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.  \ 

1/    DgfcH  C.  WOECESTEB 

ADTROX  ov  "  THa  rBiLirrDn  iii.urM 




r,  ItU, 





VOL.  I 


L  TiKW  Ponrr  aitd  SnajKcr^MATTKB         •        .        .        •  1 

IL  Wab  IiTDmKDKNCE  Phomibbd  ? 18 


IT.  The  FaEMKDiTXTED  Ikbtibqkkt  Attack       •        .        ■  127 

T.  IifBintaxifT  Rdls  ahd  thb  Wilcox-Sakgbnt  Bipobt  ISS 

TL  IirainiQBMT  Bulk  ik  tse  Cagatak  Valley  170 

TEL  IirenBOBin'  Bitle  in  tbe  Visatab  and  Blbbwhzri    •  206 

TUL  Did  We  Debtbot  a  Repcbuc? 242  ' 

IX.  The  Conduct  of  the  Wae 270 

X.  Mb.  Bbtak  akd  ImBiutDBitoE 206   ' 

XL  The  First  Phu.ippikb  Commisbiok        ....  801 

XXL  The  EsTABi.iBHHBin'  or  Ctvu.  Govebxmeitt        ,        .  826 

XQL  Tbb  Phiupfine  Cini.  Service 860 

XIT.  The  Cokbtajbclart  and  Pitbijo  Order       .        .        .  878 

XV.  The  Adhikistbation  o»  Justice 400 

XVL  Health  Conditiohb .408 

XVIL  Saouio  and  the  Benouet  Road 440 

XTin.  Thx  CoSsDiKATioa  of  SciEHTiric  Wore     ...  488 

i.,GoogIe  ■ 





YOL.  I 

I.  Turw  PoiHT  AKD  Subjxot-Uattbs        ....  1 

IL  Was  Imdrpbhdinci  Psomibzd? 18 


IV.  Thi  Pbbkxditatxd  iHsrBOEKT  Attack                        .  127 

y.  iKSDRQEifT  RuiA  ASS  THB  Wilcoz-Saboent  Rxfokt  152 

TL  Iksdroxiit  Buu  n  thx  Caqatan  Vaij.i:y                  .  170 

TO.  IxsnBOKHT  Scut  IK  the  Tisatab  akd  Eubwhksk    .  206 

Vm.  Did  Wk  Dmteot  a  Bkpdblic? 242  " 

IX.  Thb  Cohdcct  of  TBI  Wab 270 

X.  UB.   BbTAS   Ajn>   IlTDBFBKDENOB 206     ' 

XL  Thb  Fijut  Philippine  CoKHUBioir        .        .        .        .801 

XTT-  Thx  EsTABLieaMENT  or  Cmi,  Oovbbkhbnt        .        >  S26 

XnL  Thb  Phiuppinb  Citu.  Sxkvicb 380 

XIT.  Thb  CoirsTABtiiAxT  and  Pubuc  Obdbb       .        .        .  878 

XV.  Thx  ADininBTBATioii  or  Jdbticb 400 

XVL  Hkaxth  Comditioms 408 


XVm.  TBB  CotiRDUTATIOIl  Or  SojBKTtriO  WoBK       ...  488 



One  of  the  Fiist  Bengcet  Government  Cottagea       ....  240 

Typloftl  Cottages  at  Bagnio 248 

A  Baguio  Home 260 

The  Baguio  Hospital 284 

Govemmeut  Centre  at  Bagnio 272 

A  SoeDs  in  tbe  Bagnio  Teachers'  Camp 280 

The  Bagnio  Conntiy  Club 288 

The  Bureau  of  Science  Building,  Manila 806 

The  Philippine  General  Hospital 814 

The  College  of  Medicine  and  Surgery,  Manila 822 

An  Old-atyle  Schoolhonw,  with  Teacherg  and  PnpUa       .        .        .  880 

A  Modern  Primaiy  School  Bailding SS8 

Old-style  Central  School  Building 84t 

Modern  Central  School  Bailding 840 

Typical  Scene  in  a  Trade  School 864 

.  An  Embroidery  Chua 882 

Philippine  Embroidery 870 

Filipino  Trained  Nurses 880 

A  School  Athletic  Team 886 

Filipina  Girls  playing  Basket-bait 894 

University  Hall,  Manila 402 

Bakfdan 410 

lu  Hostile  Country 418 

Trarel  under  Difficulties 420 

Dangerous  Navigation 484 

A  Negrito  Family  and  theii  "  Hoasa  " 442 

A  Typical  Negrito 448 

Typical  Kalingas 462 

SeUling  a  Head-hunting  Fend 468 

Entertaining  the  Kalingas 444 

An  Ifugao  Family 470 

Ifugao  Dancers *■■  478 

An  Ifugao  Dancer 484 

Ifngao  Bice  Terraoea 492 






View  Point  and  Subject-Mattbb 

It  ifi  customary  in  Latin  countriefl  for  a  would-be 
author  or  orator  to  endeavour,  at  the  b^tnnmg  of  his  book 
or  his  speech,  to  establish  his  status.  Possibly  I  have  be- 
come partially  Latinized  as  the  result  of  some  eighteen 
years  of  residence  1q  the  Philippines.  At  all  events  it  is 
my  purpose  to  state  at  the  outset  facts  which  will  tend  to 
make  clear  my  view  point  and  at  the  same  time  brieSy  to 
outline  the  subject-matter  which  I  hereinafter  discuss. 

As  a  boy  I  went  through  several  of  the  successive 
stages  of  collector's  fever  from  which  the  young  commonly 
suffer.  First  it  was  postage  stamps;  then  birds'  nests, 
obtained  during  the  winter  season  when  no  longer  of  use 
to  their  builders.  Later  I  was  allowed  to  collect  eggs, 
and  finally  the  birds  themselves.  At  one  time  my  great 
ambition  was  to  become  a  taxidermist.  My  fandly  did 
not  actively  oppose  this  demre  but  suggested  that  a  few 
preliminary  years  in  school  and  collie  might  prove  useful. 

I  eventually  lost  my  ambition  to  be  a  taxidermist  but 
did  not  lose  my  interest  in  zoology  uid  botany.  While  a 
stud^it  at  the  University  of  Michigan  I  specialized  in 
these  subjects.  I  was  fortunate  in  having  as  one  of  my 
instructors  Professor  Joseph  B.  Steere,  then  at  the  head 
of  the  Department  of  Zoology.  Professor  Steere,  who 
had  been  a  great  traveller,  at  tkaes  entertained  his  classes 

TOU  I  —  B  1 



with  wonderfully  interesting  tales  of  adventure  on  the 
Amazon  and  in  ttie  Andes,  Peru,  Formosa,  the  Philippines 
and  the  Dutch  Moluccas.  My  ambition  was  fired  by 
his  stories  and  when  in  the  spring  of  1S86  he  announced 
his  intention  of  returning  to  the  Phihppines  the  following 
year  to  take  up  and  prosecute  anew  zoological  work  which 
he  had  begun  there  in  1874,  offering  to  take  with  him  a 
limited  number  of  his  students  who  were  to  have  the 
benefit  of  his  knowledge  of  Spanish  and  of  his  wide  ex- 
perience as  a  traveller  and  collector,  and  were  in  turn  to 
allow  him  to  work  up  their  collections  after  their  retiim 
to  the  United  States,  I  made  up  m^  mind  to  go. 

I  was  then  endeavouring  to  get  through  the  University 
on  an  allowance  of  $375  per  year  and  was  in  consequence 
not  overburdened  with  surplus  funds.  I  however  managed 
to  get  my  life  insured  for  $1500  and  to  borrow  $1200  on 
the  pohcy,  and  with  this  rather  limited  sum  upon  which 
to  draw  purchased  an  outfit  for  a  year's  collecting  and 
sailed  with  Doctor  Steere  for  Manila.  Two  other  young 
Americans  accompanied  him.  One  of  these,  Doctor 
Frank  8.  Bourns,  was  like  myself  afterwards  destined  to 
play  a  part  in  Philippine  affairs  which  was  not  then 
dreamed  of  by  either  of  us. 

We  spent  approximately  a  year  in  the  islands.  Unfor- 
tunately we  had  neglected  to  provide  ourselves  with 
proper  official  credentials  and  as  a  result  we  had  somO't. 
embarrassing  experiences.  We  were  arrested  by  sus- 
picious Spanish  officials  shortly  after  our  arrival  and  were 
tried  on  trumped-up  chaises.  On  several  subsequent  .- 
occasions  we  narrowly  escaped  arrest  and  imprisonment. 

The  unfriendly  attitude  of  certain  of  our  Spanish  ac-  - 
quaintances  was  hardly  to  be  wond^^d  at.  They  could 
not  believe  that  sensible,  civilized  hiunan  beings  woiUtf 
shoot  tiny  birds,  pay  for  eggs  the  size  of  the  tip  of  one's 
little  finger  more  than  hens'  eggs  were  worth,  undeigo 
not  a  few  hardships  and  run  many  risks  while  living  in 
the  amplest  of  aaJ^ve  houses  on  very  inadequate  food, 



unless  actuated  by  some  hidden  purpose.  At  differ^it 
times  they  suspected  us  of  looking  for  gold  deposits,  of 
designing  to  stir  up  trouble  among  the  natives,  or  of  being 
political  spies. 

When  Doctor  Bourns  came  back  with  the  American 
troops  in  IjQ^  and  I  returned  as  a  member  of  the  first 
Philippine  Commission  in  14^,  this  last  supposition  be- 
came a  fixed  belief  with  many  of  our  former  Spanish  ac- 
quaintances who  still  remained  in  the  islands,  and  they 
frankly  expressed  their  regret  that  they  had  not  shot  us 
while  they  had  the  chance. 

Over  against  certain  unpleasant  experiences  with  those 
who  could  not  understand  us  or  our  work  I  must  set 
much  kind  and  invaluable  assistance  rendered  by  others 
niio  could,  and  did. 

AH  in  all  we  spent  a  most  interesting  year,  visiting 
eighteen  of  the  more  important  islauds.* 

Throughout  this  trip  we  lived  in  very  cloae  contact 
with  the  Fihpinos,  either  occupying  the  fynbuncdes,  the 
municipal  buildings  of  their  towns,  ^ere  they  felt  at 
liberty  to  call  and  observe  us  at  all  hours  of  the  day  and 
ni^t,  or  actually  living  in  their  bouses,  which  in  some 
instances  were  not  vacated  by  the  owners  during  our 

Incidentally  we  saw  something  of  several  of  the  wild 
tribes,  including  the  Tagbanuas  of  Palawan,  the  Moros  of 
Jold,  Basilan  and  Mindanao,  and  the  Mangyans  of 

We  experienced  many  very  real  hardships,  ran  not  a 
few  seriotis  risks  and  ended  our  sojourn  witii  six  weeks  of 
fever  and  starvation  in  the  interior  of  Mindoro.  While 
we  would  not  have  cut  short  our  appointed  stay  by  a 
day,  we  were  nevertheless  delighted  when  we  could  turn 
our  faces  homeward,  and  Doctor  Bourns  and  I  agreed 

*  Cfiyo,  I^U&waa,  Balatwo,  CagBTan  de  Joltf,  J6\6  ptoper,  BasUan, 
Mindanao,  Panay,  Ouimaras,  Nesros,  Siquijor,  Ceba,  Bohol,  Samar, 
Ijeyte,  Maabote,  Marinduque  and  Mindoro.  .  . 



that  we  had  had  quite  enough  of  Ufe  in  the  Philip- 

Upon  my  arrival  at  my  home  in  Vennont  a  competent 
physician  told  my  family  that  I  might  not  live  a  week. 
I  however  recuperated  so  rapidly  that  I  was  able  to  re- 
turn to  the  Univeisity  of  Michigan  that  fall  and  to  com- 
plete the  work  of  my  ficnior  year.  I  became  a  member  of 
the  teaching  staff  of  the  institution  before  my  graduation. 

Little  as  I  suspected  it  at  the  time,  the  tropics  had  fixed 
their  strangely  firm  grip  on  me  during  that  fateful  first 
trip  to  the  Par  East  which  was  destined  to  modify  my 
whole  subsequent  life.  I  had  firmly  believed  that  i£ 
fortunate  enough  to  get  home  I  should  have  sense 
enough  to  stay  there,  but  before  six  months  had  elapsed 
I  was  finding  life  at  Ann  Arbor,  Michigan,  decidedly 
prosaic,  and  longing  to  return  to  the  Philippines  and 
finish  a  piece  of  zoological  work  which  I  knew  was  as  yet 
only  begun. 

Doctor  Bourns,  like  myself,  was  eager  to  go  back,  and 
we  set  out  to  raise  $10,000  to  pay  the  expenses  of  a  two- 
years  collecting  tour,  in  the  course  of  which  we  hoped  to 
visit  regions  not  hitherto  penetrated  by  any  zoologist. 

Times  were  then  getting  hard,  and  good  Doctor  Angell, 
the  president  of  the  university,  thought  it  a  great  joke 
that  two  yotmg  fellows  like  ourselves  shoiild  attempt  to 
raise  so  considerable  a  sum  to  be  spent  largely  for  our  own 
benefit.  Whenever  he  met  me  on  the  street  he  used  to 
ask  whether  we  had  obtained  that  |10,000  yet,  find  then 
shake  with  laughter.  One  of  the  great  satisfactions  of 
my  life  came  when,  on  a  beautiful  May  morning  in  1890, 
I  was  able  to  answer  his  inquiry  in  the  affirmative. 

He  fairly  staggered  with  amazement,  but  promptly  re- 
covering himself  warmly  congratulated  me,  and  with 
that  kindly  interest  which  he  has  always  shown  in  the 
affairs  of  young  men,  asked  how  he  cotdd  help  us.  Through 
his  kindly  offices  and  the  intervention  of  the  State  De- 
partment we  were  able  to  obtain  a  royal  order  from  the 



Spanish  government  which  assured  us  a  very  difiFerent 
reception  on  our  return  to  the  Pfaihppines  in  August  from 
that  wliich  had  been  accorded  us  on  the  occasion  of  our 
first  visit  to  the  islands. 

There  was  now  revealed  to  us  a  pleasing  side  of  Spanish 
character  which  we  had  largely  missed  during  our  first 
visit.  Satisfied  as  to  our  identity  and  as  to  the  motives 
which  actuated  us,  the  Spanish  officials,  practically  with- 
out exception,  did  everything  in  their  power  to  asust  us 
wid  to  render  our  sojoum  pleasant  and  profitable.  Our 
mail  was  deUvered  to  us  at  {Mints  fifty  miles  distant 
from  provincial  capitals.  When  our  remittances  failed 
to  reach  us  on  time,  as  they  not  infrequently  did,  money 
was  loaned  to  us  freely  without  security.  Troops  were 
urged  upon  us  for  our  protection  when  we  desired  to  pene- 
trate regions  considered  to  be  dangerous.  Our  Spanish 
friends  constantly  offered  us  the  hospitality  of  their  homes 
and  with  many  of  them  the  offer  was  more  than  pro  forma. 
Indeed,  in  several  instances  it  was  insisted  upon  so 
strongly  that  we  accepted  it,  to  our  great  pleasure  and 

Officials  were  quite  frank  in  discussing  before  us  the 
aff'airs  of  their  several  provinces,  and  we  gained  a  veiy 
clear  insist  into  existing  political  methods  and  conditions. 

During  this  trip  we  lived  in  even  closer  contact  with 
the  Filipino  '  population  than  on  the  occasion  of  our  first 
visit.  Our  rapidly  growing  knowledge  of  Spanish,  and 
of  Visayan,  one  of  the  more  important  native  dialects, 
rendered  it  increasingly  easy  for  us  to  communicate  with 
them,  gain  their  confidence  and  learn  to  look  at  things 

'  I  employ  the  noun  Filipinos  to  designate  ooUeotively  the  ^K^t 
civilized.  Christianized  peoples,  otdled  respeotively  the  CaKaT^ns. 
Doeanoa,  Pangaain&ns,  Zambalone,  Pampanganfi.  Tagilofre,  BiooLi 
and  Viaayana,  or  any  of  them;  the  adjeotive  Filipino  to  designate 
anything  pwtaining  to  these  peoplee,  or  any  of  them ;  the  noun  Phil- 
ippines to  designate  the  coimtry,  and  the  adjeotive  Philippine  to  dang- 
Date  anything  pertaining  to  the  oountry  as  distin^niished  from  its 



from  their  view  point.  They  talked  with  us  most  frankly 
and  fully  about  their  pohtical  troubles. 

During  this  our  second  sojourn  in  the  Philippines, 
which  lengthened  to  two  years  and  ax  months,  we  re- 
visited the  islands  with  which  we  had  become  more  or 
less  familiar  on  our  first  trip  and  added  six  others  to  the 
list.'  We  lived  for  a  time  among  the  wild  Bukidnons 
and  Negritos  of  the  Negros  mountains. 

After  my  companion  had  gone  to  Borneo  I  had  the  mis- 
fortune to  contract  typhoid  fever  when  alone  in  Busuimga, 
and  being  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  the  malady  from 
which  I  was  suffering,  kept  on  my  feet  imtil  I  could  no 
longer  stand,  with  the  natural  result  that  I  came  uncom- 
monly near  paying  for  my  foolishness  with  my.  life,  and 
have  ever  since  suffered  from  resulting  physical  disabili- 
ties. When  able  to  travel,  I  left  the  islands  upon  the 
urgent  recommendation  of  my  physician,  feeling  that  the 
task  which  had  led  me  to  return  tiiere  was  almost  accom- 
plished and  sure  tiiat  my  wanderings  in  the  Far  East 
were  over. 

Shortly  after  my  retiim  to  the  United  States  I  was 
offered  a  position  as  a  member  of  l^e  zodlogical  staff  of 
the  University  of  Michi^n,  accepted  it,  received  speedy 
premotion,  and  hoped  and  expected  to  end  my  days  as  a 
college  professor. 

In  1898  the  prospect  of  war  with  Spain  awakened  old 
memories.  I  fancy  that  the  knowledge  then  possessed 
by  the  average  American  citizen  relative  to  the  Philip- 
pines was  fairly  well  typified  by  that  of  a  good  old  lady 
at  my  Vermont  birthplace  who  had  spanked  me  when  I 
was  a  small  boy,  and  who,  after  my  first  return  from  the 
Philippine  Islands,  said  to  me,  "Deanie,  are  them  Philip- 
pians  you  have  been  a  visitin'  the  people  that  Paul  wrote 
the  Epistle  to?" 

I  endeavoured  to  do  my  part  toward  dispelling  this 
ignorance.    My  knowledge  of  Philippine  affairs  led  me 

*  Busuaoga,  Culion,  Tawi  T&vi,  Tablas,  Bomblon  and  SboTan. 




6  III 

S  -5  s  i 

-  I!i 

5  istc 

o    'Hi 

I 'Mi 

"=  .3I-3 
S  *  ?  I-  S 






strongly  to  favour  armed  intervention  in  Cuba,  where 
Bimilar  political  conditiona  seemed  to  prevail  to  a  con- 
siderable extent,  and  I  fear  that  I  was  considered  by  many 
of  my  university  colleagues  something  of  a  "jingo." 
tade«l,  a  member  of  the  University  Board  of  Regents 
said  that  I  ought  to  be  compelled  to  enlist.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  compulsion  would  have  been  quite  unnecessary 
had  it  not  been  for  physical  disability. 

My  life-long  friend  and  former  travelling  companion, 
Doctor  Bourns,  was  not  similarly  hampered.  He 
promptly  joined  the  army  as  a  medical  officer  with  the 
rank  of  major,  and  sailed  for  the  islands  on  the  second 
steamer  which,  carried  United  States  troops  there.  As  a 
natural  result  of  his  familiarity  with  Spanish  and  bis 
wide  acquaintanceahip  among  the  Fihpinos,  he  was 
ordered  from  the  outset  to  devote  his  time  more  largely 
to  poUtical  matters  than  to  the  practice  of  his  profession. 
He  did  all  that  he  could  to  prevent  misunderstandings 
between  Filipinos  and  Americans.  He  assisted  as  an 
interpreter  at  the  negotiations  for  the  surrender  of  Manila 
on  August  13,  1898,  after  taking  part  in  the  attack  on 
the  city.  Later  he  was  given  the  rather  difficult  task  of 
suppressing  a  bad  outbreak  of  smallpox  among  the 
Spanish  prisoners  of  war,  which  he  performed  with  great 
success.  He  was  finally  made  chief  health  officer  of 
Manila,  although  he  continued  to  devote  himself  largely 
to  poUtical  matters,  got  numberless  deserving  Filipinos 
out  of  trouble,  and  rapidly  increased  his  already  wide 
circle  of  Filipino  friends.  Through  his  letters  I  was  kept 
quite  closely  in  touch  with  the  situation. 

Meanwhile  I  decided  that  the  Philippines  were  not  for 
me,  asked  for  and  obtained  leave  for  study  in  Europe, 
and  in  December  1898  set  out  for  New  York  to  engage 
passage  for  myself  and  my  family.  I  went  by  way  of 
Washington  in  order  to  communicate  to  President  Mc- 
Kinley  certain  facts. relative  to  the  Philippine  situation 
which  it  seemed  to  me  ought  to  be  brought  to  his  attention. 



I  believed  that  there  was  serious  danger  of  an  outbreak 
of  hoBtilitiea  between  Filipinos  and  Americans,  and  that 
such  a  catastrophe,  Faulting  from  mutual  misunder- 
standing, might  be  avoided  if  seasonable  action  w«% 
taken.  I  have  since  learned  how  wrong  was  this  latter 
behef.  My  previous  experience  had  been  almost  exclu- 
sively with  the  Visayans  and  the  wild  tribes,  and  the 
revolution  against  the  United  States  was  at  the  outset  a 
strictly  Tag&log  affair,  and  hence  beyond  my  ken. 

President  McKinley  very  kindly  gave  me  all  the  time 
I  wanted,  displayed  a.  most  earnest  desire  to  learn  the 
truth,  and  showed  the  deepest  and  most  friendly  interest 
in  the  FiUpinos.  Let  no  man  believe  that  then  or  later 
he  had  the  sli^test  idea  of  bringing  about  the  exploita^ 
tion  of  their  country.  On  the  contrary,  he  evinced  a 
most  earnest  desire  to  leam  what  was  best  for  them  and 
then  to  do  it  if  it  lay  within  his  power. 

To  my  amazement,  at  the  end  of  our  interview  he  asked 
me  whether  I  would  be  willing  to  go  to  the  islands  as  bis 
personal  representative. 

I  could  not  immediately  decide  to  make  such  a  radical 
change  in  my  plans  as  this  would  involve,  and  asked  for 
a  week's  time  to  think  the  matter  over,  which  was  granted. 
I  decided  to  go. 

Meanwhile,  the  President  had  evolved  the  idea  of 
sending  out  a  commission  and  asked  me  if  I  would  serve 
on  it.  I  told  him  that  I  would  and  left  for  my  home  to 
make  preparations  for  an  early  departure.  A  few  da^ 
later  he  annoxmoed  the  names  of  the  commissioners. 
They  were  Jacob  Gould  Schurman,  President  of  Cornell 
University;  Major-General  Elwell  S.  Otis,  then  the  rank- 
ing army  officer  in  the  Philippines ;  Rear-Admiral  George 
Dewey,  then  in  command  of  the  United  States  fleet  in 
Pbihppine  waters ;  Colonel  Charles  Denby,  who  had  for 
fourteen  years  served  as  United  States  Minister  to  China, 
and  myself. 

Colonel  Denby  was  delayed  in  Washington  by  public 



buBmesa.  Mr.  ScfaurmflQ  and  I  reached  Yokohama  on 
the  morning  of  February  13,  and  on  arrival  there 
learned,  to  our  deep  r^;ret,  that  hoetilities  had  broken 
out  on  the  fourth  instant.  We  reached  Manila  on  the 
evening  of  March  4,  but  Colonel  Denby  was  unable  to 
join  us  until  April  2.  Meanwhile,  aa  we  could  not  begin 
our  work  in  his  absence,  I  had  an  exceptional  opportunity 
to  observe  conditions  in  the  field,  of  which  I  availed 

I  served  with  the  first  Philippine  Commission  until  it 
had  completed  its  work,  and  was  then  appointed  to  the 
second  Philippine  Commission  without  a  day's  break  in 
my  period  of  service. 

The  members  of  this  latter  body  were  William  H.  Taft 
of  Ohio ;  Luke  £.  Wright  of  Tennessee ;  Henry  C.  Ide 
of  Vermont;  Bernard  Moses  of  California,  and  myself. 
Briefly  stated,  the  task  before  us  was  to  establish  civil 
government  in  the  PhiUppine  Islands.  After  a  period  of 
ninety  days,  to  be  spent  in  observation,  the  commission 
was  to  become  the  legislative  body,  while  executive 
power  continued  to  be  vested  for  a  time  in  the  military. 

This  condition  endured  until  the  4th  of  July,  1901,  on 
which  day  Mr.  Taft  was  appointed  civil  governor.  On 
September  1, 1901,  each  of  the  remaining  ori(pnal  members 
of  the  commission  became  an  executive  officer  as  well.. 
Mr.  Wright  was  appointed  secretary  of  commerce  and 
police ;  Mr.  Ide,  secretary  of  finance  and  justice ;  Mr. 
Moses,  secretary  of  pubUc  instruction,  and  I  myself, 
Secretary  of  the  Interior.  On  the  same  day  three  Fili- 
pino members  were  added  to  the  commission :  Dr.  T.  H. 
Fardo  de  Tavera,  Sr.  Benito  Legarda  and  St.  Jos^  R.  de 

Until  the  16th  of  October,  1907,  the  Commission  con- 
tinued to  serve  as  the  sole  le^lative  body.  It  is  at 
the  present  time  the  upper  house  of  the  Philippine  Leg- 
islature, the  Philippine  Assembly,  composed  of  ei^ty- 
one  elective  members,  constituting  the  lower  house. 



I  hare  therefore  had  a  hand  in  the  enactment  of  all 
legislation  put  in  force  in  the  Philippine  Islands  since  the 
American  occupation,  with  the  exception  of  certain  laws 
passed  during  my  few  and  brief  absences. 

As  secretary  of  the  interior  it  fell  to  my  lot  to  organize 
and  direct  the  operations  of  a  Bureau  of  Health,  a  Bureau 
of  Government  Laboratories,  a  Bureau  of  Forestry,  a 
Bureau  of  Public  Lands,  a  Buicau  of  Agriculture,  a 
Bureau  of  Non-Christian  Tribes,  a  Mining  Bureau  and  a 
Weather  Bureau.  Ultimately,  the  Bureau  of  Non- 
Christian  Tribes  and  the  Mining  Bureau  were  incorporated 
with  the  Bureau  of  Government  Laboratories  to  form  the 
Bureau  of  Science,  which  continued  under  my  executive 
control.  The  Bureau  of  Agriculture  was  traiisferred  to 
the  Department  of  Public  Instruction  in  1909. 

I  was  at  the  outset  given  administrative  control  of  all 
matters  pertaining  to  the  non-Christian  tribes,  which 
constitute,  roughly  speaking,  an  eighth  of  the  population 
of  the  Philippines,  and  until  my  resignation  retained  such 
control  throughout  the  islands,  except  in  the  Moro 
Province,  which  at  an  early  day  was  put  directly  imder 
the  governor-general. 

I  participated  in  the  orgfmization  of  civil  government 
in  the  several  provinces  of  the  archipelago,  and  myself 
dr^ted  the  Municipal  Code  for  the  government  of  the 
towns  inhabited  by  Filipinos,  as  well  as  the  Special  Pro- 
vincial Government  Act  and  the  Township  Government 
Act  for  that  of  the  provinces  and  settlements  inhabited 
chiefly  by  the  non-Christian  tribes. 

At  the  outset  we  did  not  so  much  as  know  with  cer- 
tainty the  names  of  the  several  wild  and  savage  tribes 
inhabiting  the  more  remote  and  inaccessible  portions  of 
the  archipelago.  As  I  was  unable  to  obtain  reliable  in- 
formation concerning  them  on  which  to  base  legislation 
for  their  control  and  uplifting,  I  proceeded  to  get  such 
information  for  myself  by  visiting  their  territory,  much 
of  which  was  then  quite  unexplored. 




Aftei  this  territory  waa  orgaoized  into  five  so-called 
Special -Govenunent  Provinces,"  some  of  my  Filipino 
friends,  I  fear  not  moved  solely  by  anxiety  for  the  public 
good,  favoured  and  secured  a  legidative  enactment  which 
made  it  my  official  duty  to  visit  and  inspect  these  pro- 
vinces at  least  once  during  each  fiscal  year.  I  shall 
always  feel  indebted  to  them  for  ^ving  me  this  oppor- 
timi^  to  become  intimately  acquainted  with  some  of 
the  most  interesting,  most  progressive,  and  potentially 
most  important  peoples  of  the  Philippines. 

When  in  1901  I  received  the  news  that  a  central  gov- 
ernment was  soon  to  be  established,  I  was  in  the  Sub- 
province  of  Lepanto  on  my  first  trip  through  the  wilder 
and  less-known  portions  of  northern  Luzon.  During 
each  succeeding  year  I  have  spent  from  two  to  four 
months  in  travel  through  the  archipelago,  familiarizing 
myself  at  first  hand  with  local  conditions. 

I  have  frequently  taken  with  me  on  these  inspection 
tripe  representatives  of  the  Bureaus  of  Forestry,  Agricul- 
ture, Science  and  Health  to  carry  on  practical  investiga^ 
tions,  and  have  made  it  my  business  to  visit  and  explore 
little  known  and  imknown  regions.  There  are  very  few 
islands  worthy  of  the  name  which  it  has  not  been  my 
privilege  to  visit. 

The  organization  of  an  effective  campaign  against 
diseases  like  bubonic  plague,  smallpox,  Asiatic  cholera 
and  leprosy  in  a  country  where  no  similar  work  had  ever 
previously  been  imdertaken,  inhabited  by  people  pro- 
foxmdly  ignorant  of  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from 
modem  methods  of  suiitation,  uid  superstitious  to  a 
degree,  promptly  brought  me  iuto  violent  conflict  with 
the  beliefs  and  prejudices  of  a  large  portion  of  the  Filipino 

A  aunilar  result  followed  the  inauguration  of  an  active 
campaign  for  the  suppression  of  surra,  foot  and  mouth 
disease,  and  rinderpest,  which  were  rapidly  destroying 
the  horses  and  cattle. 



From  the  outset  I  was  held  responsible  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  marine  and  land  quarantine  regulations,  which . 
were  at  first  very  obnoxious  to  the  genertd  public. 

When  the  Pure  Food  and  Drugs  Act  adopted  by  Con- 
gress for  the  United  States  was  made  applicable  to  the 
Philippines  without  any  provision  for  its  enforcement, 
this  not  altogether  pleastmt  duty  was  assigned  to  me. 

I  did  not  seek  appointment  to  the  Philippine  service 
in  the  first  instance.  The  political  influence  at  my  com- 
mand has  never  extended  beyond  my  own  vote.  During 
a  period  of  twelve  years  nly  removal  was  loudly  and  fre- 
quently demanded,  yet  I  saw  President  Schurman,  Colonel 
Denby,  General  Otis,  Admiral  Dewey,  Commissioner 
Moses,  Governor  Taft,  Governor  Wright,  Governor  Ide, 
Governor  Smith,  Secretary  Shuster,  CommiBsioner  Tavera, 
Commissioner  Legarda  and  Governor  Forbes,  all  my  col- 
leagues on  one  or  the  other  of  the  Philippine  commissions, 
leave  the  service,  before  my  own  voluntary  retirement 
on  September  15,  1913. 

I  had  long  expected  a  request  for  my  resignation  at 
any  time,  and  had  .often  wWied  that  it  mi^t  come. 
Indeed  I  once  before  tendered  it  voluntarily,  only  to  have 
President  Taft  say  that  he  thought  I  should  wi^draw  it, 
which  I  did.  I  am  absolutely  without  political  ambition 
save  an  earnest  desire  to  earn  the  political  epitaph,  "He 
did  what  he  could." 

During  my  brief  and  infrequent  visits  to  the  United 
States  I  have  discovered  there  widespread  and  radical 
misapprehension  as  to  conditions  in  the  Philippines,  but 
have  failed  to  find  that  lack  of  interest  in  them  which  is 
conmionly  said  to  exist.  On  the  contrary,  I  have  foimd 
the  American  public  keenly  desirous  of  getting  at  the  real 
facts  whenever  there  was  an  opportunity  to  do  so. 

The  extraordinary  extent  to  which  untrue  statements 
have  been  accepted  at  their  face  value  has  surprised  and 
deeply  disturbed  me.  I  have  conversed  with  three  col- 
lege presidents,  each  of  whom  believed  that  the  current 




racpenses  of  the  Philippine  government  were  paid  from 
the  United  States  Treasury. 

The  preponderance  of  false  and  misleading  statements 
about  the  Philippines  is  due,  it  aeems  to  me,  primarily  to 
the  fact  that  it  is  those  persons  with  whom  the  climate 
.  disagrees  and  who  in  consequence  are  invalided  home, 
>  and  those  who  are  separated  from  the  service  in  the  in- 
terest of  the  public  good,  who  return  to  the  United  States 
I  and  get  an  audience  there ;  while  those  who  successfully 
'  adapt  themselves  to  local  conditions,  display  interest  in 
^   Uieir  work  and  become  proficient  in  it,  remain  in  the 
idands  for  long  periods  during  which  they  are  too  busy, 
*  and  too  far  from  home,  to  make  themselves  heard. 
Incidentally  it  must  be  remembered  that  if  such  per- 
sons do  attempt  to  set  forth  facte  which  years  of  practical 
experience  have  taught  them,  they  are  promptly  accused 
of  endeavouring  to  save  their  own  bread  and  butter  by 
seeking  to  perpetuate  conditions  which  insure  them  fat 

When  I  think  of  the  splendid  men  who  have  uncom- 
plainingly laid  down  their  hves  in  the  military  and  in  the 
civil  service  of  their  country  in  these  islands,  and  of  the 
lai^er  mrniber  who  have  given  freely  of  their  best  years 
to  unselfish,  efficient  work  for  others,  this  chai^  fills  me 
with  indignation. 

The  only  thing  that  kept  me  in  the  Philippine  service 
for  so  long  a  time  was  my  interest  in  the  work  for  the 
non-Christian  tribes  and  my  fear  that  while  my  successor 
was  gaining  knowledge  concerning  it  which  can  be  had 
only  through  experience,  matters  might  temporarily  go 
to  the  bad.  It  has  been  my  ambition  to  bring  this  work 
to  such  a  point  that  it  would  move  on,  for  a  time  at  least, 
by  its  own  momentum. 

I  am  now  setting  forth  my  views  relative  to  the  past 
and  present  situation  in  the  islands  because  I  believe 
that  their  inhabitants  are  confronted  by  a  danger  graver 
than  any  which  they  have  before  faced  »nce  t^e  time 



when  their  fate  wavered  in  the  balanoe,  while  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  United  States  ^ould  acquire  sover- 
eijpity  over  them  or  should  f'^'^w  Spain  to  continue  to 
rule  them  was  imder  conside.  '  '  n. 

It  is  my  piupose  to  tell  the  plain,  hard  truth  regard- 
less of  the  effect  of  such  conduct  upon  my  future  carcOT. 
It  has  been  alleged  that  my  views  on  Philippine  prob- 
lemswere  coloiu^  by  a  desire  to  retain  my  official  position. 
Nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth.  Indeed,  no 
man  who  has  not  served  for  long  and  sometimes  very 
weary  years  as  a  public  official,  and  has  not  been  a  target 
for  numerous  more  or  less  irresponsible  individuals  whose 
hands  were  filled  with  mud  and  who  were  actuated  by  a 
fixed  desire  to  throw  it  at  something,  can  appreciate  as 
keenly  as  I  do  the  manifold  blessings  which  attend  the 
life  of  a  private  citizen. 

I  trust  that  I  have  said  enough  to  make  clear  my  view 
point,  and  now  a  word  as  to  subject-matter.  It  is  my  in- 
tention to  correct  some  of  the  very  mmaerous  misstate- 
ments which  have  been  made  concerning  past  and  present 
conditions  in  the  Philippines.  I  shall  quote,  from  time 
to  time,  such  statements,  both  verbal  and  written,  and 
more  especially  some  of  those  which  have  recently  ap- 
peared in  a  book  entitled  "The  American  Occupation  of 
the  Phihppines,  1898-1912,"  by  James  H.  Blount,  who 
signs  himself  "Officer  of  the  United  States  Volimteers  in 
the  Phihppines,  1899-1901 ;  United  States  District  Judge 
in  the  Phihppmes,  1901-1905." 

Judge  Blount  has  indulged  so  freely  in  obvious  hyper^ 
bole,  and  has  made  so  very  evident  the  bitter  personal 
animosities  which  inspire  many  of  his  statements,  that  it 
has  been  a  genuine  siu^rise  to  his  former  associates  and 
acquaintances  that  his  book  has  been  taken  seriously. 

It  should  be  sufficiently  evident  to  any  unprejudiced 
reader  that  in  writing  it  he  has  played  the  part  of  the 
special  pleader  rather  than  that  of  the  historian.  He 
has  used  government  records  freely,  and  as  is  usually  the 





caae  when  a  apecial  pleader  quotes  from  such  records,  tlie 
nature  of  the  matter  which  he  has  omitted  is  worthy  of 
more  than  passing  attention.  I  shall  hope  to  he  able  to 
fill  some  of  the  gaps  that  he  has  left  in  the  documentary 
history  of  the  events  which  he  discusses  and  by  bo  do- 
ing, very  materially  to  change  its  purport. 

As  pubUc  documents  have  been  so  misused,  and  as  a 
new  administration  is  bestowing  on  Filipinos  political 
offices,  and  ^ving  them  opportunities,  for  which  they  are 
as  yet  utterly  imprepared,  tfius  endangering  the  results  of 
years  of  hard,  patient,  self-sacrificing  work  performed  by 
experienced  uid  competent  men,  it  becomes  necessary  to 
strike  home  by  revealing  impleasant  facts  which  are  of 
record  but  have  not  heretofore  been  disclosed  because  of 
tiie  injury  to  reputations  and  the  woimding  of  feelings 
which  would  result  from  their  publication.  In  doing 
this  I  feel  that  I  am  only  disohai^ng  a  duty  to  the  people 
of  the  United  States,  who  are  entitled  to  know  the  truth 
if  ike  present  possibility  of  Philippine  independence  is  to 
be  seriously  considered,  and  to  the  several  Hlipino  peoples 
who  are  to-day  in  danger  of  rushii^  headlong  to  their 
own  utter  and  final  destruction. 

At  the  outset  I  shall  discuss  the  oft-asserted  claim  that 
the  Filipino  leaders  were  deceived  and  betrayed  by  Ameri- 
can officials  whom  they  assisted,  and  that  this  unpar- 
donable conduct  led  to  the  outbreak  of  active  hostihties 
which  oodured  just  prior  to  the  arrival  at  Manila  of  the 
first  Philippine  Commission. 

I  shall  then  show  that  these  leaders  never  established  a 
government  which  adequately  protected  life  and  property, 
OF  gave  to  th«r  people  peace,  happiness  or  justice,  but 
on  the  contrary  inaugurated  a  veritable  reign  of  terror 
under  which  miu-der  became  a  governmental  institution, 
while  rape,  inhiimftn  torture,  burying  alive  and  other 
ghastly  crimes  were  of  common  occmrence,  and  usually 
went  unpimished.  The  data  which  I  use  in  establishii^ 
these  contentions  are  for  the  most  part  taken  directly 



from  the  Insurgent  records,  in  refenii^  to  which  I  employ 
the  war  department  abbreviation  "P.  I.  R."  followed 
by  a  mmiber. 

I  next  take  up  some  of  t^e  more  important  subsequent 
historical  events,  describing  the  work  of  the  first  Philip- 
pine Commission,  and  showing  in  what  manner  the 
government  established  by  the  second  Philippine  Com- 
mwsion  has  dischai^ed  its  stewardship,  subsequently  dis- 
cussing certain  as  yet  unsolved  problems  which  confront 
the  present  government,  such  as  that  presented  by  the 
existence  of  slavery  and  peonage,  and  that  of  the  non- 
Christian  tribes.  For  the  benefit  of  those  who,  like  Judge 
Bloimt,  consider  the  Philippines  "&  vast  straggly  archi- 
pelago of  jungle-covered  islands  in  the  south  seas  which 
have  been  a  nuisance  to  every  government  that  ever 
owned  them,"  I  give  some  facts  as  to  the  islands,  their 
climate,  their  natiiral  resources  and  their  commercial 
possibilities,  and  close  by  setting  forth  my  views  as  to 
the  present  ability  of  the  civilized  Cagayans,  Ilocanos, 
PampaugauB,  Zambals,  Pangasinflns,  Tagdlogs,  Bicols 
and  Visayans,  commonly  and  correctly  called  Filipinos, 
to  establish,  or  to  maintain  when  established,  a  stable 

I  government  throughout  Filipino  territory,  to  say  nothing 

I  of  bringing  under  just  and  effective  control,  and  of  pro- 
Itecting  and  civilizing,  the  people  of  some  twenty-seven 
non-Christian  tribes  which  constitute  an  eighth  of  the 

(1  population,  and  occupy  approximately  half  of  the  terri- 

,  tory,  of  the  Philippine  Islajids. 

I  wish  here  to  acknowledge  my  very  great  indebtedness 
to  Major  J.  R.  M.  Taylor,  who  has  translated  and  com- 
piled the  Insurgent  *  records,  thereby  making  available  a 
very  lai^e  mass  of  reliable  and  moat  valuable  information 
without  which  a  number  of  chapters  of  this  book  woiild 
have  remained  unwritten.    Surely  no  man  who  bases  his 

I I  use  the  word  "  Inaui^eats  "  as  a  proper  noun,  to  deei(piate  the 
Filipiooa  who  took  up  arms  agaiast  ihe  United  States,  h«aoe  (ja.^t&lize 
it,  and  the  adjective  derived  from  it. 



statements  concemlng  Filipino  rule  on  the  facts  set  forth 
in  these  records  can  be  accused  of  deriving  his  inform&- 
tion  from  hostile  or  prejudiced  sources. 
Of  them,  Major  Taylor  says :  — 

"No  one  reading  the  Insui^eDt  records  c&n  ful  to  be  im- 
pressed with  the  difference  between  the  Spanish  and  the  TaglU 
log  documents.  Many  of  the  former  are  doubtleea  written 
with  a  view  to  their  coming  into  the  hands  of  the  AmericsDB,  or 
with  deliberate  purpoae  to  have  them  do  so,  and  are  framed 
accordingly.  All  TagfUog  documents,  intended  only  for  flU- 
pinoe,  say  much  that  is  not  sud  in  the  Spanish  documents. 
The  orders  of  the  Dictator  *  to  his  subjecta  were  conveyed  in 
the  latter  series  of  documents." 

■  Oeneral  Aguinaldo. 



Was  Indbpendbncb  Promised? 

It  has  long  been  the  fashion  in  certain  quartera  to 
allege,  or  to  insinuate,  tiiat  American  consuls  and  naval 
officers  promised  the  Insui^nt  leaders  that  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Philippines  would  be  recognized  by  the 
United  States.  It  has  been  claimed  by  some  that  the 
cooperation  of  the  Insurgents  in  the  military  operations 
against  Manila  was  sought  for  and  secured.  Others  say 
that  they  were  at  least  de  facto  allies  of  the  United  States, 
and  that  they  were  in  the  end  shamelessly  betrayed  and 
wantonly  attacked. 

These  are  very  serious  charges.  I  Bhall  prove,  chiefly 
by  the'Insurgent  records,  that  each  of  them  is  false.  I 
ask  the  forbearance  of  my  readers  if,  in  the  three  chapters 
which  I  devote  to  these  matters,  I  quote  documentary 
evidence  at  length .  When  original  docxmients  or  extracte 
from  them  tell  a  clear  and  reasonably  concise  story,  I 
sometimes  insert  them  bodily  in  the  text.  In  other 
cases  I  give  my  own  version  of  the  facts  which  they  set 
forth,  but  give  the  full  text  in  foot-notes.  In  nearly  all 
instances  references  are  given  to  sources  of  documentary 
information.  I  greatly  regret  that  Taylor's  narrative, 
with  its  very  numerous  supporting  documents,  is  not 
readily  accessible  to  the  student  of  history.  It  ought  to 
have  been  published,  but  never  got  beyond  the  galley- 
proof  stage.  In  referring  to  it,  I  am  therefore  obUged  to 
use  the  word  Taylor  followed  by  the  letters  and  figures 
designating  the  page  of  this  g^ley  proof  on  which  the 
passage  referred  to  is  found.    Whenever  possible  I  ^ve 



the  War  Department  numbers*  of  Insurgent  documents, 
but  in  a  few  cases  can  give  only  the  exhibit  numbers 
assigned  by  Taylor  in  printing  the  documents. 

