detd
of secrecy for the present. And, moreover, I entreat you
plural. — Tb.] to be patient if our soldiers should insult some
Illipino, because, as volimteers, they are yet lacking in dis-
cipline.' " '
Admiral Dewey has te^t^ed as foUows, concerning the
recognition of Philippine independence by him : —
"The Chairman. You remember the question of your
reci^nizing his republic was a good deal discussed and you
wrote me a letter, which I read in the senate. Of course, I
am only asking now about what you said in the letter. There
was no recognition of the republic ?
"Admiral Dewey. Never. I did not think I had any
authority to do it and it never occurred to me to do it. There
was a sort of a reign of terror: there was no government.
These people had got power for the first time in their lives and
they were riding roughshod over the community. The acts of
cruelty which were brought to my notice were hardly credible.
I Taylor, 4 MG., E.
VOL.1 — ■ -, .
L.,,l,;.:M.,L-.OOgle
00 THE PHUIPPINES FAST AND PRESENT
1 sent word to Aguiualdo that he must treat his priBoners
kindly, and he said be would."
He has further testified that he never as much as heard
of independence until the appearance of .^uinaldo's
proclamation of June 15, 1898 : —
"Admiral Dewey. . . . Then when I beard that oiu* troops
were coining I aaked him to withdraw his troops from Cavite
and make room for our men. He demurred at this, but fimUly
withdrew and established headquarters across the bay at a
place called Bacoor, from which place on the 15th of June he
sent me a proclamation declaring the independence of tiie
Philippines.
"The Chairman. Was that the first?
"Admiral Dewey. That was the first intimation ; the first
I had ever heard of independence of the Philippines.
" The Chairman. He had said something to you —
"Admir(d Dewey. Not a word. He had done what I told
him. He was most obedient ; whatever I told him to do he
did. I attached so little importance to this proclamation that
I did not even cable its contents to Washington, but forwarded
it through the mails. I never dreamed that they wanted
mdependence."
Remembering that Admiral Dewey was not beii^ in-
terrogated as to the statements of the "ReseQa Verldica,"
it will be seen that he has, neverthdess, covered them .
fuUy.
It w^ my good fortune to be long and intimately as-
sociated with Admiral Dewey while serving on the first
Philippine commission. He always grew indignant when
the subject of any promises relative to independence said
to have been ma!de by him was so much as mentioned,
and gave to the commisedon in writing the following : —
" The statement of Emilio Aguinaldo, imder date of Sept. 23,
published in the Springfield Republicanf so far as it relates to
reported conversations with me, or actions of mine, is a tissue
of falsehood. I never, directly or indirectly, promised the
fllipinos independence. I never received Aguinaldo with
military honors, or recognized or saluted the so-called Fili|nno
Sag. I never conadered him as an ally, edthough I did make
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
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:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED T gl
nse of him and the natives to assist me in my operations against
the Spaniards." *
As Dewey's allegations flatly contradict those of
Aguinaldo, we must choose between the two. While I
have no doubt as to where the choice will fall, I will now
submit some additional matter of interest. Let us first
con^der the history of the "ReseQa Yetldica" in which
Aguinaldo makes the charges above quoted. On Sep-
tember 12, 1899, Buencamino wrote of it to Apadble
in Hongkong, saying : —
"This work is entitled 'Resefia Verfdica de la Rerolucito
fWpina' in which Don EmiUo relates in detail his acts with
Admiral Dewey. It baa been distributed to the Consuls and
you are ordered to reprint it there translated into English and
send some copies to the United States, even though only a
thousand, if you deem it advisable. Send copies also to Euroi>e,
Sefior Agoncillo taking charge of the publication. If the Agent
you may have selected for the United States should still be
there, it would be advisable for him to take a copy of the pam-
phlet with him for its publication.
"This is an order of the Government which I take pleasure
in transmitting to you for due execution." '
But there was a change of heart about e^ving the
pamphlet to the constils, for imder date of September 30
Buencamino wrote : —
"We have not distributed them here in order that Otia may
not counteract the effects that we desire to produce with tlus
publication, through his usual machinations. Nor do we be-
lieve it advisable to make this pamphlet public in those colonies
before your arrival in the United States." *
To this letter he added in cipher the following post-
script to Pablo Ocampo, in charge of Aguinaldo's corre-
spondence in Manila : —
"At last moment — Nots bene :
"Don't deliver any copy of the 'Resefia Verfdica' to the
> Report of the Philippine oommisrioa to tlie PreBideat. J&nuuy
81, 1900. Vol. I, p. 121.
*P. I. R., 306.3. 'ibid., 396.3.
:dbvGoogIe
52 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Consuls, even tfaougli it was so directed in the b^inninn; of the
letter. All except one, which is for you, will be sent to Hong-
kong, Don Fedro de la Vi&a being bearer of the eame, as also
of the other documents. The copy intended for you is neither
to be divulged nor published, for strict reserve is required until
those which are being sent arrive at their destination." '
The reason for preserving such secrecy relative to this
document until it could reach its destination and work its
harm is of course obvious. Its statements were so out-
rageously false that they would have been instantly and
authoritatively contradicted had it been issued seasonably
at Manila.
The truth is that Aguinaldo's claim that he had been
promised independence was a gradual growth. Let us
trace it.
On May 21, he wrote a circular letter to "My dear
brother," inviting the recipients and their companions
to meet him at once, and arrange the best way to entrap
all the enemy in their homes.
In this he says that he has promised the American
admiral that they will "carry on modem war" and adds :
"Even if a Spaniard surrenders, he must be pardoned
and treated well, and then you will see that our reputa^
tion will be very good in all Europe, which will declare for
our independence; but if we do not conduct ourselves
thus, the Americans will decide to sell us or else divide
up our territory. As they will hold us incapable of gov-
erning our land, we shall not seciu"e our liberty, rather the
contrary; our own soil will be delivered over to other
hfmds." *
> P. 1. R., 461. 4.
• " My Dear Brother : I inform you that we arrived here in Cavite
at eleven o'clock and disembarked at four o'clock in the afternoon after
OUT conference with the Amerioan Admir^. Everything appears to
be favourable for obtaining' our independence. I cannot say more on
that Bubjeot as it would take too long.
"I have no other object in writing this except to ask you and your
companions to meet at once and arrange the beat way to entrap all
the enemy in your town, employing deceit, for inataooe, majce a
:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED T S3
In this letter, written on the very day of the interview
at which he subsequently claimed that Admiral Dewey
had promised independence, does he make any cl^m that
this had occurred ? No, he veiy distinctly implies the
contrary. Is it beUevable that if he could truly have said
"The United States, .through its representatives Dewey
and Pratt, has promised to recognize our independence"
he would have failed to do so when this would instantly
have secured him the vigorous support which he was
then uncertfun of obtaining ? I think not.
In this letter Aguinaldo specifically directs that deceit
be employed and that Spanish officers be treacherously
attacked. The practising of deceit was a carefully con-
sidered part of the insurgent policy. In a letter from
Hongkong dated July 21, 1898, A^ncillo writes as
follows to Mabini ; ' —
"the time will come when disguises must be set aside and we
will see who is deceiving whom. The Btatements made by some
preeent of wbatever you think beet to the chiefs suoceasively and then
At onoe enter the faouaee and attack them, or if not this, do what you
think beet. Show vak>r and resolution, brothers, the hour hoa arrived
for the Philippines to belong to her eone and not to them, only one
step and we shall reach Independence ; be constant, brothers, and be
united in feelings, do not imitate those who show two faces, whatever
such people do sooner or later they will be slaves. Respect foreigners
and their property, also enemiea who surrend^.
" I want you to know that in respect to our conduct I have promised
the American Admiral and other nations, that we shall carry on modem
war. Even if a Spaniard surrenders, he must be pardoned and treated
well and then you will see that our reputation will be very good in
all Europe which will decline for our Independence ; but if we do not
conduct ourselves thus the Amerioans wilt decide to sell us or else
divide up our territory as they will hold us incapable of governing
our land, we shall not secure our hbarty; rath^ the contrary; our
own soil will be delivered over to other hands.
" Therefore, my brethren, I urge that we strive to unite our efforts,
and let us flre our hearts with the idea of vindicating our country.
Many nations are on our side." — P. I. R., 12. 1.
' Mabini was a Tag&log paralytic of exceptional ability. In my
opinion he was the strongest man whom the revolution produced.
:dbvGoogIe
64 THE raOLIPPINES PAfiT AND PRESENT
of the commanders of the fleet here to Don Emilio aud myself
were to the efiFect that the exclusive purpose of the Government
at Washington with regard to the Filipinos, is to grant this
country independence, without any conditions, although I sfud
to myself that such a purpose was too pMlanthropical. Don
Eknilio knew what I thought then, and I still think the same;
that is to say that we are the ones who must eecure the indepen-
dence of our country by means of unheard of sacrifices and thus
work out its happiness." ^
Agxiinaldo himself frankly advocated the use of de-
ceit. He practised what he preached. Simeon Villa,
one of his companions on his subsequent flight through
Northern Luzon, before he finally took refuge at Falanan,
kept a diary, which constitutes an official record of this
long journey. In it he has inserted some bits of history
of other days, of which none is more interesting than his
account of the beginning of hostilities against the Span-
iards, in August, 1896. From it we learn that Aguinaldo,
who was known to the friar of his town to be both a mason
and a chief of the Katipilnan, was in danger during August,
and on the night of the 29th of that month called a meet-
ing of all the compromised persons of the place, who
a^'eed that on the following day he should "make repre-
sentations to the governor of the province." Villa says
that he was greatly beloved by the governor and his wife.
Early on the following morning, he "presented himself to
the governor, and in the name of the people of Cavite
Viejo, offered him their respects and their loyalty to
Spain," at the some time asking a garrison of a hxmdred
men for his town, which the governor promised to send
at once if the captain-general approved.
That afternoon he reported the results of his efforts
to his fellow-conspirators, "and told them that then was
the opportune moment for rising agatuat the Spaniards."
He initiated the uprising himself the nest morning.*
» p. I. R., 451. 1.
■ Extract from the Jounuil of Simeon Villa.
" The memoTable month <d August, 1896, arrived. Aguinaldo waa
:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED T 58
Gould deceit be more deliberately practised or treachery
more frankly employed 7
'master' of the Cftvite Lodga. Uoreovta, he vu a member ttf
the 'Katipan&n' Society and the chief of tJie many memben who
were Id the pueblo of Cavite Viejo. What was to be done 7 A^ui-
naldo, not knowing what to do, and mindful of the fact that the cu-
rate there knew positively tliat he was not only a nuwoa, but alao the
chirf of the Katipfinana of his pueblo, oonaidered ft expedient on the
night of August 29 to at once call a meeting of all the compromised
poeoiiR in lus town. Aguinaldo made dear to them their grave eit-
nation.
" They all agreed that on the following day Aguinaldo, thrar chief,
should make repreaentationa to the Governor of Cavite ; so he went
away very early the following morning, presented himself to the gov-
wnor, and in the name of the people of Cavite Viejo offered him their
respects and their loyalty to Bpain, at the same time requesting him
to eondeseend to send to his town a garrison of 100 men for its seourity.
The govcflitor replied that he would first oonault the captain-general,
and if the proposition was apj^oved he would send the garrison at
"As Agninaldo was greatly beloved by Uie governor and hia wife,
they offered him wine and sweetmeats. As soon as this was over he
took his leave and returned happy to his town. Ou arrival in the town
he assembled all the compromised persons and informed them of the
brilliant result of hia eftorts. Continuing, he told them that then was
the oppMtune moment for rising in arms against the Spaniards. To
this thiey unanimously replied by saying it was terrible, beoause no
arms were available, and that for this reaaon it would certainly prove
to be a disaater for them.
"Bat Aguinaldo. in company with his godfather, the lamented
Candido Tirana, insisted on convincing them with their strong argn-
ments- They made them understand that Bpanish cruelty would
annihilate them without fail, and tcs no other reason than that they
were members of the KatipAnan.
" Aa it happened, at that very time there were two 'Guardia Civil'
soldiers in the court-house. So at about 2 o'clock in the morning,
Aguinaldo and Tirona went directly to the court-house. Arriving
tlm«, these two determined inaurgent chiefs intimated to the guards
that they should surrender their equipments. Theee replied that it
waa impossible, and said they would die first. Instantly a stanggle
ensued between the four men, which lasted nearly an hour. But it
resulted in favor of the iosui^nt chiefs who succeeded in taking the
guns and oai-tridges. Once in posaeSBion of these armaments, the two
chiefs, aooompanied by a. number of the town people, directed them-
selves to the convent in order to capture the curate. Very unfortu-
nately for them, the curate waa no longer there when they arrived;
he had made his escape. While the struggle was going on with the
:dbvGoogIe
gQ THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
I have indulged in this digression to show that Agui-
naldo could hardly have complained had the methods
which he used against others been employed against him.
He was never deceived by the Americans, but his claims
relative to independence grew rapidly, and he was soon
deceiving his own people.
On May 24th, be issued no less than four proclama-
tions. One of these, doubtless intended to be seen by
Americans, made no mention of Independence, but
said:' —
g^uards in the oourt-houae, he reoeived the news and fled at onoe by
embarkiDS in a native boat.
" The insuiKent chiefs then returned to the oourt-house and immedi-
ately prepared a oommunication to all the munioipal oaptains ia the
provinoea of Cavite, Batangas and Lai^na, inviting them to at onoe
rise against Spain, and stating that their own town of Cavite Viejo
WM already freed from slavery.
" Each one of these oommunioations was sent out by a mounted
oourier, so that before the expimtion of many hours all the towns in
Cavite Provinoe were informed of whathad taken plaee in Cavite Viejo.
" On thefoUowingday someof the towns took up arms. At the same
time Agiunaldo, in company with many people from his town, marched
on Tmua in order to attaek the Spanish troops who were there. When
he arrived in Imus the people of this town at onoe joined him and they
all went to the oonvent, in which were the friars and the soldiers of
the 'Ouardia Civil.' Just aa he arrived at the atrium of the Church
bis oompanious did not wish to follow bim, for fear that the soldiera
were occupying the church tower. So Aguinaldo advanced alone untQ
he reached the door of the oonvent. Once here, he called his compan-
ions to aid bim. But these were not so determined as he was, and only
about five responded. When these got to where Aguinaldo was, he
commenced breaking in the door which was soon open. They went
upstBdrs, .but they found nobody, since the friars and soldiers had
crossed over to the treasury buildiiig.
" Aguinaldo's companions were now numerous, because the others
followed him when they saw that nothing happened to those who went
up into the oonvent ; and all of these went immediately to the treasury
building, in which were the friars and soldiers whom they were hunting.
When they reached it they found the doors dosed, so they could not
pass. Aguinaldo ordered the house burned. Those in bidiue inside
the house were without any other remedy and had to surrender ; but
meanwhile some of them had been burned to death, among these a
lieutenant of the 'Ouardia Civil.' By this victory Aguinaldo suo-
oeeded in taking 17 rifles and two 2\ pounder guns." — P. I. R., 860.
' "My Beloved Countrymen: I accepted the ^reement of peace
:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED T 57
"The great powerful North American nation has offered
its disinterested protection to secure the liberty of this
coimtry."
In another proclamation, doubtless intended for a
different use, he made the statement that the great
North American nation had come to give decisive and
disinterested protection, "considering us as sufficiently
civilized and capable of governing ourselves." ^
proposed by Don Pedro A. I^temo after his consultation with the
Captam-Ofineral of the islands (Philippines), agreeing in oonsequenoe
thereof to suirender our arms and dialMUid the troops under my immedi-
ate commimd under certain oonditions, as I believed it more advan-
tageous for the country than to continue the inaurreotion, for which
I had but limited resouroea, but as some of the said conditions were
not complied with, some of the bands are disooutented and have not
mitrend^«d their u'ms. Five months have elapsed without the in-
auguration of any of the reforms whieh I asked in order to place our
oonatry on a level with civilized people — for instanoe, our neighbor,
Japan, which in the short space of twenty years has reached a point
where she has no reason to envy any one, her strength and ascendency
b^ng shown in the laat war with China. I see the impotence of the
Spanish Government to contend with certain elements which oppose
constant obstacles to the progress of the country itself and whose
destructive influence has been one of the causes of the uprbing of the
masses, and as the great and powerful North American nation has
offered its diaint«rested protection to secure the Uberty of this
oountry, I again assume command of all the troops in the Htriiggle for
the attainment of our lofty aspirations, inaugurating a dictatorial
government to be administered by deorees promulgated under my sole
responsibility and with the advice of diBtinguished persons until the
time when these islands, being under our complete control, may form
a constitutional repubUoan assembly and appoint a president and
cabinet, into whose hands I shall then resign the oommand of the
"Einuo AoniNAi.no.
"Given at Cavite, May 24. 1898." —P. I. R- 206. 6.
' "The great North American nation, the cradle of genuine liberty
Mid therefore the friend of our people oppressed and enslaved by the
tyranny and despotism of its ruler, has come to us manifesting a pro-
tection as decisive as it is undoubtedly disinterested toward our in-
habitants, considering us as sulHoiently civilized and capable of govern-
ing ourvelves and our unfortunate country. In order to maintain this
high estiniate granted us by the generous North American nation we
should abominate all those deeds which tend to lower this opinion,
which are pillage, theft, and all sorts of crimes relating to persons or
:dbvGoogIe
58 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
On June 5, having practically gained control of
Cavite Province, he felt strong enou£^ to announce
that independence would be proclaimed on June 12,
and on that date he did proclaim it in a decree.
The Admiral of the American Squadron, with the com-
manders and officers of his command, was invited to the
ceremonies, hut none of them went. As it was important
for Aguinaldo to have some one there to pose as a repre-
sentative of the United States, he utilized for this purpose
a certain "Colonel" Johnson, an ex-hotel keeper of
Shangbfu, who was running a cinematograph show. He
appeal^ as Aguinaldo's chief of artillery and the
reprea^itative of the North American nation.^
Even as late as October 3, 1898, Agoncillo in a memo-
randum addressed to President McKinley did not claim
that independence htid been promised, but said : —
"As soon as the Spanish-American war b^an, the American
representatives and officials in Singapore, Hongkong and
Manila, invited the natives of the Philippines to assist the
American arms, which they did gladly and loyally, as allies,
with the conviction that their personality would be recognised,
as well as their political, autonomous and sovereign rights." *
property, with the purpose of avoiding int^^tational oon£Ict during
the period of our oampaiga." — P. I. R., 43. 3.
' Of this ertraordinary ooourrenoe Taylor saya : —
"Invitations to the ceremony of the declaration of independenoe
were sent to Admiral Dewey; but neither he nor any of his olBoen
were preeent. It was, however, important to Aguinaldo that some
Amerioan should be there whom the assembled people would oonsider
a representative of the United States. 'Colonel' Johnson, es-hotel
keeper of Shajighai, who was in the Philippines exhibiting a. cinemato-
graph, kindly consented to appear on this occasion as Aguinaldo's
Chief of Artillery and the representative of the North American nation.
His name does not appear subsequently among the papers of Aguiniddo.
It is possible that his position as oolonel and chief of artillery was a
merely temporary one which enabled him to appear in a uniform whieh
would befit the oharaoter of the representative of a great people upon
so solemn an occasion I " *
' P. I. R., 461. 4.
•Taylor, 26 A J.
:dbvGoogIe
Ji
!l
III
ill
■fl
II
bvGoogle
:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE FROUISEDr 69
III it he does, however, claim that the orgEoiizatioii of
a govenunent mdependent of America and Spain was
accomplished with the tacit consent of the admiral com-
manding the fleet and with that of the general and military
and political commanders of the United States of North
America in the Philippines.
"Who, knowii^ these facts, not only did not object but
accepted them as a consummated legal act, and mamtuned
official relations with the new organieation, making use thereof
in its subsequent actions and for the subsequent development
of the camiMugn, which was consequently brought to such a
happy end." '
This is a second illustration of the stereotyped insurgent
procedure of announcing a policy and then claiming that
failure to attack it meant acquiescence in it. Admiral
Dewey says that he did not even read this proclamation.
There was no reason why he should have done so, as it
did not deal with matters which he was authorized to
settle. He had no instructions relative to the recogni-
tion of new governments, and he sent this document to
Washington without comment, as he should hav& done.*
Apropos of this chdm that American oflScers tacitly rec-
ognized the Insurgent government, certain passages from
an unsigned document in the handwriting of Mabini, pre-
pared abgut July 15, 1898, are of interest. Mabini, speak-
ing of the attitude of the Americana, says, "Notwith-
standing all this and in spite of their protestations of
friendship, they have always refused to recognize that
govenunent." Also, "If they persist in refusing to rec-
ognize our government, we shall see ourselves compelled
to come to an agreement with any other government
that will consent to recognize us on friendly terms." ■
t P. I. R., 451. 4. > See p. fiO.
' " The7 ^re aw&re that a OoTemment haa been eHtabliahed here
from the beginning : firat the Diotatorial, and afterwards, when iereral
[vovinoeB had been freed from Spanish domination, there was implanted
in the same a proper OTsanization, and thus a new Government was
ertabliahed in the form best adapted to the prtnoiplea of liberty ; but
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
60 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PBE8BNT
This statement is certainly sufficiently specific as to
whether Americans had recognized the Insurgent govern-
ment on or before the date when it was written.
Let us now consider the relations between A^uinaldo
and General Anderson.
Blount attempts to make much of a cablegram, sent by
the latter, in which, after describing the Filipinos, he
adds, "The people expect independence." Blount says: —
"That cablegram of July 22nd, above quoted, in which the
commandiDg general of our forces in the Pmlippines advises the
Washington Government, 'The people expect independence'
is the hardest thing in the pubUc archives of our government
covering that momentous period for those who love the memory
of Mr. McKinley to get around. After the war with the
Filipinos broke out, McKinley said re[>eatedly in pubhe speeches,
'I never dreamed they would tiun against us. ' " '
If there is nothing harder than this to get around the
memory of President McKinley will not suffer, as the
Dotwitbatatiding all this &n.d in spite of their proteat&tiona of friendsliip,
they have alw&ya refused to reco^ze that govermnent.
" The things they request involve the reoc«nition of a right wfaioh
we cannot and ought not to grant, unless they recognize our Qovem-
ment and unless the limits of the powers of both sides be defined.
If they wish us to recogniae them in Cavit«, let them recognize our
rights in Parafiaque.
" The United States are our creditors more than any other nation ;
not only are tbey due the gratitude of the Filipino people, but also
they should be allowed to profit by the advantages this people oMi
grant them without loss of our legitimate right to a free and independent
life. Therefore we are disposed to make a treaty or convention with
them. They will be no longer able to allege the lack of national char-
acter, t(a in the near future there is to be assembled the Revolutionary
Congress composed of the Representatives of the provinces,
" They should understand that they have come to make war on the
Spaniuds; that the Filipinos have risen in arms against the same
enemy to achieve their liberty and independence ; and that in conae-
queuoe they cannot exercise dominion over us without violation of
international law. If they persist in refusing to recognise our Govern-
ment, we shall see ourselves obliged to come to an agreement with any
other government that will consent to recognize us on friendly terms."
— P. I. R., 58.
' Blount, p. 24.
:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED? 61
importAnt thing is not what Aguinftldo had led his people
to expect, but what the American officials had promised
him. The President was certainly not bound to believe
that the Filipinos would turn against us even if they
did then e;q)ect independence. Blount has seen fit to
leave unmentioned certain other facts which are veiy
pertinent in this connection.
Apparently sometime during September, 1898, Sandico
made the following statement in a letter to Aguin^do : -~
"I also have to inform you that Sefiorea Basa, Cort^ and
Co. have congratulated the Government of the United States
upon the capture of Manila, stating at the same time that now
that IHlipino soil had been soaked with American blood, the
Islands must remain American. I believe that a telegram
should be sent immediately, to counteract that sent by them." '
Probably Sandico did not know that on August 15,
1898, Agoncillo had transmitted another tele^am to
President McKinley throng Consul-General Wildinan,
reading as follows : —
"Agoncillo, my Commissions and Ambassador-Extraor-
dinary, representing the provisiotia] government of the
Philippine Islands, in its name and the name of its President,
Elmilio Aguinaldo, congratulates you on the successful termiiia-
tion of the war, and commends the occupancy of Manila. I
assure the United States of the allegiaiice and unquestioning
support of our people, and petition tnat we be granted one or
more representatives on the commissioD that is to decide the
future of our Islands." *
It would appear, therefore, that the President had more
information on this subject than was transmitted by
General Anderson !
Not only did the latter passively refrain from recogniz-
ing Aguinaldo's pretensions, but on July 22, 1898, he
wrote to him as follows : —
"I observe that your Excellency has announced yourself
Dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply
:dbvGoogIe
63 THE! PHILIPPtKES PABT AND PBESENT
in a militaiy capacity, I have no authority to rect^niiie Buch
an aasumption. I have no orders from my government (m the
subject." •
The effort to keep Americans in ignoruice of the true
state of affairs was kept up until further deception was
useless. Consul WiUiams, for instance, wrote on June
16, 1898 : —
"For future advajitage, I am maintaining cordial relations
with General Aguiualdo, having stipulated submiaaiv^iees to
our forces when treating for tbeir return here. Xiast Sunday,
i2th, they held a counul to form provisional government. I
was urged to attend, but thought beet to declme. A form of
government was adopted, but General Aguinaldo told me to-
day that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be
held as a colony- of the United States of America." *
Yet on Sunday, June 12, Aguinaldo had in reality
proclaimed the independence of the Philippines. Few
Americans at this time knew any Spanish and none un-
derstood Tag&Iog, so that it was comparatively easy to
deceive them. What Consul 'V^TUiams reported was what
A^naldo considered it expedient to have him believe.
The foUowing undated letter from Aguinaldo to Mabini,
supposed to have been sent at this time, is of especial
interest in this connection ; —
"Mt dbab Brother: I do not want to go there [where
the addressee is] until after the visit of the American Consul,
because I do not wish the negotiations to end in an ultimatum,
and in order that you may tell Mm all that is favoiu'able for
the cause of our Nation. I charge you with the task of giving
him a reply, and if he should aak about me tell him that since
the time of his last visit there I have not recovered from my
illness. If anything imporiiant should happen we can com-
municate with each other by telegraph, u^ng a code in matters
that require secrecy." *
In a letter supposed to have been written during
November, 1898, prepared for Aguinaldo's signature and
> Senate Dooument 2
«Ti^lOT,26AJ.
:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDBNCE PBOMtSEDT 63
addressed to Sefior McKinley, President of the Republio
of the United States of Nortii America, but apparently
never sent, Aguinaldo renews the charge ^ previously
made in his "Resefia Veiidica," that Pratt and Dewey
promised independence. It need not be further dia-
The climax was finally reached in an ofiicial protest
against the Paris Treaty written by Agoncillo in Paris
on the 12th of December, 1898, in which occurs the
following : —
"The United States of America, on their part, cannot allege
a bett« right to constitute themselves as arbitrators as to the
future of the Philippmee.
"On the contrary, the demands of honour and good faith
impose on them the explicit recognition of the political status
of the people, who, loyal to their conventions, were a devoted
ally of their forces in the moments of danger and strife. The
noble g^ieral EkniUo Aguinaldo and the other Filipino chiefe
were solicited to place themselves at the head of the suffering
and heroic sons of that country, to fight against Spain and to
second the action of the brave and skilful Admiral Dewey.
" At the time of employing their armed cooperation, both the
Commander of the Petrel and Captun Wood in Hongkong,
before the declaration of war, the American Consuls-General
Mr. Pratt in Singapore, Mr. Wildman, in Hongkong, and
Mr. Williams in Cavite, acting as international agents of the
great American nation, at a moment of great anxiety offered to
I " Qoinc to Sngapore, I had Beveral intervievB with the Consul of
the TTnited Statoa, Mr. Spencer Pratt, who informed me tiiat the war
WM directed aeniiut Spain only and that in addition your aotioa in
the Philippines Iiad as an objeot the independence of my beloved
oountry.
" The Commander of the MacCvIioch telegraphed me also from
Hongkong, offering in the name of Commodore Dewey, to take me
to Chvite, in ordw to raise the Filipinos agaiiut Spain.
" Without any written treaty, oounting only upon the saored word
of American citizana, I went to Hongkong', embarked on the Mae-
CvUoeh and a few days later had the honor to make the aoquaintanoe
of the victorious Commodore Dewey, who likewise informed me that
he had come to make war sgainat Spain, that he had annihilated the
fleet of Admiral Montojo and that the United States desired to give
the Philippines their independence." ~P. L R., 441. 2.
i.,GoogIe
64 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Tecogoize the indepeiideDce of the Filipino nation, aa soon aa
triumph waa obtained.
"Under the faith of such promises, an American man-of-war,
the McCuUock was placed at the disposal of the said leadera
and which took them to their native shores ; and Admiral
Dewey himself, by sending the man-of-war ; by not denyii^
to General Aguinaldo and his companions the exacting of hia
promises, when they were presented to him on board his flag-
ship in the Bay of Manila ; by receiving the said General Agui-
naldo before and after his victories and notable deeds of arms,
with the honours due the Commander-in-Chief of an allied
army, and chief of an independent state; by accepting the
efficacious cooperation of that Army and of those Generals:
by recognizing the Filipino flag, and permitting it to be hoisted
on sea and land, consenting that their ehips should sail with the
said flag within the places which were blockaded ; by receiv-
ing a solemn notification of the formal proclamation of the
Philippine nation, without protesting against it, nor opposing
in any way its existence ; by entering into relations with those
Generals and with the national Filipino authorities recently
established, recognized without question the corporated body
and autonomous sovereignty of the people who had just suc-
ceeded hi breaking their fetters and freeing themselves by the
impulse of their own force." '
It will be noted that the claim constantly grows. The
commander of the Petrel Captain Wood, Consul
Wildman and Consul Williams are now included among
those alleged to have promised independence, and it is
claimed that Aguinaldo was received with the honours
due the chief of an independent state when he visited
Admiral Dewey, whereas his own original claim was that
he was received with the honours due a general, which is
quite a different matter.
As a matter of fact, American officers usually addressed
uid treated Aguinaldo as a general. The extent to which
they were able to use bis organization to further the ends
of ^eir government will be set forth later.
In a letter to Wildman, dated August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo
admits that there is no t^eement, but says that he cannot
'P. I. B., 102. 1.
Lr,,l,;.:M.,G00glL"'
ill
III
b,Goo^lc
:dbvGoogIe
WAS INDEPENDENCE PROMISED T 65
tell the peoples that it does not exist, "fearii^ that I
may not be able to restrain the popular excitement."*
He begs Wildman to use his influence on his govemmrait
so that it will realize the inadvisability of deciding the
fate of the people "without considering their will duly
represented by my government." Is it conceivable that,
if there had been any ground for claiming a promise of
independence, Aguinaldo would have failed to mention
it at this time 7
We may summarize the well-established facts as fol-
lows:—
Coosul-General Pratt was, or professed to be, in hearty
sympathy with the ambition of the Filipino leaders to ob-
tain independence, and would personally have profited
from such a result, but he refrained from compromising
his government and made no promises in its behalf.
Admiral Dewey never even discussed with Aguinaldo
the possibility of independence.
There is no reason to believe that any subordinate of
the Admiral ever discussed independence with any Fili-
pino, much less made any promise concerning it.
Neither Consul Wildman nor Consul Williams promised
it, and both were kept in ignorance of the fact that it
was desired up to the last possible moment.
It is not claimed that either General Anderson or
General Mwritt made any promise concerning it.
The conclusion that no such promise was ever made by
any of these men is fully justified by well-established facts.
Aguinaldo himself carefully refrained at the outset
from saying, in any document which Americans could
read, that independence had been promised, and advanced
this claim only when the growing strength of his land
force had given him confidence. He repeated it, with
increasing emphasis, as his army increased in size, ulti-
nately openly threatening war if his pretensions were
not recogniz^. In doing this, he was merely carrying
'P. I. B., BookaO-l.
VOL. T — f
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
66 THE PBILIFPINES PAST AND PSBSENT
out a carefully prearranged plan, agreed upon by the
HoQgkoQg junta.
And now let us exanune the claim that the insurgents
were our "faithful aUies" and "cooperated" with us in
the taking of Manila. We shall find that this subject
richly repays investigation.
ib,GoogIe
CHAPTER in
InSUEGBNT "CoOPliRATION"
I HATE previously ^ called attention to the minutes of
a session of the Hongkong junta held on May 4, 1898,
from which it indirecUy appears that the Filipino leaders
at that time hoped to secure arms at the expense of the
Americans and purposed to attack them later if it seemed
advisable.
The treacherous policy then outlined was never departed
from by Aguinaldo and his associates, who sailed for
Manila with their eyes wide open, fcnowii^ full well that
they had been promised nothing; prepared to match
their wits agdnst those of Admiral Dewey, and intent on
deceiving him and on securing from him arms to be used
first against the Spaniards and later against the Ameri-
cans, after they had been employed to help bring about
the downfall of Spain.
There exists a sigmficant circular signed "J.M.B." '
believed to have been an outright forgery, both from its
tenor and from the fact that the signature "J.M.B."
is not in the handwriting of Basa's letter hereinbefore
quoted.
It contains the following statements : —
"The true patriots have organized a committee to which I
belong, naming Aguinaldo as President and Agoncillo as Vice-
Preffldent. Tlie latter and three others have commenced diplo-
matic n^otiaticms with the Admiral and American Consul,
and we infer that they are trying to make colonies of us, although
they said they would give us independence. The Committee
deemed it advisable to mmulate belief, at the same time equip-
ping ourselves with arms.
> P. 39. * Fot J. M. Bau.
L.,,l,;.:M.,G00gIe
68 THE PHILIPKNES PAST AND PRESpNT
"We have accepted arms ofEered by the Admiral which will
be disembarked in the Philippinee by the squadron.
"A part of our forces will aid the Americans by fighting with
them in order to conceal our real intentions, and part will be
held in reserve. If America triumphs and proposes a colony,
we shall reject such offer and rise in arms.
"A separate expedition will disembark at whatever point
may be considered suitable.
"3oe6 Alejandrino embarked with the American squadron
in order to ^ve secret instructions to the Chiefs.
"Be very cautious about this exceedingly delicate pointy
you will commimicate with prudent and intelligent chiefs who
will recognize the gravity of the subject," '
Here, then, in a faked-up letter on which Basa's initials
were forged in order to gain the prestige of his name for
this treacherous plan, we have definitely set forth the
purpose of the Filipinos to deceive the Americans by
aUovring a part of the Insurgent force to fight with them,
and then to attack them.
Reference has ah'eady been made to Agoncillo's advice
to Aguiualdo, given under date of August 26, 1898, to
the effect that friendly relations should be mfuntained
with the Americans until the diplomatic negotiations at
Paris should end ; that an effort should be made to find
out the future status of the islands "by deceitful means,"
and that confidence should never be put in the Americans.
Aguinaldo put the whole matter in a nutshell in a post-
script to this letter, saying : —
"You should issue an order commanding that all our chiefs
should employ a policy of friendship toward the Americans
until our status is defined ; but said order should be confiden-
tially ^ven. Try to mislead them," *
Bray also very strongly advised awaiting the results of
the Pfuis conference.'
' P. I. R., 507-7. • P. I. R., 477. 1.
■ " Until the Philippine question is finally deoided, yon would do
well in not having any controversy with the Americans. After hav-
ing secured the extinction o( Spanish control for good, you may then
liquidate acoounta with Ihe United States in the event that they wiah
:dbvGoogIe
INSUEGENT "COOPERATION" 69
Blount claims that the Filipinos hoped that the Treaty
of Paris would leave their country to them as it left Cuba
to the Cubans,' and adds that having helped us take the
city of Manila, they "felt that they had been 'given the
double cross,'" "believed that the Americans had been
guilty of a dupUcity rankly Machiavellian, and that was
the cause of the war." *
The quotations already given from Insui^ent records
show plainly that the principal thing for which the
Filipinos were waiting was the ousting of Spain from the
Philippines by the United States ; those which follow show
that war was by no means inevitable as a result of a
a deciaion at Paris adverse to Filipino hopes, for the
question of whether a United States protectorate, or even
annexation to the United States, ini^t be considered,
was left open to a very late date.'
It has been claimed not only that the Insurgents
whipped the Spaniards without our assistance, but
whipped them so thoroughly that Spanish sovereignty
had practically disappeared from the islands at the time
Manila surrendered. It has further been alleged that
"decrepit" Spwn "could not possibly have sent any
reenforcranents to the Philippines. Besides, t^e Filipinos
would have 'eaten them up.'" *
to eontrol in the interior ; but in the meantime, let what will ooour,
do not allow younelf to have any controversy with them. Matters
are in a very delicate state at the present time." — P. I- R., 398. 3.
In a pofltsoript to the same letter Bray says : —
"America is a great nation and doee not wish that oonditiona be
dictated to her. I am more than, ever convinced that you must be
patient and await what they propose, without opposing their wishes
and insanities, before the questions before the Paris Congrees are
definitely settled and the islands ceded by Spain ; then there would
still be time to show your teeth if they try to govern the country.
I would not obieot at present to them taking up their reddenoe
there and acting in the capacity of guud for good government, pUo-
ing our trust for the future in Providence which will never atwidon
tbePhilippinea." — P. I. K.,398. 3.
'Blount, p. 283. • Ibid., p. 283. 'Seep. 74.
* "Both Spanish fleets had been destroyed and Spain had but one
left to [coteet her own ooaat dties. The death knell of her onoe proud
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
70 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
But the Filipinos had fou^t Spain before and were
by no means sanguine. Their more intelligent and
reasonable men clearly foresaw that they coiild not win
unaided. Sefior Antonio Regidor was at the time residing
in London. He was a Filipino of \inusual intelligence
and ^ECeptionally good education. He took a keen
interest in the situation, and on July 28, 1898, tel^raphed
" Agonciilo as follows : —
"In the name of the FilipinoB, you should inunediately send
a telegraphic message to MacKinley, requesting him not to
abandon the islands, after having fought as brothers for a
common cause. Pledge him our unconditional adhesion, espe-
cially of well-to-do people. To return to Spain, in whatever
form, would mean annihilation, perpetual anarchy. Filipinos
en masse should visit the consuls at Hongkong, Singapore.
London commerce support it. Influence Aguinaldo to accept
American flag, flying it everywhere, thus obliging them to
remain." '
This leaves no room for doubt as to Regidor's views,
but Agonoillo did not share them. He replied on July
29: —
"Frovisiona] govemmenfa aspiration is independence.
Make this campaign." *
R^dor was not to be persuaded. On July 30 he
replied as follows, addressing his communication to Basa :
"America vacillating as to remaining feara conflicts later
with natives international question other difficulties necessary
to encourage her all of you submit united unconditionally rais-
ing American flag great demonstrations necessary to influence
outside opinion show islands resolved united America high
circles advise in view present circumstaQces only feasible pro-
gramme is protectorate." *
colonial empire had sounded. Decrepit as she was, she ooutd not
postibly have sent any reenforoements to the Philippinea. Bendes,
the Pilipinoa would h&ve 'eaten them up.'" — Bi<ount, p. 127.
' P. I. R., 471. 4. ' Ibid.. 471. 4. • Ibid., 4fiO. 2.
:dbvGoogIe
INSUBOENT •'OOOPB&A.nOH" 7t
Obviously, Agoncillo was someirtiat impressed by this
cablegram, for on August 1 in a letter to Aguinaldo he
made the following statements and inquiries : —
"If the American troops leave us alone there, the questions
which will arise are these : Have we sufficient arms to maintain
the war f^ainst Spain in order to secure our independence 7
If the other nations are opposed to our independence and wish
that we should continue under the Spanish sovereignty, have we
sufficient strength to wage a war and obtain victory over Spain
and over them in the future ? If you think that we have not
sufficient strength to fight against them, should we accept
independence under the Americmi protectorate 7 And if bo,
what conditions or advantages should we give to the United
States 7 You should carefully consider the preceding questions,
and I surest that you should, in a confidential manner, consult
them with your cabinet-in-banc, as well as with your private
secretary and military chiefs of rank; and your decision be
notified to our representatives abroad in order that they may
know what they must do in their negotiations. You will see
from the telegram addressed to me by Reader that he suggests
to me to send a message to MacKinley requesting him not to
abandon ua, and to submit to them [the U. S.] unconditionally.
As I do not agree with him and as I cannot take any action
which is agfunst the instructions of the government, 1 replied
to him tbat the only desire of our government is independence.
This may be seen from the enclosed telegram. On account of
this reply, he was, I think, somewhat offended, as he afterwards
sent a telegram to Joviales [Basa] instead of to me. The latter,
upon receivii^ the telegram, convened all the boastful patriots,
and they adopted a resolution to send a message to MacKinley
requesting annexation. Fortunately, in the meeting there was
present Dr. Justo Lucban, who protested against such measure.
In view of this protest, they again agreed that I should be pres-
et in the meeting, since I am the representative of our govern-
ment. At the meeting vrhore I was present, I pointed out the
inadvisability of their resolution, stating, as one of the reasons,
that we should await your instructions in regard to the matter
before sending any message of that character. So the message
was not sent ; but I was later informed that Basa had, after all,
sent it yesterday, because he believed that it would not injure
our cause. Upon learning this, I was carried away by passion
and went so far as to say to Basa the following : ' Many of us,
especially myself, think ourselves to be wise, without being bo ;
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
72 THE PHIUPPINES PAST AND PEE8ENT
politicians for what we bear from others ; we claim to be pa-
triots, but we are only so in words ; we wish to be chiefs, but
none of us act in a way worthy of a chief.' To this he did not
reply. Perhaps his conscience accused him of an act of treach-
ery, eince we agreed in the meeting to await your letter. What
union can you expect from this people? " '
Note that the Basa here referred to is the man whose in-
itials were forged on the letter quoted on page 67.
In the course of the above-mentioned letter Agoncillo
came back once more to the question of independence
under a protectorate and made it very clear that at this
late day be did not know whether this was or was not
what the Filipinos desired.^
On August 21, Apacible obviously did not think that
it woiild be an easy matter to escape from Spanish domina-
tion, much less tiiat the islands were ah'eady rid of it,
for he wrote to Mabini that the United States were likely
again to deliver the Filipinos into the hands of Spain.
He said that "if events will be what their telegrams in-
dicate, we have a dark and bloody future before us. To
be again in the hands of Spain will mean a long and
bloody war, and it is doubtful whether the end will be
favourable to us. . . . Spain free from Cuba and her
othCT colonies will employ her energy to crush us and will
send here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba." ' Apacible
> p. I. R., 471. 4.
* "You Bhould not forg:et what I have stated at the beginninK of
thin letter; beoause 1 am of the opinioa that those questions should
be well considered by all of you. If our people demre independenoe
under the American protectorate, it is necessary that our representa-
tives to the United States be given inatruotions as to the conditions
which we should grant to the United States. The peace n^rotiations
are in full blast, and it is probable that we will be rather late in seod-
ing our representativeH. Therefore, if you agree to independence
under a protectorate, you should recommend it at once. I leave it,
however, to your care, as you ore better qualified than myself conoent'
ing the conditions of our country." — P. 1. R., 471, 4.
' "My Dear Friend : . . . The last telegrams ftrom Europe which
Felipe will send you by this mail are alarming for our future. The
preliminaries of peaoe are announced. The demand of America ie,
annexation of Porto Rioo and the Ladrone Islands, independeaoe of
:dbvGoogIe
m
IP-
li-
i
I
bvGoogle
:dbvGoogIe
INSURGENT "COOPERATION" 73
thought that the best thing was independence under an
American protectorate.
On August 7, 1898, ^gu^ialdo warned Agoncillo that
in the United States he should "not accept any contracts
or give any promises respecting protection ot annexation,
because we will see first if we can obtain independence." ^
Even annexation to the United States was not excluded
by Aguinaldo from the possible accepted solutions, for
in outlining the policy of the? Philippine government to
Sandico on August 10, 1898, he wrote: —
Cuba under an American protootorate and an Amerioan oozing sta-
tion in the Philippines. That is, the^ will aeain deliver us into the
hands of Spain. On the other hand, all the pavers will unite to pre-
vent the annexation of the Philippines, according to the telefcrama of
Regfidor; the American cabinet hedtateB about including us in the
negotiations for peaee from fear of a conflict with us and the Filipinos
in Europe advise us to send a message to America giving our uncondi-
tional adhesion. If events will be what these telegrams indicate, we
have a dork and bloody future before ua. To be again in the handa
of Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whether
the end will be favourable to us. The treaty of peaoe sanctioned by
the other powers will assure the dominion of Spain. Spain free from
Cuba and her other oolonies will employ all her energy to crush us
and will send here the 150.000 men she has in Cuba. I do not think
that the Filipinos will again submit to their tyrants and there will be
a long and bloody war. And on account of the treaty the other
powers will aid Spain to completely dominate us and place all possible
obstacles in our way to prevent shipment of arms and all kinds of
revolutionary labours. In view of all this and bearing in mind the
present u^ency of the matter, it is neoeesary for that government to
eatahlish and publish its policy. We believe that the best for us and
the only feasible one. if we want to establish negotiations with America,
is independence under an Ameriean proteotorate." ~ P. I. R., 453. 3.
'"The policy which you will pursue in the United Statee is the
following one : —
" M(^e them tmderatand that whatever may be their mtention
towards ns, it is not possible for them to overrule the sentiments of
the people represented by the government, and they must first recc^-
□ize it if we are to oome to an agreement. Still do not accept any con-
tracts or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, be-
cause we will see first if we can obtain independence. This is what
we shall endeavour to secure ; meanwhile, if it should be possible to do
so, still give them to understand in a way that you are unable to bind
yourself but that once we are independent, we will be able to make
anangemeuts with them." — P. I. R., Books C-1.
i.,GoogIe
74 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
"The policy of the govemment is as follows: Ist. To
Btruggle for the independence of 'the Philippines' as far as our
strength and our means will permit. Protection or annexa-
tion will be acceptable only when it can be clearly seen that
the recc^nition of our Independence, either by force of arms or
diplomacy, is impossible." '■
On August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo wss still ready to con-
sider annexation if necessary.* He was apparently not
sanguine at tlus time as to the result of a continued
stru^e with Spain. At all events, he wanted the help
of the Americans if such a struggle was to come, and
desired to know on what terms it could be had.*
Meanwhile the Filipinos in Hongkong who favoured
annexation made themselves heard.
On July 18, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote
from that place : —
"I believe I know the sentimeni« of the political leaders
and of the moneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite
of all statements to the contrary, I know that they are fighting
for annexation to the United States first, and for independence
secondly, if the United States decides to decline the sovereignty
of the Islands. In fact, I have had the most prominent leaders
>P. I. R..5. 7.
* Id & letter written on th&t date to Agoncillo he s&ys : —
" Not withstan ding, I enclose 70U the credentials as requested;
tberebj' you will see that in addition to your reprosentine: ua at Wash-
ington, 70U may assist the commiasion they have formed for the pur-
pose of determining the future condition of the Philippines.
" But you muet act in suoh manner that they may not be able to say
that we have accepted the said commission, because it is my wish to
protect [protest 7 D. C. W.| at all times aeainst their being charged with
determining our destiny. You must bear in mind that the poUoy of the
government is to obtain absolute Independenoe, and if penjhanee we
should know by the course of events that suoh cannot be the ease, we
will then think of protection or annexation." — P. I. R., Books C-1.
■ On August 30, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote Agonoillo : —
" It is said that Qeneral Merritt is going away to take part in the
work of the Commission. On this aecount it is important that you
proceed ae quickly as possible to America, in order to know what takes
place. If perchtUDce we should ro back to Spanish control, aak them
to help us as the French helped them during their own revolution and
ask also the terms." — P. I. R., Books C-1.
:dbvGoogIe
nratmoENT "coOpeeation" 75
call on me and say they would not raise one finger unless I could
assure them that the United States intended to give them United
States citiaenship if they wished it." '
We have already noted the action of Basa and the
Cortez family who insisted that the Islands must remain
American,* and that of Agoncillo, who cabled President
McKinley in Aguinaldo's name and his own, congratulat-
ing him on the outcome of the war, commending the oc-
cupation of Manila, and assuring the people of the United
States of the alliance and unquestioning support of
the Filipinos,* but it is to be feared that the sending of
this cablegram was only one more move in the Insurgent
game of deceit.
There were annexationists in Manila as well as in
Hongkong.* Indeed we know that some of the strongest
and best of the Filipinos there were in favour of it.
Felipe Buraicamino, writing in 1901, said : —
"In June of 1898, DonCayetano Arellano' addressed to Don
Felipe Buencamlno and Don Ambroeio Rianzares Bautista a
letter written from the town of Fagsanjin, province of Laguns,
in reply to one addressed to him by those two gentlemen. In
this letter Don Cayetano outUned the idea of union with the
United States and said : 'Avoid all doing and undoing, and when
America has established a stable order of affairs, then it will be
time enough to make laws.' Mabini, whose inSuence at that
time was in the ascendant in Aguinaldo's government, paid no
heed to this wise advice. In October of 1898, while the Philip-
pine government was established in Malolos, and before congress
' Taylor, 18 AJ. 'See p. 61. » Ibid.
• Borne time during Augaat, 1898, Sandieo wrote « letter to Agni-
naldo of which the poatseript reads as follows : —
"P.S. — If you think of appointing me as Delegate to Manila,
please send me my credentials. There are also annexationists here
U.B., In Manila. — D. C. WJ." — P. I. R.. 416. 3.
' Now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands.
He is a man of excellent character, h^h attainments and great ability.
He held important legal positions under the Bpaniah government.
In October, 1898, he vas appointed Secretary of Foreign Relations of
the "Hiilippine Republic." but never served as such of&cer. He was
givan the degree of Doctor of I«w by Tale University in 1904.
:dbvGoogIe
76 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
had promulgated a Philippine constitution, Messrs. Arellano
and Pardo^ still more earnestly advocated union with America,
the first as secretary of foreign affairs and the latter as chief
diplomat. Their plan consisted in asking the Umted States to
acknowledge the independence of the country under a protector-
ate through the mediation of General Otis, and this plan was
accepted at a cabinet meeting by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. But
on the following day Sandico came and told Aguinaldo that he
had had a conference with the Japanese consul and had been
told by Iiim : ' that if Aguinaldo would support absolute inde-
pendence the Japanese Government would help.' Aguinaldo
believed Sandico's story (which turned out to be a&olutely
false) and did not carry out the resolution adopted by the cabi-
net. Messrs. Arellano and Pardo, after this affront, separated
themselves from the Maloloa government. Aguinaldo told me
afterwards that he had received a letter from Agoncillo, dated
Washington, assuring him that a majority of the American
people were inclined to acknowlet^ the independence of the
Philippines and of Cuba." *
But annexationists were not confined, in the Philippines,
to the vicinity of Manila.
As late aa September 6 Consul Williams reported
that a delegation from four thousand Visayan soldiers,
a delegation which also represented southern business
interests, had come to him and pledged loyalty to an-
nexation.'
Clearly, th^i, the ^tuation early in September was as
foUowB : All were agreed that the assistance of the United
States was necessary in getting rid of Spanish sovereignty.
Under the plan of Aguinaldo and his followers friendly
relations were to be nuuntfuned with the United States,
if possible, until Spain was ousted from her Philippine
territory, and then they were to "show their teeth,"
and see "who was deceiving whom," resorting to "force
of arms" if necessary. Protection or annexation would
be accepted only when it could be clearly seen that the
' Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tayeni, one of the moat brilliant living
Filipinos. He had spent many yesjs in F^a, was a talented physiciaD,
&iid under Amerioan rule a^ved for more tban seven years as a member
of the Philippine Commiasion. ■ Taylor, 55 AJ. ' Taylor, 26 AJ.
:dbvGoogIe
INSURaENT "COOPERATION" 77
recogmtion of independence, won either by force of anna
or by diplomacy, was impossible.
Other influential and patriotic Filipinos favored
annexation to the United States or a United States pro-
tectorate, but their views were in the end ignored by
Aguinaldo and his following, and as the latter had the
guns their ideas prevailed.
The Treaty of Paris, which terminated Spanish sover-
eignty in the Philippines, was signed on December 10,
1898. It is importaiit to bear this date in mind later,
when considering the Insurgent records relative to the
preparations which were so carefully made for attacking
the American troops.
And now let us consider the actual facts as to the co-
operation alleged to have been asked by Americans and
given by Klipinos. The following points are not in dis-
pute:—
Pratt asked Aguinaldo to coSperate with Dewey.
Aguinaldo was taken to Manila with the understanding
that he would do so.
Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by destroying the main
Spanish fleet ; by brining him and his associates back
to the Philippines ; by furnishing them anas and ammuni-
tion; by blockading Manila and by keeping at a safe
distance the Spanish mosquito fleet, which would have
made dangerous, or impossible, the landing of the anna
subsequently imported by the Insurgents.
Aguinaldo successfully attacked ^e Spani^ garriiona
in the provinces and used the arms and ammunition cap-
tured, or brought in by deserters, to equip a force which
surrounded and attacked Manila, drove large nimibera of
people into the walled city, thus rendering the position
of the Spanish garrison very difficult in the face of a
possible bombardment, and prevented this garrison from
betaking itself to the provinces, as it mi^t otherwise
have done, leaving Manila to shift for itself.
Aguinaldo was powerless to take the place by assault.
L,:,,l,;.d:,G00gIe
78 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
It lay at the mercy of Dewey's guns, and it would have
been possible for the Admiral to take it at any time, but
he could not at first have garrisoned it with United States
forces, and never thought of attempting to use Insurgent
forces for this purpose.
Did Dewey really want or need Aguinaldo's help?
Let us consider his testimony on the subject : —
"Senator Cartnack, You did want a man there who could
oi^anize and rouse the people ?
"Admiral Dewey. I didn't want anybody, I would like
to say DOW that Aguinaldo and his people were forced on me by
Consul Pratt and Consul W^ldman ; I didn't do anything —
"Senator Carmack. Did they have any power to force him
upon you?
"Admiral Detcey. Yes; they had in a way. They had
not the official power, but one will yield after a while to con-
stant pressure. I did not expect anything of them ; I did not
think they would do anything. I would not have taken them ;
I did not want them ; I did not beheve in them ; because, when
I left Hongkong, I was led to suppose that the country was in
a state of insurrection, and that at my first gun, as Mr. Wilhams
put it, there would be a general uprising, and I thoi^ht these
half dozen or dozen refi^ees at Hongkong would play a very
small part in it."'
The picture of the poor admiral, busy getting his fleet
ready for battle, pestered by officious consuls on the one
hand and by irresponsible Filipinos on the other, is pa-
thetic ; but it had its humorous features, which were not
lost on the Admiral himself. I quote the following : —
"Senator Patterson. Was there any communication between
you and Pratt in which the matter of a written pledge or agree-
ment with Aguinaldo was discussed with r^erence to the
Phihppine Islands?
"Admiral Dewey. No.
"Senator Patterson. What became of the correspondence.
Admiral, if you Icnow?
" Admiral Dewey. It is all in the Navy Department. When
I turned over my command my official correspondence was s^
sent to the Navy Department.
ib,GoogIe
raauEOBNT "COOPERATION" 79
"Senator Pattenon. You reWned all of your lett«B from
any United States officials ?
"Admiral Dewey. No ; they went to the Department.
"Senator Patterson. I mean you did not destroy them.
"Admiral Dewey. No: I did not destroy than.
"Senator Patterson. And you turned than over to the
Navy Department ?
"Admiral Dewey. Yes; our r^ulations require that. I
may say that for my own information I kept copies of certain
tel^rams and cabl^rams. I don't think I kept copies of Mr.
Pratt's letters, as I did not consider them of much value. He
seemed to be a sort of busybody there and interfering in other
people's businesB and I don't think his letters impressed me.
" Senator Patterson. He was the consul-general ?
"Admiral Dewey. Yes ; but he had nothing to do with the
attack on Manila, you know.
"Senator Patterson. I understand that.
"Admiral Dewey. 1 received lots of advice, you underBtand,
from many irresponsible people.
"Senator PaUeraon. But Pratt was the consul-general of
the Government there 7 ^
" Admiral Dewey. Yes; he was consul-general.
"Senator Patterson. And he communicated with you,
Saving you such information as he thought you might be inter-
ested in, and among other information he gave you was this
concerning Aguinaldo?
"Admiral Dewey. I don't remember; no, I really don't
remember his telling me anything about Aguinaldo more than
that cabl^ram there, and I said he might come. And you
see how much importance I attached to him ; I did not wait
for him.
"Senator Patterson. What you said was: 'Tell Aguinaldo
to come as soon as possible.'
"Admiral Dewey. Yes; but I did not wut a moment for
"Senator Patterson. Yes ; but there was a reason for that.
"Admirai Dewey. I think more to get rid of him than any-
thing else.
" Senator Carmack. Bid of whom ?
"Admiral Dewey. Of Aguinaldo and the Filipinos. They
were bothering me. I was very busy getting my squadron
ready for batUe, and these little men were coming on board
my ship at Hongkoi^ and taking a good deal of my time, and
I did not attach the slightest importauce to anything they
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80 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
could do, and they did nothing ; that ia, none of them went
with me when I went to Mirs Bay. There had been a good deal
of talk, but when the time came they did not go. One of them
didn't go because he didn't have any toothbrush.
"Senator Bvsrowa. Did he give that as a reason ?
"Admtrai Dewey. Yea ; he Baid, 'I have no toothbrush,'" '■
However, Dewey ultimately yielded to the pressure
exercised on him by Pratt and Wildman, and allowed
Aguinaldo and some of bis associates to be brought to
Manila. Having them there he proposed to get assistance
from them, not as allies, but as a friendly force attacking
a common enemy, in its own way.
Let us continue with his testimony as to cooperation
between Aguinaldo and the naval forces of the United
States:—
"Senaior Paiterson. Then, Admiral, until you knew that
they were going to send land forces to your assistance . you
thought there was a necessity to organize the Fihpinoa into
land forces, did you 7
" Admiral Dewey. No; not a necessity.
"Senaior Patterson. You thought it might prove of value
to you?
"Admiral Dewey. I testified here, I think, in a way that an-
swers that. I said to Aguinaldo, 'There is our enemy; now,
you go your way and I will go mine ; we had better act inde-
pendently.' That was the wisest thing I ever said.
"Senator Patterson. But you stated that you were using
these people and they were permitted to organize, that you
might use them.
"Admiral Dewey. They were assisting us.
"Senator Patterson. Very well, they were to assist you.
Did you not either permit them or encourage them — I do not
care which term you use — to organize into an army, such
as it was, that they might render you such assistance as you
needed?
"Admiral Dewey. They were assisting us, but incidentally
they were fighting their enemy ; they were fighting an enemy
which had been thdr enemy for three himdred years.
' Soiate DooumentB, Vol. 2fi, pp. 2931-2932.
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INBTJBQENT "COOPEBATION" 81
"Senator PaUerson. I understand that, Admiral.
"Admirai Dewey. While asButing ua th^ were fighting
thdr own battles, too.
" The Chairman. You were encoura^ng inauixectJon against
a common enemy with which you were at war ?
"Admiral Dewey. I think bo. I had in my mind an illustra-
tion furnished by the civil war. I was in the South in the civil
war, and the only friends we had in the South were the aegroeB,
and we made use of them ; they assisted us on many occasions.
I had that in mind ; I said these people were our friends, and
'we have come here and they will help ua just eractly aa the
negroes helped ua in the civil war.'
"Senator Paiieraon. The negroes were expecting thmt
freedom —
"Admiral Detoey. The Filipinos were slaves, too.
"Senator Patterson. What were the Rlipinos expecting?
"Admiral Dewey. They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards ;
I do not think they looked much beyond that. I cannot recall
but I have in mind that the one thing they had in their minds
was to get rid of the Spaniards and then to accept us, and that
would httve occurred — I have thought that many times — if
we had had troops to occupy Manila on the let day of May
before the insurrection got started ; these people would have
accepted ua as their friends, and they would have been our loyal
frimda — I don't know for how long, but they would have hem
our friends then.
"Senator Patterson. You learned from Pratt, or Wildman,
or Williams, very early, did you not, that the f^lipinoB wanted
thedr own country and to rule their own couutty ; that that is
what they were expecting ?
"Admiral Dewey. I heard from Williams that there was an
insurrection there agunst the Spaniards. The Spaniards were
very cruel to them, and I think they did not look much beyond
getting rid of them. There was one, Dr. Rizal, who had the
idea of independence, but I don't think that Aguinaldo had
much idea of it.
"Senator Carmack. Then what useful purpose did the
I^^nno army serve ; why did you want the flhpino army at
ail?
"Admiral Dewey. I did not want them.
"Senator Carmack. Did you not want the Illipino forces?
"Admiral Dewey. No, not really. It was their own idea
coming over there. We could have taken the city at any
moment we had the troops to occupy it."
vol- 1— a
D,q,i,i.:dbvL-.oogIe
82 THE PHILEPFINXa PAST AND PRESENT
Admiral Dewey has made the following statements
relative to the importance of Aguinaido's military operar-
tions: —
" Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did wonder-
fully well. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle,
and finally put one of those old smoothbore guns on a barge,
and he wanted to take this up — wanted me to tow it up so he
could attack the city with it. I said, 'Ob, no, no; we can do
nothing until our troops come.' I knew he could not take the
city without the assistance of the navy, without my assistance,
and I knew that what he was doing — driving the Spaniards in
— was savii^ our own troops, because our own men perhaps
would have had to do that same thing. He and I were always
on the most friendly terms ; we bad never had any differ^icea.
He considered me as his liberator, as his friend. I think he had
the highest admiration for us because we bad whipped the
Spaniards who had been riding them down for three hundred
years.
"Senator PaUerson (continuing). You aesit this short dis-
patch to the Secretary of the Navy : —
" ' Aguioaldo, the revolutionary leader, visited the Olympia
yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31.
Doubt his ability to succeed. Situation rontuns unchanged.'
" Do you recall that visit ?
"Admiral Dewey. Yea.
"SetuUor Patterson. He came to tell jrou, did he, that he
was going to make a general attack, and you —
"Admiral Dewey, Yes.
"Senator PaUeraon. And you doubted his ability to suc-
ceed?
"Admiral Dewey. And he wanted me to assist him. He
wanted me to tow one of his guns up into position. I knew be
could not take the city ; of course he could not.
"Senator Patterson. Did you lu^e that he should not make
the attack?
"Admiral Deaey. I do not remember that; very likely I
did.
"Senator Patterson. And was he not persuaded or restrained
by you from doing so ?
"Admired Dewey. I do not remember; but it is very
likely. I did not want to see a lot of them killed unnecessarily,
because I knew they could not take that walled city. Tbey had
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INSUEGBNT "COOPERATION" 83
no artiUery, and they could not take it, I knew very well, and I
wanted the situation to remun as it waa until our troops came
to occupy it,
"Senator Paitenon. But you found that whenever you ex-
pressed a strong objection to anything being done at that time
that Aguinaldo yielded to your request ?
" Admiral Dewey. Up to the time the army came he did
everything I requeeted. I had not much to do with him aft^
the army came." '
But Dewey's in0uence over Aguinaldo was not suffi-
cient to prevent his looting, as the following extracts from
hia testimony show : —
"Senator Patteraon. Is that what you mean when you say
he looted — that he made reprisi^ for his army, took provisions
and whatever was necessary 7 That is what you meant ?
" Admiral Dewey. That is one part of it.
" Senator Carmack. This was taking provisions for the uae
of the army ?
" Admiral Dewey. That is one thing he did.
" Senator Carmaek. You said you did not object to that
at the time ?
" Admiral Dewey. No. It would have been useless; he got
beyond me very soon — he got out of my hands very soon.*
"Senator Carmack. You said yesterday you suspected that
Aguinaldo took the lion's share of the provisions that were
gathered for the anny. What was the ground upon which you
made that accusation 7
"Admiral Dewey. Because he waa living in Maloloe like a
prince, like a king, in a way that could only have come about
by his taking the lion's share. Then, in regard to hia looting,
I repeat what I said yesterday. He began within forty-eight
hours after he landed in Cavite to capture and take everythii^
he wanted. I know these things of my own knowledge, because
I saw the loot brought in ; and I know that every dollar that
was taken from the workingmen at the navy-yard was taken at
the threat of death,*
• •••••*
"Senator Patterson. Do you believe in this proclamation he
was uttering falsehoods to the Filipino people ?
I Senate Documenta, Vol. 25, p. 2956.
* tfrid., p. 2961
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84 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
"Admiral Dewey. Yee; I do abeolutel^. I think he was
there for gain — for money — that independence had never up
to that time entered his head. He was there for loot and money.
Tliat is what I believe, since you aak me my belief ; I believe
that implicitly.^
• •••««*
"Senaior Pcdteraon. And you found nothing to cause any
doubt as to his loyalty up to the time until after Manila sui^
rendered?
"Admiral Deirey. His loyalty to whom?
"Senaior Paiteraon. To you and to the cause for which he
was fighting 7
"Admiral Detoey. I began to suspect he was not loyal to us
about the time our troops arrived, when he demurr«d at moving
out of Cavite to make room for our troops.
"Senator Paiteraon. Do you mean by that that you feared
that he was commencing to think more of independence than
the success of the American cause ?
"Adrniral Dewey. Yes." *
We have seen to what extent Aguinaldo cooperated
with the marine forces of the United States. Now let us
examine the claim that he cooperated with the land
forces after their arrival.
One of the things which the Insurgents are said to have
accomplished was the maintenance of an effective land
blockade which prevented the entrance of provisions,
and produced a very serious food shortage. Both Otis
and Dewey have stated that they did this, but we learn
from the Insurgent records how erroneous was this conclu-
sion.*
> Senate Dooumenta, Vol. 25, p. 2955.
) Ibid., p. 2952.
' The following pasBOge is an extract from an und^ed order dated
July 22, 1898: —
"For the preservation of peace and Koed order in the oommunity
and to put an end to the acts of those who within and without the city
of Manila and in the neiKhboriug provinoes not under the oontrol (^
the Spanish Gkivemment, are evading the orders issued by these
Headquarters, and in view of the large number of those who are storing
and monopolising food and other most necessary articles, under the
pretenoe of desiring to sell them to the Americans, but whose real
intention is to ship them secretly to Manila where they receive higher
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IN8UK0ENT "COOPERATION" 85
The laading of the American troops for the attack on
Manila was not actively opposed by the Filipinos, but
it was narrowly and distrustfully watched.
Necessary transportation requested by General Ander-
son was ultimately furnished by Aguinaldo, but only grudg-
ingly after a three weeks' delay, and as a result of threats
that it would be seized if not voluntarily supplied.
The necessary positions in the trenches around Manila
from which to make the attack on that city were, in part
at least, yielded to the Americans by the Filipinos
upon the request of the former.
The Insui^ents twice informed the Spaniards in ad-
vance of projected American attacks.
They carried out their own attack on the city without
regard to the plans, or the requests, of the Americans.
They secretly treated with the Spaniards in the endeavour
to secure the surrender of the city to themselves.
pricM for their merohandise, without regard for the injury tbiey tm
doing the oauae of our independence, I have wen fit to decree the fol-
towing: . . ." P. I. R., 45. S and 125. 3.
Relative to this matter, Taylor says : —
"The defection of Bueneamino and Pilar had opened the road to
Afoinaldo, but at first the blookade was not eSeative. There w&K
loo many nativee there vith friends and relations in Aguinaldo's oamp
to make him deaire to aubjeet the city to the hardHhips of an effective
fflege. And, furthermore, he did not have the foroe, nor did his men
have the necessary discipline, to prevent the ingress of supplies. It
was not until the first part of July that the price of provisions iacreoeed.
It was at no time found neceasary by the authorities to take over all
the stares of provisions in the city. Indeed, there seems to have been
a fairly steady traffic in supplies between Manila and the country to
the north. It was a trafSc in which it haa been charged that certain
Spanish officers of rank made large sums. Aguinaldo permitted it,
and on July 26, 1898, signed a& order directing that food should be
sent into Manila from the north to prevent starvation in the city, and
ordered the heads of the towns in the vicinity not to interfere with
this traffic (P. I. R., 1087-4). The entianoe of food supplies was
confined to the northern line, for then it would not be known to the
Americans who, after July 30, oooupied the entrenchments in front
of San Antonio Abad. It was not expedient for them to see too much
of Aguinaldo's methods." *
•Taylor, 14 AJ.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
86 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PBBSENT
After the capitulation to the Americans had been
agreed upon, and on the very morning of the day of the
surrender, they endeavoured to pueh home an attack.
Disregarding the request that they keep out of the final
assault, they crowded into the city with, and after, the
American troops. They fired on Spanish soldiers on the
city wall while a fla^ of truce was flying, provoking a
return fire which killed and wounded American soldiers.
They demanded for themselves Malacailan palace and
other buildings and a share in "the war booty." They
promptly looted the parts of the city which they occupied,
and ultimately retired from their positions within the
city limits on the evening of their last day of grace ^ter
being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so
they would be driven out.
I will now quote from the records in support of these
statements.
The following is the programme of "cooperation" out-
lined to Aguinaldo by Bray in a letter dated June 30,
1898 : —
"I am very amdouB to receive the news of the capitulation
of Manila and I hope that General Augustfn will be obliged to
turn over his sword to you in person and not to the Americana.
You are by right entitled to it and I should like to see it so from
a political standpoint, as I am of the opinion that you should
declare the independence of the Philippines before the arrival
of General Merritt, appointed by the President to be Governor
with full powers to establish a provisional government.
• «*«*••
Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the
interior towns with their troops or any other act which might
be construed as a conquest, should meet with resistance.
***•«•■«
"After having written these lines, I had another conference
with Mr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent for me retard-
ing the question of independence. He has had a consultation
with the Supreme Judge of this place, and he is of opinion that
you should proclaim independence at once, notwithstanding
what Admiral Dewey and Consul WiUiams say agamst it, and
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INBDHQENT "COOPERATION" 87
this ahould be done before General Merritt can arrive. A Gov-
ernment having been thus constituted in due form, the Ameri-
cans would have no right to invade the Philippines without com-
mitting a violation of international law. They are no longer
fighting against the Spaniards against whom they declared war.
The advice of Coneul Williams to delay this, b a diplomatic
pla^ to eain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because
he is well aware of the false position said General would find
h^nself in. The key to the situation is now in your hands;
do not permit any one to take it away from you. The Americans
have done nothmg but bombard and deetroy the Spanish fleet
on the bigh seas ; they have not conquered any land, but in the
meantime the control of the Philippines has passed by conquest
from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans have no
r^t to eater further. Under certain conditions and guarantees,
permit the landing of American troops ; but be very careful,
they must not be permitted to land until they execute an agree-
ment with the duly constituted government of the Philippines,
reepectii^ all its institutions, and they must under no pretext
whatever be permitted to garrison any place except the munic-
ipal limits of Manila, Cebd, and Iloflo, and even therein care
should be observed. . . . You must not permit a single soldier
to land without havii^ these guarantees." '
When General Anderson, with the first United States
troops of occupation, arrlTed at Manila Bay, Aguinaldo
did not call on him, as an " ally " might have been ex-
pected to do. Later, however. Admiral Dewey and
General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but without
any of the ceremony of an official military call, the
Admiral saying to General Anderson : —
"Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just
put on your blouse. Do not go with any ceremony." *
And they went in that way.
On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo defi-
nitely requesting his cooperation in the following words : —
"For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable r^
lations with you, and to have you and your force codperate with
us in the militaiy operations against the Spanish forces." '
> P. I. R.. 3B8. 2.
:dbvGoogIe
88 THE PHILIPPINES FAST AND PBE8ENT
On July 5 Aj^uioaldo replied, thankmg General
Anderson for the
"amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands
inspire in the Great North American nation," '
and also for his desire to have friendly relations with
the Filipinos and treat them with justice, courtesy and
kindness. There is, however, not a word relative to
cooperation in his reply, and Anderson apparently never
renewed his request for cooperation in military operations.
On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying : —
"I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by
Your Excellency m your welcome letter received on the 6th
instant, to eiide&vour to come to a definite imderstimding, which
I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect
large additional land forces, and it must be apparent to you as
a military officer that we wiU require much more room to camp
our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. For this I
would like to have Your Excellency's advice and cooperation,
as you ar« best acquainted with the resources of the country," '
To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter
dated July 9, 1898, to the Adjutant-General of the United
States Army, General Anderson says of Aguinaldo : —
"When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not
at all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding
with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to
cooperate. But he has declared himself Dictator and Presi-
dent, and is trying to take Manila without our assistance.
This is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will,
I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to estabtisb
a provisional government." *
Evidently, however, codperation, even in the matter
of getting necessary transportation, did not materialize,
for on July 17 S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote
Aguinaldo as follows : —
"We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transporter
tion, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For aU this
' P. I. R., 102-10.