As  his  exhibits  are  serially  arranged  it  is  easy  to  find 
any  one  of  them.  Copies  of  his  work  may  be  found  in  the 
War  Department  and  in  the  office  of  the  Chief  of  the 
Kiilippine  Constabulary. 

Referring  to  the  charge  that  the  Insiirgents  were 
deceived,  even  had  deceit  been  practised  as  claimed, 
Aguinaldo  would  have  had  no  just  ground  for  com- 
plaint, for  he  himself  not  only  frankly  advocated  its 
use,  but  deliberately  employed  it  in  his  dealings  with  the 
Americans,  as  clearly  appears  in  records  hereinafter  cited.* 
However,  most  Americans  hold  to  a  standard  very  dif- 
ferent from  his.  Was  it  departed  from  in  this  instance  ? 
.  Aguinaldo  has  specifically  and  repeatedly  chained  that 
I  Pratt  and  Dewey  promised  him  the  recognition  of  the 
^  independence  of  the  Philippines  by  the  United  States.* 

Judge  Blount  has  referred  to  the  "de  facto  alliance 
between  the  Americans  and  Aguinaldo,"  and  has  dwelt 
at  length  on  "promises,  both  expressed  and  implied," 
which  were  subsequently  repudiated  by  Consul  Pratt, 
Admiral  Dewey  and  Generals  Anderson  and  Merritt, 
constantly  suggesting,  even  when  he  does  not  specifically 
charge,  bad  faith  on  the  part  of  these  officers  of  the 
United  States.*  , 

On  analyzing  his  statements  we  find  that  he  is  dis- 
creetly non-committal  as  to  exactly  what  were  the  ex- 
pressed promises,  nor  does  he  make  it  so  plain  as  might 
be  deedred  what  legitimate  inferences  were  deducible 
from  the  acts  of  the  Americans  in  question.    He  quotes 

■  Beeuming  with  the  letten  "P.  I.  B." 

■  See  pp.  53,  55,  68. 

>  See  pp.  27,  47,  49,  63  of  tluB  book  for  repetitions  and  variations 
of  this  ehMife  of  A^naldo. 

*  See  p.  31  of  his  book,  "The  American  Oooup&tion  of  the  Philip- 
pinee,"  in  Tetening  to  which  I  will  hereafter  ijse  the  word  Blount,  fol- 
lowed by  a  page  number. 




their  residence  outside  the  islands.  Their  deportation 
was  duly  provided  for,  and  Aguinaldo  and  twenty-aix  of 
his  companions  were  taken  to  Hongkong,  on  the  Spanish 
steamer  Uranus;  arriving  there  on  December  31,  1897. 
V  On  January  2,  1898,  $400,000  were  deposited  in  the 
Hongkong  Bank,  to  the  credit  of  Aguinaldo  and  Co. 

The  Insurgent  leaders  remaining  at  Biacnabat6  had  a 
meeting  under  the  presidency  of  Isabelo  Artacho,  an 
Ilocano '  who  was  the  ranking  officer  iu  the  absence  of 
Aguinaldo,  and  requested  that  the  second  instalment,  of 
$200,000,  be  paid  to  them.  The  Spanish  governor- 
general,  Primo  de  Rivera,  acceded  to  their  request,  and 
they  divided  the  money,  although  Aguinaldo  denied  their 
right  to  do  so,  claiming  that  it  should  have  been  sent  to 

The  third  payment  of  $200,000  was  apparently  never 
made.  Primo  de  Rivera,  says  that  he  turned  over  a 
check  for  $200,000  to  his  successor,  General  Augustin, 
ID  April,  1898 ;  giving  as  his  reason  for  refusing  to  pay 
it  to  the  Insurgents  that  there  seemed  to  him  to  be  no 
prospect  of  its  being  equitably  divided  among  those  who 
were  entitled  to  receive  it  imder  the  agreement. 

Aguinaldo  and  his  associates  claimed  that  certiun  re- 
forms were  promised  by  the  Spanish  government  at  the 
time  the  treaty  of  Biacnabatd  was  negotiated,  and  as 
these  measures  were  not  put  into  effect,  they  organized  a 
junta  or  revolutionary  committee  at  Hongkong.  It  in- 
cluded in  its  membership  a  number  of  Filipino  political 
exiles,  then  residing  at  that  place. 

The  men  who  composed  this  organization  soon  fell  to 
quarrelling  and  it  became  necessary  to  come  to  a  definite 
understanding  as  to  its  aims.  Under  the  arrangement 
finally  reached,  the  junta,  as  a  whole,  was  charged  with 
the  work  of  propaganda  outside  of  the  archipelago ;  with 

'  The  Iloeanos  ore  one  of  the  eight  civilized  peoples  who  oolleotivelir 
DuJce  up  the  fWpinoa.  The?  number  803,942,  and  inhabit  oertaia 
proviooei  in  northiem  Luzon. 



all  diplomatic  negotiations  with  foreign  governments; 
and  with  the  preparation  and  shipment  of  such  articles 
as  were  needed  to  carry  on  the  revolution  in  the  Philip- 
pines. It  was  to  be  allowed  voice  by  Aguinaldo's  govera- 
ment  in  any  serious  question  which  might  arise  abroad, 
and  would  aid  that  government  in  bringing  the  civil  ad- 
ministration of  the  Phihppines  to  the  level  of  that  of  the 
most  advanced  nations. 

Trouble  soon  arose  amoi^  the  former  Insui^nt  leaders 
over  the  division  of  the  fimds  deposited  at  Hongkong. 

Taylor  gives  a  trustworthy  and  concise  account  of  the 
events  of  this  period,  and  as  it  is  of  historic  interest,  and 
makes  clear  just  how  Aguinaldo  came  to  go  to  Singapore, 
meet  Pratt,  and  enter  into  negotiations  with  him,  I  quote 
extensive  extracts  from  it.' 

"From  January  4  to  April  i,  Aguinaldo  withdrew  from  the 
banks  5786.46  pesos  in  part  interest  on  the  money  he  had  de- 
posited. This  was  used  to  pay  the  expenses  of  himself  and  his 
companions  in  Hongkoi^.  These  expenses  were  kepf  at  a 
minimum ;  the  money  was  drawn  and  spent  by  him.  If  one 
of  the  men  with  him  needed  a  new  ptur  of  shoes,  Aguinaldo 
pud  for  them ;  if  another  wanted  a  new  coat,  Aguinaldo  bought 
it.  Minute  accounts  were  kept,  which  are  on  file  among  his 
papers,  and  it  is  seen  from  them  that  his  expenses  were  exceed- 
ing his  income,  which  could  only  be  12,000  pesos  a  year,  while 
he  was  living  at  the  rate  of  ^,000,  with  constant  demands 
bdng  made  upon  him  by  men  who  came  from  the  Philippines. 
Life  was  not  easy  under  these  conditions.  Aguinaldo's  com- 
panions were  entirely  dependent  upon  him.  Their  most  trivial 
expenses  had  to  be  approved  by  him,  and  he  held  them'  down 
with  a  strong  blind.  They  were  men  living  in  a  strange  land, 
among  a  people  whose  language  they  did  not  speak,  having 
nothing  to  do  but  quarrel  among  themselves,  exiles  waiting  for 
a  chance  to  return  to  their  own  country,  which  they  watched 
mth  weary  eyes  while  they  guarded  the  embers  by  which  they 
hoped  to  Ught  the  fires  of  a  new  insurrection. 

'  I  h&ve  not  felt  at  liberty  to  correat  spelliiiK.  oapitaJization,  punotn- 
ation  or  grammar  in  quotatione,  except  in  the  case  of  perfectly  evident 
printer's  errors.  It  should  be  remembered  th&t  tlie  results  of  Taylor's 
work  were  left  iu  the  form  of  galle;  proof. 



"  The  meo  who  had  accompanied  Asuiaaldo  to  Hongkong 
were  not  the  only  Filipinos  domiciled  there ;  a  number  of  men 
had  taken  refuge  in  that  British  colony  after  the  events  of  1872, 
and  Bome  of  them  at  least  had  proepered.  Some  of  them,  like 
the  membere  of  the  Cortes  family,  seem  to  have  had  almost 
no  relations  with  the  followers  of  Aguinaldo ;  some,  like  J.  M. 
Baaa,  knew  them  and  took  part  in  some  of  the  meetings  of  the 
governing  groups,  but  were  probably  not  admitted  to  their 
full  confidence,  as  Aguin&Ido  and  his  immediate  following 
wanted  and  were  working  for  independence  and  independence 
alone,  while  the  Filipinos  who  had  long  lived  in  Hongkong 
wanted  to  see  the  archipelago  lost  to  Spain,  but  had  no  con- 
fidmce  in  the  ability  of  the  country  to  stand  alone  or  in  the 
fitness  of  Aguinaldo  and  [his  following  to  direct  the  councils  ' 
of  a  state.  The  character  of  the  new  refugees  did  not  inspire 
confidence  in  these  older  men,  who  hoped  for  a  protectorate  by 
or  annexation  to  the  United  States. 
\"  On  May  6, 1898,  l^e  consul-general  of  the  Ignited  States  there 
informed  the  State  Department  that  D.  Cort^,  M.  Ck>rbSs, 
A.  Rosario,  Gracio  Gonzaga,  and  Jos£  Maria  Basa  (50),  all 
very  wealthy  land-owners,  bankers,  and  lawyers  of  Manila, 
desired  to  tender  their  allegiance  and  the  alliance  of  their 
powerful  families  in  Manila  to  the  United  States,  and  that  they 
had  instructed  all  their  connections  to  render  every  aid  to  the 
Umted  States  forces  in  Manila.  \  On  May  14  he  forwarded  state- 
mtnta  of  other  flhpinos  domiciled  in  Hongkong,  not  members 
of  the  junta,  that  they  desired  to  submit  their  alliance  and 
the  alliance  of  their  families  in  the  Philippine  Islands  to  the 
United  States.  One  of  Aguinaldo's  followers,  writing  somewhat 
later,  spoke  with  bitterness  of  the  rich  old  men  who  went  about 
calling  their  companions  'b^garly  rebels,'  but  these  men 
were  rich,  and  their  names  and  their  apparent  adhesion  to  the 
cause  represented  by  Aguinaldo  would  inspire  confidence  in 
him  among  men  of  property  in  the  Fhihppines.  They  were, 
accordingly,  not  to  be  lightly  alienated ;  therefore,  at  first,  at 
least,  no  open  break  took  place  with  them,  but  their  attitude 
toward  the  leaders  of  the  insurrection  is  qhown  by  the  fact  that 
after  the  early  sunmier  of  1898  they  took  no,  or  very  httle, 
part  in  the  insurgent  movement,  although  they  were  fiving  in 
Hongkong,  the  seat  of  the  junta,  which  conducted  the  propa- 
ganda for  the  insurgrait  government  of  the  Philippines. 

"  But,  in  fact,  Aguinaldo  had  no  just  conception  of  the  con- 
ditions and  of  the  opportunities  wtuch  were  about  to  open  be- 



fore  the  Hongkong  junta,  for  although  war  between  Spun  and 
the  United  States  was  imminent  and  a  United  States  squadron 
was  in  Hongkong  threatening  Manila,  Aguinaldo  was  chiefly 
concerned  in  finding  how  to  avoid  losing  the  money  which  had 
been  received  from  the  Spanish  government  as  the  price  of  his 
surrender.  The  importance  of  his  presence  near  the  Philippines 
In  case  of  war  did  not  occur  to  him,  or  if  it  did  occur  to  him  any- 
thing which  he  could  obtain  there  from  the  aid  of  the  United 
States  probably  seemed  for  the  moment  of  litUe  consequeoce 
compared  with  escaping  from  his  wrangling  companions  with 
enoi^h  money  to  live  on  in  Pans. 

"  Artacho,  who  had  received  5000  pesos  as  his  share  of  the 
second  payment,  arrived  in  Hongkong  and  on  April  5  demanded 
200,000  pesos  of  the  insurgent  funds,  probably  under  the 
agreement  that  he  should  establish  a  company  in  Hongkong 
for  the  benefit  of  the  former  leaders  and  not  merely  of  those 
who  had  accompanied  Aguinaldo.  But  the  leaders  in  Hong- 
kong had  denounced  that  agreement,  and  refused  to  pay.  He 
then  entered  suit  before  the  supreme  court  of  Hongkong,  callinx 
upon  Aguinaldo  for  an  accounting  of  the  trust  funds  deposited 
in  his  hands  for  the  benefit  of  Artacho  and  others,  and  asked 
for  an  injunction  restrainii^  Aguinaldo  or  any  member  of  the 
junta  from  handling  or  disposing  of  any  part  of  said  funds.  He 
filed  as  evidence  copies  of  the  Biacnabat6  agreement  and  of 
the  f^reement  made  by  the  leaders  on  December  19.  This 
suit  was  brought  not  merely  in  the  name  of  Artacho,  but  in 
that  of  all  the  exiles  who  were  described  as  living  in  exile  in 
Hongkong  in  accordance  with  an  agreement  made  with  the 
Spanish  Government.  Artacho  probably  had  adherents  among 
these  men,  some  at  least  of  whom  were  utteriy  weary  of  waiting 
in  Hongkong  and  of  living  upon  what  was  doled  out  to  them. 
Some  at  least  saw  no  chance  of  any  other  fate  than  indefinite 
exile  spent  in  dependence  upon  the  inner  group  for  even  the 
means  of  existence. 

"  The  suit  was  in  equity,  and  called  for  an  accounting  for  the 
tniBt  funds  which  the  complainant  recognized  were  l^ally  in 
the  hands  of  Aguinaldo.  It  could  be  carried  on  only  with  great 
difficulty  without  his  presence  and  without  his  account  books. 
Meetings  were  held,  and  Artacho  was  denounced  as  attempting 
to  extort  blackmail,  but  he  refused  to  yield,  and  Aguinaldo, 
rather  than  explain  the  inner  workings  of  the  Hongkong  junta 
before  a  British  court,  prepared  for  flight.  A  summons  was 
issued  for  his  appearance  before  the  supreme  court  of  Hongkong 
on  April  13, 1898,  but  he  was  by  that  time  beyond  its  juriadiction. 



/"  He  drew  out  the  50,000  pesos  from  the  Chartered  Bank, 
much  had  become  due  according  to  the  terms  of  the  deposit, 
and  pwhaps  such  other  sums  as  could  be  drawn  upon  by  check, 
mga^ed  passage  for  Europe  by  way  of  Singapore  for  G.  H.  del 
Filar,  J.  M.  Leyba,  and  hiniself  under  assumed  names,  appointed 
V.  B^armino  to  succeed  to  his  functions,  and  gave  him  checks 
mgned  in  blank  to  draw  the  interest  of  tiie  sums  on  deposit  to 
provide  for  the  support  of  the  exiles.  He  gave  as  his  reason  for 
departure  that  he  was  going  to  remain  under  cover  until  Artacho 
could  be  bought  off,  but  he  intended  to  go  far  afield  for  this 
puipoee,  as  he  gave  his  destination  as  Europe  and  the  United 

"  Aguinaldo  and  his  companions  probably  s^ed  from  Hong- 
kong on  April  8, 1898,  and  arrived  in  Singapore  on  April  21,  after 
stopping  in  Saigon.  War  between  the  United  States  and  Spain 
had  be^  rendered  inevitable  by  the  resolution  of  Congress 
demanding  that  Spain  should  withdraw  her  forces  from  Cuba, 
and  was  declared  on  April  21.  Although  Aguinaldo  and  his  fol- 
lowers did  not  appreciate  the  influence  which  conditions  on  the 
other  side  of  the  world  might  have  upon  the  future  of  the  Phiiip- 
pioee,  it  happened  that  in  Singapore  at  that  time  there  was  an 
Knglinhrrn^n  named  Bray  who  did.  He  had  been  a  member  of 
the  civil  service  in  India,  and  had  lived  for  some  years  in  the 
Phihppines,  but  he  had  fallen  upon  evil  days  and  was  engaged 
in  writing  letters  to  the  Singapore  Free  Press  upon  the  Philip- 
pines, and  in  retailing  such  information  as  was  in  his  possession 
concerning  them  to  the  United  States  consul-general  in  Sii^a- 
pore,  Mr.  E.  Spencer  Pratt,  for  transmittal  to  Commodore 
Dewey.  Bray  heard  of  the  arrival  of  Aguinaldo  and  reaUzed 
what  could  be  done  with  him,  and  that  if  the  matter  were  well 
handled  it  might  be  to  his  own  advantage.  He  went  at  once  to 
see  Aguinaldo  and  informed  him  that  the  United  States  consul- 
general  was  anxious  to  see  him.  He  went  to  the  consul-general 
and  informed  him  of  the  importance  of  Aguinaldo,  and  that  he 
was  in  Singapore.  Aguinaldo  had  to  be  persuaded  to  agree  to 
a  meeting.  The  consul-general  was  anxious  for  it,  and  it  took 
place,  according  to  Aguinaldo,  on  the  night  of  April  22  (accord-* 
ing  to  Pratt,  on  the  morning  of  April  24).  The  statement  made 
by  Aguinaldo  is  probably  correct.  According  to  his  account 
book,  he  paid  $11  on  April  23,  1898,  for  a  tel^ram  to  the  Hong- 
kong junta  concerning  the  negotiations  'with  America.' 

"Aguinaldo  knew  but  little  English,  Pratt  knew  no  Spanish, 
so  in  their  interview  Bray  acted  as  interpreter.  An  interpreter 
trho  is  interested  in  the  subject  of  the  discussion  may  be  a 



dangerous  man.  It  is  impossible  to  say  what  he  told  Agni- 
naldo.  Certainly  Pratt  did  not  know ;  but  whatever  was  said 
during  these  conversationa  it  is  within  the  Umita  of  possibility 
that  Pratt  may  have  been  made  to  eay  by  the  interpreter  more 
than  he  intended,  and  that  bia  statements  of  what  would  prob- 
ably be  granted  by  the  United  States  Government  and  his  ex- 
preasion  of  good  wishes  for  the  cause  of  Filipino  independence 
may  have  been  translated  as  assurances  and  as  promises.  Bray, 
who,  according  to  his  Pihpino  former  friends,  was  apt  to  taJk 
too  much,  may  have  talked  too  much  on  this  occasion,  and  so 
the  myth  of  the  formal  agreement  between  Aeuinaldo  on  be- 
half of  the  Filipino  insurgents  and  Pratt  on  beb^  of  the  United 
States  grew  up,  a  fiction  which  Bray  himself,  with  a  natural 
desire  to  add  to  his  own  importance,  did  his  best  to  circulate. 
"Bray  did  not  ask  for  his  reward  at  the  time,  but  probably 
reckoned  upon  making  himself  indispensable  as  an  adviser,  so 
that  later  he  could  make  bis  own  terms.  For  a  time  he  wrote 
letters  of  advice  to  Aguinaldo,  which  may  have  had  some  in- 
fiuence  upon  the  line  of  conduct  which  he  adopted,  and  later 
was  employed  in  furnishing  from  Hongkong  news  to  various 
newspapers  of  events  and  conditions  in  the  Philippines.  His 
cablegrams  shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilitiee  between 
the  United  States  and  the  insurgents  were  more  picturesque 
than  veracious,  but  they  were  apparently  considered  effective, 
as  Aguinaldo  ord^^  that  he  should  be  given  $5000.  He 
wanted  more,  but  the  Hongkong  junta  did  not  trust  him,  and 
he  ceased  to  be  in  their  employment."  > 

'^  As  we  shall  see,  Bray  did  not  do  all  of  the  interpreting 
at  Singapore,  and  we  shall  be  able  to  determine  wi^  some 
accuracy  what  actually  transpired  there. 

We  can  now  consider  understandingly  the  chaises  made 
against  Pratt  and  Dewey. 

It  has  been  claimed  over  and  over  again,  that  Pratt 
promised  Aguinaldo  recognition  of  the  independence  of 
the  Philippines  if  he  and  his  people  would  co6perate  with 
the  United  States  forces  against  Spain. 

Aguinaldo  himself  made  the  charge  in  his  ' 
Veridica"  *  in  the  following  words :  — 

'  Taylor,  42  F  Z-43  P  Z. 

*  For  the  hiatory  of  this  document,  see  p.  51. 


WAS  inden:ndence  promised  t  27 

"In  this  interview  Consul  Pratt  told  me  that  because  the 
Spaniards  had  not  complied  with  the  agreement  of  Biac-nB^batfi, 
the  Filipinos  had  a  ri^t  to  renew  their  interrupted  revolution 
and  advised  me  to  take  up  arms  anew  against  Spain,  assuring 
me  that  America  would  give  the  Filipinos  the  greatest  advan- 
tages (mayores  ventajas).  Then  I  asked  the  Consul  what 
advantages  the  United  States  would  concede  to  the  Philippines, 
suggestii^,  when  I  had  the  proper  opening,  the  propriety  of 
making  an  agreement  in  writing,  to  which  the  Consul  answered 
that  he  would  report,  by  telegraph,  on  the  subject  to  Mr.  Dewey, 
who  was  the  chief  of  the  expedition  against  the  Philipfmes, 
and  who  had  ample  powers  from  Presidetat  McKinley. 

"  On  the  following  day,  between  10  and  12  in  the  morning,  we 
again  took  up  the  matter.  Consul  Pratt  saying  that  the  admiral 
had  answered  my  inquiry  oy  saying  that  the  United  States  would 
at  least  recognize  the  independence  of  the  Philippine  govern- 
ment under  a  naval  protectorate,  but  that  there  was  no  neces- 
nty  to  put  it  in  writii^,  as  the  words  of  the  admiral  and  the 
American  consul  were  sacred  and  would  be  fulfilled,  not  beii^ 
like  iiime  of  the  Spaniards,  and  finally,  that  the  Government 
of  North  America  was  a  very  honourable  Government,  a  very 
just  and  very  powerful  one^'V 

On  April  27,  ti^^  Pratt  telegraphed  tte  Secretary  of 
State  as  follows :  — 

"Gcaieral  Aguinaldo  gone  my  instance  Hongkong  arrange 
with  Dewey  cooperation  insurgents  Manila. 

"  Pratt." 

On  the  28th  he  wrote  the  Secretary,  explaining  how 
he  had  come  to  meet  Aguinaldo,  and  stating  just  what  he 
had  done.    He  said :  — 

"At  this  interview,  after  leamii^  from  General  Aguinaldo 
the  state  of  an  object  sought  to  be  obtained  by  the  present  in- 
surrectionary movement,  which,  though  absent  from  the  Philip- 
pines, he  was  still  directing,  I  took  it  upon  myself,  whilst  ex- 
plaining that  I  had  no  authority  to  speak  for  the  Government, 
to  point  out  the  danger  of  continuing  independent  action  at 
this  stage;  and,  having  convinced  him  of  the  expediency  of 
cooperating  with  our  fieet,  then  at  Hongkong,  and  obtained  the 
aaeurauce  of  lus  wiUingness  to  proceed  thither  and  confer  with 

»P.  I.  R..  1300.2. 



Conmiodore  Dewey  to  that  end,  should  the  latter  so  deore,  I 
telegraphed  the  Conunodore  the  same  day  as  follows,  through 
our  consul-general  at  Hongkong :  — 

" '  Aguinaldo,  insurgent  leader,  here.  Will  come  Hongkong 
arrange  with  Conimodore  for  general  cooperation  inauj^^ts 
Manila  if  desired.    Telegraph. 


The  Commodore's  reply  read  thxis :  —    - 

'"Tdl  Aguinaldo  come  soon  as  possible. 

Pratt  adds: — 

"  I  rec^ved  it  late  at  night,  and  at  once  communicated  to 
General  Aguinaldo,  who,  with  his  aide-de-camp  and  privat« 
secretary,  all  under  assumed  names,  I  succeeded  in  getting  off 
by  the  British  Steamer  Malacca,  which  left  here  on  Tuesday 
the  26th. 

"Just  previous  to  his  departure,  I  had  a  second  and  last  intw- 
view  with  General  Aguinaldo,  the  particulars  of  which  I  shall 
give  you  by  next  mail. 

"The  general  impressed  me  as  a  man  of  intelligence,  ability, 
and  courage,  and  worthy  the  confidence  that  had  been  placed 

"  I  think  that  in  arranging  for  his  direct  codpotition  with  the 
commander  of  our  forces,  I  have  prevented  possible  conflict 
of  action  and  facilitated  the  work  of  occupying  and  adminis- 
tering the  Phihppines. 

"  If  this  course  of  mine  meets  with  the  Government's  approval, 
Bs  I  trust  it  may,  I  shall  be  fully  satisfied ;  to  Mr,  Bray,  however, 
I  consider  there  is  due  some  special  recognition  for  most  valu- 
able services  rendered. 

"  How  that  recognition  can  best  be  made  I  leave  to  you  to 

"  I  have,  etc."  * 

It  will  be  noted  that  Pratt  explained  to  Aguinaldo  that 
he  had  no  authority  to  speak  for  the  government ;  that 
there  was  no  mention  in  the  cablegrams  between  Pratt  and 
Dewey  of  independence  or  indeed  of  any  conditions  on  which 
Aguinaldo  was  to  cooperate,  these  details  being  left  for 

I  Senate  Document  62,  part  1,  Fifty-fifth  Congresa,  Third  Session, 
P.  P.  341  el  teq. 








i    I 



j'-^^fig^:  •:■ 



future  arrangemeDt  with  Dewey ;  and  that  Pratt  thought 
that  he  had  prevented  possible  conflict  of  action  and 
facilitated  the  work  of  occupyii^  and  adminifitering  the 

The  particulars  as  to  the  second  and  last  interview 
between  Aguinaldo  and  Pratt  were  embodied  in  the  fol- 
lowing letter :  — 

"No.  213.        Consdiatb-Gbnebal  or  the  United  States. 
"  Singapore,  April  30,  1898. 

"Sm:  Referring  to  my  dispatch  No.  212,  of  the  28th  iniitant, 
I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  in  the  second  and  last  interview 
I  had  with  Gen.  Rmilio  Aguinaldo  on  the  eve  of  his  departure 
for  Hongkong,  I  enjoined  upon  him  the  necessity,  under  Commo- 
dore Dewey's  direction,  of  exerting  absolute  control  over  his 
forces  in  the  Philippines,  as  no  excesses  on  their  part  would  be 
tolerated  by  the  American  Government,  the  President  having 
declared  that  the  present  hostilities  with  Spain  were  to  be  car- 
ried on  in  strict  accord  with  modem  principles  of  civilized  war- 

"  To  this  Genial  Aguinaldo  fully  assented,  assuring  me  that 
he  intended  and  was  perfectly  able,  once  on  the  field,  to  hold 
his  followers,  the  insurgents,  in  check  and  lead  them  as  our  com- 
mander should  direct. 

"  The  general  stated  that  he  hoped  the  United  States  would 
assume  protection  of  the  Philippines  for  at  least  long  enough  to 
allow  the  inhabitants  to  establish  a  government  of  thmr  own, 
in  the  organization  of  which  he  would  desire  American  advice 
and  assistance. 

"These  questions  I  told  him  I  had  no  authority  to  discuss. 

"  I  have,  etc., 

"E.  Spencer  Prait, 

"  United  States  ConsulrGenertU," 

In  a  subsequent  communication  written  on  July  28, 
1898,  Pratt  made  the  following  statement :  — 

"I  declined  even  to  discuss  with  General  Aguinaldo  the  ques- 
tion of  the  futiure  policy  of  the  United  States  with  regard  to  the 
Philippines,  that  I  held  out  no  hopes  to  him  of  any  kind,  com- 
mitted the  government  in  no  way  whatever,  and,  in  the  course 
of  our  confidences,  never  acted  upon  the  assumption  that  the 
Govemm^it  would  cooperate  with  him  —  General  Aguinaldo  — 




for  the  furtherance  of  any  plans  of  his  own,  noi  that,  in  accc^ 
iog  his  said  cooperation,  it  would  comider  iteelf  pledged  to 
recognize  any  political  claims  which  he  might  put  forward."' 

What  reason  if  any  is  there  for  denying  the  truth  of  this 
allegation  ? 

I  will  ^ve  in  full  Blount's  statement  as  to  what  occurred 
at  a  meeting  held  at  Singapore,  to  celebrate  the  early  suc- 
cesses of  Dewey  and  Aguinaldo,  as  it  constitutes  his 
nearest  approach  to  a  direct  claim,  that  any  one  at  any 
time  promied  independence :  — 

"First  there  was  music  by  the  band.  Then  followed  the 
formal  reading  and  presentation  of  the  address  by  a  Dr.  Santos, 
representing  the  Filipino  community  of  Singapore.  The  ad- 
dnss  plet^ed  the  'eternal  gratitude'  of  the  Filipino  people  to 
Admiral  Dewey  and  the  honored  addressee;  alluded  to  the 
glories  of  independence,  and  to  how  Aguinaldo  had  been  enabled ; 
by  the  arrangement  so  happily  effected  with  Admiral  Dewey 
by  Consul  Pratt,  to  aroiue  ei^t  millions  of  Filipinos  to  take 
up  arms  'in  defence  of  those  principles  of  justice  and  liberty 
of  which  your  country  is  the  foremost  champion '  and  trusted 
'that  the  United  States  .  .  .  will  efficaciously  second  the 
programme  arranged  between  you,  sir,  and  General  Aguinaldo 
in  this  port  of  Singapore,  and  secure  to  us  our  independence 
under  the  protection  of  the  United  States.' 

"Mr.  Prattarose  and  'proceeded,  speaking  in  French,'  says 
the  ne^rapaper  —  it  does  not  say  Alabama  iVench,  but  that  is 
doubtless  what  it  was —  'to  state  his  belief  that  the  Pllipinos 
would  prove  and  were  now  proving  themselves  fit  for  self- 
government.'  The  gentleman  from  Alabama  then  went  on  to 
review  the  mighty  events  and  developments  of  the  precedii^ 
six  weeks,  Dewey's  victory  of  May  1st,  'the  brilliant  achieve- 
ments of  your  own  distinguished  leader,  General  Emilio  Agui- 
naldo, cooperating  on  land  viith  the  Americans  at  sea,'  etc.  '  You 
have  just  reason  to  be  proud  of  what  has  been  and  is  being  ac- 
complished by  General  Aguinaldo  and  your  fellow-countrymen 
under  his  command.  'When,  six  weeks  ago,  I  learned  that 
General  Aguinaldo  had  arrived  incognito  in  Singapore,  I  imme- 
diately sought  him  out.  An  hour's  interview  convinced  me 
that  he  was  the  man  for  the  occasion ;  and,  having  communi- 
cated with  Admiral  Dewey,  I  accordingly  arranged  for  him  to 
join  the  latter,  which  he  did  at  Cavite.    "The  rest  you  know. ' "  ' 

>  Senate  Document  62,  part  1,  Fifty-fifth  Congress,  Third  Sesdon; 
also  P.  I.  R.,  496.  ■  Blount,  pp.  11-12. 


Nov,  it  happens  that  Dr.  Santos  himself  forwarded  his 
speech,  and  his  verdon  of  Pratt's  reply  thereto,  in  a  letter 
to  Aguinaldo,  dated  Singapore,  June  9,  1898.  As  he 
served  as  interpreter,  he,  if  any  one,  shoxild  know  what 
Pratt  said.  After  describing  the  change  in  tone  of  the 
Singapore  Free  Press,  with  which  strained  relations  had 
form^y  existed,  and  the  subsequent  friendliness  of  the 
editor  of  this  paper  and  that  of  the  Straits  Times,  he  says 
that  on  the  previous  afternoon  he  went  with  the  other 
Filipinos  to  greet  Pratt.    He  continues :  -~ 

"  Tias  occasion  was  unusually  opportune  by  reason  of  ours 
having  been  victorious  and  immediately  after  the  cry  of  our 
worthy  chief  which  found  an  echo  in  this  colony.  For  tbia  pur^ 
pose  M  or  more  fWpinoe  —  9  of  the  higher  class,  15  musicians 
and  the  remainder  of  the  middle  class  —  went  to  greet  Consul  A., 
here,  and  on  the  invitation  of  Mr.  Bray  we  ascended.  He 
received  us  in  his  private  office,  and  it  was  imposing  to  see  that 
the  only  decoration  was  the  American  flag  which  covered  the 
desk,  and  in  its  centre,  a  carved  wooden  frame  holding  the  por- 
trait of  our  worthy  chief.  He  shook  hands  with  all  of  us,  and  I 
introduced  them  all.  We  found  there  also,  and  were  introduced 
to,  the  Editor  of  the  Straite  Timea  and  the  Free  Press  of  here, 
and  after  being  thus  assembled,  after  a  musical  selection,  I  read 
tiie  following  speech  in  IVench  ;  — 

'"His  Excellenct,  thx  Consul  Gbnkbal  or  the  United 
States  of  Auebica  in  Sinqapobe  : 
" '  YoTTR  Excellency  ;  The  Filipinos  of  all  social  classes 
residing  in  this  port,  have  come  to  greet  Your  Excellency  as 
the  genuine  representative  of  the  great  and  powerful  American 
Republic  in  order  to  express  to  you  our  eternal  gratitude  for 
the  moral  and  material  support  given  by  Admiral  Dewey  to 
our  General  Aguinaldo  in  his  campaign  for  the  liberty  of  eight 
million  Filipinos.  The  latter  and  we  ourselves  hope  that  the 
United  States,  your  nation,  persevering  in  its  humanitarian  pol- 
icy, will  without  cessation  and  (with)  decided  energy  continue  to 
support  the  programme  (^eed  upon  in  Singapore  between  Your 
Eitcellency  and  Gwieral  Aguinaldo,  that  is  to  say,  the  Indepen- 
dmce  of  the  Piiihppine  Islands,  under  an  American  protector- 
ate. Accept  our  cordial  acknowledgments  and  congratuJa- 
tions  on  b«iig  the  first  one  in  accepting  and  supporting  this  idea 
which  time  uid  events  have  wdl  developed  to  the  great  satis- 



faction  of  our  nation.  iFlnally,  we  request  you,  Most  Excellent 
Sir,  to  expreee  to  your  worthy  President  and  the  American 
Republic,  our  sincere  acknowledgments  and  our  fervent  wishes 
for  their  prosperity.    I  have  concluded.' 

"  The  Consul  replied  hereto  in  French,  in  more  or  lees  the 
following  terms :  — 

'"You  have  nothing  to  thank  me  for,  because  I  have  only 
futhfully  followed  the  instructions  received  from  my  Govern- 
ment ;  the  fact  of  the  sudden  departure  of  your  General  will 
permit  you  to  infer  that  I  have  done  so.  I  shall  in  any  case 
mform  my  Government  of  your  good  wishes  and  I  tbai^  you 
in  its  name.  You  know  that  your  wishes  are  mine  also,  and 
for  this  reason  at  the  last  interview  I  had  with  Mr.  Aguinaldo, 
I  repeated  to  him  that  he  should  observe  the  greatest  humanity 
possible  in  the  war,  in  order  that  our  army,  our  soldiers,  our 
nation  and  all  the  other  nations  may  see  that  you  are  biunane 
and  not  savages,  as  has  erroneously  been  believed.' 

"  After  this  there  was  enthusiastic  applause  for  the  Consul ; 
he  offered  us  all  cigars,  glasses  of  very  fine  sherry,  and  lemonade 
for  the  musicians  and  the  majority.  The  toasts  wra'e  offered 
with  the  sherry  by  your  humble  servant,  Sres.  Cannon,  Enrf- 
qucB,  Celio,  Reyes,  the  Consul,  the  editors  of  the  Free  Preaa, 
Straits  Timea  and  Mr.  Bray.  We  drank  to  America  and  her 
humanitarian  work  of  redemption;  to  the  Philippines  with 
America ;  we  gave  thanks  to  the  Consul,  to  Mr.  Bray  as  an 
important  defender ;  we  drank  to  the  Free  Press  for  taking  such 
an  interest  in  our  affairs,  and  to  the  Straits  Times  (sarcastically)  ; 
but  I  was  very  careful  not  to  propose  a  toast  to  our  general, 
which  was  done  at  the  proper  time  by  '  Flaco ' '  when  we  gave 
three  cheers ;  for  the  sake  of  comtesy  we  cheered  for  England, 
which  bad  been  so  hospitable  to  us,  and  when  everybody  had 
become  quiet,  the  Editor  of  the  Straits  Times  took  his  glass  in 
his  hand  and  cried  in  a  loud  voice,  'The  Philippine  Republic,' 
to  which  we  all  responded.  'Flaco'  disappeared  a  moment, 
and  when  he  returned  he  brought  with  him  the  Am^can  flag, 
and  formally  presented  it  to  us  in  French,  which  I  interpreted 
to  all  in  Spanish,  as  follows :  '  Gentlemen :  The  American  Consul, 
■  with  ills  deep  affection  for  us,  presents  us  this  Sag  as  the  greats 
est  and  most  expressive  remembrance  which  he  can  give  us. 
The  red  stripes  stand  for  the  generous  blood  of  her  sons,  shed 
to  obtain  her  liberty ;  the  white  stripes  stand  for  her  virginity 
and  purity  as  our  country ;   the  blue  background  indicates  the 



S  5°iS' °^d'?rr""  ,».  ''f».»°<'  indeprndent  State: 

1»  our  hSDZjT,',iT^^*  l*^"  "*''  ««P«<*.  »"d  may  God 

•o  the  mirSrf  mZSiS   ^  '°«°''  '  "urtesy.'    Hereupon, 

pleas,  him  vS/Z.1,     S     ,.""  ^^  "''^"^  "•"='  ■""i"'  to 
»tMed  withX^„,i„!"^y'/^'"  "'S,  "«  left,  very  weU 

I  inert  aboieSlI^^'/"'  ""E  '"*  "'  "J  »P<«"1'.  "Uch 
-U'h  I  3^i„  ^T^fS"  '7".?"  '^""^  "^  i^*  text, 

I  am,  '  "  "*'  ""S"  »nd  mstruotiona  for  the  future, 

/a-      jx  "  YouTB,  ete. 

Wigned)  Ismoso  de  los  Sahtos." 

note: ^  '^""  ''°'" Taylor  hM  appended  the foUovring 

AgJSdoOTj!;;^frr'°  °  ■'*'»'•  ™tten  in  TagMog  to 
kSSSj  12  ZtS  °,riL^'"'",  ^=  'l<«"tw  tb.  American  o4.S 
hurrah  for  tK!  ^f!*  "?'  Hurrah  for  General  Agumaldo, 
"PparenUy  tit»  ElM  f',"  P^PPi""'  and  thm,  having 

FUipinoe  (pT  "eTS"?)' rf        ''° *'"°* '' *" ""^  "''"'''"^ 

of  "Slf  U^^'°if^""'  *«  n"'  present  the  representative 
favourabfe^t  h^  f7?T^,'  "  Singapore  in  a  very 
now  we  «i,r„  r,"'  '  '^^  *«  '»=<*  »»  I  find  them.  If 
with  B  W wi^'  'T-''  ^'"""y  "^^  •'y  D"--  S>ntos 
exception™  thIT5  °'  "■  ""  ^'^  *°''  "»'  'rf*  "le 
which  hee^cir;  ;  f'^"''^  ^atitude"  the  paasagea 
at  all  T-iiAi''"'""""*''^*^'"'' in  the  original 
nor  is'  there  ^""''u"'  "dependence  are  not  alluded  to, 
been  enabled  t^         •"  *  suggestion  that  Aguinaldo  had 

up  arms  wlh  K  '™  "'«'"  """""^  "'  ™P™<«  t"  t^k^ 
P  arms,  which  he  certainly  had  not  done. 

'  P.  I.  R..  5ie.  4. 



Dr.  Santos  in  his  speech  did  resort  to  a  stereotyped 
Filipino  procedure  so  very  commonly  employed  that 
those  of  us  who  have  dealt  much  with  his  people  have 
learned  to  meet  it  almost  automatically.  It  consists  in 
referring  to  one's  having  said  just  exactly  what  one  did 
not  say,  and  then  if  one  fails  to  note  the  trap  and  avoid 
it,  in  claiming  that  because  one  did  not  deny  the  alle- 
gation one  has  admitted  its  truth. 

Aguinaldo  himself  later  repeatedly  resorted  to  this  pro- 
cedure in  his  dealings  with  Dewey  and  others. 

In  the  present  instance  Santos  employed  it  rather 
cleverly  when  he  expressed  the  hope  that  the  United 
States  would  "continue  to  support  the  programme  agreed 
upon  in  Singapore,  between  your  Excellency  and  General 
Aguinaldo,  that  is  to  say,  the  independence  of  the  Philip- 
pine Islands  imder  an  American  protectorate." 

Now  if  this  was  agreed  to,  Aguinaldo  later  constantly 
violated  his  part  of  the  agreement,  for  we  shall  see  that 
he  stated  over  and  over  again,  in  correspondence  with 
members  of  the  junta  and  others,  that  a  protectorate 
would  be  considered  only  if  absolute  independence  finally 
proved  unattainable,  but  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that 
any  such  agreement  was  made. 

Dr.  Santos  read  his  speech  to  Mr.  Pratt  in  French. 
Blount  implies,  whether  rightly  or  wrongly  I  do  not  know, 
that  Pratt's  knowledge  of  French  was  poor.  At  all  events 
Pratt  in  his  reply  made  not  the  slightest  reference  to  the 
hope  expressed  by  Santos  that  the  United  States  would 
continue  to  support  the  programme  which  Santos  said  had 
been  agreed  upon  between  Pratt  and  Aguinaldo,  and 
claim  of  a  promise  of  independence  based  on  these  speeches 
must  obviously  be  abandoned.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
Pratt  personally  sympathized  with  the  ambitions  of  the 
P^pino  leaders,  and  openly  expressed  his  sympathy  on 
this  aod  other  occasions,  but  to  do  this  was  one  thing  and 
to  have  attempted  to  compromise  his  government  would 
have  been  another  and  very  different  one.    The  shrewd 



Filiimice  with  whom  he  was  dealing  understood  this 
difference  perfectly  well. 

It  is  a  regrettable  fact  that  there  exists  some  reason 
to  believe  that  his  sympathy  was  not  purely  disinterested. 
Aguinaldo  claims  that  Pratt  wished  to  be  appointed 
"representative  of  the  Philippines  in  the  United  States 
to  promptly  secure  the  official  recognition  of  oxir  inde- 
pendence" and  that  he  promised  him  "a  high  post  in 
the  customs  service." ' 

It  will  be  noted  that  several  sentences  and  phrases  in 
Blount's  statement  are  enclosed  in  quotation  marks. 
From  what  were  they  quoted?  The  next  paragraph  in 
his  book  tells  us :  — 

"Says  the  newspaper  clipping  which  has  preserved  the  Pratt 
oration :  At  the  conclusion  of  Mr.  Pratt's  speech,  refreshments 
were  served,  and  as  the  Filipinos,  being  Christians,  drink  alcohol, 
there  was  no  difficulty  in  arranging  as  to  refreahmenta."  * 

The  use  of  this  clipping  from  the  Singapore  Free 
Press  illustrates  admirably  Blount's  methods.  The  Free 
Press  had  at  first  displayed  a  marked  coldness  toward  the 
iosui^nt  cause,  but  its  editor,  Mr.  St.  Clair,  was  oppor^ 
tunely  "seen"  by  Bray,  who  reported  that  as  a  result  of 
his  visit,  both  the  editor  and  the  paper  would  thereafter 
be  friendly,  and  they  were.    In  other  words,  the  Free 

'"The  Consul  —  after  tellin?  me  that,  before  arriving  in  Hong- 
kong harbor,  a  launch  would  be  sent  by  the  Admiral  to  secretly  take 
ns  to  the  North  American  squadron,  a  Becreoy  which  pleased  me  also, 
as  it  would  avoid  giving  publicity  to  my  acts  —  then  advised  me  thai 
I  should  appoint  him  the  representative  of  the  Philippines  in  the  United 
Statea  to  promptly  secure  the  offlctal  reooKnitioa  of  our  independence. 
I  answered  that  whenever  the  Philippine  government  should  be  formed, 
I  would  nominate  him  for  the  office  he  desired,  although  I  considered 
that  but  small  recompense  for  his  aid,  and  that  in  case  of  our  having 
the  good  fortune  to  secure  our  independeaoe  I  would  bestow  upon  him 
a  high  post  in  the  oustoms  service  besides  granting  the  commercial 
advantages  and  the  participation  in  the  expenses  of  the  war  which 
the  Consul  asked  for  his  Oovemment  in  Washington,  eince  the  Filipinos 
agreed  in  advance  to  what  is  here  stated,  considering  it  a  proper  testi- 
monial of  gmtitude."— P.  I.  R.,  1300.  2. 

'Bloiuit,p.  12. 