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:dbvGoogIe
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INBUEQENT "COOPEHATION" 89
we are willing to pay a ftur price, but no more. We find bo
far that the native population are not willing to give us this
assdstance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and
if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties
to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do
this, as we are here to befriend the Fihpinos. Our nation has
spent miUions in money to send forces here to expel the Span*
iards and to give good government to the whole people, and tbe
return we are aelang is comparatively slight.
"General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that
we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with
labor and material at the current market pricee. We are pre-
pared to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot
undertake to bai^ain for horsee with each individual owner."
Aguinaldo sent this letter by a sta£F ofBcer to Generfd
Anderson inquiring whether it was sent by authority of
the latter, who then indorsed on it in a statement that
it was. Nevertheless, Major Jones reported on July
20 that it was impossible to secure transportation ex-
cept upon Aguinaldo's order and that the natives had
removed their cart wheels and hidden them, from which
it is to be inferred that' the transportation requested
had not been furnished.
Obviously General Anderson was informed that Agui-
naldo had given orders a^inst furnishing the transporta-
tion desired, for on July 21 he wrote the Adjutant-
General of the Army as follows : —
"Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation aa
elaborate system of miUtary government, under his assumed
authority as Dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being
given us, except by bia order. As to this last, I have written
to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts,
fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and
that he must aid in having them filled."
On July 23 General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as
follows: —
"Gbnebai. : When I came here three weeks ago I requested
Your Excellency to give what assistance you could to procure
:dbvGoogIe
92 THE PHIUPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
troops in places conquered by the Filipinos from the
Spaniards without first communicating in writing the
plac^ to be occupied and the object of the occupation.'
Aguinaldo's assumption of civil authority on July 15,
1899, did not pass unnoticed. On July 21 General
Anderson wrote the Adjutant-General of the army con-
cerning it : —
"His assumptioa of civil authority I have ignored, and let
him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it,
while I did not recognize him as a military leader. It may seem
strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclama-
tion as Dictator, his declaration of martial law, and pubUcation
and execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote
such a protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey's
request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of
Mftjor-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every
other way that we do not recognize the Dictatorship. These
people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all
deference, that we have heretofore underrated the natives.
They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization
of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are
fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are industnous.
A small detail of natives will do more work la a given time than
a regiment of volunteers."
' "Debtor to the generosit? of the North Amerioans, and to the
favors we have received throi^h Admiral Dewey and (beins) more de-
drouB than any other person of preventing any oonfliot which would
have as a residt foreign intervention, which mtist be extremely pre-
judicial, not alone to my nation, but also to that of Your Exoellenoy,
1 consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembark-
ing North Amerioan troops in the places conquered by the PUipinos
from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because
as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philip-
pine people might oonsider the occupation of its territories by NorUi
American troops as a violation of its rights.
"I comprehend thatwithout the destruction of the Spanish squadron
the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidily. Be-
cause of this T take the liberty of indicating to Your Excellency the
necessity that before disembarking, you should communicate in writ-
ing to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the
object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due tiam
and (thus) prevent the commission of any transgression against IrioD^
ship." — P. I. R., Books C-1. .
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INBXJROENT "COOPERATION". 93
Because he was invited as general rather than as
president, Aguinaldo refused to attend a parade and
review on the 4th of July. This fact is, in itself, an answer
to his claim that the AJnericans were tacitly recognizing
his pretensions.
After referring to this incident, Blount says : —
"On subeequeDt anniversaries of the day in the Philippines
it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our dedara-
tion before gatherings of the Illipino people. It saved dis-
Tbis statement is incorrect. I myself was present the
following year when the declaration was r^id on the
Luneta to a considerable gathering of Filipinos among
whom were many school children, and it has often been
read since.
The landing of American troops at Parahaque and their
going into camp near that town on July 15 caused much
excitement, and a lively interchange of telegrams between
Insurgent officers followed.*
They were suspicious of the intentions of the Americans,*
and trouble soon began.
On July 16 Greneral Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as
follows ; —
1 BloDst, p. 59.
* On July 15 Oener&l Koii«l telegraphed Affuiiuldo u follows : —
"Ui^nt. Reoeived a telegram from the oaptain adjutant, who is
in Pai-afiaque, of the following tenor: 'I inform your eircellenoy that
two casooe of armed Amraicans have arrived at this point. I await
orders from Your B^ccellency.* Which I hasten to oommunioate to
Your Excellency for the proper aotioa." — P. I. R,, 849.
Later on the same day Arevalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows : —
"Lieutenant-Colouel Dubooe with three hundred men waiting for
more troope from Cavite, and alaoorders, butnottoattaok." — P.I. R.,
849.
'Captain Torres tel^rapfaed Aguinaldo on July 15 as follows: —
"I have read all your telegrams and carried out the same, and I
tneidentally questioned them about their purposes, [they] replying
tiiat they will aid ; let time demonstrate it. They bJbo intend to en-
oamp over here at Paraliaque. I will report to you any oocuj
— P. I. R.,
:dbvGoogIe
M THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
"An American has come here who aays that he u a Colonel
of the Anny whom we should obey ; and that it Lb your denie.
We did not listen to him, awaiting yom- order."
On the back of the tdegram is written the following : —
"Reply. — You should not obey. What this American
Colonel says is a lie. Be cautious so as not to be deceived.
You should require from him proof. Be always vigilant, but
upright, also all of the officers and soldiers must be strict and
not timid." '
Obviously there was no real cooperation between Ameri-
can and Filipino troops at this time. General Anderson
ignored General Aguinaldo's request for information as
to places where American troops were to land in Filipino
territory and the objects of disembarking them.
The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack
upon Manila, and it became desirable to occupy some
of the Insurgent trenches. On July 29 Ar^valo tele-
graphed A^naldo as follows : —
"In conference with General Greene I aeked for an official
letter, a copy of which I send you : 'Headquarters 2nd Brigade,
U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July
29th, 1898. El SeSor Nokiel, Gbnseai. de Bbioadg. Sir :
In pursuance of our conversation of yesterday and the message
which Captain Ar^valo brought to me during the night, I beg
to inform you that my troops will occupy the intrenchments
between the Camino Heal and the beach, leaving camp for that
purpose at 8.00 o'clock this mommg. I will be obliged if you
will give the necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men.
Thanking you for your courtesy, I remain, very re^ectfully,
your obedient servant, F. V. Greene, Briqaj)ikb GenesaXi,
comnumding.' " *
This clear direct declaration of intention by General
Greene is the actual transaction referred to by Blount as
"Jockeying the Insurgents out of their trenches." He
bases his statements concerning the matter on a news-
paper report.
:dbvGoogIe
IN8UEQENT "COOPEEATION" 06
The attitude of the anny officers in the matter of
obtaining pennission to occupy the trenches needed in
preparing for the assault on the city could not hare been
more coirect.
On August 10 General Merritt gave the following
emphatic instmctionB relative to the matter : —
"No rupture with Insurgents. Tbis is imperative. Can
ask Influrgent generals or Aguinaldo for permiBsitm to occupy
their trenches, but if refused not to use force."
On the same day GenerM Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo,
asking pennission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse
No. 14, in order to place artillery to destroy it. The
permission was granted on the following day.
During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to
have avoided conferences with American officers. On
the second of the month Mablni wrote him how he had
put off Admiral Dewey's aid with a false statement that
he did not know Aguinaldo's whereabouts.'
The landing of American troops at Parafiaque for the
assault on Manila led to the concentration of Insurgent
troops at the neighbouring town of Bacoor.'
On August S Fernando Acevedo ' wrote to General PIo
^"Admiral Dewey'i Aide was here to-dA^. I told him I was
igoonnt of jour whereabouts and, if he had no objection, he might
talk with me as I am your representative ; but he said that he could
not do so, as he had orders to apeak with you peteonally, about some-
thing very important. He then departed." — P. I. R., 1179. 5.
* The following telegram was Euldreased to the President or the
Seeretary of War by Sulpicio at Baooor, on August 8, 1898 : —
" Last night I received a telegram from General Noriel, asking for
100 oavanes of riae which he needs immediately, sinoe he has ordered
to aend him all the troope here on account of the landing of Americans
in Parafiaque. Oeneral Maeoardo will send him the troops whiah
are here. There are 56 bundles [of rioe. — Tb.) deposited in this
storehouse."— P. I. R., 1179. 5.
* This man's reoord is not laiown to me. Apparently he was an
oKeee is the Spanish army, for he is later reported aa surrendenng
to the Insurgents at Santa Ana oa August 13, 1898. See footnote
4. p. 104.
:dbvGoogIe
96 THE PHILIPPINEa PAST AND PRESENT
del Pilar that the Americans were going to attack the next
day and that, —
"It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place
to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night amiihiiate them,
sparing none, for the way they have deceived us, and will again
without faU, in the contract signed by Sr. Emilio ; and con-
vince yoiuTself, my friend, that it is necessary to do this ; and
when it is done the whole world will wonder and say that we
have done well, and will not be able to give out that the people
here are fools spending the time sucking their fingers." ^
Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of
the proposed American attack on the 13th instant, aa is
shown by the followii^ letter: —
"(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary.
Office of the Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.)
" SbSor Don AKTBano Ricabtk : *
" Mt Deab Sib : I have received to-day your kind letter
givii^ warning of the attack on ManUa, and I thank you for
your personal interest in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate.
I fissure you that I am yours, most truly and sincerely,
"Luis MAammz Alcobbndas.
"SiNGALON, August 10, 1898." *
According to Taylor, this was not the first occturence
of this sort. He says : —
"The officers of the United States Anny who believed that
the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American
movements were right. Sastrfin has printed a letter from Pfo
del Pilar, dated July 30, to t^e Spanish officer commanding
at Santa Ana, in which Filar swd that Aguinaldo had told him
that the Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2
and advised that the Spaniards should not give way, but hold
their positions. Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards
should fall back on the walled city and surrender Santa Ana to
himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo's
information was correct, and on August 2 eight American sol-
diers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire." •
' Taylor, 33 AJ. > Artomio Rjoarte waa one ot the rankiDK In-
Bui^ent generaJs directing operations againHt Manila.
* P. I. R., 1087. 6. * Taylor, 30 AJ.
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INSDEOENT "COOpBBATION" 07
Taylor continues : —
"And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans.
It is not probable that these were the oidy two such letters
written. Aguinaldo had by this time found out that Although
be could defeat the ecattered Spanish detachments, he could
not defeat the Spanish force holding the lines of Manila, He
did not want the Americans in the Philippines. They were in
his way, and he had already made up his mind that if they did
not give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force.
He Baw very early that it was extremely improbable that he
should obtain from them what he wanted; accordingly all
losses both among Spaniards and Americana would, from
Aguinaldo's point of view, mure to his benefit. The beet
posutde thing for him would be to hold his own force intact
while they wore each other out. The Spanish losses, small as
they were, occurred in front of the American lines, not in front
of the lillipinoB. There is no reason, accordingly, for believing
that the fllipinoe aulfered heavily. To arrange that the Span-
iards should inflict losses upon the Americans, while he saved
his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of Agiunaldo ; but
it was decidedly not the conduct of an ally." '
The feeling toward the American troops at this time is
further shown by a telegram from General Pio del I^lar,
sent from San Pedro Macati on August 10, 1898 : —
" Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about
to surrender because they want to turn over the place; the
Americans want them to leave only the batteries and aay that
they will station themselves in said batteries. It appears that
they want to deceive us ; they do not want to give us arms, and
if they do not give us arms, we shall attack them and drive them
out. I await your reply." *
TUa is perhaps not quite the kind of cooperation that
Admiral Dewey and Grenerals Anderson and Menitt had
fflcpected.
The truth is that the Insurgents were determined to
capture Manila for themselves, not only because of the
"war booty," for which they were hungry, but because
of the status which they felt that the taking of the capital
> Tt^or, 30 AJ. "P.I.B..
TOI-. 1 — H
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98 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
of the Philippines would assure them. The great im-
portance which they attached to this plan is shown in
communications written by AgonciUo, A^uinaldo and
others.^
Of conditions at this time, Taylor says : —
"On July 7, Aguin&Ido appointed Artemio Riearte and
Pantalefin Garcfa to negotiate the surrender of Manila by the
Spaniards to him (Exhibit 155). On July 5 Pantale6n Garcfa
was planning to enter Manila by way of Tondo or of Santa
Cruz (P. I. R., 243. 7). On the 9th Aguinaldo ordered that rice
should be gathered from the towns of Manila Province for the
use of his troops in the decisive attack upon Manila which he
intended making in a few days (P. I. R., 1087. 5).
"Aguinaldo, finding that his chance of obtuning Manila for
himself was growing steadily less, now determined to force
himself into the city with the Americans and demand a con-
sideration for the assistance he bad rendered them during the
siege. It is true he had assisted them, but his assistance had
not been intentional. It was the result of the operations he
was carryine on for bis own ends. The operations of the
Filipinos and the Americans were against Spain as a common
enemy of both ; but the operations were not joint operations,
and ^though their purpose was a common purpose, it was not
a mutual one. On August 8 Aguinaldo appointed General
' On August 2, 1899, Agonoillo wrote Mabini : —
" I send Don Emilio the infomuttion I have been able to obtain
here, in order that in view thereof you [plural] may oonsidsr the best
solution of our present political problem, which u an exceptional owe
in history. In my opinion, the moat critioal moment, which I oaJl
agoDizing, whether oorreetty or not I know not, is the capture of Manila,
where General Merritt will constitute a provisional govemmeut, in
compliance with the instructions troja his Qovemment. It is un-
necessary to recommend that you observe great tact, great prudence,
when this event occurs. Ascertain the real wishes of the people in
this eonfflct and the war resources at our disposal and those which
you may count on during the struggle until its termination."
— P. I. R., 451. 3.
In his document entitled "Means for Attaining Filipino Independ-
ence" Aguinaldo had written : —
"VIII. Exterior attack. Above everything the Revolutiomsts
must oceupy ail Manila including the Walled City with the object
and purpose that the nation possessing the Philippines according to
the decision of the Powers will be forced to come to an understanding
with the Filipinos to avoid the shedding of blood." — P. I. B., 457. 5.
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INBUROENT "C05PERATI0N" 99
Ricarte conimanijer in the operationa about Manila, ordered
hJTn to respect the property oi all foreigners, and told him that
in case hia troope succeeded in entering Manila they were to
carry their fiag and plant it there (P. I. R., 703. 2). Judging
from an unsigned draft of a letter, he must have warned the
for^gn consuls in Manila about the same time to gather under
the protection of their Sags all of their fellow-citizens who had
not taken refuge on the vessels in the bay, so that when his
troops entered the city no foreign lives would be taken, and no
foreign property would be injured. The earnestness with
which he urged that all foreigners not Spaniards should take
steps to identify themselves and their property shows that he
considered the persons and property of Spanish civilians aa
fair booty of war." '
There waa certainly no need of Insurgent assistance in
the assault on Manila.
The reports which reached Aguinaldo that the surrender
of Manila had been ^reed upon in advance were correct,
as is shown by the following testimony of Admiral Dewey :
"SenaioT Paiterson. When did you reach an understandmg
with the Spanish commander upon the subject,* — how long
before the 12th or 13th of August ?
"Admiral Deteq/. Several days before.
"SemOor Patterson. To whom did you communicate the
arrangement that you had 7
"Admiral Dewey. General Merritt and, of course, all of
my own captains — General Merritt, and I think a council of
officers on board of one of the steamers. I think there were
several army officers present when I told the General that;
and I may say here that I do not think General Merritt took
much stock m it.
"Senator Patterson. What statement did you make to
them, Admiral, in substance 7
"Admiral Dewey. That the Spaniards were ready to sur-
render, but before doing so I must engage one of the outlying
forts. I selected one at Malate, away from the city,* They
said I must engage that and fire for a while, and then I was to
make a signal by the international code, 'Do you surrender?'
Then they were to hoist a wliite flag at a certain bastion ; and
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100 THE PHIUPPINES PAST AND PKE8ENT
I may say now that I was the first one to discover the white
flag. We had 50 people looking for that white flag, but I
happened to be the first one who saw it. I fired for a while,
and then made the signal according to the programme. We
could not see the white flag — it was rather a thick day — but
finally I discovered it on the south bastion ; I don't know
how long it bad been flying there when I first saw it." '
On August 12, the day before Manila surrendered,
Buencamino telegraphed Aguinaldo, urging him in the
strongest terms to attack that night so that Americans
might be obUged to ask him to stop, with the result that
the Insurgents would be included in the ofl5cial negotia-
tions. He further advised Aguinaldo that he must not
suspend bis attack because the Americans suspended
theirs.*
General Anderson tells us that, on the evening of August
12, he received an order from General Merritt to notify
Aguinaldo to forbid the Insurgents under his command
from entering Manila. This notification was delivered
to Aguinaldo that night, and was received by him with
anger.*
On the following morning the Insurgents actually made
an independent attack of their own, as planned.* It
> Senate Doouments, Vol. 25, p. 2943.
> "I must tell you that I feel aa you should feel in regard to our
government not havii^ officially partieipated in the oapitnlation of
Manila. Aoeordingly the war must be oontinued with Spain, because,
if we attack to-night, the Amerioans, acting upon the requeat of the
Spaniards and foreigaera in addition to those who toolc part in the
capitulation, will have to ask us to suspend operations ; henoe we shall
be included in the negotiations and this will work to our advantage.
"To-night at 2 a.m. you will attack without fail in order that we
may be included in the capitulation which the Americans made to-day.
You must not stop the attacks because they do, and this is also the
opinion of our partisans among the foreigners."
— P. I. R., 1179. 5*427.5.
* "Our Rule in the Philippines," The North Ameriean Review, 1600,
No. 170.
' General Ricarte to Aguinaldo, Ai^uat 12, 1898, 11.15 p.h. :
"Have received the telegram from your honourable person regard-
ing attack at four o'clock in the morning, ^though we will make the
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INBDEGENT "COOPERATION" 101
promptly led to trouble with the Americans, and at 8 a.u.
Aguinaldo received a telegram from General Anderson
sternly warning him not to let his troops enter Manila
without the consent of the American commander on the
south side of the Pasig River.'
Aguinaldo apparently took no action in response to
this request, except to direct General Riego de Dios, who
was at Cavite, to go with Buencamino without losing a
moment and ask for an explanation, in writing if possible.*
At 10.50 A.M. he telegraphed General Anderson saying
that his troops were being forced, by threats of violence,
to retire from positions which they had taken, and asking
Anderson to order his troops to avoid difficulty with the
Insurgent forces. Aguinaldo said that he had directed
his men to aid the American forces if the latter are attacked
by a common enemy, but was discreetly silent on the sub-
ject of their entering Manila.'
attfwk tuiywa7. 1 have directed Qen. Pfo Del Pil&r begin flring
ctumoii At the hour set. At the present time we are making prepara-
tiaun and will also give orders to the ofaiefa of the eolumns."
— P. I. R., 849.
i"Auput 13, 1898.
"Dated. Camp Dewey 13. To Oeneral Aguinaldo. Conunanding
Phibppiae Forces, Bacoor : Do not let jour troops enter Manila with-
out the permiBsioQ of the American commander on this side of Pasig
river. You will be under our fire.
" Anderson, Brig. Qeneral."
— P.I. B., 102-10.
' "Cop; : Qen. Riego, Cavite : Have just received a note from Oan.
Anderson saying to me he does not permit my troops to ester Manila
without permission from the American commander on this side of the
Pssig River. They will be under his Are. Oo with Sofior Buenoamioo
and ask for an explanation, in writing if possible, as to the motive for
■aid note, without losing a moment. August 13, '98. E. A."
— P. I. B.,849.
' "I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite. In oons^
quence of this 1 have not answered until now. My troops are foreed
by yours, by means of threats of violence, to retire from positions taken.
It is necessary to avoid conflict, which I should lament, that you order
your troops that they avoid difficulty with mine, as until now they
have ooDducted themsdves aa brothers to take Manila. I have given
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102 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Fifteen minutes later, at 11.05, he received a reply to
his telegram to General Riego de Dios, in which that
officer commnnicated the views of Araneta ^ and Buenca-
mino, who had been unable to find General Anderson.
This important communication follows : —
"Most urgent. Araneta and Buencamino having been
consulted in regard to your telegram of to-day, they confirm
capitulation, and in regard to the telegraphic note of General
Anderson they are of the opinion, first that we should con-
tinue hostilities while we ask for an explanation ; second, that
explanation should be in the following terms : Inquire reason
for note and ask why our troops are not to enter Manila with-
out permission of the American commander ; third, in case the
(terms of ?) capitulation is given as the reason, to answer that
we do not suspend our attempt to enter Manila. Its capitula-
tion is not favourable to our independence. General Anderson
is not here. General Merritt is probably in Manila. Only
Admiral Dewey is in the Bay. We ask authorization to ex-
press our explanation in the proposed terms and to have a
conference with Admiral Dewey in order to have our clums
reach General Merritt." *
An indorsement written by Mabini and signed by
Aguinaldo on the above paper reads : —
"I authorize every assertion of right, but state that we
believe that we have the right to enter Manila without per-
mission as we have a part in the surrender of the Spaniaida.
They would not have surrendered if our troops had not cut
off their retreat to the interior. Besides but for us the landing
of troops would have cost them much blood. Obtwn an answer
as soon as possible in order to lay a protest before the consuls
in case it is necessary." »
■ Oregorio Araneta, later a member of the Philippine Commisaioa
and Secretary of Finance and Juatioe. He waa Seoretar; of Juatioe
under the Maloloa government, and waa alao aecretuy of the Insur-
gent Congraas. He wu at this time a bright young lawyer of good
ability and oharaoter.
» P. I. B., 849. ' Ibid.
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DJBUBOENT "COOPERATION" 103
Naturally, trouble followed. At 1.30 P.M. General
Bicarte telegraphed to Aguinaldo : —
"Americans wish to put us out. Give directions." *
Apparently about the same hour he wired more at
lei^h, as follows : -~
"Most urgent. American troops rearguard our trenches.
Mabolo and San Josd warn us that they will fire on us when the
time comes. Impossible to rem^n there without disagreeing
with them. Since 5 o'clock this morning we have been furiously
attacking. Americans firing incessantly, Spanifuds silent.
No losses yet." *
At 3.52 he wired again : —
"General Pfo del Pilar informs me of the following : 'Come
here, if possible, as our soldiers at the barrio of Ckiucepci6n
are not sJlowed to go out and we are prohibited to move on any
farther. We it was who succeeded m capturing that place.
Come here or there will be trouble, since they are driving me
away, and refusing to listen to what I say.' I un at this very
moment going to aforesaid place." *
At 5 P.U. another was sent by Bicarte to Aguinaldo as
follows : —
"Colonel San Miguel arrived here from Ermita. Regional
Exposition, Agricultural College and other buildings are ours.
Our flag flies aheady at Ermita. Colonel Agapito Dons6n
with his troops is in the P^ez building, Paco. Colonels Julian
Ocanipo and Imdoro Tolentino are in the convent of Ermita.
All houses without flag are guarded by our soldiers." *
At 6.15 P.M. he telegraphed as follows : —
"I infonn you that the chiefs of our troops have reported to
me that our flag at Singalong church {visiia) was removed by
the Americans and they hoisted theirs instead, not allowing us
to approach thereto. General Pfo del Pilar is at present at the
barrio of Concepci6n. Americans prohibited him to move on
any farther. How can he enter Manila?"*
» Ibid., 849.
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104 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
No attention was paid to Gen^^ Anderson's request
that the Insui^nt troops should not enter Manila with-
out permission. They crowded forward with and alter
the American forces. Coming out on Bagumbayan drive,
they found American and Spanish troops confronting
each other but not firing, the former on the drive, the
latter on the neighbouring city wall. A flag of truce was
waving from the south bastion, nevertheless the Insur-
gents fired on the Spanish forces, provoking a retiim fire
which killed and wounded American soldiers. Of this
incident General Greene has said : —
"At this point the California r^ment a short time before
had met some infiurgents who had fired at the Spaniards on
the waits, and the latter, in returning the fire, had caused a
loss in the California regiment of 1 killed and 2 wounded." '
Some of these matters must have come to the atten-
tion of General Anderson, for he sent Aguinaldo a tele-
gram, received by the latter at 6.36 p.m., as follows : —
"Dated Ermita Headquarters 2nd Division 13 to Gen. Agui-
naldo. Commanding Filipino Forces. — Manila, taken. Serious
trouble threatened between our forces. Try and prevent it.
Your troops should not force themselves in the city until we
have received the full surrender then we will n^otiate with
you.
" ANnsBSON, commanding." *
It appears that the Insurgent troops took the suburb
of Santa Ana, and captured Spanish and Filipino officers
and men.'
> Report of War Dept., 1898, Vol. I, part 2, p. 60.
' Taylor, Exhibit 739.
• The following two telegrams were sent by Qeneral Pfo del Piter
to Aguinaldo at 9.30 p.u. : —
"I inform you that the Bayambang troops who have presented
themeelvea before me when we entered Santa Ana thia afternoon, are :
4 lieutenants, 171 soldiers with their respective rifles and ammunitions.
Major Fernando Acevedo, Captain Lioerio Qeronimo, 1 Spanish lieu-
tenant, and 1 prisoner by the name of Enrique Flores. All of them
I put under your orders. "—P. I. R., 1179.6.
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INSUEOENT "COOPBRATION" 105
In view of the known facts, how absurd becomes the
following contention of Aguinaldo, advanced in his
L Veridica" : —
"Our own forces could see the American forces land on the
beach of the Luneta and of the Paseo de Santa Lucfa. The Span-
ish soldiers, who were on the walls of the city, drew the atten-
tion of every one because they did not fire on the former, a mys-
tery which was explained at nightfall of that day, by the news
of the capitulation of the place by General S^or JAudenes '
to the Aiaerican General, Mr. Menitt, a capitulation which
the American Generals claimed for themselves, an infraction
of wliat had been agreed upon with Admiral Dewey, in r^ard
to the formation of plans for the attack and taking of Manila
by the two armies, American and Filipino, together and in
combination.
"This inexplicable Une of conduct on the part of the Ameri-
can officers was made clearer by the tel^rams, which GenMtil
Anderaon addressed to me, from Maytubig on the said 13th
day, requesting that I should order our troops not to eater
Maiula, which request was refused, inasmuch as it was caa-
trary to what was agreed upon, and to the high ends of the
Revolutionary Government, which, on taking upon itself the
immense work of besieging Manila, during the two months and
a half, aacnficing thousands of lives and millions in material
interests, could not surely have done so with any object oth^
than that of capturing Manila and the Spanish garrison which
with firmness and tenacity defended that place." *
On August 14 Agulnaldo telegraphed General Ander-
son as follows : —
"My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila,
have always been promised that they could appear in it, aa you
know and cannot deny, and for this reason, and on account of
the many sacrifices made of money, and lives, I do not consider
it prudent to issue orders to the contrary, as they might be dis-
obeyed against my authority. Besides, I hope that you will
allow the troops to enter because we have g^ven proofs many
"Very urgent. I inform you of the oapture m&de by my soldien :
2 lieutenants of the Marine Corps, 2 lieutenants of tbe Spanish in-
fantry, 62 soldiers. Rifles about 400. I put them under yoiu orders
andawait yourioBtmotionH."— P. i. R., 1179. 5,
' The Spanish Govemor-GenenO. ' P. I. R., 1300. 2.
:dbvGoogIe
106 THE I^njPPINES PABT AND FREBBNT
times of our friendship, ceding our positioos at Parofiaque,
Pasay, Sing^on and Maytubig. Nevertheless, if it seems beat
to you, and in order to enter into a frank and friendly under-
Standing and avoid any disagreeable conSict before the eyes of
the Spaniards, I will commission Don Felipe Buencamino and
others, who will to-day go out from our lines and hold a confer-
ence with you, and that they will be safe during the conference." '
Aguinaldo and his associates pressed the demand for
joint occupation. On Ai^ust 13 Admiral Dewey and
General Merritt informed the government that since
the occupation of Manila and its suburbs the Insurants
outdde had been insisting on this, and asked how far
they might proceed in enforcing obedience in the
matter.
They were informed by a telegram dated August 17
that the President of the United States had directed; —
"That there must be no joint occupation with the Insur-
gents. The United States in the possession of Manila city,
Manila bay and harbor must praaerve the peace and protect
persons and property within the territory occupied by their
mihtary and naval forces. The insurgents and all others
must recognize the mihtary occupation and authority of the
United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by
the President. Use whatever means in your judgment are
necessary to this end." *
This left the militfuy and nav^ conmuuidera no option
in the premises, and in any event dual occupatioD was out
of the question because of the lawlessness of the Insiui^nt
troops.
At this very time they were looting the portions of the
city which they occupied, and as is abundantly shown by
their own records were not confining their attacks to
Spaniards, but were assaulting their own people and raid-
ing the property of foreigners as well.* The continuation
of such a condition of affairs was manifestly impossible.
The Insuigents promptly demanded their share In the
> Taylor. 68 HJ. ■ Ibid., 69. * See footnote 2, p. 108.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INBUKGENT "GOdPEKATION" 107
"war booty," and asked certain other extraordinaiy con-
ceedons as follows ; —
" (4) Our sacrifices in coSperatiog in the siege and taking of
Manila imng well known, it is juat that we should share in the
war booty.
" (5) We demand for our use the palace of Malacafiang and
the Convents of Malate, Ermita and Paco or San Fernando de
Mao.
" (6) We demand that the civil offices of Manila be filled
by North Americana and never by Spaniards ; but If General
Merritt should require some Filipinos we should be pleased if
he will grant our President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the favour of
recommending select and skilled Filipinos. The jurisdiction
of the authorities of Manila shall not be recognized beyond the
municipal radius.
" (7) The American forces shall not approach nor penetrate
our military positions without permission of the respective
conmiand^v thereof and shall evacuate all the positions which
they occupy at the present time beyond the municipal radius ;
Spaniards who pass our lines without permission of the com-
okander will be conudered as spies.
"(10) Lastly we state clearly that our concessions and
petitions do not signify on our part that we recognize the
Bovereagnty of North America in these islands, as they are made
necessary by the present ww." '
Under the instructions of the President these demands
could not be acceded to. Nor could they have been
acceded to had there been no such instructions. In this
connection the following extract from General J&udenes's
cablegram for June Sth to his home government is highly
significant : —
" Population of suburbs have taken refuge in walled city from
fear of outrages of insurgents, preferring to run risks of bom-
bardment, which has not yet b^un." *
It would seem that the population of the suburbs did
not have a high idea of Insurgent discipline.
> P. I. R., Boola C-1. > T^lor, 15 AJ.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
108 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
That their apprehensions were not groundless is shown
by a passive in a letter sent the following day to GoTemor-
Gleneral Augustin by Buencamino : —
" Manila being surrounded by land and by sea, without hope
of assistance from anywhere, and Sefior AguinaJdo being die-
posed to make use of the fleet in order to bombard, if Your
Excellency should prolong the struggle with tenacity, I do not
know, frankly, what else to do other than to succumb dyii^,
but Your ^cellency knows that the entrance of 100,000
Indians,' inflamed with battle, drunk with triumph and with
blood, will produce the hecatomb from which there will not be
allowed to escape ^ther women, children, or Peninsular friars,
— especially the friars ; and, I believe that the rights of hu-
manity, imperilled in such a serious way, should be well con-
sidered by Your Excellency, for however dear glory and military
duty may be, although worth as much or more than existence
itself there is no right by which they should be won at the cost
of the rights of humanity, and the latter outweigh every con-
sideration and all duty." *
Don Felipe knew his own people. He also knew, none
better, what they had in mind at this time.
As it was the Insurgent forces made the moat of such
opportunity as they had, and their own records show it.
In the suburbs of Manila they sacked and comuiitted
outrages, threatening people with their arms, and this
was still going on a week after the fallof Manila.*
General Pfo del Pilar was believed to be responsible
for much of this misconduct, and Mabini proposed that
as it was necessary for bJTn to leave the vicinity of Manila,
and they could not remove him by force, he be promoted.*
'The word Indios, here trenalated "Indituts," means MalftyMi
Filiplnoa of pure blood u disUniruialLed from metlizos or people of
mixed blood. ' P. I. R., 918. 2.
■ The fotlowiiig telegram was aeat by Colonel Job6 to Aguinaldo : —
"U^ent. August 20, 1898 : Colonel Ldpez reports that our troops
are still saokiiis and oommitting outragea in Molate, Faoo and
Ermita, even menaoing people with their arms. Urge you to take
proper meuures to stop these abuses." — P. I. It., 1167. 3.
* Extract from a letter of August 20, 1899, from Mabini to Aguinaldo :
"Se&<n' Lfipez, your adjutant, arrived and told me of many oom-
plaints regarding the behaviour of the soldiers. He says that oiur otB-
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INSURGENT "COOPERATION" 109
Some time during this month Sandico wrote Aguinaldo
as follows : —
"The Americans have already beard of the frequent caaes of
kidnapping (dukul) occurring in Tondo, San Sebasti^ and
San Miguel. Laet night some of ours were surpriBed in the
act of kidnapping a person. I have also heard that many
persona are asking for contributions of war. I tell them '
that you know nothing of all this and that if some persons are
kidnapped it is due to the hate of the natives for the Spanish
spies and secret poUce, which is great." '
Evidently Sandico continued to interest himself in the
matter of preventing disorder, for on September 24, 1898,
he wrote Aguinaldo from Manila as foUows : —
"By authority of General Don Pfo del Pilar and accompanied
by the War Auditor, Seftor Urbano, we entered a prison where
the individuals Mariano de la Cruz and Mariano Crisdetomo
were kept. They were almost prostrated. They had lately been
released from Bilibid where they had been confined for poUtical
crimes. On being asked the reason for their imprisonment
they began by showing us their bodies from which blood stili
issued as the result of the barbarous treatment received from
Major Carmona who, by the way, is the same person of whom
I spoke to you in one of my previous letters; I declared to
you then that he had assaulted, revolver in hand, a man in
the middle of one of the most frequented streets of the suburi)
of Paco on pure suspicion.
"The prisoners in question stated that if they admitted the
accusations made against them it was for fear of greater punish-
ments promised by said Major. The officer of the guard took
eon cany off many horaee, some of them belonging to foreignen. If
the foreignera ahould enter a protest against each doingi, I do not
know what will be thought of our government.
" It is also, absolutely necessary that a stop should be put to the
passes, and that the tax on merchandise entering Manila, should no
longer be eicaoted. It is absolutely neoessaiy, if you think well of it,
for us to promote General Pfo, and make him your second in oommand.
It is necessary for hiri to leave the vicinity of Manila, as we cannot
mnove him by force ; and do not reprimand him.
" If you approve, I will write a Decree, but I reflect that nothing will
succeed, if our oommanders are not obliged to comply."
— P. I. a. 472. 13.
' I.e. the Ainerwans. * P. I. R., 458. 8.
:dbvGoogIe
110 THE PHILIPPIN™ PAST AND FBESENT
the liberty of stnking with his fiat the one who dared to express
himself so.
"Before euch a spectacle Major Bell found himself forced
to tell them that brutal acts are not precisely a recommendation
for a country that wished to be free and that they, the Ameri-
cana, do not arrest any one without just cause.'
"I take the liberty of calling your attention to the matter
in question and other abuses in order that the measures you
may think fit be adopted to remedy this evil. In fact, we are
m^dng a target of ourselves in the sight of all nations, especially
BO in that of the Americans who note any act of oura and judge
us secretly now in order to do so later in public. To make light
of this is to plant a seed of future injury to us, because many
will desire to place themselves under the protection of the
American Qag, seeing that ours refuses to defend the citisens'
individual rights.
"I, for my part, ask that Major Canuona be arrested to-
gether with lus accomplices in the matter so that it may serve
as a lesson not only for him but also for those who thiifik like
him." *
Obviously Sandico's protest of September 24 did not
produce the desired result, for on September 28 he wrote
Aguinaldo a long letter complaining that in Mfmila per-
sonal security did not exist, people were being tortured
and murdered, kidnapping and theft were very frequent,
Mid these abuses were being committed by Filipino
officers and men. Some of the things which had come to
his knowledge were of such a nature that he preferred to
speak to Aguinaldo privately about them.*
' Major J. F. Bell accompamed Sandioo on this trip.
»P. I. R., 1166. 12.
' " I regret very muoh to have to inform yon tliat m long m pw-
eoDBi property is not respected here in Manila eapoeially, b? some of
our men, as long as personal security does not exist and as long as
prisoners are tortured, we cannot hope to deserve the oonfldenoe
of the other governments. Murders, thefts of oarriages and horses,
are very frequent here, as is kidnapping, . . .
" Sergeant Barcena, of the Fifth Company of the Second Zone, that
is the zone of General PIo del Pilar, informed me that the cruel offloers
of that Zone, were Major Cannona and a lieutenant who was formoiy
a barber.
" i knov that the Government has ordered that private persona
and property be respected and has withdrawn trom tiie milittuy the
:dbvGoogIe
UreUBOENT "COOPBBATION" 111
Murder, pillaging, torture of prisoners, kidnapping,
theft — these are not pleasant thiz^, but they continued
to occur, and Aguinaldo, who apparently de^red to pre-
vent them, was powerless to do so. He did not dare
discipline General Pio del Pilar, nor remove him from the
vicinity of Manila, and the soldiers of that officer con-
tinued to work their will on their own unfortunate and
helpless people.
Aguinaldo at first flatly refused to direct the disorderiy
Insurgent forces to leave Manila. The American com-
mander showed great forbearance and negotiations con-
tinued.
On August 16, 1808, the Diplomatic Commission
(Buencamino and Gregorio Araneta) telegraphed Agui-
power of trying oirOuuiB ; but in view of the fact that notwitb utanding
ttuB reetriction some of them oODtinue to discharge powers of whioh
they have been divested, I find it neoessar}' to call your attention
thorato, in order that more energotia measuree may be adopted bo
that ottier nations may not bo led to believe th&t our Koverament is
very weak.
" In the juriBdiotlon of the Amerioaoa, I have Burprised Bmall groups
of otDiceni, who devote themaelvee to aummonine petwma before them
and arresting them. These groups can be found in Binondo, Tondo
and Trozo. I have used all friendly measures to secure their dissolu-
tion, but if they continue theii oonduct, I ghaJl be obUged to turn them
over to the American authoritiee, although I inform you that I shall
not make use <rf such meBsures, until diplomatic meiins are exhausted.
" I understand very well that in endeavouring to stop the abuses com-
mitted by onr ofBoers aod by the Filipinos who claim to belong to us,
in UanilA, I expose myself to becoming a victim of their vengeance ;
nevertheless, this does not terrify me, because my duty to the oountry
requires it.
" I beg of yon that if you take any steps against Major Carmona
and the barber Ueutenant, to be very oareful and call General Ffo del
Filer and come to an understanding with him as to the mode of pun-
iahmeut of theae officers. . . .
" I have diaoovered grave casee which are occurring in the I^eaidio
ot Manila, which I propose to relate to you when I shall have the
honor to see you peisonally. The Americans are already aware of
theee casee, and are working in their own interest untiringly.
" I oould tell you a good many other things, but I do not do so on
aoDount of lack (rf time, and because I wish to reserve them ontil I can
speak to you privately. In the meantime, order me as you will, etc."
— P. I. R., 416. 7.
:dbvGoogIe
112 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
naldo that a clause in a proposed agreement requiring
prior permission of Insurgent officers before American
troops could pass or approach their lines had greatly dis-
pleased General Anderson who declined to treat imtil
after the withdrawal of Noriel's troops from Manila.'
Aguinaldo's reply, sent on August 17, 1898, shows that
he had already made up his mind to fi^t the Americans,
for it contains the following significant words : "The
conffict is coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing
by asking as favours of them what are really our rights." *
While negotiations were pending General Merritt sent
Major J. F. Bell to Aguinaldo with a letter and also with
a memorandum in wMch were the words : —
"In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his
arrangeiQeDte with us, you may conimunicate to him as fol-
lows: ..."
There follow six paragraphs, of which the third is of
special importance. It reads as follows : —
"(3) That I have every disposition to repreaent liberally
the Government at Washington, which I know is inclined to
'"General Anderson reoeived ua very well, but in the proposed
agreement the clauses requiring the prior permiBsion of our oommanderH
before Amerio&n troops could pass or approach our lines displeased
him very much. Gen. Anderson refuses to treat until after the with-
drawal of Noriel's troopa. I think it prudent to yield. This tel^ram
is in amplifloation of another which, at the request of Gen. Anderson,
we sent through his telegraph station to your excellency." — P. I. R..
849.
■ "It is impossible to order General Noriel to fall back because if
we order it they will ask the same thing from General PIo and we
■hall get nothing ourselves. And the worst is that after we have
evacuated Manila and its environs they will follow ua up to our new
positions to take them too without our being able to obtain from them
any formal Btatement of the oonoession signed in due form. The con-
flict is coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing by asking as
favours of them what are really our rights. We shall maintain them
as long M we are able, confiding in Providenoe and in Justice. I con-
firm my last tel^pmn. Tell General Anderson that we shall hold a
meeting of the council of Government in order to decide. Hease
return here soon with your companions. I inolose the map which I
hope you will return." — P. 1. R.. 427. 1.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
An DNSANITAItT WlLU
s & typical old-atyle well, with the family WBahiog going o
A Flowiho ARTBaiAN Will.
Tbne is do way in which the water from nich b well can berome infected.
More tbftD eight hundred fifty have been sunk, and the death rate io some
towDB (ortuiut« enough to pooesa tlieni has fallen off fifty per cent, as a
ixibvGoogle
INSUBOENT "COOPEEATION" 113
deal fairly with him and faia people ; but not knowing what the
policy of that Government will be, I am not prepaid to make
any promises, except that in the event of the United States
withdrawing from these islands care will be taken to leave him
in aa good condiMon as he wa» found by the forces of the Oovem-
meid."'
Relative to the italicized portion of this etaXeanent
Major Bell says : —
" I was presaed to explain further just what meaning Qeneral
M. meant to convey by the underscored portion of this remark,
but I replied that I had repeated the language General M.
had used to me, and I preferred they should s^ any further
explaostion from him, lest I might imwittingly fall into error
if I undertook to explain his meaning myself. Their lack of
definiteness and my unwillingness to comment upon the lan-
guage seemed to arouse their apprehensions and su^icions.
They have been trying ever since to obtain in writing some
definite promise on thos subject." *
Aguinaldo ordered that the machinery of the water
vorks be started up at once, a thing which was very
necessary as Manila was suffering from lack of water.
I should be glad if I could leave this matter here, but
I cannot, for Major Bell elsewhere makes the further
statement : —
"Attention is invited to General Merritt's promise made
known to Aguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that in the event
of the United States withdrawing from these islands, care would
be taken to leave Aguinaldo in as good condition as he was
found by the forces of the Government. From a remark the
General made to me I inferred he intended to interpret the
expression 'forces of the Government' to mean the naval forces,
diould future contingencies neces^tate such an interpretation." *
Let us hope that Major Bell misunderstood General
Mmitt's intention. If this is not the case, I must say
in all franknees that in my opinioQ it was General Merritt's
intention to indulge in sharp practice.
■ Senate Document No. 208, p. 22. * tbid., p. 23. * Ibid., p. 26.
vol- I— I
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
114 THE PHILIPPINBS PAST AND PRESENT
Obviously, the American naval forces did not find
Aguinaldo in any "condition," in the sense in which
General Merritt uses the term. On the contrary, they
brou^t him from Hongkong and assisted him in starting
a revolution. The negotiations in question were relative
to the positions held by the Insurgents at the time the
negotiations took place, and General Merritt's promise
could not legitimately be interpreted to refer to anything
else.
Had Aguinaldo accepted his offer, a most embarrassing
situation would have resulted. General Merritt was
obviously not authorized to make such a proposition in
the first instance, and the only honourable course left
open to him would have been to advise Washington of
his improper action and beg the Government to support
him in it and thus save the honour of the country.
Fortunately, Aguinaldo did not act upon the promise
nor accept the offer. On the contrary, be promptly and
indignantly denied that he was committed to anything,
and sought to impose new conditions which were not
acceded to.
Meanwhile some one doubtless got hold of General
Merritt and called his attention to the fact that in making
this offer he had grossly exceeded his authority, for in
hb reply to Aguinaldo's protest General Merritt says : —
"So far as any promises as to what should be done in the
event <tf a conclusion of a treaty between the United States
and Spwi are concerned, it ia utterly impoaaible for nte as the
military representative only of the Unit^ States to make ^ly
promises such as you request. As you have akeady been in-
formed, you may depend upon the good will of the Americans
out here and the Government, of which you already know the
beneficence, to determine these matters in the futiue." '
Coming, as th^ statement did, after the offw made in
the memorandtmi hereinbefore referred to, it must have
aroused the suspicions of Aguinaldo and his associates,
I Senate Docnment No. 206, p. 24.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INSUBQENT "CXKiPBRATION" 115
and in my opinion Memtt'a conduct in making such a
proposal in the first instance was inexcusable.
Before he could tenninate the negotiations which fol-
lowed he was called away, and turned this matter, together
with oth^ unfinished buaineea, over to bis successor,
General B. 8. Otis.
On August 31, 1898, the latter official wrote to Agui-
naldo as follows : —
"General Aguinauk), Bacoob:
"Refemi^ to promise made by General Merritt to reply
to your letter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state
that he was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity
to reply. Being unacquainted with the situation, I must take
time to inform myself before answering, which I will do at the
earliest opportunity. " 0ns."
On September 8 Gienera! Otis wrote Aguinaldo a long
letter fully discussing the whole situation in the light of
the complete information which he had meanwhile ob-
tained. Since so much baa been made of this incident
by Blount and others, I invite attention to the following
extracts from General Otis'a letter, which embody a fair
and judicial statement of the conditions which existed : —
"You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city
of Manila, te which you promise to retire your troops, and nejne
as conditions precedent : First, protection to your shipping by
the United States Navy, and the free navigation of your vessels
within the waters in United States occupation ; second, restitu-
tion to your forces of all positions which are now occupied by
your troops, in the event that treaty stipulations' between the
United States and Spain surrender to the last-named govern-
ment the territory occupied by the former; and thirdly, that
United States troops now occupying positions beyond the lines
you name shall retire within the same.
"A discussion of your proposition to hold, jointly, with the
United States Government, the city of Manila, involves con-
fflderation of some of the other concessions you desire to be
made, and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present the
matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect, although, from
remarks contained in former correspondence, I am of the
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
116 THE PHIUPHNES PAST AND PREBENT
opinion that you are fully aware bow untenable tbe proposition
is. Tbe United States and Spain were and are beUigerent
parties to a war, and were so recognized by the civilized world.
In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then in full
posBessioQ of Spanish forces, was surrendered to the first-named
beUigerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation
gave the United States Government full occupimcy of the city
and defences of Manila, and that Government obligated itseU
to insure the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants
of the city to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and
all international precedents the United States authority over
Manila and its defences is full and supreme, and it cannot es-
cape tbe obligations which it has assumed.
"But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my
Government to hold and administer the flairs of the city of
Manila and its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions con-
t^ned in former correspondence and from my appreciation of
your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition — a
joint occupation — ■ upon supposed equitable grounds, referring
to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistance tbey
have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila.
It is well known they have made personal sacrifices, endured
great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten
that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the
seas of both hemispheres ; sent back to Spain the Spanish army
and navy forces, recently embarked for your destruction, and
the secure holding of the Philippine possessions; that since
May 1 last its navy has held the city of Manila at its mercy,
but out of consideration of humanity refused to bombard it,
preferring to send troops to demand surrender, and thereby
preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants ? Is it for-
gotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the re-
tention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions has
opened up to you the ports of the Island of Luzon and held
Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects?
*******
"Apart from all legal and equitable considerations, and
those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of jus-
tice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the impracti-
cability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila and its
suburbe, and in this I know that I shall have the approval of
your excellent judgment. It would be extremely difficult to
prevent friction between our respective forces, which might
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INSURGENT "COePERATION" 117
result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may for coq-
tinued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity,
irreBponsible members of our organizations, by careless or
Impertinent action, might be the means of inciting grave dis-
turbances ; and in this connection I call to your attention the
recent shooting affair at Cavite, which still requires investiga-
tion. There might also arise conflict of authority between our
subordinate officers. Even now, within precincts in entire
actual possession of our troops, I find that permits are ^ven
to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make arrests,
to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions and authority,
and that several cases of kidnapping have taken place. In
pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far as we can,
domestic tranquillity, our officers have arrested suspected
parties, and they have asserted (with what element of truth I
know not) that the insurgent forces are the offenders. I have
declined to accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the
contrary, although it would appear that officers connected with
those forces have issued the permits to which I allude. Such
interference with our administration of civil affairs must even-
tually result in conffict.
"... And here permit me to remark upon a view of the sub-
ject you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupa-
tion of the city's suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance,
should have a share in the booty resultii^ from the conquest
of the city, on account of harckhips endured and asaiBtance
rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion
granted, your conclusion, under the rules of war which are bind-
ing on my Government, does not follow, for it has never recog-
nized the existence of spoils of war, denominated 'booty,' as
have many European governments. No enemy's property of
any kind, public or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded
to, any of its officers or men, and should they attempt to ap-
propriate any of it for their individual benefit, they would be
very severely punished through military tribunals, on which
have been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The
enemy's money and property (all that is not necessary to be
expended in adnunisteriog local affairs in the enemy's territory)
must be preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and
between the supreme authorities of the nations concerned.
My troops cannot acquire booty nor any individual benefit by
reason of the capture of an enemy's territory. I make this
comment, believittg that you hold erroneous opinions in respect
to individual advantages which occupation bestows.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
118 THE PHIUFHNES PAST AND PRESENT
"I request your indulgence while I briefly conmder the con-
ceeadons you ask us to make as condllione precedent to the re-
tirement of your forces to the iines indicated by your note of the
27th ultimo.
"The firet is : Protection to your shipping and free uaviga-
tiou to your vessels. Neither the extent of protection nor the
limit of free navigation you request is understood. Certainly
you could not mean protection on the high seas, or in the porta
not in the rightful possession of the United States. That, as
you are fully aware, could only be effected by treaty, or guaran-
tee, followii^ international recognition of the belligCTent rights
of the Philippine revolutionary government. While the existing
armistice continues, the United States are in rightful possession,
in so far as the navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are
concerned, only of the bay of Manila and its navigable tribu-
taries. Within the same all vessels of trade and commerce
and the war vessels of recognized national powers sail freely
as long as the sovereignty of my Government is not assailed
nor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect, what-
ever eoncessious are extended by way of relaxation of trade
restrictions, incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will
be extended to all alike, and discrimination in this r^ard ia
neither intended nor permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises
supervision over all naval matters, and they are in no way re-
lated to the duties conferred upon me by law. Nor woidd it
»v«ul should I seek his consent for greater latitude of action,
for even if disposed to grant special concessions he could not
do BO, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my Government
could now, imder the prevailing truce with Spain, invest him
with the requisite powers to do so and at the same time pre-
serve its international obligations.
"The second concession named by you is restitution of
positions in the city of Manila to your forces, in case the treaty
of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered under the
late capitulatory articles; and the third and last is a promise
to retire our troops within the lines indicated by you, as the
hnes on which you desire your troops to remain permanently.
These propositions, having a kindred nature, may be considered
together, and, indeed, have already been impliedly answered.
From previous statements of facts and logical conclusions
made and stated in this communication, concerning the nature
of the obligations resting on the United States with regard to
the territory to which they have the l^al right of posaeasion
under contracting articles with Spain, it is evident that neithw
:dbvGoogIe
INSCRGBNT "COOPBEATION" 119
in law or moniU can the concoBsioQa be made. I would be
powerless to grant them in any aspect of the case, being nothing
more than an agent to cany out the infitructioDB of the executive
head of my Government and not bdng vested with discretionary
power to determine matters of such moment. Id the present
instance I sm not only powerless to accede to your request, but
have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindful of
its international promises and national honour, which it has
never broken nor sacrificed, not to accede joint occupation of
the city and suburbs of Manila and am directed specially to
preserve the peace and protect persons and property within
the territory surrendered under the terms of the Spanish capitu-
lation. These mandates must be obeyed.
"Thus have I endeavoured with aJl candor and sincerity,
holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the situation
as understood by me, and I doubt not by the Republic which I
represent. I have not been instructed as to what policy the
United States intends to pursue in regard to its legitimate hold-
ings here, and hence I am unable to g^ve you any information
on the subject. That it will have a care and labor conscien-
tiouflly for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. It
remains for you, beneficiaries of its sacrifices, to adopt a course
of action which will manifest your good intentions and show to
the world the principles which actuate your proceedings.
"It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am
compelled by my instructions to direct that your armed forces
evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and
defences, and that I shall be obliged to take action with that
end in view within a very short space of time should you decline
to comply with my Government's demands; and I hereby
serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn
beyond the line of the city's defences before "Thursday, the 15th
instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action, and that
my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate
consequences which may ensue.
• •*«««*
"In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred
freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this communi-
cation and am del^ated by Um to state that he fully approves
of the same in all respects ; that the commands of our Govern-
ment compel us to act as herein indicated, and that between our
respective forces there will be unanimity and complete concert
of action."
:dbvGoogIe
120 THE PHILIPPINEH PAST AND PRESENT
This calm and temperate discussion of the situation,
coupled with the firm statement of intention with which
it closed, produced a decided effect on Aguinaldo. Con-
cerning the events to which it led, Genen^ Otis has made
this statement : —
"On September 13, a commiseion Bent by Aguinaldo and
consisting of three members, one of whom was the treasurer
and another the attomey'^eneraJ of the insurgent government,
called for the purpose of discussing the subject of my letter of
the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request in
writing that the insurgent troo^w retire to the line designated
by. General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating that unless
they withdrew as directed we would be obliged to resort to
force. i?hey then asked that I withdraw the letter and issue
a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force, as Agui-
naldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove his troops
upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter of the 8th
instant would stand. They then said that as the demands of
that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents would with-
draw as directed therein, but that if I would express in writing
a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which
I designated — something which he could show to the troops
and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon a
request from these headquarters — he would probably be able
to retire his men without much difficulty ; that, of course, they
themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would
be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note
of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following: —
" ' Office U. S. Mn,iTAaT Govebnob ra the
" 'PHrLippiNE Islands,
" 'Manila, P. I., September 13, 1898.
'"Tna ComcANDiNa Gbnbbal of the Philippinb Fobces;
" ' Sir : Referring to my commimication of September 8, I
have the honour to inform you that I have had a most agreeable
conversation with certain gentlemen who are in the interests of
your revolutionary government upon the matters therein
contained. We have discussed at length the compUcations
now existing, which will exist, and will doubtlees increase, while
our troops continue to occupy jointly certain districts of the
city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity of the
withdrawal of your troops in order that the friendly relations
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INSVBQBNT "COOPEaATION " 121
which have always been muntwned by and between them and
the forces of the United States Government may be perpetuated.
I am sure that the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments
and will clearly reptnli them to you. May I ask you to pa-
tiently listen to their report of our conversation ?
" ' It is my desire that our friendly intercouiBe and mutual
amicable relatiouB be continued ; that they be not jeopardized
if we can by conast^it action avoid it, and such, I am certain,
is the deore of yourself and associates.
" ' May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops from
Manila?
" ' Permit me to add in concluuon that I have that confidence
in your ability and patriotism which will lead you to accede to
this request.
" ' I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,
(Signed) " ' E. S. Ons,
'"Major-General, U. S. V.,
" ' United States Military Governor in the Philippines.'
"In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was re-
ceived;—
" ' Malolos, Bulacan, September 16, 1898.
" 'The Commanmno Gbnbral or the American Forces :
" ' Mt d&ab Sir : Referring to your esteemed communication,
dated the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I
have given appropriate orders that my troops should abandon
their most advanced poeitiona within some of the suburbs, and
that they should retire to points where contact with yours
would be more difficult, in order to avoid all occasion for conffict.
" ' I hope that by these presents you will be fully convinced
of my constant desire to preserve amicable relations with the
American forces, even at the risk of sacrificing a part of the
confidence placed in my government by the Philippine people.
" ' A consideration of my many occupations will serve to ex-
cuse me for not having answered with the promptness desired.
' Your very respectful servant,
(Signed) " ' Euiuo Aqqinaldo.'
" On theevening of the 15th the armed msurgent oi^anizations
withdrew from the city and all of its suburbs, as ac^owledged
by their leaders, excepting from one small outlying district.
This certain agents of Aguinaldo asked on the previous day to
be permitted to retain for a short time, on the plea that the
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122 THE PHILIPPINES "^AST AND PRESENT
general officer in command ' vrould not obey inBtnictions, and
they propoeed to remove his men gradually by organieationa
sad thereafter to pmiish him for his disobedience. The with-
draval was effected adroitly, as the insui^ents marched oat
in excellent spirits, cheering the American troops." *
I have given the facts thus fully for the reason that
this is the one instance I have found in which a promise
was made, fortunately in the form of an offer which was
not accepted, and then withdrawn. It has seemed to me
that the reasons why General Merritt should never have
made it, and why General Otis could not possibly have
renewed it, should be fully set forth.
On September 7, 1898, General Otis had cabled to Wash-
ington tiiat Admiral Dewey and he considered conditions
critical, and that the number of armed Insurgents in the
city was large and rapidly increasing. He stated that
on the 8th he would send a notification to Aguinatdo that
unless the latter's troops were withdrawn beyond the line
of the suburbs of the city before September 15 he would
be obUged to resort to forcible action and that the United
States would hold Aguinaldo responsible for any imfor-
tunate consequences which might ensue.
Aguinaldo still hoped to obtain recognition of his gov-
ernment by the United States, but did not consider such
recognition probable, and pu^ed preparations to attack
if a favorable opportunity should offer.
Before occupying ourselves with these preparations,
let us briefly review the results of our investigations as to
Insurgent cooperation with the American forces up to this
time.
Taylor has made the following excellent summary of
the case : —
"Up to this time Aguinaldo had continued a desultory war-
fare with the Spanish troops in Manila. That none of his
> Flo itH Hlar.
■ B«poTt of the War Deputment, 1899, Vol. I, part IV, pp. fr-lO.
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INSTmOENT "COOPERATION" 12S
attoiclra vere very eerious is shown from the Spanish reports of
casualties ; but although he had failed to secure the suirender
of the city to himself, he had kept its garrison occupied and
within their works. The American force on land was now
strong enough to be^ offensive operations. So far the rela-
tions between the Americans and Aguinaldo had not been really
Mendly. They were in his way, and yet he could not break
with them, for he hoped to use them for the attainment of the
designs which he had by this time frankly declared. The
Americans had listened to these declarations, and had not an-
swered them, nor was it possible to answer them. The American
forces were there under the instructions of the President to
make war on Spam and to establish a military government in
the Philippines. Aguinaldo had declared himself a dictator
and the Philippines independent. To have recognized him in
his civil capacity, to have dealt with him In his civil capacity,
would have meant a recognition of his government by the
military commander in the field — a thing impossible and un-
lawful. Officers of the United States forces are not empowered
to recognize governments ; that function is reserved to the
Preudent of ^e United States; and in this case he, in his
orders to the Secretary of War, dated May 19, copies of which
were forwarded to General Merritt for his guidance, informed
him that the army of occupation was sent to the Philippines
'for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of the
Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order and security
to the i^aads while in the possession of the United States.'
These instructions contemplated the establishment of a mili-
tary government in the archipelago by military officials of the
United States.
"It is true that in spite of the date of these instructions
General Merritt in San Francisco had received no copy of them
on August 28, three days after the departure of General Ander-
son, and what that officer knew of them could only have been
what General Merritt remembered of the contents of an un-
signed copy of them shown him at the White House, but they
were in accordance with the practice of the United Stat^
Government in occupying conquered territory, that practice
General Anderson well knew, and his relations with Aguinaldo
were guided by it.
"It has been claimed that Aguinaldo and his followers
received the impression at this time from their conversation
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124 THE PHIL1PMNE8 PAST AND PRESENT
with American officers that the United States would un-
doubtedly recognize the independence of the Philippines, and
that the cooperation of the insurgents was due to this impres-
sion. There was no cooperation. That he attempted in vun
to secure the surrender of Manila to himself was not codpera-
tion. Th&t he refrained from attacking the Americans and
occasionally permitted them to be furnished supplies, for which
they paid, was not cooperation. The fact that for a time their
plans and his plans were parallel does not mean cooperation,
Aguinaldo was forced by the exigencies of the situation, by the
necessity of strengthening his hold upon the people, by the
necessities of bis operations against the Spaniards, to make
Spaniards and natives alike believe that all that he did was
with the aid of the Americans by whom he would be supported
in all his acts. He needed their support, and if he could not
obtain that he needed the appearance of their support for the
attainment of his ends ; and this he was foroed to purchase
by compliance, or apparent compliance, with their demands.
But his compliance with them, as all American officers serving
there well kiiew, was never willing, was never complete, and
was never given except under pressure. It is true that writers
upon the subject, speaking with the confidence which is bom
of insufficient and incomplete information, assure their readers
that any government but that of the United States, any colonial
administrators but Americans, would have been able to obtain
the hearty cooperation of Aguinaldo and his followers by judi-
cious concessions to them at this time. The only concession
which would have obtained that hearty cooperation would have
been the recognition of the independence of the Philippines
under a United States protectorate, of Aguinaldo clothed with
the plenitude of the powers of the Katiptinan as dictator, and
a promise to promptly withdraw from the islands. Tliis prom-
ise the Government of the United States could not make.
Until the ratification of a treaty of peace with Spain the insiu*-
gents of the Philippine Islands were rebellious subjects of Spun,
and with them, except as fighting men, no relations could be had.
"No report of operations or returns of strength were rendered
by Aguinaldo at this or any other time to any American com-
mander, and no American commander ever rendered such re-
turns to him. At the time of General Merritt's arrival, and
until Manila was occupied by the Americans, the insurgents
and United States troops were united solely by the fact that
they had Manila as a common objective. Conditions were
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INSURGENT "COOPERATION" 125
HucI) that the Americans, in order to obtain its surrender, had
to avoid doing anything which might cause the insurgents to
attack them and per^ps make terms with Spain; while
Aguinaldo and his followers, in order to accomplish the sur-
render of Manila to themselves, had to muntain such relations
with the Americans as would induce the Spaniards to believe
that their fieet was at bis disposal,' and also such apparent
harmonj' and co5peration with them in the execution of their
plans that the recalcitrant among the Filipinos would be forced
to believe that the Americans would in ail ways use their forces
to support Aguinaldo in the attainment of his desires.
"General Merritt saw this and the necessity for immediately
taking such steps as would lead to his occupation of Manila.
With the arrival of the third expedition he was able to pass
through the insurgent hnes between Camp Dewey and Manila,
for he had sufficient force to accept no refusal from Aguinaldo.
"In his report he said that the insurgents had obtained posi-
tions of investment opposite the Spanish lines along their full
extent, and that on the bay front their lines ran within 800
yards of San Antonio Abad. The approaches to the beach and
village of Pasay were in their possession.
" ' This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of
quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish
position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult
to deal with owing to the peculiar conditions of our relations
with the insurgents. ... As General Aguinaldo did not visit
me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military
leader, and aa my instructions from the President fully con-
templated the occupation of the islands by the American land
forces, and stated that "the powers of the mihtary occupant are
absolute and supreme and inmiediately operate upon the polit-
ical condition of the inhabitants," I did not consider it wise to
hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until
I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I
would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation
and enforce my authority in the event that his pretensions
should clash with my designs. For these reasons the prepara-
tions for the attack on the city were pressed and the miUtary
operations conducted without reference to the situation of the
insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently
fully established by the fact that when the troops at my com-
mand carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the
sea to the Pasay road on the eirtreme Spanish right, we were
* 8m Buenoamino's letter to J&udineB, p. 108.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
226 THE PHtLIFFINES PAST AND PBESENT
under no obLigation, by prearranged plans of the mutual attack,
to turn to the right wd clear the m>nt atill held by the ioaur-
gent«, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the
city and the auburbe.' " *
All that the Insurgeate and the Americang ever had in
common was an enemy. They each fought that enemy
in their own way. There was no cooperation. On the
part of the Insurgents there was treachery. I will submit
further evidence of this fact.
' Taylor 36 AJ. «( aeq.
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CHAPTER rV
The Pbbmeditatbd Instjroent Attack
It will be remembered that the minutes of the session
of the Hong Kong junta at which Aguinaldo reported the
result of his negotiations with Pratt and received his in-
structions relative to the trip to Manila, recorded the
fact that there would be no better occasion for the expedi-
tionary forces "to arm themselves at the expense of the
Americans," and that provided with arms the Filipino
people would be able to oppose themselves to the United
States and combat their demands if they attempted to
colonize the country.*
The possible, if not the probable, desirability of attack-
ing the United States troops was, it is evident, clearly
foreseen from the beginning. Active preparations for
doing this now soon began.
Although Insurgent officers in full imiform freely
visited Manila at all times, Aguinaldo wrote on Octob^ 1
to his commands in Laguna Province that he must not
permit Americans there without passes. He was to get
rid of them civilly, but he was to keep them out and in-
form all authorities there of his instructions.
On August 24 an American soldier was killed and
others were wounded in Cavite by Insurgent troops who
fired from behind. An Insurgent officer in Cavite at the
time reported on his record of services that he —
"took part in the movement against the Americans on
the afteraoon of the 24th of August, under the orders of the
commander of the troops and the adjutant of the poet."
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128 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PREaENT
This shows that the movement was ordered, but the
Insurgents promptly realized that it was ill advised.
On August 28 General Llanera was reported to be pre-
paring for operations against the Americans. He was
ordered to suspend his preparations, llie same day
General P. Mercado Rizal, commanding in Laguna
Province, wrote Mabini asking whether they were to
consider the Americans as their allies or their enemies.
He wanted to know whether the war was to stop or con-
tinue becoming more furious. This not because he
desired to ask questions about the secrets of the govern-
ment, but because he wished to prepare the minds of the
people for the future. Mabini's answer has not been
found.
We have already noted that on Autgust 8 Fernando
Acevedo wrote General PIo del Pilar recommending that
he attack and annihilate the American troops ; that on
August 10 Pilar wrote Aguinaldo suggesting that the
Americans be attacked, and that on August 17 Aguinaldo
stated : "The conflict is coming sooner or later." '
At this time Sandico entered the service of the Ameri-
cans as an interpreter and acted as a spy, endeavouring
to keep his people fiUly informed relative to the plans and
acts of his employers. Incidentally he endeavoured to
convince the latter that the barbarities really committed
by Insurgent officers and troops in Manila were perpe-
trated by enemies of the Insurgent cause who wished to
discredit it.
In a letter dated September 21, 1898, Apacible saya
that the conflict will come sooner or later and asks Agui-
naldo if it would not be better for them to provoke it
before the Americans concentrate their troops.*
' P. I. R., 427. 1.
* "The insolent oommentKry of the Amerioan Consul here, if it is
true, clearly ehowa the intention of Amerioa to impose her will upon
ua by force. In this case, the oonfliot will oome sooner or later. Would
it not be better for ub to provoke the oonfliot while the Amenoans
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THE PREUBDITATBD IN8UR0EHT ATTACK 129
On September 10 General Garcia reported to Aguinaldo
that on the previotis oi^t the Americans had attempted
to push back his line at San Lazaro, and that morning
had concentrated and penetrated the Insurgent territory,
making a reconnaissance through the fields about Sam-
paloc. Aguinaldo put an indorsement on this communi-
cation saying that he had long since ordered that the In-
surgent line should not be passed. He instructed Garcia
to throw troops in front of the Americans at Sampaloc,
and order them to leave, and to warn the bolo men.
Obviously, little more was needed to provoke an Insurgent
attack.1
An unsigned draft of an order in Aguinaldo's hand-
writing dated Malolos, September 13 (?), 1898,* shows
how tense was the situation while the question of with-
drawal of the Insurgent forces from the city of Manila
was under consideration. It contains instructions for
General Pio del Pilar, General P. Garcia and General
Noriel or Colonel Cailles. Their purpose is hardly open
to doubt.
General Pio del Pilar was directed : —
"To have a detachment posted in the interval from the
branch of the river of Paco in a northerly direction to the
bridge and so on up to the Fadg river in the direction of Paoda-
can, the river servii^ as a line until the suburb of Panque is
reached which will be under our jurisdiction. Proceed to exe-
have not aa yet oo&oentnted their troops there ? Or would it be better
to w^t for tbe results of the Congress of Puis ? This question should
be answered immediatelj by the oommittee on foreign relations of
the Congress of representatives and the decisioii should be sent at
onoe to us so that we oan proceed aooording to your instruotions."
— P.I, R.,453. 11.
'" I gave an order long ago not to permit our line to be passed, and
to say frankly that it was by my order. To be prepared to deteai our
rights you are ordered to place troops in front of Amcrioan position at
Bampaloe and to tell them plainly to leave, to warn the ^mdalahan
(bolo men. — D. C. W.) and get everything ready; you must warn
the commanders of the zones about Manilft Do not forget, whenever
In doubt." — P. I. R., 8«.
'P. I. R.. 88. 9.
VOL, I — K
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180 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
cute this order on its receipt, posting detachm^its where they
are necessary and trenches will be made without loss of time
working day and night. Do not rest for by doing so we may lose
the opportunity ; beg of the troops to assist in the formation
of intrenchments. Matters have a bad aspect, we especiaily
expect somethit^ Wednesday and Thursday, the 15th and 16ui
of this month. The danger is imminwit on tie mentioned days,
also in the time that follows.
"Keep strict vigilance at all hours. In case you receive
orders to leave that place, do not do so on any account without
my orders, happen what may. . . .
" Ckmcentrate ali your forces in Santa Ana b^ore the day
arrives.
" Warn your soldiers against firing at random as the Span-
iards did, if possible have them calculate the number of their
antagonists and how much ammunition there is in comparison
with the number of the attacking force, in fact, there are oooa-
uons when each shot fired kills as many as four mcai.
" I hope you will see to the execution of these instructions
and that you will maintain the honour of the Philippines by your
courage fuid in no way permit your rights to be tramfded under-
foot." 1
General Garcia was instructed as follows : —
"On Wednesday, the 14th of this month, you will post de-
tachments in the points indicated by lines on the enclosed plan.
On receipt of this and as soon as you learn its contents, proceed
secretly to determine the most suitable places to post detach-
ments and immediately post our troops and have intrenchments
made employing day and night in this work. Beg this of our
The instructions to Noriel or Cailles read as follows : —
"At dght o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, the 14th,
withdraw your command from the town of Malate as indicated
on the enclosed plan, from the bridge in Singalong and in a
Btra^ht line from there to the branch of the river in Paco will
be the line of our jurisdiction even though we may not be of
one mind in the matter. On receipt of this proceed to determine
the most suitable plac^ to post our troops even if they are not
supplied with batteries ; on posting the detachments pve in-
structions to have intrenchments made immediately without
«P. I. R.,88.0. 'Ibid.
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THE FBEUEDITATED INStrRGENT ATTACK 131
reetmg, eepecially on the days of the ISth and 16th. Since
afFaira have a serious aspect, do not loee vigilance and be on the
alert at all times. . . ,
" Concentrate all the forces and have a call to arms in Cavite
BO that all the troops may be in Pasay on Wednesday night.
" In case the Americans attempt to order you out do not leave
your poets, happen what may, but exercise prudence and be
prepared leaving them to give the provocation. Answer them
that you have no instructiona given you with regard to what
they ask." '
Obviously the maintemuice of peace at this time hung
by a very slender thread. On September 14 the governor
of Cavite tel^raphed Aguinaido aa follows : —
"Moat urgent. I desire to know from you the result of the
ultimatum. Advise me if we must prepare our troops for ac-
tion to-morrow. I await a reply." *
But war was not to begin at this time. On September
23 Bray wrote to Aguinaido advising him to maintain a
defensive attitude imtil the reeult of the negotiations at
Paris should become known, giving way to the Americans
and not showing his teeth. He coiild take the offensive
later if advisable and should have little difficulty in settling
accounts with the American eoldiers.'
Bray suggested the possibiUty of an alliance between
the American and the Spanish soldiers if a conflict should
arise before the departure of the latter.*
1 p. I. R., 88. 9. ' Thid.. 849.
■ " Until the deuMon of the Parii CongrMi is knoim, all of hb here
an of the opinion that you ihould maintain a defensive attitude re-
gardine the Amerioani, giving way to them vith regwd to Manila
and its ouburbB or in anythinr they may wish, although apparently
only, and not ahow them your teeth. After the decision of the Congress
ts known, you may take the offenaiTe if advisable, and aocordiog to the
Information we may hare of the American soldiers it should not be
difficult for you and your army to settle aooounts with them."
— P.I. R..398. 6.
* " If you and the Americans should happen to come in conflict
before the departure of the Spanish soldiers, it might happen that
the Tankeee would enter into an alliance with them to combat the
FilipinoB. Think well over this." — P. I. H.. 398. 8.
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132 THE FHILIfPIN&S PAST AND PRESENT
Meaawhile preparations for the attack progressed.
During September, Sandico wrote Aguinaldo suggesting
the urgent necessity of reorganizing the "masons" and
the Katlptinan,' and that all be furnished with knives,
to be kept hidden so that they might be "ready for any
event."
In spite of efforts to keep the Insurgent soldiers in
hand, feeling among them ran high, and they wanted to
fight.* On November 30, 1898, General Mascardo tele-
graphed from San Fernando to Aguinaldo asking if he
might begin firing in order to prevent the American troops
from disembarking, and Aguinaldo promptly answered in
the affirmative.*
On December 5 Malvar telegraphed from Lipa that
according to a despatch from Batangas, American divers
were working unceasingly and that a subordinate had
ordered that they be fired on if they attempted to land.
Aguinaldo replied that he did not mind their working at
sea, but that they must not be allowed to land under any
circumstances.*
>"It ifl ftlso of urgent neoesaitr, SetLor President, to reSetabliflh
oonunitteea in all the suburbH and that the masoDs uid the Katipliiuui
be reoi^»nized, and it is advisable that nil be provided with knives
read; for any event, but it is proper that these aj-ma be hidden."
— P. I. R.,466. 9.
■ "Our soldiers toe always desirous of flghting in order to bring
affaira to an end, aa they are very resentful with regard to the evaoua-
tion of the suburbs mentioned." — P. I. R., Booka C-1.
'"Most urgent. Have received telegnphio order from War
Dept., whioh saya: 'Prevent Amerioan troopa from disembarkjng.*
In oaM they insist what am I to do 7 May I begin firing 7 "
This tel^r&m was indorsed by Aguinaldo : —
"Answered afBrmatively December 1, 1898." — P. I. R., 849.
* "Most urgent. Aocording to despatch from Captain detached at
Batangas, American divers are working unceasingly. Re sftys that he
ordered them to be fired on in case they try to land. Await your
reply."
Aguin&ldo's reply ran aa follows : —
"I do not mind their working at sea, but you must under no condi-
tions allow them to land troops ; be brave for the sake of your Tag&log
heart. Approve your action." — P. I. R., 1179. 2.
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THE PEEMEDITATED 1N80ROENT ATTACK 133
On Decembra 6 Sandico tel^p>apbed Aguinaldo as
follows : —
"The difficulty of last night at the San Ju&n picket with
the American troops has beesa adjusted without prejudice.
Our preparations ought to continue. Awaiting ordeis." ■
San Juan was where the firing commenced on February
4, 1899.
On December 9 Callles wired Aguinaldo as follows : — ■
"Report to you that there are 3000 Americana in front of
our position at Singalong. I do not know what th^ wish ; if
they enter Pineda I open firo." *
By this time the Insurgents had made up their minds
that the Americans, who had been bearing their insults
in ^ence, were cowards. Aguinaldo's indorsement on
this tel^;ram reads : —
"Answered: Nevertheless the 3000 American soldiers are
few against my Colonel and his 300 soldiers, and I believe you
have more thim that number. E. A., Dec. 12, 1898." •
R^ative to the insults which were at this time showered
upon Americans, Taylor has made the following state-
"Fortune had been good to Aguinaldo and his associates
in the eight months during which the United States had pre-
vented Spain from relieving her beleaguered garrisons in the
Philippines, and she might still be kind. The men about
Aguinaldo who had risen farthest and fastest could not endure
the thought of having to accept subordinate positions in a gov-
ernment not directed by themselves. The halberdiers at the
door of the palace of the president saluted them as the halber-
diers at the doorway of his lordship the governor-general in
Manila had struck the marble steps with their halberds at the
coming of the Spanish generals. They swaggered down the
streets of Maloloe, clashing their swords behind them, and they
knew that if they won, the Philippines would be divided into
fiefs which they, as dukes and marquises, would hold in feudal
tenure from a Malay potentate. They were confident. They
ip.LB.,8W. *Ihid. 'Ibid. *56AJ.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
134 THE PHILm>INB8 PAST AND PRESENT
held Luz6n. They held the people. They had no mtention
of returning to office stools or to the life of outlaws and hunted
men. The United States force in Manila was small and
America was far. It was true that they might have to ^ht for
the prize which they had seized, but the military leaders about
Agumaldo were confident of winning in case they fought. They
bdieved the Americans were afraid of them and would be easily
beaten. American soldiers had been sdzed and had been in-
sulted by the followers of Aguinaldo and no resort had been
made to force. The Americans had been ordered to avoid
brining on an engagement and had obeyed. It is also probable
that many of the insults to which they had been subjected were
not appreciated by them, A tall soldier from western America
paid no attention to the insults hurled at him in a language
which he did not understand. And yet the small excited Fili-
pinos might retire feeling that the American had tamely sub-
mitted to insult worse than a blow."
By the middle of December, Aguinaldo had placed in
position in the vicinity of Manila all of the &Ad guns in
his possession.
liie Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10. It
provided for the termination of Spanish sovereignty in
the Philippines. This was what the Insurgents had been
waiting for, and thereafter things moved rapidly. It Is
obvious that an attack was definitely planned for at this
time, for on December 21, Commandant F. E. Rey tele-
graphed Aguinaldo that the second chief of the second
zone of Manila had directed him to assist by entering
that city as soon as they opened fire against the American
troops.^
On the following day Cailles reported that he had
occupied blockhouse No. 12, which was within the
American lines, and added the following significant
statement : —
'■ "We are oonatantly alarmed here hy American troops who wioh
to come within the military line. To-day received word from eeoosd
ohief, second Bone, Manila, that as soon as they opened fire against
the Amerioan troops I a«sist by entering Manila. I have do orders
in thiB matter; I await your direotiona." — P. I. R., 8W.
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THE PKEHEDITATBD nfflDBQENT ATTACK 135
"The order of yesterday waa, on hearing the first shote from
Santa Ana, for my whole force to hurl themselves on the Ameri-
can line of trenches, and to follow the Uving to Manila. The
dead con he with the dead. Yesterday we were content waiting
for the arming of the San Quintin." *
San Quintin's Bay was the anniversary of the Sicilian
vespera, the massacre of the French in Sicily in 1268.
Obviously the Insurgents were planning sometMng similar
for Manila.
For some reason the attack was not made as planned,
but there was no intention of abandoning it. Within
fifteen days of January 1 some 40,000 Filipinos left Manila.
Why 7 On January 7, Aguinaldo wrote to Seflor Benito
L^arda at Manila, saying : —
"I b^ you to leave Manila with yoiu* family and come here
to Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten you — I merdy
wish to warn you for your satisfaction, although it is not yet the
day or the week." *
Many details of the plan of attack have come into our
possession. Doctor Manuel Xeres Bui^os wrote Agui-
naldo during January relative to a plui for an uprisii^ of
the prisoners in BiUbid Prison, saying that it should by
all means come "before the movement is begun any-
where else," and calling attention to the necessity of
stationing men to prevent the American soldiers near
by in the Zorilla theatre from coming to the rescue. On
the back of this letter there is a sketch plan showing
where bolo men were to be stationed, ready to attack
these Boldiere.'
' P. I. R., 849.
■ Taylor, 70 AJ.
* " It ia absolutely neoeasary that an order be received here permit-
tins the uprising of those in prison before the movement ia begun any-
where tAao ; in the prison the word ihall be given at the moment the
bugle sounds retreat; it ia indispensable that some of our party be
I^epared in the vicinity of the Iris bridge, San Pedro street and Dulum-
bnyan bridge, in order to prevent the Americans quartered in the
Fennsylvania barracks (Zorilla theatre) from aiding those in the
priwn-" — P. L B., 73. 3.
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136 THE PHEUPPINEa PAST AND PRESENT
In his message to Congress dated Jantiaiy 1, 1899,
Agulnaldo said : —
"I consider argumenta unnecessary in support of the pro-
posed amendments, every one knows that our newborn R^ublic
now has to fight for ito existence against giants in ambition and
in power." •
An unsigned letter addressed to Apacible on Janiuiiy 4,
1899, contains the foilowiog statement : —
"It appears that conflict with the Americans is imminent
and inevitable. Several of their vessels with thousands of
soldiers commanded by General Miller were sent to Iloilo on
December 20th last to take that port together with the whole
of Visayas and Mindanao." *
On January 4 the following significaDt telegram was
sent out : —
"Circular Telegram from the Secretary of the Interior to Pro-
vincial Presidents, wherever there may be Tel^p'aphic
Service, to be communicated to the Local Chiefs of each
Town.
" Malolos, January 4, 1899, 9.35 a.1iI.
"To the Provincial President of the Province of Paogasin^ :
"Hasten the preparation of all the towns in order to oppose
the American invasion. See that all the inhabitants prepare
their bolos and daggers; also that in each street and barrio
national militia is organized, each six of whom should be com-
manded by a corporal, each thirteen by a sei^eant, each twenty-
six by a second lieutenant, each fifty-two by a first lieutenant,
and each one hundred and four by a captain, directing that the
soldiers of the national militia elect their own officers, informing
all that upon our attitude depends our salvation.
"LiNGATBN, January 4, 1899."
There is a note thereon which reads : —
" C(Hnmunicate this to all of the local chiefs, and to the com-
manding general ."
(Signed by initials which are ill^ble, but evidently those
of the Provincial President.) *
«P. I. B.,40. 8. • /Wd., Books C-1. * Ibid., llil. 3.
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THE PEEMEDITATBD INSUBGENT ATTACK 137
On January 5, 1809, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation
which contains tbe following statement : —
"The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of peace
and friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is, that
with rising ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on December
26, with the purpose of acquiring for themselves the title of
conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied
by my government.
"My government cannot renuun indifferent in view of such
a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by
a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, 'champion of
oppressed nations.' Thus it is that my government is ready
to open hostilities if the Amencsn troops attempt to take forci-
ble poesesaion of the Visayan Islands. I announce these rights
before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may
pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppres-
sors of nations and the tormentors of human kind.
"Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed." '■
Three days later this proclamation, which was rather
dangerously like a declaration of war, was reissued with
a significant change in the last one of the passages quoted,
the words "attempt to take forcible possession of any
part of the territory submitted to its jurisdiction" being
substituted for the words ' ' attempt to take forcible posses-
sion of tiie Visayan Islands."
On January 8, 1899, at 9.40 P.U., Sandico telegraphed
Aguinaldo as follows : —
" Note. — In consequence of the orders of General Rios
to his officers, as soon as the Filipino attack b^ns the Ameri-
cans should be driven into the Intramuros district and the
Walled city should be set on fire." *
Preparations for the attack, which was to be^ inside
the city of Manila, were now rapidly pushed to conclu-
fidon. I quote Taylor's excellent summary of them : —
"After Aguinaldo's proclamation of January 5 the number
of oi^anizatione charg^ with an attack within the city in-
• P. I. B., 1186. 10. » Ibid.. 849.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
138 TnE FHILIPFINES PAST AND FBE8ENT
creased rfq)idly and it ia possible that those which bad been
formed during Spanish rule had never been disbanded. San-
dico'a clubs for athletic exercises and mutual improvem^it
formed a nucleus for these bodies uid the directing bouds of
the popular committees took up the work of recruiting, while
some of the members became officers of the militia or san-
datahan. On January 6 the commander of militia in Troso,
Manila, reported that 1130 soldiers had been em'olled by the
popular committee. On January 7 Bonifacio Ardvalo for-
warded to the head of the central committee a list of the
officers of the battalion which had just been organized in Sam-
paloc for the defence of their liberties. Apparently about the
same time J. Limjap submitted to Sandico a project for
arming the prisoners in Bilibid Prison with the urns of the
American s(ddier8 quartered in the ZorriUa Theatre across the
street. He said : —
'"Jacinto Limjap having been proclaimed commander of
the volunteers of the penitentiary, I ask you to authorize the
creation of a disciplinary battalion and the provisioQal appoint-
ments of officers for 600 eandatahan, or militia, ready to provide
themselves by force with the American rifles in the Zonilla
Theatre.'
"He followed by a statement of the officers desired. It
was not difficult for him to obtain volunteers there to rob, to
bum, to rape and to murder. These were the crimes for which
they were serving sentences. The political priaonera had been
"On January 18 Sandico approved of the officers for the first
battalion organized by the committees of Sampaloc ; on January
27 he approved those of the second battalion. By January 22
two battalions had been organized in Quiapo. At least one
regiment of eight companies was raised in Blnondo, for on Jan-
uary 23 its commander forwarded a roll of the officers to Agui-
naldo for his approval. ... On January 25 T. Sandico, at
Malolos, submitted for approval the names of a number of offi-
cers of the territorial militia in the city of Manila. On January
30, 1899, a roll of four companies just organized in Malate was
forwarded approved by T. Sandico, and on the sune day the
committee of Trozo, Manila, applied to T. Sandico for permis-
sion to recruit a body for the defence of the country. The r^-
ment of ' Armas Blancas ' had already been raised in Tondo and
Binondo. It was in existence there in December, 1898, and
may have been originally organized to act against Spain. On
February 2 all officers of the territorial militia in Manila reported
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THE PREMEDITATED IN8UR0BNT ATTACK 130
at Coloocsn, in aficorduice with orders of Sandico, for the pur-
pose of receiving their commisBionB and taking the oath to the
flag. A man who took part in tliis ceremony wrote that a multi-
tude of men were present in uniform, and that the oath was ad-
ministered by Gen. Pantaledn Garcia. There is no reason for
believing that this is a complete statement of sandatahan or-
ganJEed in Manila by the end of January, and yet this statement
gives a force of at least 6330 men. General Otis said that this
force bad been reported to him as being 10,000 men. It is prob-
ably true that only a small number of them bad rifles ; but
armed with long knives and da^ers they could have inflicted
much damage in a sudden n^ht attack in the narrow and
badly l^hted streets of Manila. On January 9, 1S99, Agui-
Daldo wrote his instructions for the sandatahan of Mamla.
Members of this body were to enter the houses of the American
officers on the pretext of bringing them presents. Once in they
were to kill. The sentinels at the gates of the barracks were to
be approached by men dressed as women and killed. The gates
of the barracks held and as many officers as possible treacber^
ously murdered, the sandatahan were to rise throughout the
city, and by attacking in the rear the United States troops on
the outer line were to aid in opening a way for Aguinaldo's
force. To further increase the confusion and perhaps to punish
the natives who bad not joined them, the sandatahan were to
fire the city.
• ••*•••
" It is a fair deduction from Luna's orders for an uprising in
Manila, from AguiiuJdo's instructions for the sandatahan,
from otiier documents amoi^ the papers of the insurgents and
from what was done in Manila on February 22 that Aguinaldo
and bis advisers about the middle of January, 1899, drew up a
plan of attack upon Manila which would, if carried out, have
infficted a severe blow upon the Americans. It was not carried
out, but that was not the fault of Aguinaldo or of Luna.
" It is true that the instructions were general ; but that par-
ticular instructions were given by Aguinaldo himself for the
murder of General Otis is shown by his note on the back of a
docimient presented to him.'
"... And then there was nothing abhorrent to Aguinaldo
and the men about him in beginning a war by the murder of
the commaading general on the other side.
iSeep.733.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
140 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
"... Asuinaldo and all his followers have declared that on
February 4 the Americana attacked the unsuspecting Filipinos
who were using their utmost efforts to avoid a war. And yet
here in Aguiufddo's own handwriting is the record of the fact
that on January 10, 1899, he ordered the murder of the Amer-
ican commander.
"The attack which Aguinaldo was preparing to deliver upon
and in Muiila was not to be a mere rud aucb as the bandits
of Cavite were in the habit of making upon the defenceless
towns. The plan was a piece of calculated savagery in which
murder and outrage were considered means to accomplish a
purpose. The servants were to kill their employers; organized
bands, dressed in the dress of civilians, living in the city of
Manila under the government of the Americans, in many cases
employed by the Americans, were to suddenly fall upon the
barracks of the American soldiers and massacre the inmates;
all Americans in the streets were to be killed, the city was to be
fired and its loot was to be the reward of loyalty to Aguinaldo.
If this plan had b^n carried out no white man and no white
woman would have escaped. The reinforcements from the
United States would have arrived to find only the smokii^
ruins of Manila. Buencamino had warned General Augustfn
what the fate of Manila would be if taken by a horde of Indians
drunk with victory. That fate was now deliberately planned
for the city. Aguinaldo planned to occupy the capitu not as
it bad been occupied by the Americans. He planned to take
it as Count Tilly took Magdeburg.
"The authors of this plan were not savages. Mabini, San-
dico, and Luna, Asiatics educated in Euro[>ean schools, were
men of trained and subtle minds. With themcruelty and assassi-
nation was not a matter of savage impulse but of deliberate
calculation ; with them assassination was employed as an effec-
tive addition to [wlitical propaganda, and murder as an ulti-
mate resource in political manceuvres." '
Some portions of Aguinaldo's instructions to the san-
datakan are particularly wortJiy of perpetuation, as they
illustrate his ideas as to the conduct which should be ob-
served by cultured, patriotic, honoxu-able and very humane
men, who were not cruel : —
"Art. 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks
should send in first four men with a good present for the Am^-
' Taylor, 68-69 AJ.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE PREMEDITATED INSUBOENT ATTACK 141
can commfuider. Immedistely after will follow four othera
who will make a pretence of looldDg for the same officer for some
reasoii and a larger group shall be concealed in the corners or
houses in order to aid the other groups at the first signal. This
wherever it is possible at the moment of attack.
"AvT. 4. They should not, prior to the attack, look at the
Americans in a threatening manner. To the contrary, the
attack on the barracks by the sandatahan should be a complete
surprise and with decision and courage. One should go alone
in advance in order to kill the sentinel. In order to deceive
the sentinel one of tbem should dress as a woman and must
take great care that the sentinel is not able to discharge his
[Hece, thus calling the attention of those in the barracks. This
will enable his companions who are approaching to asidst in the
general attack.
"Abt. 5. At the moment of the attack the sandatahan
should not attempt to secure rifles from their dead enemies,
but shall pursue, slashing right and left with boloe until the
Am^icans surrender, and after there remans no enemy who
can injure them, they may take the rifles in one hand and the
ammunition in the other.
"Abt. 6. The officers shall take care that on the tops of
the houses along the streets where the American forces shall
pass there will be placed four to six men, who shall be prepared
with stones, timbers, red-hot iron, heavy furniture, aa well as
boiling wat«r, oil and molasses, rags soaked in coal oil ready
to be lighted and thrown down, and any other hard and heavy
objects that they can throw on the passing American troops.
At the same time in the lower parts of the houses will be con-
cealed the sandatahan, who will attack immediately. Great
care should be taken not to throw glass in the streets, as the
greater part of our soldiers go barefooted. On these houses
there will, if possible, be arranged, in addition to the objects to
be thrown down, a number of the sandatahan, in order to cover
a retreat or to follow up a rout of the enemy's column, so that
we may be sure of the destruction of all the opposing forces.
"Art. 7. All FiU^nnos, real defenders of their country,
shoidd live on the alert to assist simultaneously the inside at-
tack at the very moment that they note the first movement
in whatever barrio or suburb, having assurance that all the
troops that surround Manila will proceed without delay to force
the enemy's line and unite themselves with their brothers in
the city. With such a general movement, so firm and decided
against the Americans, the combat is sure to be a short one, and
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142 THE PHILIPPINE8 FAST AND FSESENT
I charge and order that the persons and goods of all foredgoerB
ehall he respected and that the American prisoners shw be
ffeated well.
"AsT. 9. In addition to the instructionB given in para-
graph 6, there shall be in the houses vessels filled with boiling
water, tallow, molasses and other hquids, which shall be thrown
as bombs on the Americans who pass in front of their houses,
or they cao make use of syringes or tubes of bamboo. In these
houses shall be the sandatahan who shall hurl the liquids that
shall be passed to them by the women and children.
"Abt. 10. In place of bolos or da^ers, if they do not poB-
sesB the same, the sandatahan can provide themselves with
lances and arrows with long sharp heads, and these should be
shot with great force in order that they may penetrate well
into the bodies of the enemy, and these should be so made that
in withdrawal from the body the head will renuun in the flesh.
*******
" Art. 12. . . . Neither will you forget your sacred oath and
inunaciilate banner; nor will you forget the promises made
by me to the eivihzed nations, whom I have assured that we
FUilHQOs are not savages, nor thieves, nor assassins, nor are we
cruel, but on the contrary, that we are men of culture and pa-
triotiam, honourable and very humane." '
Aguinaldo enjoined order on his subordinates.*
The Filipinos were now ready to assume the offensive,
but d^ired, if possible, to provoke the Americans into
firing the first shot. They made no secret of their desire
for confiict, but increased their hostile demonstrations
and pushed their lines forward into forbidden territory.
Their attitude is well illustrated by the following extract
from a telegram sent by Colonel Cailles to Aguinaldo on
January 10, 1899 : —
"Most urgent. An American interpreter has come to tell
me to withdraw our forces in Maytubig fifty paces. I shall
" P. I. B., 209-207.
' "Above idl I exiMot th&t you will respeot the persons and goods
of private persons of all nationalitiefl, inolnding the Chineee ; that you
will treat well the prisoners and grant life to those of the eneniy who
Burrendor. And that you be on the sbarp lookout for those traitors
and enemies who, by robbery, will seek to max our viotory."
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THE FREHEDITATED INSDHOENT ATTACK 143
not draw back a etep, and in place of withdrawing, I shall ad-
v&ace a little farther. He brings a letter from his general, in
which he Bpeaks to me as a friend. I said that from the day I
knew that Maqtiinley (McKinley) opposed our independence
I did not want any deaUngs with any American. War, war, is
what we want. The Americana after this speech went off
pale." '■
Aguinaldo approved the hostile attitude of Cailles, for
there is a reply in his handwriting which reads : —
"I approve and applaud what you have done with the
Americans, and zeal and valour always, also my beloved officers
and soldiers there. I believe that they are playing us until
the arrival of their reSnforcementa, but I shall send an ultimatum
and remain always on the alert. — E. A. Jan. 10, 1899." *
On titiis same day Aguinaldo comnussioned Feliciano
Cruz and Severino Quitiongco to assassinate General
Otis.»
On January 13 Noriel and Cailles tel^raphed Agui-
naldo as follows: —
"We desire to know results of ultimatum which you mention
in your telegram, and we also wish to know what reward our
Government is arran^i^ for the forces that will be able first to
enter Manila."
This telegram is indorsed in Aguinaldo'a handwriting :
"As to the contents of your telegram, those who will be the
heroes will have as their rewards a hirge quantity of money,
extraordinary rewards, promotaons, crosses of Biak-na-bat6,
Marquis of Malate, Ermita, Count of Manila, etc., besides the
congratulations of our idolizing country on account of their
beh^ patriotic, and more, if they capture the regimente with
thdr generals, and, if p(»Bible, the chief of them ail who repre-
sents our future enemies in Manila, which (lot ?) falls to you, or,
better said, to General Noriel and Colonel CaiDes.
"The ultimatum has not been sent, but it will be within a
few days.
(Signed) "E. A.
"Malolos, Jan. 14, 1899." *
ip. I.B.,849. 'Ibid.
* For the dooument on whioh this Btatement Is baaed see p. 733.
'P. I. B.. 849.
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144 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
On January 14, 1899, the people at Aparri shouted:
"Death to the Americans," and held a review to celebrate
the rupture of friendly relations with the United Statra.'
At this time Aguinaldo had a dream about a victorious
attack upon Manila and telegraphed it to some of his
officers. General Garcia replied from Caloocan on
January 17 that the dream would come true as soon as
the conflict with the Americans began.'
In January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo was still not quite
ready, and ordered that the Filipino soldiers in the walled
city keep on good terms with the Americans, in order to
deceive them, "since the hoped-for moment has not yet
arrived." •
The Insui^nts grew surer and siu-er that the Americans
were cowards,* and openly boasted that when the attack
began they would drive them into the sea.
' Taylor. 81 AJ.
> "In reply to your t«Ieg7am conoemiiiK your dream of raitering
Manila after four hours of combat. I have the honour to inform you
for myself Mid the offloers and soldiers under my oommand that your
dream will oome true as Boon as the oooflict inth the Americans be-
pns, since we sh^ advance at any oost." — P. I. R., 849.
' On January 21, 1890, the commander of the fourth isone, Caloo-
oan, wired Aguinaldo that :
"Julian Santo, oommander of the territorial militia of Troso, in-
forms me that 400 native soldiers of the Spuiiah army ttnday incor-
porated in his militia. He lives in the widled oity, and he wuits to
know your opinion upon the present situation, since the Americana
want to hold them aa prisoners or confine them in Bilibid prison."
(Indorsed, handwriting of Aguinaldo:) "Tell the Filipino soldiers
in the walled city afBIiated to our cause that they must keep on good
terms with the Americans, in order to deceive them, and prevent
their oonflning them, since the hoped-for moment has not yet arrived."
— P. I. B.. 849.
* On January 20, 1899, a correspondent wrote to one of the In-
surgents abroad :
"In some places (in Manila) there have been fights with bolos be-
tween Filipinos and Americana who wanted to tear down the proclama-
tion of our president while the people defended it with their bolos.
They say that it amuses them to see the Americans run when they
draw their knives. It b said that some 10,000 servants have gone on
strike. Some Americans have already disappeared by the method
of 'dukut' but it will not be proper to publish this in my opinion."
— P. LB., 980. 82.
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THE PREMEDITATED INSUBGENT ATTACK 145
On January 21 General Otis wrote to Admiral Dewey
that; —
"The insurgents will not now permit us to cross their lines
and have been very insulting to our officers, calling to them that
very shortly they will give us battle. My best information
is that they have fully determined to attack both outside and
within the city before our additional troops arrive, and the
least spark may start a conflagration." '
As the date of the proposed attack drew near, the work
of strengthening the Insurgent positions around Manila
was pushed with all possible speed.*
About the middle of January Genra^ Otis stationed
the First Nebraska Regiment upon the high ground at
Santa Mesa for sanitary reasons. Of conditions at this
time, and of the circumstances leading to the actual out-
break of hostilities Taylor says : —
"During the latter part of January General Otis was in-
formed oa good insurgent authority that the insurgents medi-
tated an attack upon those troops, and he was advised to re-
move them, as in their exposed i>osttion they would kill them all.
General MacArthur, under whose command the regiment was,
' Taylor. AJ. 73.
* (Telegram received by E, Aguinaldo :)
"To the PreeideDt of the Repubtio, MaloloB, from the Provinoi^
Oovemor of Manila, San Juan del Monte, Jan. 29, 1899, 10.25 A.u. :
I yeeterday visited the military road in prooees of construction, Santa
Ana to nneda. To-morrow it wilt be suiEoiently completed to permit
pasaaffe, and in two days after it will be finished. Considerine opening
another military road direct from Oaloooan to San Juan. Deeire
authority.
(Indorsed, handwriting of Aeuinaldo :) " Tel^ram iwwived. lam
very much satisfied, and in the name of the government I congratulate
you and the presidents of Santa Ana and Pineda with their inhabitants
for their efforts for the public good. You are authorized to open
another mihtaiy road from Caloooan to San Juan del Monte, and I
want you to endeavor to finish it this week, as I am certain you wiU."
~ P. I. R., 849.
(Telegram received by E. A^oaldo :)
"To the Secretary of the Interior, Maloloa, from San Juan dal
Monte — Received Feb. 3, 1S99 from the Provincial Qovemor Manila :
Road marked out ; work b^an Wednesday. I shall put forth every
effort to finish by middle of the ooming week." — P. I. R., 849.
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146 THE PHILIFPINBS PAST AND PRESENT
placed two guns in position thare, as it was fully expected that
the insurgents would direct their attack upon that point, as in
fact they did. On February 4, 1899, the tents of the lament
covered the ridge, and its outposts extended along the San Juan
EUver, a small stream which formed part of the line of delimita-
tion between the Americaos and the insui^ents.
"For Bome days before the outbreak of hostilities the pres-
sure of the insurgents was coiutant aloi^ this position, so con-
Btant indeed that in the light of subsequent events it indicated
a premeditated purpose on the part of some one in the insurgent
army to force a colUsion at that point. On February 2 General
MacArthur, commanding the Second Division of the Eighth
Army Corps, wrote to the commanding general of the Filipino
troops in ^e third zone in front of him that —
'"An armed party from your command now occupies the
village in front of blockhouse No. 7, at a point considerably
more than a himdred yards on my side of the line, and is very
active in exhibiting hostile intentions. This party must be
withdrawn to your side of the line at once. From this date if
the line is crossed by your men with arms in their hands they
must be regarded as subject to such action as I may deem neces-
sary.'
"Colonel San Miguel, who commanded at San Juan dd
Monte, replied upon the receipt of this commiinication that the
action of his troops was fordgn to his wishes and that he would
^ve immediate orders for them to retire. At about half past
8 on the night of February 4 a email insurgent patrol entered
the territory within the American lines at blockhouse No. 7
and advanced to the little village of Santol in front of an out-
post of the Nebraska regiment. This was the same point from
which the insurgents had been compelled to retire on February 2.
An American outpost challenged, and then as the insurgent
patrol continued to advance the sentinel Bred, whereupon the
insurgent patrol retired to blockhouse No. 7, from which fire
was immediately opened upon the Americans. This fire spread
rapidly down the American and insui^^t lines and both forces
at once sprang to arms." *
General Otis's aoooimt of the opening of active hostili-
ties follows : —
"On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detach-
ment to draw 3ie fire of our outposts, which took up a position
:dbvGoogIe
THE PBZHEDITATIID INSUBOEHT ATTACK 147
immediately in froot and within a few yaids of the same. The
outpost was strengthened by a few tw our men, who silently
bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was re-
ported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to com-
municate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops
Gonoemed. His prepared letter wae shown me and approved,
and the re^ly received was all that could be desired. However,
the ^reement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening
of February 4 another demonstration was made on one of our
small outposts, which occupied a retired position at least 150
yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon,
ao insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or
answer when challenged. The result was that our picket dis-
charged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa
opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.
"The insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a
small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all thwr
ingenuity to accomplish, in order to justify in some way their
premeditated attack. It is not believed that the chief insur-
gent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were
not completely prepared to assume the initiative. They de-
sired two or three days more to perfect their arrangements, but
the real of their army brought on the crisis which anticipated
their premeditated action. They could not have delayed long,
however, for it was their object to force an issue before American
troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila." ^
Thus began the Insui^nt attack, so long and so care-
fully -planned for. We learn from the Instirgent records
that the shot of the American sentry missed its mark.
There was no reason why it should have provoked a hot
return fire, but it did.
The result of the ensuing combat was not at all what
the Insurgents had anticipated. The Amaicans did not
drive very well. It was but a short time before they
themselves were routed and driven from their positions.
Aguinaldo of course promptly advanced the claim that
his troops had been wantonly attacked. The plain fact
is that the Insurgent patrol in question deliberately drew
the fire of the American sentry, and this was just as much
' Taylor, 73 AJ.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
148 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
an act of war as was the firing of the shot. Whetii^
the patrol was acting under proper orders from higher
authority is not definitely known.
In this connection the following telegram sent by Captain
Zialcita from Santa Ana on February 4, 1899, at 9.55 p.u.,
to Major Gray, San Juan del Monte, is highly interesting :
"I received the telegram forwarded from Malolos. General
Ricarte is not here. I believe (that if the) Americans open fire
we shall attack. Will aak instructions (of) Malolos." *
This looks as if Zialcita at least knew that something
was to be done to draw the American fire.
Aguinaldo's first statement relative to the opening of
hostilities is embodied in a general order dated Malolos,
February 4, 1899, and reads in part as follows : —
"Nine o'clock p.m., this date, I received from Caloocan sta-
tion a message communicated to me that the American forces,
without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our
camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the
blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses
among our soldiers, who in view of this unexpected aggression and
of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to defend
themselves until the firing became general all along the line.
"No one can deplore more than' I this rupture of hostilities.
I have a clear conscience that I have endeavoured to avoid it
at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the
army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations
and many sacrificed rights.
"... I order and conomand: —
"1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine
forces and the American forces of occupation are brok^i, and
the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed
by the laws of war.
" 2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philip-
pine forces will be treated aa prisoners of war.
"3. This proclamation shall be conmiunicated to the accred-
ited consuls of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may
accord the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and the
resulting declaration of war," '
' P. I. B., 20X8. • Ibid., 1090. 6.
:dbvGoogIe
THE PREMEDITATED INSURGENT ATTACK 149
Aguinaldo's protestations relative to his efforts to avoid
hostilities are absurd, in view of his own instructions con-
cerning the attack to be made simultaneously within and
without the city of Manila.
There is other correapondence which throws light on the
situation which existed inunediately prior to the outbreak
of hostilities. On January 25, 1899, Agoncillo cabled
I from Washington to Apacible in Hongkong: "Recom-
I mend you await beginning American i^gression, justifying
our conduct nations." *
Apacible apparently did not take this view of the matter,
for on January 31 he wrote to Aguinaldo that the Senate
in Washington would take final vote upon the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain on February
6, and said : —
"It is urgently necessary for America to answer us immedi-
ately before the ratification of the treaty. A confiict after the
ratification of the treaty would be unfavorable to us in public
opinion." *
Obviously this letter might be interpreted as a recom-
mendation that hostilities begin before February 6 if
America did not answer meanwhile. It was evidently
well imderstood in Hongkong that Aguinaldo's receipt
of Apacible's letter might cause war to begin, for on Feb-
ruary 3, 1899, Bray, anticipating the outbreak of hos-
tilities of the following day, cabled Senator Hoar at Wash-
ington as follows : —
" Receive caution news hostilities Manila discredited here denied
Filipino circles supposed political move influence vote Senate
to-day any case insignificant skimush due intentional provo-
cation.
f " Brat." »
The extracts from the Insurgent records above quoted
leave no escape from the concludon that the outbreak
of hostilities which occurred on February 4, 1899, had been
' P. I. R., 453. 4. » P. I. R., 453. 2. • P. I. B,. 493. 12.
:dbvGoogIe
ISO THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PEESBNT
carefully prepared for and was deliberately preripitated
by the Filipinos themselves.
Blount says : —
"It would be simply wooden-headed to affirm that they ever
expected to succeed m a war with us." ^
It may have been wooden-headed for the FHipinos to
expect this, but expect it they certainly did. We have
seen how they held their soldiers in check until after
Spain had been ousted from the Philippines by the Treaty
of Paris as they had originally planned to do. It now only
remained to carry out the balance of t^eir ori^nal plan
to get rid of the Americans in one way or another.
General Otis states that " when Aguinaldo had completed
his preparations for attack he prepared the outlines of his
declaration of war, the full text of which was published at
Malolos on the eveniug, and very shortly after, hostilities
began. This declaration was circulated in Manila on the
morning of February 5." *
The Insurgents brought down upon themselves the
punishment which they received on February 4 and 5.
Bloxmt has stated ' that if the resolutions of Senator
Bacon introduced on January 11, 18d9, had passed, we
never should have bad any war with the Filipinos. The
resolutions in question concluded thus : —
"That the United States hereby disclaim any diapoeition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over
said ifilandfl except for the pacification thereof, and assert their
determination when an independent government shall have
been duly erected tberdn entitled to recognition as such, to
transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reason-
able and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain,
and to thereupon leave the govemmeait and control of the
islands to thdr people."
I must take issue with Blount as to the effect which
these resolutdom might have bad if passed. The Insur-
1 Blonnt, p. 190. * T^jtIot, 86 AJ« ■ Blount, p. 175.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE PREMEDITATED INSUBQENT ATTACK 151
gents felt themselyes to be fully eompetent to bring about
such pacification of the idands as they deemed necessary.
At the time the resolutions were presented in the Senate
their soldiers were strainii^ at the leash, ready to attack
their American opponents upon the most slender excuse.
Aguiualdo himself could not have held them much longer,
and it is not impossible that they got away from him as
it was. They would have interpreted the passage of the
Bacon resolutions as a further evidence of weakness, and
hastened their attack. As we have seen, "war, war,
war" was what they wanted.
Blount has endeavoured to shift the responsibility for
the outbreak of hostilities to the United Stetes by claim-
ing that certain words italicized by him in what he calls
the "Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation" were neo-
essarily, to the Insurgents, "fighting words." The ex-
presdons referred to have to do with the establishment
of United States sovereignty and the exercise of govern-
mental control in the Philippine Islands.
These words were not "fighting words," the Insurgent
policy being, as I have shown by the records, to con^der
the acceptance of a protectorate or of annexation in the
event that it did not prove possible to negotiate absolute
independence, or probable that the American troops
could be driven from the islands.
The growing confidence of the Insurgents in their abil-
ity to whip the cowardly Americana, rather than any
fixed determination on their part to push a stru^e for
independence to the bitter end, led to their attack.
:dbvGoogIe
CHAPTER V
Instjrqent Rule and the Wilcox-Sarqent Repobt
Teos Good Book Bays, "By their fruits ye shall know
them, whether they be good or evil," and it seems proper
to apply this test to the Insurgents and their government.
The extraordinary claim has been advanced that the
United States destroyed a republic in the Philippines
and erected an ohgarchy on its ruins. Various writers
and speakers who have not gone so far as this have yet
maintained that Aguinaldo and his associates established
a real, effective government throughout the archipelago
during the interim between his retium and the outbreak
of hostilities with the United States.
In stmunarizing conditions on September 15, 1898,
Judge Blount says : ' —
"Absolute master of all Luzon outside Manila at this time,
with complete machinery of govenunent in each province for
all matters of justice, taxes, and police, an army of some 30,000
men at his beck, and his whole people a unit at his back, Agui-
naldo formally inaugurated his permanent government — per-
manent as opposed to the previous provisional government —
with a Constitution, Congress, and Cabinet, patterned after
our own,* just as the South American republics had done before
him when they were freed from Spain, at Malolos, the new
capital."
He refers to our utter failure to understand "what a
wonderfully complete 'going concern' Aguinaldo's gov-
ernment had become throughout the Philippine Archi-
pelago before the Treaty of Paris was sigued." *
1 Blount, p. 98.
* The ooastitution used was most oertamly not patterned after
our own. See p. 265.
•Blount, p. in.
:dbvGoogIe
INBUBGENT ROLE AND THE WILCOX-SARGENT REPORT 153
He bases his claim as to the excellent state of public
order in the Insurgent territory at this time on a report of
Paymaster W. E. Wilcox and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent
of the United States Navy, who between October 8 and
November 20, 1898, made a long, rapid trip through
noriihem Luzon, traversing the provinces of Bulacan,
Pampanga, Tarlac, Pangasinfin, Nueva Ecija, Nueva
Vizcaya, Isabela, Cagayan, South Hocos and Union, in
the order named, thence proceeding to Dagupan and down
the raihvad through Pangasindn, Tarlac, Pampanga and
Bulacan to Manila.
He says that these gentlemen found the authority
of Aguinaldo's government universally acknowledged,
the country in a state of perfect tranquillity and public
order,' with profound peace and freedom from brigandage
and the like.'
Now if it be true that A^uinaldo established complete
machinery of government throughout all of Luzon out-
side of Manila for all matters of justice, taxes and police,
so that life and property were safe and peace, tran-
quillity and justice assured, we may well d^pense with
quibbling as to whether the proper name was appUed to
such government. But did he ?
Let us examine with some care the history of the
Vfilcox-Sargent trip, and see if we can gtun further light
from other sources relative to the condition of pubUc
order in the territory which they traversed.
I propose, for the most part, to let the captured In-
surgent records speak for themselves, as it is fair to as-
sume that Insurgent officers were at no pains to repre-
I "The light Messrs. Sargent and Wiloox thiov on the then uni-
versal aoknowledgfment of the Authority of the Agoinaldo government
and the perfect tranquillity and public order maintained under it, in
the Cagayan valley." — Blount, pp. 114-115.
■ "The country in fact, ae Aguinaldo always claimed in his proo-
lamations of that period seeking recognition of hia government by
the Powers, in a state of profound peace and tranquillity — free from
brigandage and the like." — Blount, p. 115.
:dbvGoogIe
154 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Bent conditions as worse than they really were. In view
of the fra^pneutary charaoter of these records, we may also
assume that the complete story would be still more
interesting and instructive than the one which I have
been able to reconstruct.
Messrs. Sai^ent and Wilcox were almost everywhere
hospitably received, and were entertained with dinners
and dances after the inimitable fashion of the hospitable
Filipino everywhere. They gained a very favourable
impression of the state of public order in the provinces
through which they passed for the reason that from the
very start their trip was strictly personally conducted.
They saw exactly what it was intended that they should
see and very little more. Their progress was several times
interrupted for longer or shorter periods without adequate
explanation. We now know that on these occasions the
scenery so carefully prepared in advance for them had be-
come a Uttle disarranged and needed to be straightened
up. Facts which I will cite show that most shocking and
horrible events, of which they learned nothing, were oc-
curring in the territory through which they passed.
For a considerable thne before their departure American
visitors had been carefully excluded from the Insurgent
territory, but the Filipino leaders decided to let these two
men go through it to the end that they might make as
favourable a report aa possible. How carefully the way
was prepared for American visitors is shown by the fol-
lowing telegram : — „« „
"San Pedbo, Macati,
"July 30, 1898.
"To the Local Presidente of Pasig:
"You are hereby informed that the Americans are going
to your town and they will ask your opinion [of what the people
desire. — Tr.] Yon should answer them that we want a repub-
lican goverament. The same answer must be given through-
out your jutisdiction.
(Signed) " Pio del Filab,
" G«neral of the Second Zone." *
>P.I. R.,968. 11
:dbvGoogIe
bvGoogle
:dbvGoogIe
INSUROBNT BULB AND THE WILCOX-SARQBNT REPORT 1S5
Now General Pilar had an uncomfortable way of kill-
ing people who did not obey his orders, and under the
rules of the Insurgent government he was abundantly
justified in so doing. His suggestions as to what visiting
Americans should be told or shown would be likely to be
acceded to. Certainly this seems to have been the case
in the present instance, for on the same day General
Noriel reported as follows : ^ —
"I*rasident R. G., Bacoor, from Gen. Noriel, Pineda, July
30, 12.10 p.H. : I mform your excellency that some commiseioQers
of the American admiral are making investigatione in the region
around Pasay as to the wishes and opinion of the people as to
the government. To-day I received a statement from some,
giving the answer : ' Free government under American proteo-
torat« [copy mutilated, two or three words '"'""'"e here] the
President.' "
Blount quotes with approval Admiral Dewey's state-
ment made shortly after the return of Wilcox and Sargent
that in his opinion their rqrort "contains the most com-
plete and reliable infonnation obtainable in regard to the
present state of the northern part of Luzon Island." '
This was true.
The admiral might have gone further and said that it
contained practically the only infonnation then obtainable
in regard to conditions in the territory in question, but as
I shall conclusively show it was neither complete nor
reliable.
Judge Blount in describing the experiences of Mesara.
Wilcox and Sargent niJively makes the statement that:
"The touristB were provided at Kosales by order of Agui-
naldo with a military escort, ' which was continued by relays all
the way to Aparri.' " •
It certainly was I
Very little Spanish was then spoken in Nueva Vizcaya,
Isabela or Cagayan. What opportunity had these two
> p. L B., 849. * Bknint, p. 108. '/Md., p. 109.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
160 THE PHILIPPINB8 PAST AND PRESENT
men, ignorant as they were of the native dialects, to learn
the sinister facts as to what had been and was occurring
in the territory which they visited?
No one can fail to be delighted with Filipino hospitality,
which was lavishly bestowed upon them everywhere, and
it is Gnly natural that they should have reported favour-
ably upon what they saw. It was about tbis time that
an order was issued ' that fronts of buildings should be
whitewashed, streets cleaned and fences repaired with
a view to showing every one, and especially travellers
through the territory of the Insurgents, that they were
"not opposed to a good such as a refined and civilized
people should have." Doubtless the report of the two
men from Dewey's fleet was made in the best of faith.
I will now endeavour to show what were some of the
actual conditions in the traritory through which they
passed.
Bidacan
They first visited Bulacan. They do not mention hear-
ing of the activities of a Chinaman named Ignacio Paua,
who had been given the rank of colonel by Aguinaldo and
assigned the task of extorting contributions for the revolu-
tion from his countrymen. In a letter to Aguinaldo
written bn July 6, 1S98, Paua states that he has collected
more than S1,000 from the Chinese of these small towns,
but asks for an order "prohibiting the outrages that are
being committed against such merchants as are not our
enemies." He further says, "When the contributions
from the Chinamen of all the pueblos shall have been
completed I wish to publish a proclamation forbidding
any injury to the Chinamen and any interference with
their small business enterpiises," and adds that "the
'"With a view to sliovin? every one and especially foreignera
travellinf; through the territory of the Republio, that we are not op-
poeed to a good suah aa a refined and civilized people should have, the
fronts ot buildings should be whitewashed, streets should be cleaned
and fenoes repaired." — P. I. R., 292. 3.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
mSUROENT RULE AND THE WILCOX-8AROENT REPORT 157
natives hereabouts themselves are the people who are
comiuittiiig said abuses." ^
Apparently Paua had no objection to the committing
of outrages against merchants that were the enemies of
the cause, nor does he seem to have objected to injury to
Chinamen before contributions were completed. Elis own
methods were none too mild. On August 27, 1398, General
Ffo del Pilar telegraphed Aguinaldo that five Insurgent
soldiers, under a leader supposed to be Paua, had entered
the store of a Chinaman, and tried to kidnap his wife, but
had left on the payment of $10 and a promise to pay S50
later, saying that they would return and hang their fellow
countryman if the latter amount was not forthcoming.*
Paua was later made a general in consideration of his
valuable services I
■ "It would he a great Batisfaodon to me to aid you with all my
stxenKth ; and the only thing that I see to object to is that the Com-
mandere and Oenerab in this province ore getting pretty dbusive
toward our brethren and allow themselves to be bribed by the TagfUog
movhanta ao aa to allow them to enter Manila with their goods, which
is of great aseistanoe to our enemies.
" Conoeming the ooatributions wliioh I have collected from the China-
men, it amounts to more than P2,000 here in Tambobong, Meycauayan
and Polo alone ; and those from the other pueblos have not yet come
to see me. Furthermore, I would like an order from you prohibiting
the outragee that are being committed against such merchants as are
not our enemies ; and when the contributions from the Chinamen of
all the pueblos shall have been completed, I wish to publish a proclama-
tion forbidding any injury to the Chinamen and any interference with
theb small business enterprises ; since this is a disgrace to our govern-
ment and to your name ; for the natives of hereabouts themselves
are the people who are committing said abuses, and in hopes of putting
a stop to them, I await your decision at the earliest possible moment
concerning the proclamation referred to." — P. I. R., 355. 11.
*"lAst night in the place known as Santo Cristo (Manila?) th«
store of J. Ricafort, a Chinaman, was entered by five soldiers of our
army under an unknown commander supposed to be Colonel Paua.
They tried to kidnap the wife of Ricafort. At the request of P. Qu-cfo
they desisted upon payment of 20 pesos and the agreement that 100
peaos would be paid later. If this was not done they would return
and hang them. To quiet these people I gave them a pass to assure
their personal safety, and exacted at the same time a promise that
they should not report the matter to the Americans. Paulino QknUa
{■ now at Pedro Maoati." — P. I. R., 1187.4.
:dbvGoogIe
TEE PHIUPHNES FAST AMD PRESENT
Our travellers next visited Pampanga. Here they ap-
parently overlooked the fact that Aguinaldo did not have
"his whole people a unit at his hack." The citizens of
Macabebe seem not to have approved of the Aguinaldo
regime, for the Insurgent records show that : —
"Representatives of the tovns of Pampanga assembled in
SaD Fernando on June 26, 1898, and under the presideucy of
General Marimino. Hizon agreed to yield him complete 'obe-
dience as military governor of the province and representative
of the illustrious dictator of these Philippine Islands.' The
town of Macabebe refused to send any delegates to this
gatherii^." '
It may be incidentally mentioned that Blount has
passed somewhat hghtly over the fact that he himself
during his army days commanded an aggregation of
sturdy citizens from this town, known as Macabebe
scouts, who diligently shot the Insurgents full of holes
whenever they got a chance. He incorrectly refers to
them as a "tribe or clan." ^ It is absurd to call them a
tribe. They are merely the inhabitants of a town which
has long been at odds with the neighbouring towns of the
province.
Things had come to a bad pass in Pampai^ when its
head wrote that the punishment of beating people in the
plaza and tying them up so that they would be exposed
to the full rays of the sim should be stopped. He argued
that such methods would not lead the people of other
> P. I. R., 223.
■ "Early in the war we had &Twled ourselvee of a oertain tribe, or
olan, known as the Maccabebes, who look nowise different from all othw
FilipinoB, but who had, under the Spanish government, by reason of
long-standing feuds with their more rebellious neighbours, come to be
absolutely loyal to the Spanish authorities. When we came they had
truisferred that loyalty to us, and had now beoome a recognized and
valuable part of our military foroe." — Blount, pp. 333-334.
:dbvGoogIe
mgURQENT EULE AND THE WILC0X-8ABQENT BEPORT 169
natioDB to believe that the reign of liberty, equality and
fraternity had begun in the Philippines.'
When it is remembered that persons tied up and ex-
posed to the full rays of the sun in the Philippine lowlfuida
soon die, in a most imcomfortable manner, we shall
agree with the head of this province that this custom has
its objectionable features I
Tarlac
While the failing of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent to
leam of the relatioi^ between the Tag&logs of Macabebe
and their neighbours, or of the fact that people were being
publicly tortured in Pampanga, is perhaps not to be won-
dered at under the circumstEuices, it is hard to see how they
could have failed to hear something of the seriously dis-
turbed conditions in Tarlac if they so much as got off the
train there.
On August 24 the commiBsioner in charge of elections
in that province asked for troops to protect him, in holding
them in the town of Urdaneta, against a party of two thou-
sand men of the place, who were going to prevent them.
On September 22 the secretary of the interior ordered
that the requirements of the decree of June IS, establish-
ing municipal governments, should be strictly complied
with, as in many of the towns "the inhabitants continue
to follow the ancient methods by which the friars exploited
UB at their pleasure and which showed their great contempt
for the law." '
' "On Jul; 28, 1898, the head of the provinoe of Pampanga wrote
that the punishment of beating people in the plaza and tying them
up BO that the; would be exposed to the full r&ya of the aun should be
stopped. He oomplaiDed that these methods had been oorried so
far that even people of good social position had been ao punished.
it was especially undesirable to employ aueh punishments, as the
people of other nations seeing them would not believe that the reigo
of Uberty, equality, and fiatemity had begun in the Philippines."
— P. I. B.. 196. 3.
' Taf lor, 47 AJ.
bvGoogli
le
160 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Tlie following letter to Aguinaldo, from Juan Nepomu-
ceno, Representative from Tarlac, speaks for itself as to
conditions in that province on December 27, 1898, shortly
after the American travellers passed through it on their
return: —
" I r^ret exceedingly being compelled to report to you that
since Sunday the 25th instant scandalous acts have b^n going
on in the Province of Tarlac, which I represent. On the night
of the Sunday mentioned the entire family of the Local Chief
of Bamban was murdered, and his house and warehouse were
burned. Also the Tax Commissioner and the Secretary,
Fabian Ignacio, have been murdered. Last night Sefior Jacinto
Vega was kidnapped at the town of Gerona ; and seven travel-
lers were murdered at O'Donnel, which town was pillaged, as
well as the barrio of Matayumtayum of the town of La Paa.
On that day various suspicious parties were seen in the town of
Panique and in the same barrio, according to reliable reports
which I have just received.
"All this general demoralization ot the province, according
to the information which I have obtained, is due to the fact that
the province is dissatisfied with the ProvinciiU Chief, S^or
Alfonso Ramos, and with Major Manuel de Le6n; for this is
substantiated by the fact that all the events described
occurred since last Sunday, when Sefior Alfonso Ramos
retiuTied, to take chai^ of the Office of Provincial President,
after having been detained for several days in this town.
Wherefore, I believe that in order to restore tranquillity in the
province, consideration be given to various documents that
have been presented to the Government and to the standing
Committee of Justice; and that there be removed from office
Sefior Alfonso Ramos, as well as said Sefior Manuel de Le6n,
who has no prest^ whatever in this province. Moreover
on the day when fifty-four soldiers of the conmiand deserted,
he himself left for San Fernando, Pampanga." •
On November 30, 1898, General Macabulos sent
Aguinaldo a telegram ^ from which it evidently appears
> P. I. R., 944.
' " I have the honour to inform you that I have been in ttua town
since yeaterda; afternoon issuing, in a proclamation, conciliatory
orders to the populaoe that the people oomprised in the upriaing must
present themselves and express aversion and repudiation of it, promis-
ing them consideratioa and pardon as long aa they lay aside anas. la
j:,GoogIe
■31
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INSURGENT RULE AND THE WILCOX-SARGENT REPORT 161
that there was an armed uprising in Tarlac which he was
endeavouring to quell and that he hoped for early success.
Apparently, however, his efforts to secure tranquilUty
were not entirely successful, for on December 1$ he
telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows : —
"In a telegram dated to-day Lieut. Paraso, commaading
a detachmeot at Camiliu, informs me that last night his detach-
ment was attacked by Tulisanes (robbers). The fire lasted
four hours without any casualties among our men. This after-
Doon received another from the captain commanding said
detachment, informing me of the same, and that nothing new
has occurred. The people of the town await with anxiety the
result of the charges they have made, especially against the
local president and the justice of the peace, the original of which
I sent to your high authority." '
Obviously the pohce machinery was not working quite
amoothly when a detachment of Insurgent troops could
be kept under fire for four hours by a robber band, and
perhaps the attacking party were not all "robbers."
Soldiers do not ordinarily carry much to steal.
We obtain some further information from the following
telegram of December 27, 1898, sent by the secretary
of the interior to the President of the Revolutionary
Government: —
"Most urgent. According to reports no excitement except
in Bangbaog, Tarlac, which at 12 a.u., 25th, was attacked by
Tulisanes [bandits or robbers, — D. C. W.]. The iocal presi-
dente with his patrols arrested six of them. On continuing
the pursuit he met in Talacon a party too large to attack. At
7 A.u. of the 26th the town was again attacked by criminals,
who killed the tax collector, and others who burnt some houses,
among them that of the local presidente, and his stables, in
which he lost two horses. I report this for your information." *
eomidiaDoe with and following the earlier published proolamation,
they presented two (runs and innumerable bolos. I hope aoon for
tranquillity among the people there through these efforts. I ask dis-
pense with aasemb^ of the Junta. Cam iun, November 30, 1898."
— P. I. R., 849.
1 P. I. K., 849. ' Ibid.
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162 THE PHlLIPPINEa PAST AND PRESENT
Evidently tax collectors were not popular in Tarlac.
Still further light is shed on the situation by a tele^itim
from the secretary of the interior to Aguinaldo, dated
December 28, 1898 : —
"According to my information the excitement in Tarlac
increases. I do not think that the people of the province would
have committed such barbarities by themselves. For this
reason the silence of General Macabulos is suspicious ; to speak
frankly, it encourages the rebels. Some seven hundred of them,
with one hundred and Mty rifles, entered Pafiique, seized the
arms of the police, the town funds, and attacked the houses of
the people. I report this for your information. All necessary
measures will be taken." •
Note also the following from the secretary of the in-
terior, under date of December 27, 1898, to Aguinaldo : —
"I have just learned that not only in Bangbang, but also in
Gerona, Onell, and other places in Tarlac, men have been as-
saulted by numerous Tulisanes, armed with rifles and bolos,
who are killing and capturing the inhabitants and attacking
travellers, robbing them of everythii^ they have. The President
shoidd declare at once that that province is in state of siege,
applying martial law to the criminals. That — (remainder
missing)." *
The secretary of agriculture took a more cheerful
view of the situation. Under date of December 28
he telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows : —
"The events in Bangbang, Tarlac Province, according to a
witness here worthy of credit, have arisen from an attempt to
procure vengeance on the local presidente, and robbery of
Chinese shops. Hence they are without political importance.
The tax collector killed, and a countryman servant of the local
presidente wounded. They burnt two houses of the local
presidente, a stable, and a warehouse for sugar-cane." *
Obviously the robbery of Chinese shops and the killing of
a few individuals was at first considered by the secretary of
agriculture to be without political impori^nce. £vi-
> P. I. R., 8W. * Ibid. ■ md,
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INBUROEKT RULE AND THE WILCOX-SABaENT REPORT 163
dently he changed his mind, however, for on the same day,
December 28, 1898, he telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows :^
" I think it necessary to send Aglipay '■ to quiet Tarlac.
Send for him. If you desire, I will go to Tarlac to investigate
the causes of the disordeis, in order to find a remedy for them." *
At this stage of events Aguinaldo was simmioned to
MaloloB by a telegram from Mabini under date of Deceni'
ber 29, which reads as follows ; —
"Most urgent. You must come here immediately. Trfas
is aick. We can come to no decision in regard to the Tarlac
matter. Cannot constitute a government without you." '
The measures which were actually taken are set forth in
another tel^p'am of the same date from the secretaries of
war and interior to Aguinaldo, which reads as follows : —
"We have sent civil and military commissioners to Tarlac;
amoi^ them the Director of War and persons of much moral
influence, in order to Btifle the disturbances. The necessary
instructions have been given them and full powers for the pur-
jwee, and as far as possible to satisfy the people. Have also
sent there six companies of soldiers with explicit instructions
to their commander to guard only the towns, and make the
people return to a peaceful life, using a policy of attraction for
the purpose." *
Let us hope that the commander was able to attract
the people with his six companies of soldiers, and make
them return to a peaceful life.
Still further light is thrown on the situation in Tarlac
by the following extract from "Episodios de la Revolucion
Rlipina" by Padre Joaquin D. Duran, an Augustinian
priest, Manila, 1901, page 71 : —
"At that period the Filipinos, loving order, having been de-
ceived of the emancipation promise, changed by the Katipdnan
into crimes and attacks on the municipahty of the pueblos, dis-
■ Oregorio Af^paiy, an Uooano Catholic prieit vho beoame an aotdve
Iiuurgent Iead». litter he abandoned the Catholic faith and set
up a new churoh which gained manr adherents in the Philippines.
' P. I. R., 849. ■ Ibid. ' Ibid.
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164 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
content broke out in all porta, and, although latent in some
provinces, in that of Tarlac was materialized in an ex-sergeant
of the late Spanish civil guard. A valorous and determined
man, he lifted up his flag against that of Aguinaldo. One
hundred rifles were sufficient to terrorize the inhabitants of s^d
province, crushing the enthusiastic members of the revolution-
ary party. . . . Having taken possession of four towns, Pe-
cheche would have been everywhere successful if ambition
and pride had not du^cted his footsteps. In January, 1899,
the Aguinaldista commander of Tarlac province, afraid that
his whole province would espouse the cause of the sergeant,
attempted by every means in his power to interrupt his career,
not hesitating to avail himself of crime to destroy the influence
of Pecheche with the many people who had been incensed by the
Katipdnan and had in turn become firm partisans of the Guards
of Honour.
"The Ilocano Tranquilino Pagarigan, local presidente at
that time of Camiling, served as an admirable instrument for
this purpose. . . . Pecheche was invited to a solemn festivity
organized by Tranquilino, who pretended to recognize him as
his chief, and rendering himself a vassal by taking an oath to bis
flag. He accepted the invitation, and after the mass which
was celebrated went to a meal at the convent, where, after
the meal was over, the members of the K, K. K, surrounded
Pecheche and 10 of his officetB and killed them with bolos or
tied them and threw them out of the windows and down the
staircase. Some priests were held captive in the building where
this took place and were informed of what had taken place
immediately afterwards."
This extract shows how easy it then was for any man
of determination to acquire a following, especially if
he could dispose of a few rifles. It also gives an excellent
idea of the methods employed by the Insurgents in dealing
with those who opposed their rule.
General Fred D. Grant once told me, with much amuse-
ment, of an interesting experience during a fight on
Mt. Arayat in Pampanga. His men took a trench and
captured some of its occupants. Several of these were
impressed as guides and required to show the attacking
forces the locations of other trenches. At first they
served unwillingly, but presently became enthusiastic
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INSURGENT RULE AND THE WILCOX-BABOENT REPORT 165
and rushed the works of their quondam fellow-soldiers in
the van of the American attack. Finally they begged
for gtms. Grant added that he could start from Bacolor
for San Fernando any morning with a supply of rifles
and pick up volunteers Plough to capture the place, and
that on the return trip he could get enough more to
attack Bacolor I
Pangaeindn
And now we come to Pangasin&n, the most populous
province of Luzon, and the third in the Philippines in
munber of inhabitants.
"In July, 1898, the officer in Dagupan wrote to the com-
mandiug general of Tarlac Province that be would like to know
whom he was required to obey, as there were so many officials
of all ranks who gave him orders that it was impossible for him
to know where he stood." '
In a letter dated August 17, ISOS, to Aguinaldo, Benito
Legarda complained that a bad impression had been
produced by the news from Dagupan that when the In-
surgents entered there, after many outrages committed
upon the inmates of a girls' school, every officer had
carried off those who suited him.*
What should we say if United States troops entered the
town of Wellesley and raped numerous students at the
college, the officers subsequently taking away with them
the yotmg ladies who happened to suit them 7 Yet things
of thia sort hardly caused a ripple in the country then
xmder the Insurgent flag, and I learned of this particular
incident by accident, although I have known Legarda
for years.
I quote the following general description of conditions
in Pangasindn from a letter addressed by Cecilio Ap6stol
to General Aguinaldo on July 6, 1898 : —
"You probably know that in the Province of Pangasindn,
of one of the towns in which your bumble servant is a resident,
» P. I. R.. 1231. 2. • Taylor, 62 AJ.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
166 THE PHILIPPIK&8 PAST AND PRESENT
the Spanish flag through our good fortune has not flown here
for tho past few months, since the few Spaniarda who lived here
have concentrated in Dagupan, a place not difficult of attack,
aa is said.
"But this is what is going on in this Province : There exist
here two Departmental Governments, one calling itself that of
Northern Luz6n and of which Don Vicente del Prado is the
President, and the other which calls itself that of Northern and
Central Luz6n, presided over by Don Juliano Paraiso. Be-
sides these two gentlemen, there are two governors in the prov-
ince ( I) one Civil Political Military, living in Lingayen, named
Don Felipe J. BartolomI, and another living in Re^ Guerrero,
a town of Tajoig, named Don Vicente Estrella. And in addi-
tion there are a large number of Administrators, Inspectors,
Military Judges, G€nerals, . . . they cannot be counted. It
is a pandemonium of which even Christ, who permits it, cannot
make anything. Indeed, the situation is insupportable. It
reminds me of the schism in the middle ages when there were
two Popes, both legitimate, neither true. Things are as clear
as thick chocolate, as the Spaniards say. In my poor opinion,
good administration is the mother-in-law of disorder, since dis-
order is chaos and chaos produces nothing but confusion, that
is to say, death.
"I have had an opportunity, through the kindness of a friend,
to read the decree of that Government, dated June 18th, of
the present year, and the accompanying 'Instructions for the
government of towns and provinces.' Article 9 of the said
decree says that the Superior Government will name a com-'
missioner for each province with the special duty of establish-
ing there the organization set forth in the decree. Very well
so far: which of the so-called Presidents of Northern or of
Northern and Central Luzdn is the conunissioaer appointed by
that government to establish the new organization in that prov-
ince ? Are military commanders named by you for Fangasi-
n&n ? I would be very much surprised if either of them could
show his credentials. Aside from these, the fact remfuns that
in those instructions no mention is made of Presidents of Depart-
ments, there is a manifest contradiction in their jurisdictions,
since while one ceiIIs himself president of a Departmental Gov-
ernment, of Northern Luz6n, the other governs the Northern
and Central portion of the Island, accordLig to the seals which
they use.
"And, neverthelras, a person callii^ himself the General
Administrator of the Treasury and the said Governor of the
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INStTRGBNT RUU! AND THE WUCOX-flAROENT REPOET 167
Proviace, both of vibam Iiv« in Tayug, come to this town when
tlie Spaniards Tolimtarily abandoned it and gathered all the
people of means, and drew up an act of election, a, copy of which
is attached. From it you will see how this organization violates
the provisionB of the decree of the 18th of June.
"Another item : They got up a contract with the people of
means of this town, and did the same thing in the other towns,
in which contract they exact from us 91250 which they call
contributions of war (see document No. 2 attached), .^^ong
the doubtful powers of these gentlemen is the one to exact
these sums included? Have they express orders from that
Government ?
"Perhaps these blessed gentlemen — they are high flyers
there is no doubt about that, — have struck the clever idea of
calling themselves generals, governors, etc., in order to enjoy a
certain prestige and to give a certain color of legality to their
acts — this, although they don't know an iota of what they are
doing. But what I am Biae of, and many other men also, is
that there is no order, that here there is not a single person in
authority whom to obey. This superfluity of rulers will finally
lead to strained relations between them and the towns of this
province will end by paying the piper.
"But we poor ignorant creatures in so far as the republican
form of government is concerned, in order to avoid worse evils
took them at their word, obeyed them like automatons, hyp-
notized by the title of 'Insui^nta' which they applied to them-
selves. But when I had an opportunity to read the said decree,
doubts were forced upon me, I began to suspect — may God
and they pardon me — that they were tryii^ to impose upon us
nicely, that, shielded by the motto, 'have ttath in and submit
to the will of the country' they came to these towns 'for busi-
ness.'
"In order to dissipate this doubt, in order to do away with
abuses, if there are abuses, I made up my mind to send you
this account of the condition of things here. I flatter myself
that when you learn of the lamentable situation of this province,
you will soon deign to take steps to establish order, because
thereon depends the tranquillity of Pangasin^ and in the end a
strict compliance with your superior orders.
"There will be no limit to the thanks of the people of this
province if their petitions secure favourable consideration and
an immediate response from the high patriotism and honourable
standpoint of the Supreme Dictator of the Philippines." *
•P. I.R., 77.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
168 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
It will be noted that the picture thus drawn by SeQor
Ap6stol differs in certain important particulars from that
painted in such engaging coloiu^ by Judge Blount.
In September, 1S9S, the civil governor of Pangasin&n
had to have an escort of troops in passing through his
province.^
On November 20, 1898, the head of the town of San
Manuel wrote the provincial governor that his people
could no longer support the troops quartered on them,
as the adherents of the Katipiian had burned or stolen
all of their property.*
The sum total of Blount's description of affairs in
this, the most populous province of Luz6n, is derived
from the narrative of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent and
reads as follows : —
"In Pangasinan 'the people were all very respectful and
polite and offered the hospitality of their homes.' " •
Doubtless true, but as a summary of conditions per-
haps a trifle sketchy.
Nueva Ecija
Nueva Ecija was the next province visited by Wilcox
and Sargent. They have failed to inform us that : —
"In December, 1899, certain men chained with being mem-
bers of this society [Guards of Honour] were interrogated in
Nueva £k;ija as to their purposee. One of those questioned
said: —
'"That their purpose was one day, the date being unknown
to the deponent, when the Ilocanos of Batac came, to rise up in
arms and kill the Tag&los, both private individuals and pubUc
employees, excepting those who agreed to the former, for the
reason that honours were granted only to the Tag&loe, and but
few to the Ilocanos.'" *
Blount has assured us that the Filipinos were a unit at
Aguinaldo's back and were and are an united people, and
» P. I. R., 47. 7. » Ibid., 951. 3.
> Blonnt, p. 109. < P. I. R., 1006.
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INSURGENT RULE AND THE WILCOX-aASGENT REPOBT 169
here are the Ilocanos of Nueva Ecija spoiling his theory
by remembering that they are Ilocanos and proposing to
kill whom ? Not certain individual Filipinos, who might
have offended them, but the Tag^ogs I
That there were other troubles in Nueva Ecija is
shown by the following statement : —
"On January 7, 1899, the commjasioner of AguinaJdo's
treasury eent to collect contributions of war in Nueva Ecija
Province reported that the company stationed in San Isidro
had become guerillas under command of its officers and op-
posed hia collections, stating that they were acting in compliance
with orders from higher authority." '
And now, in following the route taken by our tourist
friends, we reach Nueva Vizcaya and the Cagayan valley.
» p. I. B., 870. 4.
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CHAPTER VI
iNsmiGBNT Rule in the Caqatan Valley
NtiBVA VizcATA is drained by the Magat River, a branch
of the CagayaD. While the provinces of Isabela and
Cagayan constitute the Ca^yan valley proper, Blount
includes Nueva Vizcaya in the territory covered by this
designation, and for the purpose of this discussion I
will follow his example.
Especial interest attaches to the history of Insui^ent
rule, in the Ci^ayan valley, as above defined, for the
reason that Blount himself served there as a judge of the
court of first instance. He says ; ' —
"The writer is perhaps as familiar witli the history of that
Cagayan valley as almost any other American."
He was. For his action in concealing the horrible
conditions which arose there under Insurgent rule,
with which he was perfectly familiar, and in foisting on
the public the account of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent,
as portraying the conditions which actually existed
there, I propose to arraign him before the bar of public
opinion. In so doing I shall consider these conditions
at some length. We have much documentary evidence
concerning them in addition to that furnished by the
Insurgent records, althoxigh the latter quite sufficiently
demonstrate many of the more essential facts.
In describing the adventures of Messrs. Wilcox and
Sargent in this re^on, Judge Blount says : * —
"There ' they were met by Simeon Villa, military commander
of Isabela province, the man who was chief of staff to Aguinaldo
■ Blount, p. 113. ■ Ibid., p. 111. * At CaHg, Isabela.
170
U.r,,l,;.:M.,G00gIe
INSUSOBNT SULE IK THSCAQAYAN VALLEY 171
afterwards, and was captured by General Funaton along Tith
Aguinaldo in the spring of 1901."
The facts as to Villa's career in the Csgayan valley
are especially worthy of note aa they seem to hare entitled
him, in the opinion of his Buperiors, to the promotion
which was afterward accorded him. He was an intimate
friend of Aguinaldo and later accompanied him on his
long flight through northern Luzon,
On August 10, 1S98, Colonel Daniel Tirona, a native
of Cavite Province and one of the intimates of Aguinaldo,
was ordered to proceed to Aparri in the Insurgent steamer
FUipinas and establish the revolutionary government
in northern Luzon. In doing this he was to hold elec-
tions for office-holders under Aguinaldo's government
and was authorized to approve or disapprove the reeulta,
his action being subject to subsequent revidon by
Aguinaldo. His forces were composed of four companira
armed with rifles.
Tirona reached Aparri on August 25 and promptly
secured the surrender of the Spaniards there.
He was accompanied by Simeon Villa, the man under
discussion, and by Colonel Leyba, who was also very
close to Aguinaldo.
Abuse of the Spanish prisoners began at once. It is
claimed that the governor of North Hocos, who was
among those captured, was grossly mistreated.
Taylor briefly summarizes subsequent events as
follows : " —
"Whatever the treatment of the Spanieh governor of Hocos
may really have been, there is testimony to »iow that some of
the other prisoners, especially the prieata, were abused and out-
raged under the direction of S. Villa and Colonel Leyba, both
of whom were very close to Aguinaldo. Some of the Spanish
civil officials were put in stocks and beaten, and one of the
officers who had surrendered at Aparri was tortured to death.
This was done with the purpose of extorting money from them,
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
172 THE PHIUPHNE8 PAST AND PRESENT
for it was believed that they had hidden funds in place of turn-
ing them over. All the Spaniards were immediately stripped
of everything they had. The priests were subjected to a system-
atic series of insults and abuse under the direction of Villa
in order to destroy their influence over the people by degrad-
ing them in their eyes. It was for this that they were beaten
and exposed naked in the sun; and other torture, such aa
pouring the wax of burning candles into their eyes, was used
to make them disclose where they had hidden church vrasels
and church funds. The testimony of a friar who suffered
these outrages is that the great mass of the people saw such
treatment of their parish priests with horror, and were present
at it only through fear of the organized force of the Katipdnan."
Taylor's statement is mildness itself in view of the well-
established facts.
The question of killing the Spanish prisoners, including
the friars, had previously been seriously considered,' but
it was deemed, wiser to keep most of the friars alive,
extort money from them by torture, and offer to liberate
them in return for a large cash indemnity, or for political
concessions. Day after day and week after week Villa
presided at, or himself conducted, the torture of ill-fated
priests and other Spaniards who fell into his hands.
Even Filipinos whom he suspected of knowing the where-
abouts of hidden friar money did not escape.
The following information relative to the conduct of
the Insurgents in the Cagayan valley is chiefly taken from
a manuscript copy of "Historia de la Conquiata de
Cagayan por los Tagalos Resolucionarios," in which the
narratives of certain captured friars are transcribed
and compiled by Father Julian Malumbres of the
Dominican Order.