Press  became  the  Singapore  organ  of  the  insurrection,  and 
its  editor,  according  to  Bray, "a  true  and  loyal  friend"  of 

Blount  claimH  to  have  made  "an  exhaustive  examina- 
tion of  the  records  of  that  period."  '  Why  then  did  he  use 
as  evidence  a  newspaper  clipping  from  an  Insurgent  organ, 
instead  of  Santos's  letter  7 

Blount  endeavours  to  make  capital  out  of  the  fact  that 
Pratt  forwarded  to  the  State  Department  a  proclamation 
which  he  says  was  gotten  up  by  the  Insurgent  leaders  at 
Hongkong  and  sent  to  the  Philippines  in  advance  of 
Aguinaldo's  coming.  He  says  that  it  was  headed  "Amer- 
ica's Alhes  "  and  quotes  from  it  as  foUoira :  — ■ 

"Compatriots:  Divine  Providence  ia  about  to  place  in- 
dependence within  our  reach.  .  .  .  The  Americans,  not  from 
mercenary  motives,  but  for  the  sake  of  humanity  and  the 
lamentations  of  so  many  persecuted  people,  have  considered 
it  opportune,  etc.  [Here  follows  a  reference  to  CXiba.]  At  the 
pres^it  moment  an  American  squadron  is  prepanog  to  sail  for 
the  PhilippiQes.  .  .  .  The  Americans  will  attack  by  sea  and 
j>revent  any  reenforoements  coming  from  Spain ;  ...  we  in- 
surgents must  attack  by  land.  Probably  you  will  have  more 
than'  sufficient  arms,  because  the  Americana  have  aims  and 
will  find  means  to  assist  us.  There  where  you  see  ibe  American 
fiagfiying,  assemble  in  numbers;  they  are  our  redeemers!"* 

The  translation  that  he  used  is  that  given  in  Senate 
Document  No.  62,  L.  60,  and  is  none  too  accurate.  He 
allows  it  to  be  inferred  that  this  proclMnation  was  actu- 
ally i^ued.    It  was  not.    Its  history  is  as  foUo^re :  — 

On  May  16, 1898,  J.  M.  Basa,  a  FiUpino,  who  had  lived 
in  Hongkong  since  1872,  on  account  of  his  connection 
with  the  troubles  of  that  year,  wrote  letters  *  to  a  number 

>  Blount,  pp.  8-9.  •  Ibid.,  p.  9. 

*  The  foUowing  is  one  of  them :  — 

"H.  KoNO,  May  16,  1898. 
"BsNOB  Don  Joes  Enrique  Baba: 

"  Mr  DBAR  Enriqdb  :  As  ui  Md  to  the  American  poliey  in  the  Phil- 
ipIHiL«B,  — America  being  the  moat  liberal  and  bumanitariui  oaticoi  in 





of  friends  reconunendiiig  the  widest  pos«ble  circulation 
of  a  proclamation  enclosed  therewith,  as  an  aid  to  the 
American  policy  in  the  Philippines  ' '  in  the  war  against  the 
tyrannical  friars  and  the  Spaniards." 

With  these  letters  there  were  sent  two  different  proclama- 
tions, each  beginning  with  the  words  "Fellow  Country- 
men." The  first,  which  is  the  one  referred  to  hy  Blount, 
continues :  — 

"Divine  Providence  places  us  in  a  position  to  secure  our 
independence,  and  this  under  the  freest  form  to  which  all  in- 
dividuals, all  people,  all  countries,  may  aspire. 

"  The  Americans,  more  for  humanity  than  for  self-interest, 
attentive  to  the  complaints  of  so  many  persecuted  Filipinos, 
find  it  opportune  to  extend  to  our  Philippines  their  protective 
mantle,  now  that  they  find  themselves  obliged  to  break  their 
friendship  with  the  Spanish  people,  because  of  the  tyranny 
they  have  exercised  in  Cuba,  causing  all  Americans,  with  whom 
they  have  great  commercial  relations,  enormous  damages. 

"  At  this  moment  an  American  fleet  is  prepared  to  go  to  the 

"  We,  your  fellow-coontrymen,  fear  that  you  will  make  use  of 
your  arms  to  fire  upon  the  Americans.  No,  brothers ;  do  not 
make  such  a  mistake ;  rather  (shoot)  kill  yourselves  than  treat 
our  liberators  as  enemies. 

"  Do  not  pay  attention  to  the  decree  of  Primo  de  Rivera, 
calling  on  you  to  enlist  for  the  war,  for  that  will  cost  you  your 
lives :  rather  die  than  act  as  ingrates  toward  our  redeemers, 
the  Americans. 

"  Note  weU  that  the  Americans  have  to  attack  by  sea,  at  the 
same  time  avoiding  reenforcements  which  may  come  from 
Si>ain ;   therefore  the  insurrection  must  attack  by  land.     Per- 

the  world,  —  I  eameatly  reoommend  the  widest  possible  otroulntion 
of  the  proolamation  which  I  send  herewith  in  order  that  the  Amerio&na 
m&y  be  supported  in  the  war  a^aiiuit  the  tyraimic&l  friars  &nd  the 
Spaniards  who  have  connived  with  them,  and  that  public  order,  bo 
neocasaiy  under  the  present  oonditions,  be  preserved. 
"  Thy  relative,  twenty-six  years  an  emigrant. 

(Signed)   "J.  M.  Basa." 

—P.  I.  R.,  1204-10. 


38  THE  FHUJPPINBB  fast  and  FRBSEStn 

hspe  you  will  have  more  than  sufficient  arms,  as  the  Americans 
have  arms,  and  will  find  the  means  to  aid  you. 

"Whenever  you  see  the  American  fl^,  bear  in  mind  that 
they  are  our  redeemers."  • 

On  the  margin  is  written :  "Viva,  for  America  mth  the 
PhiUppinee  I  " 

Apparently  what  Basa  h&e  means  by  independence  is 
independence  from  Spain,  for  it  ia  known  ^lat  he  was 
in  favour  of  annexation  to  the  United  States,  and  in  the 
second  proclamation  we  find  the  following :  — 

"This  is  the  best  opportunity  which  we  have  ever  had  for 
contriving  that  our  country  (all  the  Philippine  Archipelago) 
may  be  counted  as  another  Star  in  the  Great  Republic  of  the 
United  States,  great  because  of  its  wisdom,  its  wealth,  and  its 
constitutional  laws. 

"  Now  is  the  time  to  offer  ourselves  to  that  great  nation. 
With  America  we  shall  have  development  in  the  broadest 
sense  (of  advancement)  in  civilization. 

"With  America  we  shall  be  rich,  civilized  and  happy, 

"  Fellow  patriots,  add  your  signatures  to  those  which  have 
already  been  given.  Explain  to  all  our  fellow  countrymen 
the  benefits  of  this  change,  which  will  be  blessed  by  Se&v&i, 
by  men  and  by  our  children. 

"  Viva  America  with  the  Philippines !  !  1"  * 

The  letters  were  imdoubtedly  given  to  Aguinaldo  for 
delivery  on  his  arrival.  They  were  never  delivered,  and  it 
is  reasonable  to  suppose,  especially  as  Basa,  who  was  a 
man  of  importance  and  means,  was  a  member  of  the  group 
who  desired  annexation  to  the  United  States,  that  Agui- 
naldo took  the  letters  along  in  order  to  avoid  a  ruptmre 
with  him  and  then  quietly  suppressed  them.  Obviously, 
however,  he  sent  or  gave  a  copy  of  the  first  one  to  Pratt, 
presumably  without  the  written  words :  "Viva,  for  Amer- 
ica with  the  Philippines  I" 

And  now  comes  a  bit  of  evidence  as  to  what  occurred 
at  Sii^apore  which  I  consider  incontrovertible. 

Aguinaldo  rettuned  promptly  to  Hongkong  and   on 

»  P.  I.  B.,  120*-ia  »  Ibid.,  1204r-ia 



May  4,  1808,  a  meeting  of  the  junta  was  held.  The 
minutes  of  this  meeting,'  signed  by  each  of  the  several 
IWpinos  present,  form  a  part  of  the  ^urgent  records 
which  have  come  into  the  possession  of  the  United  States 
Government.    They  state  among  other  things  that :  — 

"The  temporary  Secretary  read  the  minutes  of  the  preced- 
ing meeting,  which  were  approved.  The  temporary  President 
reported  that  D.  Emiho  Aguinaldo  had  just  arrived  from 
Singapore  uid  it  became  necessary  for  him  to  take  possession 
of  the  office  to  which  he  has  been  elected." 

After  the  transaction  of  some  further  business  Agui- 
naldo was  summoned,  appeared  at  the  meeting,  and  was 
duly  installed  as  President.    Then :  — 

"The  President  described  the  negotiations  which  took 
place  during  his  absence  in  Singapore  with  the  American  Consul 
of  that  En^h  colony.  Both  agreed  that  the  I^ident  should 
confer  with  the  Admiral  commanding  the  American  squadron 
in  Mirs  Bay,  and  if  the  latter  should  accept  his  proportions, 
advantageous,  in  his  judgment,  to  the  Philippines,  he  would 
go  to  aaid  country  in  one  of  the  cruisers  which  form  the  fleet 
for  the  purpose  of  takii^  part  in  the  present  events.  And  as 
he  did  not  find  the  Admiral,  he  thought  it  well  to  have  an 
interview  with  the  American  Consul  of  this  colony  on  the  day 
of  his  arrival,  but  was  not  satisfied  with  such  intCTview. 

"  Considering  the  critical  conditions  in  the  Phihppines  at 
present,  he  b^ed  the  committee  to  discuss  the  advisability 
of  his  going  to  said  islands  with  all  the  leaders  of  prominence  in 
the  last  rebeUion  residing  in  this  colony,  in  case  the  Admir^ 
gave  them  an  opportunity  to  do  so." 

Note  that  there  is  here  absolutely  not  one  word  of  any 
promise  of  independence  made  to  Aguinaldo  by  Pratt  or 
Miy  one  else.  Is  it  conceivable  that  Aguinaldo  in  de- 
scribing "the  negotiations  which  took  place  during  his 
absence  in  Singapore  with  the  American  Consul  of  the 
English  Colony"  would,  by  any  chance,  have  tailed  to 
inform  his  associates  in  Hongkong  of  such  an  extraor- 
dinary and  fortunate  occurrence  as  the  promising  by 
»  P.  I.  R.,  53-2. 



Mr.  Pratt  and  Admiral  Dewey  that  the  United  States 
would  recognize, Philippine  independence? 
Sandico  >  thought  that  Aguinaldo  ought  to  go,  for  — 

"From  conferences  which  he  had  with  the  Adnural  of  the 
American  fleet  and  with  the  American  Consul  m  this  colony, 
he  beheved  that  under  present  conditions  it  was  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  President  to  go  to  the  Philippines,  since, 
according  to  the  American  Consul,  Manila  had  been  taken  by 
said  fleet,  and  a  provisional  government  was  now  being  formed 
in  that  capital.  The  intervention  of  the  President  ui  the  for- 
mation of  that  government  is  undoubtedly  essential,  since  his 
prestige,  which  everybody  recognizes,  would  evidently  prevent 
dissensions  among  ^e  sons  of  the  country,  and  it  would  be 
possible  thereby  to  obtain  a  perfect  organization  both  for  the 
miUtary  and  civil  evolutiob  of  that  country. 

"  Srs.  Garchitorenft  *  and  Apacible  *  expressed  themselves  in 
nmilar  terms.  Notwithstanding  the  previous  remarks,  the 
Presid^it  inmated  that  he  considered  it  reckless  for  him  to  go 
to  the  Philippines  without  first  making  a  written  agreement 
with  the  Admiral,  as  it  might  happen,  if  he  placed  himself  at 
his  orders,  that  he  might  make  him  subscribe  to  or  sign  a  docu- 
ment contuning  proposals  highly  prejudicial  to  the  interests 
of  the  country,  from  which  might  arise  the  following  two  very 
grave  contingencies : 

"  1st.  If  he  should  accept  them,  he  would  undoubtedly  commit 
an  unpatriotic  act,  and  his  name  would  justly  be  eternally 
cursed  by  the  FlUpinos. 

"  2d.  If  he  should  refuse,  then  the  break  between  the  two 
would  be  evident. 

"And  to  avoid  this  sad  dilemma,  he  proposed  to  the  com- 
mittee that  the  four  parties  (?)  of  the  insurgents  now  here, 
under  charge  of  the  competent  chiefs  authorized  in  writing  by 
him,  should  go  to  the  Philippines  to  intervene,  after  a  con- 
ference with  the  Admiral,  in  these  important  questions ;  such 
means,  m  his  opinion,  should  be  first  employed  to  ascertfun  m 

>  Teodoro  S&ndioo,  an  influential  Tag&lc^  leader,  who  apoke  Engiish 
veil  And  afterward  served  as  a  spy  while  employed  hj  the  Amerioaiu 
aa  an  interpreter. 

■  Sefior  Gaivhitorena  was  a  wealthy  Tag&los  of  Manila,  and,  at 
this  time,  a  prominent  member  of  the  Hongkong  junta. 

'  Dr.  Qalicano  Apacible,  a  very  intelligent  and  rather  conservative 
TaK^log:  physidan.  After  Aguhialdo  left  Hongkong,  he  was  the 
leading  member  of  the  junta. 



an  authentic  manner  what  the  intentions  of  the  United  States 
ta  r^ard  to  that  country  are;  and  if  his  intervention  is  ab- 
solutely necessary,  he  would  not  object  to  go  at  once  to  the 
Philippines,  endeavouring  by  all  the  means  in  his  power  to 
remedy  the  critical  condition  of  the  country,  to  which  he  had 
offered,  and  always  would  willingly  ofTer,  to  sacrifice  his  life." 

Why  adopt  means  to  leam  from  the  admiral  what  the 
intentions  of  the  United  States  were  in  regard  to  the 
Philippines  if  both  he  and  Pratt  had  already  promised 
recognition  of  independence  7 

"Srs.  Sandico,  Garcbitorena,  Gonzf^a '  and  Apacible  re- 
plied that  they  were  fully  convinced  the  Admiral  of  the  Ameri- 
can squadron  would  furnish  the  President  all  the  arms  which 
he  might  desire,  since  the  former  was  convinced  that  the  fleet 
could  do  nothing  in  the  Philippines  unless  it  were  used  in  con- 
junction with  the  insurgents  in  the  development  of  their  plans 
of  war  against  the  Spanish  government.  .  .  .  The  authority 
to  treat  which  the  President  desired  to  give  to  the  other  chiefs, 
without  reflecting  at  all  upon  their  pergonal  qualifications, 
they  did  not  believe  would  be  as  efficacious  as  his  personal 
intervention  which  is  necessary  in  grave  affairs,  such  as  those 
the  subject  of  discussion  j  there  would  be  no  better  occasion 
than  that  afforded  them  to  insure  the  landing  of  the  expedition- 
ary forces  on  those  islands  and  to  arm  themselves  at  the  expense 
of  the  Americans  and  to  assure  the  situation  of  the  Philippines 
in  regard  to  our  legitimate  aspirations  against  those  very 
peo[de.  The  Fihpino  people,  unprovided  with  arms,  would 
be  the  victims  of  the  demands  and  exactions  of  the  United 
States ;  but,  provided  with  arms,  would  be  able  to  oppose  them- 
selves to  them,  struggling  for  independence,  in  which  consists 
the  true  happiness  of  the  Philippines.  And  they  finished  by 
saying  that  it  made  no  difference  if  the  Spanish  government 
did  demand  the  return  of  the  P400,(X)0,  and  if  the  demand 
wwe  allowed  in  an  action,  since  the  object  of  the  sum  would  be 
obtained  by  the  Admiral  furnishing  the  Filipinos  the  arms  which 
they  required  for  the  struggle  for  their  legitimate  aspirations." 

Here,  then,  was  a  definite  plan  to  obtain  arms  from  the 
Americans  to  be  iised  if  necessary  "(gainst  those  very 
people"  later. 

'  &-.  Ontoo  Goniaga,  a  prominent  Filipino  lawyer  of  the  provinoe 
<tf  Cagayan. 



"The  Preadent,  with  hia  presUge  in  the  Philippines,  would 
be  able  to  arouse  those  masses  to  combat  the  demands  of  the 
United  States,  if  they  colonized  that  country,  and  would  drive 
them,  if  circumstances  rendered  it  necessary,  to  a  Titanic 
struggle  for  their  independence,  even  if  they  ^ould  succumb 
in  shaking  off  the  yoke  of  a  new  oppressor.  If  Washington 
proposed  to  carry  out  the  fundamental  principlea  of  its  con- 
stitution, there  was  no  doubt  that  it  would  not  attempt  to 
colonize  the  Philippines,  or  even  to  annex  them.  It  was  prob^ 
able  then  that  it  woidd  ^ve  them  independence  and  guarantee 
it;  in  such  case  the  presence  of  the  President  was  necessary, 
as  he  would  prevent  dissensions  among  the  sons  of  the  country 
who  sou^t  office,  who  might  cause  the  intervention  of  Euro- 
pean powers,  an  intervention  which  there  was  no  reason  to  doubt 
would  be  highly  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  the  country.  .  .  , 
What  injury  could  come  to  the  Philippines,  even  if  we  ad- 
mitted that  the  Admiral  would  not  give  ajms  to  the  President 
on  account  of  his  refusal  to  eaga  a  document  prejudicial  to  the 
country,  after  he  had  taken  aH  means  to  provide  for  her  de- 
fence? None.  Such  an  act  of  the  President  could  not  be 
censured,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  would  be  most  meritorious, 
because  it  would  be  one  proof  more  of  his  undoubted  patriotism." 

Not  one  word  of  any  promise  of  independence  do  we 
find  in  this  remarkable  docmuent.  On  the  contrary  it 
furnishes  conclusive  proof  that  no  such  promise  had 
been  made  and  that  the  future  relations  between  FlUpinos 
and  Americans  were  still  completely  uncertain. 

And  now  comes  some  direct  evidence.  Bray  and 
St.  Clair,  the  latter  the  editor  of  the  Insurgent  organ 
in  Singapore,  were  present  on  the  occasion  when  inde- 
pendence was  said  to  have  been  promised  by  Pratt. 
Bray  subsequently  declared  in  the  most  positive  terms 
tJiat  it  was  promised.  St.  Clair  wrote  him  a  letter  taking 
him  roundly  to  task  for  this  claim,  in  the  following  very 
interesting  terms :  — 

"  I  felt  it  to  be  my  duty  to  let  Pratt  know  that  you  still  hold 
that  you  and  Santos  have  evidence  that  will  controvert  his, 
(and)  he  was,  of  course,  extremely  disappointed,  because  he  (is) 
quite  aware  of  what  took  place  in  Spanish,  and  as  to  turning  of 
his  conversation  into  a  pretense  of  agreement  he  knows  nothmg. 





He  a&ys  very  truly :  'My  own  party,  the  Democrats,  vill  eay 
if  they  read  this  book  —  If  this  man  takes  it  upon  himself  to 
be  a  Plenipotentiary  without  authority,  we  had  better  not 
employ  him  any  more  —  I  franWy  cannot  understand  youp 
action, 'as  to  its  unwisdom  I  have  no  doubt  at  all. 

"Admiral  Dewey  goes  home,  it  is  believed,  to  advise  the 
President  on  Naval  and  Colonial  Aff^rs,  he  knows  exactly 
what  did  take  place  and  what  did  not,  and  I  should  know  if  he 
had  any  ground  to  think  that  the  slightest  promise  was  made  by 
Pratt  to  Aguinaldo  be  would  declare  it  unauthorized  and  de- 
cline to  sanction  it.  I  am  certain  Pratt  reported  what  he  sup- 
posed took  place  accurately;  he  had  no  surety  on  what  you 
might  have  said,  naturally. 

"And,  curiously,  you  never  mentioned  to  me  anything  of  the 
agreement  as  having  taken  place  then,  nor  in  the  paper  you 
communicated  to  me  was  there  any  mention  of  one,  nor  did 
Pratt  know  of  any.  It  is  only  more  recently  that  the  fiction 
took  shape.  '  The  wish  father  to  the  thought,'  or  the  statement 
repeated  till  it  has  become  believed  by  the  — ,^  this  ia  conmion. 

"Now  I  would  like  to  urge  you,  from  the  practical  point  of 
view,  to  drop  any  such  foolfslmess.  The  vital  thing,  oad 
nothing  else  counts,  is  what  Dewey  said  and  did  when  he  at 
last  met  Aguinaldo.  That,  that,  that,  is  the  thing,  all  else  is 
empty  wind. 

"  Supposing  that  Pratt  and  Wildman  had  covered  inches  of 
paper  with  'Qauses'  and  put  on  a  ton  of  sealing  wax  as  consular 
seals,  what,  pray,  to  any  common  sense  mind  would  all  that 
have  been  worth ?  Nothing  I  I  NothiM!  1  And  yet,  where 
is  the  agreement,  where  is  the  seal?  where  are  there  any 
signatures  ?  And  if  you  had  them  —  waste  paper  —  believe 
me,  that  all  this  potter  about  Pratt  and  Wildman  is  ener^ 
misdirected.  The  sole  thing  to  have  impressed  upon  the  public 
in  America  would  be  the  chaining  of  Dewey  and  Aguinaldo 
together  as  participants  in  common  action ;  you  surdy  com- 
prehend this  means  I  Think  and  think  again;  it  means 
success  as  far  as  it  is  possible.  The  other  work  is  not  only  lost, 
but  does  not  gain  much  sympathy,  especially  this  criticism  of 
the  conduct  of  American  troops ;  things  may  be  true  that  tCte 
not  expedient  to  say.  Sink  everything  into  Dewey-Aguinaldo 
cooperation,  that  was  on  both  sides  honest  even  if  it  did  not 
imi^y  any  actual  arrangement,  which,  of  course,  Dewey  him- 
self could  not  make.  That  here  you  have  the  facts,  —  undenied 
■ —  incontrovertible."  ' 

>  Thwe  is  an  illegible  w<nd  in  the  original.         '  P.  I.  R..  406-S. 



The  following  letter  of  Bray  to  Aguinaldo,  dated  Janu- 
ary 12,  1899,  seeniB  to  me  to  throw  much  light  on  the 
question  of  how  these  claims  relative  to  the  promised 
reci^nition  of  Filipino  independence  sometimes  ori^nated 
and  were  bolstered  up :  — 

"With  regard  to  your  proclamation,  there  is  still  a  trump 
card  to  be  played.  Did  you  not  say  that  the  basis  of  any 
n^otiation  in  Sii^apore  was  the  Indepeodence  of  the  Philip- 
pines under  an  American  protectorate  7  This  is  what  Consul 
Pratt  telegraphed  and  to  which  Dewey  and  Washington  ^reed : 
as  I  figured  up  the  'price'  of  the  tel^ram,  I  know  very  well 
what  occurred,  and  I  am  ready  to  state  it  and  to  swear  to  it 
when  the  proper  time  comes.  There  are  five  of  us  against  one 
in  the  event  of  Consul  Pratt  receiving  instructions  to  deny  it. 
Furthermore,  Mr.  St.  Ctair  knows  what  happened  and  I  am 
certain  that  he  also  would  testify.  St.  Clair  still  has  the  rough 
draft  as  an  historical  rehc,  and  St.  Clair  is  a  true  and  loyal 
friend  of  yours,  as  is  your  humble  servant,"  ' 

The  utter  unscmpulousness  of  Bray  is  shown  by  his 
claim  that  St.  Clair  would  confirm  his  false  statements, 
made  as  it  was  after  receiving  St.  Clair's  letter  above 

But  Bray  did  not  wait  for  Aguinaldo  to  play  this  trump 
card.  He  tried  to  play  it  himself  by  cabling  Senator 
Hoar,  on  the  same  day,  that  as  the  man  who  introduced 
General  Aguinaldo  to  the  American  government  through 
the  consul  at  Singapore  he  was  prepared  to  swear  that  the 
conditions  under  which  Aguinaldo  promised  to  cooperate 
with  Dewey  were  independence  under  a  protectorate.* 

»P.  I.  R.,398.  9. 

' "  HoNQKONQ,  12  Jan.  1899,  —  2  p.h. 
"SxMATOR  Hoar,  WaBhinirtoa. 

"As  the  man  who  introduced  Oenertkl  Aguinaldo  to  the  Amerioan 
government  through  the  eonaul  at  Singapore,  I  frankly  state  that  the 
conditions  under  which  Aguinaldo  promised  to  oofiperate  with  Dewey 
were  independence  under  a  protectorate.  I  am  prepared  to  swear  to 
this.  The  mihtary  party  Bubomed  correapondenta  are  deceiving  the 
American  nation  by  means  of  malevolent  lying  atatements.  If  your 
powerful  influence  does  not  change  this  insensate  potioy  there  will  be 
a  hopeless  conflict  with  the  inevitable  results  disastrous  for  the  Ameri- 
cans. "  Bhat." 
—P.  L  B.,  863-4. 



Let  US  now  trace  Aguinaldo'e  subsequent  movementa, 
and  see  what  promises,  if  any,  were  made  to  hint  by  WUd- 
man  and  Dewey.  He  had  returned  to  Hongkong  with 
two  companions,  all  travelling  under  assumed  names. 
Only  his  most  trusted  friends  among  the  members  of  the 
junta  were  at  first  allowed  to  know  where  he  was  living. 

Bis  situation  was  a  difficult  one.  It  was  necessary  for 
him  to  come  to  some  sort  of  a  temporary  ^rangement 
with  Artacho,  if  he  was  to  avoid  legal  difficulties,  and  to 
reestablish  himself  with  some  of  his  companions,  who  had 
accused  him  of  deserting  with  the  intention  of  going  to 
Europe  to  live  on  money  which  belonged  to  them.  When 
harmony  had  been  temporarily  restored  through  the  good 
offices  of  Sandico,  Aguinaldo  had  an  interview  with  Con- 
sul General  Wildman.  He  has  since  claimed  that  Wild- 
man,  too,  promised  him  independence,  but  the  truth 
seems  to  be  that  he  himself  said  he  was  anxious  to  be- 
come an  American  citizen.  This  being  impossible,  he 
wanted  to  return  to  the  Philippines  and  place  himself 
under  Dewey's  orders.  He  wanted  to  help  throw  off  the 
yoke  of  Spain,  and  this  done,  would  abide  by  the  decision 
of  tiie  United  States  as  to  tdie  fate  of  the  Philippines.' 

' "  Then  Aguinaldo  had  an  interview  with  the  United  States  conaul 
in  Hongkong,  in  which  he  told  him  that  he  was  anxious  to  become  an 
Americiyi  citizen,  but  this  being  impossible,  he  desired  to  be  allowed 
to  letum  to  the  Philippinee  and  place  himself  under  the  orders  of 
Commodore  Dewey.  Aooording  to  the  brother  of  that  Consul,  who 
certainly  must  have  had  opportunities  for  knowing  the  facts  in  the 
ease,  he  made  no  demands  for  independence,  but  said  that  he  hoped 
that  the  Americans  would  not  leave  the  Filipinos  to  their  fate,  but 
would  annex  the  Philippines  and  protect  them  against  the  Spaniards. 
He  promised  the  Consul  that  he  would  fight  with  the  Americans  and 
not  attempt  to  foment  a  revolution  against  the  United  States.  His 
highest  expressed  aim  was  to  throw  oS  the  Spanish  yoke,  and,  that 
once  accomplished,  he  would  abide  by  the  decision  of  the  United  States 
u  to  the  ultimate  disposition  of  the  Philippines.  If  Aguinaldo  had 
expressed  his  real  intentions  of  obtaining  urns  and  using  them  only 
tor  his  own  purposes,  and,  if  he  found  it  expedient,  against  the  United 
BtatM,  it  is  not  to  be  thought  that  he  would  have  been  returned  to  the 
IMippiuee  on  a  United  States  vessel."* 

•Taylor,  44  F  Z. 



Any  claim  that  A^uinaldo  had  been  promiBed  inde- 
pendence by  Wildman,  or,  indeed,  that  the  latter  had  been 
allowed  to  know  that  the  Filipinos  desired  it,  seems  to  me 
to  be  negatived,  not  only  by  Wildman's  own  statements, 
but  by  a  letter  from  Agoncillo  to  Aguinaldo  written  on 
Augiwt  5,Ci^^m  which  he  says : —  *--' 

"The  American  consul  left  my  house  to-day  at  3  o'clock, 
as  I  had  requested  an  interview  with  him  before  his  departure, 
and  I  was  unable  to  go  to  the  Consulate  on  account  of  the 
awelling  of  my  feet.  From  our  conversation  I  infer  that  in- 
dependence will  be  given  to  us.  I  did  not,  however,  disclose 
to  him  our  true  desires.  .  .  .  Sud  consul  approved  my  tele- 
gram to  McKinley,  which  has  been  sent  to-day  through  him, 
a  copy  of  which  is  herewith  enclosed.  If  they  accept  our  rep- 
resentative in  the  commission,  we  may  arrive  at  a  friendly 
understanding,  and  it  will  enable  us  to  prepare  for  the  fight  in 
case  they  refuse  to  listen  to  our  request.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  at  the  very  b^inning  they  refuse  to  admit  our  representative, 
we  will  at  once  be  in  a  position  to  know  what  should  be  done, 
i.e.  to  prepare  for  war." ' 

On  May  4,  1898,  the  Hongkong  junta  voted  that 
Aguinaldo  oi^t  to  go  to  the  Philippines,  and  go  he  did. 
It  would  seem  that  he  at  first  gave  up  the  idea  of  joining 
Dewey,  for  on  May  11  he  wrote  a  cipher  letter,  giving 
minute  directions  for  the  preparation  of  signals  to  assist 
his  ship  in  making  land,  by  day  or  by  night,  at  Dingalan 
Bay  on  the  east  coast  of  Luzon ;  directing  the  capture  of 
the  town  of  San  Antonio,  just  back  of  Capones  Islands, 
in  Zambales,  and  ending  with  the  words:  "We  will 
surely  arrive  at  one  of  the  two  places  above  mentioned,  so 
you  mtist  be  prepared." 

Something  led  him  again  to  change  his  mind,  and  he 
finally  sailed  on  the  McCvUoch. 

In  his  "Resefia  Veridica"  written  later  for  political 
purposes,  Aguinaldo  has  definitely  claimed  that  Dewey 
promised  him  that  the  United  States  would  recognize 
the   independence  of   the   FUipino  people.     I  will   let 

•  P.  I.  B.,  471.  7. 



him  tell  his  own  stoiy,  confronting  his  statements  with 
those  of  the  admiral. 

"May  19,  1898. 
"  The  McCuUoch  Bt&rted  at  eleven  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  17th  of  May  for  the  Philippines;  we  anchored,  between 
twelve  and  one  o'clock  on  the  t^temooo  of  the  19th,  in  the 
waters  of  Cavite,  and  immediately  the  launch  of  the  Admiral 
—  with  his  aid  and  private  secretary  —  came  to  convey  me 
to  the  Olympia,  where  I  waa  received,  with  my  aid,  Sr.  Leyva, 
with  the  honors  of  a  general,  by  a  section  of  marine  guards."  ^ 

Relative  to  this  matter.  Admiral  Dewey  has  testified :  * 

"The  Chairman.    You,  of  course,  never  saluted  the  flag? 

"  Admiral  Dewej/.  Certunly  not;  and  I  do  not  think  I  ever 
called  Aguinaldo  anything  but  Don  EmiUo ;  I  don't  think.  I 
ever  called  him  'General.' 

"  The  Chairman.  And  when  he  came  on  board  ship  was  he 
received  with  any  special  honors  at  the  side? 

"  Admiral  Dewey.    Never." 

The  "Resefia  Veridica"  continues:  — 

"The  Admiral  received  me  in  a  salon,  and  after  greetings 
of  courtesy  I  asked  him  '  if  all  the  telegrams  relative  to  m^^ 
which  he  had  addressed  to  the  Consul  at  Singapore,  Mr.  Pratt, 
were  true.'  He  replied  in  the  affirmative,  and  add«Ml,  'that  the 
United  States  had  come  to  the  Philippines  to  protect  its  natives 
and  free  them  from  the  yoke  of  Spun.' 

"He  said,  moreover,  that  'America  was  rich  m  territory 
and  money,  and  needed  no  colonies,'  concluding  by  assuring 
me,  'to  have  no  doubt  whatever  about  the  reccwiition  of 
Philippine  independence  by  the  United  States.'  Thereupon 
he  a^ed  me  if  I  could  get  the  people  to  arise  against  the  Span- 
iards and  carry  on  a  rapid  campaign."  * 

As  we  have  seen,  Dewey  sent  only  one  tel^ram  to 
Pratt  about  Aguinaldo.  It  merely  directed  that  ^e  latter 
be  sent. 

'P.  I.  B.,  1300.2. 

*  Admiial  Dewey's  teBtimony,  from  whJoh  I  quote  eztraott,  will  b« 
round  in  Senate  Documents,  Vol.  25, 57  Congreae,  Irt  session,  pp.  2928, 

•P.  LB.,  1300.  2. 




"I  then  expressed  to  him  my  profomid  acknowledgement 
for  the  generous  help  which  the  United  States  was  givii^  the 
Filipino  people,  aa  well  as  my  admiration  for  the  magnificence 
and  goodness  of  the  American  people.  I  also  stated  to  him  that 
'before  leaving  Hongkong,  the  Filipino  Colony  had  held  a 
meeting,  at  which  was  discussed  and  considered  the  possibility 
that  —  after  defeating  the  Spaniards — the  FiUpinos  might  have 
a  war  with  the  Americans,  if  they  should  refuse  to  recognize 
OUT  independence,  who  were  sure  to  defeat  us  because  they 
should  find  us  tired  out,  poor  in  ammunitions  and  worn  out  in 
the  war  against  the  Sparuards,'  requesting  that  he  pardon  my 

"The  Admiral  replied  that  he  'was  delighted  atmydncerity, 
and  believed  that  both  Filipinos  and  Americans  should  treat 
each  other  as  allies  and  friends,  clearly  explaining  all  doubts 
for  the  better  understanding  between  both  parties,'  and  added 
that,  'so  he  had  been  informed,  the  United  States  would  recog- 
nize the  independence  of  the  Filipino  people,  guaranteed  by 
the  word  of  honor  of  the  Americans,  —  more  binding  than 
documents  which  may  remain  unfulfilled  when  it  is  deared  to 
fail  in  them  as  happened  with  the  compacts  signed  by  the 
Spaniards,  advising  me  to  form  at  once  a  Filipino  national 
flag,  offering  in  virtue  thereof  to  recognize  and  protect  it  before 
the  other  nations,  which  were  represented  by  the  various 
squadrons  then  in  the  Bay ;  although  he  said  we  should  con- 
quer the  power  from  the  Spaniards  before  floating  said  flag, 
so  that  the  act  should  be  more  honourable  in  the  sight  of  the 
whole  world,  and,  above  all,  before  the  United  States,  in  order 
that  when  the  Filipino  ships  with  their  national  fiag  would 
pass  before  the  foreign  squadronp  they  should  inspire  respect 
and  esteem.' 

"Again  I  thanked  the  Admiral  for  his  good  advice  and 
generous  offers,  informing  him  that  if  the  sacrifice  of  my  life 
was  necessary  to  honor  the  Admiral  before  the  United  States, 
I  was  then  ready  to  sacrifice  it. 

"I  added  that  under  such  conditions  I  could  assure  him 
that  all  the  Filipino  people  would  unite  in  the  revolution  to 
shake  off  the  yoke  of  Spain ;  that  it  was  not  strange  that  some 
few  were  not  yet  on  his  side  on  account  of  lack  of  arms  or  be- 
cause of  personal  expediency. 

"Thus  ended  this  first  conference  with  Admiral  Dewey,  to 
whom  I  announced  that  I  would  take  up  my  residence  at  the 
Naval  Headquarters  in  the  Cavite  Arsenal."  ' 
•  P.  I.  R.,  1300.  2. 



Further  on,  in  the  same  document,  Aguinaldo  advances 
the  cl^m  that  on  the  occasion  of  the  visit  of  General 
Anderson  and  Admiral  Dewey  the  latter  again  promised 
him  independence. 

He  says :  — 

"  In  the  same  month  of  July,  the  Admiral,  accompanied  by 
General  AndersoD,  presented  himself,  and  after  greetings  <h 
courtesy  said  to  me:  'You  have  seen  confirmed  all  of  what 
I  pronused  and  said  to  you.  How  pretty  your  flag  is.  It 
has  a  triangle,  and  it  looks  like  Cuba's.  Will  you  give  me  one 
as  a  reminder  when  I  return  to  America  ? ' 

"  I  replied  to  him  that  I  was  convinced  of  his  word  of  honour 
and  that  there  was  no  necessity  whatever  to  draw  up  in  docu- 
mentary form  his  agreements,  and  as  for  the  flag,  that  he  could 
count  on  it,  even  at  that  very  moment. 

"  Dewey  continued :  '  Documents  are  not  complied  with 
when  there  is  no  honour,  as  has  happened  with  your  agreement 
with  the  Spaniards,  who  have  fuled  in  what  was  written  and 
ragned.  IVust  in  my  word  for  I  hold  myself  responsible  that 
the  United  States  will  recc^nize  the  independence  of  the  country. 
But  I  recommend  to  you  [plural.  —  Tb.]  to  keep  everytlung 
which  we  have  talked  about  and  fureed  upon  with  a  great  detd 
of  secrecy  for  the  present.  And,  moreover,  I  entreat  you 
plural.  —  Tb.]  to  be  patient  if  our  soldiers  should  insult  some 
Illipino,  because,  as  volimteers,  they  are  yet  lacking  in  dis- 
cipline.' " ' 

Admiral  Dewey  has  te^t^ed  as  foUows,  concerning  the 
recognition  of  Philippine  independence  by  him :  — 

"The  Chairman.  You  remember  the  question  of  your 
reci^nizing  his  republic  was  a  good  deal  discussed  and  you 
wrote  me  a  letter,  which  I  read  in  the  senate.  Of  course,  I 
am  only  asking  now  about  what  you  said  in  the  letter.  There 
was  no  recognition  of  the  republic  ? 

"Admiral  Dewey.  Never.  I  did  not  think  I  had  any 
authority  to  do  it  and  it  never  occurred  to  me  to  do  it.  There 
was  a  sort  of  a  reign  of  terror:  there  was  no  government. 
These  people  had  got  power  for  the  first  time  in  their  lives  and 
they  were  riding  roughshod  over  the  community.  The  acts  of 
cruelty  which  were  brought  to  my  notice  were  hardly  credible. 

I  Taylor,  4  MG.,  E. 
VOL.1  — ■  -,  . 



1  sent  word  to  Aguiualdo  that  he  must  treat  his  priBoners 
kindly,  and  he  said  be  would." 

He  has  further  testified  that  he  never  as  much  as  heard 
of  independence  until  the  appearance  of  .^uinaldo's 
proclamation  of  June  15,  1898 :  — 

"Admiral  Dewey.  .  .  .  Then  when  I  beard  that  oiu*  troops 
were  coining  I  aaked  him  to  withdraw  his  troops  from  Cavite 
and  make  room  for  our  men.  He  demurred  at  this,  but  fimUly 
withdrew  and  established  headquarters  across  the  bay  at  a 
place  called  Bacoor,  from  which  place  on  the  15th  of  June  he 
sent  me  a  proclamation  declaring  the  independence  of  tiie 

"The  Chairman.    Was  that  the  first? 

"Admiral  Dewey.  That  was  the  first  intimation ;  the  first 
I  had  ever  heard  of  independence  of  the  Philippines. 

"  The  Chairman.     He  had  said  something  to  you  — 

"Admir(d  Dewey.  Not  a  word.  He  had  done  what  I  told 
him.  He  was  most  obedient ;  whatever  I  told  him  to  do  he 
did.  I  attached  so  little  importance  to  this  proclamation  that 
I  did  not  even  cable  its  contents  to  Washington,  but  forwarded 
it  through  the  mails.  I  never  dreamed  that  they  wanted 

Remembering  that  Admiral  Dewey  was  not  beii^  in- 
terrogated as  to  the  statements  of  the  "ReseQa  Verldica," 
it  will  be  seen  that  he  has,  neverthdess,  covered  them  . 

It  w^  my  good  fortune  to  be  long  and  intimately  as- 
sociated with  Admiral  Dewey  while  serving  on  the  first 
Philippine  commission.  He  always  grew  indignant  when 
the  subject  of  any  promises  relative  to  independence  said 
to  have  been  ma!de  by  him  was  so  much  as  mentioned, 
and  gave  to  the  commisedon  in  writing  the  following : — 

"  The  statement  of  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  imder  date  of  Sept.  23, 
published  in  the  Springfield  Republicanf  so  far  as  it  relates  to 
reported  conversations  with  me,  or  actions  of  mine,  is  a  tissue 
of  falsehood.  I  never,  directly  or  indirectly,  promised  the 
fllipinos  independence.  I  never  received  Aguinaldo  with 
military  honors,  or  recognized  or  saluted  the  so-called  Fili|nno 
Sag.    I  never  conadered  him  as  an  ally,  edthough  I  did  make 







nse  of  him  and  the  natives  to  assist  me  in  my  operations  against 
the  Spaniards."  * 

As  Dewey's  allegations  flatly  contradict  those  of 
Aguinaldo,  we  must  choose  between  the  two.  While  I 
have  no  doubt  as  to  where  the  choice  will  fall,  I  will  now 
submit  some  additional  matter  of  interest.  Let  us  first 
con^der  the  history  of  the  "ReseQa  Yetldica"  in  which 
Aguinaldo  makes  the  charges  above  quoted.  On  Sep- 
tember 12,  1899,  Buencamino  wrote  of  it  to  Apadble 
in  Hongkong,  saying : — 

"This  work  is  entitled  'Resefia  Verfdica  de  la  Rerolucito 
fWpina'  in  which  Don  EmiUo  relates  in  detail  his  acts  with 
Admiral  Dewey.  It  baa  been  distributed  to  the  Consuls  and 
you  are  ordered  to  reprint  it  there  translated  into  English  and 
send  some  copies  to  the  United  States,  even  though  only  a 
thousand,  if  you  deem  it  advisable.  Send  copies  also  to  Euroi>e, 
Sefior  Agoncillo  taking  charge  of  the  publication.  If  the  Agent 
you  may  have  selected  for  the  United  States  should  still  be 
there,  it  would  be  advisable  for  him  to  take  a  copy  of  the  pam- 
phlet with  him  for  its  publication. 

"This  is  an  order  of  the  Government  which  I  take  pleasure 
in  transmitting  to  you  for  due  execution."  ' 

But  there  was  a  change  of  heart  about  e^ving  the 
pamphlet  to  the  constils,  for  imder  date  of  September  30 
Buencamino  wrote  :  — 

"We  have  not  distributed  them  here  in  order  that  Otia  may 
not  counteract  the  effects  that  we  desire  to  produce  with  tlus 
publication,  through  his  usual  machinations.  Nor  do  we  be- 
lieve it  advisable  to  make  this  pamphlet  public  in  those  colonies 
before  your  arrival  in  the  United  States."  * 

To  this  letter  he  added  in  cipher  the  following  post- 
script to  Pablo  Ocampo,  in  charge  of  Aguinaldo's  corre- 
spondence in  Manila :  — 

"At  last  moment  —  Nots  bene : 

"Don't  deliver  any  copy  of  the  'Resefia  Verfdica'  to  the 

>  Report  of  the  Philippine  oommisrioa  to  tlie  PreBideat.  J&nuuy 
81,  1900.     Vol.  I,  p.  121. 

*P.  I.  R.,  306.3.  'ibid.,  396.3. 



Consuls,  even  tfaougli  it  was  so  directed  in  the  b^inninn;  of  the 
letter.  All  except  one,  which  is  for  you,  will  be  sent  to  Hong- 
kong, Don  Fedro  de  la  Vi&a  being  bearer  of  the  eame,  as  also 
of  the  other  documents.  The  copy  intended  for  you  is  neither 
to  be  divulged  nor  published,  for  strict  reserve  is  required  until 
those  which  are  being  sent  arrive  at  their  destination."  ' 

The  reason  for  preserving  such  secrecy  relative  to  this 
document  until  it  could  reach  its  destination  and  work  its 
harm  is  of  course  obvious.  Its  statements  were  so  out- 
rageously false  that  they  would  have  been  instantly  and 
authoritatively  contradicted  had  it  been  issued  seasonably 
at  Manila. 

The  truth  is  that  Aguinaldo's  claim  that  he  had  been 
promised  independence  was  a  gradual  growth.  Let  us 
trace  it. 

On  May  21,  he  wrote  a  circular  letter  to  "My  dear 
brother,"  inviting  the  recipients  and  their  companions 
to  meet  him  at  once,  and  arrange  the  best  way  to  entrap 
all  the  enemy  in  their  homes. 

In  this  he  says  that  he  has  promised  the  American 
admiral  that  they  will  "carry  on  modem  war"  and  adds : 
"Even  if  a  Spaniard  surrenders,  he  must  be  pardoned 
and  treated  well,  and  then  you  will  see  that  our  reputa^ 
tion  will  be  very  good  in  all  Europe,  which  will  declare  for 
our  independence;  but  if  we  do  not  conduct  ourselves 
thus,  the  Americans  will  decide  to  sell  us  or  else  divide 
up  our  territory.  As  they  will  hold  us  incapable  of  gov- 
erning our  land,  we  shall  not  seciu"e  our  liberty,  rather  the 
contrary;  our  own  soil  will  be  delivered  over  to  other 
hfmds."  * 

>  P.  1.  R.,  461.  4. 