The forma! surrender of Aparri occurred on August
26. Tirona, his officers and his soldiers, promptly
pilU^;ed the convento.' The officers left the Bishop of
Vigan ten pesos, but the soldiCTS subsequently took them
away from him. Wardrobes and tnioks were brokrai
* See p. 731. ■ The parsonage, or reddenoe of the priest.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INBURGENT RULE IN THE CAGAYAN VALLEY 173
open ; clocks, shoes, money, everything was carried off.
Even personal papers and prayer-books were taken from
some of the priests, many of whom were left with ab-
solutely nothing save the few remaining clothe in which
they stood.^
On the same day Villa, accompanied by Victa and
Rafael Perea,' went to the convento and told the priests
who were imprisoned there that their last hour had come.
He shut all of them e^ccept the bishop and five priests in
a room near the church, then separated the Augustiniana,
Juan Zallo, Gabino Olaso, Fidel Franco, Mariano Rod-
riguez, and Clemente Hidalgo, from the others and took
them into the lower part of the convento where he told
tiiem that he intraided to kill them if they did not give
him more money. The priests told him that they had
given all they had, whereupon he had their arms tied
behind their backs, kicked them, struck them and
whipped them with rattans.
Father Zallo was thrown on his face and savagely
beaten. Meanwhile two shots were fired over the heads of
the others and a soldier called out "One has fallen,"
badly frightening the priests who had remained shut in
the room. Villa then returned with soldiers to this room,
ordered his men to load, and directed that one priest step
forward to be shot. Father Mariano Ortiz compUed
with this request, asking that he be the first victim.
Villa, however, contented himself with threatening him
with a revolver and kicking and striking him until he fell
to the floor. He was then beaten with the butts of guns.
Father Jos6 Vazquez, an old man of sixty years, who
had thrown some money into a privy to keep it from falling
into the hands of the Insurgents, was stripped and com-
pelled to recover it with his bare hands, after which he
was kicked, and beaten with rattans.
Father Aquilino Garcia was unmercifully kicked and
beaten to make him give up money, and this sort of
' Insurgent ofBoen.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
174 THE FHILn^INES PAST AND PBE8ENT
thing contiiiued until Villa, tired out with the phymca]
exertion involved in assaulting these defenceless men,
departed, leaving his uncompleted task to others, who
continued it for some time.
The net result to the Insui^ents of the sacking of the
amvento and of the tortures thus inflicted was approxi-
mately 120,000 gold in addition to the silver, bank notes,
letters of credit, jewels, etc., which they obtained.
On September 5 Villa had Fathers Juan Recio and
Buenaventura Macia given fifty blows each, although
Father Juan was ill.
Villa then went to Lalloc, where other priests were im-
prisoned. On September 6 he demanded money of them,
causing them to be kicked and beaten. Father Angel
was beaten in an especially cruel manner for the appar-
ent purpose of killing him, after which he was thrust
into a privy. Father Isidro Fernandez was also fearfully
abused. Stripped of his habit, and stretched face down on
the floor, he was horribly beaten, and was then kicked,
and struck with the butt of a revolver on the forehead.
A little later the priests were offered their liberty for
a million dollars, which they were of course unable to
furnish. Meanwhile the torture continued from time
to time.
On August 30 Tuguegarao was taken by the Insurgents
without resistance. Colonel Leyba promptly proceeded
to the convento and demanded the money of the friars
as spoil of war. He found only eight hundred pesos in
the safe. Father Corujedo was threatened with death
if he did not give more. Other priests were threatened
but not tortured at this time. The prisoners in the jail
were liberated, but many of them had promptly to be put
back agfun because of the disorder which resulted, and
that same evening Leyba was obliged to publish a notice
threatening robbers with death.
At midnight on September 3 Father Corujedo was
taken from the convento by Captain Diego and was again
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INSURGENT RUU: IN THE CAGAYAN TALLBY 175
asked for money. Replying that he had no more to give,
he was beaten with the hilt of a sabre and stripped of
his habit, preparatory to being executed. A mock sen-
tence of death was pronounced on him and he was placed
facii^ to the west to be shot in the back. Di^^ ordered
his soldiers to load, adding, ' ' When I count three all fire,"
but the fatal count was not completed. Three priests
from Alcala were given similar treatment.
The troubles of the priests imprisoned at Tuguegarao
were sufficiently great, but they were augmented a
thoiisand fold when Villa arrived on September 11.
He came to the building where they were imprisoned,
bearing a revolver, a sabre and a great quantity of rattans.
He ordered the priests into the comer of the room in which
they were confined, and beat those who did not move
quickly enough to suit him. He threatened them with a
very rigorous examination, at the same time assuring them
that at Aparri he had hung up the bishop until blood flowed
from his mouth and his ears, and that he would do the same
with them if they did not tell him where they had their
money hidden. There followed the usual rain of kicks and
blows, a number of the priests being obliged to take off
their habits in order that they might be punished more
effectively.
Fathers Calixto Prieto and Daniel Gonzales, professors
in educational institutions, he ordered beaten because they
were friars.
Fathers Corujedo and Caddedila were beaten, kicked
and insulted. Both were gray-hured old men and the
latter was at the time very weak, and suffering from a
severe attack of asthma. Father Pedro Vincente was
also brutally beaten.
The following is the description given by an eye-witnesa
of conditions at Tuguegarao : —
"Even the Indioa of Cagayan complEuned and were the
victims of lootii^ and robbery on the part of the soldiery. So
lackii^ in dificipline and so demoralized was that army that
L;„l,z.-;l:,G00gIe
176 THE PHILIPPrNES PAST AND PRESENT
according to the confeseisn of a prominent lilipino it was of
imperative necessity to disarm them.' On the other hand we
saw with real astonishment that instead of warlike eoldiers
accustomed to battle they were nearly all raw recruits and
apprentices. From an army lacking in discipline, and lawless,
only outrages, looting and all sorts of sav^ery and injustice
were to be expected. Witnesses to their demoralisation are,
a^de from the natives themselves who were the first to ackno^-
e^e it, the Chinese merchants whose losses were incalculable ;
not a single store or conmiercial establishment remained that
was not looted repeatedly. As to the Spaniards it goes with-
out saying because it is publicly known, that between soldiers
and officers they despoiled them to their heart's content, with-
out any right except that of brute force, of everything that
struck their fancy, and it was of no avail to complain to the
officers and ask for justice, as they turned a deaf ear to such
compl^nts. At Tuguegarao they looted in a manner never
seen before, like Vandals, and it was not without reason that
a prominent Filipino said, in speaking to a priest : 'Vandalism
has taken possession of the place.' These acts of robbery were
generally accompanied by the most savage insults; it was
anarchy, as we heard an eye-witness affirm, who also stated
that no law was recognized except that of danger, and the
vanquished were granted nothing but the inevitable duty of
bowing with resignation to the iniquitous demands of that
soulless rabble, skilled in crime."
Villa now set forth for Isabela. Meanwhile the jailer
of the priests proceeded to steal their clothes, including
shirts, shoes and even handkerchiefs. Isabela was taken
without resistance on September 12. Dimas Guzman'
swore to theT>rie8tson his life that he would work without
rest to the end that all friars and all Spaniards mi^t
be respected, but he perjured himself.
On September 12 Villa and others entered the town of
Cabagan Viejo, where Villa promptly assaulted Father
Segundo Rodriguez, threatening him with a revolver,
beating him immercifully, insulting him in every possibte
way and robbing him of his last cent. After the bloody
< Their own oommamd^ so reported. See p. 202.
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INSURGENT BULE IN THE CAGAYAN VAIXET 177
scene was over he sacked the eonvenio, even takii^ away
the priests' clothes.
Villa also cruelly beat a EWpmo, Quintin Agansi, who
was taking care of money for masses which the priests
wished to save from the Insurgents.
After Father S^undo had suffered torture and abuse
for two hours he was obliged to start at once on a journey
to Auitan. The suffering priest, after being compelled
to march throi^ the street shouting "Vivas I" for the
Republic and Aguinaldo, spent the night without a
mouthful of food or a drink of water.
Father I>eogracia8 Garcia, a priest of Cabagan Nuevo,
was subjected to torture because he had sent to Hongkong
during May a letter of credit for (5000 which belonged to
the Church. Villa and Leyba entered his eonvenio and
after 'beating him ordered his hands and feet to be tied
together, then passed a pole between them and had him
lifted from the ground, after which two great jars of
water were poured down his nose and throat without
interruption.* In order to make the water flow through
his nose better, they thrust a piece of wood into the nasal
passives imtil it came out in his throat. From time to
time the torture was suspended while they asked him
whether he would tell the truth as to where he had con^
cealed his money. This unfortunate priest was so sure
he was going to die that while the torture was in progress
he received absolution from a fellow priest. After the
torture with water there followed a long and cruel beating,
and the imhappy victim was finally thrust into a filthy
privy.
Meanwhile Father Calzada was assaulted by a group of
soldiers and badly beaten, after which he was let down
into the filth of a privy, first by the feet and afterwards
by the head.
On the 14th a lieutenant with soldiers Altered the
:dbvGoogIe
178 THE PHILIPPfNBS PAST AND PRESENT
corwento of Tumauini and as usual demanded money
of the occupants, who gave him $80, all they had at the
time. This quantity not being satisfactory, a rope was
aent for and the hands of the two priests were tied while
they were whipped, kicked and beaten. They were,
however, released when Father Bonet promised to get
additional money. They had a short respite until the
arrival of Villa, who still demanded more money of
Father Blanco, and failing to get it for the reason that the
father had no more, leaped upon him and gave him a
dreadful beating, his companions joining in with whips,
rattans and the butts of guns. They at last left their
victim stretched on the groimd aJmoat dead. This
priest showed the marks of his ill treatment six months
afterward. Not satisfied with this, Villa gave him the
so-called "water cure."
Meanwhile his followerB had also beaten Father Bonet.
Villa started to do likewise but was too tired, having
exhausted his energies on Father Blanco. While the
tortures were going on, the convento was completely
sacked. Father Blanco's library was thrown out of the
window,
Villa entered Ilagan on the 15th of September at 8
o'clock at night. Hastening to the convenlo, with a com-
pany of well-armed soldiers, he had his men surround
the three priests who awaited him there, then summoned
the local priest to a separate room and demanded money.
The priest gave him all he had. Not satisfied. Villa
leaped upon him, kicking him, beating him and pounding
him with the butt of a gun. Many of his assodates
joined in the disgraceful attack. The unfortunate victdm
was then stripped of his habit, obliged to lie down and
received more than a hundred lashes. When he was
nearly senseless he was subjected to torture by water,
being repeatedly lifted up when filled with water, and
allowed to fall on the floor. While some were pouring
water down his nose and throat, others spilled hot wax
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INSmtOENT BCLE IN THE CAOAYAN VALLEY 170
on his face and head. The torment repeatedly rendered
the priest sensetess, hut he was allowed to recover
from time to time bo that he might suffer when it was
renewed.
The tortming of this unhappy man lasted for three
hours, and the horrible scene was immediately succeeded
by another quite as bad. Villa called Father Domingo
Gampo and, after taking from him the little money that
he had, ordered him stripped. He was then given
numberless kicks and blows from the butts of rifles and
150 lashes, after which he was unable to rise. There
followed the torture with water, on the pretext that he
had money hidden away.
Meanwhile the houses of Spaniards and the shops of
the Chinese were completely sacked, and the men who
objected were knocked down or cut down with bolos.
Numerous ^Is and women were raped.
On September 15 Leyba received notice of the surrender
of Nueva Vizcaya. I quote the following from the
narrative above inferred to : —
"Delfin's soldiers^ were the most depraved ever seen: thdr
thieving insUocts had no bounds ; bo they had hardly entered
Nueva Vizcaya when they started to give themselves up furi-
ously to robbery, looking upon all things as loot ; in the very
shadow of these soldiers the province was invaded by a mob of
adventurous and ragged persona from Nueva Ecija ; between
the two they picked Nueva Vizcaya clean. When they had
grown tired of completely shearing the unfortunate Vizcayan
people, leaving them poverty-stricken, they flew in small bauds
to the pueblos of Isabela, going as far as Angadanan, giving
themselves up to unbridled pillage of the most unjust and dis-
orderly kind. Some of these highwaymen demanded money
and arms from the priest of Angadanan, but Father Marciano
informed them 'that it could not be, as Leyba already knew
what he had and would be angry.'
"To this very day the people of Nueva Viacaya have been
unable to recover from the stupendous loasea suffered by them
> Major Delfln oommanded the expedition which took Nueva
Vizot^a.
:dbvGoogIe
180 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
as regards th«r wealth and industries. How many cursea did
they pour forth and still continue to level against the Katipdnan
that brought them naught but tribulations 1"
Confirmation of these statements is found in the fol-
lowing brief but significant passage from the Insurgent
records: —
"At the end of December, 1898, when the military com-
mander of Nueva Vizcaya called upon the Governor of that
province to order the police of the towna to report to him as
volunteers to be incorporated in the army which was being
prepared for the defence of the country, the Governor protested
agamat it and informed the government that his attempt to
obtmn volunteers was in fact only a means of disarming the
towns and leaving them without protection agfunst the soldiers
who did what they wanted and took what they wished and
committed every outrage without being punished for it by their
The effect of the surrender of Nueva Vizcaya on Leyba
and Villa is thus described by Father Malumbres : —
"Mad with joy and swollen with pride Leyba and company
were like men who travelled flower-strewn paths, crowned with
laurels, and were acclaimed as victors in' all the towns on their
road, their intoxication of joy taking a sudden rise when they
came to believe themselves kings of the valley. It was then
that their delirium reached ite brimful measure and their
treatment of those whom they had vanquished began to be
daily more cruel and inhuman. In Cf^yan their fear of the
forces m Nueva Vizcaya kept them from showing such unquali-
fiable excesses of cruelty and nameless barbarities, but the tri-
umph of the Katipijnan arms in Nueva Vizcaya completely
broke down the wall of restraint which somewhat repressed
those sanguinary executioners thirsting to fatten untranmielled
on the innocent blood of unanned and defenceless men. From
that melancholy time there began an era of unheard of out-
rages and barbarous scenes, unbelievable were they not proved
by evidence of every description. The savage acts committed
in Isabela by the inhuman Leyba and Villa cannot possibly
be painted true to life and in all their tragic detuls. The
blackest hues, the most heartrending accents, the most vigor-
ous lai^uage and the most fulminating anathemas would be
' P. I. R., 246. 8.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INSDHOENT RULE IN THE CAGAYAN VAZXEY 181
a pale image of the truth, and our pen cannot express with true
atdour the terrifying scenes and cruel torments brought about
by such fierce chieftiuns on such jndefensive religious. It
seems imposeible that a fleshly heart could hold so much wicked-
ness, for these petty chiefs were veritable monsters of cruelty
who surpassed a Nero ; men who were entire strangers to noble
and humane sentiments and who in f^ipeaiance having the
figure of a man were in refdity tig^ roaring in desperation, or
mad dc^ who gnashed their teeth in fury."
On September 18 Leyba continued hia inarch, while
Villa remained behind at Ilagan to torture the prisoners
who mi^t be brought in from Isabela.
On arrival at Gamut, Leyba at once entered the con-
sento and as usual immediately demanded money from
the priests. Father Venancio gave him all he had. He
was nevertheless given a frightful whipping, six persons
holding him while others nuned blows upon him. A de-
termined effort was made to force the priest to recant,
and when this failed Leyba leaped upon him, kicking
and beating him. He then ordered him thrown down
face uppermost, and asked for a knife with the apparent
intention of mutilating him. He did not use the knife,
however, but instead, assisted by his followers, gave the
unhappy priest another terrific beating, even standing
upon him and leaping up and down. The priest was left
unable to speak, and did not recover for months.
Later Leyba had torture by water applied to Father
Gregorio Cabrero and lay brother Venancio Aguinaco,
while Father Sabanda was savagely beaten.
On the 19th of September Father Miguel Garcia of
Reina Mercedes was horribly beaten in bis convento
by a captain sent there to get what money he had.
In Cauayan, on September 20, Fathers Perez and
Aguirrezabal were beaten and compelled to give up
money by five emissaries of Leyba, and the latter priest
was cut in the' face with a sabre. The convento was
sacked. On the 25th Leyba arrived and after kicking
and beating Father Garcia compelled him to give up
:dbvGoogIe
182 THE PHILIPPINBS PABT AND PBE8ENT
91700. He then informed the priests that if it were not
for Aguinaldo's orders he would kill all the Spaniards.
On the afternoon of the 24th three priests and a Spaniard
named Soto arrived at Ilagan. The following is the state-
ment of an eye-witness as to what happened ; —
"They led the priests to the headquarters of the command-
ing officer where the tyrant Villa, always eager to inflict suffer-
ing on humanity, awaited them. The scene witnessed by the
priests obeisant to the cruel judge waa horrifying in the ex-
treme. Four lions whose thirst for vengeance was extreme in
all, threw themselves, blind with fury, without a word and with
the look of a basilisk, upon poor Sefior Soto pving him such
innumerable and furious blows on head and face that weary
as he was from his past journey, the ill-treatment received at
Angadanan and weighted down by years, he was soon thrown
down by his executioners under the lintel of the door getting
a terrible blow on the head as he fell ; even this did not satisfy
nor tame down those fierce-hearted men, who on the contrary
continued with their infamoiu work more furious than before,
and their cruelty did not Sag on seeing their victim at their
feet. They could have done no worse had they been SiUpan
say^es dancing in triumph around the palpitating bead cut
from the body of some enemy.
"The priests who witnessed this blood-curdling scene trem-
bled like the weak reed before the gale, waitti^ their turn to
be tortured, but God willed that cruel Villa should be cont^tt
with the butchery perpetrated upon unhappy Sr. Soto. Villa
dismissed the priests after despoiling them of their bags and
clothes telling them, to tonnent them; 'Go to the convento
until the mis^g ones turn up so that I may shoot you ail
together.' "
Leyba entered Echague on September 22, promptly
going to the convento as usual and demandii^ money of
the priest, Father Mata. Wben the latter had given him
all he had, he received three terrific beatings at the hands
of some twelve men armed with whips and sticks, after
which Leyba himself struck him with his fist and his
sabre. He was finally knocked down by a blow with
the sabre and left disabled. It took six months for him
to recover.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
msmiOENT ROLE IN THE CAQATAN VALLEY 183
Shortly after Leyba's arrival in Nueva Vizcaya on the
afternoon of the 25th, five priests were summoned to
Solano and there abused in the usual fashion in an effort
to extort money from them. Only one escaped ill
treatment and one was nearly killed.
Leyba now went to Bayombong to carry out the es-
tablished programme with the priests. There he found
Governor Perez of Isabela, who had taken with him cer-
tain government moneys and employed them to pay sal-
aries of soldiers and other employees. He insisted on the
return of the total amount and threatened to shoot Perez
if it was not forthcoming. The Spaniarda of the vicinity
subscribed S700 which they themselves badly needed and
saved him from being shot. The priests of Uie place were
then summoned to Leyba's quarters and were beaten
and tortured. One of them was thrown on the floor and
beaten nearly to death, Leyba standing meanwhile with
his foot on the unfortunate man's neck. Another was
given six hundred lashes and countless blows and kicks.
Leyba stood on this man's neck also. When the victim's
back ceased to have any feeling, his legs were beaten.
Leyba terminated this period of diversion by kicking
Father Diez in the solar plexus and then mocking him
as he lay gasping on the floor. That afternoon one of
the priests, so badly injured that he could not rise xm-
aided, was put on a horse and compelled to ride in the
hot sun to Solano.
Villa and Leyba had their able imitators, as is shown
by the following description of the torturing of Father
Ceferino by Major Delfin at Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, on
September 27 : —
"They wished to give brave evidence of their hate for the
friar before Leyba left, and show Mm that they were as brave
as he when it came to oppressing and torturing the friar. This
tragedy began by Jimenez again asking Father Ceferino for
the money. The priest answered as he had done before.
Then Jimenez started to talk in Tagalog to the commanding
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
184 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
officer aad Burely it was nothing good that he told him, for
suddenly Del£u left the bench aad darting fire from his eyea,
f^ in blind fury upon the defenceless priest ; what harsh words
he uttered in Tagalog while he vented Ms fury on his victim,
striking him with his clenched fist, slapping him and Idcliing
him, I do not know, but the religious man fell at the feet of his
furious executioner who, being now the prey of the most stu-
pendous rage, could scarcely get his tongue to stutter and
continued to kick the priest, without seeing where he lacked
him,- Getting deeper and deeper in the abyss and perhaps not
knowing what he was about, this petty chief made straight for
a sabre lying on a table to continue his bloody work. In the
meantime the priest had risen to his feet and awuted with resig-
nation new torments which certainly were even worse than the
first, for he gave him so many and such hard blows with the
sabre that the blade was broken close to the hilt. This acci-
dent so infuriated Delfiu that he again threw himself upon the
Eriest, kickiag him furiously and striking him repeatedly imtil
e again threw him to the ground, and not yet satisfied, his
vengefulness led him to throw himself upon his victim with
the fury of a tiger after his prey, beating him on the head with
the hilt of the saber until the blood ran in streams and formed
pools upon the pavement. The priest, more dead than alive,
shuddered from head to foot, and appeared to be struggling in
a tr^nendous fight between life and death; he had hardly
enough strength to get his tongue to ask for God's mercy. At
this most critical juncture, and when it seemed as if death were
inevitable, the martyr received absolution from Father Diez,
who witnessed the blood-curdling picture with his heart pierced
with grief at the sight of the sufferings of his innocent brother,
feeling as must the condenmed man preparing for death who
sees the hours fiy by with vertiginous rapidity. The blood
Sowing from the wounds on the priest's head appeared to in-
furiate and blind the heart of Delfin who, rising from his vic-
tim's body, sped away to the armory in the court house, seized
a rifle, and came back furious to bnun him with the butt and
finish killing the priest ; but God willed to free his servant from
death at the hands of those cannibals, so that generous Lieu-
tenant Navarro interfered, took the rifle away from him and
caught Delfln by the arm, threatening him with some words
spoken in Tagalog. Then Navarro, to appease Delfin's anger,
turned the priest over with his face to the ground and gave him
a few strokes with the bamboo, and feigning anger and indigna^
tion, ordered him aw^.
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INStmGENT RULE IN THE CAGAYAN VALLEY 185
"Those who witnessed the horrible tragedy, the brutality
of the tyrant and the prostration of the friar were persuaded
that the latter would never survive his martyrdom. The reli-
giouB man himself holds it as a veritable portent that he out-
lived such a terrible trial ; but even this did not satisfy them as
Bubsequently the Secretary f^ain called Father Ceferino to
Bubject him to a further scrutiny, as ridiculous as it was mali-
cious, though it did not go beyond words or insults."
Sefior Perez, the governor of Isabela, and Father
Diez were compelled to go to Ilagan. After they had
arrived there on October 2d, Villa proceeded to torture
them. At the outset ten soldiers, imdoubtedly instructed
beforehand, beat the governor down to the earth, with
the butts of their guns. Villa himself struck him three
times in the chest with the butt of a gun and Father Diez
gave him absolution, thinking he was dying. Father
Diez was then knocked down repeatedly with the butts
of guns, being made to stand up promptly each time in
order that he might be knocked down again. Not
satisfied with this, Villa compelled the suffering priest to
kneel before him and kicked him in the nose, repeating
the operation until he left him stretched on the floor
half-senseless with his nose broken. He next had both
victima put in stocks with their weight supported by
thdr feet atone. While in this position soldiers beat
them and jumped onto them and one set the governor's
beard on fire with matches. Father Diez was kept in
the stocks four days. He was then sent to Tuguegarao
in order that personal enemies there might take vengeance
on him, Wla bidding him good-by with the following
words: "Go now to Tuguegarao and see if they will
finish killing you there." Sefior Perez was kept in the
stocks eight days and it is a wonder that he did not die.
Upon the 25th of September Villa went to the convento
in Ilagan prepared to torture the priests, but he succeeded
in compelling a number of them to sign indorsements
in his favour on various letters of credit payable by the
Tabacalera Company and departed again in fairly good
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
186 ^I^E PHtT.tPPlNRR FAST AND FRSSENT
htunour, having done nothing worse than strike one of
them.
Later, however, on the pretext that Fathers Aguado
and Labanda had money hidden away, he determined
to torture them with water. The first to be tortured was
Father Labanda. Villa had him taken to the prison
where the priest found his two faithful Filipino servants
who had been beaten cruelly and were then hanging from
a beam, this having been done in order to make them tell
where his money was.
He was tied after the usual fashion and water poured
down his nose and throat. During the brief recites
necessary in order to prevent his dying outright he was
cruelly beaten. They finally dragged him out of the
prison by the feet, his head leaving a bloody trail on the
stones. After he had been taken back to his companions,
one of the men who had tortured him came to beg his
pardon, saying that he had been compelled to do it by
ViUa.
Father Aguado was next tortured in one of the rooms
of the amoenio. Villa finished the day's work by an-
nouncing to the band of priests that he would have them
all shot the next day on the plaza, and ordering them to
get ready.
On the 20th the barbarities practised by this inliiiTTiflr^
fiend reached their climax in the torturing to death of
lieutenant Piera. The following description gives some
faint idea of one of the most diabolical crimes ever com-
mitted in the Philippines : —
"Villa's cruelty and sanguinary jeering grew without let
or hindrance from day to day ; it seemed that this hyena con-
tinually cudgelled his bruns to invent new kinds of torture and
to jeer at the friars. On the night of the 29th of September
the diabolical idea occurred to him of giving the amp de grace
to the prestige of the friars by making them pass through the
streets of Ilagan conducting and playing a band of music.
He carried out his nonsensical purpose by calling upon Father
Diograciaa to play the big drum, and when this priest had
:dbvGoogIe
nratTROBNT EULB IN THE CAOAYAN VALLEY 187
started playing Villa learned that Father Primo was a musician
and could therefore play the drum and lead the band with all
BkiU, so he called upon Father Primo to come fonrard, and with
one thing and another this ridiculous function was carried on
until the late hours of the night.
"While these two priests were serenading Villa and his
gang, the most dreadful shrieks were heard from the jail,
accompanied by pitiful cries that would melt the coldest heart.
The priests hearing these echoes of sorrow and pain, and who did
not know for what piu'pose Fathers Deogracias and ^mo had
been separated from them, seemed to recognize the voices of
these two priesta among the groans, believing them to be cruelly
tortured ; for this reason they began to say the rosary in order
that the Most Holy Virgin might imbue them with patience
and fortitude in their martyrdom. Great was their surprise
when these priests returned sajdng that they had cont^ted
themselves with merely making fun of them by obliging them
to play the big drum and lead the band.
"Although this somewhat tempered theu* sorrow, a thorn
remained in their hearts, fearing that the moving lamentations
and the mortal groans came from the lips of some hapless
Spaniard. This fatidical presentiment turned out unfortu-
nately to be a fact. The victim sacrificed that melancholy
night, still remembered with a shudder by the priests, was
Lieutenant Salvador Piera. This brave soldier, who had made
up his mind to die in the breach rather than surrender the town
of Aparri, was persuaded to capitulate only by the prayers
and tears of certain Spanish ladies who had been instructed
to do so by a man who should have been the first one to shoulder
a ri8e. After having been harassed in Aparri he was taken
to Tugu^arao at the request of Esteban Quinta or Isidore
Maquigat, two artful filibusters thirsting to revenge themselves
on the Lieutenant, who during the time of the Spanish govern-
ment had justly laid his heavy hand upon them. In the latter
part of September they conducted hun on foot and without
any consideration whatever to the capital of Isabela. In this
town he was at once placed in solitary confinement in one of
the rooms of the eoraento and allowed no intercourse with
any one. The sin for which they recriminated Piera was
his having chained Dimas* with being a filibuster, and their
revengefulnesa reached an incredible limit. The heartrend-
' Dimai Ouznuui.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
190 THB PHKJPPINBS PAST AND PEEaENT
of wretches buried in the corwetUo garden a body stilt dripinng
wann blood from the lipe of which there escaped the feeble
plaiute of anguish of a dying man."
The feeling of the Spaniards relative to this matter
ia well shown by the following statement of Father
Malumbres : —
"This horrible crime cannot be pardoned by God or man,
and is still uninvestigated, crying to Heaven for vengeance
with greater reason than the blood of the innocent Abel. So
long as the criminals rem^n unpimished it will be s black and
indelible stigma and an ugly stam on the race harbouring in its
midst the perpetrators of this imheard-of sin. Words of repro-
bation are not enough, justice demands exemplary and complete
reparation, and if the powers of earth do not tEike justice into
their own handSj God will send Ore from Heaven and will cause
to disappear from the face of the earth the criminals and even
their deecendant«. A murder bo cruel and premeditated can
be punished in no other way.
"If the courts here should wish to punish the guilty persoi^
it would not be a difficult task ; the public pointe its finger at
those who dyed their hands in the blood of the heroic soldier,
and we shall set them forth here echoing the voice of the people.
The soulless instigator was Dimaa Guzman. The executioners
were a certain Jos£ Guzman (aUas Pepin, a nephew of Dimas)
and Cayetano P4rez."
The matter was duly taken up in the courts, and Judge
Bloimt himself tried the cases.
The judge takes a very mild and liberal view of tiie
occurrence. He says of it : ' —
"Villa was accompanied by his aide. Lieutenant Ventura
Guzman. The latter is an old acquaintance of the author of
^e present volume, who tried him afterwards, in 1901, for
playing a minor part in the murder of an officer of the Spanish
army committed under Villa's orders just prior to, or about the
time of, the Wilcox-Sargent visit. He was found guilty, and
sentenced, but later Uberated under Freeident Roosevelt's
amnesty of 1902. He was guilty, but the deceased, so the people
in the Gagayan Vall^ used to say, in being tortured to death,
■Blount, p. 112.
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INSUBOENT BULB IN THE OAOATAN TALLGY 191
got only the same Bort of medicine he had often administered
thereaboute. At any rate, that waa the broad theory of the
amnesty in wiping out all these old cases."
He adds : —
"I soitenced both IXmas and Ventura to life imprisomnrait
for being accessory to the murder of the Spanish officer above
named, Lieutenant Piera. Villa officiated as arch-fiend on
the grewsome occasion. I am quite sure I would have hung
Villa without any compunction at that time, if I could have
gotten hold of him. I tried to get hold of him, but Governor
Taft'fl attorney-general, Mr. Wilfley, wrote me that Villa was
somewhere over on the mainland of Asia on British territory,
and extradition would involve application to the London
Foreign Office. The intimation was ^at we had trouble enough
of our own without borrowing any from feuds that had existed
under our predeceesoiB in sovereignty. I have understood that
Villa is now practirang medicine in Manila. More than one
officer of the American army that I know afterwards did things
to the lilUpinos ahnost as cruel as ViUa did to that unhappy
Spanish officer. Lieutenant Piera. On the whole, I think
President Roosevelt acted wisely and humanely in wiping the
slate. We had new problems to deal with, and were not bound
to handicap ourselves with the old onee left over from the Span-
ish r^pme."*
But it happens that thla was the Filipino regime.
Piera's torture occurred at the very time when, according
to Blount, Aguinaldo had "a wonderfully complete
'going concern' throughout the Philippine archipelago."
Furthermore, it occurred in the Cagayan valley where
Blount says "perfect tranquillity and pubhc order" were
then being maintained by "the authority of the Aguinaldo
government" in a coimtry which Messrs. Wilcox and
Sargent, who arrived on the scene of this barbarous
murder by torture four weeks later, found so " quiet and
orderly."
Not only was Blount perfectly familiar with every
detail of this damnable crime, but he must of necessity
> Blount, p. 114.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
192 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
have known of the torturing of friars to extort money,
which preceded and followed it.
The following statement seems to sum up his view of
the whole matter ; —
"It is true there were cruelties practised by the Filipinos
on the Spaniards. But they were ebullitions of revenge for
three centuries of tyranny. They do not prove unfitness for
self-government. I, for one, prefer to follow the example set
by the Roosevelt amnesty of 1902, and draw the veil ovw all
those matterB." *
The judge drew the veil not only over this, but, as we
have seen, over numerous other pertinent matters which
occurred m this land of "profound peace and tran-
quillity" just at the time Wilcox and Sargent were making
their trip. My apologies to him for withdrawing the
veil and for maintaining that such occurrences as those
in question demonstrate complete and utter imfitness for
self-government on the part of those who broxight them
about 1
If it be true that Blount knew more than one officer
of the American army who did things to the FilipinoB
aUnost as cruel as Villa did to Lieutenant Piera, why did
he not report them and have the criminals brought to
justice?
Such an attack on the army, in the course of which
there is not given a name or a fact which could serve as
a basis for an investigation, is cowardly and despicable.
I do not for a moment believe that Blount speaks the
truth, but if he does, then his failure to attempt to bring
to justice the human fiends concerned brands him 1
It has been the fashion in certain quarters to make vile
allegations of this sort against officers of the United States
army, couching them in discreetly general terms. This is
a contemptible procedure, for it frees those who make reck-
less charges from danger of the criminal proceedings which
would otherwise doubtless be brought against them.
■ Blount, p. 113.
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INSDRGENT ntJLBi IN THE CAGAYAN VALLEY 193
Od arrival at Ilagan, the town where Fiera was tor-
tured to death, Blount says ' that Messrs. Wilcox and
Sargent were
"given a grand baile [ball] and fieala [feast], a kind of dinner-
dejicej we would call it. . . . From Ilagan they proceeded to
ApajTi, cordially received everywhere, and finding the country
in fact, as Aguinaldo always claimed in his proclamations of
that period, seeking recognition of his government by the
Powers, in a state of profound peace and tranquillity — free
from brigandage and the like."
Within sight of the banquet ball, within hearing of
the music, lay a lighter on which were huddled eighty-four
priests of the Catholic Church, many of them gray-baired
old men, imiocent of any evil conduct, who for weeks had
BuCTered, mentally and plQ^cally, the tortures of the
damned.
Of the events of this evenii^ and the foUowii^ day
Father Malumbres says ; —
"From the river the eonverUo could be seen profusely illu-
minated and the strains of music could be heard, an evident
sign that they were eqgaged in revelry. This gave us a bad
stort, as we came to fear that Villa had returned from the
expedition undertaken to come up with two Americans who
had crossed the Carab&Uo range and were thinking of coming
down ae f ar as Aparri. It was late to announce to Villa our
arrival at Ilagan, so that we were obliged to pass the night on
the lighter. In the morning our boat was anchored in front of
the pueblo of Ilagan, where we were credibly informed that
Villa had returned. This accursed news made us begin to
fear some disagreeable incident.
" Our Matias went ashore and delivered the official communi-
cation r^arding our transfer to Villa, while we wuted impa-
tiently for his decision. Sergeant Matias at length returned
with ordera for our disembarkation ; we put on the best clothes
we had and the rowers placed a broad plank between the lighter
and the arsenal and we left our floating prison two abreast.
Matias called the roll and the order to march, we were eighty-
four friars in a long column climbing the steep ascent to Dagaa.
>Bloimt,p. 114.
VOL. I — o
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
194 THE PHILIFFINEB PAST AND PaESENT
" When we had arrived in front of the building used for head-
quarters, we faced about in front thereof, and the first thing
we saw in one of the windowa were the sinister features of Fal-
aria, who with a thundering brow and black look was delighting
himself in the contemplation of so many priests smrounded by
bayonets and filled with misery. Any other person but Villa
would have melted on seeing such a spectacle, which could but
incite compassion. The two American tourists were also
looking on at this horrible scene as if stupefied, but they soon
withdrew in order, perhaps, not to took upon such a painfu]
picture. It was, indeed, heartrending to contemplate therein
old gray-haired men who had passed their Uves in apostolic
work side by side with young men who had just arrived in this
ungrateful land, and many sick who rather than men seemed
to be marble statues, who had no recourse but to stand in line,
without one word of consolation; therein figured some who
wore religious garb, others in secular dress limited to a pair of
rumpled trousers and a cast-oS coat, the lack of this luxurious
garment being replaced in some instances by a native shirt.
"For two long hours we were detained in the middle of the
street under the rays of a burning sun and to the scandal of the
immense crowd which had been gathered together to witness
the denouement of the trt^edy. The priests had hardly come
into the presence of Villa when Fathers Isidro and Florentine
were called out for the purpose of having heaped upon them a
flood of insults and affronts. Father Isidro was ordered by
Villa to interview Sr. Sabas Orros, who. Villa supposed, would
wreak his revenge blindly upon him, but he was greatly mis-
taken, as said gentleman treated the priest with great respect ;
the tyrant remained talking to Father Florentino in the recep-
tion room of the headquarters building, and when it appeared
that such talk would come to blows, the elder of the Americans
left one of the rooms toward the reception room, and the
scene suddenly changing, Villa arose and addressing the priest
said : ' I am pleased to introduce to you an Am^can Brigadier-
Genial, Mr. N.' The latter returned a cordial greeting in
Spanish to the priest who made a courteous acknowledgm^it ;
after this exchange of courtesies, Villa resumed his defamatory
work, pouring out a string of absurdities and infamous insults
upon the friars, goii^ so far as to say in so many words : 'from
the bishop down you are all thieves and depraved' he added
another word which it would be shameful to write down, and
BO he went on from one abyss to another without r^;ard to
reputations or the respect due to venerated persons.
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mSUROBNT BULB IN THE CAOAYAN VALLEY 195
" The American let his disgust be seen while ViUa was talking,
and the latter understood tbeee protests and ordered the priest
to withdraw, the comedy coming to an end by the American
ahalfing hands with the priest and offering him assistance.
Villa would not shake hands with him, as was natural, but the
priest was able to see that he was confused when he saw the
distinction and courtesy with which an American general had
treated a helpless friar. What a narrow idea did the Americans
form of the government of Aguinaldo, represented by men as
savage and inhuman as Villa 1
"The natives averred that the Americans referred to were
spies who had come to explore those provinces and were making
maps of the strategic points and principal roads, bo that a very
careful watch was kept upon them and Villa took measures
to have them go down the river without landing at any place
between Eichague and Ilagan. At Hagan they were given an
entertainment and dance. Villa being a skilled hand in this sort
of thing, and a few days later he accompanied them to Aparri •
without allowing them to set foot on land. The government
of Aguinaldo no longer had everything its own way, and secret
orders had been ^ven to have every step of &e explorers
followed. The comnmnding and other leading officers of the
Valley, supporting the orders of the government, circulated an
order throughout the towns which read as follows : —
"'To ALL Local Opficbbs:
"'You will not permit any maps to be made or notes to be
taken of strate^c points by Americans or foreigners ; nor will
you allow them to become acquainted with the points of de-
ieace ; you will endeavour to report immediately to this Govotu-
ment any suspicious persons; you will make your investiga-
tions secretly, accompanyii^ suspected persons and feigning
that their investigations are approved, and finally when it shaU
seem to you that such suspected persons have finished their
work, you will advise without loss of time, in order that their
notes may be seized.'
"Despite this order the Americans were able to inform them-
advee very thoroughly of the forces in the Valley and its state
of d^ence, and lillipinos were not lacking who for a few pesos
would put them abreast of all information regarding the plans
and projects of Aguinaldo's government."
ReUtiTe to this Wilcox-Sargent trip Taylor eays : —
> A distanee of 120 miles.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
196 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AKD PRESENT
"In October and November, 1898, Paymaster W. B. WUcox,
U.S.N., and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent, U.S.N., travelled
through Northern Luzon from which they returned with a
favourable impreesion of the government which had been set
up by Aguinaldo's agent«.
" It was realized by the subtle men whom they met that it
waa highly expedient that they should make a favourable report
and accordingly they were well received, and although constant
obstacles were thrown in the way of their seeing what it was
not considered well for them to see yet the real reasons for the
delays in their journey were carefully kept from them. At
least some of their letters to the fleet were taken, translated,
and sent to Aguinaldo, who kept them, and constant reports
upon them and their movements were made."
Blount refers to the fact that Mr. Sargent tells a char-
acteristic story of Villa,' whose vengeful feeling toward
the Spaniards showed on all occasions.
It would doubtless have interested the travellers to
know that the "robbery" consisted in taking the funds
out of the province to save them from falling into Villa's
hands, and in paying them to soldiers in Nueva Vizcaya to
whom money was due. It would further have interested
them to know that this unfortunate Spaniard had been
twice tortured within an inch of his life by Villa.
But let us continue our interrupted narrative : —
"The presence of the Americans in Ilagan soon freed us
from certain forms of savagery and barbarous intentions on
the part of Villa. There can be no doubt that the tyrant was
constantly cudgelling his brains to invent new methods of
showing his contempt for the friars; at the unlucky time we
write of he conceived the infamous plan of ordering a circular
enclosure of cane to be made, put a pig into it — we trust the
reader will pardon the details ~ with a bell hung to his neck,
blindfolded the priests and compelled them to enter the enclo-
sure with sticks in their hands, and in this ridiculous attitude,
1 "The former Spanish Qovemoi of the ProTinoe was of cotuse a
prisoner in Villa's ouatody. Villa had the ez-Qoromor brought in,
for the travellers to see him, and remarked, in his presenoe to them,
"This is the man who robbed this province of twenty-five thousand
doUars daring the last year of his oiBoe.'" — Blount, p. 115.
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INSTmOENT RULE IN THE CAOAYAN VALLEY 197
obliged them to strike about when the sound of the bell appraised
them of the animal's proximity; it is obvious that the princi-
pal purpose of the fiendish Villa was to have the priests lay
about them in such a way as to deal each other the blows
instead of the pig. The tyrant also had the idea of making us
and the other priests in Ilf^an parade the streets of that town
dancing and playing the band. The wish to consummate bis
plan was not lacking but he was deterred by the presence of
the Americans and the arguments of Sr. Sabas Orros to whom
we also owed the signal favour that Villa did not take us to our
prisons at Tumauini and Gamut on foot and with our clothing
in a bundle at our backs."
On October 2 a banquet was fpven in Villa's honour at
Bagan and the pleasant idea occurred to him to have four
of the friars dance at it for hia amusement. The people
of the town put their handkerchiefs before their faces
to shut out the sight, and some wept. Father Campo,
one of the priests who was obUged to dance, had great
ulcers on his legs from the wounds caused by the cords
with which be had been boimd when be was tortured with
water, and was at first unable to raise his feet from the
floor ; but Villa threatened him with a rattan until he
finally did so. This caused the sores on his legs to burst
open so that the bones showed.
On the 3d of October a ninnber of the friars were com-
pelled to get up a band and go out and meet Leyba
with music on his arrival. The people of the towns
closed th^ windows in disgust at the sight. A great
crowd had gathered to receive Leyba, and the priests
were compelled to dance in the middle of the street, but
ibis agfun only caused disgust. A couple of priests were
then beaten in the usual fashion in a private bouse.
This caused murmuring even among those of the soldiers
who were natives of the Cagayan valley. At the same
time two other priests were horribly whipped in the
prison.
This has been a long story, but the half has not been
told. Those who escaped torture had their feelings
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
198 THE PHILIFPINSa PABT AND PRESENT
harrowed by the sight of the sufferings of their fellows.
They were constantly and grossly insulted; were often
confined in the most unsanitary quarters; given poor
and insufficient food and bad water, or none at all;
robbed of their clothing; compelled to march long dis-
tances imder a tropical sun when sick, wounded and
suffeiii^ ; obliged to do servants' work pubUcly ; forced
to make a ridiculous spectacle of themselves in the public
streets; ordered to recant, aud heaven knows what
not I "
The torments practised on them had two principal
objects : to compel them to give up money, and to dis-
credit them with the common people. They failed to
accomplish this latter result. There is abunduit evidence
that the natives of the Cagayan valley clothed and fed
them when they could, and wept over the painful humil-
iations and the dreadful sufferings whi(di they were
powerless to prevent or relieve.
The tormentors were men from distant provinces, with
no possible personal grievances against the priests whom
they martyrized. Their action was the result, not of an
"ebullition of revenge for three centuries of tyranny"
as stated by Blotmt, but of insensate greed of gold and
d^nnable viciousness. I believe the American people
will hold that such cruelities brand t^ose who practise
them as unfit to govern their fellows, or themselves.
Lest I be accused of basing my conclusions on ex parte
statements I will now retiun to the Insurgent record of
events in the Cagayan valley.
At the outset the Spanish officers of the Tabacalera
Company ' fared comparatively well. In a letter dated
September 27, 1898, and addressed to the secretly of
war of the revolutionary government, Leyba says of
the taking of Tuguegarao that the only terms of the sar-
render were to respect life. He therefore felt at liberty
> La Compailia General de Tabaeoa de FUipinas, a very strong oom-
merdal cngaiiiution.
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INatrEOBNT EULE IN THE CAOATAN VALLEY 199
to Bfflze all the money that the friars had hidden, "which
was acoompliBhed by applying the stick." He adds that
they did nothing to the agents of the great Tabacalera
Company, then the most powerful commercial organiza-
tion in the Islands, for the significant reason that they
had fomid that its stock was lai^ly held by Frenchmen
and feared trouble.*
On December 4, 180S, Leyba, concerning whose ideas
as to public order we are already informed, wrote a most
illuminating lett^ setting for^ the conditions which
had existed there. He does not claim that there had been
Octavian peace !
It should be borne in mind that this letter covers the
very time during which Messrs. Wilcox and Sai^ent
passed through the Cagayan valley. It paints a vivid
picture of conditions, and as the painter was the ranking
Insurgent officer in the valley dimi^ this entire period,
he cannot be accused of hostile prejudice. I therefore
give the letter in full : —
"ApARM, December 4, 1898.
"Do» Baldouero Aqdinaldo,
" Thb Sbcbetabt of Wab :
"Dbar Sib and of my Greatest EersBH: I take the
libwty of addreesing this to you in order to state that owing
to the lack of discipline in the soldiers whom we have brought,
aiuce they are all volunteers and whom I am not able to reduce
1 "I call your attention to the faot that the only tenns to the eiir-
rander were to respect life, and it was for this reason that I seized all
the money they [i.e. the friara, — D. C. W.I had hidden away, which
was Booompli^ed by applying the stick. In this capital I found
thirty-^our thousand dollars in Bilver and a draft on the CompatLia
Generrf de Tabaoos for twenty thousand dollars which can be oolleoted
here. ...
" The beuw can give you more details ooneerning the abuses com-
mitted in this provineeofVizoaya by the foroes of Major Delfln EequJzel.
Also, I wish to inform you that we have done nothing to the Compafiia
Genend de Tabacoa, for we have learned from their records that much
of their stock is held by Frenchmen, and consequently we fear a con-
flict. For this reason we await your orders on this matter. We took
all the anna we found in their possession, however." — P. I. R., 271. 2.
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200 THE PHILIPPINE8 PAST AND PEB8ENT
to rigorous subordinatioD, for the revolution would find itself
without soldiers with whom to win triumph, they committed
many abuses and misdeed which, for the lack of evidence, I
was not able to punish, although I knew of these abuses but
had no proof, and as a lover of my coimtry and of the prestige
of the Revolutionary Army, I took care not to disclose the secret
to any one, in this way avoiding the formation of an atmosphere
against the cause of our Independence to the grave injury of
us all. But it happened that, in epite of the good advice which
I have given them and the punishments which I have given to
some of the 3d Company of Cauit, they did not Improve their
conduct but have gone to the extreme of committing a scanda-
lous robbery of 20,800 pesos which sum the German, Otto
Weber, was taking to the capital, which deed has caused me to
work without ceasing, without sleeping entire nights, for I
understood what a serious matter it was to take money from a
foreigner. After making many InquirieB, it was discovered
that a very large part of the money which reached the sum of
$10,000, a little more or less, was buried under the quarters
which the Bald company occupied, this with the sanction of all
the officers, it appears to me, because it is impossible that such
a sum could be brought into a house where so many soldiers are
living without the Imowledge of the officers.
"Indignant at such shameful behaviour, I reprimanded the
officers and preferred charges agfunst the ones I deemed to
blame in the matter.
"Afterwards I foimd out that they had attempted' to murder
me for trying to find out the originators of the crime. On
account of this, and in order to prevent a civil war which would
have broken out against the said soldiers if precautions had not
been taken, I decided to disarm them, to the great displeasure
of the Colonel who was not aware of my motives.
"This bad conduct has been copied by the soldiers of the
4th Company stationed in Ilagan, and I believe the Colonel,
guided by my warning, will take the same measures in regard
to them.
"As the officers are the first ones to commit abuses and mis-
deeds, it is easily seen that the soldiers under their orders,
guided by them, will commit worse ones than the chiefs, and
as these seem to lack the moral strength to control and repri-
mand them, I propose to you, if it meets your approval, that
all these soldiers and some of the officers be returned to their
homes by the steamer Luzon, if there should be atifficient coal,
or In another if you order it, since they tell me themselves that
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INBUEGENT EULE IN THE CAGAYAN VALLEY 201
because they are far away from their homee they do not wish
to continue in the service in this province. This ia easily
arranged as there are now men stationed in this province for
instnictii^ the native volunteers, many of whom have been
students, and will therefore make good officers and non-com-
miesioned officers, and in this way a battalion could be formed,
well disciplined from the beginning and disgraceful things would
be avoided not only towards the natives of this province but
also towards foreigners, which is the most important. Having
stated my case, I place myself always at your disposal, request-
ing you will attend to this affair.
"With reference to the 4th Company stationed in the Prov-
ince of Isabels, whose captun is Don Antonio Monzon of
Panamitan, there are many complaints of thefts and assaulte
committed by the soldiers, and in answer to my questions, Don
8ime6n Adriano y Villa, Major and Sanitary Inspector and
doctor of this battalion, whom I have stationed there for lack
of a competent person, tells me that he has always punished
and offered advice to officers and soldiers in order to prevent the
recurrence of thefts and assaults, but he has never been able to
suppress them completely, because the soldiers are abandoned
by their officer, and because of lack of example on the part of
the latter ; they do not understand that it is a great blot when
they commit these abuses, since when they discover the goods
or house of a Spaniard they beheve they have a right to appro-
priate everything which they encounter.
"I have learned lately, that some foreigners, residents in
that province, among them some employees of the Tobacco
Factory, 'El Oriente' and of the firm of Baer Senior & Co.,
who have Spanish employees in various pueblos of that province,
have some very serious complaints to make of assaults com-
mitted against them prejudicial to their interests; however,
I hope that now with the arrival of General Tirona he will
regulate matters, although I believe that this gentleman is not
sufficiently energetic in proceeding agunst the officers and
soldiers, as I have seen when I reprimanded and punished
them for faults committed he has pardoned them, and it ap-
pears that he censures energetic acts which we must use in
order to subject them to rigorous discipline. The same thing
happened when Major Sr. Victa wished to discipline them ;
it appears that the Colonel reprimanded him when he punished
some soldiers for gambling in their quarters, since, as you know,
that gentleman l^lieves that he who is right is the one who
comes to him first, and who is best able to flatter him.
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202 THE PHILIPPINB8 PAST AND PRESENT
"The ColoDel has agreed with me that bis first act on
arrival at the province of Isabela should be to disarm and take
all the money he finds among the soldiers of the 4th Company
(Panamitan) in order to serve as indemnity for the property
of the fore^eiB in case they should make any claim.
"I request that you send some leader or officer in order to
superintend our actions, and to lift the doubt which hangs
over the person who has worked faithfuUy and honourably m
the sacred cause of our Independence.
" I am filling the position of First Chief m the Port of Aparri
temporarily on account of the absence of the Colonel who has
conferred on me all his duties and power. After the military
operations which were carried on as far as the last town in
Isabela, being tired and somewhat sick, I was put in charge
of these military headquarters, which I found to be very much
mixed up, the town, moreover, being desperate on account of
the assaults committed by my predecessor, Rafael Perca, who
was appointed by the Colonel, and who was formerly 2d C^i-
tain of the steamer Filipinos. After arriving and taking
charge, having received numerous complaints against him, I
had him arrested and I found that he had been guilty of rob-
bery, imlawful use of insignia, illegal marriage, rape and at-
tempted rape. I hold him in custody only awuting the arrival
of the Colonel in order to convene a court-martial for his trial, in
which the Colonel will act as President and I as Judge Advocate.
"With nothing more to communicate, I hope you will
attend to my just clum and send a special delegate to investi-
gate our acts and see the truth, for perhaps if a statement comee
direct from me you will not beUeve it.
"I am your ^ectitmate and faithful subordinate, who kisses
3rour hand,
(S^ed) " J. N. Lbtba." >
Blount states that conditions existed "just like this,
all over Luzon and the Visayan Islands." * Unfortunately
this was only too true I
The troops complained of by Leyba were made up of
Aguinaldo's fdlow townsmen. They never obeyed any
• P. I. R. 192. 4.
■ "I was in tba,t town, for a smiilar purpose, with Qovemor Taft
in 1901, after a bloody war whioh almost oertoiuly would not have
ooourred had the Puis Peaoe Commisuoa known the conditions th«D
existing, just like this, all over Luzon and the Visayan Islands." — Blount,
p. 116.
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INSnRQENT BUIE IN THE CAOAYAN VALLEY 203
one else, and left a trail of murder and rapine behind them.
Aguinaldo never punished them, and from the time when
one of them tried to murder their commander mitil a
guard composed of them murdered General Antonio
Luna in June, 1899, they are mentioned only with fear
and execration.
Bloimt describes with enthusiasm the establishment
of civil government in Cagayan.
Perhaps Americans will be interested in knowing who
was its head and how it worked. The "elections" were
held on December 9, 1898, and Dimas Guzman was
chosen head of the province. He was the man subse-
quently sentenced to life-imprisonment by Blount, for
complicity in the murder of Lieutenant Piera. In describe
ing his method of conducting hia government he says
that the people doubted the legality of attempts to collect
taxes ; that the abuses of heads of towns caused rioting
in the towns, in which only Ilocanos took part ; and that
he not only did not report these things but contrived to
conceal them from foreigners in the province.*
His ffulure to report these troubles and disorders to his
government is of interest, as Blount alleges* that dif-
> "On aoooimt of this the vulgar people doubted the legalit? of onr
aotioDB in the aoUectioa of taxes, aod ocoordingly it became diffioiilt ;
and this, ooupled with the inv«t€rate ftbtuea of the hea4ls of the tonus,
whioli the head of the pravinoe was not able to perceive in time to
oheok. eauaed a tumult in Eohapie, which, owing to wise oounoila
and efforts at pacification, was appe&aed without it being followed b;
Barioufl oonaeqnenoee ; but I have no doubt that this tumult wai due
only to the suggeetions of ungovernable and passionate persons ani-
mated by the spirit of taotton, since thoee who took part in it were
all nooanoa, no native of Eohague having any hand in it. The same
thing ooeuned in Naguilian, where the disorders were also quieted.
Not only did I make no report of all this to the government of the
republio on account of the abnormality of the present oonditiona, but
I also sucoeeded in ooaoealing them from the foreigners here so that
flM7 ihould not succeed in discovering the truth, which would be to
the (wjudioe of our cause." — Taylor, 42 AJ.
* "I may add that as judge of that distriot in 1901-2 there came
before me a Qomber of oasee in the trial of which the fact would be
brought out ot this or that differeooe among the local aathtnitieB hav-
:dbvGoogIe
204 THE PHILIPPmES PAST AND PRESENT
ferences between the local authorities vere in a number
of cases referred to the Malolos government for settle-
ment.
Blount says* that General Otis's reports were full of
inexcusable blunders about the Tag&logs taking posses-
sion of provinces and making the people do things, and
cites the relations between Villa and Dimas Guzman to
illustrate the error of these allegations.
He has elsewhere * referred to Villa as the ' ' arch-fiend ' '
in the matter of torturing the unhappy Spaniards as well
aa the Filipinos who incurred his ill-mil. We have seen
that Guzman proved an apt pupil and did credit to his
instructor in connection with t^e torturing of Lieutenant
Piera, but it neverthdess appears from Guzman's own
statements that his relations with the Insurgent officers
and their subordinates involved some rather grave
difficulties. Of Major Canoy, for instance, he says : —
"I must add that the said Major Canoy is such a remarkable
character that he saw fit to give my cook a beatii^ for not tak-
ing off his hat when he met him. He insulted the delegate of
rents of Cabagan Viejo for the same reason. He struck the
head man of the town of Bagabs^ in the face. He put some of
the members of the town council of Echague in the stocks, and
he had others whipped." '
It was really incautious for Ciovemor Guzman to com-
plain of these conditions because Major Canoy and his
party won, and the Governor had to resign.
But the day of reckoning came. It was in consequence
ing been referred to the Maloloe Government for settlement. And
they always waited until they heard from it." — Blount, p. 115.
' "General Otis's reports are full of the moat inezousable blunders
about how 'the Tagals' took possession of the various provinoea and
made the people do this or that. Villa's relations with GuEman were
just about those of a New Yorker or a Boatonian sent up to Vermont
in the days of the American Revolution to help organize the redstanoe
there, in oonjunction with one of the local leaders of the patriot oanae
in the Green Mountain State." — Blount, p. 112.
■Blount, p. 114.
• TaylOT, 42 AJ.
:dbvGoogIe
IN8UB0BNT ROLE IN THE CAGATAN VALLEY 203
of the atrocitiee comimtted by the Tag&log soldiers in the
Cagayan valley that Captain Batchelder was able a little
later to march practically unopposed through the prov-
inces of Nueva Vlzcaya, Isabela and Cagayan with
one battalion of Americui negro troops, for whom he had
neither food nor extra ammunition, and that Tirona
surrendered the Insurgent forces in the valley without
attempting resistance I
:dbvGoogIe
CHAPTER Vn
Insubgent RniiB in the Visatas and EI£EWHBBE
Refebrino to the conditions alleged to have been found
by Sargent and Wilcox in the Cagayan valley, Blount
"Had another Sargent and another Wilcox made a similar
trip through the provinces of southern Luz6n about this same
time, under similar friendly auspices, before we tiuned friend-
ship to hate and fear and misery, in the name' of Benevolent
Assimilation, they would, we now know, have found «milar
oonditiona." '
So f ar aa concerns the provinces of Mindoro and Pala-
wan, and the great island of Mindanao, he dodges the
issue, alleging the unimportance of Mindoro and Pala-
wan, and claiming that "Mohammedan Mindanao"
presents a problem by itself. Under such generalities
he hides the truth as to what happened in these regions.
Z agree with him that there was essential identity be-
tween actufd conditions in the Cagayan valley and those
which prevailed under Insurgent rule elsewhere in Luz6n
and in the Visayas. I will go further and say that con-
ditions in the Cagayan valley did not difTer essentially
from t^ose which prevailed throughout all portions of
the archipelago which fell under Insui^ent control, ex-
cept that in several provinces captured friars and other
Spaniards were quickly murdered whereas in the Cagayan
valley no friar was quite killed outright by torture.
Those who ultimately died of their injuries lived for some
time.
Let m now consid^ some of the actual occurrences in
'Blount, p. 111.
206
:dbvGoogIe
maOBOENT WJLE IN THE TISATAS AND ELBEWHERE 207
these other provinces, continuing to follow the route of
our toimsts until it brings us back to Manila.
Souih llocoi
The first province visited by Messrs. Wilcox and Sar-
gent after leaving Aparri was South Ilocoa. The con-
ditions which had prevailed at Vigan, the capital of the
province, shortly before their arrival, are described in a
letter signed "Mariano" and addressed under date of
September 25, 1898, to Sefior Don Mena Cris61ogo, from
which I quote extracts : —
"Deab Mena: I read with a happy heart your letter of
the 3rd instant, and in answer I have to say: —
" On the 22ad of August a mass meeting was held for the
election of the local presidente of this town, and I was elected
to the office; and on the Ist instant the Colonel appointed
me Provisional Provincial President of this province, so that
you can imagine the position I am in and the responmbilitjes
which weigh on me.
" Your house is occupied by the Colonel, in view of the fact
that it is not rented.
" I have here eleven friar prisoners and the damned priests
who escaped from here have not as yet been returned, but it
is known that they are prisoners in Cagayan, and as soon as
they arrive here I will treat them as they deserve.
' It is with great r^ret that I have to relate the events and
misfortunes which we have been suffering here since the arrival
of the troops, as all the detachments are supported by the
towns, and here in the capital where the commissary is estab-
lished, our resources are exhausted, owing to the unreasonable
demands of the commissary, because he never asks what is only
just and necessary, but if he needs provisions for 200 men, he
always asks enough for 1000. And notwithstandu^ this,
the most lamentable and sad occurrences are taking place
almost daily in the different barrios, and often in the town
itself; the soldiers are guilty of many abuses and disorderly
acts, such as rapes and miuders, which usually remain un-
pimished by reason of the real authors thereof not being found,
and when they are found and reported to their commanders,
the latter do notliing. One ni^t the house and estate of
Saiio llnon in Anannam was sacked by uz anned men, who
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
208 THE PHIUPMNES PAST AND PRESENT
threatened tiim and took his money, hia wife's jewela and the
best horses he had. Thank God that his family was at the
time in the capital, and it appears that now the authois €i
this act are being discovered.
" I am at the present time working with Father Aglipay to
have the forces stationed here replaced by our volunteers
which I am recruiting, in order to prevent in so far as pc»^ble
the frequent acta of barbarity which the former are committing
in the province.
" When the friars from Lepanto arrived here, they were made
to publish the following proclamation : —
' Proclamation. — We, the friars, declare that all the acts
committed by us against the honest Filipinos when we dis-
charged our respective .offices, were false and in contraventioii
of the rights of the Holy Church, becaiise we only wished to
deceive and prejudice the honest inhabitants of the Philippines ;
for which reason we now suffer what we are suffering, as you
see, according to the old adage that " he who owes must p^."
And now we inform all you honest Filipinos that we repent
for the acts above referred to, which are in contravention of
the laws and good customs, and ask your pardon. — ViQAN,
September 13, 1898.'
"All of which I communicate to you in order that you may
form an idea of what is taking place here, and take such steps
as may be proper for the common good, and especially for the
good of tha town, hoping that with the aid of your valuable
protection the abuses and disorders suffered by the residents
will be stopped." '
The province of Abra, noW a subproTiDce of South
Hocos, was evidently no exception to the geaeral rule,
for there is on file a letter to Aguinaldo with twenty-six
signatures, protesting bitterly against the oppression of
the poor, in the effort to compel them to contribute war
taxes, complaining against the misuse of supplies gathered
ostensibly for the soldiers, and stating that the petitioners
will be obliged to take refuge with the Igorots and
Negritos, if not granted relief.'
ip. I. R.,974. 3.
*"Deoemb«^ 20, 1808.
" To THE Honorable Pbesident riF thh Rbtoltttionabt Gotebnhbnt.
" Th« undesigned remdents of ttie barangay of D. Franoisoo Queru-
Un and D. Melchor Balueg, of Bnoay, of the [oovinoe ttf Abm, appeal
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
BuiLDiHa THE BEHonBT Road.
In thiB, as in many other places, it proved necessary to blast the road out o(
the solid rock.
:dbvGoogIe
:dbvGoogIe
INSOROBNT RULE IN THE VISAYAB AND ELSEWHERE 209
Apparently the trouble grew, for on December 27, 1898,
the "Director of Diplomacy" telegraphed to Aguinaldo
concerning it, saying : —
"Most urgent. The discont^it in the proviucee of F&n-
gasin^B, Tarlac and Yloco (Ilocoe) is increasing. The town
of Bangbaog rose in revolt the 25th and 26th of this month,
and killed a]ft of the civil officiala. It ia impossible to describe
the abuses committed by the military and civil authorities of
the said provinces. I urge you to send a force of 100 men and a
diplomatic of&cer to reestablish order. The matter is urgent." ^
I find nothing important in the Insui^rait records con-
cerning conditions in La Union at this time. Pangaain&n,
to you with the utmoat aubjeotion from th^ pUoe of reddeiioe and
state : Th»t their heads or lepresentatives, D. FranciBoo Querub&i
and Melohor Balueg, respectively, force them to pay two petot each
08 a war tax, your humble vamals above cited being hardly able to
earn their own livelihood and support their families, and, notwithstand-
ing their labor, some of them cannot get anything to eat without ap-
pealing to the charity of their richer neighbours ; but notwitha tending
this sad situation, they offer a peseta each as a mark of gratitude to
the mother country, iSlipinas, but said gentlemen, the representatives
mentioned, have not the slightest pity and worry ua to the ext«nt
of having kept us in our houses a day and a night without anything to
eat, not even permitting us to go out to get a drink.
" We must inform you that the head of the barangay, D. Melchor
Balueg, when he gathers the supphea for the troops stationed in his
town, said supplies conaiBting of rice, pigs, chickens and egge, uses
one-half (J what ia gathered, and then again orders his assiatants to
"In t&ot, the undersigned request you to direct that the pt»eta
which they o9er be accepted and that the said Don Frauciaoo Quffiubin
and Don Melchor Balueg be reUeved of their duties, in order to put a
stop to the abuses oonstoutVy committed by them ; and if this be not
done, the petitioners will be obliged to leave their homes and property
in the town and take up their reaidenoee in the mountains with the
Negritos and Igorots, in order that the othcos may remain in the
town and live tranquilly.
" This is a grace which we do not doubt we will receive from you,
whose life may Qod preserve for many years.
"BucAT, November 12, 1898." (26 wgnatures)
(In blue penoil in the handwriting of Aguinaldo:) "It will be
aptnoved.
"Deo. 20, 1898. "B. A."
—P. I. R., 991. 4.
»P.I. R..849.
VOL. I — F
:dbvGoogIe
210 THE FHILIPPINB8 PAST AND PBBSENT
Tarlac, Pampanga and Bulacan, which were now revirated
by our tourists, have ak^ady been discussed.
The Pronnee of Manila
Conditions in Manila Province, as distinguished from
Manila City, left much to be desired.
Admiral Dewey made a statement applicable to the
territory adjacent to the city and bay of Manila in a
cablegram to Washington dated October 14, 1S98, which
reads as follows : —
"It is important that the dispoution of the Philippme
Islands should be decided as soon as possible. . . . Geaeral
anarchy prevuls without the limits of the city and bi^ of
Manila. Natives appear unable to gfyvem," '
Of it Blount sajrs : —
"In this cabl^ram the Adnural most unfortunately re-
peated as true some wild rumours then currently accepted by
the Europeans and Americans at Manila which, of course, were
impossible of verification. I say 'unfortunately' with some
earnestness, because it does not appear on the face of his
message that they were mere rumours. And, that they were
whtdly erroneous, in point of fact, has already been cleared
up in previous chapters, wherein the real state of peace, order,
and tranquillity which prevailed throughout Liu6n at that
time has be^ it is beheved, put beyond all doubt."*
Blount seems here to have overlooked the fact that the
admiral himself was in Manila Bay and in Manila City
at the time he sent th^ cablegram. The statem^ita in
question were not rumom^, they were deliberate expres-
sions of opinion on the part of a man who had first-hand
information and knew what he was saying.
They were not the Admiral's only allegations on this
subject. When testifying before the Senate committee
he said: —
" Admiral Deioey. I knew that there was no government in
the whole of the Philippines. Our fleet had destroyed the
> Blount, p. 130. > Ibid^ pp. 130-131.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
mSUROENT RDU! IN THK VISATAB AND EUSWHBRB 211
only government there was, and there was no othw government ;
tha« waa a reign of terror throughout the Pbilippmes, looting,
robbing, murdering ; a reign of terror throughout the i^aoda!^
La Laguna
Having brought our tourist friends safely back to
Manila, we must now leave them there and etrike out by
ourselves if we are to see other provinces.
La Laguna lies just east of Manila. Of it we learn that :
"Laguna Province was bo overrun by bands of robbers
that the head of the pueblo of San Pablo ordered the people
to concentrate in the town to avoid their attacks." '
Hie proTiDoe of Bataan lies just aeroas the bay from
Manila.
"On January 10, 1899, the secretary ci the interior directed
the governor of Bataan Province to asoertun the whereabouts
of a number of men who had just deserted with their rifles
from the commands there. He was to appeal to their patiiotr
iem and tell them that if they would but return to thdr com*
panies their complaints would be attended to and they would
be pardoned." *
ZawbdUi
Zambales joins Bataan on the weet and north. On
November 13, 2898, Wenoeslao Vinvegra wrote to Agui-
naldo describing the state of affairs in this province. From
his letter we learn that two brothers named Teodoro and
Doroteo Pansacula, claiming to be governor and brig-
adier general respectively, who are charged with aban-
donment of their posts in the field, disobedience and at-
tempts against the union of the Insurgents, had been
committing all manner of abuses. They had organized
a band of cut-throats, anned with rifles and bolos, and
■ P. I. R., 1142.4. */Ud.,aoa2.3.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
212 THB FHILIPFINB8 PAST AND PRESENT
were terrorizing the towns, committing robbmee and
murders and ordering that money be fumlshed for them-
selves and food for their men.
They were also encouraging the people to disobey the
local authorities and refuse to pay taxes, and were pro-
miL^ting a theory, popular with the masses, that the
time had come for tiie rich to be poor and the poor rich.
They had furthermore induced r^idar Lasurgent troops
to rise up in anns.^
From this communication it would appear that the
Insui^ent government had not been entirely effective in
Zambales up to November 13th, 1898.
From other commimicatious we learn that the soldiers
at Alaminos were about to desert on November 30th,
1898 ; ' that it was deemed necessary to restrict travel
between Tarlac, Pampai^a, Bataan and Zambales in
order to prevent robberies ;■ and that on January 9, 1899,
the governor of the province found it impossible to con-
tinue the inspection of a number of towns, as many of
their officials had fled to escape the abuses of the miUtary.*
Conditions were obviously very serious in Zambales at
this time.
> P. I. R., 964. 3.
■ " On November 30, 1898, the oommAndar in Alaminofl, Zambales
Itevinoe, telegraphed that hia soldiers vere i^ about to desert as the
head of Vbe town would not furniah rations or pay without orders from
the Bovemor." — P. I. R.. 2002. 3.
' "On Deoember 22, Aguinaldo, in aooorduioe with a request from
the governor of Zambales Province, ordered the heads of the provinces
of Pangasin&n, Tarlao, Bataan, and Pampanga to prohibit the people
of their provinces from going to Zambales without passports signed by
them, stating the route they were to take in going and returning and
the length of time to be spent in the journey. The governor of Zam-
bales had asked for this regulation in order to .prevent the oommission
of robberies in ZambaJes and to distinguish persons justly subject to
suspicion from those of good conduct." — P. I. R., 266. 3.
'"On January 9, the governor of Zambalee found it impossible
to continue the inspection of certain towns of his province and to
continue holding elections, as many of the officials had fled to escape
the exactions and abuses of the military commanders."
— P. I. R., 988. 2.
:dbvGoogIe
INSURQENT rule: IN THE VISAYAB AND ElfiEWHERE 213
Cavite
Cavite province lies immediately south of Manila
province aa the latter was tiien constituted. On Ai^ust
24, 1898, the secretary of war wired Aguinaldo that two
drunken Americans had been killed by Insurgent sol-
diers.' On the same day General Anderson advised the
governor of Cavite that one American soldier had been
killed and three woimded by Ms people, and demanded
his immediate withdrawal, with bis guard, from the town.*
The governor asked Aguinaldo for instructions. Agui-
naldo replied instructing the governor to deny that the
American had been killed by Insurgent soldiers and to
claim that he had met death at the hands of his own
companions. The governor was further directed to pve
up his life before leaving the place.*
In view of the definite stat^ent from one of his own
officers that the soldier in question was killed by Filipino
soldiers, Aguinaldo's instructions to say that he was
killed by Americans are interesting as showing his
methods.
Not only were the Insurgents obviously unable to con-
trol their own soldiers in Cavite town sufficiently to pre-
vent them from committing murder, but conditions in
the province of the same name left much to be desired.
> "The Oovemor of Cavite reports two drunken Americans h&ve
been killed by our aoIdierB. I tell him to have an inrestiKation immedi-
atolf and report the faot to the Amerioan oommaoder." — P. I. R., 849.
■ "Moat urgent. Gen. Auderwn informs me in a letter that, 'in
order to avoid the very Mrioua miafortime of an encounter between
our troops, I demand your immediate withdrawal with your guard
from Cavite. One of my men haa been killed and three wounded by
your people.' This ia positive and does not admit of explanation or
delay. I aak you to inform me of your deoiaion." — P. I. B., 849.
* "QxN. RiKQo i>B Dioa, Cavite : Telegram received. Do not leave
the post, and say that you cannot abandon the city without my orders,
and say that he was not killed by our soldiers, but by them themselves
[the Americans. — D. C. W.J, since they were drunk, aocordins to
your telegram. Give up your life before abandoning that place, and
investigate matters." — P. I. R., 849.