•  "  My  Dear  Brother :  I  inform  you  that  we  arrived  here  in  Cavite 
at  eleven  o'clock  and  disembarked  at  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  after 
OUT  conference  with  the  Amerioan  Admir^.  Everything  appears  to 
be  favourable  for  obtaining'  our  independence.  I  cannot  say  more  on 
that  Bubjeot  as  it  would  take  too  long. 

"I  have  no  other  object  in  writing  this  except  to  ask  you  and  your 
companions  to  meet  at  once  and  arrange  the  beat  way  to  entrap  all 
the  enemy  in  your  town,  employing  deceit,  for  inataooe,  majce  a 



In  this  letter,  written  on  the  very  day  of  the  interview 
at  which  he  subsequently  claimed  that  Admiral  Dewey 
had  promised  independence,  does  he  make  any  cl^m  that 
this  had  occurred  ?  No,  he  veiy  distinctly  implies  the 
contrary.  Is  it  beUevable  that  if  he  could  truly  have  said 
"The  United  States,  .through  its  representatives  Dewey 
and  Pratt,  has  promised  to  recognize  our  independence" 
he  would  have  failed  to  do  so  when  this  would  instantly 
have  secured  him  the  vigorous  support  which  he  was 
then  uncertfun  of  obtaining  ?    I  think  not. 

In  this  letter  Aguinaldo  specifically  directs  that  deceit 
be  employed  and  that  Spanish  officers  be  treacherously 
attacked.  The  practising  of  deceit  was  a  carefully  con- 
sidered part  of  the  insurgent  policy.  In  a  letter  from 
Hongkong  dated  July  21,  1898,  A^ncillo  writes  as 
follows  to  Mabini ; '  — 

"the  time  will  come  when  disguises  must  be  set  aside  and  we 
will  see  who  is  deceiving  whom.    The  Btatements  made  by  some 

preeent  of  wbatever  you  think  beet  to  the  chiefs  suoceasively  and  then 
At  onoe  enter  the  faouaee  and  attack  them,  or  if  not  this,  do  what  you 
think  beet.  Show  vak>r  and  resolution,  brothers,  the  hour  hoa  arrived 
for  the  Philippines  to  belong  to  her  eone  and  not  to  them,  only  one 
step  and  we  shall  reach  Independence ;  be  constant,  brothers,  and  be 
united  in  feelings,  do  not  imitate  those  who  show  two  faces,  whatever 
such  people  do  sooner  or  later  they  will  be  slaves.  Respect  foreigners 
and  their  property,  also  enemiea  who  surrend^. 

"  I  want  you  to  know  that  in  respect  to  our  conduct  I  have  promised 
the  American  Admiral  and  other  nations,  that  we  shall  carry  on  modem 
war.  Even  if  a  Spaniard  surrenders,  he  must  be  pardoned  and  treated 
well  and  then  you  will  see  that  our  reputation  will  be  very  good  in 
all  Europe  which  will  decline  for  our  Independence ;  but  if  we  do  not 
conduct  ourselves  thus  the  Amerioans  wilt  decide  to  sell  us  or  else 
divide  up  our  territory  as  they  will  hold  us  incapable  of  governing 
our  land,  we  shall  not  secure  our  hbarty;  rath^  the  contrary;  our 
own  soil  will  be  delivered  over  to  other  hands. 

"  Therefore,  my  brethren,  I  urge  that  we  strive  to  unite  our  efforts, 
and  let  us  flre  our  hearts  with  the  idea  of  vindicating  our  country. 
Many  nations  are  on  our  side."  —  P.  I.  R.,  12.  1. 

'  Mabini  was  a  Tag&log  paralytic  of  exceptional  ability.  In  my 
opinion  he  was  the  strongest  man  whom  the  revolution  produced. 



of  the  commanders  of  the  fleet  here  to  Don  Emilio  aud  myself 
were  to  the  efiFect  that  the  exclusive  purpose  of  the  Government 
at  Washington  with  regard  to  the  Filipinos,  is  to  grant  this 
country  independence,  without  any  conditions,  although  I  sfud 
to  myself  that  such  a  purpose  was  too  pMlanthropical.  Don 
Eknilio  knew  what  I  thought  then,  and  I  still  think  the  same; 
that  is  to  say  that  we  are  the  ones  who  must  eecure  the  indepen- 
dence of  our  country  by  means  of  unheard  of  sacrifices  and  thus 
work  out  its  happiness."  ^ 

Agxiinaldo  himself  frankly  advocated  the  use  of  de- 
ceit. He  practised  what  he  preached.  Simeon  Villa, 
one  of  his  companions  on  his  subsequent  flight  through 
Northern  Luzon,  before  he  finally  took  refuge  at  Falanan, 
kept  a  diary,  which  constitutes  an  official  record  of  this 
long  journey.  In  it  he  has  inserted  some  bits  of  history 
of  other  days,  of  which  none  is  more  interesting  than  his 
account  of  the  beginning  of  hostilities  against  the  Span- 
iards, in  August,  1896.  From  it  we  learn  that  Aguinaldo, 
who  was  known  to  the  friar  of  his  town  to  be  both  a  mason 
and  a  chief  of  the  Katipilnan,  was  in  danger  during  August, 
and  on  the  night  of  the  29th  of  that  month  called  a  meet- 
ing of  all  the  compromised  persons  of  the  place,  who 
a^'eed  that  on  the  following  day  he  should  "make  repre- 
sentations to  the  governor  of  the  province."  Villa  says 
that  he  was  greatly  beloved  by  the  governor  and  his  wife. 
Early  on  the  following  morning,  he  "presented  himself  to 
the  governor,  and  in  the  name  of  the  people  of  Cavite 
Viejo,  offered  him  their  respects  and  their  loyalty  to 
Spain,"  at  the  some  time  asking  a  garrison  of  a  hxmdred 
men  for  his  town,  which  the  governor  promised  to  send 
at  once  if  the  captain-general  approved. 

That  afternoon  he  reported  the  results  of  his  efforts 
to  his  fellow-conspirators,  "and  told  them  that  then  was 
the  opportune  moment  for  rising  agatuat  the  Spaniards." 
He  initiated  the  uprising  himself  the  nest  morning.* 

» p.  I.  R.,  451.  1. 

■  Extract  from  the  Jounuil  of  Simeon  Villa. 
"  The  memoTable  month  <d  August,  1896,  arrived.    Aguinaldo  waa 



Gould  deceit  be  more  deliberately  practised  or  treachery 
more  frankly  employed  7 

'master'  of  the  Cftvite  Lodga.  Uoreovta,  he  vu  a  member  ttf 
the  'Katipan&n'  Society  and  the  chief  of  tJie  many  memben  who 
were  Id  the  pueblo  of  Cavite  Viejo.  What  was  to  be  done  7  A^ui- 
naldo,  not  knowing  what  to  do,  and  mindful  of  the  fact  that  the  cu- 
rate there  knew  positively  tliat  he  was  not  only  a  nuwoa,  but  alao  the 
chirf  of  the  Katipfinana  of  his  pueblo,  oonaidered  ft  expedient  on  the 
night  of  August  29  to  at  once  call  a  meeting  of  all  the  compromised 
poeoiiR  in  lus  town.  Aguinaldo  made  dear  to  them  their  grave  eit- 

"  They  all  agreed  that  on  the  following  day  Aguinaldo,  thrar  chief, 
should  make  repreaentationa  to  the  Governor  of  Cavite ;  so  he  went 
away  very  early  the  following  morning,  presented  himself  to  the  gov- 
wnor,  and  in  the  name  of  the  people  of  Cavite  Viejo  offered  him  their 
respects  and  their  loyalty  to  Bpain,  at  the  same  time  requesting  him 
to  eondeseend  to  send  to  his  town  a  garrison  of  100  men  for  its  seourity. 
The  govcflitor  replied  that  he  would  first  oonault  the  captain-general, 
and  if  the  proposition  was  apj^oved  he  would  send  the  garrison  at 

"As  Agninaldo  was  greatly  beloved  by  Uie  governor  and  hia  wife, 
they  offered  him  wine  and  sweetmeats.  As  soon  as  this  was  over  he 
took  his  leave  and  returned  happy  to  his  town.  Ou  arrival  in  the  town 
he  assembled  all  the  compromised  persons  and  informed  them  of  the 
brilliant  result  of  hia  eftorts.  Continuing,  he  told  them  that  then  was 
the  oppMtune  moment  for  rising  in  arms  against  the  Spaniards.  To 
this  thiey  unanimously  replied  by  saying  it  was  terrible,  beoause  no 
arms  were  available,  and  that  for  this  reaaon  it  would  certainly  prove 
to  be  a  disaater  for  them. 

"Bat  Aguinaldo.  in  company  with  his  godfather,  the  lamented 
Candido  Tirana,  insisted  on  convincing  them  with  their  strong  argn- 
ments-  They  made  them  understand  that  Bpanish  cruelty  would 
annihilate  them  without  fail,  and  tcs  no  other  reason  than  that  they 
were  members  of  the  KatipAnan. 

"  Aa  it  happened,  at  that  very  time  there  were  two  'Guardia  Civil' 
soldiers  in  the  court-house.  So  at  about  2  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
Aguinaldo  and  Tirona  went  directly  to  the  court-house.  Arriving 
tlm«,  these  two  determined  inaurgent  chiefs  intimated  to  the  guards 
that  they  should  surrender  their  equipments.  Theee  replied  that  it 
waa  impossible,  and  said  they  would  die  first.  Instantly  a  stanggle 
ensued  between  the  four  men,  which  lasted  nearly  an  hour.  But  it 
resulted  in  favor  of  the  iosui^nt  chiefs  who  succeeded  in  taking  the 
guns  and  oai-tridges.  Once  in  posaeSBion  of  these  armaments,  the  two 
chiefs,  aooompanied  by  a.  number  of  the  town  people,  directed  them- 
selves to  the  convent  in  order  to  capture  the  curate.  Very  unfortu- 
nately for  them,  the  curate  waa  no  longer  there  when  they  arrived; 
he  had  made  his  escape.    While  the  struggle  was  going  on  with  the 



I  have  indulged  in  this  digression  to  show  that  Agui- 
naldo  could  hardly  have  complained  had  the  methods 
which  he  used  against  others  been  employed  against  him. 
He  was  never  deceived  by  the  Americans,  but  his  claims 
relative  to  independence  grew  rapidly,  and  he  was  soon 
deceiving  his  own  people. 

On  May  24th,  be  issued  no  less  than  four  proclama- 
tions. One  of  these,  doubtless  intended  to  be  seen  by 
Americans,  made  no  mention  of  Independence,  but 
said:'  — 

g^uards  in  the  oourt-houae,  he  reoeived  the  news  and  fled  at  onoe  by 
embarkiDS  in  a  native  boat. 

"  The  insuiKent  chiefs  then  returned  to  the  oourt-house  and  immedi- 
ately prepared  a  oommunication  to  all  the  munioipal  oaptains  ia  the 
provinoea  of  Cavite,  Batangas  and  Lai^na,  inviting  them  to  at  onoe 
rise  against  Spain,  and  stating  that  their  own  town  of  Cavite  Viejo 
WM  already  freed  from  slavery. 

"  Each  one  of  these  oommunioations  was  sent  out  by  a  mounted 
oourier,  so  that  before  the  expimtion  of  many  hours  all  the  towns  in 
Cavite  Provinoe  were  informed  of  whathad  taken  plaee  in  Cavite  Viejo. 

"  On  thefoUowingday  someof  the  towns  took  up  arms.  At  the  same 
time  Agiunaldo,  in  company  with  many  people  from  his  town,  marched 
on  Tmua  in  order  to  attaek  the  Spanish  troops  who  were  there.  When 
he  arrived  in  Imus  the  people  of  this  town  at  onoe  joined  him  and  they 
all  went  to  the  oonvent,  in  which  were  the  friars  and  the  soldiers  of 
the  'Ouardia  Civil.'  Just  aa  he  arrived  at  the  atrium  of  the  Church 
bis  oompanious  did  not  wish  to  follow  bim,  for  fear  that  the  soldiera 
were  occupying  the  church  tower.  So  Aguinaldo  advanced  alone  untQ 
he  reached  the  door  of  the  oonvent.  Once  here,  he  called  his  compan- 
ions to  aid  bim.  But  these  were  not  so  determined  as  he  was,  and  only 
about  five  responded.  When  these  got  to  where  Aguinaldo  was,  he 
commenced  breaking  in  the  door  which  was  soon  open.  They  went 
upstBdrs,  .but  they  found  nobody,  since  the  friars  and  soldiers  had 
crossed  over  to  the  treasury  buildiiig. 

"  Aguinaldo's  companions  were  now  numerous,  because  the  others 
followed  him  when  they  saw  that  nothing  happened  to  those  who  went 
up  into  the  oonvent ;  and  all  of  these  went  immediately  to  the  treasury 
building,  in  which  were  the  friars  and  soldiers  whom  they  were  hunting. 
When  they  reached  it  they  found  the  doors  dosed,  so  they  could  not 
pass.  Aguinaldo  ordered  the  house  burned.  Those  in  bidiue  inside 
the  house  were  without  any  other  remedy  and  had  to  surrender ;  but 
meanwhile  some  of  them  had  been  burned  to  death,  among  these  a 
lieutenant  of  the  'Ouardia  Civil.'  By  this  victory  Aguinaldo  suo- 
oeeded  in  taking  17  rifles  and  two  2\  pounder  guns."  — P.  I.  R.,  860. 

'  "My  Beloved  Countrymen:    I  accepted  the  ^reement  of  peace 



"The  great  powerful  North  American  nation  has  offered 
its  disinterested  protection  to  secure  the  liberty  of  this 

In  another  proclamation,  doubtless  intended  for  a 
different  use,  he  made  the  statement  that  the  great 
North  American  nation  had  come  to  give  decisive  and 
disinterested  protection,  "considering  us  as  sufficiently 
civilized  and  capable  of  governing  ourselves."  ^ 

proposed  by  Don  Pedro  A.  I^temo  after  his  consultation  with  the 
Captam-Ofineral  of  the  islands  (Philippines),  agreeing  in  oonsequenoe 
thereof  to  suirender  our  arms  and  dialMUid  the  troops  under  my  immedi- 
ate commimd  under  certain  oonditions,  as  I  believed  it  more  advan- 
tageous for  the  country  than  to  continue  the  inaurreotion,  for  which 
I  had  but  limited  resouroea,  but  as  some  of  the  said  conditions  were 
not  complied  with,  some  of  the  bands  are  disooutented  and  have  not 
mitrend^«d  their  u'ms.  Five  months  have  elapsed  without  the  in- 
auguration of  any  of  the  reforms  whieh  I  asked  in  order  to  place  our 
oonatry  on  a  level  with  civilized  people  —  for  instanoe,  our  neighbor, 
Japan,  which  in  the  short  space  of  twenty  years  has  reached  a  point 
where  she  has  no  reason  to  envy  any  one,  her  strength  and  ascendency 
b^ng  shown  in  the  laat  war  with  China.  I  see  the  impotence  of  the 
Spanish  Government  to  contend  with  certain  elements  which  oppose 
constant  obstacles  to  the  progress  of  the  country  itself  and  whose 
destructive  influence  has  been  one  of  the  causes  of  the  uprbing  of  the 
masses,  and  as  the  great  and  powerful  North  American  nation  has 
offered  its  diaint«rested  protection  to  secure  the  Uberty  of  this 
oountry,  I  again  assume  command  of  all  the  troops  in  the  Htriiggle  for 
the  attainment  of  our  lofty  aspirations,  inaugurating  a  dictatorial 
government  to  be  administered  by  deorees  promulgated  under  my  sole 
responsibility  and  with  the  advice  of  diBtinguished  persons  until  the 
time  when  these  islands,  being  under  our  complete  control,  may  form 
a  constitutional  repubUoan  assembly  and  appoint  a  president  and 
cabinet,  into  whose  hands  I  shall  then  resign  the  oommand  of  the 


"Given  at  Cavite,  May  24.  1898."  —P.  I.  R-  206.  6. 

'  "The  great  North  American  nation,  the  cradle  of  genuine  liberty 
Mid  therefore  the  friend  of  our  people  oppressed  and  enslaved  by  the 
tyranny  and  despotism  of  its  ruler,  has  come  to  us  manifesting  a  pro- 
tection as  decisive  as  it  is  undoubtedly  disinterested  toward  our  in- 
habitants, considering  us  as  sulHoiently  civilized  and  capable  of  govern- 
ing ourvelves  and  our  unfortunate  country.  In  order  to  maintain  this 
high  estiniate  granted  us  by  the  generous  North  American  nation  we 
should  abominate  all  those  deeds  which  tend  to  lower  this  opinion, 
which  are  pillage,  theft,  and  all  sorts  of  crimes  relating  to  persons  or 



On  June  5,  having  practically  gained  control  of 
Cavite  Province,  he  felt  strong  enou£^  to  announce 
that  independence  would  be  proclaimed  on  June  12, 
and  on  that  date  he  did  proclaim  it  in  a  decree. 

The  Admiral  of  the  American  Squadron,  with  the  com- 
manders and  officers  of  his  command,  was  invited  to  the 
ceremonies,  hut  none  of  them  went.  As  it  was  important 
for  Aguinaldo  to  have  some  one  there  to  pose  as  a  repre- 
sentative of  the  United  States,  he  utilized  for  this  purpose 
a  certain  "Colonel"  Johnson,  an  ex-hotel  keeper  of 
Shangbfu,  who  was  running  a  cinematograph  show.  He 
appeal^  as  Aguinaldo's  chief  of  artillery  and  the 
reprea^itative  of  the  North  American  nation.^ 

Even  as  late  as  October  3, 1898,  Agoncillo  in  a  memo- 
randum addressed  to  President  McKinley  did  not  claim 
that  independence  htid  been  promised,  but  said : — 

"As  soon  as  the  Spanish-American  war  b^an,  the  American 
representatives  and  officials  in  Singapore,  Hongkong  and 
Manila,  invited  the  natives  of  the  Philippines  to  assist  the 
American  arms,  which  they  did  gladly  and  loyally,  as  allies, 
with  the  conviction  that  their  personality  would  be  recognised, 
as  well  as  their  political,  autonomous  and  sovereign  rights."  * 

property,  with  the  purpose  of  avoiding  int^^tational  oon£Ict  during 
the  period  of  our  oampaiga."  —  P.  I.  R.,  43.  3. 

'  Of  this  ertraordinary  ooourrenoe  Taylor  saya :  — 

"Invitations  to  the  ceremony  of  the  declaration  of  independenoe 
were  sent  to  Admiral  Dewey;  but  neither  he  nor  any  of  his  olBoen 
were  preeent.  It  was,  however,  important  to  Aguinaldo  that  some 
Amerioan  should  be  there  whom  the  assembled  people  would  oonsider 
a  representative  of  the  United  States.  'Colonel'  Johnson,  es-hotel 
keeper  of  Shajighai,  who  was  in  the  Philippines  exhibiting  a.  cinemato- 
graph, kindly  consented  to  appear  on  this  occasion  as  Aguinaldo's 
Chief  of  Artillery  and  the  representative  of  the  North  American  nation. 
His  name  does  not  appear  subsequently  among  the  papers  of  Aguiniddo. 
It  is  possible  that  his  position  as  oolonel  and  chief  of  artillery  was  a 
merely  temporary  one  which  enabled  him  to  appear  in  a  uniform  whieh 
would  befit  the  oharaoter  of  the  representative  of  a  great  people  upon 
so  solemn  an  occasion  I "  * 

'  P.  I.  R.,  461.  4. 

•Taylor,  26  A  J. 











III  it  he  does,  however,  claim  that  the  orgEoiizatioii  of 
a  govenunent  mdependent  of  America  and  Spain  was 
accomplished  with  the  tacit  consent  of  the  admiral  com- 
manding the  fleet  and  with  that  of  the  general  and  military 
and  political  commanders  of  the  United  States  of  North 
America  in  the  Philippines. 

"Who,  knowii^  these  facts,  not  only  did  not  object  but 
accepted  them  as  a  consummated  legal  act,  and  mamtuned 
official  relations  with  the  new  organieation,  making  use  thereof 
in  its  subsequent  actions  and  for  the  subsequent  development 
of  the  camiMugn,  which  was  consequently  brought  to  such  a 
happy  end." ' 

This  is  a  second  illustration  of  the  stereotyped  insurgent 
procedure  of  announcing  a  policy  and  then  claiming  that 
failure  to  attack  it  meant  acquiescence  in  it.  Admiral 
Dewey  says  that  he  did  not  even  read  this  proclamation. 
There  was  no  reason  why  he  should  have  done  so,  as  it 
did  not  deal  with  matters  which  he  was  authorized  to 
settle.  He  had  no  instructions  relative  to  the  recogni- 
tion of  new  governments,  and  he  sent  this  document  to 
Washington  without  comment,  as  he  should  hav&  done.* 

Apropos  of  this  chdm  that  American  oflScers  tacitly  rec- 
ognized the  Insurgent  government,  certain  passages  from 
an  unsigned  document  in  the  handwriting  of  Mabini,  pre- 
pared abgut  July  15, 1898,  are  of  interest.  Mabini,  speak- 
ing of  the  attitude  of  the  Americana,  says,  "Notwith- 
standing all  this  and  in  spite  of  their  protestations  of 
friendship,  they  have  always  refused  to  recognize  that 
govenunent."  Also,  "If  they  persist  in  refusing  to  rec- 
ognize our  government,  we  shall  see  ourselves  compelled 
to  come  to  an  agreement  with  any  other  government 
that  will  consent  to  recognize  us  on  friendly  terms."  ■ 

t  P.  I.  R.,  451.  4.  >  See  p.  fiO. 

' "  The7  ^re  aw&re  that  a  OoTemment  haa  been  eHtabliahed  here 
from  the  beginning :  firat  the  Diotatorial,  and  afterwards,  when  iereral 
[vovinoeB  had  been  freed  from  Spanish  domination,  there  was  implanted 
in  the  same  a  proper  OTsanization,  and  thus  a  new  Government  was 
ertabliahed  in  the  form  best  adapted  to  the  prtnoiplea  of  liberty ;  but 



This  statement  is  certainly  sufficiently  specific  as  to 
whether  Americans  had  recognized  the  Insurgent  govern- 
ment on  or  before  the  date  when  it  was  written. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  relations  between  A^uinaldo 
and  General  Anderson. 

Blount  attempts  to  make  much  of  a  cablegram,  sent  by 
the  latter,  in  which,  after  describing  the  Filipinos,  he 
adds,  "The  people  expect  independence."    Blount  says:  — 

"That  cablegram  of  July  22nd,  above  quoted,  in  which  the 
commandiDg  general  of  our  forces  in  the  Pmlippines  advises  the 
Washington  Government,  'The  people  expect  independence' 
is  the  hardest  thing  in  the  pubUc  archives  of  our  government 
covering  that  momentous  period  for  those  who  love  the  memory 
of  Mr.  McKinley  to  get  around.  After  the  war  with  the 
Filipinos  broke  out,  McKinley  said  re[>eatedly  in  pubhe  speeches, 
'I  never  dreamed  they  would  tiun  against  us. '  " ' 

If  there  is  nothing  harder  than  this  to  get  around  the 
memory  of  President    McKinley  will   not  suffer,  as  the 

Dotwitbatatiding  all  this  &n.d  in  spite  of  their  proteat&tiona  of  friendsliip, 
they  have  alw&ya  refused  to  reco^ze  that  govermnent. 

"  The  things  they  request  involve  the  reoc«nition  of  a  right  wfaioh 
we  cannot  and  ought  not  to  grant,  unless  they  recognize  our  Qovem- 
ment  and  unless  the  limits  of  the  powers  of  both  sides  be  defined. 
If  they  wish  us  to  recogniae  them  in  Cavit«,  let  them  recognize  our 
rights  in  Parafiaque. 

"  The  United  States  are  our  creditors  more  than  any  other  nation ; 
not  only  are  tbey  due  the  gratitude  of  the  Filipino  people,  but  also 
they  should  be  allowed  to  profit  by  the  advantages  this  people  oMi 
grant  them  without  loss  of  our  legitimate  right  to  a  free  and  independent 
life.  Therefore  we  are  disposed  to  make  a  treaty  or  convention  with 
them.  They  will  be  no  longer  able  to  allege  the  lack  of  national  char- 
acter, t(a  in  the  near  future  there  is  to  be  assembled  the  Revolutionary 
Congress  composed  of  the  Representatives  of  the  provinces, 

"  They  should  understand  that  they  have  come  to  make  war  on  the 
Spaniuds;  that  the  Filipinos  have  risen  in  arms  against  the  same 
enemy  to  achieve  their  liberty  and  independence ;  and  that  in  conae- 
queuoe  they  cannot  exercise  dominion  over  us  without  violation  of 
international  law.  If  they  persist  in  refusing  to  recognise  our  Govern- 
ment, we  shall  see  ourselves  obliged  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  any 
other  government  that  will  consent  to  recognize  us  on  friendly  terms." 
—  P.  I.  R.,  58. 
'  Blount,  p.  24. 



importAnt  thing  is  not  what  Aguinftldo  had  led  his  people 
to  expect,  but  what  the  American  officials  had  promised 
him.  The  President  was  certainly  not  bound  to  believe 
that  the  Filipinos  would  turn  against  us  even  if  they 
did  then  e;q)ect  independence.  Blount  has  seen  fit  to 
leave  unmentioned  certain  other  facts  which  are  veiy 
pertinent  in  this  connection. 

Apparently  sometime  during  September,  1898,  Sandico 
made  the  following  statement  in  a  letter  to  Aguin^do :  -~ 

"I  also  have  to  inform  you  that  Sefiorea  Basa,  Cort^  and 
Co.  have  congratulated  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
upon  the  capture  of  Manila,  stating  at  the  same  time  that  now 
that  IHlipino  soil  had  been  soaked  with  American  blood,  the 
Islands  must  remain  American.  I  believe  that  a  telegram 
should  be  sent  immediately,  to  counteract  that  sent  by  them."  ' 

Probably  Sandico  did  not  know  that  on  August  15, 
1898,  Agoncillo  had  transmitted  another  tele^am  to 
President  McKinley  throng  Consul-General  Wildinan, 
reading  as  follows :  — 

"Agoncillo,  my  Commissions  and  Ambassador-Extraor- 
dinary, representing  the  provisiotia]  government  of  the 
Philippine  Islands,  in  its  name  and  the  name  of  its  President, 
Elmilio  Aguinaldo,  congratulates  you  on  the  successful  termiiia- 
tion  of  the  war,  and  commends  the  occupancy  of  Manila.  I 
assure  the  United  States  of  the  allegiaiice  and  unquestioning 
support  of  our  people,  and  petition  tnat  we  be  granted  one  or 
more  representatives  on  the  commissioD  that  is  to  decide  the 
future  of  our  Islands."  * 

It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  the  President  had  more 
information  on  this  subject  than  was  transmitted  by 
General  Anderson ! 

Not  only  did  the  latter  passively  refrain  from  recogniz- 
ing Aguinaldo's  pretensions,  but  on  July  22,  1898,  he 
wrote  to  him  as  follows :  — 

"I  observe  that  your  Excellency  has  announced  yourself 
Dictator  and  proclaimed  martial  law.    As  I  am  here  simply 



in  a  militaiy  capacity,  I  have  no  authority  to  rect^niiie  Buch 
an  aasumption.  I  have  no  orders  from  my  government  (m  the 
subject."  • 

The  effort  to  keep  Americans  in  ignoruice  of  the  true 
state  of  affairs  was  kept  up  until  further  deception  was 
useless.  Consul  WiUiams,  for  instance,  wrote  on  June 
16,  1898 :  — 

"For  future  advajitage,  I  am  maintaining  cordial  relations 
with  General  Aguiualdo,  having  stipulated  submiaaiv^iees  to 
our  forces  when  treating  for  tbeir  return  here.  Xiast  Sunday, 
i2th,  they  held  a  counul  to  form  provisional  government.  I 
was  urged  to  attend,  but  thought  beet  to  declme.  A  form  of 
government  was  adopted,  but  General  Aguinaldo  told  me  to- 
day that  his  friends  all  hoped  that  the  Philippines  would  be 
held  as  a  colony-  of  the  United  States  of  America."  * 

Yet  on  Sunday,  June  12,  Aguinaldo  had  in  reality 
proclaimed  the  independence  of  the  Philippines.  Few 
Americans  at  this  time  knew  any  Spanish  and  none  un- 
derstood Tag&Iog,  so  that  it  was  comparatively  easy  to 
deceive  them.  What  Consul  'V^TUiams  reported  was  what 
A^naldo  considered  it  expedient  to  have  him  believe. 

The  foUowing  undated  letter  from  Aguinaldo  to  Mabini, 
supposed  to  have  been  sent  at  this  time,  is  of  especial 
interest  in  this  connection ;  — 

"Mt  dbab  Brother:  I  do  not  want  to  go  there  [where 
the  addressee  is]  until  after  the  visit  of  the  American  Consul, 
because  I  do  not  wish  the  negotiations  to  end  in  an  ultimatum, 
and  in  order  that  you  may  tell  Mm  all  that  is  favoiu'able  for 
the  cause  of  our  Nation.  I  charge  you  with  the  task  of  giving 
him  a  reply,  and  if  he  should  aak  about  me  tell  him  that  since 
the  time  of  his  last  visit  there  I  have  not  recovered  from  my 
illness.  If  anything  imporiiant  should  happen  we  can  com- 
municate with  each  other  by  telegraph,  u^ng  a  code  in  matters 
that  require  secrecy."  * 

In  a  letter  supposed  to  have  been  written  during 
November,  1898,  prepared  for  Aguinaldo's  signature  and 

>  Senate  Dooument  2 



addressed  to  Sefior  McKinley,  President  of  the  Republio 
of  the  United  States  of  Nortii  America,  but  apparently 
never  sent,  Aguinaldo  renews  the  charge  ^  previously 
made  in  his  "Resefia  Veiidica,"  that  Pratt  and  Dewey 
promised  independence.     It  need  not  be  further  dia- 

The  climax  was  finally  reached  in  an  ofiicial  protest 
against  the  Paris  Treaty  written  by  Agoncillo  in  Paris 
on  the  12th  of  December,  1898,  in  which  occurs  the 
following :  — 

"The  United  States  of  America,  on  their  part,  cannot  allege 
a  bett«  right  to  constitute  themselves  as  arbitrators  as  to  the 
future  of  the  Philippmee. 

"On  the  contrary,  the  demands  of  honour  and  good  faith 
impose  on  them  the  explicit  recognition  of  the  political  status 
of  the  people,  who,  loyal  to  their  conventions,  were  a  devoted 
ally  of  their  forces  in  the  moments  of  danger  and  strife.  The 
noble  g^ieral  EkniUo  Aguinaldo  and  the  other  Filipino  chiefe 
were  solicited  to  place  themselves  at  the  head  of  the  suffering 
and  heroic  sons  of  that  country,  to  fight  against  Spain  and  to 
second  the  action  of  the  brave  and  skilful  Admiral  Dewey. 

"  At  the  time  of  employing  their  armed  cooperation,  both  the 
Commander  of  the  Petrel  and  Captun  Wood  in  Hongkong, 
before  the  declaration  of  war,  the  American  Consuls-General 
Mr.  Pratt  in  Singapore,  Mr.  Wildman,  in  Hongkong,  and 
Mr.  Williams  in  Cavite,  acting  as  international  agents  of  the 
great  American  nation,  at  a  moment  of  great  anxiety  offered  to 

I "  Qoinc  to  Sngapore,  I  had  Beveral  intervievB  with  the  Consul  of 
the  TTnited  Statoa,  Mr.  Spencer  Pratt,  who  informed  me  tiiat  the  war 
WM  directed  aeniiut  Spain  only  and  that  in  addition  your  aotioa  in 
the  Philippines  Iiad  as  an  objeot  the  independence  of  my  beloved 

"  The  Commander  of  the  MacCvIioch  telegraphed  me  also  from 
Hongkong,  offering  in  the  name  of  Commodore  Dewey,  to  take  me 
to  Chvite,  in  ordw  to  raise  the  Filipinos  agaiiut  Spain. 

"  Without  any  written  treaty,  oounting  only  upon  the  saored  word 
of  American  citizana,  I  went  to  Hongkong',  embarked  on  the  Mae- 
CvUoeh  and  a  few  days  later  had  the  honor  to  make  the  aoquaintanoe 
of  the  victorious  Commodore  Dewey,  who  likewise  informed  me  that 
he  had  come  to  make  war  sgainat  Spain,  that  he  had  annihilated  the 
fleet  of  Admiral  Montojo  and  that  the  United  States  desired  to  give 
the  Philippines  their  independence."  ~P.  L  R.,  441.  2. 



Tecogoize  the  indepeiideDce  of  the  Filipino  nation,  aa  soon  aa 
triumph  waa  obtained. 

"Under  the  faith  of  such  promises,  an  American  man-of-war, 
the  McCuUock  was  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  said  leadera 
and  which  took  them  to  their  native  shores ;  and  Admiral 
Dewey  himself,  by  sending  the  man-of-war ;  by  not  denyii^ 
to  General  Aguinaldo  and  his  companions  the  exacting  of  hia 
promises,  when  they  were  presented  to  him  on  board  his  flag- 
ship in  the  Bay  of  Manila ;  by  receiving  the  said  General  Agui- 
naldo  before  and  after  his  victories  and  notable  deeds  of  arms, 
with  the  honours  due  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  an  allied 
army,  and  chief  of  an  independent  state;  by  accepting  the 
efficacious  cooperation  of  that  Army  and  of  those  Generals: 
by  recognizing  the  Filipino  flag,  and  permitting  it  to  be  hoisted 
on  sea  and  land,  consenting  that  their  ehips  should  sail  with  the 
said  flag  within  the  places  which  were  blockaded ;  by  receiv- 
ing a  solemn  notification  of  the  formal  proclamation  of  the 
Philippine  nation,  without  protesting  against  it,  nor  opposing 
in  any  way  its  existence ;  by  entering  into  relations  with  those 
Generals  and  with  the  national  Filipino  authorities  recently 
established,  recognized  without  question  the  corporated  body 
and  autonomous  sovereignty  of  the  people  who  had  just  suc- 
ceeded hi  breaking  their  fetters  and  freeing  themselves  by  the 
impulse  of  their  own  force." ' 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  claim  constantly  grows.  The 
commander  of  the  Petrel  Captain  Wood,  Consul 
Wildman  and  Consul  Williams  are  now  included  among 
those  alleged  to  have  promised  independence,  and  it  is 
claimed  that  Aguinaldo  was  received  with  the  honours 
due  the  chief  of  an  independent  state  when  he  visited 
Admiral  Dewey,  whereas  his  own  original  claim  was  that 
he  was  received  with  the  honours  due  a  general,  which  is 
quite  a  different  matter. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  American  officers  usually  addressed 
uid  treated  Aguinaldo  as  a  general.  The  extent  to  which 
they  were  able  to  use  bis  organization  to  further  the  ends 
of  ^eir  government  will  be  set  forth  later. 

In  a  letter  to  Wildman,  dated  August  7, 1898,  Aguinaldo 

admits  that  there  is  no  t^eement,  but  says  that  he  cannot 

'P.  I.  B.,  102. 1. 







tell  the  peoples  that  it  does  not  exist,  "fearii^  that  I 
may  not  be  able  to  restrain  the  popular  excitement."* 
He  begs  Wildman  to  use  his  influence  on  his  govemmrait 
so  that  it  will  realize  the  inadvisability  of  deciding  the 
fate  of  the  people  "without  considering  their  will  duly 
represented  by  my  government."  Is  it  conceivable  that, 
if  there  had  been  any  ground  for  claiming  a  promise  of 
independence,  Aguinaldo  would  have  failed  to  mention 
it  at  this  time  7 

We  may  summarize  the  well-established  facts  as  fol- 

Coosul-General  Pratt  was,  or  professed  to  be,  in  hearty 
sympathy  with  the  ambition  of  the  Filipino  leaders  to  ob- 
tain independence,  and  would  personally  have  profited 
from  such  a  result,  but  he  refrained  from  compromising 
his  government  and  made  no  promises  in  its  behalf. 

Admiral  Dewey  never  even  discussed  with  Aguinaldo 
the  possibility  of  independence. 

There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  any  subordinate  of 
the  Admiral  ever  discussed  independence  with  any  Fili- 
pino, much  less  made  any  promise  concerning  it. 

Neither  Consul  Wildman  nor  Consul  Williams  promised 
it,  and  both  were  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  fact  that  it 
was  desired  up  to  the  last  possible  moment. 

It  is  not  claimed  that  either  General  Anderson  or 
General  Mwritt  made  any  promise  concerning  it. 

The  conclusion  that  no  such  promise  was  ever  made  by 
any  of  these  men  is  fully  justified  by  well-established  facts. 

Aguinaldo  himself  carefully  refrained  at  the  outset 
from  saying,  in  any  document  which  Americans  could 
read,  that  independence  had  been  promised,  and  advanced 
this  claim  only  when  the  growing  strength  of  his  land 
force  had  given  him  confidence.  He  repeated  it,  with 
increasing  emphasis,  as  his  army  increased  in  size,  ulti- 
nately  openly  threatening  war  if  his  pretensions  were 
not  recogniz^.    In  doing  this,  he  was  merely  carrying 

'P.  I.  B.,  BookaO-l. 

VOL.  T  — f 



out  a  carefully  prearranged  plan,  agreed  upon  by  the 
HoQgkoQg  junta. 

And  now  let  us  exanune  the  claim  that  the  insurgents 
were  our  "faithful  aUies"  and  "cooperated"  with  us  in 
the  taking  of  Manila.  We  shall  find  that  this  subject 
richly  repays  investigation. 




I  HATE  previously  ^  called  attention  to  the  minutes  of 
a  session  of  the  Hongkong  junta  held  on  May  4,  1898, 
from  which  it  indirecUy  appears  that  the  Filipino  leaders 
at  that  time  hoped  to  secure  arms  at  the  expense  of  the 
Americans  and  purposed  to  attack  them  later  if  it  seemed 

The  treacherous  policy  then  outlined  was  never  departed 
from  by  Aguinaldo  and  his  associates,  who  sailed  for 
Manila  with  their  eyes  wide  open,  fcnowii^  full  well  that 
they  had  been  promised  nothing;  prepared  to  match 
their  wits  agdnst  those  of  Admiral  Dewey,  and  intent  on 
deceiving  him  and  on  securing  from  him  arms  to  be  used 
first  against  the  Spaniards  and  later  against  the  Ameri- 
cans, after  they  had  been  employed  to  help  bring  about 
the  downfall  of  Spain. 

There  exists  a  sigmficant  circular  signed  "J.M.B." ' 
believed  to  have  been  an  outright  forgery,  both  from  its 
tenor  and  from  the  fact  that  the  signature  "J.M.B." 
is  not  in  the  handwriting  of  Basa's  letter  hereinbefore 

It  contains  the  following  statements :  — 

"The  true  patriots  have  organized  a  committee  to  which  I 
belong,  naming  Aguinaldo  as  President  and  Agoncillo  as  Vice- 
Preffldent.  Tlie  latter  and  three  others  have  commenced  diplo- 
matic n^otiaticms  with  the  Admiral  and  American  Consul, 
and  we  infer  that  they  are  trying  to  make  colonies  of  us,  although 
they  said  they  would  give  us  independence.  The  Committee 
deemed  it  advisable  to  mmulate  belief,  at  the  same  time  equip- 
ping ourselves  with  arms. 

>  P.  39.  *  Fot  J.  M.  Bau. 



"We  have  accepted  arms  ofEered  by  the  Admiral  which  will 
be  disembarked  in  the  Philippinee  by  the  squadron. 

"A  part  of  our  forces  will  aid  the  Americans  by  fighting  with 
them  in  order  to  conceal  our  real  intentions,  and  part  will  be 
held  in  reserve.  If  America  triumphs  and  proposes  a  colony, 
we  shall  reject  such  offer  and  rise  in  arms. 

"A  separate  expedition  will  disembark  at  whatever  point 
may  be  considered  suitable. 

"3oe6  Alejandrino  embarked  with  the  American  squadron 
in  order  to  ^ve  secret  instructions  to  the  Chiefs. 

"Be  very  cautious  about  this  exceedingly  delicate  pointy 
you  will  commimicate  with  prudent  and  intelligent  chiefs  who 
will  recognize  the  gravity  of  the  subject,"  ' 

Here,  then,  in  a  faked-up  letter  on  which  Basa's  initials 
were  forged  in  order  to  gain  the  prestige  of  his  name  for 
this  treacherous  plan,  we  have  definitely  set  forth  the 
purpose  of  the  Filipinos  to  deceive  the  Americans  by 
aUovring  a  part  of  the  Insurgent  force  to  fight  with  them, 
and  then  to  attack  them. 

Reference  has  ah'eady  been  made  to  Agoncillo's  advice 
to  Aguiualdo,  given  under  date  of  August  26,  1898,  to 
the  effect  that  friendly  relations  should  be  mfuntained 
with  the  Americans  until  the  diplomatic  negotiations  at 
Paris  should  end ;  that  an  effort  should  be  made  to  find 
out  the  future  status  of  the  islands  "by  deceitful  means," 
and  that  confidence  should  never  be  put  in  the  Americans. 

Aguinaldo  put  the  whole  matter  in  a  nutshell  in  a  post- 
script to  this  letter,  saying :  — 

"You  should  issue  an  order  commanding  that  all  our  chiefs 
should  employ  a  policy  of  friendship  toward  the  Americans 
until  our  status  is  defined ;  but  said  order  should  be  confiden- 
tially ^ven.     Try  to  mislead  them,"  * 

Bray  also  very  strongly  advised  awaiting  the  results  of 
the  Pfuis  conference.' 

'  P.  I.  R.,  507-7.  •  P.  I.  R.,  477.  1. 

■  "  Until  the  Philippine  question  is  finally  deoided,  yon  would  do 
well  in  not  having  any  controversy  with  the  Americans.  After  hav- 
ing secured  the  extinction  o(  Spanish  control  for  good,  you  may  then 
liquidate  acoounta  with  Ihe  United  States  in  the  event  that  they  wiah 



Blount  claims  that  the  Filipinos  hoped  that  the  Treaty 
of  Paris  would  leave  their  country  to  them  as  it  left  Cuba 
to  the  Cubans,'  and  adds  that  having  helped  us  take  the 
city  of  Manila,  they  "felt  that  they  had  been  'given  the 
double  cross,'"  "believed  that  the  Americans  had  been 
guilty  of  a  dupUcity  rankly  Machiavellian,  and  that  was 
the  cause  of  the  war."  * 

The  quotations  already  given  from  Insui^ent  records 
show  plainly  that  the  principal  thing  for  which  the 
Filipinos  were  waiting  was  the  ousting  of  Spain  from  the 
Philippines  by  the  United  States ;  those  which  follow  show 
that  war  was  by  no  means  inevitable  as  a  result  of  a 
a  deciaion  at  Paris  adverse  to  Filipino  hopes,  for  the 
question  of  whether  a  United  States  protectorate,  or  even 
annexation  to  the  United  States,  ini^t  be  considered, 
was  left  open  to  a  very  late  date.' 

It  has  been  claimed  not  only  that  the  Insurgents 
whipped  the  Spaniards  without  our  assistance,  but 
whipped  them  so  thoroughly  that  Spanish  sovereignty 
had  practically  disappeared  from  the  islands  at  the  time 
Manila  surrendered.  It  has  further  been  alleged  that 
"decrepit"  Spwn  "could  not  possibly  have  sent  any 
reenforcranents  to  the  Philippines.  Besides,  t^e  Filipinos 
would  have  'eaten  them  up.'"  * 

to  eontrol  in  the  interior ;  but  in  the  meantime,  let  what  will  ooour, 
do  not  allow  younelf  to  have  any  controversy  with  them.  Matters 
are  in  a  very  delicate  state  at  the  present  time."  — P.  I-  R.,  398.  3. 

In  a  pofltsoript  to  the  same  letter  Bray  says :  — 

"America  is  a  great  nation  and  doee  not  wish  that  oonditiona  be 
dictated  to  her.  I  am  more  than,  ever  convinced  that  you  must  be 
patient  and  await  what  they  propose,  without  opposing  their  wishes 
and  insanities,  before  the  questions  before  the  Paris  Congrees  are 
definitely  settled  and  the  islands  ceded  by  Spain ;  then  there  would 
still  be  time  to  show  your  teeth  if  they  try  to  govern  the  country. 
I  would  not  obieot  at  present  to  them  taking  up  their  reddenoe 
there  and  acting  in  the  capacity  of  guud  for  good  government,  pUo- 
ing  our  trust  for  the  future  in  Providence  which  will  never  atwidon 
tbePhilippinea."  — P.  I.  K.,398.  3. 

'Blount,  p.  283.  •  Ibid.,  p.  283.  'Seep.  74. 

*  "Both  Spanish  fleets  had  been  destroyed  and  Spain  had  but  one 
left  to  [coteet  her  own  ooaat  dties.     The  death  knell  of  her  onoe  proud 



But  the  Filipinos  had  fou^t  Spain  before  and  were 
by  no  means  sanguine.  Their  more  intelligent  and 
reasonable  men  clearly  foresaw  that  they  coiild  not  win 
unaided.  Sefior  Antonio  Regidor  was  at  the  time  residing 
in  London.  He  was  a  Filipino  of  \inusual  intelligence 
and  ^ECeptionally  good  education.  He  took  a  keen 
interest  in  the  situation,  and  on  July  28, 1898,  tel^raphed 
"  Agonciilo  as  follows :  — 

"In  the  name  of  the  FilipinoB,  you  should  inunediately  send 
a  telegraphic  message  to  MacKinley,  requesting  him  not  to 
abandon  the  islands,  after  having  fought  as  brothers  for  a 
common  cause.  Pledge  him  our  unconditional  adhesion,  espe- 
cially of  well-to-do  people.  To  return  to  Spain,  in  whatever 
form,  would  mean  annihilation,  perpetual  anarchy.  Filipinos 
en  masse  should  visit  the  consuls  at  Hongkong,  Singapore. 
London  commerce  support  it.  Influence  Aguinaldo  to  accept 
American  flag,  flying  it  everywhere,  thus  obliging  them  to 
remain." ' 

This  leaves  no  room  for  doubt  as  to  Regidor's  views, 
but  Agonoillo  did  not  share  them.  He  replied  on  July 
29:  — 

"Frovisiona]  govemmenfa  aspiration  is  independence. 
Make  this  campaign."  * 

R^dor  was  not  to  be  persuaded.  On  July  30  he 
replied  as  follows,  addressing  his  communication  to  Basa : 

"America  vacillating  as  to  remaining  feara  conflicts  later 
with  natives  international  question  other  difficulties  necessary 
to  encourage  her  all  of  you  submit  united  unconditionally  rais- 
ing American  flag  great  demonstrations  necessary  to  influence 
outside  opinion  show  islands  resolved  united  America  high 
circles  advise  in  view  present  circumstaQces  only  feasible  pro- 
gramme is  protectorate."  * 

colonial  empire  had  sounded.    Decrepit  as  she  was,  she  ooutd  not 
postibly  have  sent  any  reenforoements  to  the  Philippinea.     Bendes, 
the  Pilipinoa  would  h&ve  'eaten  them  up.'"  — Bi<ount,  p.  127. 
'  P.  I.  R.,  471.  4.  '  Ibid..  471.  4.  •  Ibid.,  4fiO.  2. 



Obviously,  Agoncillo  was  someirtiat  impressed  by  this 
cablegram,  for  on  August  1  in  a  letter  to  Aguinaldo  he 
made  the  following  statements  and  inquiries :  — 

"If  the  American  troops  leave  us  alone  there,  the  questions 
which  will  arise  are  these :  Have  we  sufficient  arms  to  maintain 
the  war  f^ainst  Spain  in  order  to  secure  our  independence  7 
If  the  other  nations  are  opposed  to  our  independence  and  wish 
that  we  should  continue  under  the  Spanish  sovereignty,  have  we 
sufficient  strength  to  wage  a  war  and  obtain  victory  over  Spain 
and  over  them  in  the  future  ?  If  you  think  that  we  have  not 
sufficient  strength  to  fight  against  them,  should  we  accept 
independence  under  the  Americmi  protectorate  7  And  if  bo, 
what  conditions  or  advantages  should  we  give  to  the  United 
States  7  You  should  carefully  consider  the  preceding  questions, 
and  I  surest  that  you  should,  in  a  confidential  manner,  consult 
them  with  your  cabinet-in-banc,  as  well  as  with  your  private 
secretary  and  military  chiefs  of  rank;  and  your  decision  be 
notified  to  our  representatives  abroad  in  order  that  they  may 
know  what  they  must  do  in  their  negotiations.  You  will  see 
from  the  telegram  addressed  to  me  by  Reader  that  he  suggests 
to  me  to  send  a  message  to  MacKinley  requesting  him  not  to 
abandon  ua,  and  to  submit  to  them  [the  U.  S.]  unconditionally. 
As  I  do  not  agree  with  him  and  as  I  cannot  take  any  action 
which  is  agfunst  the  instructions  of  the  government,  1  replied 
to  him  tbat  the  only  desire  of  our  government  is  independence. 
This  may  be  seen  from  the  enclosed  telegram.  On  account  of 
this  reply,  he  was,  I  think,  somewhat  offended,  as  he  afterwards 
sent  a  telegram  to  Joviales  [Basa]  instead  of  to  me.  The  latter, 
upon  receivii^  the  telegram,  convened  all  the  boastful  patriots, 
and  they  adopted  a  resolution  to  send  a  message  to  MacKinley 
requesting  annexation.  Fortunately,  in  the  meeting  there  was 
present  Dr.  Justo  Lucban,  who  protested  against  such  measure. 
In  view  of  this  protest,  they  again  agreed  that  I  should  be  pres- 
et in  the  meeting,  since  I  am  the  representative  of  our  govern- 
ment. At  the  meeting  vrhore  I  was  present,  I  pointed  out  the 
inadvisability  of  their  resolution,  stating,  as  one  of  the  reasons, 
that  we  should  await  your  instructions  in  regard  to  the  matter 
before  sending  any  message  of  that  character.  So  the  message 
was  not  sent ;  but  I  was  later  informed  that  Basa  had,  after  all, 
sent  it  yesterday,  because  he  believed  that  it  would  not  injure 
our  cause.  Upon  learning  this,  I  was  carried  away  by  passion 
and  went  so  far  as  to  say  to  Basa  the  following :  '  Many  of  us, 
especially  myself,  think  ourselves  to  be  wise,  without  being  bo  ; 



politicians  for  what  we  bear  from  others ;  we  claim  to  be  pa- 
triots, but  we  are  only  so  in  words ;  we  wish  to  be  chiefs,  but 
none  of  us  act  in  a  way  worthy  of  a  chief.'  To  this  he  did  not 
reply.  Perhaps  his  conscience  accused  him  of  an  act  of  treach- 
ery, eince  we  agreed  in  the  meeting  to  await  your  letter.  What 
union  can  you  expect  from  this  people?  " ' 

Note  that  the  Basa  here  referred  to  is  the  man  whose  in- 
itials were  forged  on  the  letter  quoted  on  page  67. 

In  the  course  of  the  above-mentioned  letter  Agoncillo 
came  back  once  more  to  the  question  of  independence 
under  a  protectorate  and  made  it  very  clear  that  at  this 
late  day  be  did  not  know  whether  this  was  or  was  not 
what  the  Filipinos  desired.^ 

On  August  21,  Apacible  obviously  did  not  think  that 
it  woiild  be  an  easy  matter  to  escape  from  Spanish  domina- 
tion, much  less  tiiat  the  islands  were  ah'eady  rid  of  it, 
for  he  wrote  to  Mabini  that  the  United  States  were  likely 
again  to  deliver  the  Filipinos  into  the  hands  of  Spain. 
He  said  that  "if  events  will  be  what  their  telegrams  in- 
dicate, we  have  a  dark  and  bloody  future  before  us.  To 
be  again  in  the  hands  of  Spain  will  mean  a  long  and 
bloody  war,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  end  will  be 
favourable  to  us.  .  .  .  Spain  free  from  Cuba  and  her 
othCT  colonies  will  employ  her  energy  to  crush  us  and  will 
send  here  the  150,000  men  she  has  in  Cuba." '    Apacible 

>  p.  I.  R.,  471.  4. 

*  "You  Bhould  not  forg:et  what  I  have  stated  at  the  beginninK  of 
thin  letter;  beoause  1  am  of  the  opinioa  that  those  questions  should 
be  well  considered  by  all  of  you.  If  our  people  demre  independenoe 
under  the  American  protectorate,  it  is  necessary  that  our  representa- 
tives to  the  United  States  be  given  inatruotions  as  to  the  conditions 
which  we  should  grant  to  the  United  States.  The  peace  n^rotiations 
are  in  full  blast,  and  it  is  probable  that  we  will  be  rather  late  in  seod- 
ing  our  representativeH.  Therefore,  if  you  agree  to  independence 
under  a  protectorate,  you  should  recommend  it  at  once.  I  leave  it, 
however,  to  your  care,  as  you  ore  better  qualified  than  myself  conoent' 
ing  the  conditions  of  our  country."  —  P.  1.  R.,  471,  4. 

'  "My  Dear  Friend :  .  .  .  The  last  telegrams  ftrom  Europe  which 
Felipe  will  send  you  by  this  mail  are  alarming  for  our  future.  The 
preliminaries  of  peaoe  are  announced.  The  demand  of  America  ie, 
annexation  of  Porto  Rioo  and  the  Ladrone  Islands,  independeaoe  of 









thought  that  the  best  thing  was  independence  under  an 
American  protectorate. 

On  August  7,  1898,  ^gu^ialdo  warned  Agoncillo  that 
in  the  United  States  he  should  "not  accept  any  contracts 
or  give  any  promises  respecting  protection  ot  annexation, 
because  we  will  see  first  if  we  can  obtain  independence."  ^ 

Even  annexation  to  the  United  States  was  not  excluded 
by  Aguinaldo  from  the  possible  accepted  solutions,  for 
in  outlining  the  policy  of  the?  Philippine  government  to 
Sandico  on  August  10,  1898,  he  wrote:  — 

Cuba  under  an  American  protootorate  and  an  Amerioan  oozing  sta- 
tion in  the  Philippines.  That  is,  the^  will  aeain  deliver  us  into  the 
hands  of  Spain.  On  the  other  hand,  all  the  pavers  will  unite  to  pre- 
vent the  annexation  of  the  Philippines,  according  to  the  telefcrama  of 
Regfidor;  the  American  cabinet  hedtateB  about  including  us  in  the 
negotiations  for  peaee  from  fear  of  a  conflict  with  us  and  the  Filipinos 
in  Europe  advise  us  to  send  a  message  to  America  giving  our  uncondi- 
tional adhesion.  If  events  will  be  what  these  telegrams  indicate,  we 
have  a  dork  and  bloody  future  before  ua.  To  be  again  in  the  handa 
of  Spain  will  mean  a  long  and  bloody  war,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether 
the  end  will  be  favourable  to  us.  The  treaty  of  peaoe  sanctioned  by 
the  other  powers  will  assure  the  dominion  of  Spain.  Spain  free  from 
Cuba  and  her  other  oolonies  will  employ  all  her  energy  to  crush  us 
and  will  send  here  the  150.000  men  she  has  in  Cuba.  I  do  not  think 
that  the  Filipinos  will  again  submit  to  their  tyrants  and  there  will  be 
a  long  and  bloody  war.  And  on  account  of  the  treaty  the  other 
powers  will  aid  Spain  to  completely  dominate  us  and  place  all  possible 
obstacles  in  our  way  to  prevent  shipment  of  arms  and  all  kinds  of 
revolutionary  labours.  In  view  of  all  this  and  bearing  in  mind  the 
present  u^ency  of  the  matter,  it  is  neoeesary  for  that  government  to 
eatahlish  and  publish  its  policy.  We  believe  that  the  best  for  us  and 
the  only  feasible  one.  if  we  want  to  establish  negotiations  with  America, 
is  independence  under  an  Ameriean  proteotorate."  ~  P.  I.  R.,  453.  3. 

'"The  policy  which  you  will  pursue  in  the  United  Statee  is  the 
following  one :  — 

"  M(^e  them  tmderatand  that  whatever  may  be  their  mtention 
towards  ns,  it  is  not  possible  for  them  to  overrule  the  sentiments  of 
the  people  represented  by  the  government,  and  they  must  first  recc^- 
□ize  it  if  we  are  to  oome  to  an  agreement.  Still  do  not  accept  any  con- 
tracts or  give  any  promises  respecting  protection  or  annexation,  be- 
cause we  will  see  first  if  we  can  obtain  independence.  This  is  what 
we  shall  endeavour  to  secure  ;  meanwhile,  if  it  should  be  possible  to  do 
so,  still  give  them  to  understand  in  a  way  that  you  are  unable  to  bind 
yourself  but  that  once  we  are  independent,  we  will  be  able  to  make 
anangemeuts  with  them."  —  P.  I.  R.,  Books  C-1. 



"The  policy  of  the  govemment  is  as  follows:  Ist.  To 
Btruggle  for  the  independence  of  'the  Philippines'  as  far  as  our 
strength  and  our  means  will  permit.  Protection  or  annexa- 
tion will  be  acceptable  only  when  it  can  be  clearly  seen  that 
the  recc^nition  of  our  Independence,  either  by  force  of  arms  or 
diplomacy,  is  impossible."  '■ 

On  August  26,  1898,  Aguinaldo  wss  still  ready  to  con- 
sider annexation  if  necessary.*  He  was  apparently  not 
sanguine  at  tlus  time  as  to  the  result  of  a  continued 
stru^e  with  Spain.  At  all  events,  he  wanted  the  help 
of  the  Americans  if  such  a  struggle  was  to  come,  and 
desired  to  know  on  what  terms  it  could  be  had.* 

Meanwhile  the  Filipinos  in  Hongkong  who  favoured 
annexation  made  themselves  heard. 

On  July  18,  1898,  Consul-General  Wildman  wrote 
from  that  place :  — 

"I  believe  I  know  the  sentimeni«  of  the  political  leaders 
and  of  the  moneyed  men  among  the  insurgents,  and,  in  spite 
of  all  statements  to  the  contrary,  I  know  that  they  are  fighting 
for  annexation  to  the  United  States  first,  and  for  independence 
secondly,  if  the  United  States  decides  to  decline  the  sovereignty 
of  the  Islands.    In  fact,  I  have  had  the  most  prominent  leaders 

>P.  I.  R..5.  7. 

*  Id  &  letter  written  on  th&t  date  to  Agoncillo  he  s&ys :  — 
" Not withstan ding,  I  enclose  70U  the  credentials  as  requested; 
tberebj'  you  will  see  that  in  addition  to  your  reprosentine:  ua  at  Wash- 
ington, 70U  may  assist  the  commiasion  they  have  formed  for  the  pur- 
pose of  determining  the  future  condition  of  the  Philippines. 

"  But  you  muet  act  in  suoh  manner  that  they  may  not  be  able  to  say 
that  we  have  accepted  the  said  commission,  because  it  is  my  wish  to 
protect  [protest  7  D.  C.  W.|  at  all  times  aeainst  their  being  charged  with 
determining  our  destiny.  You  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  poUoy  of  the 
government  is  to  obtain  absolute  Independenoe,  and  if  penjhanee  we 
should  know  by  the  course  of  events  that  suoh  cannot  be  the  ease,  we 
will  then  think  of  protection  or  annexation."  —  P.  I.  R.,  Books  C-1. 
■  On  August  30,  1898,  Aguinaldo  wrote  Agonoillo :  — 
"  It  is  said  that  Qeneral  Merritt  is  going  away  to  take  part  in  the 
work  of  the  Commission.  On  this  aecount  it  is  important  that  you 
proceed  ae  quickly  as  possible  to  America,  in  order  to  know  what  takes 
place.  If  perchtUDce  we  should  ro  back  to  Spanish  control,  aak  them 
to  help  us  as  the  French  helped  them  during  their  own  revolution  and 
ask  also  the  terms."  —  P.  I.  R.,  Books  C-1. 


nratmoENT  "coOpeeation"  75 

call  on  me  and  say  they  would  not  raise  one  finger  unless  I  could 
assure  them  that  the  United  States  intended  to  give  them  United 
States  citiaenship  if  they  wished  it." ' 

We  have  already  noted  the  action  of  Basa  and  the 
Cortez  family  who  insisted  that  the  Islands  must  remain 
American,*  and  that  of  Agoncillo,  who  cabled  President 
McKinley  in  Aguinaldo's  name  and  his  own,  congratulat- 
ing him  on  the  outcome  of  the  war,  commending  the  oc- 
cupation of  Manila,  and  assuring  the  people  of  the  United 
States  of  the  alliance  and  unquestioning  support  of 
the  Filipinos,*  but  it  is  to  be  feared  that  the  sending  of 
this  cablegram  was  only  one  more  move  in  the  Insurgent 
game  of  deceit. 

There  were  annexationists  in  Manila  as  well  as  in 
Hongkong.*  Indeed  we  know  that  some  of  the  strongest 
and  best  of  the  Filipinos  there  were  in  favour  of  it. 

Felipe  Buraicamino,  writing  in  1901,  said  :  — 

"In  June  of  1898,  DonCayetano  Arellano' addressed  to  Don 
Felipe  Buencamlno  and  Don  Ambroeio  Rianzares  Bautista  a 
letter  written  from  the  town  of  Fagsanjin,  province  of  Laguns, 
in  reply  to  one  addressed  to  him  by  those  two  gentlemen.  In 
this  letter  Don  Cayetano  outUned  the  idea  of  union  with  the 
United  States  and  said :  'Avoid  all  doing  and  undoing,  and  when 
America  has  established  a  stable  order  of  affairs,  then  it  will  be 
time  enough  to  make  laws.'  Mabini,  whose  inSuence  at  that 
time  was  in  the  ascendant  in  Aguinaldo's  government,  paid  no 
heed  to  this  wise  advice.  In  October  of  1898,  while  the  Philip- 
pine government  was  established  in  Malolos,  and  before  congress 

'  Taylor,  18  AJ.  'See  p.  61.  »  Ibid. 

•  Borne  time  during  Augaat,  1898,  Sandieo  wrote  «  letter  to  Agni- 
naldo  of  which  the  poatseript  reads  as  follows :  — 

"P.S.  —  If  you  think  of  appointing  me  as  Delegate  to  Manila, 
please  send  me  my  credentials.  There  are  also  annexationists  here 
U.B.,  In  Manila.  —  D.  C.  WJ."  —  P.  I.  R..  416.  3. 

'  Now  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Philippine  Islands. 
He  is  a  man  of  excellent  character,  h^h  attainments  and  great  ability. 
He  held  important  legal  positions  under  the  Bpaniah  government. 
In  October,  1898,  he  vas  appointed  Secretary  of  Foreign  Relations  of 
the  "Hiilippine  Republic."  but  never  served  as  such  of&cer.  He  was 
givan  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  I«w  by  Tale  University  in  1904. 



had  promulgated  a  Philippine  constitution,  Messrs.  Arellano 
and  Pardo^  still  more  earnestly  advocated  union  with  America, 
the  first  as  secretary  of  foreign  affairs  and  the  latter  as  chief 
diplomat.  Their  plan  consisted  in  asking  the  Umted  States  to 
acknowledge  the  independence  of  the  country  under  a  protector- 
ate through  the  mediation  of  General  Otis,  and  this  plan  was 
accepted  at  a  cabinet  meeting  by  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo.  But 
on  the  following  day  Sandico  came  and  told  Aguinaldo  that  he 
had  had  a  conference  with  the  Japanese  consul  and  had  been 
told  by  Iiim :  '  that  if  Aguinaldo  would  support  absolute  inde- 
pendence the  Japanese  Government  would  help.'  Aguinaldo 
believed  Sandico's  story  (which  turned  out  to  be  a&olutely 
false)  and  did  not  carry  out  the  resolution  adopted  by  the  cabi- 
net. Messrs.  Arellano  and  Pardo,  after  this  affront,  separated 
themselves  from  the  Maloloa  government.  Aguinaldo  told  me 
afterwards  that  he  had  received  a  letter  from  Agoncillo,  dated 
Washington,  assuring  him  that  a  majority  of  the  American 
people  were  inclined  to  acknowlet^  the  independence  of  the 
Philippines  and  of  Cuba."  * 

But  annexationists  were  not  confined,  in  the  Philippines, 
to  the  vicinity  of  Manila. 

As  late  aa  September  6  Consul  Williams  reported 
that  a  delegation  from  four  thousand  Visayan  soldiers, 
a  delegation  which  also  represented  southern  business 
interests,  had  come  to  him  and  pledged  loyalty  to  an- 

Clearly,  th^i,  the  ^tuation  early  in  September  was  as 
foUowB :  All  were  agreed  that  the  assistance  of  the  United 
States  was  necessary  in  getting  rid  of  Spanish  sovereignty. 

Under  the  plan  of  Aguinaldo  and  his  followers  friendly 
relations  were  to  be  nuuntfuned  with  the  United  States, 
if  possible,  until  Spain  was  ousted  from  her  Philippine 
territory,  and  then  they  were  to  "show  their  teeth," 
and  see  "who  was  deceiving  whom,"  resorting  to  "force 
of  arms"  if  necessary.  Protection  or  annexation  would 
be  accepted  only  when  it  could  be  clearly  seen  that  the 

'  Dr.  T.  H.  Pardo  de  Tayeni,  one  of  the  moat  brilliant  living 
Filipinos.  He  had  spent  many  yesjs  in  F^a,  was  a  talented  physiciaD, 
&iid  under  Amerioan  rule  a^ved  for  more  tban  seven  years  as  a  member 
of  the  Philippine  Commiasion.      ■  Taylor,  55  AJ.      '  Taylor,  26  AJ. 



recogmtion  of  independence,  won  either  by  force  of  anna 
or  by  diplomacy,  was  impossible. 

Other  influential  and  patriotic  Filipinos  favored 
annexation  to  the  United  States  or  a  United  States  pro- 
tectorate, but  their  views  were  in  the  end  ignored  by 
Aguinaldo  and  his  following,  and  as  the  latter  had  the 
guns  their  ideas  prevailed. 

The  Treaty  of  Paris,  which  terminated  Spanish  sover- 
eignty in  the  Philippines,  was  signed  on  December  10, 
1898.  It  is  importaiit  to  bear  this  date  in  mind  later, 
when  considering  the  Insurgent  records  relative  to  the 
preparations  which  were  so  carefully  made  for  attacking 
the  American  troops. 

And  now  let  us  consider  the  actual  facts  as  to  the  co- 
operation alleged  to  have  been  asked  by  Americans  and 
given  by  Klipinos.  The  following  points  are  not  in  dis- 

Pratt  asked  Aguinaldo  to  coSperate  with  Dewey. 

Aguinaldo  was  taken  to  Manila  with  the  understanding 
that  he  would  do  so. 

Dewey  assisted  Aguinaldo  by  destroying  the  main 
Spanish  fleet ;  by  brining  him  and  his  associates  back 
to  the  Philippines ;  by  furnishing  them  anas  and  ammuni- 
tion; by  blockading  Manila  and  by  keeping  at  a  safe 
distance  the  Spanish  mosquito  fleet,  which  would  have 
made  dangerous,  or  impossible,  the  landing  of  the  anna 
subsequently  imported  by  the  Insurgents. 

Aguinaldo  successfully  attacked  ^e  Spani^  garriiona 
in  the  provinces  and  used  the  arms  and  ammunition  cap- 
tured, or  brought  in  by  deserters,  to  equip  a  force  which 
surrounded  and  attacked  Manila,  drove  large  nimibera  of 
people  into  the  walled  city,  thus  rendering  the  position 
of  the  Spanish  garrison  very  difficult  in  the  face  of  a 
possible  bombardment,  and  prevented  this  garrison  from 
betaking  itself  to  the  provinces,  as  it  mi^t  otherwise 
have  done,  leaving  Manila  to  shift  for  itself. 

Aguinaldo  was  powerless  to  take  the  place  by  assault. 



It  lay  at  the  mercy  of  Dewey's  guns,  and  it  would  have 
been  possible  for  the  Admiral  to  take  it  at  any  time,  but 
he  could  not  at  first  have  garrisoned  it  with  United  States 
forces,  and  never  thought  of  attempting  to  use  Insurgent 
forces  for  this  purpose. 

Did  Dewey  really  want  or  need  Aguinaldo's  help? 
Let  us  consider  his  testimony  on  the  subject :  — 

"Senator  Cartnack,  You  did  want  a  man  there  who  could 
oi^anize  and  rouse  the  people  ? 

"Admiral  Dewey.  I  didn't  want  anybody,  I  would  like 
to  say  DOW  that  Aguinaldo  and  his  people  were  forced  on  me  by 
Consul  Pratt  and  Consul  W^ldman ;  I  didn't  do  anything  — 

"Senator  Carmack.  Did  they  have  any  power  to  force  him 
upon  you? 

"Admiral  Detcey.  Yes;  they  had  in  a  way.  They  had 
not  the  official  power,  but  one  will  yield  after  a  while  to  con- 
stant pressure.  I  did  not  expect  anything  of  them ;  I  did  not 
think  they  would  do  anything.  I  would  not  have  taken  them ; 
I  did  not  want  them ;  I  did  not  beheve  in  them ;  because,  when 
I  left  Hongkong,  I  was  led  to  suppose  that  the  country  was  in 
a  state  of  insurrection,  and  that  at  my  first  gun,  as  Mr.  Wilhams 
put  it,  there  would  be  a  general  uprising,  and  I  thoi^ht  these 
half  dozen  or  dozen  refi^ees  at  Hongkong  would  play  a  very 
small  part  in  it."' 

The  picture  of  the  poor  admiral,  busy  getting  his  fleet 
ready  for  battle,  pestered  by  officious  consuls  on  the  one 
hand  and  by  irresponsible  Filipinos  on  the  other,  is  pa- 
thetic ;  but  it  had  its  humorous  features,  which  were  not 
lost  on  the  Admiral  himself.     I  quote  the  following :  — 

"Senator  Patterson.  Was  there  any  communication  between 
you  and  Pratt  in  which  the  matter  of  a  written  pledge  or  agree- 
ment with  Aguinaldo  was  discussed  with  r^erence  to  the 
Phihppine  Islands? 

"Admiral  Dewey.    No. 

"Senator  Patterson.  What  became  of  the  correspondence. 
Admiral,  if  you  Icnow? 

"  Admiral  Dewey.  It  is  all  in  the  Navy  Department.  When 
I  turned  over  my  command  my  official  correspondence  was  s^ 
sent  to  the  Navy  Department. 



"Senator  Pattenon.  You  reWned  all  of  your  lett«B  from 
any  United  States  officials  ? 

"Admiral  Dewey.    No ;  they  went  to  the  Department. 

"Senator  Patterson.     I  mean  you  did  not  destroy  them. 

"Admiral  Dewey.    No:  I  did  not  destroy  than. 

"Senator  Patterson.  And  you  turned  than  over  to  the 
Navy  Department  ? 

"Admiral  Dewey.  Yes;  our  r^ulations  require  that.  I 
may  say  that  for  my  own  information  I  kept  copies  of  certain 
tel^rams  and  cabl^rams.  I  don't  think  I  kept  copies  of  Mr. 
Pratt's  letters,  as  I  did  not  consider  them  of  much  value.  He 
seemed  to  be  a  sort  of  busybody  there  and  interfering  in  other 
people's  businesB  and  I  don't  think  his  letters  impressed  me. 

"  Senator  Patterson.    He  was  the  consul-general  ? 

"Admiral  Dewey.  Yes ;  but  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
attack  on  Manila,  you  know. 

"Senator  Patterson.    I  understand  that. 

"Admiral  Dewey.  1  received  lots  of  advice,  you  underBtand, 
from  many  irresponsible  people. 

"Senator  PaUeraon.  But  Pratt  was  the  consul-general  of 
the  Government  there  7  ^ 

" Admiral  Dewey.    Yes;  he  was  consul-general. 

"Senator  Patterson.  And  he  communicated  with  you, 
Saving  you  such  information  as  he  thought  you  might  be  inter- 
ested in,  and  among  other  information  he  gave  you  was  this 
concerning  Aguinaldo? 

"Admiral  Dewey.  I  don't  remember;  no,  I  really  don't 
remember  his  telling  me  anything  about  Aguinaldo  more  than 
that  cabl^ram  there,  and  I  said  he  might  come.  And  you 
see  how  much  importance  I  attached  to  him ;  I  did  not  wait 
for  him. 

"Senator  Patterson.  What  you  said  was:  'Tell  Aguinaldo 
to  come  as  soon  as  possible.' 

"Admiral  Dewey.    Yes;   but  I  did  not  wut  a  moment  for 

"Senator  Patterson.    Yes ;  but  there  was  a  reason  for  that. 

"Admirai  Dewey.  I  think  more  to  get  rid  of  him  than  any- 
thing else. 

"  Senator  Carmack.    Bid  of  whom  ? 

"Admiral  Dewey.  Of  Aguinaldo  and  the  Filipinos.  They 
were  bothering  me.  I  was  very  busy  getting  my  squadron 
ready  for  batUe,  and  these  little  men  were  coming  on  board 
my  ship  at  Hongkoi^  and  taking  a  good  deal  of  my  time,  and 
I  did  not  attach  the  slightest  importauce  to  anything  they 




could  do,  and  they  did  nothing ;  that  ia,  none  of  them  went 
with  me  when  I  went  to  Mirs  Bay.  There  had  been  a  good  deal 
of  talk,  but  when  the  time  came  they  did  not  go.  One  of  them 
didn't  go  because  he  didn't  have  any  toothbrush. 

"Senator  Bvsrowa.    Did  he  give  that  as  a  reason  ? 

"Admtrai  Dewey.    Yea ;  he  Baid,  'I  have  no  toothbrush,'"  '■ 

However,  Dewey  ultimately  yielded  to  the  pressure 
exercised  on  him  by  Pratt  and  Wildman,  and  allowed 
Aguinaldo  and  some  of  bis  associates  to  be  brought  to 
Manila.  Having  them  there  he  proposed  to  get  assistance 
from  them,  not  as  allies,  but  as  a  friendly  force  attacking 
a  common  enemy,  in  its  own  way. 

Let  us  continue  with  his  testimony  as  to  cooperation 
between  Aguinaldo  and  the  naval  forces  of  the  United 

"Senaior  Paiterson.  Then,  Admiral,  until  you  knew  that 
they  were  going  to  send  land  forces  to  your  assistance .  you 
thought  there  was  a  necessity  to  organize  the  Fihpinoa  into 
land  forces,  did  you  7 

" Admiral  Dewey.    No;  not  a  necessity. 

"Senaior  Patterson.  You  thought  it  might  prove  of  value 
to  you? 

"Admiral  Dewey.  I  testified  here,  I  think,  in  a  way  that  an- 
swers that.  I  said  to  Aguinaldo,  'There  is  our  enemy;  now, 
you  go  your  way  and  I  will  go  mine ;  we  had  better  act  inde- 
pendently.'   That  was  the  wisest  thing  I  ever  said. 

"Senator  Patterson.  But  you  stated  that  you  were  using 
these  people  and  they  were  permitted  to  organize,  that  you 
might  use  them. 

"Admiral  Dewey.    They  were  assisting  us. 

"Senator  Patterson.  Very  well,  they  were  to  assist  you. 
Did  you  not  either  permit  them  or  encourage  them  —  I  do  not 
care  which  term  you  use  —  to  organize  into  an  army,  such 
as  it  was,  that  they  might  render  you  such  assistance  as  you 

"Admiral  Dewey.  They  were  assisting  us,  but  incidentally 
they  were  fighting  their  enemy ;  they  were  fighting  an  enemy 
which  had  been  thdr  enemy  for  three  himdred  years. 

'  Soiate  DooumentB,  Vol.  2fi,  pp.  2931-2932. 





"Senator  PaUerson.    I  understand  that,  Admiral. 

"Admirai  Dewey.  While  asButing  ua  th^  were  fighting 
thdr  own  battles,  too. 

"  The  Chairman.  You  were  encoura^ng  inauixectJon  against 
a  common  enemy  with  which  you  were  at  war  ? 

"Admiral  Dewey.  I  think  bo.  I  had  in  my  mind  an  illustra- 
tion furnished  by  the  civil  war.  I  was  in  the  South  in  the  civil 
war,  and  the  only  friends  we  had  in  the  South  were  the  aegroeB, 
and  we  made  use  of  them ;  they  assisted  us  on  many  occasions. 
I  had  that  in  mind ;  I  said  these  people  were  our  friends,  and 
'we  have  come  here  and  they  will  help  ua  just  eractly  aa  the 
negroes  helped  ua  in  the  civil  war.' 

"Senator  Paiieraon.  The  negroes  were  expecting  thmt 
freedom  — 

"Admiral  Detoey.    The  Filipinos  were  slaves,  too. 

"Senator  Patterson.    What  were  the  Rlipinos  expecting? 

"Admiral  Dewey.  They  wanted  to  get  rid  of  the  Spaniards ; 
I  do  not  think  they  looked  much  beyond  that.  I  cannot  recall 
but  I  have  in  mind  that  the  one  thing  they  had  in  their  minds 
was  to  get  rid  of  the  Spaniards  and  then  to  accept  us,  and  that 
would  httve  occurred  —  I  have  thought  that  many  times  —  if 
we  had  had  troops  to  occupy  Manila  on  the  let  day  of  May 
before  the  insurrection  got  started ;  these  people  would  have 
accepted  ua  as  their  friends,  and  they  would  have  been  our  loyal 
frimda  —  I  don't  know  for  how  long,  but  they  would  have  hem 
our  friends  then. 

"Senator  Patterson.  You  learned  from  Pratt,  or  Wildman, 
or  Williams,  very  early,  did  you  not,  that  the  f^lipinoB  wanted 
thedr  own  country  and  to  rule  their  own  couutty ;  that  that  is 
what  they  were  expecting  ? 

"Admiral  Dewey.  I  heard  from  Williams  that  there  was  an 
insurrection  there  agunst  the  Spaniards.  The  Spaniards  were 
very  cruel  to  them,  and  I  think  they  did  not  look  much  beyond 
getting  rid  of  them.  There  was  one,  Dr.  Rizal,  who  had  the 
idea  of  independence,  but  I  don't  think  that  Aguinaldo  had 
much  idea  of  it. 

"Senator  Carmack.  Then  what  useful  purpose  did  the 
I^^nno  army  serve ;  why  did  you  want  the  flhpino  army  at 

"Admiral  Dewey.    I  did  not  want  them. 

"Senator  Carmack.    Did  you  not  want  the  Illipino  forces? 

"Admiral  Dewey.    No,  not  really.     It  was  their  own  idea 
coming  over  there.    We  could  have  taken  the  city  at  any 
moment  we  had  the  troops  to  occupy  it." 
vol-  1— a 



Admiral  Dewey  has  made  the  following  statements 
relative  to  the  importance  of  Aguinaido's  military  operar- 
tions:  — 

"  Then  he  began  operations  toward  Manila,  and  he  did  wonder- 
fully well.  He  whipped  the  Spaniards  battle  after  battle, 
and  finally  put  one  of  those  old  smoothbore  guns  on  a  barge, 
and  he  wanted  to  take  this  up  —  wanted  me  to  tow  it  up  so  he 
could  attack  the  city  with  it.  I  said,  'Ob,  no,  no;  we  can  do 
nothing  until  our  troops  come.'  I  knew  he  could  not  take  the 
city  without  the  assistance  of  the  navy,  without  my  assistance, 
and  I  knew  that  what  he  was  doing  —  driving  the  Spaniards  in 
—  was  savii^  our  own  troops,  because  our  own  men  perhaps 
would  have  had  to  do  that  same  thing.  He  and  I  were  always 
on  the  most  friendly  terms ;  we  bad  never  had  any  differ^icea. 
He  considered  me  as  his  liberator,  as  his  friend.  I  think  he  had 
the  highest  admiration  for  us  because  we  bad  whipped  the 
Spaniards  who  had  been  riding  them  down  for  three  hundred 

"Senator  PaUerson  (continuing).  You  aesit  this  short  dis- 
patch to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy :  — 

" '  Aguioaldo,  the  revolutionary  leader,  visited  the  Olympia 
yesterday.  He  expects  to  make  general  attack  on  May  31. 
Doubt  his  ability  to  succeed.     Situation  rontuns  unchanged.' 

"  Do  you  recall  that  visit  ? 

"Admiral  Dewey.    Yea. 

"SetuUor  Patterson.  He  came  to  tell  jrou,  did  he,  that  he 
was  going  to  make  a  general  attack,  and  you  — 

"Admiral  Dewey,    Yes. 

"Senator  PaUeraon.  And  you  doubted  his  ability  to  suc- 

"Admiral  Dewey.  And  he  wanted  me  to  assist  him.  He 
wanted  me  to  tow  one  of  his  guns  up  into  position.  I  knew  be 
could  not  take  the  city ;  of  course  he  could  not. 

"Senator  Patterson.  Did  you  lu^e  that  he  should  not  make 
the  attack? 

"Admiral  Deaey.  I  do  not  remember  that;  very  likely  I 

"Senator  Patterson.  And  was  he  not  persuaded  or  restrained 
by  you  from  doing  so  ? 

"Admired  Dewey.  I  do  not  remember;  but  it  is  very 
likely.  I  did  not  want  to  see  a  lot  of  them  killed  unnecessarily, 
because  I  knew  they  could  not  take  that  walled  city.    Tbey  had 



no  artiUery,  and  they  could  not  take  it,  I  knew  very  well,  and  I 
wanted  the  situation  to  remun  as  it  waa  until  our  troops  came 
to  occupy  it, 

"Senator  Paitenon.  But  you  found  that  whenever  you  ex- 
pressed a  strong  objection  to  anything  being  done  at  that  time 
that  Aguinaldo  yielded  to  your  request  ? 

"  Admiral  Dewey.  Up  to  the  time  the  army  came  he  did 
everything  I  requeeted.  I  had  not  much  to  do  with  him  aft^ 
the  army  came." ' 

But  Dewey's  in0uence  over  Aguinaldo  was  not  suffi- 
cient to  prevent  his  looting,  as  the  following  extracts  from 
hia  testimony  show :  — 

"Senator  Patteraon.  Is  that  what  you  mean  when  you  say 
he  looted  —  that  he  made  reprisi^  for  his  army,  took  provisions 
and  whatever  was  necessary  7    That  is  what  you  meant  ? 

"  Admiral  Dewey.     That  is  one  part  of  it. 

"  Senator  Carmack.  This  was  taking  provisions  for  the  uae 
of  the  army  ? 

"  Admiral  Dewey.    That  is  one  thing  he  did. 

"  Senator  Carmaek.  You  said  you  did  not  object  to  that 
at  the  time  ? 

"  Admiral  Dewey.  No.  It  would  have  been  useless;  he  got 
beyond  me  very  soon  —  he  got  out  of  my  hands  very  soon.* 

"Senator  Carmack.  You  said  yesterday  you  suspected  that 
Aguinaldo  took  the  lion's  share  of  the  provisions  that  were 
gathered  for  the  anny.  What  was  the  ground  upon  which  you 
made  that  accusation  7 

"Admiral  Dewey.  Because  he  waa  living  in  Maloloe  like  a 
prince,  like  a  king,  in  a  way  that  could  only  have  come  about 
by  his  taking  the  lion's  share.  Then,  in  regard  to  hia  looting, 
I  repeat  what  I  said  yesterday.  He  began  within  forty-eight 
hours  after  he  landed  in  Cavite  to  capture  and  take  everythii^ 
he  wanted.  I  know  these  things  of  my  own  knowledge,  because 
I  saw  the  loot  brought  in ;  and  I  know  that  every  dollar  that 
was  taken  from  the  workingmen  at  the  navy-yard  was  taken  at 
the  threat  of  death,* 

•  •••••* 

"Senator  Patterson.  Do  you  believe  in  this  proclamation  he 
was  uttering  falsehoods  to  the  Filipino  people  ? 

I  Senate  Documenta,  Vol.  25,  p.  2956. 
*  tfrid.,  p.  2961 



"Admiral  Dewey.  Yee;  I  do  abeolutel^.  I  think  he  was 
there  for  gain  —  for  money  —  that  independence  had  never  up 
to  that  time  entered  his  head.  He  was  there  for  loot  and  money. 
Tliat  is  what  I  believe,  since  you  aak  me  my  belief ;  I  believe 
that  implicitly.^ 

•  •••««* 

"Senaior  Pcdteraon.  And  you  found  nothing  to  cause  any 
doubt  as  to  his  loyalty  up  to  the  time  until  after  Manila  sui^ 

"Admiral  Deirey.     His  loyalty  to  whom? 

"Senaior  Paiteraon.  To  you  and  to  the  cause  for  which  he 
was  fighting  7 

"Admiral  Detoey.  I  began  to  suspect  he  was  not  loyal  to  us 
about  the  time  our  troops  arrived,  when  he  demurr«d  at  moving 
out  of  Cavite  to  make  room  for  our  troops. 

"Senator  Paiteraon.  Do  you  mean  by  that  that  you  feared 
that  he  was  commencing  to  think  more  of  independence  than 
the  success  of  the  American  cause  ? 

"Adrniral  Dewey.    Yes."  * 

We  have  seen  to  what  extent  Aguinaldo  cooperated 
with  the  marine  forces  of  the  United  States.  Now  let  us 
examine  the  claim  that  he  cooperated  with  the  land 
forces  after  their  arrival. 

One  of  the  things  which  the  Insurgents  are  said  to  have 
accomplished  was  the  maintenance  of  an  effective  land 
blockade  which  prevented  the  entrance  of  provisions, 
and  produced  a  very  serious  food  shortage.  Both  Otis 
and  Dewey  have  stated  that  they  did  this,  but  we  learn 
from  the  Insurgent  records  how  erroneous  was  this  conclu- 

>  Senate  Dooumenta,  Vol.  25,  p.  2955. 

)  Ibid.,  p.  2952. 

'  The  following  pasBOge  is  an  extract  from  an  und^ed  order  dated 
July  22,  1898:  — 

"For  the  preservation  of  peace  and  Koed  order  in  the  oommunity 
and  to  put  an  end  to  the  acts  of  those  who  within  and  without  the  city 
of  Manila  and  in  the  neiKhboriug  provinoes  not  under  the  oontrol  (^ 
the  Spanish  Gkivemment,  are  evading  the  orders  issued  by  these 
Headquarters,  and  in  view  of  the  large  number  of  those  who  are  storing 
and  monopolising  food  and  other  most  necessary  articles,  under  the 
pretenoe  of  desiring  to  sell  them  to  the  Americans,  but  whose  real 
intention  is  to  ship  them  secretly  to  Manila  where  they  receive  higher 



The  laading  of  the  American  troops  for  the  attack  on 
Manila  was  not  actively  opposed  by  the  Filipinos,  but 
it  was  narrowly  and  distrustfully  watched. 

Necessary  transportation  requested  by  General  Ander- 
son was  ultimately  furnished  by  Aguinaldo,  but  only  grudg- 
ingly after  a  three  weeks'  delay,  and  as  a  result  of  threats 
that  it  would  be  seized  if  not  voluntarily  supplied. 

The  necessary  positions  in  the  trenches  around  Manila 
from  which  to  make  the  attack  on  that  city  were,  in  part 
at  least,  yielded  to  the  Americans  by  the  Filipinos 
upon  the  request  of  the  former. 

The  Insui^ents  twice  informed  the  Spaniards  in  ad- 
vance of  projected  American  attacks. 

They  carried  out  their  own  attack  on  the  city  without 
regard  to  the  plans,  or  the  requests,  of  the  Americans. 
They  secretly  treated  with  the  Spaniards  in  the  endeavour 
to  secure  the  surrender  of  the  city  to  themselves. 

pricM  for  their  merohandise,  without  regard  for  the  injury  tbiey  tm 
doing  the  oauae  of  our  independence,  I  have  wen  fit  to  decree  the  fol- 
towing:    .  .  ."     P.  I.  R.,  45.  S  and  125.  3. 

Relative  to  this  matter,  Taylor  says  :  — 

"The  defection  of  Bueneamino  and  Pilar  had  opened  the  road  to 
Afoinaldo,  but  at  first  the  blookade  was  not  eSeative.  There  w&K 
loo  many  nativee  there  vith  friends  and  relations  in  Aguinaldo's  oamp 
to  make  him  deaire  to  aubjeet  the  city  to  the  hardHhips  of  an  effective 
fflege.  And,  furthermore,  he  did  not  have  the  foroe,  nor  did  his  men 
have  the  necessary  discipline,  to  prevent  the  ingress  of  supplies.  It 
was  not  until  the  first  part  of  July  that  the  price  of  provisions  iacreoeed. 
It  was  at  no  time  found  neceasary  by  the  authorities  to  take  over  all 
the  stares  of  provisions  in  the  city.  Indeed,  there  seems  to  have  been 
a  fairly  steady  traffic  in  supplies  between  Manila  and  the  country  to 
the  north.  It  was  a  trafSc  in  which  it  haa  been  charged  that  certain 
Spanish  officers  of  rank  made  large  sums.  Aguinaldo  permitted  it, 
and  on  July  26,  1898,  signed  a&  order  directing  that  food  should  be 
sent  into  Manila  from  the  north  to  prevent  starvation  in  the  city,  and 
ordered  the  heads  of  the  towns  in  the  vicinity  not  to  interfere  with 
this  traffic  (P.  I.  R.,  1087-4).  The  entianoe  of  food  supplies  was 
confined  to  the  northern  line,  for  then  it  would  not  be  known  to  the 
Americans  who,  after  July  30,  oooupied  the  entrenchments  in  front 
of  San  Antonio  Abad.  It  was  not  expedient  for  them  to  see  too  much 
of  Aguinaldo's  methods."  * 

•Taylor,  14  AJ. 