:dbvGoogIe
214 THB PHILIPFINES PAST AND PRESENT
On December 29, 1898, the governor wired Aguinaldo
that the town of Marigondong had risen in arms.^
It is a well-known fact that land records were destroyed
in Cavite. Of this matter Taylor says: —
"In Cavite, in Cavite Province, and probably in most of
the other provinces, one of the first acts <u the insurgents who
gathered about Aguinaldo was to destroy all the land titles
which had been recorded and filed in the Spanish administra-
tive bureaus. In case the independence of the Philippines
was won, the land of the friars, the land of the Spaniards and
of those who still stood by Spain, would be in the gift of Agui-
Q^do or of any strong man who could impose his will upon the
people. And the men who jomed this leader would be rich
m the chief riches of the country, and those who refused to do
so would be ruined men." '
Sorsogdn
"The native civil officials who took charge of the govern-
ment of Sorsogdn Province when the Spaniards abandoned
it did not think it worth while to hoist the insurgent flag until
a force of four companies arrived there to take station early
in November, 1898. The officer in command promptly or-
dered the Chinamen in the town of Sorsog6n, who are prosperous
people, to contribute to the support of his troops. They
at once gave him cloth for uniforms, provisions, and 10,000
pesos. This was not sufficient, for on November 8 Gen.
Ignacio Paua, who seems to have been the insurgent agent
in dealing with the Chinese, compluned that the troops in
SoT8og6n were pillaging the Chinamen there. They had killed
13, wounded 19, and ruined a number c^ others." '
In January, 1899, a correspondent wrote Aguinaldo that
it was verydiffiexilt to collect taxes as every one was taking
what he could lay hia hands on.*
■ "Urgent. 0«n. Alvues telegraphed that Riego de Dioa informed
bim that the tovn of Maragondong had risen in turma on aooount ol
abuses committed by the local President against Salvador Riego,
This is the reason the tovn took up arms. Will go there to-mortow."
p I. ji. 849.
• Taylor, 19 AJ. • P. L K., 1067. 4. * Taylor," 95 HB. '
ib,GoogIe
INSUKGENT RULE IN THE VISAYA8 AND ELSEWHERE 215
Amboa Camarinea
On Septanb^ 18, 1898, Eliaa Angeles, a corporal of the
guardia civU, headed an uprising agalost the Spaniards.
The Spanish officer in command, and all of his family,
were lolled by shooting up through the floor of the room
which they occupied. Angeles then assumed the Utle
of Politico-Mihtary-Govemor.
When the Tag&Iog Vicente Lucban arrived on his way
to Samar, he ordered Angeles to meet him at Ms^arao,
wiUi all his troops and arms, disarmed the troops, giving
their rifles to his own followers, marched into Nueva
Caceres emd took possession of the entire govermnent.
Aguinaldo subsequently made Lucban a general, and sent
him on his way to Samar.
Lucban was succeeded by another Tag&log, "General"
Guevara, a very ignorant man, who displayed special
ability in making collections, and is reported to have kept
a lai^ part of the funds which came into his possession.
Colonel Pefla, who called himself "Genertd," was one
of the worst of the Tag&log invaders, for they were prac-
tically that. He threatened all who opposed him with
death, and summarily shot at least one man in Tigaon.
That town subsequently rose against him, and he was
badly cut up by the Bicols.' On getting out of the hos-
pital he was sent away.
The daughters of prominent families suffered at the
hands of these villains. Fefia abducted one, a son of
Guevara another. Her brother followed young Guevara
and killed him. If girls of the best families were so
treated, how must those of the common people have
fared?
Braganza ordered the killing of all Spaniards and
Chinese at Minalabag. Some forty-eight Spaniards were
murdered.
* The name applied to the FUlpinos of Amboa Canurines, Albay
aiMlSonogdn.
:dbvGoogIe
216 THE PHIUPPINE8 PAST AND PRESENT
Many Chinese were killed at Fasacao; about thirty
at Iiibmanan by order of Vicente Ureua a Tag41og ; more
than twenty at Calabanga.
Conditions became so unbearable that Faustino Santa
Ana gathered around him all Bicols who were willing to
fight the Tag^ogs, but the troubles were finally patched up.
American troops had httle difiiculty 'm. occupying Ambos
Camarines and other Bicol provinces, owing to the hatred
in which the T^&logs were held.
Mindoro
Conditions in the important island of Mindoro may be
inferred from the fact that it became necessary for its
governor to issue a decree on November 10, 1898, which
contained the following provisions among others : —
"2nd. The local presidentes of the pueblos will not permit
any one belonging to their jurisdiction to pasa from one pueblo
to another nor to another province without the correspondii^
pass, with a certificate upon its back that the taxes of its holder
have been piud.
" 3rd. That from this date no one will be allowed to abs^it
himself from his pueblo without previously informing its
head who will give him an authorization on which will be
noted the approval of the presidente of the pueblo. . . .
" 5th. Persons arriving from a neighboring town or prov-
ince in any pueblo of this province wUI immediately present
themselves before the presidente of said pueblo with their
passes. He will withoutcharge, stamp them withhisofficialseal."'
These are peculiar regulations for a province which is
at peace, and as Major Taylor has truly remarked : —
"The form of libertiy contemplated by the founders of the
Philippine Republic was not considered incompatible with a
very considenUDle absence of personal freedom." *
Later, when travelUi^ through Mindoro, I was told how
an unfortimate legless Spaniard, who had been numing
a small shop in one of the towns and who was on good
terms with his Filipino neighbors, was carried out into
' P. I. R., 262. 3. > Taylor. 4S AJ.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
11
s
I
1
bvGoogle
bvGoogle
IK8DRGENT ROI.B IN THE VISAYAS AND EI3EWHERE 217
the plana, seated in a chair, and then cut to pieces with
boloB in the presence of his wife and children who were
compelled to witness the horrible spectacle 1
On this same trip Captain R. G. OiOBey, then the Ameri-
can Governor of Mindoro, told me while I waa at Pina-
malayan that the people there were greatly alarmed be-
cause a murderer, liberated under the amnesty, had re-
turned and was prowling about in that vicinity. Tim
man had a rather unique record. He had captured one
of his enemies, and after stripping him completely had
caused the top of an inunense ant-hill to be dug off. The
unfortunate victim was then tied, laid on it, and the earth
and ants which had been removed were shovelled back
over his body until only his head projected. The ants
did the rest 1 Another rather unusual achievement of
this interesting individual was to tie the feet of one of
his enemies to a tree, fasten a rope around his neck, hitch
a carabao to the rope, and st&rt up the carabao, thus
pulling off the head of his victim. Yet this man and
others like him were set at liberty under the amnesty
proclamation, in spite of the vigorous protests of the
Philippine Commission, who thought that murd««rs of
this type ought to be hanged.
And now I wish to disciiss briefly an interesting and
highly characteristic statement of Judge Blount. In
referring to conditions in the Visayan Islands, he says : —
"Of course the Bouthem Islands were a little slower. But
as Luzto Koee, so go the rest. The rest of the archipelago is
but the tail to the Luz6n kite. Luz6q contains 4,000,000 of
the 8,000,000 people out there, and Manila is to the Filipino
people what Paris is to the French and to France. Luzdn is
about the use of Ohio, and the other six islands that really
matter, are in size mere little Connecticuts and Rhode Islands,
and in population mere Arizonas or New Mexicos."'
This paragraph is no exception to the general rule that
the statements of this author will not bear analysis. One
•Blotuit, p. 116.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
218
THE PHILIPPINES FAST AND FSEBENT
of the other six islands that he says really matters is
Samar, Its area is 5031 square miles. The area of
Rhode Island is 1250 square miles. The smallest of the
tax islands named is Bohol, with an area of 1411 square
miles. It cannot be called a little Rhode Island.
As regards population, Arizona has 122,931. It is
hardly proper to call either Fanay with a population of
743,646, Cebu with 592,247, NegPOB with 460,776, Leyte
with 357,641, Bohol with 243,14$ or eren Samar with
only 222,690, a mere Arizona, and New Mexico with
195,310 is also a bit behind.
Luz6n really has an area of 40,969 square miles and a
population of 3,798,507.* What Bloimt is pleased to call
"the tail to the Luz6n kite," is made up as follows: —
toLAHP
AB.A (Bgnu. Miu.)
ForDLAnov
Samar .
Negroa .
Panay .
Leyte .
Cebu .
Bohol .
5,031
4,881
4,911
2,722
1,762
1,411
222,600
460,776
743,646
357,641
592,247
243,148
Totals
20,419
2,620,148
Even so, the tul is a trifle long and heavy for the kite,
but if we are going to compare Luz6n with "the Southern
Islands, " by which Blount can presumably only mean the
rest of the archipeU^o, why not really do it 7 The pro-
cess involves nothing more complicated than the subtrac-
tion of its area and population from those of the archipel-
^^ as a whole.
AuA Ceouiu Milk)
FoFDUnOK
Luzdn
115,026
40,969
7,635,420
3,798,607
Difference . .
74,057
3,836,919
* Aooepting the 19(3 oeoaiu figures.
:dbvGoogIe
mamtoENT rule m the tisatas and euewhere 210
Performing this operation, we discover that the tail
would fly away wit^ the kite, as Luz6n has less than half
of the total population and only a little more than a third
of the total area.
To compare the area or the population of one large
island with those of individual small ones, in determining
the relative importance of the former in the eoimtry of
which it makes up a part, is like comparing the area and
population of a great state with those of the individual
coimties going to make up other states.
Blount resorts to a similar questionable procedure in
trying to show the insignificance of Mindoro and Palawan.
There are an island of Mindoro and a province of Mindoro ;
an island of Palawan and a province of Palawan. In
each case the province, which includes numerous small
islands, as well as the large one from which it takes its
name, is much larger and more populous than is the main
island, and obviously it is the province with which we
are concerned.
Even if Blount wished to limit discusaion to the Chris-
tian natives commonly called Filipinos, hig procedure is
still wholly unfair. Of these there are 3,575,001 in Luz6n
and 3,412,685 in the other islands. In other words, the
Fihpino population is almost equally divided between the
two regions.
As he would not have found it convenient to discuss
the conditions which arose in Mindanao under Insurgent
rule, he attempts to show that no political impor-
tance attaches to them. In the passage above quoted
he does not so much as mention either Mindoro or Pala-
wan (Par^ua). Elsewhere, however, he attempts to
justify his action by making the following statements : —
"The political or govenimental problem being now re-
duced from 3141 islaads to eleven, the last three ' of the nine
' AgMiTiiJdo aoniidered Misdaiuo important enough to form one
of the three federal states into whioh tie propoeed to divide the FhiliiH
ib,GoogIe
220 THE PHILIPnNES PAST AND PRESENT
contfuned in the above table may also be eliminated as fol-
lows : ' —
"Mindoro, the large island just south of the main bulk
of Luzdn, pierced by the 121st meridian of longitude east of
Greenwich, is thick with densely wooded mountuns and
jungle over a large part of its area, has a reputation of being
very unhealthy (malarious), is also very spu^y settled, and
does not now, nor has it ever, cut any figure politically as a
disturbing factor." '
Apart from the fact that the political problem involved
in the government of the important islands which Blount
would thus leave out of consideration, is not solved by
ignoring it, certain of bis further statements cannot be
allowed to go imcorrected.
The allegation that the island has never "cut any figure
politically as a disturbing factor" is absurd. In the
Spanish days its forests furnished a safe refuge for evil-
doers who were from time to time driven out of Cavite
and Batangas. A large proportion of its Filipino inhabit-
ants were criminals who not infrequently organized
regular piratical expeditions and raided towns in Masbate,
Romblon and Palawan. The people of the Cuyos and
Calamianes groups lived in constant terror of the Kfindoro
pirates, and tulisanea,' who paid them frequent visits.
I myself have been at Calapan, the capital of the prov-
ince, when the Spanish officials did not dare to go without
armed escort as far as the outskirts of the town for fear
of being captured and held for ransom. Diuing con-
siderable periods they did not really pretend to exercise
control over the criminal Filipinos inhabiting the west
coast of the island. Conditions as to pubUc order were
worse in Mindoro than anywhere else in the archipelago
north of Mindanao and Joi6.
No less absurd are Blount's su^estions as to the gen-
eral worthlessness of the island. There are high moun-
tains in its interior, and there are great stretches of the
I Bloimt, p. 228. * Ibid., p. 229. ■ Bandits, or oiganiBed robben.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INBUBOENT BULE IN THE VI8AYAS AND EI£EWHEBE 221
most fertile land in the world along its coast. Its north-
em and eastern portions have a very heavy and evenly
distributed rainf ^, and are admirably suited to the grow-
ing of cocoanuts, hemp, cacao, rubber and similar tropi-
cal products. In this region rice flourishes wonderfully
without irrigation. There was a time in the past when
Mindoro was known as "the granary of the Philippines."
Later its population was decimated by constant Moro
attacks, and cattie disease destroyed its draft animals,
with the result that the cultivated lands were abandoned
to a considerable extent and again grew up to jungle,
from which, however, it is easy to redeem them. The
west coast has strongly marked wet and dry seasons sim-
ilar to those at Manila. There is abundant water avail-
able for irrigation, furnished by streams which never run
dry. Much of the soil is rich, and will grow the best of
sugar in large quantity. The forests, which now cover
extensive areas, sboimd in fine woods, and produce rubber
and other valuable gums. There are outcroppings of
lignite at numerous points on the island, and in the vi-
cinity of Mt. Halcon is found the finest marble yet dis-
cov^^ in this part of the world. Gold is aiao present
in some quantity at various places. In short, Mindoro
is naturally one of the richest islands in the Archipelago.
If its tillable lands were under high cultivation, it would
support half the population of the Philippines.
Palawan
In endeavouring to show that Palawan is without po-
litical importance Blount has followed precisely the pro-
cedure which he adopted in the case of Mindoro. first,
he gives the area and the population of the island, when
he should concern himself with the province. The area
of the island is 4027 square miles ; that of the province,
5238 square miles. According to the 1903 census, the
popula^on of the island was 10,918, while that of the
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
222 THE TBnJSVaiEB PAST AND PRESENT
province, which contains such thickly settled and fertile
islands as Cuyo and A^taya, was 30,582. Of course, if
one wishes to emphasize the imimportance of Palawan,
it is more convenient to take the figures for the island.
Blount says : —
" Parfkgua,^ the long narrow island seen, at the extreme lower
left of any map of the archipelago, extending northeastrsouth-
west at an ai^le of about 45°, is practically worthlesB, being
fit for nothing much except a penal colony, for which purpose
it is in fact now used." *
I must deny the truthfulness of his statements, even
if we limit our consideration to the island of Palawan.
Only 159 of its 4027 square miles are utilized for a penal
colony. Its natural wealth is dmply enormoiis. It is
covered throiigbout the greater part of its extent with
virgin forest containing magnificent stands of the best
timber. Damar, a very valuable varnish gum, is abun-
dant in its mountains. Much of the so-called ' ' Singapore
cane," so highly prized by makera of rattan and wicker
furniture, comes from its west coast. It is a wdl-watered
island, and its level plains, which receive the wash from
its heavily forested mountains, have a soil of unsurpassed
futility in which cocoanute come to befunng in five years
or even less. Incidentally, the greater part of the island
lies south of the typhoon belt. Matampaya Sotmd, situ-
ated near its northwestern extremity, is one of the world's
great harbors. But should we wish to rid ourselves of
this wonderful island, I may say, without violating any
official confidences, that there was a time when Germany
would have been more than pleased to take it oS our
hands ; and indeed our Briti^ friends, who were suffi-
ciently interested in it to survey it some decades ago,
might posdbly be prevailed upon to accept it I
There are good reasons why Blount thought it conven-
ient to make it appear that Palawan was politically un-
■The old Spaoiata name for FlftUwao. * Blount, p. 328.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INSURQEHT RCLB IN THE VISATAfl AND EUEWHERE 223
importaat. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities with
Spain the Filipino garrison at Puerto Princesa mutinied,
and the things which they did were not nice. Among
others, they liberated the convicts, Puerto Princesa being
at the time a penal colony, and the latter, together with
some of tiie soldiers, started up the east coast of the
island, leaving a trail of devastation in their wake. The
prosperous town of Tinitian was abandoned as they
approached it, and was so thoroughly cleaned out by them
that it has never since been reoccupied except by a few
stragglers. Other towns, including Tay-Tay, were raided.
On November 27, 1899, Aguinatdo's representative in
this province wrote him that the inhabitants were pre-
paring to kill all the Tag&logs and revolt against Insur-
gent rule.' Later when some of the latter were anxious to
get the people of one of the northern settlements to
take them on a short boat journey, these Visayans con-
sented to give them a lift only on condition that they
first allow themselves to be boimd, and then took them
out to sea and threw them overboard.
Another thing which Bloimt would have found it in-
convenient to discuss is the conduct of the people of
Cuyo, at one time the capital of the province. On this
island, which contains but twentynsne squiu'e miles, there
were in 1903 no less than 7545 inhabitants. They hated
Mid feared the people of Mindoro and sent messengers
to Hoilo, after the Americans had occupied that place, to
beg for a garrison of American troops, and to say that if
furnished with an American flag they themselves would
defend it. For some reason they were not given the flag,
Bud the sending of a garrison was long delayed. Having
grown weary of waiting, they made an American flag of
their own, hoisted it, and when the Insurgents from Min-
doro came intrenched themselves and defended it. They
were actually being besieged when the American garrison
finally arrived. Here is one more fact inconsistent with
> P. I. R., 944. 10.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
234 THE TmUPPStJES PABT AND PRESENT
the theory that the Filipino people were a, unit at.
Aguinaldo's back, and of course the easiest way to get
around such an occurrence is to forget to mention it !
Mindanao
And now we come to the great island of Mindanao,
which all but equals Luz6n in size, having an area of 36,292
square mJles as against the 40,969 of Luz6n. Blount's
first mention of it is peculiar.
In connection with the words " the other six ialan<k
that really matter," in the passage above cited on page
116 of h^ book, he has inserted a foot-note reading as
follows : —
"The BIX mun Visayan Islands. Mohammedan Mindanao
is always dealt with in this book aa a separate and distinct
problem." '
But it was hardly possible for him to dismiss this
great island, which is a little continent by itself, quite so
cavalierly and I will quote the more important of his
further and later stat^ents regarding it: —
"While the great Mohammedan island of Mindanao, near
Borneo, with its 36,000 square miles of area, requires that the
Philippine archipelago be described as stretching over more
than one thousand miles from north to south, still, inasmuch
aa Mindanao only contuns about 500,000 people all told,
half of them semi-civilized, the governmental problem it
presents has no more to do with the main problem of whether,
if ever, we are to grsnt independence to the 7,000,000 Chris-
tians of the other islands, than the questions that have to be
passed on by our Commissioner of Indian AfTtura have to do
with the tariff. Mindanao's 36,000 square miles constitute
nearly a third of the total area of the Philippine archipelago,
and more than that fraction of the 97,500 square miles of
territory to a consideration of which our attention is reduced
by the process of elimination above indicated. Turning over
Mindanao to those crudely Mohammedan semi-civilised
MoroB would indeed be 'like granting self-government to an
1 Blount, p. 110.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
bvGoogle
INSDBQENT RCLE IN THE TISATAS AND
Apache reservattoa under some local chief,' as Mr. Roose-
velt, in the camp^ga of 1900, ignorantly declared it would
be to grant aelf-govemment to Luz6n under Aguinaldo. Fur-
thermore, the Moroe, so far as they can think, would prefer
to owe allegiance to, and be entitled to recognition as subjects
of, some great nation. Again, becsusa the Filipinos have no
moral right to control the Moros, and could not if they irould,
the latter being fierce fighters and bitterly opposed to the
thought of possible ultimate domination by the Filipinos, the
most uncompromising advocate of the consent of the governed
principles haa not a leg to stand on with r^ard to Mohammedan
Mindanao. Hence I affirm that as to it, we have a distinct
separate problem, which cannot be solved in the lifetime of
anybody now living. But it is a problem which need not m
the least delay the advent of independence for the other four-
teen fifteenth of the inhabitants of the archipelago — all
Christians living on islands north of Mindanao. It is true
that there are some Christian Filipinos on Mindanao, but in
policing the Moros, our government would of course protect
them from the Moros. If they did not like our government,
they could move to such parts of the islands as we might per-
mit to be incorporated in an ultimate Philippine republic.
Inasmuch as the 300,000 or so Moros of the Mohammedan
island of Mindanao and the adjacent islets called Jolo (the
'Sulu archipelago,' so called, 'reigned over' by the sultan of
comic opera fame) originally presented, as they will always
present, a distinct and separate problem, and never did have
anything more to do with the Philippine insurrection against
us than their cousins and co-religionista over in near-by Bor-
neo, the task which confronted Mr. Root in the fall of 1899,
to wit, the suppression of the Philippine insurrection, meant
practically the subjugation of one big island, Luz6n, contun-
mg half the population and one third of the total area of the
archipelago, and six neighbouring small ones, the Visayan
Islands." •
Now as a matter of fact Mindanao is by no means
Mohammedan. The Mohammedan Malays, called Moros,
are fomid here and there along the western coast of the
Zamboanga peninsula and along the southern coast of the
island as far as Davao. They also extend far up the CotSr
bate River and occupy the Lake Lanao region, but that
1 Bltnint, p. 220.
vot. I— Q
bvGoogli
le
226 THE I^njPPINES PAST AND PRG8ENT
is all. The interior of the island is for the most part
occupied by the members of a number of non-Cliristiaii,
non-Mohammedan tribes, while its northern and eastern
coasts are inhabited by Yisayan Filipinos, of whom there
are many in Zamboanga itadi.
While, as Blount says, the Moros took no part in the
insurrection against the United States, the Visayans of
Mindanao did, and we had some Uvely tussles with them
in Misamis and in Surigao.
It is indeed unthinkable that we should turn Mindanao
over to the Moros. Abandonment of it by us would in
the end result in this, as they would take possession of
the entire island in the coiu-se of time. Neither the other
wild tribes nor the Filipinos could stand against them. I
heartily ag^cee with the conclusion that we must retain
this island for many years before we can settle the prob-
lems which it presents. It is further true that we might
retain it and still grant independence to the remainder
of the Philippine Archipelago, but if we are to eliminate
Mindanao from consideration because the Filipinos have
no right to control the Moros, of whom there are in reality
only about a hundred and fifty-four thousand^ on the
island, and could not if they would, what about Luz6n,
where there are in reality no less than four hundred
and sixty thousand non-Christians,^ many of whom, like
the Ifugaos, Bontoc Igorots, Kalingas and wild Tii^aos,
are fierce fighters and practically all of whom are bitterly
opposed to the thought of possible ultimate domination
by Filipinos, while most of them welcome American rule ?
Have the Filipinos any more moral right to control
them than they have to control the Moros ? Could they
control them if they would ? And has the most uncom-
promising advocate of the consent of the governed prin-
ciple "a leg to stand on" in the one case if he lacks it in
the other ?
The Filipino politicians are not ready to admit that
I Aoccvding to the oensus ot 1803, 154,700. ■ See table on p. 051.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INaUKOENT RUUB IN THE VISAYAS AND ELSEWHERE 227
Filipinos could not satisfactorily govon Moros and have
even alleged that they did so govern them during the
period DOW under discussion. Let us examine the facts.
Aguiaaldo attempted to enter into negotiations with
the Sultan of Jol6, addressii^ him as his "great and
powerful brother," ' but this brother does not seem to
have received his advances with enthusiasm, and the other
brothers proceeded to do things to the Filipinos at the
first opportunity.
Jos£ Roa in writing Aguinaldo on January 26, 1899, of
conditions in the province of Misamis says : ' —
"Hardly had said evacuation of Iligan taken place on the
28th of last month, when the Moros or Mohammedans of the
interior, our mortal enemies since times immemorial on account
of their religious fanaticism which they cany to extremes, as
do their co-religionists in Europe and Asa, and on account of
their objection to leading a civilized life, began to harry the
town of Itigan which is the nearest town to the lake around
which is the densest Mora population. Due to the prestige
of the local president of that town, Scllor Carloto Sariol, and
the euei^ that he showed, after some days of constant firing
against groups who descended upon the suburbs of the town,
he was successful in having them abandon their hostile atti-
tude and promise to hve in peace and harmony with said
' (Contemponu? copy in Spanish. — P. I. R., Books C-L :)
" January 19, 1899.
" The President of the Philippine Republic very cordially greeta hie
great and powerful brother, the Sultan ot Jolo, and makes known : —
"That the Filipinoa, after having thrown off the yoke of foreign
domination cannot f o^rot their brothers of Jolo to whom they are bound
by the ties of race, interests, security and defense in this region of the
Far East.
"The Philippine Republic has resolved to respect absolutely the
beliefs and traditions ot each island in order to establish on solid bases
the bonds of fraternal unity demanded by our mutual interests.
" I therefore in the name of all the Filipinos very gladly offer to the
powerful Sultan of Jolo and to all brothers who acknowledge his great
authority, the highest assurance of friendship, consideration and es-
teem.
" Malolos, January 18, 1899."
(
«P. LR., 76. 1.
:dbvGoogIe
228 THK PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
towns, this verbal agreement beiii^ participated in by the
Dattos of some settlements who did not wish to treat with the
Spanish Government.
" Being acquainted nevertheless with these people, we know
by experience that the more friendly they appear, the more
we must watch against them, because as soon as they find a
good opportunity they do not ful to take advantage of it to
enter the towns for the purpose of sacking them and Udnappii^
as mfuiy of their inhabitants as possible in order to reduce
them to slavery."
Ifnmediately after the abandonment of Cotabato by the
Spaniards the Filipino residents set up a government
there. A few days later the Moro datos, Fiang, Ali and
Djimbangan, dropped in with their followers, cut off the
head of the FUipino presidente, served a few other leadit^
officials and citizens in the same manner, and proceeded
to set up a government of their own which was the only
government that the place had prior to the arrival of the
American troops.
Date Djimbai^an promptly caused the Filipina women
of the place to be stripped and compelled to march before
him on the public plaza in a state of nudity.
At Zamboanga the Moros could have taken the town
at any time after the Spaniards left had they desired to
do so. On the arrival of the Americans Dato Mandi
offered to take it and turn it over to them, but his propo-
sition was declined.
He subsequently swore to an affidavit relative to condi-
tions under Inaiu-gent rule. It reads as follows ; —
"We always had peace in Zamboanga District, except
during the revolution of the Filipinos in the year 1899, when
for seven or eight months there was in existence the so-called
Filipino Republic. During that time there was much robbing
and killing ; the life of a man was worth no more than that of
a chicken ; men killed one another for personal gain ; enemies
fought one another with the bolo instead of settling their dif-
ferences before the law. It was a time of bloodshed and terror.
There was no justice. Because of this the Mores were opposed
to the Filipinos. There was conflict between the betts' class
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INSURQBNT RUI£ IN THE TIHATAS AND ELSEWHERE 229
of flliiNuoB and the revolutJonistB, who had gained control
of the local government." '
Elsewhere throughout the More territory those fW-
pinoB who did not promptly make their escape were mur-
dered or enslaved. In short, the lion and the Iamb lay
down together, with the Iamb inside as usual.
Thus it will be seen that this first and last attempt of
Filipinos to govern Moros did not result in complete
Baldomero Aguinaldo made a subsequent attempt to
open communication with the Sultan of Jol6, authorizing
him to establish in all the rancherias of Mindanao and
Jol6 a government in accordance with a decree duly trans'
mitted. The Sultan was requested to report the result
of his efforts and to give the niunber of his forces with
their arms, and was advised that, " if in this war, which
I consider to be the last, we secure our independence
and with the opposition of our brothers in that region,
with yourself at their head, we are successful in preventing
the enemy from gaining a foothold, the grateful country
will always render a tribute of hom^e and gratitude to
your memory." * Curiously, the Sultan seems to have
remained unmoved by the appeal.
> From an official dooument on file at Muula.
* " Being brothers, the desoend&nta of the a&me race and of one eonl,
the same sun ahinea upon us and we breathe the same air, so that our
BentimentB are also one, and we aspire to the independence and liberty
of our oountiy in order to secure its progreBS and place it on a level with
other oivilized nations ; and with this assurance 1 have taken the libert7
to address you this letter, begging of you to accept the commission
which in the name of our government I have the honour to confer upon
you. Yon are autborized thereunder to establish in all the 'Ran-
cherias' of Mindanao and Jolo, a civil and military economic-adminis-
trative organization, in accordanoe with the deorees which I enoloee
herewith, and after having established the same, I request that you
make a report to our Honourable President of the Philippine Republic,
%-. Emilio Aguinaldo, of the result thereof and of the number of the
force with their arms and ammunition, in order to ascertain whether
they would be sufQoient to prevent the invasion of the enemy and
whether there ia any necessity of sending reinforcements of arms to
Bud Islands for this purpose. If in this war, which I oonsider to be
j:,GoogIe
230 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Mashate
This tight Uttle island of 1236 square miles had in 1903
a Yisayan population of 29,451. Its people are all Fili-
pinos, and are on the whole rather an unusually orderly
and worthy set. There is no reason why it should have
been excluded in considering "the human problem in its
broader governmental aspect," whatever that may be, nor
can I understand why Blount should have desired to ex-
clude it except that he seems to have been endeavoiuing
to exclude everything possible outside of Luz6n, in order
to increase the apparent importance of the Christian
provinces of that island. Masbate should of course be
taken into accoimt in connection with the Yisayan Is-
lands, of which it is one.
The islands ordinarily included in the group known as
" The Visayas ' ' from the ancient tribal name of the civilized
Filipino people who inhabit them, who are called Visayans,
are Samar, Panay, Negroa, Leyte, Cebd, Bohol, Masbate,
Tablas, Romblon, Ticao, Burias, Siquijor and numerous
smaller islands adjacent to those named. Altib^ou^
their inhabitants are all rated as one people, they speak
a number of more or less distinct difdects. Only Faoay,
Negros, Samar, Tablas and Sibuyan have non-Christian
inhabitants, and in the three islands last named their
number is so small as to be negligible. In the moim-
tains of Panay and Negros, however, Negritos are to be
foimd in considerable numbers, as are the representatives
of a tribe sometimes called Monteses ' and sometimes
the last, we secure our independenoe, and with the oppositian of our
brothers in that region, with yourself at their head, we are Buocesstul
in preventing the enemy from Ksining a foothold, the grateful country
wiD always reader a tribute of homage and gratitude to your memory.
" God iM-eserve you many years.
"May 31, 1899. "Baldoukro Aouinaldo,
" Ueut. 0«n. Superior P. M. Commander of Southern Be^on,
"To TBK HoNOURABLB Sni/TAN Raha Halon."
— P. I. B., 810-4.
> Spanish for "mountain people."
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INSDBOENT RULE IN THE VISATAS AND ELSEWHERE 231
Bulddnon. The latter tribal desj^nation I have thought
it best to reserve for certain inhabitants of northern Min-
danao.
In the Visayas, Palawan and Mindanao the government
of Aguinaldo was established at various places and dif-
ferent times, without consulting or considering the will
of the people. The meD who went as his delegates were
supported by armed forces, hence their authority was not
at first questioned, but soon there arose murmurii^
which might easily have grown into a war cry.
The attitude of the Visayan FiHpinos is clearly fore-
shadowed in the following extract from a letter dated
January 14, 1899, in which Mabini discussed the ad-
visability of putting the constitution in force : —
"And even if this change is made, I iear that Negrae and
Iloflo will form a federal Republic and not one in conformity
with the centralized Republic provided for by the Cooatitu-
tion." •
The action later taken by Negros shows that there was
abundant reason for this fear.
As late as February 26, 1899, the Insui^ent govern-
ment was still ignorant as to the real conditions in N^;ros
and MindftTiao.'
From a letter written on March 18, 1899, to Apacible
at Hongkong, we leani that Aguinaldo and his followers
were even then still uninformed as to events in the Vi-
>P. I. R..512. A 5.
> Estiact from a letter to Apacible of tbe Hongkong junta dated
Fehraary 26, 1899 : —
"It is &1bo said that the Cantonal Gov^mnent of Negros has wished
to make a treaty with the Amerioana, some roembers of that govern-
ment having eome in Amerioan transportB to oonf er with General Otis.
We are not aware of the conditions of the amngement, beoauae the
Negros people have thus far not wished to put themselves in oom-
mnnioatioii with us ; we oul; know by news more or lees reliable that
the capitis of that island has been oooupied by the American foroes
without opposition.
"Of Mindanao we know absolutely nothing; we also are ignorant
of what has been the lot of our agents in Amerioa."
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232 TEE FHILIPPtNES FAST AND PRESENT
sayan Zslands.' In view of these facts, how ridiculous
become the cootentionB of those who claim that the
Malolos government represented the archipelago as a
whole. And what shall we say of the following statement,
remembering that the Treaty of Paris was signed De-
cember 10, 1899?
"When the Treaty of Paris was mgned, General Otis was in
possession of Cavite and Manila, with less than twenty thou-
sand men under his command, and Aguinaldo was in poaees-
eion of practically all of the rest of the archipelago with between
35,000 and 40,000 men under his command, armed with guns,
lutd the whole Mlijnno population were in sympathy with the
anny of their country." *
Ultimately, by one means or another, and chiefly by
the use of armed emissaries, the Visayan Istauds, with the
exception of Negros, were brought into the Insurgent
fold.
Mabini's fear that Negroa and Boilo would form a
federal republic was not realized, but Negros set up its
own government, applied to the local commander of the
United States forces for help, endeavoured with almost
complete success to keep out Tag&log invaders, and pres-
ently settled down contentedly under American rule,
facta of which Bloimt makes no mention. On the con-
trary, without just cause, he includes this great island,
with its 4881 square miles of territory and its 560,776
inhabitants, in the area over which he claims that Agui-
naldo exercised complete control.
At Iloilo the American troops encountered opposition
when they planned to land. Negotiations had been en-
> "Of the Viaajraa and Mindanao we know nothing positive aa yet,
it IB whiBpei«d that the Amerioaiu have succeeded in oooupying Negros
and Cebfl against the will of the inhabitants. Hollo oontinaes the
struggle energetically. It does not matter that they ooeupy tempo-
rarily those beautiful islands, because Luzdn will know how to flght
for hersc^ and the rest of the islands, and will not lay down anna with-
out the independence of the Philippine Arolupelago."
■ Blouat, p. 140.
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IN8UBOENT BDLE IN THE TISAYAS AND EI^EWHERE 233
tered into with the loc^ Filipino officers, but the latter,
under the influence of representatives whom Aguinaldo
had sent from Luz6d, announced themselves as adher-
ents of his government, and when the American troops
finally disembarked fired the town ahead of them. It
has been claimed that in doing this they were inspired
by pure patriotism, but the facts shown by their own
records present a very different picture.
In writii^ to Aguinaldo on April 8, 1899, Mabini says :
"We have received a couunimlcation forwarded from
Iloflo, from General Martfo Delgado and Francisco Soriano,
Jour cominiasioner. Soriano states that the troops of Diocno
ave done nothing except commit excesses and steal money
during the attack by the Americans upon the town of Iloflo,
even gfAag so far as to break their guns by using them as poles
to cany the stolen money which they took to C^piz. It is
said that these forces, besides being unwilling to fight the
Americans, refuse to give their guns to those who do wish to
fight and do not want C&piz to aid the people of Iloflo, who are
the ones who support the entire forces, including the troops of
Diocno who went there." *
This same letter contains the following brief reference
to conditions in Cebu and Leyte : —
"Also a native priest, Setior Pascual Reyes, has arrived
here from Cebd, and says that in Leyte General Lucban is
committing many abuses and that Colonel M6jica is only a
mere figurehead. In Cebti, he says, things are also in a chaotic
condition, because the military chief, Magedlum [Maxilom,
— Tr.], and the people are not in harmony."
Further details as to conditions in Cebu are given in a
letter to Aguinaldo from the commissioner whom he
put in chaj^e of electionB in that island, who on Febru-
ary 19, 1899, writes : ' —
"Having arrived in this province the 8th of last month, I
t^ on the 11th for the northern pueblos of this Island to hold
the elections for the ofiSces ordered by the Superior Decree of
June 18, last.
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234 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
"The news spread Uke an electric spark, as in all the pueblos
I visited later I found that almost aU of the residents were in
their homes, so that when the elections were held in the town
hall, all the principal residents attended, requesting me to
inform you that they were disposed to sacrifice even their
dearest affections whenever necessfuy for our sacred cause:
they only asked me to inform those who hold the reins of
government at the present time in this province, that some
steps be taken to put a stop to the arbitrary acts which had
been and still are being committed by the so-called Captains,
Majors, Colonels, Generals and Captains General, who abudi^
in the most barefaced manner the positions they claimed to
hold, were depriving them of their horses and their carabaos,
or cattle. I promised them that I would do this, as I do now,
by Bending a communication at once to Sres. Flores and Max-
ilom, who are at the head of the provincial goveniment, im-
pressing upon them the fact that if they continue to grant
ranks and titles to persons of this character, as they have done,
it would end in the utter ruin of this wealthy province."
He adds that these men did not remedy the evils com-
plained of. It would be possible to cover in detail all of
this and the remaining Insurgent territory, and to show
that Judge Blount was quite right in stating that condi-
tions similar to those encountered in Luz6n arose there,
but the limitations of time and space forbid, and I must
ask my readers to accept on faith the statements of Blount
and myself that such was the case I
Taylor thus summarizes the conditions which ultimately
"The Insurgent soldiers lived in their own land as they
would have lived in a conquered country. They were quar-
tered on the towns and the towns had to feed them whether
they would or not.
"Peace there was where Aguinaldo's soldiers had not pen-
etrated, but there does not seem to have been progress. Life
went very well in a long siesta in the shady villages under the
pahn trees, but not only the structure of the State, its very
foundations were falling apart. When Aguinaldo's soldiers
came they brought cruelty and license with them. Proud of
their victories and confident in themselves they felt that the
labourers in the fields, the merchants in the towns, were for the
:dbvGoogIe
IN8UB0ENT BULB IN THB TI8ATA8 AND ELSEWHERE 235
purpose of adminiatering to their necessities and their deairea.
Agmnaldo, having seen this force gather about him, was forced
to entreat it, to appeal to it ; he was never strong enough to
enforce discipline, even if he cared to do it."
Aguinaldo himself finally became disheartened over
his inability to maintiun a decent state of public order in
the territory which he claimed to govern, and in Decem-
ber, 1898, tendered his resignation, giving among other
reasons odious favouritism on the part of some of the
military chiefs, together with a desire to enrich them-
selves by improper means, such as accepting bribes,
making prisoners a source of gain, and decreasing the
allowance of the soldiers. He said that many soldiers
had received sums of money as their share of booty, and
intimated that officers mmt have done the same. He
made charges against civU as well as military officers and
ended by saying that he retained the evidence for presen-
tation when called on.'
> "The seoond reason for my resignation is the pain oaosed me by
having still to read u&odc the reports of our military assooiates that
in some of the chiefs, besides odious favouritism, is olearly seen a desire
to enrich themselves, aeoepting bribes, makiiig even prisoaers a means
of gain, and others there are, above all the oommiasariea, who dare
to decrease the allowanoe of the soldier, little enough already ; — I
throw the blame at all this upon thoae who taught ub such a custom ;
oonsequently I have reason to hope that they will ohange their
methods.
"The same cause of complaint I have concerning some companions
who are diseharging civil ofBces, estfecially those who are far from the
oversight of the government, who put their own welfare before the
common good, and devise a thousand means to further their own ends,
even to the extent of gambling. Where are the police? Are they,
perohanoe, also bribed ? Pity money is so ill spent 1 However, evw^r
one is obliged to know that falsehood will never prevail against truth,
and as evidence hereof many soldiers have confessed to the govern-
ment as to having received certain sums in the share of the booty, and
if we consider that the latter who receive their share have told the
truth, why should those who are present during the putition of the
money and receive nothing, not do so 7 In this way the eyes of some
that watv blinded are gradually opened; I confess, moreover, that
the latter are to be blamed less than those la authority who are so
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236 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PBESENT
Aguinaldo was later persuaded to withdraw his res^-
nation. No wonder that he wished to tender it I
In referrii^ to the report of Wilcox and Sargent, Blount
has said: —
"This report was submitted by them to Admiral Dewey
under date of November 23, 1898, and by h\n\ forwarded to
the Navy Department for its information, with the comment
that it 'in my opinion cont^ns the most complete and reliable
information obtainable in regard to the present state of the
northern part of Luzon Island.' The Admiral's iadoraement
was not sent to the Senate along with the report." '
He thus gives it to be understood that the admiral
beUeved that the report truthfully set forth the condi-
tions which actually existed in these provinces, and that
his indorsement was suppressed. Not only was it true
that this report when rendered contained the most com-
plete and reliable information then available in regard
to the existing state of the northern part of Luzon Island,
but it contained the only first-hand information avail-
able. The facts ultimately leaked out and led the ad-
miral radically to change his opinion as to the conditions
which arose under Insurgent rule. Of them he later
said: —
"There was a sort of a reign of terror; there was no govnn-
ment. These people had got power for the first time in thdr
lives and they were ricUng roughshod over the community.
The acts of cruelty which were brought to my notice were
hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldo that he must treat
his prisoners kindly, and he said he would."
I believe that I have fully demonstrated the truth of
these statements. Blount was thoroughly familiar with
" I certify to the truth of all the above-mentioned evils, which miut
be eradicated. I retain the evidence for presentation when oalled on,
BO that if any of theread^^ hereof should consider themaelvee referred
to and should resent it, I am ready to beg their paidon." — P. LB., 8. 2.
' Blount, p. 108.
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INStTBOENT BOLE IN THE VI8AYAB AND ELSEWHERE 237
Dewey's testimony before the Senate Committee, in
which they occur, but he did not mention them.
I cannot close this discussion of Insurgent rule without
quoting extracts from a remarkable document written by
Isabelo Artacho in October,' 1899. It was entitled
"Declaration Letter and Proclamation" and was ad-
dressed to the Filipino people. While it is probable
that Artacho was impelled to tell the truth by hk hatred
for Aguinaldo, tell the truth he did, and his rank and
standing entitle his statements to consideration : —
"Study the work of the tnBurrection ; see if it is, as is said,
the fwthful interpretation of your wishes and desires.
" Go through your towns, fields, and mountains. Wherever
you see an insurgent gun or bolo you will find girls and faithful
wives violated, parents and brothers crying for the murder of
a son or of a brother ; honest families robbed and in misery ;
villages burned and plundered for the benefit of a chief or a
General; you will see fresh and living signs yet of those hor-
rible crimes perpetrated with the greatest cynicism by those
who call themselves your liberators ! Liberators because
they wear red pants, or a red shirt, or cany on their hats a
piece of red cloth or a triangular figure !
"Here, a iweadent stabs a man, perhaps the most honest of
the village, simply for having implored mercy for a creature
arbitrarily inflicted with the cepo [an oblong square piece of
heavy wood divided into two parts, with a lock at each end
and nz or more holes in the middle to confine the feet of pris-
oners] ; there, a dying man, suspended by the feet in a cepo,
raised from the level of the ground, by another president who
has charged him with an unproved crime ; there a poor woman
falsely chai^d and driven by petty officers with their bayonets
for having objected to their invasion into her house, or shop,
they being supposed to be, each, Justice itself, 'JusHda,' and to
be obeyed as images of the Gods ; there, generals who murder
without fear, for an inugoificant motive, creatures whose
members are being mutilated, or their fiesh cut in slices and
afterwards roasted and given them to eat; there, officers
braining a girl who has refused to accede to their sensual
wishes, the lifeless body of the victim, pierced with shots,
after having been made use of, is thrown into the river. It ia
> Ben&te Doouments, Vol. 25, pp. 282&-2941.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
238 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
not unusual to witness officers burying people alive in a tomb
prepared by the victim, by order of the murderer; it is not
unusual to see a Puiwie-Juoge pointing a revolver at a man who
is about to give evidence, and threatening to brain him for
having dared to ask; 'Why and to whom am I to declare?'
And finally, on his tottering throne, you will see the Magistrate
of the Philippines, so called by his worshippers, with his me-
phistophelian smite, disposing and directing the execution of
a murder, of a plunder, of a robbery, or the execution of some
other crimes against those who are indifferent or do not care
to worship him, auch indifference being con^dered a crime.
"Putting aside the many other murders, I may mention
that one recently committed on the person of the renowned
and by many called the worthy General, Antonio Luna, which
took place just at the entrance of the palace of the Republic
Preddency, and also the assassination at Kavite of the ever
remembered martyr, Andr^ Bonifacio, the founder of the
'Katdpiinan' Society, and the one who initiated the Revolution
of 1896 ; E^Eunst the memory of whom it has been comnutted,
in the proclamation of that falsely called Republic, the crim-
inal and imjust omission to render the smallest manifestation
of Filipinos' feelings towards him, to prevent that same
might dislike his murderers I
"Study the ordinances aqd constitution of this so-called
democratic Government of the Republic, that grand work of
the wise Filipinos ; admire with me that beautiful monu-
ment erected on a sheet of paper and consecrated to the con-
truest of reason and labour, especially in connection with human
rights and property, the basis for the well-being of social life;
but, lament and deplore with me its palpable nullity when
brought to practice and you will again see that the laws were
made for the people and not the people for the laws I
"Under this republic called democratic it is a crime to think,
to wish, to say, anything which does not agree with what the
8^d Gods think, wish and say. Nobody and nothing is at-
tended to, whilst those who have your lives in their hands must
be respected.
"Under this Goverment there cannot be the slightest notice
taken of family, property, morality and justice, but confumon
and disorder appear everywhere like a dreadful shadow, pro-
duced by the ignorance of the subordinate officers, and of the
powers that be in the villages and provinces, who are sup-
ported by a epedal conmiittee, or speciaJ commissioners em-
powered to impoverish and to ruin all and with the right ot
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
INSUBOENT KULB IN THE ViaATAB AND BUEWHERE 239
diBpoait^ at their own accord, Ufe, family and individual
property without responsibility whatsoever on their part.
" Let the peaceful annexation of the whole of the Southern
lelanda of Jol6, Mindanao, IloOo, N^ros, CebiJ and others
where now the American flag is hoisted and under whose
shadow tranquillity and well-bong are experienced, speak for
itself.
" Let it speak for Itself, the proceeding observed by the whole
people of Imus, who were asking protection when the American
troops took [>o38essioD of the town of fiacoor, whilst the insur-
gent troops ^ere located were hostile.
" Let them speak for themselves, the protests against the
war made by the numerous persons of S. Francisco de Malab6n,
Sta. Cruz de Malab6n, Perez Dasmarifias aad other towns,
before the Worthy Chief Mariano Trfas, who ultimately
refused, with dignity, the high position of Secretary of War,
for which rank he was promoted for reasons which are not
worth publishing here. In fine, let it speak for itself, the
non-res^tance shown by the people of Old Kavite [Kawit],
Noveleta, and Rozaiio of the heroic province of Kavite, not-
withstanding the many iatrenchments and troops there lo-
cated, as well as the identical behaviour observed by other
towns of Luzon provinces who are ready, to follow when the
American troops are in them.
a ***** •
" In fact no one would believe it, and the Flulippine people
are tired of waiting for the day when Haring Gavino will shuce
a napkin to produce suddenly horses vomiting fire and light-
ning and troops of dangerous insects; that day in which
they will witness the realization of that famous telegraphed
dr^jn to the effect that two hours after the commencement of
tiie war the insurgents will take their breakfast in the Palace
of ' Malacafiang, ' their tiffin in the Senate House, and their dinner
on board the Olympia or in Kavite; that day in which the
celebrated Pequenines army, with their invisible Chief-leader,
will exterminate the American troops by means of handfuls of
dust and sand thrown at them, which process, it is said, has
caused the smallpox to the Americans; that day in which
the Colorum army will capture the American fleet with the
cords their troops are provided with, in combination with a
grand intrenchment of Tayabas made of husks of paddy,
by a Naearene, who will then, by merely touching, conv^ each
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
240 TEE PHIUPPINES FAST AND PSESBNT
busk into a Bee with a deadly sting; that df^ in which the
insurgents, like their leadere, provided with hosts of flour,
or of paper, pieces of candles of the holy-week matins, holy
water, pieces of consecrated stones; of vestments belon^ng
to a miraculous Saint or with some other Anting-Anting or
talisman or amuletos, will make themselves invuhierable to
bullets ; also have power to convert into any of the four ele-
ments, like those personages of the Philippine legends and
cometUes, — Ygmidio, Tefioeo, Florante, Bamardo, CarfHO,
etc.
" Yes, the people of the PhiUppines are quite tired of wuting
for the predicted European conflict, which it is esid would
^ve them their independence ; if not, perhaps, divide the
Islands as they are now amongst cousins, brothers, nephews,
uncles and godfathers.
" In the near future, when we have acquired the necessary
political and social education and the habit of behaving justly
towards ourselves and towards our fellow-brothers ; when free
from all superstition, healthy, strong and vigorous, we find
ourselves capable of governing ourselves, without there being
the possibility of the preponderance of our pasaons in the
consideration, direction, and administration of the interests
of our country, then, and only then, we wiU be free 1 we will
be independent I *
" HoNQKONQ, 1st October, 1899."
Most of the men who perpetrated the outrages I hare
detailed are alive to-day, and are powers in their reepectire
communities. Simeon Villa was recently elected a mem-
ber of the municipal board from the south district of
Manila, but fortunately an American governor-general
prevented him from taJdng his seat. Just prior to my
departure from Manila he was appointed, by Speaker
O^efia, a member of a committee on reception for
Govemor^General Harrison.
The kind of independent "government" these men es-
tablished is the kind that they would agun establish if
they had the chance,* but among the persons to be tortuzed
' p. I. R., 838-2.
■ la this oonneotion note Blount's statement : —
"But we are considering how much of a goyenunent th« FilipinM
had in 189S, b«oauBe the answer is pertinent to what BOtt ot • soron-
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INSURGENT RULE IN THE TISAYAB AND EI^EWHERE 241
and murdered would now be those Americans who failed to
escape seasonably. I do not mean to say that such a
state of affairs would come about immediately, but it would
certainly arise within a comparatively short time. Sooner
yet "the united Fihpino people" would spht up on old
tribal lines, and fly at each other's throats.
ment thejr oould run if permitted now or ftt aiqr time ia the future."
— BujcHT, p. 73.
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CHAPTER Vni
Did We Destbot a Republic?
The cl^m has frequently been made that the United
States govemment destroyed a republic in the Philippine
Islands,^ but some of t^e critics seem to entertain peculiar
ideas as to what a r^ublic is. Blount states* that
Aguinaldo declined to hear our declaration of indepen-
dence read "because we would not recognize hia right to
asseri; the same truths," and then apparently forgetting
the Insurgent chief's ^eged adherence to the principles
of this docimient, he lets the cat out of the bag by Baying
that "the war satisfied \ia all that Aguinaldo would hare
been a small edition of Porfirio Diaz," and would him-
self have been " The Republic." *
He would doubtless have set up just this sort of a
govemment, if not assassinated too soon, but it would
* Blount nttn to
"The death-wammt of the Philipinne repubUo sigaed by Mr.
MoEJnle; on Septembm 16th." — Blookt, p. 99.
SpoaJdng of Mr. Boosevelt's opinion of the piaotioability of gnntine
independenee to the Filipinoa, he sayB : —
"Tet it represented then one of the many ourrent miaapprehenBioiu
about the Filipinos whioh moved this great nation to destroy a yonng
republio set up in a spirit of intelligent and greneroaa emulation of our
own." — BixinNT, p. 230.
' "Here was a man oluming to be President of a newly establlBhed
republic baaed on the prinoiples set forth in our Declaration of Inde-
pendence, which republic had juet issued a like Declaration, and he
was invited to come and hear our declaration read, and declined be*
cause we would not recognize his right to assert the same truths."
— BLontJT, p. 59,
■ "The war satiafled ns all that Aguinaldo would have been a small
edition of Porfirio Diaz, and that the Filipino republia-that-might-have>
been would have been, very decidedly, 'a going conoem,' although
Aguinaldo probably would have been able to say with a degree of
accuracy, as Diaz might have said in Meidao for so many years, 'The
Republio T I am the Republic' " — Bmunt, p. 292.
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DID WB DESTROY A BSPUBUCT 243
hardly have accorded with the principles of the declaration
o( independence, nor would it have been exactly " a gov-
ernment of the people, by the people, for the people."
Blount truly says' that the educated FiUpinos, ad-
mittedly very few in number, absolutely control Gie mae&es.
He adds' that j^-esidentes of puebtiK are as absolute
bosses as is Murphy in Tammany Hall, and that the towns
taken collectively constitute ^e provinces. The first
statement is true, and the second, which is tantamount
to a declaration that the presidentes control every square
foot of the provinces and every man in them, is not so far
from the truth as it might be. I have been old-fashioned
enough to retain the idea that a republic is "a state in
which the sovereign power resides in the whole body of
the people, and is ex^cised by representatives elected
by them."
Blount labored under no delusion as to Oib fitness of
tiie common people to govern.*
' "The war demonatnted to the army, to a Q. E. D., that the Fitt-
pinoB are 'capable of self-govenunent,' unleai th« kmd whieh faappeni
to suit the geniuB of the Amerioaa people is the only kmd of govern-
ment on earth that is respectable, and the one pana<3ea for all the UIb of
government among men without r^ard to their temperament or his-
torieal antecedents. The edoeated patriotio FilipinoB oan control the
massM of the people in thar several distriots as oompletely as a oap-
tain ever oontroUed a company." — Blocnt, p. 292.
* " Even to-day the preddente of a pueblo is as absolute boss of his
town as Charles F. Murphy is in Tammany Hall. And a town or
pueblo in the Philippines is more thui an area oovered by more or lees
contiguous buildings and grounds. It is more lilce a township in Maasa-
ohiuettB, BO that when you aooount govemment^dly for the pueblos of a
given province, you aoooimt for every square foot of that provinoa
and for every man in it."
* "In there reviewing the Samar and other insurreotions of 10O5 in
the Philippines, you And him (t.e. Roosevelt) dealing with the real root
ol the evil with perfect honesty, though adopting the view that the
Filipino people were to blame therefcw, becansa we had plaoed too much
power in the hands of an ignorant eleet(K«te, which had elected rasoall;
otBeiala." — Blount, p. 297.
Also:—
"Bat we prooeeded to ram down their throats a preconceived theoT7
that the only road to sdf-govemment was for an alien people to step
"» line qua turn." — Bu>ONi,p.M6.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
244 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Not only did the Filipinos themselves understaiid
perfectly well that they had no republic, but there were
many of them who were fully aware of the fact that they
could establish none. Fernando Acevedo, in writing to
General Pfo del Pilar on August 8, 1898, said ; ' —
"There could be no republic here, even though the Americana
Bliould consent, because, according to the treaties, the Fili-
pinos are not in condition for a repubUc. Besides this, all
Europe will oppose it, and if it should be that they divide our
country as though it were a round cake, what would become
of us and what would belong to us 7"
I will now trace the evolution of the government
which Aguinaldo did set up. In doing so I follow Taylor's
argument very closely, drawing on his unpublished Ms.,
not only for ideas, but in some instances for the words in
which they are clothed. I change his words in many cases,
and do not mean to unload on hiin any responsibility
for my statements, but do wish to acknowledge my in-
debtedness to him and at the same time to avoid the neces-
sity for the continual use of quotation marks.
Aguinaldo's methods in establishing his repubUc are
shown by his order' that "any person who fi^ts for his
country has absolute power to kill any one not friendly
to our cause" and the further order* prescribing that
twdve lashes should be given to a soldier who lost even
a single cartridge, while if he continued to waste ammu-
nition he should be severely punished. In March, 1899,
workmen who had abandon«i their work in the arsenal
at Malolos were arrested, returned, given twenty-five
laahes each and then ordered to work.*
Also: —
"Of Murse the ignorant electorate we perpetnited on Sanur u an
'expression of our theoretical views' proved that we had 'gone too
test' io conferring self-government, or to quote Mr. Roosevelt, had been
'reposing: too much oonfldsnoe in the self-govemiiig power of a people,'
if to begin with the rankest material for oonstmoting & government that
there was at hand was to ofFer a fair test of capacity for self-govern-
ment." — Blodnt, p. 546. ' P. I. R., 499. I Ex. 134.
■ Ibid., 206. 1. ■ Ibid., 1124. 2. * Ibid., 204. 6.
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DID WE DESTROY A REPUBLIC? 21S
The news that an American expedition was about to
sail for the Philippines made hiin realize that he had not
much more than a month in which to place himself in
a portion in which he would have to be consulted and
assisted, and this he tried to do. The arms he received
from Hongkong on May 23 enabled him to begin an in-
surrection, not as an ally of the United States, but on hia
own account. From May 21 to May 24 he issued orders
for the uprising against Spain. On May 24 he declared
himself Dictator of the Philippines in a proclamation
in which he promised to resign his power into the hands
of a president and cabinet, to be appointed when a consti-
tutional assembly was convened, which would be as soon
as the islands had passed into his control. He further
announced that the North American nation had given
its disinterested protection in order that the liberty of the
PhiUppines should be gained.^ On May 25, 1898, the
first American troops sailed from San Francisco for the
Philippines.
Aguinaldo still had a month in which to seize enough
Spanish territory to erect thereon what would appewr to
the Americans on their arrival to be a government of
Luz6n, of which he was the head. The Hongkong
junta and Aguinaldo himself intended to ask for the recog-
nition of th^ government, but they had first to create it.
To obtain recognition it was necessary that the American
commander on land should be able to report that wherever
he or his troops had gone the country was ruled by
Aguinaldo according to laws which showed that the people
were capable of governing themselves.
As the United States is a republic it was natural that
the directing group of insurgent leaders should decide upon
a republican form of government. That form would
appeal to the people of the United States; the first
"Christian Asiatic Republic" was a description which
would inevitably awaken sympathy in that mother of
> P. I. B., 206. 6.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
316 THE PHnJFPINBa PAST AND FREBBNT
republics. The idea was a wise and subtle one; but
Aguinaldo's republic was merely an elaborate stage-setting,
arranged for the contemplation of the people of the
United States.
By June 5, 1898, the success of the insurgent arms had
been such that Aguinaldo tdt that he could throw down
the mask. He would still be glad of American assistanoe,
but he felt himself strong enough to do without it. He
saw that "there can now be proclaimed before the FiUpino
peot^e and the civilized nations its only aspiration, namely,
the independence of this country, which proclamation
should not be delayed for any ulterior object of this govern-
ment " ^ and ordered that the independence of the Philip-
pines should be proclaimed at his birthplace, Cavite
Viejo, on June 12, 1393. On that date he formally
proclaimed it. The provinces of Cavite, Bataan, Pam-
panga, Batai^as, Bulacan, Laguna and Morong w&te
about to fall into his hands, the Spanish troops in them
being besieged, and about to surrender.
From the same place on June 18, 1898, Aguinaldo
promulgated his decree for the creation and adminis-
Iration of municipalities.* In brief, this provided that
as soon as the territoiy of the archipelago, or any
portion thereof, had passed from the possession of
Spanish ioTcea, the people in the towns who were most
conspicuous for their intelligence, social position and
upri^t conduct were to meet and elect a town govern-
ment. The heads of the towns in every province were to
elect a head for the province and his three coimsdlors.
The provincial council, composed of these four officials,
with the presidente of the capital of the province, were to
see to the execution in that province of the decrees of the
central government and to advise and surest.
This provincial coimcil was to elect representatives
for the revolutionaiy congress, which was to be charged
with submitting suggestions to the central government
' p. I. R., 674. 1. » Ibid., 206. 3.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
DID WK DESTBOY A KEPUBUCT 217
Upon interior and exterior affairs, and was to be heard
by the government upon serious matters which admitted
of delay and discussion.
Before any person elected to office was pennitted to
dischai^ his functions, his election was to be approved
by the central government. The military commanders,
except in time of war, were to have no jurisdiction over the
civil authorities. They could, however, demand such
supplies as they might need, and these could not be re-
fused. The government was to appoint commisaioners
to carry these regiilations into effect.
On Jime 20 Aguinaldo issued his regulations for the
government of provinces and municipahties ' as supple-
mental to the decree of two days before. It wemt
mto the details of government, under the following
heads: police, justice, taxation and registration of
propertiy.
On Jime 23 he proelaimed the establishment of a revolu-
tionary government, with himself as "president." In
this capacity he had all the powers of the Spanish gov-
emo>general, unhampered by any orders from Spain.
It is true that the scheme provided for the eventual foi^
mation of a republic, but it is doubtful if the people who
drew it up really Imew what that word meant. What
was provided for in practice was a strong and highly
oentrahzed military dictatorship, in which, under the
form of election, provision was made for the filling of all
offices by men devoted to the group which had seized
control.
According to this decree the dictatorial government was
in future to be entitled the revolutionary govenmient.
Its duty was to strugf^e for the independence of the
Philippines in order to estalflsh a true republic. The dic-
tator was to be known as the president of the revolu-
tionary government. There were to be four secretaries —
one of fordgn affairs, commerce and loarine; one of
» P. I. B., 206. 3.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
248 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
war and public works ; one of police and interior ordor,
justice, education and hygiene; one of the toeasury,
agriculture and n^anufactures. The government could
increase the number of secretariee if necessary. They
were to assist the president in the despatch of business
coming under their departments.
In addition to the president and bis secretari^, there
was to be a revolutionary congress composed of repre-
sentatives from the provinces of the Philippine Archi-
pelago, elected as provided by the decree of June 18.
In case a province was not able to elect representatives,
the government would appoint them for such province.
The congress was to discuss and advise, to approve
treaties and loans, and to examine and approve the ac-
counts of the secretary of the treasury. If important
matters admitted of delay, the congress would be heard
concerning them ; but if they did not admit of delay,
the president of the government was to act at once.
Projects of law could be presented by any representative,
and by the secretaries of the government.
A permanent committee of congress presided over by
the vice-president was to be chosen by that body. This
was to serve as a court of appeal in criminal cases and as
a coiurt of final jurisdiction in cases arising between the
secretaries of the government and provincial officials.
The acts of congress were not to go into effect until the
president of the government, ordered their execution.
He was also to have the right of veto.
This was awell-devised plan to secure control for the cen-
tra group about Aguinaldo. His commisdoners, under a
form of election in which the electorswere carefullyselected
men, established municipid governments devoted to the
cause of the revolution. These were to choose provincial
officials and members of the congress. All elections were
subject to Aguinaldo's approval, and every province was
imder the command of a military representative of his,
who could and did call upon the civil authorities for
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DID WE DESTROY A REPUBLIC f 249
such supplies as he deemed fit. All real power was vested
in the central group, and the central group was composed
of Emilio Aguinaldo and his public and private advisers.
By this time he had gathered about him men who were
trained in the law, some of whom had served the Spanish
government in various capacities. They were accustomed
to the methods that had previously prevailed under the
Spanish regime, and were now ready to draw up con-
stitutions and regulations for the new government.
Mabini wrote the three organic decrees. Copies of them
were sent to the foreign consuls in Manila, and on July
15, 1898 to Admiral Dewey.
Although the title of "president" was assumed by
Aguinaldo, as more likely to be favourably con^dered
in the United States than "dictator," the tendency of
his followers who had not been educated in Europe was
to speak of and to regard him not as a president, but as an
overlord holding all power in his hands. The people
did not feel themselves citizens of a republic, copartners
in an estate; they considered themselves subject to a
ruler who sometimes called himself president, and some-
times dictator. Indeed, there is much to show that if
Aguinaldo and his followers had succeeded in their plans,
even the name "republic" would not have been long
continued as the title of his government.'
1 On July 7, 1S98, the eeoretaiy vi the revolutioiiary junta in Min-
danao, in writing to A^inaldo, olosed his letter with the following
(onuula : " Conuniuid this, your vwsal, »t all hoim at the orders of
his respected ohid, on whom he will new turn his biiok, and whom
he will never forswear. God preserve you, Captain General, many
yean." P. I. R., 1080. 1. Every now and then we find » queer use
of the tenn " royal family." This seems to have been oommon among
the mass of the people. Heads of towns and men of position often
used the expression " royal orders " in speaking of the orders and
decrees issued by Aguinaldo. For otample, the officials of Tayug, a
town of 19,000 people in Pangasin&n Province, certified, on October 9,
189S, that they had carried out the instructions for " the establishment
of the popular government in aocordanoe with the royal decree of
June 18, 1898." — P. I. R., 1188. 1.
In October certun of ^luinsldo's adherents in Tondo wrote to him
:dbvGoogIe
360 THE PHILIFHNES PAST AND PRESENT
AguiiiAldo's claim as to the effectivenesB of his govern-
ment on Almost 6, 1898, was as follows : ^ " The govern-
ment of the revolution actually rules in the provinces of
Cavite, Batangas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Laguna, Morong,
Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, ^anta and besieges the
capital, Manila. The most perfect order and tranquillity
reign in these provinces, governed by authorities elected
by the inhabitants in conformity with the organic decrees
dated June 18 and 23 last. Moreover, the revolution
has about nine thousand prisoners of war who are treated
htmsanely and according to the rules of civilized warfare.
We can muster more thim thirty thousand men organized
as a r^ular army."
It may have been that in the majority of these provinces
municipal governments, formed in accordance with the
provisions of the decree of June 18, had been established ;
but provincial governments had not been established in
aU of them, and tranquillity did not reign in any of them,
and proteited against the aots of the local preeidente, who, they held,
h&d not been duly elected in aooordaiioe with the proTiBions of the
" royal order " ot June 18, 1898. They oloeed their respeotful protest
by requesting that said royal order should be obeyed. — Taylor, AJ., 63.
In 1899 an 6fBo«' of the army in Union Province wrote : " In ac-
oordanoe with the orders of the seoretary of war of our repablioan
government of these islands, issued in oomplianoe with royal decree,
article 5. published on March 8." On September 1, 1898, the local
preeidente of the town of Mangatarem, writing to the head of the
province, said that he had not furnished the estimates required because
the elections provided for in " article 7 of the royal decree of the
superior government, dated June 18 last," bad not been approved.
A yoang son of a member of Aguinaldo's cabinet, writing to his father
in September, 1899, spoke of the " royal decree of June IS, 1898."
— P. I. R., 1188. 3. In Bomblon, in August, 1898, elections were held in
oomplianoewiththepresoriptionof the"royaldecreeof June 18, 1898,"
and Aguinaldo approved them, apparently without oonsidering that
this was an anomalous way of describing a decree of the dictator of
the so-called republic. On March 7, 1899, a general in the revolutionary
service stated that an ofQoer had been released from arrest by a " royal
ordw." The attitude of mind which made men speak of Agninaldo's
"royal ordeia " in 1898 did not change when he fled brfore the ad-
vance of the United States army. His orders remained rojral orders.
They were again and again referred to in this way.
' P. I. B.. Books O-l.
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DID WE DESTROY A Rm^UBLICf 261
as they were the scene of operations i^funst the Spaztiards.
There could not well have been nine thousand prisoners in
his hands at this time, as that was claimed later when a
large additional number of Spaniards had surrendered. As
for the thirty thousand men oi^amzed as a regular army,
there may be a certain difference of opinion as to what con-
stitutes a regular army ; the men whosawAguinaldo's force
then, and who have read the papers of its leaders, must be of
the opinion that that force was not a regular army. Prob-
^ly only Manila Proyince bad a provincial government
on August 6. Its local presidentes met at Cavite Viejo on
August 3 and elected three members of congress from
the province, and also the members of the provincial
government. The election took place under the super-
vision of Colonel Teodoro Gonzales, whom Aguinaldo
had appointed governor of Manila Province on August 1.
He remained governor after the election was held. Not
until August 17 did the local presidentes of Bulacan
assemble under the presidency of the secretary of the
interior and proceed to elect two members to coi^ress
and the members of the provincial government. Not
until August 20 was there an election for the members
of the provincial government of Cavite Province. This
was held ia the town of Cavite. Isaac Fernando Rios,
who was afterwards a member of the Filipino jimta in
Madrid, was chosen a representative of the proviace;
but as he wrote that he was in favour of coming to
some agreement with Spain which would permit the
development of the Philippines, without abandoning the
sovereignty of that country, Aguinaldo promptly dis-
approved his election ^ and ordered a new one held for the
office thus left vacant. On October 2, 1899, Aguinaldo
approved the result of a new election held there because
fotu: of the five high officials of the province had absented
themselves, while one of them had died. Of the men
who had so absented themselves one had gone abroad,
> P. I. B., 1216. 1.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
252 THE PHIIJPPINE8 PAST AND PRESENT
while the other three had remained in Manila or Cavite
under the government of the Ujiited States.^
The people of the provinces obeyed the men who had
arms in their hands. It is not probable that many of
them had any conviction concerning the form of govern-
ment which would be beet for the Philippines. There
were no signs of a spontaneous desire for a republic.
Orders came from the group about Aguinaldo, and the
people accepted a dictator and a republic as they accepted
a president and a republic, without knowing, and prob-
ably without caring very much, what it all meant, except
that they hoped that taxes would cease with the departure
of the friars. A determined and wellHsrgamzed minority
had succeeded in imposing its will upon an unorganized,
heterogeneous, and leaderless majority.
As Boon as a province was occupied by the Insurgents
it was divided into territorial zooes within which com-
mand was exerted by military officers. On July 20, 1898,
Cavite had been divided into four zones, and next day
Brigadier-General Artemio Ricartewas placed in command
of the province, and the first zone.
By July 7 Bulacan Province had been divided into six
zones, and Nueva Ecija into fo\ir zones, with a separate
oommander for each zone. These men established the
government prescribed by Aguinaldo's decrees of the
middle of June. Probably by the end of July Aguinaldo's
municipal govenunents had been established in the greater
part of the towns of Luz6n. These governments were
not established by the mass of the people. The mass of
the people were not consulted, but they were not in the
habit of being consulted in such matters and probably
saw no necesdty for it in this case. As an evidence of
this we have the fact that from the beginning the acts of
election were almost always drawn up in Spanish, al-
though by far the greater portion of the people of the
archipelago spoke only the native dialects.
» P. I. B., 1216. 1.
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DID WE DE8TB0Y A REPUBLIC T 263
The method of establisbii^ these municipal govern-
ments employed in Cavite in June, 1898, was continued
to the end of Aguinaldo's rule. It was the same in dif-
ferent places and at different times. Data obtained
from reports and documents written in towns far removed
from each other follow. They must be considered to-
gether in order to obtain an idea of what this method
really was.
When the Insui^ent movement had progressed suffi-
ciently far, the leaders collected their adherents and ob-
tuned recognition as the heads of their provinces or dis-
tricts. For example, representatives of the towns of
Fampanga assembled at San Fernando on Jime 26, 1898,
and under the presidency of General Maximo Hizon
agreed to yield him "complete obedience as military
governor of the province and representative of the illus-
trious dictator of these PhiUppine Islands." ^ The town
of Macabebe refused to send any delegates to this gather-
ing. Commissionere, in almost every case officers of
Aguinaldo's army, were empowered by him to establish
the so-called republican government. Ttey appointed
delegates who proceeded to the smaller towns and held
elections; but whenever possible the commissioner of
Aguinaldo presided. In many cases these delegates
were heutenants of the army. The commissioners selected
the electors, for they had all to be "marked out by their
good conduct, their wealth, and their social position,"
and they had all to be in favour of independence. They
then presided at the elections, which were viva voce.
They apparently selected the people to be elected, and
forwarded a record of the proceedings to the central
government. The election had to be approved by the
dictator or president before the successful candidates
could assume the duties of their offices. Later on, the
mihtary commanders remote from the seat of government
were authorized to approve elections and install the
> P. 1. B., 223.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
264 THE PHZLIPPINB8 PAST AND PRESENT
successful candidates, but the records of election had
even then to be forwarded to the capital for approval,
the action of the commissioner not being final.
The commissioners do not seem to have been able to
find many men who had the necessary requisites for
electors. In the town of Lipa, Batangas Province, with a
population of forty thousand seven hundred forty-three,
at the election held July 3, 1898, a presidente was chosen
for whom twenty-five votes were cast. On November
23, 1808, an election was held at Vigan, Docos Sur, for
a presidente to Hucceed one who had been elected repre-
sentative in congress. One himdred and sixteen votes
were cast. The population of Vigan is nineteen thousand.
On October 5, 1898, at Echa^e, Isabela Province, a
presidente was elected for whom fifty-foiur votes were
cast. The population of Echague is fiifty-four thousand.
On October 2, 1898, at Cabagan Nuevo, Isabela, one
hundred and eleven men voted out of a population of
mxty-two hundred and forty. On January 29, 1899,
the town of Hemani, in Sajnar, elected its municipal
oflBcials under the supervision of V. Lukban. Fifty-
four men voted. The town has a population of twenty-
five hundred and fifty-five.
The elections, so-called, were not always held without
protest. For example, the town of San Job6, Batan^s,
protested unavailingly to Aguinaldo against the result
of an election held at 10 P.M., in a storm of rain. Men
who had been on friendly terms with the Spaniards
were usually excluded from all participation. If in spite
of the precautions taken men were elected who were
disliked by the commissioner or his supporters, the
election could be set aside on the groimd that the person
dected was not an adherent of the revolution.
The elections were often held in a sii^ular manner,
as in the followii^ case: ^ —
" On August 20, 1898, four men of Tondo appeared before
■ P. I. B. 1X33. 1.