After  the  capitulation  to  the  Americans  had  been 
agreed  upon,  and  on  the  very  morning  of  the  day  of  the 
surrender,  they  endeavoured  to  pueh  home  an  attack. 
Disregarding  the  request  that  they  keep  out  of  the  final 
assault,  they  crowded  into  the  city  with,  and  after,  the 
American  troops.  They  fired  on  Spanish  soldiers  on  the 
city  wall  while  a  fla^  of  truce  was  flying,  provoking  a 
return  fire  which  killed  and  wounded  American  soldiers. 

They  demanded  for  themselves  Malacailan  palace  and 
other  buildings  and  a  share  in  "the  war  booty."  They 
promptly  looted  the  parts  of  the  city  which  they  occupied, 
and  ultimately  retired  from  their  positions  within  the 
city  limits  on  the  evening  of  their  last  day  of  grace  ^ter 
being  warned  by  General  Otis  that  if  they  did  not  do  so 
they  would  be  driven  out. 

I  will  now  quote  from  the  records  in  support  of  these 

The  following  is  the  programme  of  "cooperation"  out- 
lined to  Aguinaldo  by  Bray  in  a  letter  dated  June  30, 
1898 : — 

"I  am  very  amdouB  to  receive  the  news  of  the  capitulation 
of  Manila  and  I  hope  that  General  Augustfn  will  be  obliged  to 
turn  over  his  sword  to  you  in  person  and  not  to  the  Americana. 
You  are  by  right  entitled  to  it  and  I  should  like  to  see  it  so  from 
a  political  standpoint,  as  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  you  should 
declare  the  independence  of  the  Philippines  before  the  arrival 
of  General  Merritt,  appointed  by  the  President  to  be  Governor 
with  full  powers  to  establish  a  provisional  government. 
•  «*«*•• 

Any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Americans  to  garrison  the 
interior  towns  with  their  troops  or  any  other  act  which  might 
be  construed  as  a  conquest,  should  meet  with  resistance. 

"After  having  written  these  lines,  I  had  another  conference 
with  Mr.  St.  Clair  of  the  Free  Press,  who  sent  for  me  retard- 
ing  the  question  of  independence.  He  has  had  a  consultation 
with  the  Supreme  Judge  of  this  place,  and  he  is  of  opinion  that 
you  should  proclaim  independence  at  once,  notwithstanding 
what  Admiral  Dewey  and  Consul  WiUiams  say  agamst  it,  and 



this  ahould  be  done  before  General  Merritt  can  arrive.  A  Gov- 
ernment having  been  thus  constituted  in  due  form,  the  Ameri- 
cans would  have  no  right  to  invade  the  Philippines  without  com- 
mitting a  violation  of  international  law.  They  are  no  longer 
fighting  against  the  Spaniards  against  whom  they  declared  war. 
The  advice  of  Coneul  Williams  to  delay  this,  b  a  diplomatic 
pla^  to  eain  time  until  the  arrival  of  General  Merritt,  because 
he  is  well  aware  of  the  false  position  said  General  would  find 
h^nself  in.  The  key  to  the  situation  is  now  in  your  hands; 
do  not  permit  any  one  to  take  it  away  from  you.  The  Americans 
have  done  nothmg  but  bombard  and  deetroy  the  Spanish  fleet 
on  the  bigh  seas ;  they  have  not  conquered  any  land,  but  in  the 
meantime  the  control  of  the  Philippines  has  passed  by  conquest 
from  the  hands  of  the  Spaniards  and  the  Americans  have  no 
r^t  to  eater  further.  Under  certain  conditions  and  guarantees, 
permit  the  landing  of  American  troops ;  but  be  very  careful, 
they  must  not  be  permitted  to  land  until  they  execute  an  agree- 
ment with  the  duly  constituted  government  of  the  Philippines, 
reepectii^  all  its  institutions,  and  they  must  under  no  pretext 
whatever  be  permitted  to  garrison  any  place  except  the  munic- 
ipal limits  of  Manila,  Cebd,  and  Iloflo,  and  even  therein  care 
should  be  observed.  .  .  .  You  must  not  permit  a  single  soldier 
to  land  without  havii^  these  guarantees." ' 

When  General  Anderson,  with  the  first  United  States 
troops  of  occupation,  arrlTed  at  Manila  Bay,  Aguinaldo 
did  not  call  on  him,  as  an  "  ally  "  might  have  been  ex- 
pected to  do.  Later,  however.  Admiral  Dewey  and 
General  Anderson  went  to  see  Aguinaldo,  but  without 
any  of  the  ceremony  of  an  official  military  call,  the 
Admiral  saying  to  General  Anderson :  — 

"Do  not  take  your  sword  or  put  on  your  uniform,  but  just 
put  on  your  blouse.    Do  not  go  with  any  ceremony."  * 

And  they  went  in  that  way. 

On  July  4, 1898,  General  Anderson  wrote  Aguinaldo  defi- 
nitely requesting  his  cooperation  in  the  following  words : — 

"For  these  reasons  I  desire  to  have  the  most  amicable  r^ 
lations  with  you,  and  to  have  you  and  your  force  codperate  with 
us  in  the  militaiy  operations  against  the  Spanish  forces."  ' 

>  P.  I.  R..  3B8.  2. 



On   July   5   Aj^uioaldo    replied,    thankmg   General 

Anderson  for  the 

"amicable  sentiments  which  the  natives  of  these    islands 

inspire  in  the  Great  North  American  nation," ' 

and  also  for  his  desire  to  have  friendly  relations  with 
the  Filipinos  and  treat  them  with  justice,  courtesy  and 
kindness.  There  is,  however,  not  a  word  relative  to 
cooperation  in  his  reply,  and  Anderson  apparently  never 
renewed  his  request  for  cooperation  in  military  operations. 
On  July  6  he  wrote  to  Aguinaldo  again,  saying :  — 

"I  am  encouraged  by  the  friendly  sentiment  expressed  by 
Your  Excellency  m  your  welcome  letter  received  on  the  6th 
instant,  to  eiide&vour  to  come  to  a  definite  imderstimding,  which 
I  hope  will  be  advantageous  to  both.  Very  soon  we  expect 
large  additional  land  forces,  and  it  must  be  apparent  to  you  as 
a  military  officer  that  we  wiU  require  much  more  room  to  camp 
our  soldiers  and  also  store  room  for  our  supplies.  For  this  I 
would  like  to  have  Your  Excellency's  advice  and  cooperation, 
as  you  ar«  best  acquainted  with  the  resources  of  the  country," ' 

To  this  letter  there  was  no  reply.  However,  in  a  letter 
dated  July  9, 1898,  to  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  United 
States  Army,  General  Anderson  says  of  Aguinaldo :  — 

"When  we  first  landed  he  seemed  very  suspicious,  and  not 
at  all  friendly,  but  I  have  now  come  to  a  better  understanding 
with  him  and  he  is  much  more  friendly  and  seems  willing  to 
cooperate.  But  he  has  declared  himself  Dictator  and  Presi- 
dent, and  is  trying  to  take  Manila  without  our  assistance. 
This  is  not  probable,  but  if  he  can  effect  his  purpose  he  will, 
I  apprehend,  antagonize  any  attempt  on  our  part  to  estabtisb 
a  provisional  government."  * 

Evidently,  however,  codperation,  even  in  the  matter 
of  getting  necessary  transportation,  did  not  materialize, 
for  on  July  17  S.  R.  Jones,  Chief  Quartermaster,  wrote 
Aguinaldo  as  follows :  — 

"We  will  want  horses,  buffaloes,  carts,  etc.,  for  transporter 
tion,  bamboo  for  shelter,  wood  to  cook  with,  etc.    For  aU  this 

'  P.  I.  R.,  102-10. 





we  are  willing  to  pay  a  ftur  price,  but  no  more.  We  find  bo 
far  that  the  native  population  are  not  willing  to  give  us  this 
assdstance  as  promptly  as  required.  But  we  must  have  it,  and 
if  it  becomes  necessary  we  will  be  compelled  to  send  out  parties 
to  seize  what  we  may  need.  We  would  regret  very  much  to  do 
this,  as  we  are  here  to  befriend  the  Fihpinos.  Our  nation  has 
spent  miUions  in  money  to  send  forces  here  to  expel  the  Span* 
iards  and  to  give  good  government  to  the  whole  people,  and  tbe 
return  we  are  aelang  is  comparatively  slight. 

"General  Anderson  wishes  you  to  inform  your  people  that 
we  are  here  for  their  good,  and  that  they  must  supply  us  with 
labor  and  material  at  the  current  market  pricee.  We  are  pre- 
pared to  purchase  five  hundred  horses  at  a  fair  price,  but  cannot 
undertake  to  bai^ain  for  horsee  with  each  individual  owner." 

Aguinaldo  sent  this  letter  by  a  sta£F  ofBcer  to  Generfd 
Anderson  inquiring  whether  it  was  sent  by  authority  of 
the  latter,  who  then  indorsed  on  it  in  a  statement  that 
it  was.  Nevertheless,  Major  Jones  reported  on  July 
20  that  it  was  impossible  to  secure  transportation  ex- 
cept upon  Aguinaldo's  order  and  that  the  natives  had 
removed  their  cart  wheels  and  hidden  them,  from  which 
it  is  to  be  inferred  that'  the  transportation  requested 
had  not  been  furnished. 

Obviously  General  Anderson  was  informed  that  Agui- 
naldo had  given  orders  a^inst  furnishing  the  transporta- 
tion desired,  for  on  July  21  he  wrote  the  Adjutant- 
General  of  the  Army  as  follows :  — 

"Since  I  wrote  last,  Aguinaldo  has  put  in  operation  aa 
elaborate  system  of  miUtary  government,  under  his  assumed 
authority  as  Dictator,  and  has  prohibited  any  supplies  being 
given  us,  except  by  bia  order.  As  to  this  last,  I  have  written 
to  him  that  our  requisitions  on  the  country  for  horses,  ox  carts, 
fuel,  and  bamboo  (to  make  scaling  ladders)  must  be  filled,  and 
that  he  must  aid  in  having  them  filled." 

On  July  23  General  Anderson  wrote  Aguinaldo  as 
follows: — 

"Gbnebai.  :  When  I  came  here  three  weeks  ago  I  requested 
Your  Excellency  to  give  what  assistance  you  could  to  procure 



troops  in  places  conquered  by  the  Filipinos  from  the 
Spaniards  without  first  communicating  in  writing  the 
plac^  to  be  occupied  and  the  object  of  the  occupation.' 
Aguinaldo's  assumption  of  civil  authority  on  July  15, 
1899,  did  not  pass  unnoticed.  On  July  21  General 
Anderson  wrote  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  army  con- 
cerning it :  — 

"His  assumptioa  of  civil  authority  I  have  ignored,  and  let 
him  know  verbally  that  I  could,  and  would,  not  recognize  it, 
while  I  did  not  recognize  him  as  a  military  leader.  It  may  seem 
strange  that  I  have  made  no  formal  protest  against  his  proclama- 
tion as  Dictator,  his  declaration  of  martial  law,  and  pubUcation 
and  execution  of  a  despotic  form  of  government.  I  wrote 
such  a  protest,  but  did  not  publish  it,  at  Admiral  Dewey's 
request,  and  also  for  fear  of  wounding  the  susceptibilities  of 
Mftjor-General  Merritt,  but  I  have  let  it  be  known  in  every 
other  way  that  we  do  not  recognize  the  Dictatorship.  These 
people  only  respect  force  and  firmness.  I  submit,  with  all 
deference,  that  we  have  heretofore  underrated  the  natives. 
They  are  not  ignorant,  savage  tribes,  but  have  a  civilization 
of  their  own;  and  although  insignificant  in  appearance,  are 
fierce  fighters,  and  for  a  tropical  people  they  are  industnous. 
A  small  detail  of  natives  will  do  more  work  la  a  given  time  than 
a  regiment  of  volunteers." 

'  "Debtor  to  the  generosit?  of  the  North  Amerioans,  and  to  the 
favors  we  have  received  throi^h  Admiral  Dewey  and  (beins)  more  de- 
drouB  than  any  other  person  of  preventing  any  oonfliot  which  would 
have  as  a  residt  foreign  intervention,  which  mtist  be  extremely  pre- 
judicial, not  alone  to  my  nation,  but  also  to  that  of  Your  Exoellenoy, 
1  consider  it  my  duty  to  advise  you  of  the  undesirability  of  disembark- 
ing North  Amerioan  troops  in  the  places  conquered  by  the  PUipinos 
from  the  Spanish,  without  previous  notice  to  this  government,  because 
as  no  formal  agreement  yet  exists  between  the  two  nations  the  Philip- 
pine people  might  oonsider  the  occupation  of  its  territories  by  NorUi 
American  troops  as  a  violation  of  its  rights. 

"I  comprehend  thatwithout  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  squadron 
the  Philippine  revolution  would  not  have  advanced  so  rapidily.  Be- 
cause of  this  T  take  the  liberty  of  indicating  to  Your  Excellency  the 
necessity  that  before  disembarking,  you  should  communicate  in  writ- 
ing to  this  government  the  places  that  are  to  be  occupied  and  also  the 
object  of  the  occupation,  that  the  people  may  be  advised  in  due  tiam 
and  (thus)  prevent  the  commission  of  any  transgression  against  IrioD^ 
ship."  — P.  I.  R.,  Books  C-1.      . 



Because  he  was  invited  as  general  rather  than  as 
president,  Aguinaldo  refused  to  attend  a  parade  and 
review  on  the  4th  of  July.  This  fact  is,  in  itself,  an  answer 
to  his  claim  that  the  AJnericans  were  tacitly  recognizing 
his  pretensions. 

After  referring  to  this  incident,  Blount  says :  — 

"On  subeequeDt  anniversaries  of  the  day  in  the  Philippines 
it  was  deemed  wise  simply  to  prohibit  the  reading  of  our  dedara- 
tion  before  gatherings  of  the  Illipino  people.    It  saved  dis- 

Tbis  statement  is  incorrect.  I  myself  was  present  the 
following  year  when  the  declaration  was  r^id  on  the 
Luneta  to  a  considerable  gathering  of  Filipinos  among 
whom  were  many  school  children,  and  it  has  often  been 
read  since. 

The  landing  of  American  troops  at  Parahaque  and  their 
going  into  camp  near  that  town  on  July  15  caused  much 
excitement,  and  a  lively  interchange  of  telegrams  between 
Insurgent  officers  followed.* 

They  were  suspicious  of  the  intentions  of  the  Americans,* 
and  trouble  soon  began. 

On  July  16  Greneral  Noriel  telegraphed  Aguinaldo  as 
follows ;  — 

1  BloDst,  p.  59. 

*  On  July  15  Oener&l  Koii«l  telegraphed  Affuiiuldo  u  follows :  — 
"Ui^nt.  Reoeived  a  telegram  from  the  oaptain  adjutant,  who  is 
in  Pai-afiaque,  of  the  following  tenor:  'I  inform  your  eircellenoy  that 
two  casooe  of  armed  Amraicans  have  arrived  at  this  point.  I  await 
orders  from  Your  B^ccellency.*  Which  I  hasten  to  oommunioate  to 
Your  Excellency  for  the  proper  aotioa."  —  P.  I.  R,,  849. 

Later  on  the  same  day  Arevalo  telegraphed  Aguinaldo  as  follows :  — 
"Lieutenant-Colouel  Dubooe  with  three  hundred  men  waiting  for 
more troope from Cavite, and  alaoorders, butnottoattaok."  —  P.I.  R., 

'Captain  Torres  tel^rapfaed  Aguinaldo  on  July  15  as  follows:  — 

"I  have  read  all  your  telegrams  and  carried  out  the  same,  and  I 

tneidentally  questioned   them  about    their  purposes,  [they]  replying 

tiiat  they  will  aid ;  let  time  demonstrate  it.     They  bJbo  intend  to  en- 

oamp  over  here  at  Paraliaque.     I  will  report  to  you  any  oocuj 

—  P.  I.  R., 



"An  American  has  come  here  who  aays  that  he  u  a  Colonel 
of  the  Anny  whom  we  should  obey ;  and  that  it  Lb  your  denie. 
We  did  not  listen  to  him,  awaiting  yom-  order." 

On  the  back  of  the  tdegram  is  written  the  following : — 

"Reply.  —  You  should  not  obey.  What  this  American 
Colonel  says  is  a  lie.  Be  cautious  so  as  not  to  be  deceived. 
You  should  require  from  him  proof.  Be  always  vigilant,  but 
upright,  also  all  of  the  officers  and  soldiers  must  be  strict  and 
not  timid." ' 

Obviously  there  was  no  real  cooperation  between  Ameri- 
can and  Filipino  troops  at  this  time.  General  Anderson 
ignored  General  Aguinaldo's  request  for  information  as 
to  places  where  American  troops  were  to  land  in  Filipino 
territory  and  the  objects  of  disembarking  them. 

The  Americans  proceeded  with  their  plans  for  the  attack 
upon  Manila,  and  it  became  desirable  to  occupy  some 
of  the  Insurgent  trenches.  On  July  29  Ar^valo  tele- 
graphed A^naldo  as  follows :  — 

"In  conference  with  General  Greene  I  aeked  for  an  official 
letter,  a  copy  of  which  I  send  you :  'Headquarters  2nd  Brigade, 
U.  S.  Expeditionary  Forces,  Camp  Dewey,  near  Manila,  July 
29th,  1898.  El  SeSor  Nokiel,  Gbnseai.  de  Bbioadg.  Sir : 
In  pursuance  of  our  conversation  of  yesterday  and  the  message 
which  Captain  Ar^valo  brought  to  me  during  the  night,  I  beg 
to  inform  you  that  my  troops  will  occupy  the  intrenchments 
between  the  Camino  Heal  and  the  beach,  leaving  camp  for  that 
purpose  at  8.00  o'clock  this  mommg.  I  will  be  obliged  if  you 
will  give  the  necessary  orders  for  the  withdrawal  of  your  men. 
Thanking  you  for  your  courtesy,  I  remain,  very  re^ectfully, 
your  obedient  servant,  F.  V.  Greene,  Briqaj)ikb  GenesaXi, 
comnumding.' "  * 

This  clear  direct  declaration  of  intention  by  General 
Greene  is  the  actual  transaction  referred  to  by  Blount  as 
"Jockeying  the  Insurgents  out  of  their  trenches."  He 
bases  his  statements  concerning  the  matter  on  a  news- 
paper report. 



The  attitude  of  the  anny  officers  in  the  matter  of 
obtaining  pennission  to  occupy  the  trenches  needed  in 
preparing  for  the  assault  on  the  city  could  not  hare  been 
more  coirect. 

On  August  10  General  Merritt  gave  the  following 
emphatic  instmctionB  relative  to  the  matter :  — 

"No  rupture  with  Insurgents.  Tbis  is  imperative.  Can 
ask  Influrgent  generals  or  Aguinaldo  for  permiBsitm  to  occupy 
their  trenches,  but  if  refused  not  to  use  force." 

On  the  same  day  GenerM  Anderson  wrote  to  Aguinaldo, 
asking  pennission  to  occupy  a  trench  facing  blockhouse 
No.  14,  in  order  to  place  artillery  to  destroy  it.  The 
permission  was  granted  on  the  following  day. 

During  the  early  part  of  August,  Aguinaldo  seems  to 
have  avoided  conferences  with  American  officers.  On 
the  second  of  the  month  Mablni  wrote  him  how  he  had 
put  off  Admiral  Dewey's  aid  with  a  false  statement  that 
he  did  not  know  Aguinaldo's  whereabouts.' 

The  landing  of  American  troops  at  Parafiaque  for  the 
assault  on  Manila  led  to  the  concentration  of  Insurgent 
troops  at  the  neighbouring  town  of  Bacoor.' 

On  August  S  Fernando  Acevedo '  wrote  to  General  PIo 

^"Admiral  Dewey'i  Aide  was  here  to-dA^.  I  told  him  I  was 
igoonnt  of  jour  whereabouts  and,  if  he  had  no  objection,  he  might 
talk  with  me  as  I  am  your  representative ;  but  he  said  that  he  could 
not  do  so,  as  he  had  orders  to  apeak  with  you  peteonally,  about  some- 
thing  very  important.     He  then  departed."  —  P.  I.  R.,  1179.  5. 

*  The  following  telegram  was  Euldreased  to  the  President  or  the 
Seeretary  of  War  by  Sulpicio  at  Baooor,  on  August  8,  1898 :  — 

"  Last  night  I  received  a  telegram  from  General  Noriel,  asking  for 
100  oavanes  of  riae  which  he  needs  immediately,  sinoe  he  has  ordered 
to  aend  him  all  the  troope  here  on  account  of  the  landing  of  Americans 
in  Parafiaque.  Oeneral  Maeoardo  will  send  him  the  troops  whiah 
are  here.  There  are  56  bundles  [of  rioe.  —  Tb.)  deposited  in  this 
storehouse."— P.  I.  R.,  1179.  5. 

*  This  man's  reoord  is  not  laiown  to  me.  Apparently  he  was  an 
oKeee  is  the  Spanish  army,  for  he  is  later  reported  aa  surrendenng 
to  the  Insurgents  at  Santa  Ana  oa  August  13,  1898.  See  footnote 
4.  p.  104. 



del  Pilar  that  the  Americans  were  going  to  attack  the  next 
day  and  that,  — 

"It  is  requisite  and  necessary  before  their  attack  takes  place 
to-morrow,  that  you  to-morrow  or  to-night  amiihiiate  them, 
sparing  none,  for  the  way  they  have  deceived  us,  and  will  again 
without  faU,  in  the  contract  signed  by  Sr.  Emilio ;  and  con- 
vince yoiuTself,  my  friend,  that  it  is  necessary  to  do  this ;  and 
when  it  is  done  the  whole  world  will  wonder  and  say  that  we 
have  done  well,  and  will  not  be  able  to  give  out  that  the  people 
here  are  fools  spending  the  time  sucking  their  fingers."  ^ 

Worse  yet,  information  was  sent  to  the  Spaniards  of 
the  proposed  American  attack  on  the  13th  instant,  aa  is 
shown  by  the  followii^  letter: — 

"(Battalion    of    Cazadores,    No.    2.     Expeditionary. 
Office  of  the  Lieutenant-Colonel.    Private.) 
"  SbSor  Don  AKTBano  Ricabtk  :  * 

"  Mt  Deab  Sib  :  I  have  received  to-day  your  kind  letter 
givii^  warning  of  the  attack  on  ManUa,  and  I  thank  you  for 
your  personal  interest  in  me,  which,  on  my  part,  I  reciprocate. 
I  fissure  you  that  I  am  yours,  most  truly  and  sincerely, 

"Luis  MAammz  Alcobbndas. 
"SiNGALON,  August  10,  1898."  * 

According  to  Taylor,  this  was  not  the  first  occturence 
of  this  sort.    He  says :  — 

"The  officers  of  the  United  States  Anny  who  believed  that 
the  insurgents  were  informing  the  Spaniards  of  the  American 
movements  were  right.  Sastrfin  has  printed  a  letter  from  Pfo 
del  Pilar,  dated  July  30,  to  t^e  Spanish  officer  commanding 
at  Santa  Ana,  in  which  Filar  swd  that  Aguinaldo  had  told  him 
that  the  Americans  would  attack  the  Spanish  lines  on  August  2 
and  advised  that  the  Spaniards  should  not  give  way,  but  hold 
their  positions.  Pilar  added,  however,  that  if  the  Spaniards 
should  fall  back  on  the  walled  city  and  surrender  Santa  Ana  to 
himself,  he  would  hold  it  with  his  own  men.  Aguinaldo's 
information  was  correct,  and  on  August  2  eight  American  sol- 
diers were  killed  or  wounded  by  the  Spanish  fire."  • 

'  Taylor,  33  AJ.  >  Artomio  Rjoarte  waa  one  ot  the  rankiDK  In- 

Bui^ent  generaJs  directing  operations  againHt  Manila. 
*  P.  I.  R.,  1087.  6.  *  Taylor,  30  AJ. 










Taylor  continues :  — 

"And  yet  Aguinaldo  claimed  to  be  an  ally  of  the  Americans. 
It  is  not  probable  that  these  were  the  oidy  two  such  letters 
written.  Aguinaldo  had  by  this  time  found  out  that  Although 
be  could  defeat  the  ecattered  Spanish  detachments,  he  could 
not  defeat  the  Spanish  force  holding  the  lines  of  Manila,  He 
did  not  want  the  Americans  in  the  Philippines.  They  were  in 
his  way,  and  he  had  already  made  up  his  mind  that  if  they  did 
not  give  him  what  he  wanted,  he  would  drive  them  out  by  force. 
He  Baw  very  early  that  it  was  extremely  improbable  that  he 
should  obtain  from  them  what  he  wanted;  accordingly  all 
losses  both  among  Spaniards  and  Americana  would,  from 
Aguinaldo's  point  of  view,  mure  to  his  benefit.  The  beet 
posutde  thing  for  him  would  be  to  hold  his  own  force  intact 
while  they  wore  each  other  out.  The  Spanish  losses,  small  as 
they  were,  occurred  in  front  of  the  American  lines,  not  in  front 
of  the  lillipinoB.  There  is  no  reason,  accordingly,  for  believing 
that  the  fllipinoe  aulfered  heavily.  To  arrange  that  the  Span- 
iards should  inflict  losses  upon  the  Americans,  while  he  saved 
his  own  men,  showed  ingenuity  on  the  part  of  Agiunaldo ;  but 
it  was  decidedly  not  the  conduct  of  an  ally."  ' 

The  feeling  toward  the  American  troops  at  this  time  is 
further  shown  by  a  telegram  from  General  Pio  del  I^lar, 
sent  from  San  Pedro  Macati  on  August  10, 1898 :  — 

"  Commandant  Acebedo  writes  that  the  Spaniards  are  about 
to  surrender  because  they  want  to  turn  over  the  place;  the 
Americans  want  them  to  leave  only  the  batteries  and  aay  that 
they  will  station  themselves  in  said  batteries.  It  appears  that 
they  want  to  deceive  us ;  they  do  not  want  to  give  us  arms,  and 
if  they  do  not  give  us  arms,  we  shall  attack  them  and  drive  them 
out.     I  await  your  reply."  * 

TUa  is  perhaps  not  quite  the  kind  of  cooperation  that 
Admiral  Dewey  and  Grenerals  Anderson  and  Menitt  had 

The  truth  is  that  the  Insurgents  were  determined  to 
capture  Manila  for  themselves,  not  only  because  of  the 
"war  booty,"  for  which  they  were  hungry,  but  because 
of  the  status  which  they  felt  that  the  taking  of  the  capital 

>  Tt^or,  30  AJ.  "P.I.B.. 

TOI-.  1  — H 



of  the  Philippines  would  assure  them.    The  great  im- 
portance which  they  attached  to  this  plan  is  shown  in 
communications  written    by  AgonciUo,   A^uinaldo  and 
Of  conditions  at  this  time,  Taylor  says :  — 

"On  July  7,  Aguin&Ido  appointed  Artemio  Riearte  and 
Pantalefin  Garcfa  to  negotiate  the  surrender  of  Manila  by  the 
Spaniards  to  him  (Exhibit  155).  On  July  5  Pantale6n  Garcfa 
was  planning  to  enter  Manila  by  way  of  Tondo  or  of  Santa 
Cruz  (P.  I.  R.,  243.  7).  On  the  9th  Aguinaldo  ordered  that  rice 
should  be  gathered  from  the  towns  of  Manila  Province  for  the 
use  of  his  troops  in  the  decisive  attack  upon  Manila  which  he 
intended  making  in  a  few  days  (P.  I.  R.,  1087.  5). 

"Aguinaldo,  finding  that  his  chance  of  obtuning  Manila  for 
himself  was  growing  steadily  less,  now  determined  to  force 
himself  into  the  city  with  the  Americans  and  demand  a  con- 
sideration for  the  assistance  he  bad  rendered  them  during  the 
siege.  It  is  true  he  had  assisted  them,  but  his  assistance  had 
not  been  intentional.  It  was  the  result  of  the  operations  he 
was  carryine  on  for  bis  own  ends.  The  operations  of  the 
Filipinos  and  the  Americans  were  against  Spain  as  a  common 
enemy  of  both ;  but  the  operations  were  not  joint  operations, 
and  ^though  their  purpose  was  a  common  purpose,  it  was  not 
a  mutual  one.    On  August  8  Aguinaldo  appointed  General 

'  On  August  2,  1899,  Agonoillo  wrote  Mabini :  — 

"  I  send  Don  Emilio  the  infomuttion  I  have  been  able  to  obtain 
here,  in  order  that  in  view  thereof  you  [plural]  may  oonsidsr  the  best 
solution  of  our  present  political  problem,  which  u  an  exceptional  owe 
in  history.  In  my  opinion,  the  moat  critioal  moment,  which  I  oaJl 
agoDizing,  whether  oorreetty  or  not  I  know  not,  is  the  capture  of  Manila, 
where  General  Merritt  will  constitute  a  provisional  govemmeut,  in 
compliance  with  the  instructions  troja  his  Qovemment.  It  is  un- 
necessary to  recommend  that  you  observe  great  tact,  great  prudence, 
when  this  event  occurs.  Ascertain  the  real  wishes  of  the  people  in 
this  eonfflct  and  the  war  resources  at  our  disposal  and  those  which 
you  may  count  on  during  the  struggle  until  its  termination." 

—  P.  I.  R.,  451.  3. 

In  his  document  entitled  "Means  for  Attaining  Filipino  Independ- 
ence" Aguinaldo  had  written : — 

"VIII.  Exterior  attack.  Above  everything  the  Revolutiomsts 
must  oceupy  ail  Manila  including  the  Walled  City  with  the  object 
and  purpose  that  the  nation  possessing  the  Philippines  according  to 
the  decision  of  the  Powers  will  be  forced  to  come  to  an  understanding 
with  the  Filipinos  to  avoid  the  shedding  of  blood." — P.  I.  B.,  457. 5. 



Ricarte  conimanijer  in  the  operationa  about  Manila,  ordered 
hJTn  to  respect  the  property  oi  all  foreigners,  and  told  him  that 
in  case  hia  troope  succeeded  in  entering  Manila  they  were  to 
carry  their  fiag  and  plant  it  there  (P.  I.  R.,  703.  2).  Judging 
from  an  unsigned  draft  of  a  letter,  he  must  have  warned  the 
for^gn  consuls  in  Manila  about  the  same  time  to  gather  under 
the  protection  of  their  Sags  all  of  their  fellow-citizens  who  had 
not  taken  refuge  on  the  vessels  in  the  bay,  so  that  when  his 
troops  entered  the  city  no  foreign  lives  would  be  taken,  and  no 
foreign  property  would  be  injured.  The  earnestness  with 
which  he  urged  that  all  foreigners  not  Spaniards  should  take 
steps  to  identify  themselves  and  their  property  shows  that  he 
considered  the  persons  and  property  of  Spanish  civilians  aa 
fair  booty  of  war."  ' 

There  waa  certainly  no  need  of  Insurgent  assistance  in 
the  assault  on  Manila. 

The  reports  which  reached  Aguinaldo  that  the  surrender 
of  Manila  had  been  ^reed  upon  in  advance  were  correct, 
as  is  shown  by  the  following  testimony  of  Admiral  Dewey : 

"SenaioT  Paiterson.  When  did  you  reach  an  understandmg 
with  the  Spanish  commander  upon  the  subject,*  —  how  long 
before  the  12th  or  13th  of  August  ? 

"Admiral  Deteq/.     Several  days  before. 

"SemOor  Patterson.  To  whom  did  you  communicate  the 
arrangement  that  you  had  7 

"Admiral  Dewey.  General  Merritt  and,  of  course,  all  of 
my  own  captains  —  General  Merritt,  and  I  think  a  council  of 
officers  on  board  of  one  of  the  steamers.  I  think  there  were 
several  army  officers  present  when  I  told  the  General  that; 
and  I  may  say  here  that  I  do  not  think  General  Merritt  took 
much  stock  m  it. 

"Senator  Patterson.  What  statement  did  you  make  to 
them,  Admiral,  in  substance  7 

"Admiral  Dewey.  That  the  Spaniards  were  ready  to  sur- 
render, but  before  doing  so  I  must  engage  one  of  the  outlying 
forts.  I  selected  one  at  Malate,  away  from  the  city,*  They 
said  I  must  engage  that  and  fire  for  a  while,  and  then  I  was  to 
make  a  signal  by  the  international  code,  'Do  you  surrender?' 
Then  they  were  to  hoist  a  wliite  flag  at  a  certain  bastion ;  and 



I  may  say  now  that  I  was  the  first  one  to  discover  the  white 
flag.  We  had  50  people  looking  for  that  white  flag,  but  I 
happened  to  be  the  first  one  who  saw  it.  I  fired  for  a  while, 
and  then  made  the  signal  according  to  the  programme.  We 
could  not  see  the  white  flag  —  it  was  rather  a  thick  day  —  but 
finally  I  discovered  it  on  the  south  bastion ;  I  don't  know 
how  long  it  bad  been  flying  there  when  I  first  saw  it."  ' 

On  August  12,  the  day  before  Manila  surrendered, 
Buencamino  telegraphed  Aguinaldo,  urging  him  in  the 
strongest  terms  to  attack  that  night  so  that  Americans 
might  be  obUged  to  ask  him  to  stop,  with  the  result  that 
the  Insurgents  would  be  included  in  the  ofl5cial  negotia- 
tions. He  further  advised  Aguinaldo  that  he  must  not 
suspend  bis  attack  because  the  Americans  suspended 

General  Anderson  tells  us  that,  on  the  evening  of  August 
12,  he  received  an  order  from  General  Merritt  to  notify 
Aguinaldo  to  forbid  the  Insurgents  under  his  command 
from  entering  Manila.  This  notification  was  delivered 
to  Aguinaldo  that  night,  and  was  received  by  him  with 

On  the  following  morning  the  Insurgents  actually  made 
an  independent  attack  of  their  own,  as  planned.*    It 

>  Senate  Doouments,  Vol.  25,  p.  2943. 

>  "I  must  tell  you  that  I  feel  aa  you  should  feel  in  regard  to  our 
government  not  havii^  officially  partieipated  in  the  oapitnlation  of 
Manila.  Aoeordingly  the  war  must  be  oontinued  with  Spain,  because, 
if  we  attack  to-night,  the  Amerioans,  acting  upon  the  requeat  of  the 
Spaniards  and  foreigaera  in  addition  to  those  who  toolc  part  in  the 
capitulation,  will  have  to  ask  us  to  suspend  operations ;  henoe  we  shall 
be  included  in  the  negotiations  and  this  will  work  to  our  advantage. 

"To-night  at  2  a.m.  you  will  attack  without  fail  in  order  that  we 
may  be  included  in  the  capitulation  which  the  Americans  made  to-day. 
You  must  not  stop  the  attacks  because  they  do,  and  this  is  also  the 
opinion  of  our  partisans  among  the  foreigners." 

—  P.  I.  R.,  1179.  5*427.5. 

*  "Our  Rule  in  the  Philippines,"  The  North  Ameriean  Review,  1600, 
No.  170. 

'  General  Ricarte  to  Aguinaldo,  Ai^uat  12,  1898,  11.15  p.h.  : 

"Have  received  the  telegram  from  your  honourable  person  regard- 
ing attack  at  four  o'clock  in  the  morning,  ^though  we  will  make  the 



promptly  led  to  trouble  with  the  Americans,  and  at  8  a.u. 
Aguinaldo  received  a  telegram  from  General  Anderson 
sternly  warning  him  not  to  let  his  troops  enter  Manila 
without  the  consent  of  the  American  commander  on  the 
south  side  of  the  Pasig  River.' 

Aguinaldo  apparently  took  no  action  in  response  to 
this  request,  except  to  direct  General  Riego  de  Dios,  who 
was  at  Cavite,  to  go  with  Buencamino  without  losing  a 
moment  and  ask  for  an  explanation,  in  writing  if  possible.* 

At  10.50  A.M.  he  telegraphed  General  Anderson  saying 
that  his  troops  were  being  forced,  by  threats  of  violence, 
to  retire  from  positions  which  they  had  taken,  and  asking 
Anderson  to  order  his  troops  to  avoid  difficulty  with  the 
Insurgent  forces.  Aguinaldo  said  that  he  had  directed 
his  men  to  aid  the  American  forces  if  the  latter  are  attacked 
by  a  common  enemy,  but  was  discreetly  silent  on  the  sub- 
ject of  their  entering  Manila.' 

attfwk  tuiywa7.  1  have  directed  Qen.  Pfo  Del  Pil&r  begin  flring 
ctumoii  At  the  hour  set.  At  the  present  time  we  are  making  prepara- 
tiaun  and  will  also  give  orders  to  the  ofaiefa  of  the  eolumns." 

—  P.  I.  R.,  849. 

i"Auput  13,  1898. 
"Dated.    Camp  Dewey  13.    To  Oeneral  Aguinaldo.    Conunanding 
Phibppiae  Forces,  Bacoor :  Do  not  let  jour  troops  enter  Manila  with- 
out the  permiBsioQ  of  the  American  commander  on  this  side  of  Pasig 
river.     You  will  be  under  our  fire. 

"  Anderson,  Brig.  Qeneral." 
—  P.I.  B.,  102-10. 

'  "Cop; :  Qen.  Riego,  Cavite :  Have  just  received  a  note  from  Oan. 
Anderson  saying  to  me  he  does  not  permit  my  troops  to  ester  Manila 
without  permission  from  the  American  commander  on  this  side  of  the 
Pssig  River.  They  will  be  under  his  Are.  Oo  with  Sofior  Buenoamioo 
and  ask  for  an  explanation,  in  writing  if  possible,  as  to  the  motive  for 
■aid  note,  without  losing  a  moment.     August  13,  '98.     E.  A." 

—  P.  I.  B.,849. 

'  "I  received  a  telegram.  My  interpreter  is  in  Cavite.  In  oons^ 
quence  of  this  1  have  not  answered  until  now.  My  troops  are  foreed 
by  yours,  by  means  of  threats  of  violence,  to  retire  from  positions  taken. 
It  is  necessary  to  avoid  conflict,  which  I  should  lament,  that  you  order 
your  troops  that  they  avoid  difficulty  with  mine,  as  until  now  they 
have  ooDducted  themsdves  aa  brothers  to  take  Manila.     I  have  given 



Fifteen  minutes  later,  at  11.05,  he  received  a  reply  to 
his  telegram  to  General  Riego  de  Dios,  in  which  that 
officer  commnnicated  the  views  of  Araneta  ^  and  Buenca- 
mino,  who  had  been  unable  to  find  General  Anderson. 
This  important  communication  follows :  — 

"Most  urgent.  Araneta  and  Buencamino  having  been 
consulted  in  regard  to  your  telegram  of  to-day,  they  confirm 
capitulation,  and  in  regard  to  the  telegraphic  note  of  General 
Anderson  they  are  of  the  opinion,  first  that  we  should  con- 
tinue hostilities  while  we  ask  for  an  explanation ;  second,  that 
explanation  should  be  in  the  following  terms :  Inquire  reason 
for  note  and  ask  why  our  troops  are  not  to  enter  Manila  with- 
out permission  of  the  American  commander ;  third,  in  case  the 
(terms  of  ?)  capitulation  is  given  as  the  reason,  to  answer  that 
we  do  not  suspend  our  attempt  to  enter  Manila.  Its  capitula- 
tion is  not  favourable  to  our  independence.  General  Anderson 
is  not  here.  General  Merritt  is  probably  in  Manila.  Only 
Admiral  Dewey  is  in  the  Bay.  We  ask  authorization  to  ex- 
press our  explanation  in  the  proposed  terms  and  to  have  a 
conference  with  Admiral  Dewey  in  order  to  have  our  clums 
reach  General  Merritt."  * 

An  indorsement  written  by  Mabini  and  signed  by 
Aguinaldo  on  the  above  paper  reads :  — 

"I  authorize  every  assertion  of  right,  but  state  that  we 
believe  that  we  have  the  right  to  enter  Manila  without  per- 
mission as  we  have  a  part  in  the  surrender  of  the  Spaniaida. 
They  would  not  have  surrendered  if  our  troops  had  not  cut 
off  their  retreat  to  the  interior.  Besides  but  for  us  the  landing 
of  troops  would  have  cost  them  much  blood.  Obtwn  an  answer 
as  soon  as  possible  in  order  to  lay  a  protest  before  the  consuls 
in  case  it  is  necessary."  » 

■  Oregorio  Araneta,  later  a  member  of  the  Philippine  Commisaioa 
and  Secretary  of  Finance  and  Juatioe.  He  waa  Seoretar;  of  Juatioe 
under  the  Maloloa  government,  and  waa  alao  aecretuy  of  the  Insur- 
gent Congraas.  He  wu  at  this  time  a  bright  young  lawyer  of  good 
ability  and  oharaoter. 

»  P.  I.  B.,  849.  '  Ibid. 



Naturally,  trouble  followed.  At  1.30  P.M.  General 
Bicarte  telegraphed  to  Aguinaldo :  — 

"Americans  wish  to  put  us  out.    Give  directions."  * 

Apparently  about  the  same  hour  he  wired  more  at 
lei^h,  as  follows :  -~ 

"Most  urgent.  American  troops  rearguard  our  trenches. 
Mabolo  and  San  Josd  warn  us  that  they  will  fire  on  us  when  the 
time  comes.  Impossible  to  rem^n  there  without  disagreeing 
with  them.  Since  5  o'clock  this  morning  we  have  been  furiously 
attacking.  Americans  firing  incessantly,  Spanifuds  silent. 
No  losses  yet."  * 

At  3.52  he  wired  again :  — 

"General  Pfo  del  Pilar  informs  me  of  the  following :  'Come 
here,  if  possible,  as  our  soldiers  at  the  barrio  of  Ckiucepci6n 
are  not  sJlowed  to  go  out  and  we  are  prohibited  to  move  on  any 
farther.  We  it  was  who  succeeded  m  capturing  that  place. 
Come  here  or  there  will  be  trouble,  since  they  are  driving  me 
away,  and  refusing  to  listen  to  what  I  say.'  I  un  at  this  very 
moment  going  to  aforesaid  place."  * 

At  5  P.U.  another  was  sent  by  Bicarte  to  Aguinaldo  as 
follows :  — 

"Colonel  San  Miguel  arrived  here  from  Ermita.  Regional 
Exposition,  Agricultural  College  and  other  buildings  are  ours. 
Our  flag  flies  aheady  at  Ermita.  Colonel  Agapito  Dons6n 
with  his  troops  is  in  the  P^ez  building,  Paco.  Colonels  Julian 
Ocanipo  and  Imdoro  Tolentino  are  in  the  convent  of  Ermita. 
All  houses  without  flag  are  guarded  by  our  soldiers."  * 

At  6.15  P.M.  he  telegraphed  as  follows :  — 

"I  infonn  you  that  the  chiefs  of  our  troops  have  reported  to 
me  that  our  flag  at  Singalong  church  {visiia)  was  removed  by 
the  Americans  and  they  hoisted  theirs  instead,  not  allowing  us 
to  approach  thereto.  General  Pfo  del  Pilar  is  at  present  at  the 
barrio  of  Concepci6n.  Americans  prohibited  him  to  move  on 
any  farther.     How  can  he  enter  Manila?"* 

» Ibid.,  849. 



No  attention  was  paid  to  Gen^^  Anderson's  request 
that  the  Insui^nt  troops  should  not  enter  Manila  with- 
out permission.  They  crowded  forward  with  and  alter 
the  American  forces.  Coming  out  on  Bagumbayan  drive, 
they  found  American  and  Spanish  troops  confronting 
each  other  but  not  firing,  the  former  on  the  drive,  the 
latter  on  the  neighbouring  city  wall.  A  flag  of  truce  was 
waving  from  the  south  bastion,  nevertheless  the  Insur- 
gents fired  on  the  Spanish  forces,  provoking  a  retiim  fire 
which  killed  and  wounded  American  soldiers.  Of  this 
incident  General  Greene  has  said :  — 

"At  this  point  the  California  r^ment  a  short  time  before 
had  met  some  infiurgents  who  had  fired  at  the  Spaniards  on 
the  waits,  and  the  latter,  in  returning  the  fire,  had  caused  a 
loss  in  the  California  regiment  of  1  killed  and  2  wounded."  ' 

Some  of  these  matters  must  have  come  to  the  atten- 
tion of  General  Anderson,  for  he  sent  Aguinaldo  a  tele- 
gram, received  by  the  latter  at  6.36  p.m.,  as  follows :  — 

"Dated  Ermita  Headquarters  2nd  Division  13  to  Gen.  Agui- 
naldo. Commanding  Filipino  Forces. — Manila,  taken.  Serious 
trouble  threatened  between  our  forces.  Try  and  prevent  it. 
Your  troops  should  not  force  themselves  in  the  city  until  we 
have  received  the  full  surrender  then  we  will  n^otiate  with 

"  ANnsBSON,  commanding."  * 

It  appears  that  the  Insurgent  troops  took  the  suburb 
of  Santa  Ana,  and  captured  Spanish  and  Filipino  officers 
and  men.' 

>  Report  of  War  Dept.,  1898,  Vol.  I,  part  2,  p.  60. 

'  Taylor,  Exhibit  739. 

•  The  following  two  telegrams  were  sent  by  Qeneral  Pfo  del  Piter 
to  Aguinaldo  at  9.30  p.u. :  — 

"I  inform  you  that  the  Bayambang  troops  who  have  presented 
themeelvea  before  me  when  we  entered  Santa  Ana  thia  afternoon,  are : 
4  lieutenants,  171  soldiers  with  their  respective  rifles  and  ammunitions. 
Major  Fernando  Acevedo,  Captain  Lioerio  Qeronimo,  1  Spanish  lieu- 
tenant, and  1  prisoner  by  the  name  of  Enrique  Flores.  All  of  them 
I  put  under  your  orders.  "—P.  I.  R.,  1179.6. 



S  s 




In  view  of  the  known  facts,  how  absurd  becomes  the 
following    contention   of   Aguinaldo,    advanced   in   his 
L  Veridica"  :  — 

"Our  own  forces  could  see  the  American  forces  land  on  the 
beach  of  the  Luneta  and  of  the  Paseo  de  Santa  Lucfa.  The  Span- 
ish soldiers,  who  were  on  the  walls  of  the  city,  drew  the  atten- 
tion of  every  one  because  they  did  not  fire  on  the  former,  a  mys- 
tery which  was  explained  at  nightfall  of  that  day,  by  the  news 
of  the  capitulation  of  the  place  by  General  S^or  JAudenes ' 
to  the  Aiaerican  General,  Mr.  Menitt,  a  capitulation  which 
the  American  Generals  claimed  for  themselves,  an  infraction 
of  wliat  had  been  agreed  upon  with  Admiral  Dewey,  in  r^ard 
to  the  formation  of  plans  for  the  attack  and  taking  of  Manila 
by  the  two  armies,  American  and  Filipino,  together  and  in 

"This  inexplicable  Une  of  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  Ameri- 
can officers  was  made  clearer  by  the  tel^rams,  which  GenMtil 
Anderaon  addressed  to  me,  from  Maytubig  on  the  said  13th 
day,  requesting  that  I  should  order  our  troops  not  to  eater 
Maiula,  which  request  was  refused,  inasmuch  as  it  was  caa- 
trary  to  what  was  agreed  upon,  and  to  the  high  ends  of  the 
Revolutionary  Government,  which,  on  taking  upon  itself  the 
immense  work  of  besieging  Manila,  during  the  two  months  and 
a  half,  aacnficing  thousands  of  lives  and  millions  in  material 
interests,  could  not  surely  have  done  so  with  any  object  oth^ 
than  that  of  capturing  Manila  and  the  Spanish  garrison  which 
with  firmness  and  tenacity  defended  that  place."  * 

On  August  14  Agulnaldo  telegraphed  General  Ander- 
son as  follows :  — 

"My  troops,  who  have  been  for  so  long  besieging  Manila, 
have  always  been  promised  that  they  could  appear  in  it,  aa  you 
know  and  cannot  deny,  and  for  this  reason,  and  on  account  of 
the  many  sacrifices  made  of  money,  and  lives,  I  do  not  consider 
it  prudent  to  issue  orders  to  the  contrary,  as  they  might  be  dis- 
obeyed against  my  authority.  Besides,  I  hope  that  you  will 
allow  the  troops  to  enter  because  we  have  g^ven  proofs  many 

"Very  urgent.  I  inform  you  of  the  oapture  m&de  by  my  soldien : 
2  lieutenants  of  the  Marine  Corps,  2  lieutenants  of  tbe  Spanish  in- 
fantry, 62  soldiers.  Rifles  about  400.  I  put  them  under  yoiu  orders 
andawait  yourioBtmotionH."— P.  i.  R.,  1179.  5, 

'  The  Spanish  Govemor-GenenO.  '  P.  I.  R.,  1300.  2. 



times  of  our  friendship,  ceding  our  positioos  at  Parofiaque, 
Pasay,  Sing^on  and  Maytubig.  Nevertheless,  if  it  seems  beat 
to  you,  and  in  order  to  enter  into  a  frank  and  friendly  under- 
Standing  and  avoid  any  disagreeable  conSict  before  the  eyes  of 
the  Spaniards,  I  will  commission  Don  Felipe  Buencamino  and 
others,  who  will  to-day  go  out  from  our  lines  and  hold  a  confer- 
ence with  you,  and  that  they  will  be  safe  during  the  conference." ' 

Aguinaldo  and  his  associates  pressed  the  demand  for 
joint  occupation.  On  Ai^ust  13  Admiral  Dewey  and 
General  Merritt  informed  the  government  that  since 
the  occupation  of  Manila  and  its  suburbs  the  Insurants 
outdde  had  been  insisting  on  this,  and  asked  how  far 
they  might  proceed  in  enforcing  obedience  in  the 

They  were  informed  by  a  telegram  dated  August  17 
that  the  President  of  the  United  States  had  directed;  — 

"That  there  must  be  no  joint  occupation  with  the  Insur- 
gents. The  United  States  in  the  possession  of  Manila  city, 
Manila  bay  and  harbor  must  praaerve  the  peace  and  protect 
persons  and  property  within  the  territory  occupied  by  their 
mihtary  and  naval  forces.  The  insurgents  and  all  others 
must  recognize  the  mihtary  occupation  and  authority  of  the 
United  States  and  the  cessation  of  hostilities  proclaimed  by 
the  President.  Use  whatever  means  in  your  judgment  are 
necessary  to  this  end."  * 

This  left  the  militfuy  and  nav^  conmuuidera  no  option 
in  the  premises,  and  in  any  event  dual  occupatioD  was  out 
of  the  question  because  of  the  lawlessness  of  the  Insiui^nt 

At  this  very  time  they  were  looting  the  portions  of  the 
city  which  they  occupied,  and  as  is  abundantly  shown  by 
their  own  records  were  not  confining  their  attacks  to 
Spaniards,  but  were  assaulting  their  own  people  and  raid- 
ing the  property  of  foreigners  as  well.*  The  continuation 
of  such  a  condition  of  affairs  was  manifestly  impossible. 

The  Insuigents  promptly  demanded  their  share  In  the 

>  Taylor.  68  HJ.  ■  Ibid.,  69.  *  See  footnote  2,  p.  108. 



"war  booty,"  and  asked  certain  other  extraordinaiy  con- 
ceedons  as  follows ;  — 

"  (4)  Our  sacrifices  in  coSperatiog  in  the  siege  and  taking  of 
Manila  imng  well  known,  it  is  juat  that  we  should  share  in  the 
war  booty. 

"  (5)  We  demand  for  our  use  the  palace  of  Malacafiang  and 
the  Convents  of  Malate,  Ermita  and  Paco  or  San  Fernando  de 

"  (6)  We  demand  that  the  civil  offices  of  Manila  be  filled 
by  North  Americana  and  never  by  Spaniards ;  but  If  General 
Merritt  should  require  some  Filipinos  we  should  be  pleased  if 
he  will  grant  our  President,  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  the  favour  of 
recommending  select  and  skilled  Filipinos.  The  jurisdiction 
of  the  authorities  of  Manila  shall  not  be  recognized  beyond  the 
municipal  radius. 

"  (7)  The  American  forces  shall  not  approach  nor  penetrate 
our  military  positions  without  permission  of  the  respective 
conmiand^v  thereof  and  shall  evacuate  all  the  positions  which 
they  occupy  at  the  present  time  beyond  the  municipal  radius ; 
Spaniards  who  pass  our  lines  without  permission  of  the  com- 
okander  will  be  conudered  as  spies. 

"(10)  Lastly  we  state  clearly  that  our  concessions  and 
petitions  do  not  signify  on  our  part  that  we  recognize  the 
Bovereagnty  of  North  America  in  these  islands,  as  they  are  made 
necessary  by  the  present  ww."  ' 

Under  the  instructions  of  the  President  these  demands 
could  not  be  acceded  to.  Nor  could  they  have  been 
acceded  to  had  there  been  no  such  instructions.  In  this 
connection  the  following  extract  from  General  J&udenes's 
cablegram  for  June  Sth  to  his  home  government  is  highly 
significant :  — 

"  Population  of  suburbs  have  taken  refuge  in  walled  city  from 
fear  of  outrages  of  insurgents,  preferring  to  run  risks  of  bom- 
bardment, which  has  not  yet  b^un."  * 

It  would  seem  that  the  population  of  the  suburbs  did 
not  have  a  high  idea  of  Insurgent  discipline. 

>  P.  I.  R.,  Boola  C-1.  >  T^lor,  15  AJ. 



That  their  apprehensions  were  not  groundless  is  shown 
by  a  passive  in  a  letter  sent  the  following  day  to  GoTemor- 
Gleneral  Augustin  by  Buencamino :  — 

"  Manila  being  surrounded  by  land  and  by  sea,  without  hope 
of  assistance  from  anywhere,  and  Sefior  AguinaJdo  being  die- 
posed  to  make  use  of  the  fleet  in  order  to  bombard,  if  Your 
Excellency  should  prolong  the  struggle  with  tenacity,  I  do  not 
know,  frankly,  what  else  to  do  other  than  to  succumb  dyii^, 
but  Your  ^cellency  knows  that  the  entrance  of  100,000 
Indians,'  inflamed  with  battle,  drunk  with  triumph  and  with 
blood,  will  produce  the  hecatomb  from  which  there  will  not  be 
allowed  to  escape  ^ther  women,  children,  or  Peninsular  friars, 
—  especially  the  friars ;  and,  I  believe  that  the  rights  of  hu- 
manity, imperilled  in  such  a  serious  way,  should  be  well  con- 
sidered by  Your  Excellency,  for  however  dear  glory  and  military 
duty  may  be,  although  worth  as  much  or  more  than  existence 
itself  there  is  no  right  by  which  they  should  be  won  at  the  cost 
of  the  rights  of  humanity,  and  the  latter  outweigh  every  con- 
sideration and  all  duty."  * 

Don  Felipe  knew  his  own  people.  He  also  knew,  none 
better,  what  they  had  in  mind  at  this  time. 

As  it  was  the  Insurgent  forces  made  the  moat  of  such 
opportunity  as  they  had,  and  their  own  records  show  it. 

In  the  suburbs  of  Manila  they  sacked  and  comuiitted 
outrages,  threatening  people  with  their  arms,  and  this 
was  still  going  on  a  week  after  the  fallof  Manila.* 

General  Pfo  del  Pilar  was  believed  to  be  responsible 
for  much  of  this  misconduct,  and  Mabini  proposed  that 
as  it  was  necessary  for  bJTn  to  leave  the  vicinity  of  Manila, 
and  they  could  not  remove  him  by  force,  he  be  promoted.* 

'The  word  Indios,  here  trenalated  "Indituts,"  means  MalftyMi 
Filiplnoa  of  pure  blood  u  disUniruialLed  from  metlizos  or  people  of 
mixed  blood.  '  P.  I.  R.,  918.  2. 

■  The  fotlowiiig  telegram  was  aeat  by  Colonel  Job6  to  Aguinaldo :  — 

"U^ent.    August  20, 1898 :  Colonel  Ldpez  reports  that  our  troops 

are    still  saokiiis    and  oommitting  outragea  in    Molate,  Faoo  and 

Ermita,  even  menaoing  people  with  their  arms.    Urge  you  to  take 

proper  meuures  to  stop  these  abuses."  —  P.  I.  It.,  1167.  3. 

*  Extract  from  a  letter  of  August  20, 1899,  from  Mabini  to  Aguinaldo : 

"Se&<n'  Lfipez,  your  adjutant,  arrived  and  told  me  of  many  oom- 

plaints  regarding  the  behaviour  of  the  soldiers.     He  says  that  oiur  otB- 



Some  time  during  this  month  Sandico  wrote  Aguinaldo 
as  follows :  — 

"The  Americans  have  already  beard  of  the  frequent  caaes  of 
kidnapping  (dukul)  occurring  in  Tondo,  San  Sebasti^  and 
San  Miguel.  Laet  night  some  of  ours  were  surpriBed  in  the 
act  of  kidnapping  a  person.  I  have  also  heard  that  many 
persona  are  asking  for  contributions  of  war.  I  tell  them ' 
that  you  know  nothing  of  all  this  and  that  if  some  persons  are 
kidnapped  it  is  due  to  the  hate  of  the  natives  for  the  Spanish 
spies  and  secret  poUce,  which  is  great."  ' 

Evidently  Sandico  continued  to  interest  himself  in  the 
matter  of  preventing  disorder,  for  on  September  24,  1898, 
he  wrote  Aguinaldo  from  Manila  as  foUows :  — 

"By  authority  of  General  Don  Pfo  del  Pilar  and  accompanied 
by  the  War  Auditor,  Seftor  Urbano,  we  entered  a  prison  where 
the  individuals  Mariano  de  la  Cruz  and  Mariano  Crisdetomo 
were  kept.  They  were  almost  prostrated.  They  had  lately  been 
released  from  Bilibid  where  they  had  been  confined  for  poUtical 
crimes.  On  being  asked  the  reason  for  their  imprisonment 
they  began  by  showing  us  their  bodies  from  which  blood  stili 
issued  as  the  result  of  the  barbarous  treatment  received  from 
Major  Carmona  who,  by  the  way,  is  the  same  person  of  whom 
I  spoke  to  you  in  one  of  my  previous  letters;  I  declared  to 
you  then  that  he  had  assaulted,  revolver  in  hand,  a  man  in 
the  middle  of  one  of  the  most  frequented  streets  of  the  suburi) 
of  Paco  on  pure  suspicion. 

"The  prisoners  in  question  stated  that  if  they  admitted  the 
accusations  made  against  them  it  was  for  fear  of  greater  punish- 
ments promised  by  said  Major.    The  officer  of  the  guard  took 

eon  cany  off  many  horaee,  some  of  them  belonging  to  foreignen.  If 
the  foreignera  ahould  enter  a  protest  against  each  doingi,  I  do  not 
know  what  will  be  thought  of  our  government. 

"  It  is  also,  absolutely  necessary  that  a  stop  should  be  put  to  the 
passes,  and  that  the  tax  on  merchandise  entering  Manila,  should  no 
longer  be  eicaoted.  It  is  absolutely  neoessaiy,  if  you  think  well  of  it, 
for  us  to  promote  General  Pfo,  and  make  him  your  second  in  oommand. 
It  is  necessary  for  hiri  to  leave  the  vicinity  of  Manila,  as  we  cannot 
mnove  him  by  force ;  and  do  not  reprimand  him. 

"  If  you  approve,  I  will  write  a  Decree,  but  I  reflect  that  nothing  will 
succeed,  if  our  oommanders  are  not  obliged  to  comply." 

—  P.  I.  a.  472.  13. 

'  I.e.  the  Ainerwans.  *  P.  I.  R.,  458. 8. 



the  liberty  of  stnking  with  his  fiat  the  one  who  dared  to  express 
himself  so. 

"Before  euch  a  spectacle  Major  Bell  found  himself  forced 
to  tell  them  that  brutal  acts  are  not  precisely  a  recommendation 
for  a  country  that  wished  to  be  free  and  that  they,  the  Ameri- 
cana, do  not  arrest  any  one  without  just  cause.' 

"I  take  the  liberty  of  calling  your  attention  to  the  matter 
in  question  and  other  abuses  in  order  that  the  measures  you 
may  think  fit  be  adopted  to  remedy  this  evil.  In  fact,  we  are 
m^dng  a  target  of  ourselves  in  the  sight  of  all  nations,  especially 
BO  in  that  of  the  Americans  who  note  any  act  of  oura  and  judge 
us  secretly  now  in  order  to  do  so  later  in  public.  To  make  light 
of  this  is  to  plant  a  seed  of  future  injury  to  us,  because  many 
will  desire  to  place  themselves  under  the  protection  of  the 
American  Qag,  seeing  that  ours  refuses  to  defend  the  citisens' 
individual  rights. 

"I,  for  my  part,  ask  that  Major  Canuona  be  arrested  to- 
gether with  lus  accomplices  in  the  matter  so  that  it  may  serve 
as  a  lesson  not  only  for  him  but  also  for  those  who  thiifik  like 
him."  * 

Obviously  Sandico's  protest  of  September  24  did  not 
produce  the  desired  result,  for  on  September  28  he  wrote 
Aguinaldo  a  long  letter  complaining  that  in  Mfmila  per- 
sonal security  did  not  exist,  people  were  being  tortured 
and  murdered,  kidnapping  and  theft  were  very  frequent, 
Mid  these  abuses  were  being  committed  by  Filipino 
officers  and  men.  Some  of  the  things  which  had  come  to 
his  knowledge  were  of  such  a  nature  that  he  preferred  to 
speak  to  Aguinaldo  privately  about  them.* 

'  Major  J.  F.  Bell  accompamed  Sandioo  on  this  trip. 

»P.  I.  R.,  1166.  12. 

' "  I  regret  very  muoh  to  have  to  inform  yon  tliat  m  long  m  pw- 
eoDBi  property  is  not  respected  here  in  Manila  eapoeially,  b?  some  of 
our  men,  as  long  as  personal  security  does  not  exist  and  as  long  as 
prisoners  are  tortured,  we  cannot  hope  to  deserve  the  oonfldenoe 
of  the  other  governments.  Murders,  thefts  of  oarriages  and  horses, 
are  very  frequent  here,  as  is  kidnapping,  .  .  . 

"  Sergeant  Barcena,  of  the  Fifth  Company  of  the  Second  Zone,  that 
is  the  zone  of  General  PIo  del  Pilar,  informed  me  that  the  cruel  offloers 
of  that  Zone,  were  Major  Cannona  and  a  lieutenant  who  was  formoiy 
a  barber. 

"  i  knov  that  the  Government  has  ordered  that  private  persona 
and  property  be  respected  and  has  withdrawn  trom  tiie  milittuy  the 



Murder,  pillaging,  torture  of  prisoners,  kidnapping, 
theft  —  these  are  not  pleasant  thiz^,  but  they  continued 
to  occur,  and  Aguinaldo,  who  apparently  de^red  to  pre- 
vent them,  was  powerless  to  do  so.  He  did  not  dare 
discipline  General  Pio  del  Pilar,  nor  remove  him  from  the 
vicinity  of  Manila,  and  the  soldiers  of  that  officer  con- 
tinued to  work  their  will  on  their  own  unfortunate  and 
helpless  people. 

Aguinaldo  at  first  flatly  refused  to  direct  the  disorderiy 
Insurgent  forces  to  leave  Manila.  The  American  com- 
mander showed  great  forbearance  and  negotiations  con- 

On  August  16,  1808,  the  Diplomatic  Commission 
(Buencamino  and  Gregorio  Araneta)  telegraphed  Agui- 

power  of  trying  oirOuuiB ;  but  in  view  of  the  fact  that  notwitb  utanding 
ttuB  reetriction  some  of  them  oODtinue  to  discharge  powers  of  whioh 
they  have  been  divested,  I  find  it  neoessar}'  to  call  your  attention 
thorato,  in  order  that  more  energotia  measuree  may  be  adopted  bo 
that  ottier  nations  may  not  bo  led  to  believe  th&t  our  Koverament  is 
very  weak. 

"  In  the  juriBdiotlon  of  the  Amerioaoa,  I  have  Burprised  Bmall  groups 
of  otDiceni,  who  devote  themaelvee  to  aummonine  petwma  before  them 
and  arresting  them.  These  groups  can  be  found  in  Binondo,  Tondo 
and  Trozo.  I  have  used  all  friendly  measures  to  secure  their  dissolu- 
tion, but  if  they  continue  theii  oonduct,  I  ghaJl  be  obUged  to  turn  them 
over  to  the  American  authoritiee,  although  I  inform  you  that  I  shall 
not  make  use  <rf  such  meBsures,  until  diplomatic  meiins  are  exhausted. 

"  I  understand  very  well  that  in  endeavouring  to  stop  the  abuses  com- 
mitted by  onr  ofBoers  aod  by  the  Filipinos  who  claim  to  belong  to  us, 
in  UanilA,  I  expose  myself  to  becoming  a  victim  of  their  vengeance ; 
nevertheless,  this  does  not  terrify  me,  because  my  duty  to  the  oountry 
requires  it. 

"  I  beg  of  yon  that  if  you  take  any  steps  against  Major  Carmona 
and  the  barber  Ueutenant,  to  be  very  oareful  and  call  General  Ffo  del 
Filer  and  come  to  an  understanding  with  him  as  to  the  mode  of  pun- 
iahmeut  of  theae  officers.  .  .  . 

"  I  have  diaoovered  grave  casee  which  are  occurring  in  the  I^eaidio 
ot  Manila,  which  I  propose  to  relate  to  you  when  I  shall  have  the 
honor  to  see  you  peisonally.  The  Americans  are  already  aware  of 
theee  casee,  and  are  working  in  their  own  interest  untiringly. 

"  I  oould  tell  you  a  good  many  other  things,  but  I  do  not  do  so  on 
aoDount  of  lack  (rf  time,  and  because  I  wish  to  reserve  them  ontil  I  can 
speak  to  you  privately.  In  the  meantime,  order  me  as  you  will,  etc." 
—  P.  I.  R.,  416.  7. 



naldo  that  a  clause  in  a  proposed  agreement  requiring 
prior  permission  of  Insurgent  officers  before  American 
troops  could  pass  or  approach  their  lines  had  greatly  dis- 
pleased General  Anderson  who  declined  to  treat  imtil 
after  the  withdrawal  of  Noriel's  troops  from  Manila.' 

Aguinaldo's  reply,  sent  on  August  17, 1898,  shows  that 
he  had  already  made  up  his  mind  to  fi^t  the  Americans, 
for  it  contains  the  following  significant  words :  "The 
conffict  is  coming  sooner  or  later  and  we  shall  gain  nothing 
by  asking  as  favours  of  them  what  are  really  our  rights."  * 

While  negotiations  were  pending  General  Merritt  sent 
Major  J.  F.  Bell  to  Aguinaldo  with  a  letter  and  also  with 
a  memorandum  in  wMch  were  the  words :  — 

"In  case  you  find  Aguinaldo  inclined  to  be  generous  in  his 
arrangeiQeDte  with  us,  you  may  conimunicate  to  him  as  fol- 
lows: ..." 

There  follow  six  paragraphs,  of  which  the  third  is  of 
special  importance.    It  reads  as  follows :  — 

"(3)  That  I  have  every  disposition  to  repreaent  liberally 
the  Government  at  Washington,  which  I  know  is  inclined  to 

'"General  Anderson  reoeived  ua  very  well,  but  in  the  proposed 
agreement  the  clauses  requiring  the  prior  permiBsion  of  our  oommanderH 
before  Amerio&n  troops  could  pass  or  approach  our  lines  displeased 
him  very  much.  Gen.  Anderson  refuses  to  treat  until  after  the  with- 
drawal of  Noriel's  troopa.  I  think  it  prudent  to  yield.  This  tel^ram 
is  in  amplifloation  of  another  which,  at  the  request  of  Gen.  Anderson, 
we  sent  through  his  telegraph  station  to  your  excellency."  —  P.  I.  R.. 

■  "It  is  impossible  to  order  General  Noriel  to  fall  back  because  if 
we  order  it  they  will  ask  the  same  thing  from  General  PIo  and  we 
■hall  get  nothing  ourselves.  And  the  worst  is  that  after  we  have 
evacuated  Manila  and  its  environs  they  will  follow  ua  up  to  our  new 
positions  to  take  them  too  without  our  being  able  to  obtain  from  them 
any  formal  Btatement  of  the  oonoession  signed  in  due  form.  The  con- 
flict is  coming  sooner  or  later  and  we  shall  gain  nothing  by  asking  as 
favours  of  them  what  are  really  our  rights.  We  shall  maintain  them 
as  long  M  we  are  able,  confiding  in  Providenoe  and  in  Justice.  I  con- 
firm my  last  tel^pmn.  Tell  General  Anderson  that  we  shall  hold  a 
meeting  of  the  council  of  Government  in  order  to  decide.  Hease 
return  here  soon  with  your  companions.  I  inolose  the  map  which  I 
hope  you  will  return."  —  P.  1.  R..  427.  1. 



s  &  typical  old-atyle  well,  with  the  family  WBahiog  going  o 

A  Flowiho  ARTBaiAN  Will. 

Tbne  is  do  way  in  which  the  water  from  nich  b  well  can  berome  infected. 

More  tbftD  eight  hundred  fifty  have  been  sunk,  and  the  death  rate  io  some 

towDB  (ortuiut«  enough  to  pooesa  tlieni  has  fallen  off  fifty  per  cent,  as  a 



deal  fairly  with  him  and  faia  people ;  but  not  knowing  what  the 
policy  of  that  Government  will  be,  I  am  not  prepaid  to  make 
any  promises,  except  that  in  the  event  of  the  United  States 
withdrawing  from  these  islands  care  will  be  taken  to  leave  him 
in  aa  good  condiMon  as  he  wa»  found  by  the  forces  of  the  Oovem- 

Relative  to  the  italicized  portion  of  this  etaXeanent 
Major  Bell  says :  — 

"  I  was  presaed  to  explain  further  just  what  meaning  Qeneral 
M.  meant  to  convey  by  the  underscored  portion  of  this  remark, 
but  I  replied  that  I  had  repeated  the  language  General  M. 
had  used  to  me,  and  I  preferred  they  should  s^  any  further 
explaostion  from  him,  lest  I  might  imwittingly  fall  into  error 
if  I  undertook  to  explain  his  meaning  myself.  Their  lack  of 
definiteness  and  my  unwillingness  to  comment  upon  the  lan- 
guage seemed  to  arouse  their  apprehensions  and  su^icions. 
They  have  been  trying  ever  since  to  obtain  in  writing  some 
definite  promise  on  thos  subject."  * 

Aguinaldo  ordered  that  the  machinery  of  the  water 
vorks  be  started  up  at  once,  a  thing  which  was  very 
necessary  as  Manila  was  suffering  from  lack  of  water. 
I  should  be  glad  if  I  could  leave  this  matter  here,  but 
I  cannot,  for  Major  Bell  elsewhere  makes  the  further 
statement :  — 

"Attention  is  invited  to  General  Merritt's  promise  made 
known  to  Aguinaldo  by  me  verbally,  namely,  that  in  the  event 
of  the  United  States  withdrawing  from  these  islands,  care  would 
be  taken  to  leave  Aguinaldo  in  as  good  condition  as  he  was 
found  by  the  forces  of  the  Government.  From  a  remark  the 
General  made  to  me  I  inferred  he  intended  to  interpret  the 
expression  'forces  of  the  Government'  to  mean  the  naval  forces, 
diould  future  contingencies  neces^tate  such  an  interpretation."  * 

Let  us  hope  that  Major  Bell  misunderstood  General 
Mmitt's  intention.  If  this  is  not  the  case,  I  must  say 
in  all  franknees  that  in  my  opinioQ  it  was  General  Merritt's 
intention  to  indulge  in  sharp  practice. 

■  Senate  Document  No.  208,  p.  22.      *  tbid.,  p.  23.      *  Ibid.,  p.  26. 
vol-  I— I 



Obviously,  the  American  naval  forces  did  not  find 
Aguinaldo  in  any  "condition,"  in  the  sense  in  which 
General  Merritt  uses  the  term.  On  the  contrary,  they 
brou^t  him  from  Hongkong  and  assisted  him  in  starting 
a  revolution.  The  negotiations  in  question  were  relative 
to  the  positions  held  by  the  Insurgents  at  the  time  the 
negotiations  took  place,  and  General  Merritt's  promise 
could  not  legitimately  be  interpreted  to  refer  to  anything 

Had  Aguinaldo  accepted  his  offer,  a  most  embarrassing 
situation  would  have  resulted.  General  Merritt  was 
obviously  not  authorized  to  make  such  a  proposition  in 
the  first  instance,  and  the  only  honourable  course  left 
open  to  him  would  have  been  to  advise  Washington  of 
his  improper  action  and  beg  the  Government  to  support 
him  in  it  and  thus  save  the  honour  of  the  country. 

Fortunately,  Aguinaldo  did  not  act  upon  the  promise 
nor  accept  the  offer.  On  the  contrary,  be  promptly  and 
indignantly  denied  that  he  was  committed  to  anything, 
and  sought  to  impose  new  conditions  which  were  not 
acceded  to. 

Meanwhile  some  one  doubtless  got  hold  of  General 
Merritt  and  called  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  in  making 
this  offer  he  had  grossly  exceeded  his  authority,  for  in 
hb  reply  to  Aguinaldo's  protest  General  Merritt  says :  — 

"So  far  as  any  promises  as  to  what  should  be  done  in  the 
event  <tf  a  conclusion  of  a  treaty  between  the  United  States 
and  Spwi  are  concerned,  it  ia  utterly  impoaaible  for  nte  as  the 
military  representative  only  of  the  Unit^  States  to  make  ^ly 
promises  such  as  you  request.  As  you  have  akeady  been  in- 
formed, you  may  depend  upon  the  good  will  of  the  Americans 
out  here  and  the  Government,  of  which  you  already  know  the 
beneficence,  to  determine  these  matters  in  the  futiue."  ' 

Coming,  as  th^  statement  did,  after  the  offw  made  in 
the  memorandtmi  hereinbefore  referred  to,  it  must  have 
aroused  the  suspicions  of  Aguinaldo  and  his  associates, 
I  Senate  Docnment  No.  206,  p.  24. 



and  in  my  opinion  Memtt'a  conduct  in  making  such  a 
proposal  in  the  first  instance  was  inexcusable. 

Before  he  could  tenninate  the  negotiations  which  fol- 
lowed he  was  called  away,  and  turned  this  matter,  together 
with  oth^  unfinished  buaineea,  over  to  bis  successor, 
General  B.  8.  Otis. 

On  August  31,  1898,  the  latter  official  wrote  to  Agui- 
naldo  as  follows :  — 
"General  Aguinauk),  Bacoob: 

"Refemi^  to  promise  made  by  General  Merritt  to  reply 
to  your  letter  of  August  27  within  four  days,  I  desire  to  state 
that  he  was  unexpectedly  ordered  away  and  had  not  opportunity 
to  reply.  Being  unacquainted  with  the  situation,  I  must  take 
time  to  inform  myself  before  answering,  which  I  will  do  at  the 
earliest  opportunity.  "  0ns." 

On  September  8  Gienera!  Otis  wrote  Aguinaldo  a  long 
letter  fully  discussing  the  whole  situation  in  the  light  of 
the  complete  information  which  he  had  meanwhile  ob- 
tained. Since  so  much  baa  been  made  of  this  incident 
by  Blount  and  others,  I  invite  attention  to  the  following 
extracts  from  General  Otis'a  letter,  which  embody  a  fair 
and  judicial  statement  of  the  conditions  which  existed :  — 

"You  designate  certain  lines  within  the  suburbs  of  the  city 
of  Manila,  te  which  you  promise  to  retire  your  troops,  and  nejne 
as  conditions  precedent :  First,  protection  to  your  shipping  by 
the  United  States  Navy,  and  the  free  navigation  of  your  vessels 
within  the  waters  in  United  States  occupation ;  second,  restitu- 
tion to  your  forces  of  all  positions  which  are  now  occupied  by 
your  troops,  in  the  event  that  treaty  stipulations'  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  surrender  to  the  last-named  govern- 
ment the  territory  occupied  by  the  former;  and  thirdly, that 
United  States  troops  now  occupying  positions  beyond  the  lines 
you  name  shall  retire  within  the  same. 

"A  discussion  of  your  proposition  to  hold,  jointly,  with  the 
United  States  Government,  the  city  of  Manila,  involves  con- 
fflderation  of  some  of  the  other  concessions  you  desire  to  be 
made,  and  to  that  I  will  at  once  refer.  I  wish  to  present  the 
matter,  in  the  first  instance,  in  its  legal  aspect,  although,  from 
remarks  contained  in  former  correspondence,  I  am  of  the 



opinion  that  you  are  fully  aware  bow  untenable  tbe  proposition 
is.  Tbe  United  States  and  Spain  were  and  are  beUigerent 
parties  to  a  war,  and  were  so  recognized  by  the  civilized  world. 
In  the  course  of  events  the  entire  city  of  Manila,  then  in  full 
posBessioQ  of  Spanish  forces,  was  surrendered  to  the  first-named 
beUigerent  power.  The  articles  of  agreement  and  capitulation 
gave  the  United  States  Government  full  occupimcy  of  the  city 
and  defences  of  Manila,  and  that  Government  obligated  itseU 
to  insure  the  safety  of  the  lives  and  property  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  city  to  the  best  of  its  ability.  By  all  the  laws  of  war  and 
all  international  precedents  the  United  States  authority  over 
Manila  and  its  defences  is  full  and  supreme,  and  it  cannot  es- 
cape tbe  obligations  which  it  has  assumed. 

"But  conceding,  as  you  do,  the  strictly  legal  right  of  my 
Government  to  hold  and  administer  the  flairs  of  the  city  of 
Manila  and  its  suburbs  (I  thus  conclude  from  expressions  con- 
t^ned  in  former  correspondence  and  from  my  appreciation  of 
your  intellectual  attainments),  you  base  your  proposition  —  a 
joint  occupation  — ■  upon  supposed  equitable  grounds,  referring 
to  the  sacrifices  your  troops  have  made  and  the  assistance  tbey 
have  rendered  the  American  forces  in  the  capture  of  Manila. 
It  is  well  known  they  have  made  personal  sacrifices,  endured 
great  hardships,  and  have  rendered  aid.  But  is  it  forgotten 
that  my  Government  has  swept  the  Spanish  navy  from  the 
seas  of  both  hemispheres ;  sent  back  to  Spain  the  Spanish  army 
and  navy  forces,  recently  embarked  for  your  destruction,  and 
the  secure  holding  of  the  Philippine  possessions;  that  since 
May  1  last  its  navy  has  held  the  city  of  Manila  at  its  mercy, 
but  out  of  consideration  of  humanity  refused  to  bombard  it, 
preferring  to  send  troops  to  demand  surrender,  and  thereby 
preserve  the  lives  and  property  of  the  inhabitants  ?  Is  it  for- 
gotten that  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  navy  and  the  re- 
tention of  Spanish  armed  men  in  its  European  possessions  has 
opened  up  to  you  the  ports  of  the  Island  of  Luzon  and  held 
Spain  helpless  to  meet  its  refractory  subjects? 


"Apart  from  all  legal  and  equitable  considerations,  and 
those  having  their  origin  in  personally  conceived  ideas  of  jus- 
tice, I  wish  respectfully  to  call  your  attention  to  the  impracti- 
cability of  maintaining  a  joint  occupation  of  Manila  and  its 
suburbe,  and  in  this  I  know  that  I  shall  have  the  approval  of 
your  excellent  judgment.  It  would  be  extremely  difficult  to 
prevent  friction  between  our  respective  forces,  which  might 



result  in  unfortunate  consequences,  labor  as  we  may  for  coq- 
tinued  harmonious  relations.  Located  in  close  proximity, 
irreBponsible  members  of  our  organizations,  by  careless  or 
Impertinent  action,  might  be  the  means  of  inciting  grave  dis- 
turbances ;  and  in  this  connection  I  call  to  your  attention  the 
recent  shooting  affair  at  Cavite,  which  still  requires  investiga- 
tion. There  might  also  arise  conflict  of  authority  between  our 
subordinate  officers.  Even  now,  within  precincts  in  entire 
actual  possession  of  our  troops,  I  find  that  permits  are  ^ven 
to  citizens,  who  are  styled  local  presidents,  to  make  arrests, 
to  carry  arms,  etc.,  in  violation  of  our  instructions  and  authority, 
and  that  several  cases  of  kidnapping  have  taken  place.  In 
pursuance  of  our  obligations  to  maintain,  in  so  far  as  we  can, 
domestic  tranquillity,  our  officers  have  arrested  suspected 
parties,  and  they  have  asserted  (with  what  element  of  truth  I 
know  not)  that  the  insurgent  forces  are  the  offenders.  I  have 
declined  to  accept  their  statements,  as  I  prefer  to  believe  the 
contrary,  although  it  would  appear  that  officers  connected  with 
those  forces  have  issued  the  permits  to  which  I  allude.  Such 
interference  with  our  administration  of  civil  affairs  must  even- 
tually result  in  conffict. 

"...  And  here  permit  me  to  remark  upon  a  view  of  the  sub- 
ject you  have  advocated  in  support  of  the  plea  for  dual  occupa- 
tion of  the  city's  suburbs.  Your  forces,  you  say  in  substance, 
should  have  a  share  in  the  booty  resultii^  from  the  conquest 
of  the  city,  on  account  of  harckhips  endured  and  asaiBtance 
rendered.  The  facts  on  which  you  base  your  conclusion 
granted,  your  conclusion,  under  the  rules  of  war  which  are  bind- 
ing on  my  Government,  does  not  follow,  for  it  has  never  recog- 
nized the  existence  of  spoils  of  war,  denominated  'booty,'  as 
have  many  European  governments.  No  enemy's  property  of 
any  kind,  public  or  private,  can  be  seized,  claimed  by,  or  awarded 
to,  any  of  its  officers  or  men,  and  should  they  attempt  to  ap- 
propriate any  of  it  for  their  individual  benefit,  they  would  be 
very  severely  punished  through  military  tribunals,  on  which 
have  been  conferred  by  law  very  sweeping  jurisdiction.  The 
enemy's  money  and  property  (all  that  is  not  necessary  to  be 
expended  in  adnunisteriog  local  affairs  in  the  enemy's  territory) 
must  be  preserved  for  final  arbitrament  or  settlement  by  and 
between  the  supreme  authorities  of  the  nations  concerned. 
My  troops  cannot  acquire  booty  nor  any  individual  benefit  by 
reason  of  the  capture  of  an  enemy's  territory.  I  make  this 
comment,  believittg  that  you  hold  erroneous  opinions  in  respect 
to  individual  advantages  which  occupation  bestows. 



"I  request  your  indulgence  while  I  briefly  conmder  the  con- 
ceeadons  you  ask  us  to  make  as  condllione  precedent  to  the  re- 
tirement of  your  forces  to  the  iines  indicated  by  your  note  of  the 
27th  ultimo. 

"The  firet  is  :  Protection  to  your  shipping  and  free  uaviga- 
tiou  to  your  vessels.  Neither  the  extent  of  protection  nor  the 
limit  of  free  navigation  you  request  is  understood.  Certainly 
you  could  not  mean  protection  on  the  high  seas,  or  in  the  porta 
not  in  the  rightful  possession  of  the  United  States.  That,  as 
you  are  fully  aware,  could  only  be  effected  by  treaty,  or  guaran- 
tee, followii^  international  recognition  of  the  belligCTent  rights 
of  the  Philippine  revolutionary  government.  While  the  existing 
armistice  continues,  the  United  States  are  in  rightful  possession, 
in  so  far  as  the  navigable  waters  of  the  Philippine  Islands  are 
concerned,  only  of  the  bay  of  Manila  and  its  navigable  tribu- 
taries. Within  the  same  all  vessels  of  trade  and  commerce 
and  the  war  vessels  of  recognized  national  powers  sail  freely 
as  long  as  the  sovereignty  of  my  Government  is  not  assailed 
nor  the  peace  of  the  locality  threatened.  In  this  respect,  what- 
ever eoncessious  are  extended  by  way  of  relaxation  of  trade 
restrictions,  incident  to  war,  to  the  citizens  of  these  islands  will 
be  extended  to  all  alike,  and  discrimination  in  this  r^ard  ia 
neither  intended  nor  permitted.  Admiral  Dewey  exercises 
supervision  over  all  naval  matters,  and  they  are  in  no  way  re- 
lated to  the  duties  conferred  upon  me  by  law.  Nor  woidd  it 
»v«ul  should  I  seek  his  consent  for  greater  latitude  of  action, 
for  even  if  disposed  to  grant  special  concessions  he  could  not 
do  BO,  and  I  doubt  if  the  supreme  authority  of  my  Government 
could  now,  imder  the  prevailing  truce  with  Spain,  invest  him 
with  the  requisite  powers  to  do  so  and  at  the  same  time  pre- 
serve its  international  obligations. 

"The  second  concession  named  by  you  is  restitution  of 
positions  in  the  city  of  Manila  to  your  forces,  in  case  the  treaty 
of  peace  remands  to  Spain  the  territory  surrendered  under  the 
late  capitulatory  articles;  and  the  third  and  last  is  a  promise 
to  retire  our  troops  within  the  lines  indicated  by  you,  as  the 
hnes  on  which  you  desire  your  troops  to  remain  permanently. 
These  propositions,  having  a  kindred  nature,  may  be  considered 
together,  and,  indeed,  have  already  been  impliedly  answered. 
From  previous  statements  of  facts  and  logical  conclusions 
made  and  stated  in  this  communication,  concerning  the  nature 
of  the  obligations  resting  on  the  United  States  with  regard  to 
the  territory  to  which  they  have  the  l^al  right  of  posaeasion 
under  contracting  articles  with  Spain,  it  is  evident  that  neithw 



in  law  or  moniU  can  the  concoBsioQa  be  made.  I  would  be 
powerless  to  grant  them  in  any  aspect  of  the  case,  being  nothing 
more  than  an  agent  to  cany  out  the  infitructioDB  of  the  executive 
head  of  my  Government  and  not  bdng  vested  with  discretionary 
power  to  determine  matters  of  such  moment.  Id  the  present 
instance  I  sm  not  only  powerless  to  accede  to  your  request,  but 
have  been  strictly  enjoined  by  my  Government,  mindful  of 
its  international  promises  and  national  honour,  which  it  has 
never  broken  nor  sacrificed,  not  to  accede  joint  occupation  of 
the  city  and  suburbs  of  Manila  and  am  directed  specially  to 
preserve  the  peace  and  protect  persons  and  property  within 
the  territory  surrendered  under  the  terms  of  the  Spanish  capitu- 
lation.   These  mandates  must  be  obeyed. 

"Thus  have  I  endeavoured  with  aJl  candor  and  sincerity, 
holding  nothing  in  reserve,  to  place  before  you  the  situation 
as  understood  by  me,  and  I  doubt  not  by  the  Republic  which  I 
represent.  I  have  not  been  instructed  as  to  what  policy  the 
United  States  intends  to  pursue  in  regard  to  its  legitimate  hold- 
ings here,  and  hence  I  am  unable  to  g^ve  you  any  information 
on  the  subject.  That  it  will  have  a  care  and  labor  conscien- 
tiouflly  for  the  welfare  of  your  people  I  sincerely  believe.  It 
remains  for  you,  beneficiaries  of  its  sacrifices,  to  adopt  a  course 
of  action  which  will  manifest  your  good  intentions  and  show  to 
the  world  the  principles  which  actuate  your  proceedings. 

"It  only  remains  for  me  to  respectfully  notify  you  that  I  am 
compelled  by  my  instructions  to  direct  that  your  armed  forces 
evacuate  the  entire  city  of  Manila,  including  its  suburbs  and 
defences,  and  that  I  shall  be  obliged  to  take  action  with  that 
end  in  view  within  a  very  short  space  of  time  should  you  decline 
to  comply  with  my  Government's  demands;  and  I  hereby 
serve  notice  on  you  that  unless  your  troops  are  withdrawn 
beyond  the  line  of  the  city's  defences  before  "Thursday,  the  15th 
instant,  I  shall  be  obliged  to  resort  to  forcible  action,  and  that 
my  Government  will  hold  you  responsible  for  any  unfortunate 
consequences  which  may  ensue. 

•  •*«««* 

"In  conclusion,  I  beg  to  inform  you  that  I  have  conferred 
freely  with  Admiral  Dewey  upon  the  contents  of  this  communi- 
cation and  am  del^ated  by  Um  to  state  that  he  fully  approves 
of  the  same  in  all  respects ;  that  the  commands  of  our  Govern- 
ment compel  us  to  act  as  herein  indicated,  and  that  between  our 
respective  forces  there  will  be  unanimity  and  complete  concert 
of  action." 