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DID VB DE8TB0Y A EEPUBUCT 266
Aguinaldo on Bacoor and announced that they were represen-
tatives of the people of the district, who loved liberty. Then
in accordance with the directions of the president of the republic
under the supervision of the secretary of the interior, they drew
lots from a hat to decide how the offices of the head of the dis-
trict, delegate of police, delegate of the treasury and delegate
of justice were to be distributed. The decision having heea
made in this simple fashion, Aguinaldo gravely approved the
election as expressing the wUl of the people. Perhaps it did,
for they seem to have continued, at least for a time, to obey
them. On November 14, 1898, Aguinaldo again approved an
election for local officials in Toudo which mce August 13 had
been within tlie Ammcan lines."
On At^uat 23 San Carios, in Pangasin&n ProTince, a
town of twenty'three thousand people, elected its officials
under the new form of government. The presidente chosen
was a well-known member of the Katipdnan, and before
the election was held announced his intention of Willing
any one who was chosen for the position for which he was
a candidate.' He was accordingly elected. In spite
of this grave infonnality, an informality which formed
one ground for a protest on the part of some of the people
of the town, Aguinaldo approved the election.
On October 21, 1898, an election was held under the
eupervision of the military commander in Camarines for
the municipal officials of the town of Yi^.* The voting
was oral, and a secretary wrote down the votes for the
two candidates under direction of the commissioner,
who finally annotmced that the candidate whose friend
he was had been elected, but without stating how many
votes he had received. This newly elected head of the
town had the town crier on the following night publish
through the streets an address to the people, in which he
thanked those who had voted for him andwiumed those who
had not that it would be well for them to beware. The
Spanish law known as the Maura Law, which regulated the
elections in the municipaUties tmder the Spanish govern-
ment, provided for a limited electoral body, composed
_» P. I. B., 1137. 4. » Ibid., R., 1166. 2.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
256 THE t^ILIPFINES FAST AND PRESENT
largely of ex-officials of the mimicipalitiee. The chooBmg
of an electoral body by the military commander of a dis-
trict probably did not seem strange to the people. The
provincial and mimicipal officials were established in office
by armed men, and they were obeyed because they had
been installed by armed men ; but it was a form of elec-
tion to which people, as a rule, saw no reason to object.
There were, however, in many cases bitter complaints of
the abuses committed by the officers thus "elected."
This form of government spread with the advance
of A^uinaldo's arms. Municipal elections were held
in Tarlac in July, in Itocoe Norte and Tayabas in August,
in Benguet and the Batanes Islands in September, 1898,
in Panay in December, 1898, and in Leyte and Samar in
January, 1899.
On December 27 Antonio Lima wrote that all the
provinces of Lus6n, Mindoro, Marinduque, Masbate,
and Ticao, Rombl6n, part of Panay, the Bataoes, and
Babuyanes Islands were under the jurisdiction of the
insui^nt government.*
By October 7, 1898, 14 of the 36 provinces and dis-
tricts into which Luz6n had been divided by the Spanish
government had civil govemora.* These 14 were Tag£-
log provinces or provinces which the Tag&Iogs con-
trolled. The other provinces were still under military
rule, and, indeed, even the provinces under civilians were
dominated by their mihtaiy commanders. With the
manner of holding elections which prevailed, the governors
must have been m^i who were in favour of the military
party in force, for otherwise they would not have been
elected.*
It is not probable that the number of provinces under
civil governors much increased. If in Pangasinin Prov-
ince, where there are many Tag&logs, organisations
opposed to the rule of A^uinaldo could cause serious
disorders, as was the case, it must have been considraed
> P. I. B., 31fl. 1. ■ Ibid., 3. 33. » Ibid., 1022. 3.
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DID WE DESTROY A REPUBLIC T 257
expedient for the success of the attempt of the Tsg&logs,
who form only a fifth of the population, to dominate
the archipelago, that all provinces in which an effective
majority of the people were not of that tribe, should be
kept under military rule. The municipal governments
which had been established in Luz6n were in the hands of
Aguinaldo'fl adherents, or of men who it was hoped would
prove loyal to him. They were men of the Spanish-
speaking group, which has always dominated the people
of the islands. They were probably not as a rule men
of means. Many of them, perhaps most of them, had
been clerks and employees under the Spanish govern-
ment, and they saw no reason for changing the methods
of town administration which had then been followed.
The municipal taxes, the estimates for expenditures, and
the regulations for town government, were but little modi-
fied from those they found in force. In many ways such
changes as were made were for the worse.
Once installed in power, Aguinaldo's officials were
required to exercise over the mass of the people about the
same control that had always been exercised over them.
The governing group considered that they were perfectly
capable of providing for the welfare of the islands, and
that it was the duty of the people to obey them without
question.
When the insurgent force was increased in preparation
for war with the Americans a large number of municipal
officials resigned, or attempted to do so. It was not
easy for a municipal officii imder Aguinaldo's govern-
ment to resign. A resignation, to be accepted, had to
be accompanied by the certificate of a physician that the
person concerned was unfit to perform the duties of
his office. Judging by the record,' an epidemic seems to
have attacked the municipal officials in January, 1899.
It is probable that they saw that war was inevitable and
that they did not wish to remain in charge of the towns
" P. I. R., 1200.
VOL. 1 — 8
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
258 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
aad be responsible for providing for the necessities of
"the liberating army." In PangasindiD in that month
men could not leave their barrier without obtaining the
permission of the headman, and in one town men who had
attempted to sell their property for the purpose of going
to Manila were, on January 17, ordered to be arrested
and their conduct investigated.*
Aguinaldo, having established himself at Malolos, or-
dered the congress provided for in his decree of June 23,
1898, to assemble at the capital on September 15, 1898, and
appointed a number of provisional representatives for
provinces and islands not under his control.* It has often
been claimed that Aguinaldo's government controlled
at this time the whole archipelago, except the bay and
city of Manila and the town of Cavite.'
Blount quotes the following statement from the report
of the First Philippine Commission :_ —
"While the Spanish troops now rem^ed quietly in Manila,
the Filipino forces made themselves mast^ of the entire
island except that city." *
I agned that statement, and signed it in good faith ;
nevertheless, it is untrue. The Filipino forces never con-
1 P. I. R., 907. 6. » P. I. R., 39. 7.
■ The following memonuidum to aoaompaoy a letter from BfAar
Don Bixto Lopez, Secretary of Setlor Don Felipe Agoncillo, to the
Honorable the Secretary of Stftte, written January 6, 1S09, clearly
sets forth this claim : —
" Pursuant to the action of said congress a detailed system of govern-
ment has been provided tor and is actually maintained in all the por-
tions of the Phihppino Islands, except so much of the provinces of
Manila and Cavite as is now in the actual possession of the American
Army, such excepted part contairung only about 3 per cent, of the popn-
lation of the entire iflands and an infinitely amsJlet proportion of their
area.
" From the fore^ing it will appear that the Philippine government
is now, as it has been practically ever dnoe the I6th of June, 1898,
in substantiaUy full possession of the territory of the people it repre-
senU."— Taylor Ex. 530 &7 KU., Congressional Record, June 3, 1902,
Vol. ?5, part 6, p. 6217.
• Blount, p. 70.
:dbvGoogIe
DID WE DESTEOY A REPUBUCT 269
trolled the territory now known aa Ifugao, Bontoc, Ka-
linga or Apayao, much less that occupied by the N^ritos
on the east coast of Luz6n, but this is not all. There
exists among the Insurgent records a very important
document, prepared by Mabini, showing that when the
call for the first session of the Filipino congress was
issued, there were no less than sixty-one provinces and
commandanciaa, which the Insui^ents, when talking
among themselves, did not even claim to control, and
twenty-one of these were in or immediately adjacent to
Luz6n.'
■"September, 1896.
" DECREE
" AlthouKli article 11, Chapter 2, of the Orgajiio Decree of June 23
(1898) last, prescribes tliftt the appointment of proviBional represen-
tatives of Congress be given to persons who have been bom or have
resided in the provinces which they are to represent ; taking into con-
sideration the urgent necessity that said body enter upon its functions
immediately, I hereby decree the following ; —
" 1. The following are appointed provisional Representatives . . .
"2. A meeting of Congress is called for the 15th instant, to be held
in the town of Malolos, provinoe of Bulac&n.
"3. The Secretary of the Interior shall take steps to notify the
persons appointed and those elected by the popular oommanderB in the
provinces already occupied by the Revolution, of the call as soon as
possible.
"Giv. ..."
(Attached hereto is the following, with the names written in Mabini's
handwriting :)
"September, 1808.
"Provinoee not subject to the Revolutionary Government of the
Philippine!.
Naubs Clabsks
Albay Highest olaas 2. Salvador V. del
Rosario and Felipe
Hooob Norte do 2. Josd, Antonio Luna
UocoB Sur do 2. Ignacio Vill&mor,
Job6 Aleji
Isabela de Luz6n Third oIbbb 1. Aristdn Bautista
Sorsogtfn do 1. Jos^ Albert
Cagay^ do 1. Pablo Tecaon
:dbvGoogIe
THE PHILIPPINES PA8T AND PKESBNT
The men who composed this congress were among
the ablest natives of the archipelago ; but representative
Makes
Abn
Nuev» ViBoayft
Corregidor
Cfttanduiuiea
Batanes
Maabsrto and Tioao
AmburaTan
Ap&yaos
Ben^et
Binatanga
Bontoo
Burias
Cayapa
Itavea
Lepanto
Prbioipe
Tiagan
Cabugauan
Island of Cebfi
Classes
Pol.-Mil. Govt.
1. laidro Paredes
1. Enrique Mendiola
Pol.-Mil. ComandMioia 1. Alberto Baireto
1. Fernando Canon
1. Le6n Apaoible
1. Mariano Ooampo
Island of Lejte
NegTOB Occidental
Island of Samu
Antique, Island of
Paiiay
Cfipis
NegTOB Orients
Island of Bobol
Rombl6n
Conoepidn
Zamboanga
Misamis
Surigao
Davao
Cotabato
Baeilan
do
Lowest class
1. Ledn Ouerrero
1. JosA Maifa de U
Vifia
Pablo Ooampo
1. HiptJlito Magsalin
1. Mit^uel ZaragoEa
do 1. Aguedo Velarde
do I. Juan Manday Oa-
Pol.-Mil. Comandanoia 1. Vicente Oonztflez
MauiBang
do 1. Mariana V. del
RoBario
lstDi8t.Pol.-Mil.Govt. 1. Pedro A. Patemo
2d Diat. do 1. Maximino P&terao
3d Dist. do 1. Benito Valdfis
4thDiBt. do 1. Tel«8foroChuidian
5th Dist. do 1. Enrique Mercaida
6th Dist. do 1. Juan Tuason
:dbvGoogIe
DID WE DESTROY A REPUBLIC T
261
inBtitutions mean uothing unless they represent the
people ; if they do not, they are a conscious lie devised
either to deceive the people of the country or foreign
nations, and it is not possible for any system foimded
upon a lie to endure. A real repubUc must be founded not
upon a few brilliant men to compose the governing group
but upon a people trained in self-restraint and accus-
tomed to govern by compromise and concession, not
Nambs
Dftpitan
Butdon
BarSe ia under Fol.-
Mil. Gk>vt. ofBahia
Levao ia undet Pol.-
Mil. Comandanoift
of Cotlabfttto
Matti
Malabang. This
Comuidaaoia is
under the Military
Comamdanoi* of
Bahialllana.
Reina Regento. This
Coauuidanoi» is
under the Pol.-
Mil. Govt, of Cot-
tabato
Bay of Sarang&ni and
adjacent islands
Tuouian
lalaod of Jol6
Smaai
Tataan
Bongao
Island of Parafua
Calamianee
Marianas Islands
Orients Carolines
Camarines, North
and South
Clasbkb
1 Diat. do 1. Gonxalo Tuaaon
l.-Mil. Comandanoia 1. Qonzalo Tuaaon
Pol.-Mfl. Comandanoia
Pol.-Mil. Comandanoia
Pol.-Mil. Govt.
Pol.-Mil. Com.
Pol.-Mil. QoTt.
1. Benito Legarda
1. Felipe Calderdn.
1. Manuel JArez
1. Manuel Oenato
Don TomCa
Roaario and
Cecilio Hilario
I, EztnMt from original in Spanish, A. L. S.,
:dbvGoogIe
262 THK PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
by force. To endure it must be based upon a solid founda-
tion of self-control, of self-respect and of respect for tiie
rights of others upon the part of the great majority of
the common people. If it is not, the government which
follows a period of timmlt, confusion and civil war will
be a government of the sword. The record the Philippine
republic has left behind it contains nothing to confirm
the belief that it would have endured, even in name, if
the destinies of the islands had been left in the hands of
the men who set it up.
The national assembly met on the appointed day in
the parish church of Barasoain, Malolos, which had
been set aside for the meetings of congress. This body
probably had then more elected members than at its
subsequent meetings, but even so it contained a large
number of men who were appointed by Aguinaldo after
consultation with his council to represent provinces which
they had never even seen.
From a "list of representatives of the provinces and
districts, selected by election and appointment by the
government up to July 7, 1899, with incomplete Ust of
October 6, 1899" ^ I find that there were 193 members,
of whom forty-two were elected and one hundred fifty-one
were appointed. This .congress was therefore not an elec-
tive body. Was it in any sense representative ? llie fol-
lowing table, showing the distribution of delegates between
the several peoples, will enable us to answer this quration.
In considering this table it must be remembered that the
relationship given between the number of delegates as-
signed to a given people and the number of individuals com-
posing it is only approximate, as no one of these peoples is
strictly limited to the provinces where it predominates.
I have classified the provinces as Tagfilog, Visayan,
etc., according to census retiuTis showing the people who
form a majority of their inhabitants in each case. *
' P. I. R.. 38. 3.
■ The 1803 oensuB returns are here used for each of the several peoples.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
DID WE DESTROY A REPUBLIC T
Visayans . .
Tog&logs . .
Ilocaaos . .
Bicols . .
Pangasinins >
PampanganB
Cagayana
Zambalatu .
Non-Christians
3,219,030
1,460,695
803,942
566,365
159,648
48,823
647,740
0
18
7
4
2
2
4
1
4
42
68
19
11
7
2
2
6
2
It will be noted that the Tag&log provinces had
eighteen out of a total of forty-two elected delegates.
The Vieayans, by far the most numerous people in the
islands, id not have one. The non-Christian prov-
inces had a very disproportionately large total of del-
egates, of whom four are put down as elected, but on
examination we find that one of these is from Lepanto,
the capital of which was an Ilocano town ; one is from
Nueva Vizcaya, where there is a considerable Cagayan-
Ilocano population ; one is from Benguet, the capital of
which was an Ilocano town, and one from Tiagan,
which was an Ilocano settlement. These del^;ates
should therefore really be credited to the Ilocanos.
, If the individual relationships of the several members
are considered, the result is even more striking. Of the
thirty-eight delegates assigned to the non-Christian prov-
inces, one only, good old Lino Abaya of Tiagan, was a
non-Christian. Many of the non-Christian comandancias
were given a number of del^ates wholly disproportionate
to their population, and in this way the congress was
stuffed full of Tag&logs.
Think of Filipe Buencamino, of Aguinaldo's cabinet,
representing the Moros of Zamboanga; of the mild,
scholarly botanist Leon Guerrero representing the MoroSf
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
264 THE PHILIPPINES PABT AND PBESENT
Bagobos, Macdayas and Manobos of Davao ; of Jos^ M.
Lerma, the unscrupulous politician of the province of
Bataan, just across the bay from Manila, representing the
wild Moros of Cotabato ; of Juan Tuason, a timid Chinese
mestizo Manila business man, representing the Yacan
and Samal Moros of Basilan ; of my good friend Benito
Legfmla, since a member of the Philippine Commission,
and a resident delegate from the Philippines to the congress
of the United States, representing the bloody Moros of
Jolo [ Yet they appear as representatives of these several
regions.
Few, indeed, of the delegates from non-Christian territory
had ever set foot in the provinces or comandandas from
which they were appointed, or would have been able to
so much as name the wild tribe or tribes inhabiting them.
I have been furnished a list, made up with all pos-
sible care by competent persons, from which it appears
that there were eighty-five delegates actually present
at the opening of congress, of whom fifty-nine were
Tag&logs, five Bicols, three Pampangans, two Visayans, and
one ft Zambalan. For the others there are no data available.
Yet it has been claimed that this was a representative
body I It was a Tag&log body, without enough represen-
tatives of any other one of the numerous Philippine peoples
to be worth mentioning.
With a congress thus oi^anized, Aguinaldo should have
had no difficidty in obtaining any legislation he desired.
The committee of congress appointed to draw up a
constitution set to work promptly, and by October 16, 1898,
had proceeded so far with their work that Buencamino was
able to write to Aguinaldo that while he had been of the
opinion that it would have been best for him to continue
as a dictator aided by a committee of able men, yet it
would now be a blow to the prestige of coi^ress to susp^id
its sessions. Aguinaldo noted upon this letter the fact
that he did not approve of a constitution.*
' P. I. B., 485. 1.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
b,GoogIe
:dbvGoogIe
DID WE DESTROY A BEPDBUCT 265
Apparently early in December the committee submitted
their project. In presenting it to congress they said'
that—
"The work whose resultfl the commission has the honour
to present for the consideration of congress has been large^
a matter of selection ; in executii^ it not only has the French
constitution been used, but also those of Belgium, Mexico,
Brazil, Nicaragua, Coeta Rica, and Guatemala, as we have
considered those nations as most resembling the Filipino people."
The most important difference between this project and
the actual constitution adopted was that, although the
project provided that the Dominican, Recollect, Fran-
ciscan and Augustinian friars should be expelled from the
country and that their estates should become the property
of the state, yet it recognized the CathoUc religion as that
of the state and forbade state contribution to the sup-
port of any other, although it permitted the practice in
private of any religion not opposed to morality, which
did not threaten the safety of the country. The govern-
ment was authorized to negotiate a concordat with the
Pope for the regulation of the relations between church
and state. A strong party was in favour of this recognition,
but it finally failed of adoption, and the constitution as
promulgated provided for the freedom and equahty of
religion and for free and compulsory education which
had not been provided for in the original project. The
constitution as approved forbade the granting of titles
of nobility, decorations or honorary titles by the state
to any f^pino. This paragraph did not exist in the
original project, which merely forbade any Filipino to
accept them without the consent of the government.
Mabini, the ablest of all Aguinaldo's advisers, did not
approve of the constitution. He himself had drawn up
a project for a: constitution during Jime, 1898, but it
was not accepted by the committee, the greater part of
whom were Catholics and for that reason opposed to
' p. I. B., 40. 1.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
266 THE PHILIPPINES PABT AND PRESENT
Mabini, who was a bitter antagonist of that church.
And yet when separation of chiirch and state was finally
provided for it did not please Mabini, who, although he
was opposed to church control, wrote to Aguinaldo ^ that
the constitution as passed by congress was not acceptable
and should not be promul^ted because the constitutional
guarantees of individual liberty could not be maintained,
as the army had to be in control for the time being, and
furthermore it was not expedient to separate church and
state, as this separation would alienate many of their
adherents. Indml, there was not much in the constitu-
tion which he thought ought to take immediate effect,*
and he wrote that congress was ill-disposed toward him
because he had refused to agree to its promulgation.
Existing conditions were such that he believed that all
powers should be vested in one person. He warned Agui-
naldo that if the constitution were put in force, he would
be at the mercy of his secretaries. On January 1, 1899,
Aguinaldo, probably at the su^estion of Mabini, proposed
certain changes in it.'
Evidently the provisions of the coi^titution did not
worry Aguinaldo much, as is shown by hia reply to the
request by some of his officers for information ae to what
reward those who were first in the attack on Manila
should receive. He promised them such titles as marquis,
duke, etc.*
On January 2, 1899, Aguinaldo announced the forma-
tion of a new cabinet made up as follows : Apolinario
Mabini president and secretary of fordgn affairs ; Teodoro
Sandico, secretary of the interior ; Mariano Trias, secretary
of the treasury ; Baldomero Aguinaldo, secretary of war
and navy, and Gracio Gonzaga, secretary oifomerUo.^ On
January 4 Mabini took the oath of office as the presi-
' P. I. R., 377. 13. ' /MA, 472. 9.
• Ibid., 40. 8. , • Ibid., 849. See p. 143.
' A geoeral teim covering eduo&tioD, public votks, agriculture and
oommerce.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
DID WE DESTROY A BEPDBLICT 267
dent of the council of government. This body met
twice a week at Malolos on set days, and at the close
of its deliberations forwarded to Aguinaldo a statement
of the subjects discussed and the conclusions reached for
his decision. The prendent of the republic did not pre-
side at, or take part in, its deliberations.
On January 4, 1899, General Otis issued a proclamation
in which he announced that the United States had ob-
tained possession of the Philippines and that its govern-
ment would beextended over the islands of the archipelago.
Aguinaldo replied next day with one which, if not intended
to be a declaration of war, was at least a warning that
hostilities were imminent. This proclamation was carried
into Manila by his emissaries and posted up over the one
issued by the American commander. It was a challenge
to a trial of strength, and Aguinaldo and his advisers
hastened their preparations for the coming combat.
The secretary of the interior on the same day sent an
order to the heads of all provinces directing the organiza-
tion of territorial militia to resist the American invasion,
and ordmng the heads of the towns to hold meetings of the
people to protest against the aggression of the United
States. They were held in accordance with these orders,
and records of the proceedings were sent to Malolos and
published in the official organ of the government as
evidence of the feeling of the people. It was, however,
not considered necessary in publidiing them to mention
the fact that they had been held in compliance with orders.
On January 14, 1899, Mabini wrote to Aguinaldo* rec-
ommending changes in the proposed constitution, which
he still liked as little as ever. He was afraid that Negros
and Panay would refuse to accept the form of govern-
ment it prescribed. The worst thing about it was that the
Americans would be less disposed to recognize Aguinaldo's
government; for when they saw the constitution they
would know, as it made no mention of them, that the
i.,GoogIe
268 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Filipinos wanted independence.. Mabini thought that
it was possible that the wording of the constitution might
have been deliberately planned by members of the congress
in favour of annexation to the United States, so that that
country would be warned, would become more mistrustful,
and would refuse to recognize Aguinaldo's government.
Whatever the president of the coimcU may have thought
about the theoretical advisability of a congress to rep-
resent the people, he foimd one much in the way when
he had obtained it.
Buencamino advised that the constitution should be
approved and promulgated ; one argument was that the
congress had been consulted in the matter of a national
loan, and if it was dissolved, there could be no loan.
This was apparently the only matter upon which it had
been consulted.^
The constitution of the Philippine Republic was ratified
at a session of the congress on January 20, 1899.
On January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo sanctioned it and
ordered that it diould be "kept, complied with and exe-
cuted in all its parts because it is the sovereign will of
the Philippine people." * The constitution provided
for a government of three coordinate powers, executive,
le^lative and judicial. Whether it provided for a form
of government which would have succeeded in the Philip-
pines was not determined by actual experience. It was
never really put in force for war with the United States
began in two weeks and the constitution must stand as
the expression of the ideas of a certain group of educated
natives rather than as the working formula for the actual
conduct of the pohtical life of a nation. One proof of
this is the fact that not until June 8, 1899, were Aguinaldo's
decrees upon the registration of marriages and upon civil
marriage, dated June 20, 1898, revoked, and the provisions
of the constitution concerning marriage put in effect.*
1 P. I. B., 485. 6.
■ Senate Document 138, Fifty-8ixt]i Congress, First Seesion.
• P. I. R., Books B-6.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
DID WE DESTROY A RBPUBUCT 289
Aguiualdo had approved the constitution ; he had in-
formed the foreign consuls and General Otis that it had
been promulgated and become the law of the land. It
was not promulgated. It had not become the law of
the land. It served one important purpose. It passed
into the hands of the Americans and showed them the
ability and the aspirations of certain individuals of the
archipelago, but Mabini and his followers did not beheve
in its form or in its provisions, and Mabini at least was
emphatic in his declarations that the time had not yet come
for it to be put into effect. On January 24, 1899, he wrote
to Aguinaldo that if it should be promulgated it would be
absolutely necessary to give the president the veto power,
and replace the elected representatives by others appointed
by the government. If this were not done the president
would be at the mercy of congress, and the people, seeing
that disf^eement between the executive government and
thecoi^;resswasthe causeof its misfortunes, would start an-
other revolutionary movement to destroy both of them.^
As long as Mabini remained in power the constitution
was mere paper. Its adoption was not indicative of the
capacity of the people to maintain self-government. It
expressed only tiie academic aspirations of the men who
drafted it. There is not the shghtest evidence from any
previous or subsequent experience of the people that it
would have worked in practice. It was enacted for the
misleading of Americans rather than for the benefit of
the Filipinos.
While the government of Aguinaldo was called a
republic, it was in fact a Tag&log military oligarchy in
which the great mass of the people had no share, llieir
duty was only to give soldiers for the army and labourers
for the fields, and to obey without question the orders
they received from the mihtary heads of their provinces.
There is no cause for vam r^rets. We did not destroy
a republic in the PhiUppines. There never was anything
' there to destroy which even remotely resembled a republic.
' P. I. R., 472. 8.
L.,,l,;.:M.,G00gIe
CHAPTER rX
The Conduct op the Wab
It is not my intention to attempt to write a history of
the war which began on February 4, 1899, nor to discuss
any one of its eeveral campaigns. I propose to limit
myself to a statement of the conditions und^ which it
was conducted, and a description of the two periods into
which it may be divided.
From the outset the Insurgent soldiers were treated
with marked severity by their leaders. On June 17, 1898,
Aguinaldo issued an order to the military chiefs of certain
towns in Cavite providing that a soldier wasting ammuni-
tion should be punished with twelve lashes for a first
offence, twenty-four for a second, and court-martialled
and "severely punished" for a third.'
' "To the Military Chiefs of tho tomu meationed in tlie margin
[there is nothing in the musin. — Tr,] : —
" As there are still many soldiers paying no notioe to the order for-
bidding the waste of oartridgee, you are required to give a certain
amount of ammunition to each soldier and to see every day it there is
any cartridge roiadng, and if so, inquire into the reason. In order that
this may be successfully carried out, I have deemed it proper to pre-
scribe the punishment for such offence, of which you will inform the sol-
diers under your coQunaad, and post this circular in a prominent ptooe.
Said punishments ore as follows : —
" Art. 1. A soldier found wasting ammunition shall be punished
with 12 lashes ; in case he commits the same offence agidn he shall be
punished with 24 lashes ; and ou a further offeuoe of lilce character by
the same soldier, he shall be court-martialled and severely punished.
" Abt. 2. A Botdior who t^os been found short of even one cartridge
out of the ammunition assigned to him, shall be punished with 12 lashes,
provided that he has not previously been in any engagement.
" AsT. 3. A soldier who has been found with no cartridges by reason
of throwing them away during an engagement, shall be court-martialled,
and severely punished.
" I moat earnestly recommend you to carefuUy look after your soldiers
and see that every one is complying with the for^^oing order.
"This order should be transmitted from one town to another men-
tioned in the mancm, and the last one should return it to this ofBoe
270
:dbvGoogIe
THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 271
On November 16, 1900, General Lacuna ordered that
any officer allowing his soldiers to load their rifles when
not before the enemy should be liable to capital punish-
ment,' which in practice was frequently inflicted on soldiers
for very minor offences.
Men of means were drafted into the ranks and thai
excused from service on the payment of cash.
The soldiery, quartered on the towns, committed end-
less abuses. Conditions were bad enough before the
outbreak of hostilities, as I have shown in the chapters
dealing with Insurgent rule. They grew rapidly worse
th^^after, and himian life became ^eap indeed.
" The documents of this period show that the insui^ent
troofffi driven from the front of Manila fell upon the people
of the neighbouring towns and burnt, robbed, and murdered.
Either their officers lost all control over them, or else they
directed these outrages. It was not for some days that con-
trol was r^ained." *
with the infommtion that the same has bean reoeived and oomplied
with by ^
" May God fuard you many years.
"£. Aquinaldo, Dictator.
"Cavitb, Jnne 17th, 1808." —P. I. R., 1124. 2.
' "November 16, 1900.
(Stamp) "I/ACUNA Brioadk. HsiAixjrAETEBa.
" Majob Thouas Taounton : Advise all offioers of this brigade that
be who allows his soldiers to toad their riSes without being before the
enemy, shall be liable to oapital punishment. If the soldiers intention-
ally or otherwise Are their pieces, whether in the air or at any deter-
mined or undetermined person, said soldiers and the ofScera to whose
command they belong shall aJso be liable to the same punishment aa
above, without further proooedinKs, for the reason that we are almost
in front of the enemy, aad all the more if the shots take effect upon any
of the soldiers or chiefs.
" Sergeants and corporals shall also take heed of the present warnings,
as they will also be given the same punishment if they by abandoning
their squads allow them to oommit certain outra^res.
" You will report receipt of and compliance with this order.
" Ood preeerve you many years.
" General Headquarters, November 16, 1900.
(Signed) " Lacttna, General, Political-Military Governor and Chief
of Operations." — P. I. R., 643. 1.
' Taylor, AJ. 86.
:dbvGoogIe
272 THE PHIUFFINEa PAST AND PRESENT
Endless orders vreee issued by Aguinaldo and other
high Insurgent ofiScers, prohibiting rape, brigandage and
robbery, and there was grave need of them. Unfortunately
they could not be enforced. Indeed it was often impos-
sible to distinguish between Insurgent soldiers, who
removed their uniforms or had none, and brigands pure
and simple.^
Many men were soldiers at one time and brigands at
another. Unquestionably soldiers and brigands some-
times cooperated. Garrisons were withdrawn from towns
which did not promptly and fully comply with the demands
of Insurgent commanders,* and armed bandits appeared
and plundered them.
>"Kabat'am, Oct. 14th, 1809.
" EDICT
"Martin F. Csloado, Oenxbal anc Poutico-Militakt Oot-
ERNOB OF THB PkOVINCK Of IlOILO.
" Ab a oonaequeuoe of the frequent assaults and robberiea oommitted
by perHons wearing military unfforms, and with the determination to
eorreet, with a firm hand, such Boandaloua conduct, which, beddes
oauaing such deeds to be laid at the door of the military, also makes it
easier for evil-doers to commit their misdeeds, I have, at the su^estion
of the Councillor of Police, ordered the following : —
" 1. Prom this date forward all private citizens are abaolutely pro~
hibited trnm wearing miUtary uniforms.
" 2. AU authorities, both civil and military, under this Qovemment,
are obliged to see to the strict enforcements of this edict.
" 3. All persons who, not being in the military s^^oe, are, after
the publication of this edict, found wearing military uniforms, and who
cannot show that they are in the milittuy sra^oe, will be suspected aa
evil-doere and will be sent to this Government to be subjected to the
oorreeponding ooireotive me«suree.
(Signed) " Masti'n Delqado,
" GoVBBNOB^BNBRAIj-P&EBinENT."
— P.I. B.. 881.4.
* "On April 10, 1890, General Ddgado wrote that, benignity having
fMled, r^rous methods would be used to enforce ooUeotiona and that if
the people did not pay —
" ' I shaU, with great pain, see myself under the necessity of with--
drawing all my forces to the mountains and leaving them [the pueblos)
to the fate which God will decide upon,' which of course meant that he
:dbvGoogIe
bvGoogle
:dbvGoogIe
THE CONDUCT OP THE WAR 273
There were some Insurgent leaders, like Cailles, who
suppressed brigandage with a heavy hand,^ but many of
them were indifTerent, even if not in alliance with the
evil doers.
The VisATAa
Feeling between TagAlog soldiers and Visayan people
grew constantly more bitter, and before many months
had passed they fell to killing each other. The highest
oflScers of the "Regional Revolutionary Government
of the Visayas" protested vigorously to Aguinaldo,*
would leave them to the meroy of the bandits who stood ready to
deeoend upon them." — F. I. R., B., 4.
" This threat was not an idle one." — Taylor, 67 H8. E-L.
>"Santa Cbtte, Laquna, July, 1899.
" Hon. Sr. Euilio Aodimaldo. . . .
" There was a notorious bandit here who was the terror of the provinoa
with his gBog i I had him arreet«d and shot and the robberies ceased.
Murders were being committed ; I had the murderers caught, shot one
of them, and there were no more murders ; officers of the reserve would
consider themselves Idags in their towns, they would shoot the local
prerldenUt and commit other unlawful acts ; I disarmed them, and tried
the most celebrated one, called Arcadio Castillo, alias Banouoane, who
attempted to escape and was killed. With the death of these persona
order has been completely reestablished in this province. Several
had rifles that were used oidy for robbery and after two or three trials
all turned over their rifles, and the arming of the battalion was com-
pleted.
(Signed} "Jcan Caillks."
— P. 1. R., 7&8.
* "Reoional Bbtolutionabt OoTBBioraifT or thk Vibatab.
"OracB or THB Presidbnt.
"Kabat6ak, March 16, 1899.
" To TBE HoMocBABui Pbbhidbmt of thb Phujpfinb Rkphblic,
" Sbnor Emiuo Aocinaldo r Faut,
"Most Distinocishbd Prbbident:
• • * • • • *
" In order to avoid the distiress which the knovdedge of the abnsee
whioh are already unbearable, daily oommitted by the troops of Se&w
IMocno, will cause you, this government has hesitated to oommunioate
them to you, but, as there is almost a reign of terror here, it feels that
it must inform you of them in order to remedy them. The death of
private individuals and assaults oommitted in the towns are daily
VOL. I — T
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
274 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
but irithout result. The situation was entirely beyond
his control.
On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order
which tells a edgnificant story of conditions, and of his
own weakness in dealing with them.*
reported aa having beeo oonmiitted by the troops of Qenenl Dioono.
Of the numerous oompuiieB of Sefior Dioono, only two under the orders
of Oeneral Ar&neta %lLt against the enemy, the remainder are the
terror of the town and it ia & week einoe Br. Dioono went to Capis with-
out telling any one what he was going to do.
" In view of the facts pointed out, the soldiers of this General oonsti-
tnting a constant danger to the town, this government asks you to order
Qeneral Dioono to turn over his rifles to us to kill Americana with and
to enable the towns to reoover their former tranquillity ; this govern-
ment asks this of you, relying upon the well-known justice with which
you act and it wishes for you many years of life for our liberty and our
independence. '
" Kabatuan, March 16, 1899.
(Signed) " Jovrro Ttjsat,
" Temporary PtttideTU.
(Signed) "FRAXcieco Sobiano,
" General Secretary."
—P. I. R., 52. 5.
' "Martin Delgado y Bermejo, lieutenant general and general in
chief of the repabboui army of the Visayan Islands.
"Gemkbal Hsadocartibb of Banta Barbara,
"April 20, 1899.
" The existence of astate of war, and the trying circnmatanoes through
which the country is now passing have brought about a complete
change in the order of neariy all the pueblos ; and I have noticed with
profound regret that sacking, robbery, Bequeetrationa, and other
crimes highly dishonourable to our noble eause, are of daily ooourrenoe.
With a view to preventing euoh conduct in the future, and in order to
guarantee to the inhabitants of the milituy district under my command
the moat complete tranquillity, I hereby decree :
"1. That any person or peraoiiH who eorcunit acts of brigandage,
sequestration, incendiarism, rape, or other disturbanoee of & publio
nature calculated to excite the public, or which infringe individual or
property righta, shall be sever^y punished in accordance with military
"2. That all offenders who present themselves to the Local or Mili-
tary Authorities within the 30 days immediatdy following this date,
and who turn over their arms and join our forces and help to fight other
outlaws and to defend the nation, will be pardoned for ttie crimes they
have committed.
"3. That when the period of 30 daTS abov« mentioned has paaoed,
:dbvGoogIe
THE CONDUCT OF THB WAB 275
In Luz6n General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiwa
and citizens of his province of committing "robberies,
assaults, kidnappings and raimes which are committed
only by barbarous and sav^e tribes." ^
That very serious conditions promptly became general
is conclusively shown by the record of Aguinaldo'a govern-
ment for February 24, 1899, when it decided —
"that the preddent of the council shall study such measures
as will put an end to the continual discord and friction between
the civil and military authorities of every province, in order
that fatal consequences may be avoided."
any person taken in the ftot of oommittlne robbery, or who attempts
to rob with an (^Kanized band of outlaws, or who steals, rapes, or per-
forms acta of inoendiarism, or any other criminal aot, will be summarily
condemned to death by a military tribunal.
" The Local Juntas of the various towns in oonjunction with citiseiifl
of standing and the military authorities will organize a vigilance service
to maintain public order and the authoritj' of tlie law.
" M. Dbloado."
—P. I. R.. Books B 4.
'"February 13, 189B.
(Id the margin : A stamp whioh says :) "Philippine Republic —
Headquarters of operations of the provinces of Southern Luztfn.
"It is with great regret that I have learned that robberies, assaults,
kidnapping, and other crimes whioh are oommitt«d only by barbarous
and savage tribes, are taking place in our towns, without taking into
ooDsideTBtion that the purpose of the insurrection which has given origin
to our social r^eneration is true justice, for the reSstablishment of
whioh aHe lives and property are being sacrificed of all who are proud
of being called Filipinos. These acts are being committed without
restriction by oiviHaiis as well aa soldiers perhaps with the cooperation
of their respective chiefs, to the shame of the authority vested in them
and to the prejudice of the society to which they unworthily belong,
and even to the integrity itself of the Republic. And in order that
these barbarous and savage acts may disappear and that rigorous and
exemplary punishment be meted out, I have deemed it proper to
forward to you for general information the proclamation of these
Headquarters of February 12th last, whioh is as follows :
(ffigned) '_
"ToTHXPouTico-MiuTABTCmEForlKrAirrA." — P. I. R.,89&-0.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
276 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos
themselves, it was to be expected that the laws of civil-
ized warfare would be violated and that American sol-
diers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with
barbarity. Fla^ of truce were deliberately violated.'
American soldiers were trapped, poisoned * and murdered
in other ways.*
It was promptly chai^d in the United States that
American soldiers were committing barbarities, and Blount
has revived these old tales.
I know personally that during the early days of the
war Insurgent prisoners and wounded were treated with
the greatest humanity and kindness.
A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the
circulation of the most shocking statements concerning
the abuses conmiitted by American soldiers. I have
■ "There does not seem to hftve been the faintest oonoeption that
there was any reason for not using the white flag to deceive people who
were foolish enough to believe that Aguioaldo was going to adhere
to the rules presoribed for its use. The writer in the early spring of
1899 onoe watched an insutgent party advance under a white flag
upon an American line of trenches. When an ofQoer and a bugler
went forward to receive them they threw down the flag and imme-
diately opened fire with the rifles which they were then seen to be
dragging behind them." — Taylor, 48 HS.
■ "Such ammunition was not effective imless flred from very close
quarters, but even its possession made the guerrillas stronger than the
people of the country and undoubtedly had much to do with securing
their eodperation, not only as bolomen but also in the digging of the
pits which were placed in the trails and also set about the towns.
These were required to be oonstructed by the local authorities. In the
bottom was set a sharp spike of bamboo, sometimes poisoned ; and the
pit was cov^«d with leaves and soil upon a fragile fnmework ; so that
if a man stood upon it he would fall through upon the spike. Bows
were set in the jungle with a string set across the trail so that any one
stunibling over it would discharge a sharp bamboo shaft with a poisoned
head. On September IS, 1000, Lukbiui congratulated the people of
the town of Katubig upon the effloient use they had made of arrows
with the hea4i8 dipped in 'dita,' a native poison. (P. I. B., 502. 8.)"
— Taylob, 83 HS.
* See also the chapter entitled "Murder aa a Ooreromeiital Insti-
tutioa."
:dbvGoogIe
THE CONDUCT OP THE WAB 277
elsewhere described' the fate that overtook Colonel
Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the
humane treatment by the Americans of prisoners and
wounded.
Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their
lives, but newspaper articles, military orders, and
proclamations issued by civil officers informed the
people that the American soldiers stole, burned,
robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was had
on their alleged wholesale violations of women, partly
to turn the powerful influence of the women as a
whole against them, and partly to show that they were
no better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently
committed rape.'
1 See p. 313.
* The following nevBpftper BUpplement printed in Tagdlog for the
benefit of the common people, ia tn>ioal of this claas of literature, with
which the country was kept flooded :
(Ciroular printed in Tagtiog. P. I. B., 17-6. Supplement to
Heraido FUi^no.
"Friday, 24tb February, 1899.
"Countstubm:
" We must consider ourselves fortunate that the bad intentions of
North America were found out early. If we had not foimd them out
by this time we should have been entrapped. And we should thank
Qod that they oommenoed the war.
" You ought to know by this time that these people can teaoh us
nothing good. What we can leam from them ia all evil. You must
admit the truth of what they are reported to do to our brothers in
Manila where they rob the houses when the dwellers in them ore out or
busy. Their evil inclinations prevail over them to such an extent that
the houses most worthy of oondderation are not safe. They are worse
than the wild people who live in the woods, they have not the slightest
idea of looking at things from the point of view of a man of honour nor
have they the slightest respect for reason, for this does uot control their
actions in the least. Witjiout the slightest attention to oivihty th^
rush into houses and if they find the people eating, without saying
a word, they take what they want from the table, put it into thdr
mouths and go as they came.
" If they find people sleeping or resting, taking the deflta, it makes
no difference to them ; they go into the most private parts of the house
as though they were walking in the Btroet.
" In the shops they take what pleases them and if the owner wants
paym«it they threaten him with their rifles.
:dbvGoogIe
278 THE PHIUPHNE8 PAST AND PEESENT
These horrible tales were at first believed even by some
of the responsible Insurant ofiScers in remote regions,'
but all such men soon learned the truth, which was known
to most of them from the start.
In ofiScial correspondence between them, not intended
for the public, orders were given to \ise women as bearers
of despatches for the reason that Americans did not
search them.' More significant yet, when conditions
"One can httrdlj believe and my pen refuses to write all (rf the
pervOTdty, and evil and bad habits of these people.
" Their habita ajid manuera are a diBgrooe to the oountry where they
were boro. In no history have such austoms and manners been de-
Boribed even in that of the most ignorant people.
" They search women who pass, feeling iJl over their bodies, tak-
ing from them money and whatever else they carry and if they oome
on them in a lonely place they atrip them naked after violating them
and do not leave a rag on them.
" Are these those honeet men of whom we have heard 7 Are these
the people who were going to teaoh us good habits ? Are these the
people who were going to guide us ? The race which does these things
is the most hated one In the world, it is the race which commits most
cruelties, it is the raoe which does not treat its mothor with respect ;
fn this raoe there is not the slightest idea of personal dignity, it is a
race which does not know what honour is, which does not possess the
slightest vestige of regard tor good raamtere. Are these the people
who are going to protect us 7 It is better for us to die at once ttum fall
into the power of these unequalled malefactors.
" i Down with the bad men 1
" I Kill the Americans 1 1
" 1 Let the people of the United States be exterminated 1 1 1
" i Notice. — This sheet is distributed gratis."
' "A l^ht upon the treatment of women by these people is given
by the fact that after an Americsji detachment had captured Lukban's
papers and family on August 18, and oame so close to taking him that
he was able to recognize their guide, one of his correspondents wrote
to him that to their surprise the women, who had fully exiwcted to be
abused, had been treated with respect and given a house to live in.
(P. I. R., 1143. 4.)" — Tatloh. 84 H8.
* In a letter to 0«neral Ambrosio Moxica from dated
March 2. 1900, occurs the foUowing r —
"The guerillas quartered in the neighbourhood must render mutual
assistance and keep up communication, so as to get the news as to where
the enemy comes or goes, and the time at which they will pass certain
points, endeavouring also to arrange that all the guerilla bands should
have regular oouriere, with you or with general headquarters, giving
advice daily of any ocouirenoe aod oarryiiig ooirespondenoe. Tbey
:dbvGoogIe
TH£ CONDUCT OF THE WAR 270
became bad in the provinces, Insm^ent officers sent their
women and children to seek American protection in
Manila or elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them
came in at Angeles, shortly after General Jacob H.
Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himself followed this
procedure, as is shown by the followii^ extracts from
Villa's famous diary : ' —
" December 22. — It was 7 a.m. when we arrived in Amb&y-
uan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful
journey they had sufTered. They were seated on the ground.
In their facea were observed indications of the ravages of
hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would
prefer sufferii^ in these mountains to being under the domin-
ion of the Americana, and that such sacrifices are the duties
of every patriot who loves hia country.
" We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them
immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites
were satisfied.
"The honorable president had already decided some days
before to send all the women to Manila, including his family,
and this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with
him.
• •••••«
" December 24. — We find ourselvea still in Talubin. About
8 o'clock this morning a report came saying the Americans
had arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest
town to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road.
An immediate decision was made. The honourable president
told his family and the other women that they should remain
in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the
Americans, and he named Sefiors Sytiar and Faez to remain
also, with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila.
As soon as the arrangement was effected, the honourable presi-
dent prepared himself for the march. The parting was a
very sad one for himself and for his family.
must select trustworthy women to carry oorrespondenoe, ohuging
them to hide the letters miderneath their skirts, bearing in mind that
the Americnns do not search them ; and in sending to the to'wna t<x
srmB or food, the orders must be sent by women and for small quantities,
BO as not to attract attention." — P. I. R., 2035. 3.
' Simeon Villa, who accompanied Aguinnldo on hia long flight, kept
a somewhat detailed aooount of events in the form of a diary.
:dbvGoogIe
280 THE PHILIPPINES FAST AND PRESENT
" The hoBourable presideot left Talubin at 11 o'clock in the
morning, his family and the other women remuning behind
with two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila."'
In this, as in all other siinilaT cases, the women were
kindly treated and safely conducted to their destination.
Aguinaldo and his fellows knew the happy fate of the mem-
bers of his own family, as is shown by a later entry ; —
" February 6. — We have been informed that the mother
and Bon of tiie honourable president are at Manila, living in
the house of Don Benito L^arda, and that they reached that
capital long before the wife and sister of the honourable presi-
dent. We have also learned that Srflor Buencamino, and
Tirona, and Concepcion are prieonerB of the American author-
ities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of the
honourable president and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that
they went to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila." *
The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino,
had allowed themselves to be captured at an earlier date.
What shall we say of a leader who would turn his mother,
wife, sister and son over to American soldiers for safe-
keeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as
murderers, and violaters of women ? Aguinaldo did just
this. That the Insurgent leaders were early and fully
aware of the t^tment accorded their wounded is shown
by the following extract from a letter to General Moxica
of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to
what should be done with woimded men : —
" If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or else-
where, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and ammu-
nition at once and carry them away as far as possible, so that
they may not be captured by the enemy ; and if the wounded
cannot be immediately removed elsewhere or retreat from the
place, let them be left there, because it is better to save the
arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos to fill up the
ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to secure for battle ;
and besides the Americans, coming upon any wounded, take
good care of them, while the rifles are destroyed ; therefore,
>P. I. R., 869. *Ibid.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
!i
li
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
:dbvGoogIe
THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 281
I repeat, they must aideavour to save the anns rather than the
men." '
There were some rare individual instancea in which un-
injured Filipinos were treated with severity, and even with
cruelty, by American soldiers. They occurred for the
most part late in the war when the "water cure" in
mild form was sometimes employed in order to compel
persons who had ^Ity knowledge of the whereabouts
of firearms to tell what they knew, to the end that the
perpetration of horrible barbarities on the common people,
and the assassination of those who had sought American
protection, might the more promptly cease. Usually
the sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had
only to tell the truth to escape pimishment. The men
who performed these cruel acts knew what treatment
was being commonly accorded to Filipinos, and in some
instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts
to explain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts
cannot be excused, but those referred to seldom resulted
in any permanent injury to the men who suffered them,
and were the rare and inevitable exceptions to the general
rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americans were
concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprec-
edented tmder similar conditions. The Insurgents vio-
lated every rule of civilized warfare, yet oathbreakera,
spies and men fighting in citizens' clothes not only were
not shot by the Americans, as they might very properly
have been, but were often turned loose with a mere warn-
ing not to offend ^ain.
The false news circulated to aid the iMurgent cause
was by no means limited to such matters. Every time
their troops made a stand they were promptly defeated
and driven back, but their faltering courage was bolstered
up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary,
victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that many
' P. I. R., 2035. 3.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
282 TH£ PmUPFINES PAST AND PREBEtTT
times more Americans had fallen in some insignificant
skirmish than were actu^y killed in the whole war,
while generals perished by the dozen and colonels by the
thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fighting
north of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand.
In reality only fifty-six Americans were killed in all
northern Luz6n during the entire month.
On April 26, 1899, the governor of Hoilo published the
following remarkable news items among others : —
" Pa VIA, April 6th, 1899.
"The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local
Presidents of the towns shown on the margin :
" Towns: Santa Barbara, Pavla, Leganes, Z&rraga, Duman-
gas, Batac Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate.
• ••••**
"Santa Ana taken by Americans bmnii^ town our troope
advancing to Roeario and Elscolta Americans request parley
account death General and officers and many soldiers.
"At 3 P.U. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American
prisoners who are to be taken to Malolos.
"At 9.45 P.U. Commissioner Lf^una details 6000 more
Americans dead and 600 prisoners.
" Otia requests parley, and our representatives being present,
he tells them to request peace and conditions, to which they
replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the parley
accomplished nothing.
" To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought.
"Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. To-
morrow 7.15 Pasig in our power. Americans little by litUe
leaving for Manila.
" General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas.
" According to reports by telegraph hostilities have com-
menced and all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also
Pasay and Maytubig.
" American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many pris-
oners taken.
" General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas : Battle
stopped by truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who
provoked war.
:dbvGoogIe
THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 283
" Foreignos favor parley one Americau general and chiefs
and officers dead." '
Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and
Eecolta are the main business streets of the city.
Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that
colonels were as numerous in our army as in theirs, for
they reported two thousand of them Idlled on February
6, 1899, and threw in one general for good measure.'
We learn from the Filipino Herald for February 23,
1899, that on that day the Filipino army captured and
occupied the suburbs of Manila, while American troops
were besieged in the outskirts of the city, at La Loma,
and in the neighboiuing town of Caloocan.'
" p. I. B.. 886. 13.
■ Exhibit 1233
(Original in Spaniah. Contempanvy aapj. P. I. B., Books B. 4.)
"OamiHAL HBASQTTAHTBBfl, Santa Babbaba, Feb. 28th, 1899."
(Litsnl copy of telegram.)
" Casualtiea, Amerioaiu, on 6tli, 2000 ColoaeU dead, one Qeneral;
all ohurchea converted Into faospitalB full Amerio&n wounded ; total
Amerioan oasu<ies 7000 conSjined by Qeneral Fulldn just arrived
from Malolos ; says also Iloflo quiet and not taken.
"A true copy
"By order of Chief of Staff. "Joan Bslobo."
' (Supplement to the Fili-pino Herald.)
" Thursday, Feb. 23rd, 1899. — 4 p.u.
" The Filipino Army oooupiea the suburbs of Manila.
"The three oolumns oommanded by Generals PIo del Pilar and
IJoerio and Col. Hison now occupy the suburbs of Sampaloc, San
Miguel, San Sebasti&n, Binondo, San Nicholas and Tondo.
" The Cavite battalion has possession of the Cuartel de Meido and
our flac is now flying there.
"SIX THOUSAND AMERICANS BESIEGED I II
" The American troops now in Caloooan and La Loma to the num-
ber of over six thousand are besieged by the oolunms oommanded by
Genenls Luna, Ijlanera and Qarcfa.
:dbvGoogIe
284 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
But why continue. No tale concerning American
losses in the Philippines was too fantastic to be told by
the leaders and believed by the soldiery and the populace.
The American soldiers were even said to be reusing to
fight, and great prisons were being constructed in order
properly to punish them.
General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured
before March 2, 1900, according to a letter sent to General
Moxica of Lejfte on that date.*
And what of conditions in the United States during
this troubled period ? We learn from the Insm^ent records
that prior to January X5, 1900, "the Union Army" had
met with a new disaster, as a result of which President
McKioley tendered his res^nation, being succeeded by
Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be pro-
claimed on February 4, 1899. On January 20, "General
Otis's successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party,"
arrived at Manila with papers and instructions relative
to proclaiming the Philippine Republic* Things now
"THE HONOURABLE PRESIDENT
"This veiy moment the speoial train oairying the Honourable
Presideat has left for C&Ioocan.
" Viva the iDdepeadent Philippiaea 1 1 1
" Viva the unconquerable Philippine Army 1 1 1
"Notioe. This sheet ia distributed BTatiB." — P. I. R., 70-6.
> " CNewa.) The Amerioan General, MaeArthur, with hii entire
etafl, was taken prisoner by our troops in Northern LuaSn. Another
American Koneral died on the 5th of January last in the North, who was
seriously wounded in an ambush or flght. When shot he was a oolonel,
but on aocount of said fight be was promoted to the rank of a general,
ao that later when he died, he had the benefit of that rank."
— P. I. B., 2035. 3.
> (Telegrams)
"WAsmNOTON, JuLuary 15, 1900, 10 a.k.
" (Received, Cebl!, January 16, 1900, 11 a.u.)
" Cymng to a new disaster of ^e Union Army, MaoKinley has ten-
dered his resignation as President, Mr. Bryan sucoeeding him.
" Peace promulgated in the Philippines. Basis of the protectorate
is bting discussed.
" Philippine independence will be proolumed February the ith.
:dbvGoogIe
THE CONDUCT OF THE WAB 285
went from bad to worse. The trouble between democrats
and republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before
August, 1901, President McKinley had brought about
strained relations between Germany and the United
States by bribing an anarchist to assassinate the German
Emperor.' Before S^tember 15, 1901, he had been
killed by a member of the Democratic party, and the
Filipinos could acclaim their independence.'
The first period of the war, which we may term the
period of organized armed resistance, drew rapidly to its
close, and there followed the second period, characterized
by guerrilla tactics on the part of the Insurgents.
On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice
of General Ro del Filar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever
ceased to rob and murder, and authorized this man,
whcnn he had been again and again asked to remove, to
begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tactics
were duly authorized for, and had been adopted by,
Insui^ent forces everywhere before the end of Novembw.
Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said : —
"If war in certain of its aspects ia a temporary reversion to
barbansm, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to sav-
agery. The man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility
before the people whose fate is in his hands, for senoua as is
the materifj destruction which this method of warfare entails,
the destruction to the orderly habits of mind and thoi^ht
which, at bottom, are civilization, is even more serious. Rob-
bery and brigandage, murder and arson follow in its wake.
"Remark'. — Tlie bama of ft protectorate haa been pablished in
English. "
"Manila, January 20, 1900, 10 a.m.
" (Received at CebU on the same day, at 11 a.m.)
" Otia' BiiooeBBor, John Waterly, of the demooratio party, has just
airived. He brings with liim papers and instructions in regard to
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
" It is believed that Rev. Martin, Bishop of Cebil, will be transferred
to the Arohbishopne of Manila, and Rev. Kozaleila to Spain." —
P. I. R., Books B-10.
> F. 1. B., 1193. 2. * Ibid., 2026.
:dbvGoogIe
286 TEE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Gaerrilla warfare meaiia a policy of destruction, a p<^^ of
terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury
caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war
in which it hae been employed, has it Becured a termination
favorable to the people who have chosen it." '
The case iinder distnissioa furnished do exception to the
general rule.
Such semblance of discipline as had previously listed
among the Insurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Con-
ditions had been very bad under the ' ' Republic ' ' and worse
during the first period of the war. During the second
period they rapidly became unendurable in many r^ons,
and the common people were driven into the arms of
the Americans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously
carried out by Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in
thousands of cases. I have described at some lei^th the
conditions which now arose in the chapter on Murder as
a Governmental Agency, to which the reader is re-
ferred for details.*
In the effort to protect the towns which showed them-
selves friendly, the American forces were divided, sub-
divided and subdivided again. On March 1, 1901, they
were occupying no less than five hundred two stations.
By December of the same year the number had increased
to six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than
sixty men to a post. As a result of the protection thus
afforded and of the humane conduct of our troops, the
people turned to us in constantly increasing munbers.
It remfuned to stamp out the dying embers of insurrec-
tion, while continuing to seek to protect those who put
their trust in us. Further subdivision of the troops in
order to garrison more points was hardly possible, but field
operations were actively pushed. One after another the
Insurgent leaders were captured or volimtarily surrendered.
Most officers of importance issued explanatory statements
to the people shortly after ^ving up active field operations,
1 Taylor, 47 H8. ■ Beginning on pago 730.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE CONDUCT OP THE WAB 287
whether they surrendered Tolimtarily or were taken
prisoners. Aguinaldo himself was captured on March
23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost point on the eaet
coast of Luz6n inhabited by civilized people. No place
in the islands, inhabited by Filipinoa, la more completely
isolated, and he had long been almost entirely cut off from
his followers, many of whom believed him to be dead.
On April 19, 1901, he issued an address to the Filipino
people, in which he clearly recognized the fact that they
wanted peace. He said : —
"Manila., April 19, 1901.
' ' To the Filipino People : —
" I believe that I am not in error in presmning that the un-
h^py fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a
surprise to those who have been famiUar day by day with the
progress oi the war. The lessons thus taught, the full meaning
of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested to
me with irrerastible force that the complete termination of hos-
tilities and a taBting peace are not only desirable but absolutely
essential to the welfare of the Philippines.
' ' The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness,
nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by
their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however,
in which they find theh advance along the path impeded by
an iiresifltible force — a force which, while it restruns them,
yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting
to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully
embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have
already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of
the United States. In this banner they repose their trust in
the belief that under its protection our people will attain all
the promised Ubertiea which they are even now beginning to
enjoy.
" The country has declared unmistakably m favor of peace ;
BO be it. Enoi^ of blood ; enough of tears and desolation.
This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they
are animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people
which has thus clearly manifested its will.
" So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me,
and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world
that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for
peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearning
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
288 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
to see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised
by the generosity of the great American nation.
"By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the
United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now
do without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am
serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be theirs.
" EinLio Aguinaldo.'
" Manila, April 19, 1901."
This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish,
Tagilog and English, undoubtedly hastened the end of
the war, but it did not lead to immediate general sur-
rendo", for as Taylor has very truly said : —
"A force like Aguinaldo's could not be surreidcred. It had
been torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline
had alwaj^ been very lax. It had originally been held together
by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained from
the pillage of Manila. That hope had disappeared, and the
leaders had become the lords of life and property each in his
own province. It was a force which could disintegrate, but
which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces
over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control
when beaten do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing
through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of
highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of stiu^y beggars
who at opportune moments resort to petty larceny." ■
Aguinaldo's forces now passed through these several
stages. Some of his more important subordinates had
previously been captured or had surrendered. Others,
still remfdning in the field, now acted on his advice, more
or lees promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time,
but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the
field only a very limited number of real military leaders,
like General Malvar in Batangas and General Lukban
in Samar, and a very considerable number of bandit
chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forces
of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented
by men who had been Insui^;ent officers or soldiers and
> Taylor, 36 OV, Exhibit 1017. > Taylor, 28 HS.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
bvGoogle
:dbvGoogIe
THE CONDUCT OF THE WAB 289
while soring in this capacity had become so enamotnred
of a lawless life that they were now imwilliDg to settle
down and work for their daily bread, preferring to con-
tinue to live ofi their long-«ufFering feUow-countrymen,
whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than
ever.
The war waa practically over. The insurrection' had
failed. In my opinion no FiHpino who held out to the
end for independence compared in intellectual power with
Mabini, and I deem his views as to why it failed worthy
of special attention. At the time of his death, he left
behind a memoir from which I quote the following : —
"The revolution f^ed because it was poorly led, because
its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by repre-
hensible actions, because in place of supporting the men most
useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he was
jealous of them. Believing that the aggrandizement of the
people was nothing more than bis own personal aggrandize-
ment, he did not judge the merits of men by then- capacity,
character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and
relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have
his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him,
he showed himself complajsant to their faults. Having thus
secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people
having deserted him, he had to fail like a wax idol melted by
the heat of adversity. God forbid that we should forget so
terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable sufferings."'
These are by no means the only reasons why the rev-
olution failed, but they foredoomed it to failure.
The surrender or capture of the more respectable
military element left the unsurrendered firearms in the
hands of men most of whom were ignorant, many of
whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom were irre-
sponsible and unscrupulous.
Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare
against them was threatened, but not actually resorted to.
■ P. I. R.. 1021. 6.
vol- I. — o
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
290 THE PHILIPPINBS PAST AND PBSSGNT
The situation was particularly bad in Batangas.
General J. F. Bell was put in charge there, and he found
a humane and satisfactory solution of the existing difficul-
ties in recoDcentration — not the kind of reconcentration
which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but a measure
of a wholly different sort. This measure and its results
have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows : —
"General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be
to avoid making war against those who really wanted the
termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect them
against the vengeance of others. Over and above all these
considerations in importance, however, was the absolute
necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure food
by levying contributions. Therefore, in order to give those
who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hard-
ship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for them-
selves and their families, it was determined to establish sones
of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable
the small garrisons thereof to ^ve the people living within
these zones efficient protection against ruinous exactions by
insurgents. He accordingly, 'in order to put an end to en-
forced contributions now levied by insuigents upon the inhab-
itants of sparsely settled and outlying barnos and districts
by means of intimidation and assassination,' ordered the
commanding officers of all towns in the provinces of Batangas
and Laguna to 'immediately specify and establish plainly
marked limits surroimding each town bounding a zone within
which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison,
to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection
to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depreda-
tion of armed insurgents. The limits may include the bar-
rios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection
and supervision by the garrison, and should include some
ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it
can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will
be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.
" 'Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once
flven and distributed to all the inhabitants within the juris-
iction of towns over which they exercise supervision, inform-
ing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits,
and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying bar-
rios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, includ-
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE CONDUCT OF THE WAH 291
ing rice, palay,^ chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits
of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their
property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become
liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be per-
mitted to move houses from outlying districts should they
desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for them-
selves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner,
and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege
of doing so. In the discretion of commanding officers the prices
of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest
of those thus seeking protection. As soon as peaceful condi-
tions have been reestablished in the brigade these persons
will be encouraged to return to their homes, and such assist-
ance be rendered them as may be found practicable.'
" It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these
zones ; but they were warned that unless they accepted that
protection their property, which consisted almost entirely
of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or deetruc-
tion, because it might be impossible to determine whether it
belonged to hostile or peaceful people. To put an end to
vengeance by assassination, it was determined to make use of
the right of retaliation conferred by General Order 100 issued
by Pnsident Lincoln in 1863. A circular tel^ram was pub-
lished announcing an intention to retaliate by the execution
of prisoners of war in case any more were assassinated by
insurgoits for political reasons. It was not found necessary
to do this. Assassinations stopped at once.
" As the campaign progressed it became more and more
apparent that a large number of poor people had contributed
through fear, for the power of the insurgents to collect came
to an end after they had lost their power of intimidation.
The efficiency of the protection afforded in auch zones was the
determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of
many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient,
and from time to time many additional families entered the
cones. The sentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and
natives volunteered assistance to Americana at every hand
and in every town. When these volunteers were trustworthy
they were armed and sent out into the mountains from which
they brought back guns, and insurgents, and hundreds of half-
famished men, women, and children who, released from the
intimidating influence of the insurgents, entered the zones
of protection.
' Uohuaked rioe.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
292 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
"The most Berious discomfort experienced by any one mthin
these areas was caused to the mestizo ruling group, whose
members bitterly resented the blow to their prest^e in being
treated like every one else. They had been accustomed to
have others work for them and obey them blindly. To a
man who could speak Spanish and who had always been the
lord of his barrio,^ the possibility of having to cultivate a field
with his own hancte was an unthinkable and scandalous thing.
These men suffered and suffered acutely ; but it was not their
bodies which suffered — it was their pride.
"Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people
had turned against their once highly respected chief, and
toward the end several thousand natives of Batangas joined
the Americans in their determmed hunt for the fugitive leader.
Realization of the fact that the people were ^;wist him mate-
rially aided in forcing his surrender.
' General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some
8000 to 10,000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or
another, in the insurrection. These prisoners were rapidly
released when they had taken the oath of allegiance. By the
first week of July no political prisoners were held in this region.
They had returned to their homes.
" The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones
and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance
of guerrilla bands was not new. There had been precedents
even in the United States. One of these is the order issued on
August 25, 1863, by Brigadier-General Ewing, commanding
the district of the border, with headquarters at Kansas City,
Mo., in which he ordered the inhabitants of a large part of
three counties of that State to remove from their residences
within fifteen days to the protection of the military stations
which he had established. All grain and hay in that district
, was ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was
not convenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned {Rebel-
' lion Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). Thy
American commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new
method of procedure in dealing with war traitors; they had,
however, effectively employed an old one.
"The insurrection had originated among the Tag&logs and
had spread like a conflagration from the territory occupied
by them. The fire had been quenched everywhere else. Gen-
eral Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tag&log
provinces.
'Village.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE CONDUCT OF THE WAE 2S3
" On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the inaur-
rection agunst the sovereign authority of the United States
in the PhiUppinea having come to an end, and provincial civil
governments having been established throughout the entire
territory of the archipelago not mhabited by Moro tribes, the
office of military governor in the archipelago was terminated.
On July 4, 1902, the President of the United States issued a
proclamation of amnesty proclajming, with certain reserva-
tions, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons
in the Philippine Arahipe^o who had participated in the
insurrection."
General Bell's motives and methods in reconcentrating
the inhabitants of this troubled region have been grossly
misrepresented, and he himself has been sadly maligned.
He is the most humane of men, and the plan which he
adopted resulted in the reestablishment of law and order
at a minimum cost of htmian suffering.
Many of the occupants of his reconcentration camps
received there their first lessons in hygienic living. Many
of them were reluctant to leave the camps and return to
their homes when normal conditions again prevailed.
The number of Filipinos killed during the Batangas
campaign was very sniall.' Blount has sought to make
it appear that partly as an indirect consequence of war
there was dreadful mortality there, citing by way of proof
the fact that the Coast and Geodetic Atlas, published
as a part of the report of the first Philippine Commission,
gave the population of Batangas as 312,192, while the
census of 1903 gave it as 257,715.^
The report of the United States Philippine Commission
for 1903 ^ves the population of Manila as 221,000, while
in 1900 it had been 260,000. Does this mean that there
had been a holocaust in Manila ? Not at all. It means
' 153, ftooording to Blount liimBelf .
* "Nor oan the ultimate responsibility b^ore the bar of history for
the avful fact that, acoordisg to the United States Coast and Oeodetio
Survey Atlas of the PhilippineB of 1899, the population of Batangas
province was 312,192, and aooording to the American Census of the
Philippines of 1903, it was 257,715, rest entirely on military shouldera,"
— Blodnt, pp. 383-384-
:dbvGoogIe
204 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
only that the thoiisands of FUipinos who had sought the
protection of the American forces there during the period
when they feared their own soldiers in the provinces had
mostly returned to their homes. During the distmiied
period in Batangas great numbers of people took refuge
in other and more peaceful regions. Some of them
returned later ; others did not.
Blount further quotes a statement in the 1901 report
of the I^vincial Secretary of Batangas to the eSect that ;
"The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by dis-
ease, such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over
200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former
years the province had."'
Apart from the fact that these figures, showii^ a
mortality of a hundred thousand from disease alone, are
hardly consistent with those quoted by Blount as showing
a decrease in population during a longer period of only
fifty-four thousand four hundred and forty-seven, it is not
apparent why Americans should be charged with deaths
due to malaria or dysentery, since no systematic effort
to rid Batangas of these ills had ever previously been
made, and the very thing which then prevented the
adoption of the measures subsequently so successfully put
forth to this end was the disorderly conduct of the people
themselves. As a simple matter of fact, however, there
was no such dreadful mortahty from these diseases at
this time. Malaria has never been especially bad in
this province, and even cholera, which swept it d^^^ing
the period in question and is far more readily commu-
nicated than is dysentery, caused only twenty-three
hundred and ninety-nine known deaths.
In the end peace was established and prosperity fol-
lowed in its wake.
This result was brought about in part by the efficient
activity of the armed forces of the United States and in
part by the efforts of the first and second Philippine
Commissions.^
< Blount, p. 597. > 3ee Chaptwa XT and XII.
CHAPTER X
Mb. Bbtak and Independence
In order to bring home to some of my Democratic and
Anti-Imperialist friends the unreliable character of the
testimony of even the very high officers of the so-called
Philippine Republic, I here quote certain extracts from
the Insurgent records, showing the important part played,
doubtl^ unwittingly, by Mr. William Jennings Bryan in
Philippine politics during the war. ' The first of these might
properly have been considered in the chapter entitled
"Was Independence Promised?" Others are instruc-
tive in that they show the use made of false news in bol-
stering up the Insurgent cause, and mi^t with propriety
have been included in the chapter on '* The Conduct of the
War." I have thought it best to keep them by themselves.
Further comment on them would seem to be superfluous.
"On May 1,1900 (P. I. R., 616. 6), I. de los Santos wrote a
long letter in Tag£Ll<% and cipher to Aguinaldo, in which he
reported upon the progress of what he would have probably
called the diplomatic campaign. If this letter is to be believed,
the agents in the United States of the junta had been able
to form relations which might be of great value to them. Santos
said in part : —
" ' CommiBaioneni . . . SetLorea Kant (G. Apacible) and
Raff {Sixto L6pez) duly carried out your last inatructions given
at T&rlac. Sefior Del Pan, sailing by way of Japan, about the
middle of October, and Sefior Caney (G. Apacible), Bailing by
way of Europe about the 1st of November, met in Toronto
about the middle of February foUowii^. But before the
arrival of Kant, Raff had already come from Hayti (United
States) and was able to pry in upon our political friends and
enemies. When they met each other they continued the voy-
age inct^nito, as Raff had done previously, makii^ themselves
ad5
bvGoogli
le
296 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
known to a very few people ; but later on, and accordii^ to
the instructions carried by Caney, they made themselves
known to a greater number of people, and have succeeded in
interviewing Bryan who happened to be in New York. SeQor
Raff said that Bryan feared being present at a conference, lest
he might be called a traitor by members of his own party, and
also by those of the opposite or "imperialist" party, who are
quite proud over the victories they have gained against our
people over there. Nevertheless, Raff was able to be present
and talk at some of the anti-imperialist meetings, our poHtical
friends introducii^ him as a friend from the committee (at Hong-
koi^) and as an advocate of the cessation of the war over there
in order that our sacred rights may be giveu consideration by
them. And as Bryan could not personally take part in the
conference, he sent a most trusted peison, his right-hand man,
Dr. Gardner. The results of the conference between Sefior
Raff and Dr. Gardner, the latter acting in the name of Mr.
Bryan, are as follows : —
'" Ist. That we may fight on, and Bryan will never cease
to defend our sacred rights. 2nd. That we must never
mention Bryan's name in our manifestos and proclamations,
lest the opposite party might say he is a traitor. 3rd. That
we are in the right ; and hence he promised in the name of
Bryan that if this Sefior Bryan is victorious in the prestdeutial
campaign, he will recognize our independence without delay.
Your honored self can easily conclude from all the forgoing
that Sefior Del Pan, after the receipt of these promises, concurred
with liim; and he returned to inform Sefior Apacible about
the results of the conference. So these two studied over the
plan of the pohcy to be adopted and carried out. I write you
what their opinions are, viz. : 1st, that they will reside there,
pending the outcome of the presidential contest, aidii^ the
propaganda and enlivening it until November, the date set
for the desired thing. Owing to what Dr. Gardner said aud
promised in the name of Bryan, some one ought to stay there
in order that Bryan may be approached, if he is elected, so he
can sign the recognition of our independence ; and this should
be done at once, lest in his excitement over the victory he
should foi^et his promise. 3rd. For carrying out the two
propo»tJonfi just mentioned, they request 2000 pounds sterl-
ing, that te $20,000 in silver, to be used for the propaganda, for
paying newspapers and for bribing senators — this last clause
is somewhat dai^erous and impossible. And 4th, that the
money must be sent immediately, and that you should be
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
MB. BRTAN AND INDEPBNDENCE 287
informed not to mention the name of Bryan in the manifeBtos
and proclamationa.
'"In order to answer quickly and decisively that proposi-
tion, and as I did not have the desired money here, I answered
ae follows : " Plan approved ; for the sake of economy we have
decided that one of the two retire, but before doing bo make
arrangements, establish communications with leaders of
Bryan's party, and he who remains should thus cultivate the
relations ; be who is to retire will locate himself in Paris near
SeSor Katipalad (Agoncillo) with whom he will secretly t^uss
political problems that may arise. So he will watch for the
opportune moment of Bryan's election, in order to go imme-
diately to Hayti and formally arrange the contract with
Bryan." ^
'"By the end of 1899, by the time guerrilla warfare was well
under way, by the time that any FiUpino government, unless
an expression of the unfettered will of the nearest bandit who
can muster a dozen rifies may be called a government, bad
ceased to exist, a stroi^ opposition to the policy of the admin-
istration had arisen in the United States and a demEind for the
recognition of the independence of the Philippines. The
junta in Hongkong were assured that the Democratic party
would come into power in the next elections and that this would
mean the success of the patriotic efforte of Agutnaldo and his
followers. The news was good and was forthwith spread abroad
in "Ebrtracts from our correspondence with America," "News
from our foreign agents," "News from America," and "Trans-
lations from the foreign press " — circulars and handbills printed
on thin paper which were smuggled into the Philippines and
passed into the hands of the guerrilla leaders who could read
Spanish. They gathered their followers about them and told
them that a powerful party had arisen in America which was
going to give them all they had ever asked for. They had only
to fight on, for success was certain. In America the "Anti-
Imperialists" were hanging the "Imperialists," and they should
continue to harry the American adherents among the natives
of the Philippines.
" ' There are a number of these publications among the papers
captured from the insurgents, and the adoption of this method
of propaganda seems to have been nearly coincidrait with
Aguinaldo's orders declaring guerrilla warfare. It does not
' Taylor, 13 KK, E.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
298 THE PHILtPI^NES PAST AND FKE8ENT
geem likdy that the matter contained in them was supplied by
a FiUpino, for if it was he assumed a general acquuntance
among the people with American poUtics and Americao methods
which they were far from possessing.
'"In theee publications the f^pinos were assured that
the Imperialists were kept in power only by the lavuh cao.-
tributions of the " truts," whatever they may have beeai ; but
the people of the United States were growing weary of their
domination and were about to return to the true principles of
Washington and Jefferson. The illustrious Americana "Croevy
Sticcney, and Vartridge" were all laboring for the cause of
Philippine independence. Long lists of American cities were
given in which the illustrious orators Mr. Crosby and Mr.
Schurts had addressed applauding crowds upon the necessity
of throttling the "truts" because they opposed recognition
of the rights of the Fihpinos. In August, 1900, " News from our
agents in America" informed its readers that —
" ' " W. J. Bryan has stated in a speech that his first act upon
being elected President will be to declare the indei>^idence of
the Philippines."
" ' On June 16, 1900, Gen. Riego de Dios, acting head of the
Hongkong junta, wrote to Gen. I. Torres (P. I. R., 530), the
guemlla commander in Bulac^ Province, and assured him that
a httle more endurance, a Uttle more constancy, was all that
was needed to secure the attainment of their ends. According
to their advices the Democratic party would win in the ap-
proaching elections in the United States, and — " it is certain
that Bryan is the incarnation of our independence."
" ' The number of men opposed to the policy of the adminis-
tration was said to be contmually increasing.
" ' The attitude of those who protect us cannot be more
manly and resolute : " Continue the struggle until you conquer
or die." Mr. Beecher of the League in Cincinnati writes us :
"I shall always be the champion of the cause of justice and of
truth," says Mr. Winalow of the Boston League. "Not even
threats of imprisonment will make me cease in my undertak-
ing," Doctor Denziger assures us. "I shall accept every riak
and responsibility," says Doctor Leverson. " If it is necessary,
I shall go so far as to provoke a revolution in my own country,"
repeats Mr. Udell. It is necessary to save the Republic and
democracy from the abyss of imperialism and save the worthy
Filipinos from oppression and determination " is cried by all,
and the sound of this cry is ever rising louder and louder,' " ■■
> Taylor, 15 and 16 KE, E.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
MB. BRYAN AND INDEPENDENCE 299
Extract from a letter of Papa Isio' dated March 4,
1901:—
"I have received from Luafin an order to proceed more
rapidly with my operations this month, as Bryan ordered
Emilfo to keep the war going vigorously until April, sad he
also sud that if indepeadence was not given the Pbiiipptnes by
that time, he, Bryan, and his followers would rise in arms
against the oppressors." *
"Tarlac, Oct. 26, 1899.
" To the Military Governor of This City, and
To the Secretary of the Interior.
"As a meeting shall be held on the morning of Sunday next
in the Presidential Palace of this Republic in return for that
held in the United States by Mr, Bryan, who drank to the name
of our Honourable President as one of the heroes of the worid,
and for the purpose of celebrating it with more pomp and con-
tributing to it the greater splendor with your personnel, I will
be obliged to you if you will please call at this office to confer
with me on the matter.
"God preserve you, etc.
(Signed) " F. Bubncamino." *
In a letter written by A. Flores, acting secretary of
war, to the military governor of Tarlac on October 27,
1899, there occurs the following : —
"In the United States meetings and banquets have been
held in honor of our Honourable President, Don Emilio Agui-
naldo, who was pronounced one of the heroes of the world by
Mr. Bryan, future president of the United States. The Ma-
sonic Society, therefore, interpreting the unanimous desires of
the people, and with the approval of the government, will on
Sunday the 29th instant, organize a meeting or popular assem-
bly in the interest of national independence and in honor of
Mr. Bryan of the anti-imperialist party, the defenders of our
cause in the United States. The meeting will consist of two
functions ; first — at nine a,m. of the 29th the assembly will
convfflie in a suitable place, a national hymn will inaugurate
■ " Pope " Isio TTsa the last of a series of bandit leaders, oltumine; for
thenudves miraoulooB powers, who long infested the mountuiiB of
^'^i. B.. ffro. 7. » P- 1- R-. "3*-»-
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
300 THE PHILIPPINES PA8T AND PRESENT
the ^cercisee, after which appropriate addresees will be de-
livered: and Becond — at four p.m. a popular demonstration
will take place throughout the town, with bands of music
parading the streets; residente will decorate and illuminate
their houses.
"Which I have the pleasure of transmitting to you for your
information and guidance and for that of the troops under your
command." '
> P. 1. E.. 17. 9.
:dbvGoogIe
CHAPTER XI
The First Philipfine Couhission
I HATE elsewhere mentioned the appointmeat of the
First Philippine Commission.
Qn January 18, 1899, its civilian members met at
Washington and received the President's instructions.
We were to aid in "the most humane, pacific and I
effective exteofiion of authority throughout these islands,
and to secure, with the least possible delay, the benefits
of a wise and generous protection of life and property to
the inhabitants."
We were directed to meet at the earliest possible day
in the city of Manila and to annoimce by a pubUc procla-
mation our presence ' and the mission intrusted to US,
carefully setting forth that while the estabhahed military
government would be continued as long as necessity might
require, efforts would be made to alleviate the burden of
taxation, to establish industrial and commercial pros-
perity and to provide for the safety of persons and property
by such means as might be found conducive to those ends.
We were to endeavour, without interfering with the
military authorities, to ascertain what amehoration in
the condition of the inhabitants and what improvements
in public order were practicable, and for this purpose were
to study attentively the existing social and pohtical state
of the several populations, particularly as regarded the
forma of local government, the administration of justice,
the collection of customs and other taxes, the means of
l-ransportation and the need of pubUc improvements, re-
Dorting through the Department of State the results of
Dur observations and reflections, and recommending such
3xecutive action as might, from time to time, seem to us
ffise and useful.
301
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
302 THE pmUPPINES PAST AND PKE8BNT
We were authorized to recommend suitable persons for
appointment to oflBces, made necessary by personal
changes in the existing civil administration, from among
the inhabitants who had previously acknowledged their
allegiance to the American government.
We were to "ever use due respect for all the ideals,
customs and institutions of the tribes which compose the
population, emphasizing upon all occasions the just and
beneficent intentions of Uie United States," and were
commissioned on account of our "knowledge, skill, and
integrity as bearers of the good-will, the protection and
the richest blessings of a Uberating rather than a conquer-
ing nation." ^
Nothing could be more false than Blount's in»nua-
tion that we were sent out to help Otis run the war.*
There was no war when we started, and we were ffltpressly
enjoined from interfering with the military government
or its officers. We were sent to deliver a message of -.
good-will, to investigate, and to recommend, and th^«
our powers ended.
Mr. Schurman and I, with a small clerical force, sailed
from Vancouver, January 31, 1899. On our arrival at
Yokohama we learned with keen regret of the outbreak •
of hostilities at Manila.
Blount has incorrectly stated that President McIQnley
had sent the commission out when the dogs of war were
already let loose.* The dogs of war had not been looseci
' For the full text of these inBtniotionB, see appendix, p. 075.
' ' ' Mr. McKinley sent Mr. Taf t out, in the spring preceding the elec-
tion of 1900, to help General MaoArthur run the war." — Bi^cnt, p. 281.
"The Taft Commission vas sent out, to 'aid' General MaoArthur, as
the Schurman Commission had ' aided' General Otis." — Blount, p. 289.
* "In February, 1899, the doga ot war being already let loose,
Preudent McKinley had resumed his now wholly impossible Benevolent
Assimilation programme, by sending out the Schurman Commission,
which was the prototype of the Taft ComnuBsion, to yeaniingly explain
our intenttona to the insurgents, and to make clear to them how unquali-
fiedly benevolent those intentions were. The scheme was like trying to
put salt on a bird's tail after you have flushed him." — BLonifT, p. 217.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE FIBST PHILIFFINB COMMISSION 303
when we started, and one of Hie main purposes in sending
us was to keep Uiem in their kennels if possible.
Aguinaldo has made the following statements in his
"Resefla Verldica" : —
"... We, the Filipinos, would have recdved said com-
mission, as honourable agents of the great America/with demon-
strations of true kindness and entire adhedoD. The commia-
sioners would have toured over all our provinces, seeing and
observing at close range order and tranquillity, in the whole of
our territory. They would have seen the fields tiUed and
planted. They would have examined our Constitution and
public administration, in perfect peace, and they would have
experienced and enjoyed that ineffable charm of our Oriental
manner, a mixture of abandon and solicitude, of warmth and
of frigidity, of confid^ce and of suspiciousness, which makes
our relations with foreigners change into a thousand colours,
agreeable to the utmost.
" Ah 1 but this landscape suited neither General Otis nor the
Imperialists 1 For their criminal intention it was better that
the American conunisaoners should find war and desolation
in the Philippines, perceiving from the day of their arrival the
fetid stench emitted by the mingled corpses of Americans and
FihpinOB. For their purposes it was better that that gentle-
man, Mr. Schurman, Prudent of the Commission, could not
leave Manila, limiting himself to listen to the few Filipinos,
who, having yielded to the reasonings of gold, were partisans
of the Imperialists. It was better that the commission should
contemplate the PbiUppine problem through confiagrations,
to the whiz of bullets, on the transverse light of all the unchained
passions, in order that it might not form any exact or complete
opinion of the natural and proper limits of said problem. Ah I
it was better, in short, that the commission should leave de-
feated in not having secured peace, and would blame me and
the other Filipinos, when I and the whole FiUpino people
anxiously deared that peace should have been secured before
rather than now, but an honourable and worthy peace for the
United States and for the Fhihpi»ne Republic." >
These statements, made to deceive the public, make
interesting readii^ in the light of our present knowledge as
to the purposes and plans of Aguinaldo and his associates.
" P. I. B., 1300. 2.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
304 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
On our arrival at Yokohama we were promptly informed
by a secretary from the United States Legation that no
less a personage than Marquis Ito had been in frequent
communication with the Filipinos since 1894, that they
had been looking to him for advice fmd support, and
that he had interested himself in the present situation
sufficiently to come to the American minister and offer
to go to the Phihppines, not in any sense as an agent of
the United States, but as a private individual, and to use
his influence in our behalf. His contention was that the
then existing conditions resulted from misunderstandings.
He said that Americans did not understand Asiatics,
but he was an Asiatic himself and did understand the
Filipinos, and thought that he cotild settle the whole
affair. The minister had cabled to Washington for in-
structions. Naturally the offer was not accepted. ■
I was reminded, by this extraordinary incident, of a
previous occurrence. I spent the month of March, 1893,
in Tokio when returning from my second visit to
the Philippines, and was kindly invited to inspect the
zoSlogical work at the Imperial University. When I
visited the institution for that purpose, I was questioned
very closely on the islands, their people and their re-
sources. The gentlemen who interrogated me may have
been connected with the university, but I doubt it.
We reached Hongkong on February 22. Here I had
an interview with Dr. Apacible of the junta, while Mr.
Schurman visited Canton, Apacible told me that the
Filipinos wanted an independent republic under an Ameri-
can protectorate. Prrased for the details of their desires,
he said that "the function of a protector is to pro-
tect." Further than that he could not go. I tried to
convince him of the hopelessness of the course the Fili-
pinos were then pursuing and of the kindly intentions of
my government, but felt that I made no impression
on him.
We arrived at Manila on March 4, 1899, too late to
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE FIBST PHILIPPINE COMMISSION 305
land. Firebugs were abroad. We watched a number
of houses bum, and heard the occasional crackle of ri£e
fire along the line of the defences around the city. The
next morning there was artillery fire for a time at San
Pedro Mac&ti. Everywhere were abundant evidences
that the war was on.
This left little for us to do at the moment except to
inform ourselves as to conditions, especially as Colonel
Denby had not yet arrived, and General Otis was over-
whelmed with work and anxiety.
I renewed my acquaintance with many old Filipino
and Spanish friends and improved the opportunity, not
likely to recur in my experience, to see as much as possible
of the fighting in Uie field.
One day when I was at San Pedro Mac&ti, Captain
Dyer, who commanded a battery of 3.2'inch guns there,
suggested that if I wished to investigate the effect of
shrapnel fire I could do so by visiting a place on a neigh-
boxuing hillside which he indicated. Acting upon his sug-
gestion, I set out, accompanied by my private secretary,
who, like myself, was clad in white duck. The Insurgent
shai^jshooters on the other side of the river devoted some
attention to us, but we knew that so long as they aimed
at us we were quite safe. Few of their bullets came within
hearing distance.
We were hunting about on the hillside for the place indi-
cated by Captain Dyer, when suddenly we heard ourselves
cursed loudly and fluently in extremely plain American,
and there emerged from a neighbouring thicket a very
angry infantry oflBcer. On venturing to inquire the cause
of his most uncomplimentary remarks, I foimd that he was
in command of skirmishers who were going through the
brush to see whether there was anything left there which
needed shooting up. As many of the Insurgent soldiers
dressed in white, and as American civilians were not com-
monly to be met in Insurgent territory, these men had
been just about to fire on us when they discovered their
VOL. I — X
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
306 THE PHILIPPINB8 PAST AND PK&SENT
mistake. We went back to Manila and bou^t some
khaki clothes.
At first my interest in military matters was not t^ipre-
ciated by my army friends, who could not see what
business I had to be wandering around without a gun in
places where guns were in use. I had, howevra-, long
since discovered that reliable first-hand information on
any subject is Likely to be useful sooner or later, and so it
proved in this case.
For several weeks after we reached Manila there vaa
no active military movement ; then came the inaugura-
tion of the short, sharp campaign which ended for the
moment with the taking of Malolos. For long, tedious
weeks oiu- soldiers had sweltered in muddy trenches,
shot at by an always invisible foe whom they were not
allowed to attack. It was anticipated that when the
forward movement b^an, it wotild be active. Close
secrecy was maintained with regard to it. Captain Hed-
worth Lambton, of the British cruiser Powerfvl, then lying
in Manila Bay, exacted a promise from me that I would
tell him if I found out when the advance was to begin, so
that we might go to Caloocan together and watch the
fighting from the church tower, which commanded a mag-
nificent view of the field of operations.
I finally heard a fairly definite statement that our
troops would move the following morning. I rurfied to
General Otis's office and after some parleying had it con-
firmed by him. It was then too late to advise Lambton,
and in fact X could not properly have done so, as the
information had been pven me under pledge of secrecy.
Accompanied by my private secretary, Dr. P. L. Sherman,
I hastened to Caloocan, where we arrived just at dusk,
having had to run the gantlet of numerous inquisitive
sentries en route.
We spent the night in the church, where Gen«^
Wheaton and his staff had their headquarters, and long
before daylight were perched in a convrauent opening in,
D,q,i,i.:dbvG'oogIe
3i
i
bvGoogle
:dbvGoogIe
THE PIBBT PHUJPPINE COMMISSION 307
its galvamzed iron roof, made on a former oooasiOD by a
shell from Dewey's fleet.
From this vantage point we oould see the entire length
of the line of battle. The attack began shortly after day-
light. Near Caloocan the Insurgent works were close in,
but further off toward La Loma they were in some places
distant a mile or more from the trenches of the Americans.
The general plan of attack was that the whole Ameri-
can line should rotate to the north and west on Caloocan
as a pivot, driving the Insurgents in toward Malabon if
possible. The latter began to fire as soon as the Ameri-
can troops showed themselves, regardless of the fact that
their enemies were quite out of range. As most of them
were using black-powder cartridges, their four or five
miles of trenches were instantly outlined. The ground
was very dry so that the bullets threw up puffs of dust
where they struck, and it was possible to judge the
accuracy of the fire of each of the opposing forces.
Rather heavy resistance was encoimtered on the extreme
right, and the turning movement did not materialize as
rapidly as had been hoped. General Wheaton, who was
in command of the forces about the church, finally moved
to the front, and as we were directly in the rear of his line
and the Insurgents, as usual, overshot badly, we found
ourselves in an uncomfortably hot comer. Bullets
rattled on the church roof like hdl, and presently one
passed through the opening through which Major Bourns,
Colonel Potter, of the engineer corps, and I were sticking
our heads. Inmiediately thereafter we were observed
by Dr. Sherman making record time on all fours along
one of the framing timbers of the church toward its
tower. There we took up our station, and thereafter
observed the fighting by peeping throu^ windows
partially closed with blocks of volcanic tuff. We had a
beautiful opportunity to see the artillery fire. The guns
were directly in front of and below us and we could
watch the laying of the several pieces and then turn our
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
308 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
field-glasses on the particular portions of the Insurgent
trenches where the projectiles were Ukely to strike.
Again and again we caught bursting shells in the fields
of our glasses and could thus see their effect as accurately
as if we had been standing close by, without any danger
of being perforated by shrapnel.
After the Insurgent position had been carried we
walked forward to their line of trenches and followed it
east to a point beyond the La Loma Church, counting
the dead and wounded, as I had heard wild stories of
tremendous slaughter and wanted to see just how much
damage the fire of our troops had really done. On om*
way we passed the Caloocan railroad station which had
been converted into a temporary field hospital. Here I
saw good Father McEinnon, the chaplain of the First
California Volimteers, assisting a surgeon and soaked
with the blood of wounded men. He was one chaplain
in a thousand. It was always easy to find him. One
had only to look where trouble threatened and help was
needed. He was sure to be there.
On my way from the railway station to the trenches I
met a very much excited officer returning from the front.
He had evidently had a long and recent interview with
Cyrus Noble/ and was- determined to tell me all about
the fighting. I escaped from him after some delay, and
with much difficulty. Later he remembered having met
me, but made a grievous mistake as to the scene of our
encounter, insisting that we had been together in "Whea-
ton's Hole," an uncommonly hot position where numerous
people got hurt. He persisted in giving a graphic account
of our experiences, and in paying high tribute to my
coolness and courage under heavy fire. My efforts to
persuade him that I had not been with hjni there proved
futile, and I finally gave up the attempt. I wonder
how many other miUtary reputations rest upon so slender
' A bnnd of whiakey tben muoh in use.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE FIfiST PmUPPINE COMMISSION 309
a foundation I This experience was unique. I never
saw another officer under the influence of liquor when
in the field.
At the time that we visited the Insurgent trenches,
not all of our own killed and wounded had been removed,
yet every wounded Insurgent whom we found had a
United States army canteen of water at his side, obviouBly
left by some kindly American soldier. Not a few of the
injured had been furnished hardtack as well. All were
ultimately taken to Manila and there given the best of
care by army surgeona.
Sometime later a most extraordinary account of this
fight, written by a soldier, was published in the Springfield
Republican. It was charged that our men had murdered
prisoners in cold blood, and had committed all maimer
of barbarities, the writer saying among other things : —
"We Bret bombarded a town called Malabon and then
entered it and killed every man, woman and child in the place."
The facts were briefly as follows : There was an Insur-
gent regiment in and near a mangrove swamp to the right
of this town. Whrai it became obstreperous it was
shelled for a short time untU it quieted down agun.
Kone of the shells entered the town. Indeed, most of
them struck in the water. Our troops did not enter
Malabon that day, but passed to the northward, leaving
behind a small guard to keep the Insurants from coming
out of Malabon in their rear. Had tiiey then entered
the town, they would not have found any women, chil-
dren or non-combatant men to kill for the reason that all
such persons had been sent away some time before.
The town was burned, in part, but by the Insurgents
themselves. They fired the church and a great orphan
asylum, and did much other wanton damage.
Being able to speak from personal observation as to
the occurrences of that day, I sent a long cablegram direct
to the Chicago Times-Herald stating the facts.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
310 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PBESBNT
After my return to the United States, President McKin-
tey was kind enough to say to me that if there had been
no other result from the visit of the first Philippine Com-
mission to the islands than the sending of that cablegram,
he should have considered the expense involved more
than justified. He added that the country was being
flooded at the time with false and slanderous rumours,
and people at home did not know what to believe. The
statements of army officers were discounted in advance,
and other testimony from some unprejudiced source was
badly needed.
On April 2, 1890, Colonel Denby arrived, and our serious
work began. The fighting continued and there was little
that we could do save earnestly to strive to promote
friendly relations with the conservative element among
the Filipinos, and to gather the information we had been
instructed to obtain.
On April 4, 1899, we issued a proclamation setting
forth in clear and simple language the purposes of the
Am^can govenunent.^ It was translated into Tagfilog
and other dialects and widely circulated. The Insuigent
leaders were alert to keep the common people and the
soldiers from learning of the kindly purposes of the
United States. They were forbidden to read the docu-
ment and we were rehably informed that the imposition
of the death penalty was threatened if this order was
violated. In Manila crowds of Filipinos gathered about
copies of the proclamation which were posted in pubfic
places. Many of them were soon effaced by Insurgent
^ents or sympathisers.
This document unquestionably served a very useful
purpose.* For one tlfing, it promptly brought us into
much closer touch with the more conservative Filipinos.
< For the text of this document sen the Appendix, p. 977.
* In view of the alleged attitude of Qenenl Otis toward the work
of the Commission, the following statement by him as to the effect
of this procUmation is of interest ; —
Oen^ Otis said: "It was niuuiimoualy decided to print, pabliBfa,
:dbvGoogIe
THE FIBST PHUJFPINE COMMISSION 3U
We soon established relations of friendlineefi and confi-
dence with men like Arellano, Tome, Legarda and Tavera,
who had left the Malolos government when it demon-
strated its futility, and yrere ready, to turn to the United
States for help. Insurgent sympathizers also conferred
freely with us. We were invited to a beautiful function
^ven in our honour at the home of a wealthy family,
and were impressed, as no one can fail to be, with the
dignified betuing of our Filipino hosts, a thing which is
always in evidence on such occasions. We gave a return
function which was lai^y attended and greatly aided
in the establishment of relations of confidence and friend-
ship with leading Fihpino residents of Manila.
The FihpinoB were much impressed with Colonel Deuby.
He was a handsome man, of imposing presence, with one
of the kindest hearts that ever beat. They felt instinc-
tively that they could have confidence in him, and showed
it on all occasions.
Meanwhile we lost no opportunity to inform ourselves
as to conditions and events, conferring with Filipinos from
varioxis parts of the archipelago and with Chinese, Ger-
mans, Frenchmen, Balkans, Austrians, Englishmen,
Spaniards and Americans. Among the witnesses who
post, and diBseminate as much as posrible among the iohabitanta
under insurgent domination this addreas, printine tb« same in the
Encliah, Spaciili, and Tagilog lansuagea. This vas done, but
Boaroel; had it been posted in ManOa tventy-four hours before
it was so torn and mutilated aa to be unreoogni sable. It mfiered
the same fate aa the proclamation of January 4, set out in
pages 113 and 114 of this report, but it produeed a marked
benefioiol influence on the people, eapeoially thoae outside our
lines, as it carried with it a conviction of the United States' intentions,
on account of the source from vhioh it emanated, it being an
expression from a committee of gentlemen espeoially appointed to
proclaim the policy which the United States would pursue."
— Tatloe, 90 AJ.
Taylor adds: "Theoomnumder of one of the regiments of sandatahan
in Manila reported that he had foroed the people of the city to destroy
the prodamationa liaued by the oommiadon (P. I. R., 73. 0). As he
found this necessary, the action erf the people could hardly have reflected
their real feelings in the matter."
:dbvGoogIe
312 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRB8BNT
came before us were farmers, bankers, brokers, merchiuits,
lawyers, physicians, railroad men, shipowners, educators
and public officiatB. Certainly all classes of opinion were
represented, and when we were called upon by the Presi-
dent, a little later, for a statement of the situation we felt
fully prepared to make it.
Blount has charged that the commission attranpted to
interfere with the conduct of the war, and cites a cable-
gram from General Otis statii^ that conferences with
Insurgents cost soldiers' lives in support of this conten-
tion. No conference with Insurgent leaders was ever
held without the previous knowledge and approval of
the general, who was himself a member of the commission.
I^te in April General Luna sent Colonel Arguelles of
his stafiE to ask for a fifteen days' suspension of hostilities
under the pretext of enabling the Insurgent congress to
meet at San Fernando, Pampanga, on May 1, to discuss
the situation and decide what it wanted to do. He called
on the commission and ui^ed us to ask Otis to grant this
request, but we declined to intervene, and General Otis
refused to grant it.
Mabini continued Lima's effort, sending Arguelles
back with letters to Otis and to the commission. In the
latter he asked for "an armistice and a suspension of
hostihties as sa indispensable means of arriving at peace,"
stating explicitly that the PhiUppine government "does
not solicit the armistice to gain a space of time in which
to refinforce itself."
The commission again referred Ai^elles to General
Otis on the matter of armistice and suspension of hostih-
ties. We suspected that the statement that these things
were not asked for in order to gain time was false,
and this has since been definitely established.
Taylor says ; —
"On April 11 Mabini wrote to G^eral Luna (Exhibit 719)
thaA Aguinaldo's council was of the opinion that no negotia-
tions for the release of the Sfianish prisoners should be conad-
:dbvGoogIe
THE FIRST PHIUPFINE COMMISSION 313
ered iinlesB the American Commisaon agreed to a suapenmon
of hostilities for the purpose of treating, not only in regard to
the prisoners, but for the purpose of opening negotiationB be-
tween Aguinaldo's government and the American authorities.
'"In arriving at this decidonwe have been actuated by the
desire to gain time for our arsenals to produce sufficient car-
tridges, if, as would seem to be probable, they persist in not
even recognizing our belligerency, as means for furthering the
recognition of our independence.' " *
Arguelles, on his return, was instructed to ask Otis
for a —
"general armistice and suspension of hostilities in all the archi-
pelago for the short space of three months, in order to enable
it to consult the opinion of the people concerning the govern-
ment which would be the most advantageous, and the inter-
vention in it which should be ^ven to the North American
Government, and to appoint an extraon^nary commission with
full powers, to act in the name of the Philippine people." *
General Otis naturally again declined to grant the re-
quest for a suspension of hostilities.
Little came of the conference between Arguelles and
the commission, except that we really succeeded in con-
vincing him of the good intentions of our government,
and th^ promptly got him into very serious trouble, as
we shall soon see. I took him to a tent hospital on the
First Reserve Hospital grounds where wounded Insur-
gents were receiving the best of treatment at the hands
of American surgeons, and he was amazed. He had been
taught to beheve that the Americans murdered prisoners,
raped women, and committed similar barbarities when-
ever they got a chwice. As we have seen, stories of this
sort were industrioiisly spread by many of the Insurgent
leaders among their soldiers, and among the common
people as well. They served to arouse the passions of the
former, and stirred them up to acts of devilish brutahty
which they might perhaps not otherwise have perpetrated.
» Taylor. 96 AJ. ' ttrid.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
314 THE PHIUPPINEB PAST AND PRESENT
AxgaeHea told the truth upon his return, and this, together
with his suggestion that it might be well to consider the
acceptance of the form of government offered by the
United States, nearly cost him his life. Relative to this
matter Taylor says : —
"When Arguelles returned to the insurgent lines, it must
have been conadered that be had said too much in Manila.
While he had been sent there to persuade the Americans to
agree to a euspennon of hostdlitiefl to be consumed in endless
discussion under cover of which Luna's army could be reorgan-
iaed, he had not only failed to secure the desired armistice, but
had come back with the opinion that it might after all be
advisable to accept the government proposed by the Umted
States. On May 22 General Luna ordered his arrest and
trial for being in favour of the autonomy of the United States
in the Philippine Islands. He was tried promptly, the prose-
cuting witness being another officer of Luna's staff who had
accompanied him to Manila and acted aa a spy upon his move-
ments (P. I. R., 285. 2). The court sentenced him to dismissal
and confinement at hard labor for twelve years. This did not
satisfy Luna's thirst for vengeance, and he was imprisoned in
Bautista on the first floor of a building whose second story
was occupied by that officer. One night Luna came alone
into the room where he was confined and told him that although
he was a traitor, yet he had done good service to the cause;
and it was not proper that a man who had been a colonel in the
army should be seen working on the roads under a guard. He
told him that the proper thing for him to do was to blow his
brains out, and that if he did not do it within a reasonable time
the sentinel at his door would shoot him. He gave him a
{Hstol and left the room. Ai^elles decided not to kill him-
self, but fully expected that the guard would kill him. Shortly
afterwM'ds Luna was summoned to meet Aguinaldo, and never
returned. On September 20, 1899, his sentence was declared
null and void and he was r^nstated in his former rank (P. I. R.,
286. 3, and 2030. 2)." '
Colonel Arguelles has told me exactly the same story.
For a time it seemed as if the views expressed by him
might prevail.
:dbvGoogIe
■E||
i: 3
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:dbvGoogIe
:dbvGoogIe
THE FUIST PHIUFPINE COMMISSION 315
"According to Felipe BueDcamino and acme others, the
majority of the members of congress had been in favour of abso-
lute independence until they saw the demoralization of the
officers and soldiers which resulted in the American occupation
of Maloloa. In the middle of April, 1899, they remembered
Arellano's advice, and all of the intelligent men in Aguinaldo's
government, except Antonio Luna and the officers who had
no desire to lay down their mihtaiy rank, decided to accept
the sovereignty of the United States. At about the same time
copies of the proclamation issued by the American Commis-
sion in Manila reached them and still further infiuenoed them
toward the adoption of this purpose. By the time congress
met in San Isidro on May 1, 1869, all of the members had
accepted it except a few partisans of Mabini, then president
of the council of government. At its Srat meeting the congress
resolved to change the policy of war with the United States
to one of peace, and this change of poUcy in congress led to
the fall of Mabini and his succeaaon by Patemo. The first
act of the new council was the appointment of a commisaioQ
headed by Felipe Buencamino which was to go to Manila and
there negotiate with the Anaerican authorities for an honourable
surrender." '
"Although Mabini bad fallen from power, Luna and hia
powerful faction had still to be reckoned with. He was Ues
moderate than Mabini, and had armed adherents, which Mabini
did not, and when Patemo declared his policy of moderation
and diplomacy he answered it on the day the new council of
government was proclaimed by an order that all foreigners
hving in the Philippines except Chinese and Spaniards, should
leave for Manila within forty-eight hours." '
Unfortunately Luna intercepted the Buencamino com-
missioo. Its head he kicked, cuffed and threatened with
a revolver. One of itB members was General Gr^orio del
Pilar. He was allowed to proceed, as he commanded a
brigade of troops which mi^t hare deserted had he been
badly treated, but Luna named three other men to go
with him in place of those who had been originally ap-
pointed.^ They were Gracio Gonaaga, Captain Zialcita,
aad Alberto Baretto. They reached Manila on May 19,
" TaylOT, 97 AJ. • Ibid.
• NominaUy they ware D&med by A^uinaldo.
:dbvGoogIe
316 THE PHILIPnNBS PAST AND PRESENT
1899, and during thdr stay there had two long inter-
viewa with the commission.
They said that they had come, with larger powers than
had been conferred on Arguelles, to discuss the possibiUty
of peace, the form of ultimate government which might
be proposed in future, and the attitude of the United
States government toward needed reforms.
Meanwhile, on May 4, we had laid before the Preffldent
a plan of government informally discussed with Arguelles,
and had received the following reply, authorizii^, in sub-
stance, what we had suggested : —
"Wakhinqton, May 5, 1899, 10.20 p.m.
"ScHOEBiAN, Manila :
"Yours 4th received. You are authorized to propose that
under the military power of the President, pending action of
Congress, government of the Plulippine IslandB shall corndst
of a governor-general, appointed by the President; cabinet,
appointed by the governor-general ; a general advisory council
elected by the people ; the qualifications of electors to be care-
fully conadered and determined ; the governor-general to have
absolute veto. Judiciary strong and independent; principal
judges appointed by the Preddent, The cabinet and judges
to be chosen from natives or Americans, or both, having regard
to fitness. The President earnestly desires the cessation of
bloodshed, and that the people of the Philippine Islands at an
early date shall have the largest measure of local aelf-govem-
ment consistent with peace and good order.
"Hat." »
Our proclamation of April 4, 1890, was also taken up
at their request and was gone over minutely, sentence by
sentence. We were asked to explain certain expresuons
which they did not fully understand.
They told us that it would be hard for their army to
lay down its arms when it had accomplished nothing, and
a^ed if it could be taken into the service of the United
States. We answered that some of the regiments might
' Repent of the Plulippine Conunisaioii to the Pretident, Vc^. I,
1900, p. 9.
:dbvGoogIe
THE FIBST PHILIPPINE COMMISSION 317
be taken over and employment on public works be found
for the soldiers of others.
We endeavoured to arrange for an interview with
Aguinaldo, either going to meet him or assuring hiin safe
conduct should he desire to confer with us at Manila.
They left, promising to return in three weeks when
they had had time to consider the matters under discus-
mon, but they never came back.
Shortly thereafter there was an odd occurrence. Soon
after our arrival we had learned that Mr. Schurman
was a man of very variable opinions. He was rather
readily convinced by plausible arfi^uments, but sometimes
very suddenly reversed his views on an important
subject.
At the outset Archbishop Nozaleda made a great im-
pression upon him. The Archbishop was a thorough-
going Spaniard of the old school, and entertained BOme-
what radical opinions as to what should be done to end the
distressing situation which existed. After talking with
him Mr. Schurman seemed to be convinced that we
ought to adopt a stern and bloody policy, a conclusion
to which Colonel Denby and I decidedly objected.
A little later he made a trip up the Fasig River with
Admiral Dewey and others and had a chance to see some-
thing of the aftermath of war. It was not at all pretty.
It never is. I was waiting for him with a carriage at the
river landing on his return and had hard work to keep
him away from the cable office. His feelings had under-
gone a complete revulsion. He insisted that if the Ameri-
can people knew what we were doing they would demand
that the war be terminated immediately at any cost and
by whatsoever means, and he wanted to tell them all
about it at once. By the next morning, however, thu^
fortunately looked rather di£ferently to him.
Mr. Schurman acquired a working knowledge of the
Spanish language with extraordinary promptness. Shortly
thereafter Colonel Denby and I discovered that when
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
318 THE PHILIPFIKIS PAST AND PRESENT
FilipiiUM came to see the commis^on in order to imput
infonnation or to seek it, he was conferring with them
privately and sending them away without our seeing them
at all.
Soon after we had made our formal statement of
the situation to the President, Mr. Schurman had an
interview with an Englishman who had been Uvii^ in
Insurgent territory north of Manila, from which he had
just been ejected, in accordance with Luna's order. This
man told him all about the mistakes of the Americans and
evidently greatly impressed him, for shortly thereafter he
read to us at a commission meeting a draft of a proposed
cablegram which he said he hoped we would approve.
It would have stultified us, had we signed it, as it involved
in effect the abandonment of the position we had so
recently taken and a radical change in the policy we had
recommended. Mr. Schurman told us that if we did
not care to sign it, he would send it as an expression of
bis personal opinion. Colonel Denby asked him if his
personal opinion differed from his official opinion, and
received an affirmative reply. We declined to approve
the proposed cabl^p'am, whereupon he informed us that
if his policy were adopted, he and General Aguinaldo would
settle things without assistance from us, and that other-
wise he would resign. He inquired whether we, too,
would send a cable, and we told him certainly not, unless
further information from us was requested. He sent his
proposed message, in somewhat modified form, and re>
ceived a prompt reply instructing him to submit it to the
full conunission and cable their views.
He did submit it to Colonel Denby and myself at a
regularly called commission meeting, ai^ed that in doing
this he had obeyed the President's instructions, and
vowed that he would not show it to General Otis. I
showed it to the General myself, allowing him to believe
that I did BO with Mr. Schurman's approval, and thus
avoided serious trouble, as he had been personally advised
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE PIB8T PHILIPPINE COMMISSION 319
from Washington of the instructions to Mr. Schurman.
The General then joined with Colonel Denby and myaelf
in a cablegram setting forth om* views, and so this incident
ended.
Mr. Schunnaa did not resign, but thereafter we saw
very little of him. He made a hasty trip to the Visayas
and the Southern Islands and sailed for the United States
shortly after his return to Manila, being anxious to get
back in time for the opening of the college year at Cornell.
Colonel Denby and I were instructed to remain at
Manila, where we rendered such assistance as we could
give, and continued to gather information relative to the
situation, the country and the people. In this latter
work we were given invaluable help by Jesuit priests, who
prepared for us a comprehensive monograph embodying
a very large amount of valuable information, and furnished
us a series of new maps as well. The latter were subse-
quently published by the United States Coast and Geo-
detic Survey in the form of an Atlas of the Philippines.
Early in September we had a most interesting interview
with Sr. Jos€ de Luzuriaga, a distinguished and patriotic
Filipino from western Negros, where American sover-
eignty bad been accepted without resistance. Up to
that time it had been possible for the people of Negros
to keep out Tag&log invaders. Sr. Luzuriaga assured
us that so long as this condition continued, there would
be no trouble, and he was quite right.
Aguinaldo's agents eventually gained a foothold there
for a short time, and did some mischief, but it did not
result very seriously.
We felt an especial interest in this island, as General
Otis had asked us carefully to study and to criticise a
scheme for its government which had been drafted by
General James F. Smith, who afterward became justice
of the Supreme Court of the PhiUppines, secretary of
public instruction and governor-general of the ishmds,
and was then in command of the troops in Negros.
:dbvGoogIe
320 THE PmUFPINES PAST AND PRESENT
Gen^nl Lawton arrived in the Philippines during our
stay. His coming had been eagerly looked forward to
by the army. He had sailed with the understanding
that he was to be put in charge of field operations. While
he was at sea, influences were brought to bear whidi
changed this plan.
It is my film conviction that if Lawton had been put
in command, the war would have ended promptly. He
was awonderful man in the field. He possessed the faculty
of instilling his own tremendous enei^y into his officers
and men, whose privations and dangers he shared, thereby
arousing an unfaltering loyalty which stood him in good
stead in time of need. If there was fighting to be done,
he promptly and thoroughly whipped everything in ^ht.
He punished looting and disorder with a heavy hand,
treated prisoners and noncombatants with the utmost
kindness, and won the good-will of all Filipinos with whom
he caxae in contact.
General MacArthur was always deelarii^ that the
Filipinos were a unit gainst us and that he could never
get infoimation from them. General Lawton never
lacked for such information as he needed, and constantly
and successfully used the Filipinos themselves as messen-
gers and for other purposes. I came to know him inti-
mately, and learned to admire and love him as did all
those who had that great privilege.
For some time I had charge of his spies. Never have
men taken longer chances than did the faithful few who
at this time fiKnished us with information as to ev^its
in Insurgent territory. Discovery meant prompt and
cruel death. For a long time Major F. S. Bourns bad
performed the uncongenial task of directing the spies.
He was then the chief health officer of Manila, and as
all sorts of people were compelled to consult him on sani-
tary matters, visits to his office aroused no suspicion.
He spoke Spanish, and this was imperatively necessary.
Our spies simply woiild not communicate results through
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE FISST PmUFPINE COMMISSION 321
interpreters. The factfi revealed by the Insui^ent records
show how right they were in refusii^ to do bo.
Major Bourns eventually returned to the United States.
His work was taken over by an army officer, with the
result that two of our best men died very suddenly in that
gentleman's back yard. As I spoke Spanish, and as all
sorts of people came to see the commission, I was the logi-
cal candidate for this job, which I thereupon inherited.
Each morning, if there was news, I myself laboriously
thumped out my notes on the t3T>ewriter, making an orig-
inal and one copy. The copy I took at once to General
Lawton. The original I took, later, to General Otis.
General Lawton was firmly convinced that most army
o&cerB were imfitted by their training to perform civil
functions. He organized municipal governments with
all possible promptness in the towns occupied by his
troops, and in this work he requested my assistance,
which I was of course glad to give. Sr. Felipe Calderon
drafted a simple provisional scheme of municipal govern-
ment which I submitted for criticism to that most dis-
tinguished and able of FiUpinos, Sr. Cayetano Arellano.*
When the final changes in it had been made, I accompanied
General Lawton on a trip to try putting it into effect.
We held elections and estabUshed municipal governments
in a number of the towns just south of Manila, and in
some of those along the Pasig River.
General Otis watched our operations and their results
narrowly, and was sufficiently well pleased with the latter
to order General Kobb^ to follow a similar course in
various towns on or near the railroad north of Manila.
Kobb6 did not profess ~to know much about municipal
government, and asked me to go with him and help until
he got the hang of the thing, which I did.
Thus it happened that the first Philippine Commission
had a sort of left-handed interest in the first municipal gov-
ernments established in the islands under American rule.
> Now chief justioe of the I%ilippiiie SuEffeme Court.
TOL. I — Y
Lr,,l,;.:M.,G00gIe
322 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PBE8ENT
In hie endeavour to show that the Commiseion inter-
fered with military operations, Blount has ascribed cer-
tain statements to Major Starr. He says : "... at San
Isidro on or about November 8, Major Starr said : 'We
took this town last spring,' stating how much our loss
had been in so doing, 'but partly as a result of the Schur^
man commission parleying with the Insui^ents, General
Otis had us fall back. We have juat had to take it
again.'" *
If Major Starr ever made such, a statement he was
sadly miMnformed. General Lawton was the best friend
I ever had in the United States Army. I saw him almost
daily when he was in Manila, and he showed me the
whole telegraphic correspondence which passed between
him and General Otis on the subject of the withdrawal
from San Isidro and Nueva Ecij a, which was certainly one of
the most ill advised moves that any military commander
was ever compelled to make. General Lawton's tmremit-
ting attacks had absolutely demoralized thelnsurgent force,
and my information is that when he finally t\imed back,
Aguinaldo and several members of his cabinet were wait-
ing, ten miles away, to surrender to him when he next
advanced, believing that they could never escape from
him. I have not the tel^raphic correspondence before
me, but I remember its salient features. Otis ordered
Lawton to withdraw, and Lawton, convinced of the in-
advisability of the measure, objected. Otis replied that,
with tile rainy season coining on, he coidd neither provi-
sion him nor furnish him ammunition. Lawton an-
swered that he had provisionB enough to last three weeks
and ammimition enough to finish the war, whereupon Otis
peremptorily ordered him to withdraw. The Philippine
Commission had no more to do with this matter than they
had to do with the similar order against advancing which
Otis sent Lawton on the day the latter won the Zapote
Kiver fight, when the Insurgents were runnii^ all over the
> Blount, p. 230.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
bvGoogle
:dbvGoogIe
TEE FIBST PHIUFPINE COldMISSION 823
Province of Cavite. Lawton wanted to push forward
and clean the whole place up. The reply to his request
to be allowed to do so ran, U memory serves me well, as
follows : ■ —
"Do nothine. You have aoconqtUshed all that was ex-
pected of you.'*^
Later on, Lawton and his devoted oflScers and men had
to duplicate the fierce campaign which had resulted in
the taidng of San Isidro. This made possible the move>
ment that Lawton had had in mind in the first instance,
which was made with the result that organized anned
resistance to the authority of the United States promptly,
ceased in northern Luz6n.
While on this subject I wi{^ to record the fact that
shortly after his return from the San Isidro campaign
General Lawton asked me to accompany him on a visit
to General Otis and act as a witness. I did so. In my
presence Lawton said to Otis that if the latter would
^ve him two raiments, would allow him to arm, equip and
provision them to suit himself, and would turn him loose,
he would stake his reputation as a soldier, and his position
in the United States Army, on the claim that within sixty
days he would end the insurrection and would deliver to
G^eral Otis one Emilio Aguinaldo, dead or alive. The
general laughed at his offer. General Lawton asked me
some day to make these facts public. As life is an un-
certain thing, I deem it proper to do so now. Personally
I am convinced that if his offer hiid been accepted he
would have kept his promise.
On September 15, 1899, Colonel Denby and I sailed
for the United States, having been recalled to Washing-
ton. Shortly after our arrival there the commission
issued a brief preliminary report. The winter was spent
in the preparation of our final report, iriiich constituted
a full and authoritative treatise on the islands, the
people and their resources. Father Jos6 AIgu€, the dis-
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
324 THE FHILIFFIKE8 FAST AND PRESENT
tinguiflhed head of the Philippine Weather Bureau, was
called to Washington to help ub, and gave us invaluable
Bsustance.
Our preliminary report, dated November 2, 1899, and
the first volume of our final report, published on January
31, 1900, contained our observations and recommenda-
tions relative to political matters.
Mr. Schurman has been credited with saying in an
address made on January 11, 1902 : "Any decent kind of
government of Filipinos by Filipinos is better than the
best possible govemm^it of Filipinos by Americans." ^
On November 2, 1900, he signed the following state-
ment : * —
"Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the com-
misraoii believe that the government of the Philippines would
speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not
necessitate, the intervention of other powera and the eventual
division of the islands among them. Only through American
occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing, and
united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable. And the
indispensable need from the Filipino point of view of main-
taining American sovereignty over the archipelago is recc%-
nized by all intelligent Filipinoe and even by those insurgents
who deare an American protectorate. The latter, it is true,
would take the revenues and leave us the responsibiliiies.
Nevertheless, they recognise the indubitable fact that the
Filipinos cannot stand alone. Thus the welfare of the Fili-
pinos coincides with the dictates of nationaJ honour in forbidding
our abandonment of the archipelago. We cannot from ainr
point of view escape the responsibilities of government which
our sovereignty ent^ls; and the commission is strongly per-
suaded that the performance of our national duty will prove
the greatest bleaalng to the peoples of the PhilipiMne Islands."]
More than fourteen years' experience in govenmiental
work in the Philippines has profoundly impressed me
with the fundamental soundness of these conclusions of
the first Philippine Commission. Every statement then
made still holds true.
> Blount, p. 105. ■ B«port I%ilippine CommiaBion, Vol. I, p. 183.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
CHAPTER Xn
Thb Establishment of CnrtL Govxrnhbnt
The first Philippine Commission did not complete
its work imtil March, 1900. By this time conditions
had BO far improved in the archipelago that President
McKinley was prepared to initiate a movement looking
toward the establishment of civil government there. With
this end in view he appointed the following commission
of five civilians; William H. Taft of Ohio, Dean C.
Worcester of Michigan, Luke E. Wright of Tennessee,
Henry C. Ide of Vermont and Bemaxd Moses of Cali-
fornia. Our appointments were dated March 16, 1900,
Our instructions which were full, are given in the appendix.^
I was the only member of the first commission to be
reappointed. Neither General Otis nor Admiral Dewey
cared to serve, and indeed the professional duties of each
of them rendered his appointment to the new com-
mission difficult, if not impossible. Mr. Schurman had
at one time expressed himself as vigorously opposed to
the idea of a new commission, maintainii^ that the best
rraults could be obtained by the appointment of a civil
governor with wide powers. It was therefore taken
for granted that he would not desire reappointment.
Colonel Denby was keenly interested in the work and
would have been glad to continue it, but he was past
seventy and with his good wife had then spent some fifteen
years in the Far East. He doubted whether his strength
would be adequate to bear the strain of the arduous task
which obviously lay before the new commission, and Mrs.
Denby desired to remain in the United States where she
' P. 981.
sas
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
326 THE PHILIPPINBS PAST AND PRESENT
could be near her children from whom she had been loi^
separated, so her husband felt constrained to say that he
did not wish to return to the Philippines.
I separated from him with the keenest regret. He was
an amiable, tactful man of commanding ability and unim-
peachable integrity, actuated by the best of motives and
loyal to the highest ideals. He constantly sought to
avoid not only evil but the appearance of evil. I count
it one of the great privil^;^ of my life to have beeu as-
sociated with him. The one thing in the book written
by Jam^ H. Blount which aroused my ire was his char^
acterization of Colonel Denby as a hypocrite. No
falser, meaner, more utterly contemptible statement was
ever made, and when I read it the temptation rose hot^-
witbin me to make pubUc Blount's personal PhilippinetvF
record, but after the first heat of anger had passed I-f-
remembered what the good old Colonel would haya~{|
wished me to do in such a case, and forbore.
The second Philippine commission, hereinafter re-
ferred to as "the commission," received its instructions
on April 7, 1900.
They covered a most delicate and complicated subject,
namely, the gradual transfer of control from military to
civil authority in a country extensive regions of which
were still in open rebellion.
In the opinion of President McKinley there was no
reason why steps should not be taken, from time to time,
to inaugurate governments essentially popular in their
form as fast as territory came under the permanent con-
trol of our troops, and indeed, as we have seen, this had
already been done by the army. It was provided that
we should continue and perfect the work of organizing
and establishing civil governments already commenced
by the military authorities. In doing this we were to
act as a board of which Mr. Taft was designated president.
It was contemplated that the transfer of authority from
miUtaiy commanders to civil officers would .be gradual,
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 327
and full and complete cooperation between theee au-
thorities was enjoined. Having familiarized oxu^lves
with the conditions then prevailing in the islands, we were
to devote our attention first to the establishment of munic-
ipal governments, in which the natives should be given
the opportunity to man^;e their local affairs to the fullest
extent and with the least supervision and control found
to be practicable. We were then to consider the oi^;ani-
zation of larger administrative divisions, and when of
the opinion that the condition of affairs in the islands
was such that the central administration could safely
be transferred from military to civil control were to report
this conclusion to the secretary of war with our recom-
mendations as to the form of central government which
should be established.
Beginning with September 1, 1900, we were authorized
to exercise, subject to the approval of the President and
the secretary of war, the l^islative power, which was
then to be transferred from the military governor to us
until the establishment of civil central government, or
imtil C3ongres8 should otherwise provide. We were
authorized during a like period to appoint to oflSce such
officers imder the judicifiJ, educational, and civil service
systems, and in the municipal and departmental govem-
ments, as were duly provided for. Until the complete
transfer of control the military governor was to remain
the chief executive head of the government and to exercise
the executive authority previously possessed by him and
not expressly assigned to the commission by the president
in his instructions. In establishing municipal governments
we were to taJce as the basis of our work those established
by the mihtary governor, xmder the order of August 8,
1890, which I had helped to set up, as well as those estab-
lished imder the report of a board constituted by the
military governor by his order of January 29, 1900, of
which SeBor Cayetano Arellano was the president.
In the establishment of departmental or provincial
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
328 THE PHIUPPINES PAST AND PBE8ENT
governments we were to give special attention to the then-
existing government of the island of Negros, established
with the approval of the people of that island under the
order of the military governor of July 22, 1899.
We were instructed to investigate troubles growing
out of large land holdings, including those of the religious
orders, and to promote, extend and improve the system of
education already inaugurated by the mihtary authorities,
giving first importance to the extension of a system of
primary education free to all, which wotdd tend to fit the
people for the duties of citizenship and the ordinary
avocations of a civilized community. Instruction was
to be given at first in the native dialects, but full oppor-
tunity for all of the people to acquire English was to be
provided as soon as possible. If necessity demanded, we
were authorized to make changes in the existing system
of taxation and in the body of the laws tmder which the
people were governed, although such changes were to be
rel^ated to the civil government which we were to
establish later, so far as might be. Our instructions con-
tained the following important passages : —
" In all the forms of govenunent and administrative provi-
fdous which they are authorized to prescribe, the commisdon
should bear in mind that the government which they are
establishing is designed not for our satisfaction, or for the
expression of our theoretical views, but for the happinoBs,
peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands,
and the measures adopted should be made to conform to thdr
customs, their habits, and even th^ prejudices, to the fullest
extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable
requisites of just and effective government.
"At the same time the commission should bear in mind,
and the people of the islands should be made plainly to under-
stand, that there are certain great principles of government
which have been made the basis of our governmental system
which we deem essential to the rule of )aw and the maintenance
of individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately,
been denied the experience possessed by us ; that there are also
certain practical njes of government which we have found to
:dbvGoogIe
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 329
be esseDtial to the preeervatioD of these great principles of
liberty and law, and that these principles and these njles of
government must be establiahed and maintained in their
islands for the sake of their liberty and hapjnness, however
much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure
with which they are familiar.
"It is evident that the most enlightened thought of the
Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these
principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short
time command universal assent. Upon every division and
branch of the government of the Philippines, therefore, must
be imposed these inviolable rules : —
" Tliat no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law ; that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation ; that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, to be infonned of the nature and cause
of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence ;
that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted ; that
no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same oEFence,
or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself; that the right to be seciu-e against unreasonable
searches and seizures £all not be violated ; that neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment
for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex-pwt-facto law shall
be passed ; that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press, or the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances 'j that no law shall be made respecting the establishment
of rehgion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be
allowed."
It has been the fashion in some quarters to sneer at
the last of these paragraphs, and to insinuate, if not to
charge, that President McKinley in his policy toward
the Phihppine Islands was actuated by unworthy motive.
Nothing could be further from the truth. From the
beginnii^ to the end the real good of the several peoples
:dbvGoogIe
330 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PEE8ENT
of the archipelago came first with him, and no one who
had the privilege of knowing him well doubts it. Thor-
oi^hly imbued with the lofty sentiments expressed by him
in our instructions, we set forth on our loi^ pilgrimage
to a country where we were to imdertake a heavy task
essentially different from tliat which had ever before
fallen to the lot of any five citizens of the United States.
On April 17, 1900, we sailed from San Francisco on the
United States army transport Hancock. We were forty-
five strong. Of this goodly company only four remain
in the Philippines to-day/ — Mr. and Mrs. Branagan,
Mrs. Worcester and myself. Singularly enough, with
two exceptions, all of the others are still aUve and at work.
Arthur W. Ferguson, prince of interpreters, who was
later appointed Executive Secretary, died in the service
after more than six years of extraordinarily faithful and
efficient work. James A. LeRoy, my faithful, able and
efficient private secretary, contracted tuberculosis, and
fell a victim to it after a long and gallant fight.
At Honolulu we met with a severe disappointment. It
was of course our duty to call on Governor Dole. We were
advised that silk hats and frock coats must be donned for
this visit, and it was perishing hot. We reached the palace
in a reeking perspiration and had a long wait in a siiffocat-
ing room. When Mr. Dole appeared, he was closely
followed by an attendant bearing a laigie and most at-
tractive-looking bottle carefully wrapped in a napkin,
and our spirits rose. But, ah^l It contained Poland
water.
At Tokio we had an audience with the Emperor and
were received by the Empress as well. In the high
official who had charge of tie palace where these events
took place, I discovered an old University of Michigan
graduate who made the occasion especially pleasant for me.
We finally reached Manila on the morning of June 3.
Althou^ the thermometer was in the nineties, a certun
> September 15, 1913.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
:dbvGoogIe
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE BSTAfiUaHMENT OF CIVIL OOTERNUENT 331
frigidity pervaded the atmcraphere on our arrival, which
General MacArthur, the military governor, eeemed to
regard in the light of an intrusion.
He had been directed to provide suitable office quarters
for ufi. To our amazement and amusement we found desks
for five commissioners and five private secretaries placed in
one httleroom inthe Ayuntamiento.^ While itwas possible
to get through the room without scrambling over them,
it would have been equaUy possible to circle it, walking
on them, without stepping on the floor. In the course
of our first long ofiicial interview with the General, he in-
formed us that we were "an injection into an otherwise
normal fdtuation."
He added that we had already mediatized the volume
of work that flowed over his desk. At the moment none
of us were quite sure what he meant, but we found the
word in the dictionary. How often in the weary years
thatwere to follow I wished that someone would materially
mediatize the task which fell to my lot ! It was General
MacArthur's honestly held and frankly expressed opinion
that what the Fihpinos needed was "military govern-
ment pinned to their backs for ten years with bayonets."
He later chained that view very radically, and when
civil provincial governments were finally estabhshed it was
with his approval, and, in many instances, upon his specific
recommen^tion.
At the outset some effort was made to keep the pubUc
away from us. Word was passed that we had no au-
thority, which was true enough, as our legislative activities
were not to b^in until September 1. The ninety days
which intervened were very advantageously spent in
gaining familiarity with the situation, which we had no
difficulty in doing. Plenty of people were already weary
of military rule and flocked to us. None of my com-
panions had ever before set foot in the Philippines, and
< The building: where the executive ofioes of the iusul&r govenunrat
have been located nnoe the Amerioan oeonpation.
D,q,i,i.:db,.GoogIe
332 THE PHnJFFINES PABT AND PBE8ENT
although I had spent more than four years there, I still
had plenty to learn.
In this connection I am reminded of an event which
occurred somewhat lat^. While the commission was
en route from Iloilo to Catbalogan when we were establish-
ing civil provincial governments, General Hughes and
Mr. Taf t became involved in a somewhat animated dis-
cussion. The General displayed an accurate knowledge
of facts which were of such a nature that one would
hardly have expected an army office to be familiar with
them. Mr. Talt said : "General, how do you do it ? You
have always been a bxisy man, devoted to your profession.
How have you managed to accumulate such a reinarkable
fund of information?" The General smiled his rare
smile and replied : "Governor, I will tell you. I always
try to go to bed at night knowli^ a little more than I did
when I got up in the morning." It is a wise plan to
follow.
On September 1 we assumed the legislative power,
otur first official act beii^ to appropriate $2,000,000
Mexican for the construction and repair of highways
and bridges.
We were impre^ed with the fundamental necessity of
promptly opening up lines of land communication in
a coimtry which almost completely lacked them, and there
were many poor people in dire need of employment who
would be rdieved by the opportunity to earn an honest
Uving which the inauguration of road construction would
afford them.
Our second act appropriated $5000 M^can for the
purpose of making a survey to ascertain Uie m(ffit ad-
vantageous route for a railroad into the mountains of
Benguet, where we wished to establish a much-needed
health resort for the people of the archipelago.
Seven days later we passed an act for the establish-
ment and maintenance of an efficient and honest civil
service in the Philippine Islands. This measure was of
D,q,i,i.:db,.GoogIe ■
OP CIVIL OOVBRNMENT 333
basic importance. We had stipulated before leaving
Washington that do political appointees should be forced
upon us under any circumstances. The members of the
second commission, like their predecessorB of the first,
were firm in the belief that national politics should, if
possible, be kept out of the administration of Fhilii^ine
afFairs, and we endeavoured to insure this result.
Our tenth act ai^ropriated $1500 Mexican to be paid
to t^e widow of Salvador Reyes, vice-president of Santa
Cruz in Laguna Province, assassinated because of his
loyalty to the established government.
Our fifteenth act increased the monthly salaries of
Filipino public school teachers in Manila.
Our sixteenth and seventeenth acts reorganized the
Forestry Bureau and the Mining Bureau.
On October 16 we appropriated J1,000,000 United
States ciurency, for improving the port of Manila, where
thiore was uigent need of protection for shipping durii^;
the typhoon season.
On December 12 we passed an act authorizing the
establishment of local pohce in cities and towns in the
PhiUppine Islands and appropriating $150,000 United
States currency for their maintenance.
Two days later we passed a much-needed.act regulating
the sale of intoxicating liquors within the city of Manila
and its attached barrios.
On December 21, we appropriated S75,000 United
States currency for the construction of the Benguet Road,
little dreaming how much time would elapse and how
many more dollars would be appropriated, before a ve-
hicle passed over it.
It will be sufficiently evident that I cannot here give an
account of the several acts which we passed when I say
that they niunber foiu- himdred forty-nine during the first
year. We created the administrative bureaus of a well-
organized government, established civil rule in numerous
municipalities and provinces, provided for the necessary
Drq,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
334 TBE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
expenses of government, OTganized courts and refoimed
the i udiciary . So important were the results following the
establishment of the Civil Service Act and the act pro-
viding for the organization of courts for the Fbilippine
Islands that I have devoted a chapter to each.
Although there were no limits on our power to enact
legislation other than those imposed by our instructiona
hereinbefore referred to, nothing was further from our
desire than to exercise too arbitrarily the authority con-
ferred upon us.
Taylor has correctly described our method of procedure
in the following words : —
"On September 1, 1900, the Commisaion began its I^psla-
tive and executive duties. In perfonning them it adopted the
pohcy of pasamg no laws, except in cases of emergency, without
publishing them in the daily press, nor until after they had
passed a second reading and the public had been ^vea an
opportunity to come before the Commiasion and suggest objec-
tions or amendments to the bills. Before enacting them they
were submitted to the military governor for hia consideration
and comment." ^
The other especially important events of our first le^a-
tive year were the establishment of civil rule in ihe
municipalities as well as in thirty-eight provinces and the
Bubstitutiou of the mihtary central government by thegrad-
ual creation of bureaus and the ultimate appointment of a
dvil governor and of five heads of executive departments.
On November 23, 1900, we passed an act providing
for the establishment of a civil government in the province
of Benguet,and thusit happened thataprovince practically
all of whose inhabitants were members of a non-Christian
tribe was the first to enjoy the benefits of civil rule. This
action grew out of investigations by General Wright and
myself made when visiting Bagulo during the latter part
of July, which led us to the conclusion that civil govern-
ment could be established in Benguet at any time and
1 Taylor, 18 H3.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE ESTABU8HMENT OF CIVIL GOTERNMENT 335
should be established as soon as possible. In view of the
rather primitive state of civilization of the people for
whom we were legislating, a special act adapted to local
conditions was passed providing for a provincial govern-
ment and fixing a form of government for the several
settlements.
On January 31, 1901, we passed an act for the organiza-
tion of municipal governments in the Fhihppine Islands
which, with various unendments, is still in effect and has
been made applicable to all municipal corporations of
the Philippines inhabited chiefly by FiUpinos, except the
city of Manila, the city of Baguio and a few small settle-
ments in the so-called special government provinces.^
On Febnia^ 6, 1901, we passed a general act for the
oi^anization of provincial governments in the Philippine
Islands. A special act was required to nmke it applicable
to any given province.
Having thus prepared for the serious work of establish-
ing civil government throughout the archipelago so fast
and so far as conditions m^t seem- to justify, we deter^
mined to visit the several provinces and to familiarize
ourselves with conditions on the ground in each case
before taking action. We invariably sought the opinion
of the military authorities as to the fitness of the prov-
inces under consideration for civil rule, and never
established it except with their approval. Indeed, in
several cases we yielded to their judgment and organized
provinces which we ourselvra thought might better wait
for a time.
Our first trip was to the northward along the line of
the Manila-Dagupan railway, and in the com"se of it
we oi^anized the provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac
and Fangaain&n.
On the 2d of March we crossed Manila Bay to Bataan
and established a civil provincial government there.
> This name is applied to oertain provinoea orgajuEed under apeoial
sots beoauM the nujority erf tbeir inhabitants are non-Christiana.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
336 THE PHILIPPINEB FAST AND FKE8GNT
The first provincial officers were necessarily appointed,
not elected. I well remember the consternation which
Mr. Taft created on this trip, when in announcing the
appointment of a man of strong character who was much
disliked by some of the people present, he said that if
the appointee did not behave well his official head would
be promptly removed. Surprise showed on almost
every face in the audience. They had become suffi-
ciently accustomed to the idea of being beheaded or
otherwise sent out of the world by their own people,
but had been led to believe that the Americans were a
htunane nation, and it took Mr. Taft at least five minutes
to explain his joke.
During the second week in March the commission
transferred its officers bodily to the United States Am^
Transport Sumner and started on a long journey in the
course of which it visited and established provincial
governments in eighteen provinces,* returning to Manila
on the 3d of May.
This trip was most interestii^ but dreadfully wearing.
Everywhere we were overwhelmed by the hospitaUty of
our Filipino friends. We arrived at some new place
nearly every morning, and the programme in each was
much the same. After an early breakfast we hurried
ashore, drove or walked about for a short time to see
what the town was like, and then attended a popular
meeting in its largest building, where we held long and
frank converse with the people on local conditions,
giving them every opportunity to air their views, with
the result that the local orators, of whom there were
usually more than a sufficiency, had an opportunity to
bring their heavy guns into action. Then followed a recess
in the course of which we partook of a very elaborate
lunch, and when possible conferred privately with in-
* Tayabu, Romblon, Masbate, Uotlo, Antique, Capiz, Cebt, Bohol,
Owridental Negros, Oriental KegrcM, Leyta, Albay, AmboB, Cama-
lines, Sonogon, Marinduque, Batangas, Surigao, and MlnuniB.
:dbvGoogIe
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIYIL OOVBENBIBNT 337
fluential men, often learning things which they did not
care to tell us in public. Then came another open meet-
ing at which the actual organization of the province was
effected and the officials were appointed and sworn in.
After this there was a long formal dinner, with the endless
courses which characterize such ftmctions in the Philip-
pines, and then came a ball which lasted till the wee small
hours. When at last we got on board, tired out, our
steamer sailed, and often brought us to some new place
by sunrise.
In several instances we did not pass the act organizing
a given province at the time of our visit, but for one
reason or another postponed action until a later date.
We visited a number of places like Jol6, Basilan, Zam-
boanga, Cotabato, Davao and Samar, where we had no
intention of establishing civil government, in order to
ol^erve local conditions.
We touched at Marinduque on our trip south, and foimd
that nothing could then be done there, but the better
element were anxious for a change, and we promised them
that if they would bring about certain specified results
before our return we would give them a provincial govern-
ment. They undertook to do so, and kept their word.
Needless to say we also kept ours.
We had grave doubts as to the advisability of estab-
lishing civil governments in Cebii, Bohol and Batangas.
In the first of these places the people were siillen and ugly.
In the second there was a marked disinclination on the
part of leading citizens to accept public office. There
had been a little scattering rifle fire on the outskirts of
the capital of the third very shortly before our arrival
there, but the organization of all these provinces was rec-
ooamended by the military authorities, and we decided
to try an experiment which could do little harm, as we
could return any one of them to military control in short
order should such a course seem necessary.
An effort has been made to make it appear that in
TOL. I — I
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
338 THE PHILIPFINEB FAST AND FBBSENT
organizing Cebii, Bohol and Batangas, we acted pre-
mattirely and upon oin: own initiative, thus complicating
the situation for the military authorities. I will let
Blount voice this complaint. He says in part : —
"In his report for 1901 Governor Taft says that the four
principal provinces, including Batangas, which gave trouble
shortly after the civil government was set up in that year,
and hod to be returned to military control, were organised
under civil rule 'on the recommendation' of the then com-
manding general (MacArthur). It certainly seems unlikely
that the haste to change from military rule to civil rule came
on the motion of the military. If the Commission ever got,
TO writing, from General MacArthur, a 'recommendation'
that any provinces be placed under civil rule while still in
insurrection, the text of the writing will show a mere Boldierly
acquiescence in the will of Mr. McKinley, the commander-
in-chief. Parol ' contemporaneous evidence will show that
General MacArthur told them, substantially, that they w»e
'riding for a fall.' In fact, whenever an insurrection would
break out in a province after Governor Taft'a inauguration as
governor, the whole attitude of the army in the Philippinee,
from the conunanding general down was 'I told you ao.
They did not say this where Governor Taft could bear it,
but it was common knowledge that they were much addicted
to damning 'politics' as the cause of all the trouble." •
Prophecy is always dangerous and when unneceBsary
seems rather inexcusable. I submit the essential portions
of the record to show exactly what we did get from General
MacArthur, and add the suggestion that it was really
hardly essential that he should make his recommendations
in writing, as he did, for the reason that he was a gentle-
man and would not have repudiated a verbal recommenda-
tion once made.
On February 5, 1901, Governor Taft wrote General
MacArthur a letter closing with the following paragraph : —
"As already conununicated to you the purpose of the Com-
mission is to make a Southern trip on the 23rd of F^rusiy,
or OS soon thereafter as practioable, with the idea of arran^og
■ Obviousl; a misprint, pwhaps, for " penual at." ' Blount, p. 380.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
II
1
bvGoogle
:dbvGoogIe
THE BSTABLISBUENT OF CIVIL QOVEBNMENT 339
for provincial governments there, md I am directed by the
ComioisBion to request your opinion as to the provinces in
which provincial governments may be safely establiBhed.
It is understood that Panay, Romblon, Tayabas, and possibly
one or two of the Camarines are ready for this. What has been
said with refermice to the Northern provinces apphes to these,
but we shall commimicate with you further as to the Southern
provinces wh^i we have been advised as to the possibility of
secunng a steamer."
On February 9, General MacArthur gave the following
instructions to the Commanding General, Department
of the Visayaa : —
"The Military Governor desires that you report to this
<^ce at the earliest date practicable the provinces in your
department that may be considered ready for the establish-
ment of civil goventments therdn and in this connection directs
me to say that it should not be considered as necessary that
complete pacification has been brought about in a province
before reporting it as ready for such government: that tbe
provincial civil governments to be established will doubtless
prove useful agents in the further work of pacification."
On February 27, that officer reported that in his opinion
Hoilo, Capiz, Oriental Negros and Occidental Negros
were ready ; that Antique might be in a few days, and
that Cebti, Bohol and Leyte were not. These facts were
reported to Governor Taft by General MacArthur on
March 4, and on the sameday Lieutenant>CoIonel Crowder
wrote to the commanding general of the Visayas : —
"The Military Governor directs me to say that he regards
the initiation of provincial civil government as an aid in the
work of pacification, in which view it is not necessary that a
province should be completely pacified as a condition to the
initiation of such government. He has expressed to the Com-
mission the opinion that you may be able, upon their arrival
at Iloilo, to submit a supplementary list of provinces In which
it would be advisable to establish at once these govenunents."
Meanwhile General MacArthur wrote on February 13,
to Governor Taft ; —
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
340 THE PHIUPPINEB FABT AND PRESENT
"In partial reply to your letter of the 5th uistant I have
the honor to inform you that the Commanding General, De-
partment of Southern Luzon, reports but one province, Taya-
Imb, aa ready at the present time for civil govemia^it. I add
the provincee of L^una, Batangas and Cavite, believing that
the institution of civil government in all these provinces will
be in aBsistance of the military authorities in the work of
pacification."
General MacArthur's communicationB seem to me to
show aomethii^ more than ' ' a mere soldierly acquiescence
in the will of Mr. McKinley," especially as the President
had no knowledge of these provinces, and never made any
recommendation whatsoever relative to the establishment
of civil government there.
Similarly, in establishing civil government in Cebu
and Bohol, the commission acted on the specific recom-
mendation of the military, and rather against its own
judgment. There seemed no very good reason for refus-
ing to try civil government, if the commanding general
wanted it tried, and when it failed, as it promptly did,
in Cebu, Bohol and Batangas, these provinces were
immediately returned to the full control of the military,
and left there until conditions became satisfactory.
Having escaped the perils of the deep, and the much
graver perils of tiie dinner table, during our southern
trip, we returned to Manila, wearier, wiser and sadder
men than when we started, for we had learned much of
the superstitions, the ignorance and the obseseions which
prevailed among the Filipinos, and we knew that many
of the men who from love of coimtry had accepted office
under ub had done so at the peril of their lives. We had
all had an excellent opportunity to come to know the
IHipinos. Their dignity of befuing, their courtesy,
their friendly hospitality, their love of impodng fimctions,
and of fiestas and display, their childishness and irre-
sponsibility in many matters, their passion for gambling,
for litigation and for political intrigue, even the loves and
the hatoeds of some of them, had be^ spread before us like
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE ESTABLISHMENT OP CIVIL GOVERNMENT 341
an open book. It is a fact that except for the inhabitanta
of Cebu, Bohol and Batangas, the people wanted what
we had to give them and were gratefti] for it. Never
before had they had their day in court, and they ap-
preciated it.
The establishment of civil government throughout so
large a proportion of the provinces in the islands would
have been impossible at this time had it not been for
the helpful activities of the Federal Party organized on
December 23, 1900, by many of the best and most in-
fluential f^pinos in the archipelf^ for the purpose of
aiding in the establishment of peace and order. Its
members were tireless in their activities. They suc-
ceeded in persuading many Insui^ent leaders to lay down
their arms, so that a normal condition could be restored in
territory which the latter had previously harried. They
convinced many of the common people of the true pur-
poses of the American government, and In nxunerous
other ways rendered invaluable services.
The officers and many of the members and agents of
this party were promptly sentenced to death by A|^-
naldo, and many of them were assassinated ; ' but the party
persisted in its efforts until success was attfuned.
During June of 1901 Professor Moses and I made
a horseback trip through Pangssin&n, La Union, Benguet,
Lepanto and Ilocos Sur, accompanied by our private
secretaries. Professor Moses was in wretched health
as the result of overwork and confinement, and needed
out-of-door exercise.
I had been intrusted with the drafting of legislation
for the government of the non-Christian tribes, and wanted
to learn as much about them as possible, so that I could
act intelligently.
We started from Dagupan mounted on horses kindly
furnished us by the army, and escorted by four mounted
infantrymen. None of us had ridden for years, and
> For further details see pp. 746 ; 753.
L.,,l,;.:M.,G00gIe
342 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
army officers were offering wagers that we would not get
as far as Bagiuo. At Mangaldan a cavalry outfit re-
placed our mounted infantrymen, and while Uie manbeni
of our new escort were resting under the shade of a tree
in the cemetery, I heard them voicing jo3^ul anticipations
of the easy time they were to have travelling with tender-
feet. I made up my mind to give them some healthful
exercise on the trip.
Having first visited the work at the lower end of the
Benguet Road and then travelled across country in a
driving storm over wretched trails, we reached Bau&ng,
our point of departure for the interior. Here I called
the sergeant in charge and asked him where were the extra
shoes for our horses. In some confusion he confessed
that he had brought none, whereupon I read him a homily
on the duties of a cavalryman, and sent the whole outfit
to San Fernando to get the horses reshod and provided
with extra shoes for the trip.
We arrived at Baguio in a howling typhoon. Wh^i we
emerged from the hills into the open, and our horses got
the full sweep of the storm, they at first refused to face it.
We forced them into it, however, and a few moments later
had found refuge in the house of Mr. Otto Scheerer, a hos-
pitable Grennan. The cavalrymen and the horses got in
under the building. It gave me great joy to hear throuj^
the floor the voice of the sergeant remarking, with much
emphasis of the sort best represented in print by dashes,
that if he had known the sort of a trip he was starting
on he would have been on sick report the morning of
his departure.
We waited in vain three days for the storm to end and
then rode on. Mr. Scheerer, who accompanied us, had
sent ahead to arrange for lunch at the house of a rich
Igorot named Acop, but when we arrived at this man's
place, soaked, cold, and hungry, we foimd it shut up.
He had not received the message and was away from home.
Investigation showed that our only resource in the com-
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE EBTABLISHUENT OF Civn. QOVERNUENT 343
missary line were Bome wads of sticky, unaalted, boiled
rice which oiir Igorot carriers had inside t^eir hats, in
contact with their frowsy hair. We bolted as much of
this as the Igorots coiild spare, killing its rather high
flavour with cayenne peppers picked beside the trail,
and continued our journey. In descending a steep hill
my horse stumbled and while attempting to recover
himself drove a sharp stone into his hoof and turned a
complete somersault, throwing me over his head on to
the rocks. When I got him up he was dead lame, and
I walked the rest of the way to Ambuklao, where we
arrived just at sunset.
This once prosperous little Igorot hamlet had been
burned by the Spaniards, for no apparent reason, during
their flight from the province in 1906, and we found only
two houses standing. They were naturally crowded.
I was 30 dead with fatigue that I threw my saddle on the
ground, and using it as a pillow, lay down in a couple of
inches of water and fell sound asleep. Later the Igorots
vacated one of the houses, and placed it at our disposal.
I spent the greater part of the night in a contest with an
old Igorot woman, who for the commendable purpose of
keying us warm tended a smoky pitch-pine fire, and shut
the door, which afforded our only means of ventUation,
every time I dropped asleep. Awakened by the stifling
smoke I would open it again, but as soon as I dozed she
would shut it. I finally solved the problem by lying
down with my head sticking out of the door.
The next day was bright and clear. We rested until
noon, drying out our belongings meanwhile, and then
continued our journey, visiting the Igorot settlements on
the Agno River and those in southern Lepanto and finally
reaching Cervantes, the capital of that sub-province.
The Igorots of Benguet and Lepanto received us with the
utmost friendliness, and when not in danger of breaking
our necks by falling over the edgM of the wretched trails,
we greatly enjoyed our trip.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
341 THE PHIIiIFFINBS FAST AND FHE8ENT
At CervanteB we were met by a delegation of Bontoc
Igorots, who b^^ed us to vMt thdr country, and we
were just preparing to do so when we received a tel^ram
recalling tis to Manila to be present at the inai^uration
of Mi. Taft aa civil governor. During our absence
the commission had established provincial governments
in Bizal, Cavite and Nueva Ecija. Mr. Taft was in-
ai^urated on July 4, 1901. Thenceforth he exercised
control over the provinces where civil government had
been establiBhed, while the mihtary governor continued
in charge of each of the remaining provinces until it
was duly organized and transferred to civil control.
In August, 1901, the conmiission s^ed on a tour of
the remaining northern provinces, visiting La Union,
DocoB Sur, Abra, nocos Norte, Cf^ayan, Isabela and
Zambalee in the order named, and establishing a govern-
ment in each. On the trip to Abra those members of the
commission not previously accustomed to roughing it
in the islands were given a novel experience, for we went
up the Abra River on bamboo rafts. However, a ver-
itable ship of state had been prepared for Governor Taft,
and no one suffered any great discomfort.
At Vigan, the capital of Ilocos, we narrowly escaped
drowning in the surf wh^i returning to our steamer. For
a time oiur good viray ' with some twenty oarsmen was
unable to make headway through the rolling waves. It
broached to, nearly filled with water, and struck the
bottom heavily several times. Some of the men quit
rowing and began to pray, whereupon General J. F. Bell,
who was sitting in the stem, rose to his feet, and shouted
at them until they became more afraid of him than c^
the sea, and pulled for dear life until we were out of danger.
Upon arrived at the ship we watched with interest the
progress of other boats tlm)ugh the surf, and were alarmed
to see the men in one madly divesting themselves of their
clothing. When it finally came alongside its occupants
* A native suif boat.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE ESTABLISHMENT OP CIVIL GOVERNMENT 34S
made flying leaps for the gangway, and we discovered
that a great hole had been knocked in Its bottom, and that
raincoats, ordinary coats, and trousers had been jammed
into this opening in order to keep the rapidly sinldng
craft afloat for a few moments.
In the Cagayan valley we had a taete of real tropical
heat. Never have I serai a man suffer more than did
Mr. Taft at Ilagan on the day when we established a pro-
vincial government for Isabela, and the night that fol-
lowed still lingers in my memory. The air was suffocating.
My bed was in a comer. I dragged it out between a
window and a door and threw both wide open. Still I
could not sleep. Slipping off my pajamas, I seated myself
on the broad window sill. The heat was intolerable. I
poured water over myself and resumed my seat in the
window. The water would not evaporate. I sat there
until morning, as I coidd not endure the heat lying down.
Such conditions are unknown throughout the greater
part of the archipelago, where cool sea breezes temper the
heat at all times. In the Cagayan valley an immense
plain is bordered by ranges of hi^ mountains to the east
and the west. They seem to shut off both monsoons to
a considerable extent, and there very trying heat is by
no means unusual.
On September 1, 1901, the first day of the second year
of actu^ service of the commisaion, a complete central
civil government was established. Commissioner Wright
waa appointed secretary of commerce and police ; Com-
missioner Ide, secretary of finance and justice; Com-
missioner Moses, secretary of public instruction, and I
myself secretary of the interior. The commission was
strengthened by the addition of three Filipino members :
Sefior Benito Legarda, Seftor Jos€ R. de Luzuiiaga, and
Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, all of whom were men of
exceptional ability and had rendered distii^piished service
in the establishment of peace and order.
Exc^t for the addition of one more Filipino on July
ixibvGoogle
346 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PHE8ENT
6, 1908, the organization of the commissioii has remained
unchanged up to the present time, although there have
been numerous changes in its personnd. The task which
lay before it was to enact a code of laws adapted to the
peculiar conditions existing in the Philippines, and this
was indeed a herculean undertaking. Its members
laboured unremittingly. Governor Taft and General
Wright were towers of strength in the early days. The
rest of us did what we could, and I, for one, am very proud
of the result. Certainly no one can ever claim Uiat the
commission was not industrious. Before it finally ceased
to be the legislative body of the islands it had passed some
eighteen hundred acts. Obviously, as it is not my pur^
pose to write an encyclopedia of law, I cannot discuss
them in detail, and must content myscjf with here barely
mentioning a few of the more important results obtained,
leaving the mqre detfuled discussion of some of thract for '
later chapters.
In general, it may be said that the additional bureaus
necessary for the work of the Insular government were
created, and ^ven proper powers. Civil govemm^it
was gradually extended to the entire archipelago.' The
criminal code was amended and supplemented by the
passage of new laws. The administration of justice was
reorganized and reformed.* An efficient native insular
police force was organized, and an admirable state of
public order brought about.* The health service was
extended to the provinces, and health conditions w&ce
greatly improved throughout the islands.* B^^o was
made accessible and became both the summer capital
and a health resort for the people of the islands.' The
scientific work of the government was coordinated, and
efiSciency and economy in its performance were insured.*
Primary and secondary schools were established through-
out the islands, supplemented by trade schools, and
' See Chapters XXI-XXIV. ' Chap. XV. ' Chap. XIV.
' Chap. XVI. ' Chap. XVII. ' Chap. XVIII.
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OuyfrrTLm Ckhtbai. School Bdiuhno.
Modern Cbntbai. School Buildino.
TUa atnioture u typical of the better-class school-houses constructed under
American rule.
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:dbvGoogIe
THE BBTABLISBMENT OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 847
a nonnal school at Manila.^ Legislation was enacted,
and submitted to the President and to Coi^^ress, coTerii^
the disposition of public lands.* The pxirchase of ex-
tensive estates belonging to catain reUgious orders, and
the sale of their holdings therein to tenants, was pro-
vided for.' Fairly adequate l^pslation for the protection
and development of the forest resources of the islands
was enacted.* Means of communication by land and
sea w^e greatly improved, and the development of com-
merce was thus stimulated.'^
It is a noteworthy fact that all of these things were
done with a per capita taxation of about $ 2.24 I
Another fundamentally important aid to the commercial
development of the islands was afforded by a radical ref-
ormation of the currency.
The islands under the sovereignty of Spain had their
own distinct silver coinage in peso, media peso, peeeta
aod media peseta pieces.
In 1878 the Spanish government, hoping to check the
heavy exportation of gold currency from the Philippines,
passed a law prohibiting the importation of Mexican
dollars, but allowed the Mexican dollars then in the islands
to continue to circulate as legal tender.
When the American troops arrived, there were in cir-
culation the Spanish-Philippine peso and subsidiary
silver coins ; Spanish pesos of different mintinga ; Mexican
peeos of different mintings ; Hongkong dollars, fractional
silver coins from different Chinese countries, and copper
coins from nearly every country in Uie Orient. Although
a law had been passed prohibiting the introduction
of Mexican dollars into the islands, they were being
constantly smugged in. Fluctuations in the price of
silver affected the value of the silver coins, and the money
in common use was in reality a commodity, worth on any
given day what one could get for it. These conditions
■ See Ctiapter XIX. * Chap. XXX. ' Cbajt. XXX.
* Chap. XXXI. • Chap. XXXH.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
348 THE FHILIFPINE8 PAST AND I^BOENT
affected most disastrously the business interests of the
islands. Merchants were forced to allow very wide
mftrgins in commercial transactions, because they did
not know what their goods would actually cost them in
local currency upon arrival. The most important busi-
ness of the local banks was in reahty that of exchange
brokers and note shavers. They hammered the exchange
rate down and bought silver, then boosted the rate
skyward and sold.
The American army brought in a large amoimt of gold,
but this did not remain in circulation long, as it was ex-
ported by the different business concerns, or hoarded.
United States silver money had a limited circulation
during the early days of American occupation, but it
passed at less than its true value. An effort was made
imder the military administration to keep the ratio of
exchai^ at two to one by the purchase from the public
of all United States currency offered at that rate to the
banks.
For a long time the banks refused to carry private
accounts in United States currency, but when it was
offered for deposit it was changed into Mexicans with
a heavy charge for the transaction, and an account opened
in Mexican currency to the credit of the depositor. If
the depositor afterward desired to get United States
currency, he gave a check for it at the then existii^ rate
of exchange. Such conditions were intolerable, and the
commission passed an act making it an offence to refuse
to accept for deposit the currency of the sovereign power,
but tUs did not remedy the fundamental difficulty.
There came a heavy slump in the price of silver. The
Insular government lost a very liu-ge sum because of the
decrease in value of its silver coin.
Mr. Charles A. Conant had been brought from the
United States to make a report on the feasibility of pro-
viding an Americfm coinage for the islands. He rec-
ommended that the unit of value should be a peso,
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE ESTABLISHMENT OP CIVII> GOVERNMENT 340
equivalent to fifty cents United States currency. Con-
jpress, by an act passed July 1, 1902, vested general au-
thority over the coinage in the Philippine government,
but the conunission decided not to take action until more
specific authority could be obtained from Congreea, as
the proposed reform was radical, and it was very important
that the new currency should at the outset command the
confidence so essential to its success.
After long discussion, Congress authorized, by an act
passed March 2, 1903, a new currency system based on
a theoretical peso of 12.9 grains of gold 900 fine, equivalent
to one-half of a United States gold doUar. The cir-
culating medium was to be the Philippine silver peso,
which was to be legal tender for all debts, public and pri-
vate, and its value was to be maintained on a parity with
the theoretical gold peso. For this purpose the creation
of a gold standfud, or gold reserve fund, was provided for,
and this fund was to be maintained and could be used
for no other purptffie.
Considerable difficulty was experienced in introducing
the new currency into the islands. The banks at first
failed to ^ve any assistance to the government. The
business men of Manila, and especially the Chinese, dis-
coimted the new Philippine peso, because it did not
contain as much silver as did the Mexican dollar. They
were quickly brought to time, and given to understand
where they stood if they discredited the currency of the
country.
The Spanish Philippine coios and the Mexican coins
in circulation were collected by the treasmy and ex-
ported to the San Francisco mint, where they were re-
minted into new coins of the weight and fineness prescribed
by law.
The establishment of a gold standard ftmd to main-
tain the parity between the gold and silver dollar was
quickly effected by the sate of exchange on the United
States in accordance with the established law, at a cost
•DiaiiizMbvGoOgle
360 THE PHILIPPINES FAST AND PBE8BNT
eetimated to be the same as the transportation of the gold
coin itself.
The army, by direction of the secretary of war, ceased
to pay in United States money, and its paymasters were
given credit at the Insular Treasury, where they obtained
the necessary funds in Philippine currency.
The government also authorized, in addition to the
coinage of silver, the issuance of paper money in two,
five, and ten peso notes. All of the coins and bills were
readily interchangeable with the United States coins in
common use, the dollar being worth two pesos, the half
dollar one peso, the twenty-five cent piece a half peso,
the ten-eent piece a peseta, the five-cent piece a media
peseta and the cent two centavos.
Unf ortxmately the silver value of the new peso was such
that when the price of silver again rose, its bullion value
was greater than its money value, and in consequence
coins of this denomination were hoarded and exported.
It proved necessary to prohibit their deportation, and to
issue new coins of less bullion value, but this was the only
really serious difficulty attending a fundamental reform
which put the currency on a sound basis. The ordinal
p^os were recoined and a handsome profit made on the
transaction.
No one who has not Uved in a country where the
circulating medium is constantly fluctuating in value can
fully appreciate the enormous benefit conferred on the
Philippine Islands by this important reform.
Another reform of far-reaching importance was the
readjustment of the burden of taxation so that it should
bear Ughtly on the necessities of life, and heavily on its
luxuries. This was a complete reversal of the scheme
which we found in force, imder which wheat fiour and
kerosene oil paid very heavy import duties while c^ars
and champagne were lightly taxed. ,
We imposed export taxes on certain products of the
country. Such tfuies are objected to by many political
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE ESTABLISHBIENT OF CIVIL OOTERNMENT 351
economists, but were approved of by the Filipinos, who
strongly opposed the imposition of a. logical and very
necessary personal tax to provide funds for the con-
struction and maintenance of highways and bridges. It
is usually wise, when practicable, to obtain funds for
necessary governmental piurposes by the imposition of
taxes which are willingly paid.
1^. Taft resigned the governorship of tbe Philippines
to become secretary of war, his resignation taking effect
'January 31, 1904. He had performed a monumental
work for the Filipinos, and for htunanity at large, during
his years of service In the islands, and carried with him
the good will of most of the people whom he had so
faithfully, efficiently and self-sacrifioingly served. He had
at one time very gravely impaired his health by hard work,
and when the opportunity came to satisfy a lifelong
ambition by accepting appointment as a Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, he had passed it by,
in order to perform his duty to the people of the Philippine
Islands. As secretary of war, and as President of the
United States, he availed himself of every opportimity
which these high offices afforded to help the Fihpinos, and
to increase the prosperity of their coimtry. They have had
no better friend, and no other friend whom they have
ever had has b^n so useful to them. One more proof
of his real greatness is afforded by the fact that to-day,
after being reviled by many Filipino poUticians whom he
befriended, who have succeeded to a large degree in
making the common people of the Philippines consider
him their enemy, his interest in the people of the Islands
is as keen, and his eagerness to help them is as great,
as in the early days when they acclaimed him their
deUverer.
General Luke £. Wright, a democrat of Memphis,
Tennessee, was appointed by President Roosevelt civil gov-
ernor in Mr. Taft's place. He rendered his country and
the Filipinos most distioguiahed service. It is one thing
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
362 THE PHDCIFPINES PAST AND PRESENT
to build up a great govemment, with numerous political
appointments at one's disposal, and anotlier to stand by
and keep it running smoothly and efficiently, when a lot
of disappointed politicians, who have seen their last hope
of political preferment go a-^imjnering, are throwing
sand into the bearings of the machine. This latter class
had begun to plot against Governor Taft before his
resignation took effect, but their machinations were
rendered fruitless by the wave of regret ndsed by his
coming departure.
They now devoted themselves, with a good deal of
success, to injiuing Governor Wright, who declined to be
dictated to, in the matter of appointments, by the Federal
Party, and aroused the ire of many poliUcians by occa-
sioually tdling the Fihpinos impalatable but wholesome
and necessary truths relative to their fitness for immedi-
ate independence.
General Wright, whose title had been changed from
governor to governor-general on February 6, 1905, went
on leave diuing the latter put of that year, fully expect-
ing to return and resume his work in the Philippines, but
the islands were not to see him again. He resigned,
effective April 1, 1906, to become United States Ambas-
sador to Japan. In my opinion, the acceptance of his
resignation at this time was one of the gravest mistakes
ever made in the Philippine policy of the United States.
The islands were deprived of the services of a very able
and distii^uuhed man, thoroughly conversant with their
needs, who had the courage of his convictions, and whose
convictions were thoroughly sound.
Certain Filipino politicians openly boasted that they
had secured his removal, and they and their ilk were en-
couraged to put forth new and pernicious efforts. Had
General Wright returned to the islands much of the po-
litical unrest from which they have since suff^ed would
have been avoided. He was beloved by his associates,
who fdt a sense of personal loss when they learned that
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL QOVEBNUENT 353
the places which had known him in The Philippines would
know him no more.
He was succeeded for the brief period of five and a half
months by Judge Henry C. Ide, vice-governor and secre-
tary of finance and justice, who had performed his
duties while he was on leave. Judge Ide was a repubh-
can, from Vermont. He resigned on September 19, 1906.
He was succeeded by General James F. Smith, a dono-
crat from California, who had come to the islands as a
colonel of volunteers, and had won promotion because of
his valuable services in the Visayas, and more especially
in the idand of N^ros, where he had earned the good will
of the Filipinos by his tact and kindness. Later he bad
served, unwillingly, as head of the Manila custom house.
He was subsequently made a justice of the supreme
court of the Philippines. A lawyer by profession, he
had resigned this position with regret to accept appoint>'
ment, on January 1, 1903, as secretary of public instruc-
tion. He did not desire the governor-generalship and
made a strong but unsuccessful effort to avoid accepting
the position, which he finally took from a sense of duty.
He was a good lawyer, with a big heart, and a keen insight
into human nature. He thorou^y understood the
Filipinos, and he made an excellent governor-general.
It was during his term of office that the Philippine Le^s-
lature, composed of an upper appointive house, the
Philippine Commission, and a lower elective house, the
Philippine Assembly, met for the first time on October 16,
1907.
I devote a separate chapter* to the Phihppine Legis-
lature and its work, so need not discuss it here. Suffice
it to say that such success as attended the work of this
body during its inaugund, first and special sessions, was
very largely due to the tactful influence of Governor-
General Smith, who gave the speaker of the assembly
much valuable, friendly counsel, and kept the two houses
■ Chapter XXVII.
VOL. I — 2 a
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
364 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AMD PRESEKT
working in comparative harmony. Having strug^ed
through one session of the lepslature, Governor-General
Smith felt at liberty to resign. He greatly desired to
leave the Philippine government service and return to
the practice of his profession. His resignation was re-
luctantly accepted, about a year after he had tendered it,
and he left the service on November 10, 1909.
He was succeeded by Vice-Governor W. Cameron
Forbes, a repubUcan from Massachusetts, who had
accepted appointment as secretary of commerce and
police on June 15, 1904. A man of independent
means, Mr. Forbes entered the public service only be-
cause of the opportunity for greater usefulness which
was thus afforded him. He brought to bear on the
problems which confronted him as secretary of com-
merce and police intelligence and ability of a very h^
order. Wide practical experience in the management
of large business interests had admirably fitted him to
improve the o]^;anization and increase the efficiency of the
insular police force, and to mature and carry out plans
for bettering means of communication and otherwise
facilitating and stimulating the normal, healthful com-
mercial development of the islands. I have devoted
several chapters to the discussion of the results accom-
plished along these lines,' and will not attempt here to
enumerate them.
Like all of his predecessors, he brought to the office
of governor-general mature experience gained on the
groimd, having been in the service more than five years
at the time of his promotion.
As governor-general, he not only retained his keen
interest in the large problems which had previously
engaged his attention, and laboured imceasingly and most
successfully in the performance of the duties of his new
office, but took an especial interest in the development
of the summer capital, and in the work for the non-
> Chaptera XIV, XXII, XXIII and XXIV.
L.,,l,;.:M.,G00gIe
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THE BBTABUaHUEHT (Of CPfJL OOVERNUENT 355
Christian peoples of the islands, devoting a muoh greater
amount of time and attention to familiarizing himself
with the needs of this portion of the population than had
ever previously been given to it by any governor-general.
He visited the Moros and the Bukit^ons in the south,
and the Negritos, the Benguet Igorots, the Lepanto
Igorots, the Bontoc Igorots, the IloDgots, the Ifugaos,
the Kahngas, and both the wild and the civilized Tingians,
in the north, repeatedly inspecting the several sub*
provinces of the Mountain Province.
Through his generosity in making proper grounds
available, public interest in outdoor sports was greatly
stimulated at Manila and at Baguio, while his own
participation in polo, baseball and golf was a good example
to Americans and Filipinos alike, in a country where
vigorous outdoor exercise is very necessary to the physical
development of the yoimg and the preservation of the
healthof the mature. Hewas a true friend of the Filipinos,
whom he genuinely liked and was always ready to assist.
His personal influence wasa powerful factor intheauccess of
the very important work carried on at the Philippine Normal
School and the Philippine Training School for Nurses.
During his term of office the prosperity of the islands
increased by leaps and bounds, public order became better
than ever before in their history, and the efficiency
of the civil service reached its maximum. No other
governor-general ever drew so heavily on his private
means in promoting the pubhc good, and it was the
irony of fate that he should have been accused, by
certain irresponsible anti-imperiahsts, of using his pubOo
office to promote his private interests. Near the end of
his administration grossly and absurdly false charges
were made gainst him on the floor of the House by
Representative TTilliam A. Jones. As their falsity has
been conclusively and finally shown,' I will not here lend
impori;ance to them by repeating them. No official
* Reply to J<met, Famiddet, Manila, 1913.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
3S6 THE PHILIPPINB8 PAST AND PBESENT
has ever given any countiy a cleaner admiiiistration than
Governor-General Forbes gave the Philippines.
It was his fortune to be in office at the time of the change
in the national administration of the United States.
Aft^ continuing to serve for months with no ogn from
Washington as to whether his resignation was desired, he
was advised by the Chief of the bureau of insular affairs
that the appointment of Mr. Francis Burton Harrison,
idio is a Tammany Hall democrat, as his succeesor had
been sent to the Senate,' and three days after its confinna-
tion received a curt request for his resignation to be
effected in a week and a day. He was aim requested to
employ servants for Mr. Harrison. Spaniards who read
on the public streets newspapers which printed this
message were seen to tear them up and stamp on the
pieces I Our Spanish friends are accustomed to expect
courtesy in connection with the removal of faithful and
efficient public servants.
All other governors-general had taken the oath of
office at Manila. Mr. Harrison took it at Washington
on September 2, 1913. He is the first American governor
of the islands who has entered upon his high duties with-
out previous experience in the country which he is to
govern, and he has as y«t displayed little inclination to
profit by the experience of either Filipino or American
administeative insular officials of high rank. It is too
soon to discuss any feature of his adniinistration other
than his attitude toward the civil service, which I take up
elsewhere,' and I can only ejqjress the hope that when he
has gained that knowledge which can come only throu^
personal observation on ^e ground, he will grow to be a
wise, strong, conservative official.
The estabhshment of civil government in the Fhihppine
Islands under American rule was a gradual evolution up
to the time of the assumption of control by Govemoi^
General Harrison.
' See pp. 376-77.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL QOVBRNMBNT 357
I will not attempt to follow in detail all of its aucceasive
stages, but in closing this chapter will endeavour briefly
to summarize the results obtained up to that time.
The Philippines now have two delegates to the Congress
of the United States appointed by the legislature in
accordance with the provision of Section 8 of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902. Both are Filipinos.
The rankii^ executive officials of the insular govern-
ment are a governor-geQeral, a secretary of the interior,
a secretary of finance and justice, a secretary of com-
merce and police and a secretary of public instruction.
AH of these officers are appointed by the Premdent, subject
to confirmation by the Senate. The secretary of finance
and justice is a Filipino; the other secretaries of de-
partments are Americans.
There is a legislature composed of two houses known
respectively as the Philippine Commission and the
Fhihppine Assembly. The Philippine Commission is
composed of nine members ; five are the governor
general and the four secretaries of department ex officio,
and four are appointed by the President subject to con-
firmation by the Senate. Four of the members are
Filipinos and five are Americans.'
The Philippine Assembly is composed of eight-one
elected members, all of whom are Filipinos. They
represent thirty-four of the thirty-nine provinces into
which the uvhipelago is divided. The two houses of
the legislature have equal powers. Neither has any
special privil^e in the matter of initiating legiBlation,
and affirmative action by both is required in order to
pass it. The Moro Province, the Mountain Province
and the provinces of Nueva Yizcaya and Agusan
are not represented in the assembly, nor are they
subject to the jurisdiction of the PhiUppine Legislature.
The Philippine Commission alone has legislative juris-
diction over them, their population being largely com-
■ Undw the new regime these flguree have been reversed.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
858 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND FBESBNT
posed of Moros, or members of other non-Christiui
tribes.
The provinces may be divided into regularly organized
provinces governed under the provincial government act,
and specially oi^anized provinces, which include the More
Province, the Mountain Province and the provinces of
Mindoro, Palawan, Agusan and Nueva ViBCaya, of which
the first is governed under a special law and the remainii^
four are governed under a different one known as "The
Special Provincial Government Act."
Regularly organized proviaces have a governor and
a treasurer. The governor is elected, and the treasurer
is appointed by the governor-general with the approval
of the commission. These two oflicials, with another
known as the third member, constitute a provincial
board. The third member is elected. As the Filipinos
usually elect to office men from among their own people,
practically all of the elective provincial officers are
Filipinos, as are ten of the appointive officers, it
having been the policy to appoint Filipinos whenever
possible.
Regularly organized provinces are divided into munici-
palities which elect their own officers and control their
own afffurs for the most part. Provincial treasurers
have intervention in municipal expenditures, which are
approved in advance for each fiscal year, and municipal
officers may be removed for misconduct by the governor-
All o&.(xira of the six special government provinces are
appointed by the govemor-^neral with the approval
of the commission.
There are four regularly organized municipalities in
these provinces, but the remainder of their territory is
divided into townships, which elect their own officers,
except their secretary-treasurers, who are appointed by
the provincial governor; and into rancherias or settle-
ments, with all of their officials appointed by the pro-
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE ESTABLISHMENT OP CIVIL OOVERNMEI^ 359
vincial governor. This latter form of local government
is confined to the more primitive wild people.
The judiciary is independent. The details of its or-
ganization will be found in Chapter XV.
Three of the seven justices of the supreme court, in-
cluding the chief justice, are Filipinos, as are approx-
imately half of the judges of the courts of first instance
and practically all justices of the peace.
At the close of the fiscal year endii^ June 30, 1913,
71 per cent of the employees in the clasafied civil service
of the islands were Filipinos painstakingly trained for
the positions to which they had been appointed.
I^or to the American occupation, the FiUpinos had
practically no intervention in the government of their
country.
The chai^^ introduced in the twelve years since the
establishment of civil government began are of a sweeping
and radical nature. For reasons hereinafter fully set forth,
I believe they have been somewhat too sweeping, and too
radical. At all events, it is now certainly the part of
wisdom carefully to analyze their results before going
further.
X deem the subject of the establishment of civil govern-
mental control over the non-Christian tribes of the
Philippines worthy of special consideration.*
> See Cawpten XX-XXIV.
:dbvGoogIe
CHAPTER Xm
The Philippine Citil Sbbtics
Before the Philippine Commission left Washington, a
clear understanding was reached with the President and
secretary of war to the effect that no pohtical appointee
whatsoever should under any circumstances be forced
upon us. After arrival at Manila early attention was
given to the drafting of a civil service act by Mr. Taft,
who was forttmate in having the assistance of Mr. Frank
M. Kiggins, chief of the examining division of the United
States Civil Service CommlBsion. The passage of this
act and its strict enforcement led to very favourable com-
ment in the United States. In his first umual message
President Roosevelt said : —
"It ia important to have this system obtain at h<Hne, but it
is even more important to have it r^dly appUed in our insular
"The merit gystem is simply one method of securing honest
and efficient administration of the government, and in the long
nm the sole justiEcation of any type of government liee in its
proving iteelf both honest and efficient."
Secretary Root also gave us his fullest auppwrt, calling
attention to the fact that the law which we had passed
was of a very advanced type, and that under such cir-
cumstances as confronted us, the securing of the best men
available should outweigh, and indeed practically exclude,
aJI other considerations.
Our action met with the xmqualified approval of or-
ganizations which especially interest themselves in the
maintenance of clean and efficient public service, such
as the Cambridge (Massachusetts) Civil .Service Reform
seo
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE PHILIPPINE CIVIL 8BRVICB 361
Association * and the National Civil Service Reform
League, whose committee on civil service in depen-
dencies spoke in very high terms of existing conditions
in the Philippines.'
In its first annual report the Civil Sra^ce Board called
attention to some of the more important provisions of
the Act in the following words : —
"Competitive examinationa must, whenever practicable,
be held for original entrance to the service, and promotions of
employees must also be baaed upon competitive examinations,
in which the previous experience and efficiency of employees
shall be given due consideration. The examinations for en-
trance to the service must be held in the United States and in
the Philippine Islands, and applicants are required to be tested
in both English and Spanish.
"Disloy^ty to the United States of America as the supreme
authority io the Islands is made a complete disquahfication for
holding office, and every applicant for admission to the service
must, before being- admitted to examination, take the oath of
loyalty. By an amendment to the Civil Service Act on Jan-
uary 2S, 1901, it is further declared that all persons in arms
against the authority of the United States in the PbiUppiQe
Idande, and all persons aiding or abetting them, on the first
day of April, 1901, shall be ineligible to hold office.
"A minimiim age limit of eighteen years and a maximum
age limit of forty years are fixed for those who enter the lowest
grades in the service. This avoids the difficulty and embarrasa-
> "The merit s^tem has received renewed support from President
BooMvelt in his administration, and by the exteDsion of civil service
throngAout the nation, as well as in our new possessions. The Philip-
pine servioe is reported to be very satisfactory, and efforts are being
made for the extension and larger development of regulations in Porto
Rioo."
■ "From the Preddent down, every official charged with a duty
tovobing the government of our dependencies is imbued with a pro-
(oimd sense of duty, and adequate realization of the situation and the
imperative neoesdty of an unselfish, patriotic execution of the laws and
reffnlationa in the interest of the highest welfare of the inhabitants of the
dependendes. With this state of affaira, the establishment of the
mMit system in them on an enduring basis should follow ae a matter
of course. It will be the aim of this Committee to aid in every possible
way in extending and improving the system, and to that end to give
to the whole subject oareful and detailed study."
:dbvGoogIe
:dbvGoogIe
THE PHILIPPINli CITIL BSRTICB 803
"From its aervice records the Board is required to compile
atmutJly, for publication on January 1, a roster of tiie officers
and employees under the Philippine Government.
"Applications from employees, classi&ed and unclassified,
for accrued and sick leave for more than two days must be made
on a form prescribed by the Board and forwarded to it for veri-
fication of service record and previous leave granted and for
recommendation before final action is taken by the Civil Gov-
ernor or Secretary of Department."
These extracts from official reports clearly show that
the act was indeed of a very advanced type, and if hon-
estly enforced would of necessity lead to tiie establish-
ment and maintenance of "an efficient and honest civil
service," for which purpose it was enacted.
In 1905 the insular govKrmnent dispensed with boards
as administrative agencies, and in accordance with this
general policy, a bureau of civil service with a director
at its head was substituted for the Civil Service Board,
thus securing greater adniinistrative efficiency and in-
creased economy.
At first the Civil Service Act applied to comparatively
few positions, as only a few bureaus and offices had been
created, but as the government was organized and grew,
the different bureaus and offices were placed in the classi-
fied service, the acts organizing them leaving in the un-
classified service positions to which in the judgment of
the commission the examination requirements of the
act should not apply. Ultimately these requirements
were made applicable to the treasurers of ail mtmici-
palities and to all positions, including teachers, in the
executive and judicial branches of the central govern-
ment, the provincial governments, and the governments of
the cities of Manila and Baguio, except a few specifically
excepted by law, which for the most part are unclassified
or exempt in almost all governments, national, state and
municipal, having civil service laws. None of the states
of the Union has such a widely extended classification of
its civil service.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
364 THE PHIUPPINBS PAST AND PRESENT
With the exception of the positions specifically placed
in the unclassified service by law and of appointaients
made by the Philippine Commission, all positions in the
Philippine civil service are classified and must be filled by
appointees who have passed civil service examinations.
Neither the governor-general nor the Bureau of Civil
Service can, by the promulgation of civil service rules,
or in any other manner whatever, transfer any position
from the classified to the tmclassified service or except
from examination any position in the classified service.
Under moat of the civil service laws of the United States
the President or the governor of the state has authority
to transfer positions from the non-claseified or exempt«i
class to the competitive classified civil SOTvice or vice
versa, these powers sometimes leading to manipulation
of the civil service rules for political purposes.
In the Phihppines, where emergencies, such as cholera
epidemics, sometimes lead to the employment of large
bodies of temporary employees without examination,
when the emergency has passed the temporary employees
have always been discharged ; and no employee has ever
received classification without examination on account
of temporary service. This is in marked contrast to
the practice in the United States, where large bodies of
employees taken on for temporary service due to emet^
genciee, such as the war with Spain, are not infrequently
blanketed into the classified service without examination.
In its last annual report the board recommended that
a number of official positions in the unclassified service
be placed in the classified service, and gave as a reason
therefor that such action would "add to the attractive-
ness of the classified service by increasing the oppor-
tunities therein for promotion to responsible positions."
This recommendation was adopted by providing that all
vacancies in the positions of heads and assistant heads of
bureaus or offices and of superintendents shall be filled by
promotion, with or without examination, in the discie-
DiqiiiiJbvGoogle
THE FHIUPPIHE CIVIL SERVICE 366
tioD of the civil gomnor or proper head of a department,
of persons in the classified dvU service, if competent
persons are found therein.
This provision is an important and distinguishing
feature of the PhiUppine Civil Service Act. The federal
civil service has none comparable with it. It is of ^lecial
value in that it induces young men of exceptional ability
and training to enter the lower grades, for they have the
certainty that faithful and efficient work will in the end
earn for them the highest poBitions.
On February 25, 1909, the director of civil service
made the following statement with respect t<r the ob-
servance of the law : —
"A careful study of Act 5 and all acts amendatory thereof
frill show that there baa be^t no change in the policy adopted
by the Conunisfflon at the outset to ^end the claseiEed ser-
vice as widely as possible and to fill by promotion all the higher
positions bo far as practicable. The provision requirii^ the
higher positions to be filled by promotion so far as practicable
has always been regarded by the Philippine Commission, by
this Bureau, and by others interested in obtaining the beet
poedble government service in the Philippines as one of the
most important providons of the Civil Service Act. It has
been faithfully observed by all Governors-General. . . . With
the exception of the positions of Governor-General and Secre-
taries of Departments, the Philippine Civil Service Act requires
the highest positions in the executive civil service, namely,
chiefs and assistant chiefs of Bureaus and Offices, to be filled
by promotion from the entire service in all cases except when
in the opinion of the appointing power there is no person com-
petent and available who possesses the qualifications required,
and this provision has be^ faithfully observed heretofore."
The enforcement of the law by the commission has
received the followii^ commendation from 'the executive
committee of the National Civil Service Reform League : —
"We have further to note with satisfaction the course of the
PhiUppine Commission, by which, if it be persevered in, the
merit system will be established in the Islands of that archi-
peli^ at least as thoroughly and consistently as in any d^»rt-
U.,:,,l,;.d:,G00gIe
386 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PBE8ENT
meat of gOTemment, Federal, State, or Mtinicipal, m the
Union. 'Hus must be, in any case, regarded bb a gratifying
recognition of sound principles of admmistration on the part
of the Commisdon, and justifies the hope that, within the Umita
of their jurisdiction at least, no repetition of the scandals of
post-belliun days will be tolerated."
Up to the time of the appointment of GoverDor-GreneTal
Harrison the provi^ons of the Civil Service Act and rules
were firmly supported by all of the governors-general
and secretaries of departments, and the annual reports
of the governor-general uniformly expressed sat^fao-
tion with their practical operation. Mr. Taft was always
an enthusiastic supporter of the merit system.
Governor-General Forbes in his inaugural address made
the following statements : —
"It ia necessary that the civil service should be r^dly main-
tEuned and its rules carefully observed. One very distinguished
Fihpino has recently been appointed to administrative control
of one of the most important departments of the Government,
equal in rank to any executive position in the Islands with the
exception of the Eixecutive head. In the executive branch of
the Government, the IHipinization of the service must steadily
continue. As vacancies occur Fihpinos will be gradually sub-
stituted for Americans as rapidly as can be done without posi-
tive detriment to the service. At the same time, care will be
taken to provide a suitable career for honest and capable
Americans who have come out here in good faith. They should
know that during good behavior and efficient performance of
their duty they are secure in their positions, and that when
they desire to return to the United States an effort will be made
to place them in the civil service at home.
"I want no better men than the present officers and em-
ployees of the Government, Americans and Filipinos. They
compare favorably with any set of men I have ever seen both as
regards abiUty and fidehty to duty."
Under the operation of the Civil Service Act the pro-
pori^ion of Filipinos employed has increased from 49 per
cent, in 1903, to 71 per cent in 1913, aa is shown by the
following table : —
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
TEtB PHILIPPINE CIVIL SERVICE
GOHPABIBON OF FbRCBNTAOOS OF AhEIUCANB AlO)
Filipinos in the Sbkvicb
NtmauM
Bwixnui
FUipbiM
1903 .
61%
49%
1904 .
49
61
1906 .
45
66
19061.
1907 .
40
60
1908 .
38
62
1909 .
38
62
1910 .
36
64
1911 .
36
66
31
29
1913
71
For the first few years after the establishment of the
government large numbers of Americans were appointed,
as there were comparatively few Fihpino candidates with
the necessary educational qualifications. During the
last two years, 89 per cent of the persons appointed in
the islands have been Filipinos.
There has been a great increase in the number of Fili-
pinos entering the civil service examinations in English.
Ten years ago 97 per cent of those examined took their
examinations in Spanish, while during last year 89 per
cent of those examined took examinatioim in English,
the total number so examined being 7755. Ahnost all
appointees for ordinary clerical work are now FilipinoB,
but the supply of bookke^>ers, stenographers, civil en-
gineers, physicians, veterinarians, surveyors, chemists,
bacteriologists, agriculturists, horticulturists, constabu-
lary officers, nurses, electricians, mechanical engineers,
and other scientific employees is still insufficient to meet
the demands of the service. Only one Filipino has passed
> No data, for 1906 avMlabte.
:dbvGoogIe
368 THK PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
the stenographer examinatioD in English dnce the or^n-
ization of the government, and it is necessary each year
to bring many American stenographers from the United
States. A few Filipinos pass each year the junior steno-
grapher examination ' and are able to fill some of the
positions which would formerly have required the ap-
pointment of Americans.
The salaries paid to executive officials, chiefs of bureaus
and offices, chief clerks, and chiefs of divisions equal in
many instances those paid to officials occupying similar
positions in the service of the United States government.
In the legislative branch the speaker receives $8000
per annum. Members of the Philippine Commisaott
without portfolios receive $7500 per annum. Members of
the Philippine Assembly receive $15 a day for each day
in which the assembly is in session.
In the executive branch secretaries of departments
receive $15,500 per annum each, including $5000 recdved
by them as members of the Philippine Commission. The
executive secretary receives $9000 per annimi. The
salaries of other bureau chiefs range from $2500 per
annum to $7500.
The justices of the Philippine Supreme Court recdve
$10,000 per annum. Judges of courts of first instance
receive from $4500 to $5500.
The following extracts from an article by the chairman
of the Philippine Civil Service Board ^ve information
with respect to salaries in the FhiUppLne Islands, as com-
pared with salaries paid in surrounding British and Dutch
colonies : —
"The saJariee paid officials in all branches of the sorice of
the Straits Settlements are generally lower than those pud in
the Philippine civil service. In this connection, however, it
is only just to state that the population and extent of the
territory tinder British control, and the expenses of living, are
less thui in the PhiUppinee, while the difficulty ctf the prob-
> Eigjit passed iMt tmt.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE PHILIPPINE CTVIL SERTICB 360
teiDB to be solved is not bo great. The salaries pud to Datives
who fill the lower grade positions in the civil service of the Phil-
ippine Islands are three and four times as great as the salaries
pud to natives in similar classes of work in the civil service of
the British Malay colonies.
"A study of the colonial civil service of the Dutch in the
islands of Java and Madura gives us somewhat differ^it
results. , , .
"The matter of salaries is peculiarly interesting. The
comparison made above of the compensations received by the
high officials in the civil service of the Tfagli^ih colonies and by
those in the Philippines does not hold good when applied to the
Dutch in Java. In fact, the salary of the Governor-General of
Java is somewhat remarkable in contrast with that of the Civil
Governor of the Philippines. As is well known, the latter
receives $20,000, while the salary of the Govemor-Oreneral ^
Java amounts to 132,000 gulden or something over (53,000.
The American official is given, in addition, free transportation
on all official investigations and free use of the governor's
palace, but not the cost of maintenance. On the other hand,
the Dutch governor is granted 51,000 gulden (about $21,500)
as personal and household expenses and travel pay.
"The general secretary of the government receives 24,000
gulden (19648), as compared with the executive secretary of
the Philippine government, whose salary is $7500.* Hie
seven heads of departments in the Javanese service each re-
ceive a like compensation of 24000 gulden. The Raad, or
Council, of the Dutch colonial government is composed of a
vice-pr^ident and four members — the former receiving about
$14,500, the latter slightly over $11,500 each. In the Phil-
ippine government the executive functions of heads of depart-
ments are exercised by four members of the legislative body,
each of whom receives $10,500 for his executive services and
$5000 for his legislative duties. Without going further into
detful, the conclusion is evident that all officials of high rank
are much better paid in the Dutch service. When a compari-
son is made between the chief clerks and other office employees
of middle grades — not natives — the salaries are seen to be
about the same in the two countries.
"All natives in positions of lower grades, however, in the
Philippine Islands fare better than their Malay brethren, either
in the Straits Settlements or in the East Indies." — (Second
Annual Report of the Philippine Civil Service Board, pp. 60, 61.)
' He now reoedvee $9000.
-2b
:dbvGoogIe
370
THE PHIUPPINES PAST AND I^BSENT
"Inference in salaries for subordiaate pojritioiiB in the
British and Dutch colonial servicce and the Philippine service
are distinctly in favour of Bubordiaate employees in the Philip-
pine service; only the higher officials, after \<mg experience,
in the British colonial service receive larger salaries than oorre-
spending officials in the Philippine service ; the leave of absence
and other privileges for the Philippine service are not leas
liberal than for other colonial services." — (Report of tbe
Philippine Commissioa for 1905, p. 74.)
The entrance aalaries of Am^cans brought to the
islands are considerably in excess of tbe entrance Balaries
received on appointment to the civil service in the United
States.
The following table shows tbe Tninimnm entrance
salaries given to Americans appointed in the United
States to the United States civil service, as shown by
the manual of examinations of the United States Civil
Service Commission for the fall of 1913, and to Ameri-
cans appointed in the United States to the Philippine
Civil Service : —
Aid (Surveyor)
Civil Engweer , .
Forester, assistant
Scientific Assistant,
(Agricultural InHpector),
Physician . . .
Printer ....
Stenographer . .
Trained Nurse . .
Teacher ....
$1400
1400
1400
1400
1600
2000
1200
600 Board,
quarters and laundry
1000
1600
$ 900
1200
1200
600
1820
.SOparhonr
700
600 and laondiy
The following cases taken from the official rosters
show some promotions to the highw positions in the
service of employees who entered the lower ranks of the
classified service : —
:dbvGoogIe
PaiLlFFINE EUB HOI DEBT.
S8 done by a pupil in one of the Manila city sohooU.
:dbvGoogIe
bvGoogle
THE PHILIPPINB CIVIL BBEVICE 371
A clerk who entered the service m 1899 at S1800 p^
annum waa appointed in 1903 an assistant chief of bureau
at $3000 per annum and in 1908 executive secretary at
$9000 per annum. A teacher appointed in 1899 at $720
per annum was appointed a chief of an office at $4000
per annum and in 1912 a jut^ at $4600 per annum.
A teacher who entered the service in 1901 at $1200 p^
aimimi was in 1909 appointed a chief of a bureau at $6000
per annum. A teacher who entered the service in 1904 at
$1000 per annum was appointed in 191 1 an assistant chief
of a bureau at $6000 per annum. A clerk who entered
the service in 1901 at $1200 per annum was appointed in
1909 an assistant chief of the executivebureau at $3750 per
annum and in 1912 a chief of a bureau at $6000 per annum.
A stenographer who entered the service in 1903 at $1400
per annum was in 1908 appointed an assistant chief of a
bureau at $5000 per annum. A transitman who entered
the service in 1905 at $1400 per annum waa in 1913 ap-
pointed an assUtant chief of a bureau at $4500 per an-
num. An accountant who entered the service in 1901
at $1800 per annimi was in 1907 appointed an assistant
chief of a biireau at $3750 per annum and in 1909 a chief
of a bureau at $6000 per annum. A hiw clerk who en-
tered the service in 1904 at $1800 per annum was in 1913
appointed judge at $4500 per annum. In no service any-
where has promotion depended more directly on demon-
strated ability, and in many instances it has been rapid.
Young men hving two in a room may obtain room and
board in boarding hoiises in Manila at a rate as low as
$35 per month each. In the Young Men's Christian
Association buildii^, a large reinforced concrete structure
with readily room, gymnasium, and a good restaxirant,
the charge for two in a room is $10.25 each. Board costs
$27.50, a total of $37.75. The expenses for clothing in
Manila are less than in the United States, as white
elothii^ is worn the whole year and white duck suits
may be obtained for about $3 each. The e}q)enses for
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
372 THE PHILIFPINE8 PAST AND PRESENT
latmdiy amount to about $5 a month. The necessity
of employing a muchacho ^ is nil, in the case of an un-
muried employee who boards. Servants are far cheaper
and better in the Philippines than in the United States.
In a discussion of the salaries paid in the Philippine civil
service the question of the leave allowed should be con-
sidered. Classified employees who receive an annual
salary of $1000 or more per annum may be granted
twenty-eight days' leave per annum to cover absences
from duty due to illness or oth^ causes. If not taken dur-
ing the calendar year in which it is earned or in January
or February of the succeeding year, it is forfeited. Em-
ployees tiding vacation leave during the months of
December, January, February and March may take
fifty-MX days, coirespondii^ to two years of sa^ce, at
one time, and may thus get time to visit Australia,
Japan, China, and neighbouring countries.
In addition to vacation leave an employee whose salary
is $1000 or more but less than S1800 per annum is entitled
to thirty days' accrued leave per annum, and an employee
whose salary is $1800 per anmim or more is entitled to
thirty-five days' accrued leave per annum. Accrued leave
may accumulate for not more than five years of service.
All classified employees are entitled to vi^t the United
States or foreign countries once in every three years,
receiving in addition to their accrued leave, one year's
vacation leave, allowance of actual travel time at half
pay not to ^ceed sixty days, and return travel expenses
from place of residence in the United States, or from port
of embarkation in a foreign cotmtry to Manila, on the
completion of two years of service after date of return.
An employee entitled to thirty-five days' accrued leave p^
annimi who visits the United States after having rendered
three years of service recdves a total of two himdred
thirteen days' accrued leave, vacation leave, and half-pay
travel time. If he postpones his visit till he has com-
> Mal« Bervaot^
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE PHILIPPINE CIVIL 8EBVICE 873
pleted five years of service, he receives a total (rf two
hundred ninety-one days' accrued leave, vacation leave
and travel time. An employee entitled to thirty days'
accrued leave per anntmi who visits the United States
after three years of service receives a total of one hun-
dred ninety-four days' leave and half-pay travel time, and
if he postpones his visit until he has rendered five years
of service, he receives a total of two hundred fifty-nine
days' leave and travel time.
It will be seen that these are very liberal allowanoee.
An employee receiving $1200 at the end of two years of
service may spend eight weeks of vacation leave visiting
Japan or other surrounding countries, and at the end of
an additional year's service he may visit hia home in the
United States with six and a third months' absence on
full and half pay and with his expenses from his home to
Manila payable two years after his return, and during every
three years of his service he may have the same privil^es.
The law also provides that if an employee is wounded or
injured in the performance of duty, he may have a total
of six months* leave on full pay in addition to any ac-
crued leave to his credit.
Employees who have rendered satisfactory service and
resign after three or more years receive in a lump sum all
accrued leave due and thirty days' half salary. For ex-
ample, an employee who has rec^ved S1800 per annxmi
and has served five years without taking any leave in ex-
cess of the four weeks' vacation leave allowable annually
would draw tl025 were he to redgn.
The school sessions amount to forty weeks per annum
and the school vacations to twelve weeks per atmiun.'
Teachers receive an annual salary and draw full pay
during vacations as well as during school sessions. Every
third year they are allowed to visit the United States or
foreign countries with an allowance of sixty days' half-pay
travel time in addition to the ten weeks' long vacation,
' Two weekB aX ChriBtniM and ton weeks in April, May and June.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
874 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
and on completing two years of service after return to the
islands they are entitled to their travelling expfflisee from
place of reddence in the United States to Manila or from
port of embarkation in a foreign country to Manila.
It is interesting to compare these provisions with the
regulations governing leave of absence in the British
colonial service ; —
(1) There ie no distinction between sick leave and ordinaiy
leave, the leave of abBence on account of sickness being charged
again^ the ordinary leave allowable.
(2) There are two classes of leave : vacation leave on full
pay and half-pay leave.
(3) The vacation leave amounts to three months every
two years, and must be taken during the two years, as it does
not accumulate.
(4) The half-pay leave amounts to two months for each
year of service, but cannot be taken until after a po-iod of aix
years' resident service in the Colony, except in cases of serious
indisposition supported by medical certificate, or of "lu^ent
private affairs," the nature of which must be stated to the
governor. In either case, the governor and council must be
satisfied that the indulgence is indispensable.
Half pay in African and Asiatic colonies may accumulate for
twelve years' service — i.e. twenty-four months' half-pay leave.
(5) After the exhaustion of all vacation leave and half-pay
leave, an advance of six months' half-pay leave may be made
on special grounds ("urgent private affairs" or illness supported
by a medical certificate), the advance being charged aj^dnst
leave accruing subsequently.
(6) For the purpose of visiting home, an officer may be
granted the vacation leave due him (which is never more than
three months) on full pay, and his accumulated half-pay leave,
to commence at the expiration of his vacation leave.
(7) Judicial and education officers do not receive the vacation
leave described in paragraph 3 above, the vacation of courts
and schools being considered equal to this, but they do receive
the half-pay leave described in paragraph i, and may, when
visiting home on half-pay leave, receive full pay during any
ordinary vacation of the court or school.
It will be noted that although officers in the British
colonial service are allowed much longer periods of ab-
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE phuipfine civil SEBTICB 375
senoe, the greater part of their absence is on half pay and
the total money value of the leave allowable in the British
colonial service and in the Philippine civil service is about
the same. As officers naturally prefer to be on full pay
instead of half pay while on leave, the provision of the
Phihppine law is in their interest ; it is also in the interest
of the service, as the periods of the absence from duty
are not so prolonged.
The Philippine Civil Service Law is now about to be
put to its first really severe test as a result of the change
in the national administration. Heretofore those whose
duty and privilege it has been to enforce it have been in
the most full and hearty sympathy with its purposes.
President McKinley was from the outset definitely com-
mitted to the widest apphcation of the merit s^item to
appointments in the Philippines. Mr. Roosevelt and
Mr. Taft firmly supported that system, as has each suc-
ceeding governor-general up to, but not including, Mr.
Harrison, who is as yet an unknown quantity.
It is interesting, however, to note that on the day fol-
lowii^ his arrival there was a demand for the instant
resignation of Mr. Thomas Gary Welch, a ffuthful and
Sclent employee of the government, who had been for
nearly ten years in the service, whose position was desired
for, and immediately given to, Mr. Stephen Bonsai. That
gentleman had been appointed at Washington a member
of the Mimicipal Board of Manila immediately after
Mr. Harrison's confirmation as govemor-genenil. It
is not recorded that Mr. Bonsai rendered any valuable
service to the city on the voyage, or durii^ the twenty-
four hours of his occupancy of his municipal post sub-
sequent to his arrival [ Nor does it appear that he
passed any examination before his early promotion.
Following cloeely upon the removal of Mr. Welch came
a demand for the resignation of Captfun Charlee H.
Sleeper, Director of Lands, who was unquestionably one
of the ablest and most efficient of the bureau chiefs.
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
876 THE I^ILIPFIKES PAST AND PBESSNT
He had earned the ill-Trill of the politieos by iosistiiig
that persoDB authorized to make public land surveys, or
other surveys on which claims of title as against the
government were to be based, should know enough about
surveying to make one correct survey when given an
opportunity practically to demonstrate their abihtiea
under very favourable conditions. He had also incurred
the dislike of influential caciques by defending the occu-
pants of small holdings on friar estates from the rapacity
of thar rich nd^bours, and by protecting free-patent
appUcants and homesto^ers when large landowners
opposed their applications in order to prevent their
securing land, so that they might the more easily be
held as peon labourers.
He bad started in his bureau a practical school for
Filipino surveyors which was trtuning really well-quali-
fied candidates for positions desired by the poUticiaos
for themsdves or their incompetent friends.
Last, but not least, he had helped to upset the plans of
the men primarily responsible for the so-called "friar
lands investigation" conducted by the House Committee
on Insular Affairs, which cost the United States govern-
ment a very large sum, and resulted in demonstrating
his uprightness and the efficiency of his administration.
Mr. John R. Wilson, the assistant director of lands,
was absent at the moment, but his resignation was de-
manded on the day of his retiun. He too was an active,
efS.cient, upright man.
Both of these removals were political acts, pure and
simple. Sr. Manuel Tinio was appointed Director of
Lands. He is a bright young Ilocano of good character,
who had become a "general" in the Insurgent army at
twenty-one years of a^. He is unfit to hold the place,
because, as he has himself frankly s^d, he knows nothing
^x>ut the work. He is charged with the duty of admin-
istering $7,000,000 worth of friar lands, and the whole pub-
lie domain of the Philippine Islands, and with such minor
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE PHILIPPINE CIVIL BERYICE 377
duties as the checlaaating of the machmations of numer-
ouB wealthy Filipinos who seek fraudulently to acquire
great tracte through fraudulent claims to unperfected
titles and by other improper means.
While in Honolulu, en route to Manila, Mr. Harrison
gave out an interview, which I am credibly informed he
has since confirmed in substance. It contained the fol-
lowing statement: —
"For years I have been of the minority in Congress and
have seen the Democr&te kicked about, trampled upon, and
otherwise manhandled by Republicans, so that I must confess
it now gives me a saturnine pleasure to see the Democrats in
a position to do the same thing to the Republicans."
His early official acts after arrival at Manila confirmed
the beUef that this was indeed the spirit in which he was
facing the grave respondbilities wluch there confronted
him.
It is beyond doubt or cavil that high ideals heretofore
have prevailed in the Philippine Civil Service. Are they
now to be substituted by the methods of the ward poUti-
cian?
In its report for 1901 the Phihppine Comroisdon said : —
"The civil service law has been in operation since our last
report, and we see no reason to change our conclusion oa to the
al»olute necessity for its existence, and strict enforcement.
Without this law American government in these Islands is,
in our opinion, foredoomed to humiliating failure."
I signed that report. I have not since seen any reason
to change n^ mind.
:dbvGoogIe
CHAPTER XIV
The Phiuppinb Constabulart and PnBUC Ohdbe
DuBiNO the last thirty years of Spanish rule in the
Philippines evil-doers were pursued and apprehended
and public order was maintained chiefly by the guardia
eivU. At the time of its oi^Miizatioii in 1858 this body
had a ffln^e dividon. By 1880 the number had been
increased to three, two for Luz6n and one for the Visayan
Islands.
The guardia civil was organized upon a military basis,
its officers and soldiers being drawn from the regular army
of Spain by selection or upon recommendation. De-
tachments were distributed throughout the provinces and
were commanded accordii^ to their size by commissioned
or non-conmiissioned officers. Central offices were located
in district capitals ; company headquarters were stationed
in provincial capitals, and detachments were sent to
places where they were deemed to be necessary.
Under ordinary conditions they rendered service as
patrols of two men each, but for the purpose of attacking
large bands of outlaws one or several companies were
employed as occasion required.
The guardia eivU bad jurisdiction over all sorts of
violations of laws and mtmicipal ordinances. They
made reports upon which were based the appointments
of municipal officers, the granting of licenses to cany
firearms, and the determination of the loyalty or the
disloyalty of individuals.
They were vested with extraordinary powers. Offences
against them were tried by coiirts-martial, and were
construed as offences against sentinels on duty. Penalties
were therefore extremely severe.
378
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THG PHILIPPINE CONSTAfiUIARY AND PUBLIC ORDER 370
Officers of the guardia civil on leave could by their
own initiative assume a status of duty with the full powers
and responsibilities that go with command. This is
contrary to American practice, imder which only dire
emergency justifies an ofBcer in assuming an official
status unless he is duly assigned thereto by competent
authority.
The guardia civil could arrest on suspicion, and while
the Spanish Government did not directly authorize or
sanction the use of force to extort confessions, it was not
scrupulous in the matter of accepting confessions so
obtsdned as evidence of crime, nor was it quick to punish
members of the gttardia civil charged with mistreatment
of prisoners.
Reports made by the ffuardia civil were not questioned,
but were accepted without support even in cases of the
killing of prisoners alleged to have attempted to escape,
or of men evading arrest.
This method of eliminating without trial citizens
deemed to be undesirable was applied with especial fre-
quency in the suppression of active brigandt^e, and
latterly during the revolution against Spain. Prisoners
in cluu^ of the ffuardia civU were always tied elbow to
elbow. They knew full well that resistance or flight was
an invitation to their guards to kill them, and that this
invitation was hkely to be promptly accepted.
In the investigation of crime the members of this or-
ganization arrested persons on suspicion and compelled
them to make revelations, true or false. Eye-witnesses
to the commission of crime were not needed in the Spanish
courts of that day. The confession of an accused person
secured his conviction, even though not made in the
presence of a judge. Indirect and hearsay evidence were
accepted, and such things as writs of habeas corpus and
the plea of double jeopardy were unknown in Spanish
procedure.
The gttardia civil could rearrest individuals and again
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
380 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PBESENT
charge them with crimes of which they had already
heen acquitted. I have been assured by reliable Filiimio
witDcssea that it was common during the latter days of
Spaniah sover^gtity for persons who had made themselves
obnoxious to tiie government to be invited by non-
commissioned officers to take a walk, which was followed
either by their complete disappearance or by the subse-
quent discovery of their dead bodies.
It naturally resulted that the members of the guardia
dtU were r^jarded with detestation and terror by the
people, but their power was so absolute that protest
rarely became public. The one notable exception wss
furnished by Dr. Risal's book entitled "Noh Me
Tangere," which voiced the complaints of the Filipinos
f^ainst them. There is not a vestige of doubt that
hatred of them was one of the principal causes of the
insurrection against Spain.
In 1901 the American government organized a rural
police force ui the Philippines. It was called the Philip-
pine constabulary. The insurrection was then drawing
to a close, but there were left in the field many guerilla
bands armed and tmiformed. Their members sought
to excuse their lawless acts under the plea of patriotism
and opposition to the forces of the United States. In
many provinces they combined with professional bandits
or with rehgious fanatics. Various "popes" arose, like
Papa Isio in Negros. The Filipinos had become accus-
tomed to a state of war which had continued for neariy
six years. Habits of peace had been abandoned. The
once prosperous haciendas were in ruins. War and pesti-
lence had destroyed many of the work animals, and those
which remained continued to perish from disease. A^tic
cholera was sweeping throu^ the archipelago, and con-
sternation and disorder followed in its wake.
Under such circumstances the organization of a rural
police force was imperatively necessary. Unfortunately
the most critical situation which it was to be called upon
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THE PHILIPPINE CON8TABDLAHT AND PUBLIG ORDER 381
to meet had to be faced at the very outset, when both
officers and men were inexperienced and before adequate
discipline could be estabhahed.
The law providing for its establiahment was drawn by
the Honourable Luke E. Wright, at that time secretary
of commerce and police and later destined to become
governor-genera! of the Philippines and secretary of
war of the United States.
It was intended that the constabulary shoxild accom-
plish its ends by force when necessary but by sympathetic
supervision when possible, suppressing brigandage and
turning the people towards habits of peace. The fact
was clearly bome in mind that the abuses of the gvardia
civil had not been forgotten and the new force was de-
signed to meet existing conditions, to allay as rapidly
as possible the existing just rancour against the similar
oi^anization established under the Spanish r€^me, and
to avoid the evils which had contributed so much toward
causing the downfall of Spanish sovereignty. The law
was admirably framed to achieve these ends.
The officers of the constabulary were selected chiefly
from American volunteers recently mustered out and
from honourably discharged soldiers of the United States
army. Some few Filipinos, whose loyalty was above
suspicion, were appointed to the lower grades. This
number has mnce been materially augumented, and
Btmie of the ori^nal Filipino appointees have risen to the
rank of captain.
It was inevitable that at the outset there should
be abuses. The organization was necessarily bom at
work ; there was no time to instruct, to formulate regu-
lations, to wait imtil a satisfactory state of discipline had
been brought about. There were not barracks for
housing the soldiers; there were neither uniforms, nor
arms, nor ammunition. There was no system for ra-
tioning the men. All of these things had to be provided,
and they were provided through a natural evolution of
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
882 THE PmUPFTNEB PAST AND PRESENT
practical processes, cryBtalUzing into form, tested by the
duties of the day. The oi^anization which grew up was a
true survival of the fittest, both in personnel and in
methods. The wonder is not that some abuses occurred,
but that they were so few ; not that there were occasional
evidences of lack of efficiency, but that efficiency was on
the whole so hi^ from the beginning.
The several provinces were made administratiTe tmits,
the commanding officer in each being de^gnated as
"senior inspector." The men who were to serve in a
given province were by preference recruited there, and a
d^>arture was thus made from the usual foreign colonial
practice.
In 1905 l^e total force was fixed at one hundred com-
panies with a nominal strength of two officers and fifty
men each. Under special conditions this rule may be
departed from, and the mze of the companies or the number
of officers increased.
Each province is divided by the senior inspector into
sections, and the responsibility for patrol work and general
poUcing rests on the senior company officer in each station.
The provinces are grouped into five districts, each com-
manded by an assistant chief who exercises therein t^e
authority, and performs the duties appropriate to the
chief for the entire Philippines. The higher adminis*
trative positions have always been filled by detailing
regular officers of the United States army.
The constabulary soldiers are now neatly uniformed,
anned with Kn% carbines and wdl disciplined. They
show the effect of good and regular food and of syst^natic
exerdse, their physical condition b^g vastly superior
to that of the average Filipino. They are given regular
instruction in thdr military duties. It is conducted in
English.
Tlte Philippine constabulary may be defined as a body
of armed men with a military organization, recruited
from among the people of tiie islands, officered in part
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
THE PHILIPKNE C0N8TABD1ARY AND PUBLIC ORDER 3S8
by Americans and in part by Filipinos, and employed
primarily for police duty in connection with the establish-
TOEXit and maintenance of public order.
Blount's chapterson the administrations of Taft, Wright
and Smith embody one proloi^ed plaint to tiie effect
that the oi^anization of the constabulary was prranature,
and that after the war proper ended, the last smoiddering
embers of armed and organized insurrection should
have been stunped out, and the brigandage which had
existed in the Philippines for centuries should have been
dealt with, by the United States army rather than by
the constabulary.
Even if it were true tbat the army could have rendered
more effective service to this end than could have been
expected at the outset from a newly otganized body of
Filipino soldiers, tiie argument agadiut the organization
and use of the constabulary would in my opinion have
been by no means conclusive. It is our declared policy
to prepare the Filipinos to establish and maintain a
stable government of their own. The proper exercise of
police powers is obviously necessary to such an end.
From tiie outset we have sacrificed efficiency in order
that our wards mi^t gain practical experience, and
might demonstrate their ability, or lack of ability, to
perform necessary governmental fimctions. Does any
one cognizant of the situation doubt for a moment that
provincial and mimicipal affairs in the Philippine Islands
would to-day be more efficiently administered if pro-
vincial and municipal officers were appointed instead of
being elected ? Is any one so foolish as to imagine that
the sanitary regeneration of the islands would not have
progressed much more rapidly had highly trained American
health officers been used in place of many of the badly
educated and comparatively inexperienced Filipino
physicians whose services have been utilized?
Nevertheless, in the concrete case tmd^ discussion I
dissent from iha claim that more satisfactory results
:dbvGoogIe
384 THE PTTTT.TPPTKTRa PAST AND PRESENT
could have been obtained by the use of American
troops.
The army had long been supreme in the Philippinee.
Every function of government had been perfonned
by Its officers and men, if perfonned at all. Our
troops had been combating an elusive and cruel enemy.
If they were human it is to be presumed that they still
harbored animosities, bom of these conditions, toward
the people with whom they had so recently been fitting.
Had thework of pacification been then turned overto them
it would have meant that often in the locahties in whidk
they had been fighting, and in dealing with the men
to whom they had very recently been actively opposed
in armed conJBict, they would have been call^ upon to
perform tasks and to entertain feelings radically dUfoent
from those of the preceding two or three years.
A detachment, marching through Leyte, found an
Amwican who had disappeared a short time before
crucified, head down. His abdominal wall had been
carefully opened so that his intestines might hang down
in his face.
Another American prisoner, found on the same trip, had
been buried in the ground with only his head projecting.
His mouth had berai propped open with a stick, a trail
of sugar laid to it through the forest, and a handful thrown
into it.
Millions of ante had done the rest.
Officers and men ^o saw such things were thereby
fitted for war, rather than for ordinary police duty.
The truth is that th^ had seen so many of them
that th^ continued to see them in imagination when
tiiey no longer existed. I well remember when a general
officer, directed by his superior to attend a banquet at
Manila in which Americans and Filipinos joined, came
to it wearing a big revolver !
Long after Manila was quiet I was obliged to get out
of my carriage in the rain and darknees half a dozen
:dbvGoogIe
THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULABY AND PUBLIC ORDER 385
times while driving the length of Calle Real, and "ap-
proach to be recognized ' ' by raw ' ' rookies, " each of whom
pointed a loaded rifle at me while I did it. I know that
this did not tend to make me feel peaceable or happy.
In my opinion it was wholly xmnecessary, and yet I did not
blame the army for thinking otherwise.
After the war was over, when my private secretary,
Mr. James H. LeRoy, was one day approaching Maloloa,
he was sternly commanded by a sentiy to halt, the com-
mand being emphasized as usual by presenting to his
attention a most unattractive' view down the muzzle of
aKrag. He was next ordered to "salute the S^," which
he finally discovered with difficulty in the distance, after
beingtold whereto look. The army way is right and neces-
sary in war, but it makes a lot of bother in time of peace !
This was not the only reason for failing to make more
extensive use of American soldiers in police duty. A
veteran colonel of United States cavaby who had just
read Judge Blount's book was asked what he thought of
the claim therein made that the army should have done
the police and pacification work of the Phihppines. His
reply was : —
"How long would it take a regiment of Filipinos to catch
an American outlaw in the United States ? Impossible I "
Another army officer said : —
"Catching Filipino outlaws with the Army is like catching
a flea in a twenty-acre field with a traction engine."
There is perhaps nothing bo demoralizing to regular
troops as employment on police duty which requires them
to work singly or in small squads. Discipline speedily
goes to the dogs and instruction becomes impossible.
Successful prosecution of the work of chasing ladrones in
the Phihppines requires a thoroufdi knowledge of local
topography and of local native dialects. Spanish is of
use, but only in dealing with educated Filipinos. A
VOL. I — 2 0
D,q,i,i.:dbvGoogIe
386 THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT
knowledge of the Fjlipino himself; of hia habits of
thoi^t ; of his attitude toward the white man ; and
toward the lUustrado, or educated man, of his own race ;
ability to enter a town and speedily to determine the
relative importance of its leading citizens, finally centring
on the one man, always to be found, t^o runs it, whether
he holds pohtical office or not, and also to enlist the
sympathy and cooperation of its people ; all of these
things are essential to the successful handling of brigand-
age in the Philippines, whether such brigandage has, or
lacks, political significance.
The' following parallel will make clear some of tiie
reasons why it was determined to use constabulary
instead of American soldiers in policing the Philippines
from the time the insurrection officially ended : —
Ukitbd States Abmt Phiuppinb Conbtabui.art
Soldier costs per aDDum Soldier costs per annum
11400. (Authority: Adju- $363.50.
taut Goieral Heistand in
1910.)
American soldiers come from Constabulary soldiers are en-
America, listed in the province where
they are to serve.
Few American soldiers speak AH constabulary soldiers speak
the local dialects. local dialecte.
Few American soldiers speak All educated constabulary sol-
any Spanish. diers speak Spanish.
American soldiers usually have Constabulary soldiers, native
but a slight knowledge of to the country, know the
local gec^aphy and topog- geography and topography
raphy. of their respective prov*
Few American soldiers have The Filipino soldier certainly
had enough contact with knoira his own kind bett^
Filipinos to understand than the American does.
thetQ.
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THE PHILIPPINE G0N8TABULART AND PUBUG ORDER 387
The American soldier uses a
ration of certain fixed com-
ponents imported over sea.
(A ration is the day's al-
lowance of food for one
soldier.)
The American ration costs
24.3 cents United States
cmrency (exclusive of cost
of traosportatiott and han-
dlii^). Fresh meat requir-
ing ice to keep it is a
principal part of the Ameri-
can ration. To supply it
requires a regular system of
transport from the United
States to Manila and from
thence to local ports, and
wagoD transportation from
ports to inland stations.
The American soldier is at no
pains to enliet the sympathy
and cooperation of the peo-
ple; and his methods of
discipline, habits of life, etc.,
makd it practically impos-
sible for him to giun them.
Before preparing the forgoing statement relative to
the reasons for using Philippine constabulary soldiera
instead of soldiers of the United States army for police
work during the period in question, I asked Colonel J. G.
Harbord, assistant director of ihe constabulary, who
has served with that body nine years, has been its acting
director and is an officer of the United States army, to fpve
me a memorandum on the subject. It is only fair to him
to say that I have not only followed very closely the line
of argument embodied in tiie memorandum which he was
good enough to prepare for me, but have in many instances
used his very words. The parallel columns are his.
The constabulary soldier is
rationed in cash and buys
the food of the country
where