This  calm  and  temperate  discussion  of  the  situation, 
coupled  with  the  firm  statement  of  intention  with  which 
it  closed,  produced  a  decided  effect  on  Aguinaldo.  Con- 
cerning the  events  to  which  it  led,  Genen^  Otis  has  made 
this  statement :  — 

"On  September  13,  a  commiseion  Bent  by  Aguinaldo  and 
consisting  of  three  members,  one  of  whom  was  the  treasurer 
and  another  the  attomey'^eneraJ  of  the  insurgent  government, 
called  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  the  subject  of  my  letter  of 
the  8th.  They  asked  me  to  withdraw  it  and  simply  request  in 
writing  that  the  insurgent  troo^w  retire  to  the  line  designated 
by.  General  Merritt,  which  I  refused  to  do,  stating  that  unless 
they  withdrew  as  directed  we  would  be  obliged  to  resort  to 
force.  i?hey  then  asked  that  I  withdraw  the  letter  and  issue 
a  request  unaccompanied  by  any  threat  to  use  force,  as  Agui- 
naldo was  fearful  that  he  would  be  unable  to  remove  his  troops 
upon  a  demand.  To  which  I  replied  that  the  letter  of  the  8th 
instant  would  stand.  They  then  said  that  as  the  demands  of 
that  letter  must  remain  unchanged,  the  insurgents  would  with- 
draw as  directed  therein,  but  that  if  I  would  express  in  writing 
a  simple  request  to  Aguinaldo  to  withdraw  to  the  lines  which 
I  designated  —  something  which  he  could  show  to  the  troops 
and  induce  them  to  think  that  he  was  simply  acting  upon  a 
request  from  these  headquarters  —  he  would  probably  be  able 
to  retire  his  men  without  much  difficulty ;  that,  of  course,  they 
themselves  understood  the  direction  to  withdraw,  which  would 
be  obeyed,  and  thereupon  repeated  their  desire  to  obtain  a  note 
of  request,  whereupon  I  furnished  them  with  the  following:  — 

" '  Office  U.  S.  Mn,iTAaT  Govebnob  ra  the 
"  'PHrLippiNE  Islands, 

"  'Manila,  P.  I.,  September  13,  1898. 
'"Tna  ComcANDiNa  Gbnbbal  of  the  Philippinb  Fobces; 
" '  Sir  :  Referring  to  my  commimication  of  September  8,  I 
have  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  I  have  had  a  most  agreeable 
conversation  with  certain  gentlemen  who  are  in  the  interests  of 
your  revolutionary  government  upon  the  matters  therein 
contained.  We  have  discussed  at  length  the  compUcations 
now  existing,  which  will  exist,  and  will  doubtlees  increase,  while 
our  troops  continue  to  occupy  jointly  certain  districts  of  the 
city  of  Manila.  I  have  urged  upon  them  the  necessity  of  the 
withdrawal  of  your  troops  in  order  that  the  friendly  relations 




5  I 




which  have  always  been  muntwned  by  and  between  them  and 
the  forces  of  the  United  States  Government  may  be  perpetuated. 
I  am  sure  that  the  gentlemen  fully  appreciate  my  sentiments 
and  will  clearly  reptnli  them  to  you.  May  I  ask  you  to  pa- 
tiently listen  to  their  report  of  our  conversation  ? 

" '  It  is  my  desire  that  our  friendly  intercouiBe  and  mutual 
amicable  relatiouB  be  continued ;  that  they  be  not  jeopardized 
if  we  can  by  conast^it  action  avoid  it,  and  such,  I  am  certain, 
is  the  deore  of  yourself  and  associates. 

" '  May  I  ask,  therefore,  that  you  withdraw  your  troops  from 

" '  Permit  me  to  add  in  concluuon  that  I  have  that  confidence 
in  your  ability  and  patriotism  which  will  lead  you  to  accede  to 
this  request. 

" '  I  am,  with  great  respect,  your  most  obedient  servant, 
(Signed)     "  '  E.  S.  Ons, 

'"Major-General,  U.  S.  V., 
" '  United  States  Military  Governor  in  the  Philippines.' 

"In  reply  to  which,  on  the  16th,  the  following  was  re- 

" '  Malolos,  Bulacan,  September  16,  1898. 
"  'The  Commanmno  Gbnbral  or  the  American  Forces  : 

" '  Mt  d&ab  Sir  :  Referring  to  your  esteemed  communication, 
dated  the  13th  instant,  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  I 
have  given  appropriate  orders  that  my  troops  should  abandon 
their  most  advanced  poeitiona  within  some  of  the  suburbs,  and 
that  they  should  retire  to  points  where  contact  with  yours 
would  be  more  difficult,  in  order  to  avoid  all  occasion  for  conffict. 

"  '  I  hope  that  by  these  presents  you  will  be  fully  convinced 
of  my  constant  desire  to  preserve  amicable  relations  with  the 
American  forces,  even  at  the  risk  of  sacrificing  a  part  of  the 
confidence  placed  in  my  government  by  the  Philippine  people. 

" '  A  consideration  of  my  many  occupations  will  serve  to  ex- 
cuse me  for  not  having  answered  with  the  promptness  desired. 
'  Your  very  respectful  servant, 

(Signed)     "  '  Euiuo  Aqqinaldo.' 

"  On  theevening  of  the  15th  the  armed  msurgent  oi^anizations 
withdrew  from  the  city  and  all  of  its  suburbs,  as  ac^owledged 
by  their  leaders,  excepting  from  one  small  outlying  district. 
This  certain  agents  of  Aguinaldo  asked  on  the  previous  day  to 
be  permitted  to  retain  for  a  short  time,  on  the  plea  that  the 



general  officer  in  command '  vrould  not  obey  inBtnictions,  and 
they  propoeed  to  remove  his  men  gradually  by  organieationa 
sad  thereafter  to  pmiish  him  for  his  disobedience.  The  with- 
draval  was  effected  adroitly,  as  the  insui^ents  marched  oat 
in  excellent  spirits,  cheering  the  American  troops."  * 

I  have  given  the  facts  thus  fully  for  the  reason  that 
this  is  the  one  instance  I  have  found  in  which  a  promise 
was  made,  fortunately  in  the  form  of  an  offer  which  was 
not  accepted,  and  then  withdrawn.  It  has  seemed  to  me 
that  the  reasons  why  General  Merritt  should  never  have 
made  it,  and  why  General  Otis  could  not  possibly  have 
renewed  it,  should  be  fully  set  forth. 

On  September  7, 1898,  General  Otis  had  cabled  to  Wash- 
ington tiiat  Admiral  Dewey  and  he  considered  conditions 
critical,  and  that  the  number  of  armed  Insurgents  in  the 
city  was  large  and  rapidly  increasing.  He  stated  that 
on  the  8th  he  would  send  a  notification  to  Aguinatdo  that 
unless  the  latter's  troops  were  withdrawn  beyond  the  line 
of  the  suburbs  of  the  city  before  September  15  he  would 
be  obUged  to  resort  to  forcible  action  and  that  the  United 
States  would  hold  Aguinaldo  responsible  for  any  imfor- 
tunate  consequences  which  might  ensue. 

Aguinaldo  still  hoped  to  obtain  recognition  of  his  gov- 
ernment by  the  United  States,  but  did  not  consider  such 
recognition  probable,  and  pu^ed  preparations  to  attack 
if  a  favorable  opportunity  should  offer. 

Before  occupying  ourselves  with  these  preparations, 
let  us  briefly  review  the  results  of  our  investigations  as  to 
Insurgent  cooperation  with  the  American  forces  up  to  this 

Taylor  has  made  the  following  excellent  summary  of 
the  case :  — 

"Up  to  this  time  Aguinaldo  had  continued  a  desultory  war- 
fare with  the  Spanish  troops  in  Manila.    That  none  of  his 

>  Flo  itH  Hlar. 

■  B«poTt  of  the  War  Deputment,  1899,  Vol.  I,  part  IV,  pp.  fr-lO. 



attoiclra  vere  very  eerious  is  shown  from  the  Spanish  reports  of 
casualties ;  but  although  he  had  failed  to  secure  the  suirender 
of  the  city  to  himself,  he  had  kept  its  garrison  occupied  and 
within  their  works.  The  American  force  on  land  was  now 
strong  enough  to  be^  offensive  operations.  So  far  the  rela- 
tions between  the  Americans  and  Aguinaldo  had  not  been  really 
Mendly.  They  were  in  his  way,  and  yet  he  could  not  break 
with  them,  for  he  hoped  to  use  them  for  the  attainment  of  the 
designs  which  he  had  by  this  time  frankly  declared.  The 
Americans  had  listened  to  these  declarations,  and  had  not  an- 
swered them,  nor  was  it  possible  to  answer  them.  The  American 
forces  were  there  under  the  instructions  of  the  President  to 
make  war  on  Spam  and  to  establish  a  military  government  in 
the  Philippines.  Aguinaldo  had  declared  himself  a  dictator 
and  the  Philippines  independent.  To  have  recognized  him  in 
his  civil  capacity,  to  have  dealt  with  him  In  his  civil  capacity, 
would  have  meant  a  recognition  of  his  government  by  the 
military  commander  in  the  field  —  a  thing  impossible  and  un- 
lawful. Officers  of  the  United  States  forces  are  not  empowered 
to  recognize  governments ;  that  function  is  reserved  to  the 
Preudent  of  ^e  United  States;  and  in  this  case  he,  in  his 
orders  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  May  19,  copies  of  which 
were  forwarded  to  General  Merritt  for  his  guidance,  informed 
him  that  the  army  of  occupation  was  sent  to  the  Philippines 
'for  the  twofold  purpose  of  completing  the  reduction  of  the 
Spanish  power  in  that  quarter  and  of  giving  order  and  security 
to  the  i^aads  while  in  the  possession  of  the  United  States.' 
These  instructions  contemplated  the  establishment  of  a  mili- 
tary government  in  the  archipelago  by  military  officials  of  the 
United  States. 

"It  is  true  that  in  spite  of  the  date  of  these  instructions 
General  Merritt  in  San  Francisco  had  received  no  copy  of  them 
on  August  28,  three  days  after  the  departure  of  General  Ander- 
son, and  what  that  officer  knew  of  them  could  only  have  been 
what  General  Merritt  remembered  of  the  contents  of  an  un- 
signed copy  of  them  shown  him  at  the  White  House,  but  they 
were  in  accordance  with  the  practice  of  the  United  Stat^ 
Government  in  occupying  conquered  territory,  that  practice 
General  Anderson  well  knew,  and  his  relations  with  Aguinaldo 
were  guided  by  it. 

"It  has  been  claimed  that  Aguinaldo  and  his  followers 
received  the  impression  at  this  time  from  their  conversation 



with  American  officers  that  the  United  States  would  un- 
doubtedly recognize  the  independence  of  the  Philippines,  and 
that  the  cooperation  of  the  insurgents  was  due  to  this  impres- 
sion. There  was  no  cooperation.  That  he  attempted  in  vun 
to  secure  the  surrender  of  Manila  to  himself  was  not  codpera- 
tion.  Th&t  he  refrained  from  attacking  the  Americans  and 
occasionally  permitted  them  to  be  furnished  supplies,  for  which 
they  paid,  was  not  cooperation.  The  fact  that  for  a  time  their 
plans  and  his  plans  were  parallel  does  not  mean  cooperation, 
Aguinaldo  was  forced  by  the  exigencies  of  the  situation,  by  the 
necessity  of  strengthening  his  hold  upon  the  people,  by  the 
necessities  of  bis  operations  against  the  Spaniards,  to  make 
Spaniards  and  natives  alike  believe  that  all  that  he  did  was 
with  the  aid  of  the  Americans  by  whom  he  would  be  supported 
in  all  his  acts.  He  needed  their  support,  and  if  he  could  not 
obtain  that  he  needed  the  appearance  of  their  support  for  the 
attainment  of  his  ends ;  and  this  he  was  foroed  to  purchase 
by  compliance,  or  apparent  compliance,  with  their  demands. 
But  his  compliance  with  them,  as  all  American  officers  serving 
there  well  kiiew,  was  never  willing,  was  never  complete,  and 
was  never  given  except  under  pressure.  It  is  true  that  writers 
upon  the  subject,  speaking  with  the  confidence  which  is  bom 
of  insufficient  and  incomplete  information,  assure  their  readers 
that  any  government  but  that  of  the  United  States,  any  colonial 
administrators  but  Americans,  would  have  been  able  to  obtain 
the  hearty  cooperation  of  Aguinaldo  and  his  followers  by  judi- 
cious concessions  to  them  at  this  time.  The  only  concession 
which  would  have  obtained  that  hearty  cooperation  would  have 
been  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  Philippines 
under  a  United  States  protectorate,  of  Aguinaldo  clothed  with 
the  plenitude  of  the  powers  of  the  Katiptinan  as  dictator,  and 
a  promise  to  promptly  withdraw  from  the  islands.  Tliis  prom- 
ise the  Government  of  the  United  States  could  not  make. 
Until  the  ratification  of  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Spain  the  insiu*- 
gents  of  the  Philippine  Islands  were  rebellious  subjects  of  Spun, 
and  with  them,  except  as  fighting  men,  no  relations  could  be  had. 

"No  report  of  operations  or  returns  of  strength  were  rendered 
by  Aguinaldo  at  this  or  any  other  time  to  any  American  com- 
mander, and  no  American  commander  ever  rendered  such  re- 
turns to  him.  At  the  time  of  General  Merritt's  arrival,  and 
until  Manila  was  occupied  by  the  Americans,  the  insurgents 
and  United  States  troops  were  united  solely  by  the  fact  that 
they  had  Manila  as  a  common  objective.    Conditions  were 



HucI)  that  the  Americans,  in  order  to  obtain  its  surrender,  had 
to  avoid  doing  anything  which  might  cause  the  insurgents  to 
attack  them  and  per^ps  make  terms  with  Spain;  while 
Aguinaldo  and  his  followers,  in  order  to  accomplish  the  sur- 
render of  Manila  to  themselves,  had  to  muntain  such  relations 
with  the  Americans  as  would  induce  the  Spaniards  to  believe 
that  their  fieet  was  at  bis  disposal,'  and  also  such  apparent 
harmonj'  and  co5peration  with  them  in  the  execution  of  their 
plans  that  the  recalcitrant  among  the  Filipinos  would  be  forced 
to  believe  that  the  Americans  would  in  ail  ways  use  their  forces 
to  support  Aguinaldo  in  the  attainment  of  his  desires. 

"General  Merritt  saw  this  and  the  necessity  for  immediately 
taking  such  steps  as  would  lead  to  his  occupation  of  Manila. 
With  the  arrival  of  the  third  expedition  he  was  able  to  pass 
through  the  insurgent  hnes  between  Camp  Dewey  and  Manila, 
for  he  had  sufficient  force  to  accept  no  refusal  from  Aguinaldo. 

"In  his  report  he  said  that  the  insurgents  had  obtained  posi- 
tions of  investment  opposite  the  Spanish  lines  along  their  full 
extent,  and  that  on  the  bay  front  their  lines  ran  within  800 
yards  of  San  Antonio  Abad.  The  approaches  to  the  beach  and 
village  of  Pasay  were  in  their  possession. 

" '  This  anomalous  state  of  affairs,  namely,  having  a  line  of 
quasi-hostile  native  troops  between  our  forces  and  the  Spanish 
position,  was,  of  course,  very  objectionable,  but  it  was  difficult 
to  deal  with  owing  to  the  peculiar  conditions  of  our  relations 
with  the  insurgents.  ...  As  General  Aguinaldo  did  not  visit 
me  on  my  arrival  nor  offer  his  services  as  a  subordinate  military 
leader,  and  aa  my  instructions  from  the  President  fully  con- 
templated the  occupation  of  the  islands  by  the  American  land 
forces,  and  stated  that  "the  powers  of  the  mihtary  occupant  are 
absolute  and  supreme  and  inmiediately  operate  upon  the  polit- 
ical condition  of  the  inhabitants,"  I  did  not  consider  it  wise  to 
hold  any  direct  communication  with  the  insurgent  leader  until 
I  should  be  in  possession  of  the  city  of  Manila,  especially  as  I 
would  not  until  then  be  in  a  position  to  issue  a  proclamation 
and  enforce  my  authority  in  the  event  that  his  pretensions 
should  clash  with  my  designs.  For  these  reasons  the  prepara- 
tions for  the  attack  on  the  city  were  pressed  and  the  miUtary 
operations  conducted  without  reference  to  the  situation  of  the 
insurgent  forces.  The  wisdom  of  this  course  was  subsequently 
fully  established  by  the  fact  that  when  the  troops  at  my  com- 
mand carried  the  Spanish  entrenchments,  extending  from  the 
sea  to  the  Pasay  road  on  the  eirtreme  Spanish  right,  we  were 
*  8m  Buenoamino's  letter  to  J&udineB,  p.  108. 



under  no  obLigation,  by  prearranged  plans  of  the  mutual  attack, 
to  turn  to  the  right  wd  clear  the  m>nt  atill  held  by  the  ioaur- 
gent«,  but  were  able  to  move  forward  at  once  and  occupy  the 
city  and  the  auburbe.' "  * 

All  that  the  Insurgeate  and  the  Americang  ever  had  in 
common  was  an  enemy.  They  each  fought  that  enemy 
in  their  own  way.  There  was  no  cooperation.  On  the 
part  of  the  Insurgents  there  was  treachery.  I  will  submit 
further  evidence  of  this  fact. 

'  Taylor  36  AJ.  «( aeq. 



The  Pbbmeditatbd  Instjroent  Attack 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  minutes  of  the  session 
of  the  Hong  Kong  junta  at  which  Aguinaldo  reported  the 
result  of  his  negotiations  with  Pratt  and  received  his  in- 
structions relative  to  the  trip  to  Manila,  recorded  the 
fact  that  there  would  be  no  better  occasion  for  the  expedi- 
tionary forces  "to  arm  themselves  at  the  expense  of  the 
Americans,"  and  that  provided  with  arms  the  Filipino 
people  would  be  able  to  oppose  themselves  to  the  United 
States  and  combat  their  demands  if  they  attempted  to 
colonize  the  country.* 

The  possible,  if  not  the  probable,  desirability  of  attack- 
ing the  United  States  troops  was,  it  is  evident,  clearly 
foreseen  from  the  beginning.  Active  preparations  for 
doing  this  now  soon  began. 

Although  Insurgent  officers  in  full  imiform  freely 
visited  Manila  at  all  times,  Aguinaldo  wrote  on  Octob^  1 
to  his  commands  in  Laguna  Province  that  he  must  not 
permit  Americans  there  without  passes.  He  was  to  get 
rid  of  them  civilly,  but  he  was  to  keep  them  out  and  in- 
form all  authorities  there  of  his  instructions. 

On  August  24  an  American  soldier  was  killed  and 
others  were  wounded  in  Cavite  by  Insurgent  troops  who 
fired  from  behind.  An  Insurgent  officer  in  Cavite  at  the 
time  reported  on  his  record  of  services  that  he  — 

"took  part  in  the  movement  against  the  Americans  on 
the  afteraoon  of  the  24th  of  August,  under  the  orders  of  the 
commander  of  the  troops  and  the  adjutant  of  the  poet." 



This  shows  that  the  movement  was  ordered,  but  the 
Insurgents  promptly  realized  that  it  was  ill  advised. 

On  August  28  General  Llanera  was  reported  to  be  pre- 
paring for  operations  against  the  Americans.  He  was 
ordered  to  suspend  his  preparations,  llie  same  day 
General  P.  Mercado  Rizal,  commanding  in  Laguna 
Province,  wrote  Mabini  asking  whether  they  were  to 
consider  the  Americans  as  their  allies  or  their  enemies. 
He  wanted  to  know  whether  the  war  was  to  stop  or  con- 
tinue becoming  more  furious.  This  not  because  he 
desired  to  ask  questions  about  the  secrets  of  the  govern- 
ment, but  because  he  wished  to  prepare  the  minds  of  the 
people  for  the  future.  Mabini's  answer  has  not  been 

We  have  already  noted  that  on  Autgust  8  Fernando 
Acevedo  wrote  General  PIo  del  Pilar  recommending  that 
he  attack  and  annihilate  the  American  troops ;  that  on 
August  10  Pilar  wrote  Aguinaldo  suggesting  that  the 
Americans  be  attacked,  and  that  on  August  17  Aguinaldo 
stated :  "The  conflict  is  coming  sooner  or  later."  ' 

At  this  time  Sandico  entered  the  service  of  the  Ameri- 
cans as  an  interpreter  and  acted  as  a  spy,  endeavouring 
to  keep  his  people  fiUly  informed  relative  to  the  plans  and 
acts  of  his  employers.  Incidentally  he  endeavoured  to 
convince  the  latter  that  the  barbarities  really  committed 
by  Insurgent  officers  and  troops  in  Manila  were  perpe- 
trated by  enemies  of  the  Insurgent  cause  who  wished  to 
discredit  it. 

In  a  letter  dated  September  21,  1898,  Apacible  saya 
that  the  conflict  will  come  sooner  or  later  and  asks  Agui- 
naldo if  it  would  not  be  better  for  them  to  provoke  it 
before  the  Americans  concentrate  their  troops.* 

'  P.  I.  R.,  427.  1. 

*  "The  insolent  oommentKry  of  the  Amerioan  Consul  here,  if  it  is 
true,  clearly  ehowa  the  intention  of  Amerioa  to  impose  her  will  upon 
ua  by  force.  In  this  case,  the  oonfliot  will  oome  sooner  or  later.  Would 
it  not  be  better  for  ub  to  provoke  the  oonfliot  while  the  Amenoans 









On  September  10  General  Garcia  reported  to  Aguinaldo 

that  on  the  previotis  oi^t  the  Americans  had  attempted 
to  push  back  his  line  at  San  Lazaro,  and  that  morning 
had  concentrated  and  penetrated  the  Insurgent  territory, 
making  a  reconnaissance  through  the  fields  about  Sam- 
paloc.  Aguinaldo  put  an  indorsement  on  this  communi- 
cation saying  that  he  had  long  since  ordered  that  the  In- 
surgent line  should  not  be  passed.  He  instructed  Garcia 
to  throw  troops  in  front  of  the  Americans  at  Sampaloc, 
and  order  them  to  leave,  and  to  warn  the  bolo  men. 
Obviously,  little  more  was  needed  to  provoke  an  Insurgent 

An  unsigned  draft  of  an  order  in  Aguinaldo's  hand- 
writing dated  Malolos,  September  13  (?),  1898,*  shows 
how  tense  was  the  situation  while  the  question  of  with- 
drawal of  the  Insurgent  forces  from  the  city  of  Manila 
was  under  consideration.  It  contains  instructions  for 
General  Pio  del  Pilar,  General  P.  Garcia  and  General 
Noriel  or  Colonel  Cailles.  Their  purpose  is  hardly  open 
to  doubt. 

General  Pio  del  Pilar  was  directed :  — 

"To  have  a  detachment  posted  in  the  interval  from  the 
branch  of  the  river  of  Paco  in  a  northerly  direction  to  the 
bridge  and  so  on  up  to  the  Fadg  river  in  the  direction  of  Paoda- 
can,  the  river  servii^  as  a  line  until  the  suburb  of  Panque  is 
reached  which  will  be  under  our  jurisdiction.     Proceed  to  exe- 

have  not  aa  yet  oo&oentnted  their  troops  there  ?  Or  would  it  be  better 
to  w^t  for  tbe  results  of  the  Congress  of  Puis  ?  This  question  should 
be  answered  immediatelj  by  the  oommittee  on  foreign  relations  of 
the  Congress  of  representatives  and  the  decisioii  should  be  sent  at 
onoe  to  us  so  that  we  oan  proceed  aooording  to  your  instruotions." 
—  P.I,  R.,453.  11. 

'"  I  gave  an  order  long  ago  not  to  permit  our  line  to  be  passed,  and 
to  say  frankly  that  it  was  by  my  order.  To  be  prepared  to  deteai  our 
rights  you  are  ordered  to  place  troops  in  front  of  Amcrioan  position  at 
Bampaloe  and  to  tell  them  plainly  to  leave,  to  warn  the  ^mdalahan 
(bolo  men.  —  D.  C.  W.)  and  get  everything  ready;  you  must  warn 
the  commanders  of  the  zones  about  Manilft  Do  not  forget,  whenever 
In  doubt."  —  P.  I.  R.,  8«. 

'P.  I.  R..  88.  9. 

VOL,  I  —  K 



cute  this  order  on  its  receipt,  posting  detachm^its  where  they 
are  necessary  and  trenches  will  be  made  without  loss  of  time 
working  day  and  night.  Do  not  rest  for  by  doing  so  we  may  lose 
the  opportunity ;  beg  of  the  troops  to  assist  in  the  formation 
of  intrenchments.  Matters  have  a  bad  aspect,  we  especiaily 
expect  somethit^  Wednesday  and  Thursday,  the  15th  and  16ui 
of  this  month.  The  danger  is  imminwit  on  tie  mentioned  days, 
also  in  the  time  that  follows. 

"Keep  strict  vigilance  at  all  hours.  In  case  you  receive 
orders  to  leave  that  place,  do  not  do  so  on  any  account  without 
my  orders,  happen  what  may.  .  .  . 

"  Ckmcentrate  ali  your  forces  in  Santa  Ana  b^ore  the  day 

"  Warn  your  soldiers  against  firing  at  random  as  the  Span- 
iards did,  if  possible  have  them  calculate  the  number  of  their 
antagonists  and  how  much  ammunition  there  is  in  comparison 
with  the  number  of  the  attacking  force,  in  fact,  there  are  oooa- 
uons  when  each  shot  fired  kills  as  many  as  four  mcai. 

"  I  hope  you  will  see  to  the  execution  of  these  instructions 
and  that  you  will  maintain  the  honour  of  the  Philippines  by  your 
courage  fuid  in  no  way  permit  your  rights  to  be  tramfded  under- 
foot." 1 

General  Garcia  was  instructed  as  follows :  — 
"On  Wednesday,  the  14th  of  this  month,  you  will  post  de- 
tachments in  the  points  indicated  by  lines  on  the  enclosed  plan. 
On  receipt  of  this  and  as  soon  as  you  learn  its  contents,  proceed 
secretly  to  determine  the  most  suitable  places  to  post  detach- 
ments and  immediately  post  our  troops  and  have  intrenchments 
made  employing  day  and  night  in  this  work.    Beg  this  of  our 

The  instructions  to  Noriel  or  Cailles  read  as  follows :  — 
"At  dght  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  Wednesday,  the  14th, 
withdraw  your  command  from  the  town  of  Malate  as  indicated 
on  the  enclosed  plan,  from  the  bridge  in  Singalong  and  in  a 
Btra^ht  line  from  there  to  the  branch  of  the  river  in  Paco  will 
be  the  line  of  our  jurisdiction  even  though  we  may  not  be  of 
one  mind  in  the  matter.  On  receipt  of  this  proceed  to  determine 
the  most  suitable  plac^  to  post  our  troops  even  if  they  are  not 
supplied  with  batteries ;  on  posting  the  detachments  pve  in- 
structions to  have  intrenchments  made  immediately  without 
«P.  I.  R.,88.0.  'Ibid. 



reetmg,  eepecially  on  the  days  of  the  ISth  and  16th.  Since 
afFaira  have  a  serious  aspect,  do  not  loee  vigilance  and  be  on  the 
alert  at  all  times.  .  .  , 

"  Concentrate  all  the  forces  and  have  a  call  to  arms  in  Cavite 
BO  that  all  the  troops  may  be  in  Pasay  on  Wednesday  night. 

"  In  case  the  Americans  attempt  to  order  you  out  do  not  leave 
your  poets,  happen  what  may,  but  exercise  prudence  and  be 
prepared  leaving  them  to  give  the  provocation.  Answer  them 
that  you  have  no  instructiona  given  you  with  regard  to  what 
they  ask." ' 

Obviously  the  maintemuice  of  peace  at  this  time  hung 
by  a  very  slender  thread.  On  September  14  the  governor 
of  Cavite  tel^raphed  Aguinaido  aa  follows :  — 

"Moat  urgent.  I  desire  to  know  from  you  the  result  of  the 
ultimatum.  Advise  me  if  we  must  prepare  our  troops  for  ac- 
tion to-morrow.      I  await  a  reply."  * 

But  war  was  not  to  begin  at  this  time.  On  September 
23  Bray  wrote  to  Aguinaido  advising  him  to  maintain  a 
defensive  attitude  imtil  the  reeult  of  the  negotiations  at 
Paris  should  become  known,  giving  way  to  the  Americans 
and  not  showing  his  teeth.  He  coiild  take  the  offensive 
later  if  advisable  and  should  have  little  difficulty  in  settling 
accounts  with  the  American  eoldiers.' 

Bray  suggested  the  possibiUty  of  an  alliance  between 
the  American  and  the  Spanish  soldiers  if  a  conflict  should 
arise  before  the  departure  of  the  latter.* 

1  p.  I.  R.,  88.  9.  '  Thid..  849. 

■ "  Until  the  deuMon  of  the  Parii  CongrMi  is  knoim,  all  of  hb  here 
an  of  the  opinion  that  you  ihould  maintain  a  defensive  attitude  re- 
gardine  the  Amerioani,  giving  way  to  them  vith  regwd  to  Manila 
and  its  ouburbB  or  in  anythinr  they  may  wish,  although  apparently 
only,  and  not  ahow  them  your  teeth.  After  the  decision  of  the  Congress 
ts  known,  you  may  take  the  offenaiTe  if  advisable,  and  aocordiog  to  the 
Information  we  may  hare  of  the  American  soldiers  it  should  not  be 
difficult  for  you  and  your  army  to  settle  aooounts  with  them." 

—  P.I.  R..398.  6. 

*  "  If  you  and  the  Americans  should  happen  to  come  in  conflict 
before  the  departure  of  the  Spanish  soldiers,  it  might  happen  that 
the  Tankeee  would  enter  into  an  alliance  with  them  to  combat  the 
FilipinoB.    Think  well  over  this."  —  P.  I.  H..  398.  8. 



Meaawhile  preparations  for  the  attack  progressed. 
During  September,  Sandico  wrote  Aguinaldo  suggesting 
the  urgent  necessity  of  reorganizing  the  "masons"  and 
the  Katlptinan,'  and  that  all  be  furnished  with  knives, 
to  be  kept  hidden  so  that  they  might  be  "ready  for  any 

In  spite  of  efforts  to  keep  the  Insurgent  soldiers  in 
hand,  feeling  among  them  ran  high,  and  they  wanted  to 
fight.*  On  November  30,  1898,  General  Mascardo  tele- 
graphed from  San  Fernando  to  Aguinaldo  asking  if  he 
might  begin  firing  in  order  to  prevent  the  American  troops 
from  disembarking,  and  Aguinaldo  promptly  answered  in 
the  affirmative.* 

On  December  5  Malvar  telegraphed  from  Lipa  that 
according  to  a  despatch  from  Batangas,  American  divers 
were  working  unceasingly  and  that  a  subordinate  had 
ordered  that  they  be  fired  on  if  they  attempted  to  land. 
Aguinaldo  replied  that  he  did  not  mind  their  working  at 
sea,  but  that  they  must  not  be  allowed  to  land  under  any 

>"It  ifl  ftlso  of  urgent  neoesaitr,  SetLor  President,  to  reSetabliflh 

oonunitteea  in  all  the  suburbH  and  that  the  masoDs  uid  the  Katipliiuui 

be  reoi^»nized,  and  it  is  advisable  that  nil  be  provided  with  knives 

read;  for  any  event,  but  it  is  proper  that  these  aj-ma  be  hidden." 

—  P.  I.  R.,466.  9. 

■  "Our  soldiers  toe  always  desirous  of  flghting  in  order  to  bring 
affaira  to  an  end,  aa  they  are  very  resentful  with  regard  to  the  evaoua- 
tion  of  the  suburbs  mentioned."  —  P.  I.  R.,  Booka  C-1. 

'"Most  urgent.  Have  received  telegnphio  order  from  War 
Dept.,  whioh  saya:  'Prevent  Amerioan  troopa  from  disembarkjng.* 
In  oaM  they  insist  what  am  I  to  do  7     May  I  begin  firing  7  " 

This  tel^r&m  was  indorsed  by  Aguinaldo :  — 

"Answered  afBrmatively  December  1,  1898."  — P.  I.  R.,  849. 

*  "Most  urgent.  Aocording  to  despatch  from  Captain  detached  at 
Batangas,  American  divers  are  working  unceasingly.  Re  sftys  that  he 
ordered  them  to  be  fired  on  in  case  they  try  to  land.  Await  your 

Aguin&ldo's  reply  ran  aa  follows : — 

"I  do  not  mind  their  working  at  sea,  but  you  must  under  no  condi- 
tions allow  them  to  land  troops ;  be  brave  for  the  sake  of  your  Tag&log 
heart.    Approve  your  action."  —  P.  I.  R.,  1179. 2. 



On  Decembra  6  Sandico  tel^p>apbed  Aguinaldo  as 
follows :  — 

"The  difficulty  of  last  night  at  the  San  Ju&n  picket  with 
the  American  troops  has  beesa  adjusted  without  prejudice. 
Our  preparations  ought  to  continue.    Awaiting  ordeis."  ■ 

San  Juan  was  where  the  firing  commenced  on  February 
4,  1899. 

On  December  9  Callles  wired  Aguinaldo  as  follows :  — ■ 

"Report  to  you  that  there  are  3000  Americana  in  front  of 
our  position  at  Singalong.  I  do  not  know  what  th^  wish ;  if 
they  enter  Pineda  I  open  firo."  * 

By  this  time  the  Insurgents  had  made  up  their  minds 
that  the  Americans,  who  had  been  bearing  their  insults 
in  ^ence,  were  cowards.  Aguinaldo's  indorsement  on 
this  tel^;ram  reads :  — 

"Answered:  Nevertheless  the  3000  American  soldiers  are 
few  against  my  Colonel  and  his  300  soldiers,  and  I  believe  you 
have  more  thim  that  number.     E.  A.,  Dec.  12,  1898."  • 

R^ative  to  the  insults  which  were  at  this  time  showered 
upon  Americans,  Taylor  has  made  the  following  state- 

"Fortune  had  been  good  to  Aguinaldo  and  his  associates 
in  the  eight  months  during  which  the  United  States  had  pre- 
vented Spain  from  relieving  her  beleaguered  garrisons  in  the 
Philippines,  and  she  might  still  be  kind.  The  men  about 
Aguinaldo  who  had  risen  farthest  and  fastest  could  not  endure 
the  thought  of  having  to  accept  subordinate  positions  in  a  gov- 
ernment not  directed  by  themselves.  The  halberdiers  at  the 
door  of  the  palace  of  the  president  saluted  them  as  the  halber- 
diers at  the  doorway  of  his  lordship  the  governor-general  in 
Manila  had  struck  the  marble  steps  with  their  halberds  at  the 
coming  of  the  Spanish  generals.  They  swaggered  down  the 
streets  of  Maloloe,  clashing  their  swords  behind  them,  and  they 
knew  that  if  they  won,  the  Philippines  would  be  divided  into 
fiefs  which  they,  as  dukes  and  marquises,  would  hold  in  feudal 
tenure  from  a  Malay  potentate.    They  were  confident.    They 

ip.LB.,8W.  *Ihid.  'Ibid.  *56AJ. 



held  Luz6n.  They  held  the  people.  They  had  no  mtention 
of  returning  to  office  stools  or  to  the  life  of  outlaws  and  hunted 
men.  The  United  States  force  in  Manila  was  small  and 
America  was  far.  It  was  true  that  they  might  have  to  ^ht  for 
the  prize  which  they  had  seized,  but  the  military  leaders  about 
Agumaldo  were  confident  of  winning  in  case  they  fought.  They 
bdieved  the  Americans  were  afraid  of  them  and  would  be  easily 
beaten.  American  soldiers  had  been  sdzed  and  had  been  in- 
sulted by  the  followers  of  Aguinaldo  and  no  resort  had  been 
made  to  force.  The  Americans  had  been  ordered  to  avoid 
brining  on  an  engagement  and  had  obeyed.  It  is  also  probable 
that  many  of  the  insults  to  which  they  had  been  subjected  were 
not  appreciated  by  them,  A  tall  soldier  from  western  America 
paid  no  attention  to  the  insults  hurled  at  him  in  a  language 
which  he  did  not  understand.  And  yet  the  small  excited  Fili- 
pinos might  retire  feeling  that  the  American  had  tamely  sub- 
mitted to  insult  worse  than  a  blow." 

By  the  middle  of  December,  Aguinaldo  had  placed  in 
position  in  the  vicinity  of  Manila  all  of  the  &Ad  guns  in 
his  possession. 

liie  Treaty  of  Paris  was  signed  on  December  10.  It 
provided  for  the  termination  of  Spanish  sovereignty  in 
the  Philippines.  This  was  what  the  Insurgents  had  been 
waiting  for,  and  thereafter  things  moved  rapidly.  It  Is 
obvious  that  an  attack  was  definitely  planned  for  at  this 
time,  for  on  December  21,  Commandant  F.  E.  Rey  tele- 
graphed Aguinaldo  that  the  second  chief  of  the  second 
zone  of  Manila  had  directed  him  to  assist  by  entering 
that  city  as  soon  as  they  opened  fire  against  the  American 

On  the  following  day  Cailles  reported  that  he  had 
occupied  blockhouse  No.  12,  which  was  within  the 
American  lines,  and  added  the  following  significant 
statement :  — 

'■  "We  are  oonatantly  alarmed  here  hy  American  troops  who  wioh 
to  come  within  the  military  line.  To-day  received  word  from  eeoosd 
ohief,  second  Bone,  Manila,  that  as  soon  as  they  opened  fire  against 
the  Amerioan  troops  I  a«sist  by  entering  Manila.  I  have  do  orders 
in  thiB  matter;  I  await  your  direotiona."  —  P.  I.  R.,  8W. 



"The  order  of  yesterday  waa,  on  hearing  the  first  shote  from 
Santa  Ana,  for  my  whole  force  to  hurl  themselves  on  the  Ameri- 
can line  of  trenches,  and  to  follow  the  Uving  to  Manila.  The 
dead  con  he  with  the  dead.  Yesterday  we  were  content  waiting 
for  the  arming  of  the  San  Quintin."  * 

San  Quintin's  Bay  was  the  anniversary  of  the  Sicilian 
vespera,  the  massacre  of  the  French  in  Sicily  in  1268. 
Obviously  the  Insurgents  were  planning  sometMng  similar 
for  Manila. 

For  some  reason  the  attack  was  not  made  as  planned, 
but  there  was  no  intention  of  abandoning  it.  Within 
fifteen  days  of  January  1  some  40,000  Filipinos  left  Manila. 
Why  7  On  January  7,  Aguinaldo  wrote  to  Seflor  Benito 
L^arda  at  Manila,  saying :  — 

"I  b^  you  to  leave  Manila  with  yoiu*  family  and  come  here 
to  Malolos,  but  not  because  I  wish  to  frighten  you  —  I  merdy 
wish  to  warn  you  for  your  satisfaction,  although  it  is  not  yet  the 
day  or  the  week."  * 

Many  details  of  the  plan  of  attack  have  come  into  our 
possession.  Doctor  Manuel  Xeres  Bui^os  wrote  Agui- 
naldo during  January  relative  to  a  plui  for  an  uprisii^  of 
the  prisoners  in  BiUbid  Prison,  saying  that  it  should  by 
all  means  come  "before  the  movement  is  begun  any- 
where else,"  and  calling  attention  to  the  necessity  of 
stationing  men  to  prevent  the  American  soldiers  near 
by  in  the  Zorilla  theatre  from  coming  to  the  rescue.  On 
the  back  of  this  letter  there  is  a  sketch  plan  showing 
where  bolo  men  were  to  be  stationed,  ready  to  attack 
these  Boldiere.' 

'  P.  I.  R.,  849. 

■  Taylor,  70  AJ. 

*  "  It  ia  absolutely  neoeasary  that  an  order  be  received  here  permit- 
tins  the  uprising  of  those  in  prison  before  the  movement  ia  begun  any- 
where tAao ;  in  the  prison  the  word  ihall  be  given  at  the  moment  the 
bugle  sounds  retreat;  it  ia  indispensable  that  some  of  our  party  be 
I^epared  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Iris  bridge,  San  Pedro  street  and  Dulum- 
bnyan  bridge,  in  order  to  prevent  the  Americans  quartered  in  the 
Fennsylvania  barracks  (Zorilla  theatre)  from  aiding  those  in  the 
priwn-"  —  P.  L  B.,  73.  3. 




In  his  message  to  Congress  dated  Jantiaiy  1,  1899, 
Agulnaldo  said :  — 

"I  consider  argumenta  unnecessary  in  support  of  the  pro- 
posed amendments,  every  one  knows  that  our  newborn  R^ublic 
now  has  to  fight  for  ito  existence  against  giants  in  ambition  and 
in  power."  • 

An  unsigned  letter  addressed  to  Apacible  on  Janiuiiy  4, 
1899,  contains  the  foilowiog  statement :  — 

"It  appears  that  conflict  with  the  Americans  is  imminent 
and  inevitable.  Several  of  their  vessels  with  thousands  of 
soldiers  commanded  by  General  Miller  were  sent  to  Iloilo  on 
December  20th  last  to  take  that  port  together  with  the  whole 
of  Visayas  and  Mindanao."  * 

On  January  4  the  following  significaDt  telegram  was 
sent  out :  — 

"Circular  Telegram  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  to  Pro- 
vincial Presidents,  wherever  there  may  be  Tel^p'aphic 
Service,  to  be  communicated  to  the  Local  Chiefs  of  each 

"  Malolos,  January  4,  1899,  9.35  a.1iI. 
"To  the  Provincial  President  of  the  Province  of  Paogasin^ : 
"Hasten  the  preparation  of  all  the  towns  in  order  to  oppose 
the  American  invasion.  See  that  all  the  inhabitants  prepare 
their  bolos  and  daggers;  also  that  in  each  street  and  barrio 
national  militia  is  organized,  each  six  of  whom  should  be  com- 
manded by  a  corporal,  each  thirteen  by  a  sei^eant,  each  twenty- 
six  by  a  second  lieutenant,  each  fifty-two  by  a  first  lieutenant, 
and  each  one  hundred  and  four  by  a  captain,  directing  that  the 
soldiers  of  the  national  militia  elect  their  own  officers,  informing 
all  that  upon  our  attitude  depends  our  salvation. 

"LiNGATBN,  January  4,  1899." 

There  is  a  note  thereon  which  reads :  — 

"  C(Hnmunicate  this  to  all  of  the  local  chiefs,  and  to  the  com- 
manding general ." 

(Signed  by  initials  which  are  ill^ble,  but  evidently  those 
of  the  Provincial  President.)  * 

«P.  I.  B.,40.  8.  • /Wd.,  Books  C-1.  *  Ibid.,  llil.  3. 




a  1 





On  January  5,  1809,  Aguinaldo  issued  a  proclamation 
which  contains  tbe  following  statement :  — 

"The  said  generals  accepted  my  concessions  in  favor  of  peace 
and  friendship  as  indications  of  weakness.  Thus  it  is,  that 
with  rising  ambition,  they  ordered  forces  to  Iloilo  on  December 
26,  with  the  purpose  of  acquiring  for  themselves  the  title  of 
conquerors  of  that  portion  of  the  Philippine  Islands  occupied 
by  my  government. 

"My  government  cannot  renuun  indifferent  in  view  of  such 
a  violent  and  aggressive  seizure  of  a  portion  of  its  territory  by 
a  nation  which  has  arrogated  to  itself  the  title,  'champion  of 
oppressed  nations.'  Thus  it  is  that  my  government  is  ready 
to  open  hostilities  if  the  Amencsn  troops  attempt  to  take  forci- 
ble poesesaion  of  the  Visayan  Islands.  I  announce  these  rights 
before  the  world,  in  order  that  the  conscience  of  mankind  may 
pronounce  its  infallible  verdict  as  to  who  are  the  true  oppres- 
sors of  nations  and  the  tormentors  of  human  kind. 

"Upon  their  heads  be  all  the  blood  which  may  be  shed."  '■ 

Three  days  later  this  proclamation,  which  was  rather 
dangerously  like  a  declaration  of  war,  was  reissued  with 
a  significant  change  in  the  last  one  of  the  passages  quoted, 
the  words  "attempt  to  take  forcible  possession  of  any 
part  of  the  territory  submitted  to  its  jurisdiction"  being 
substituted  for  the  words ' '  attempt  to  take  forcible  posses- 
sion of  tiie  Visayan  Islands." 

On  January  8,  1899,  at  9.40  P.U.,  Sandico  telegraphed 
Aguinaldo  as  follows :  — 

"  Note.  —  In  consequence  of  the  orders  of  General  Rios 
to  his  officers,  as  soon  as  the  Filipino  attack  b^ns  the  Ameri- 
cans should  be  driven  into  the  Intramuros  district  and  the 
Walled  city  should  be  set  on  fire."  * 

Preparations  for  the  attack,  which  was  to  be^  inside 
the  city  of  Manila,  were  now  rapidly  pushed  to  conclu- 
fidon.    I  quote  Taylor's  excellent  summary  of  them :  — 

"After  Aguinaldo's  proclamation  of  January  5  the  number 
of  oi^anizatione  charg^  with  an  attack  within  the  city  in- 
•  P.  I.  B.,  1186.  10.  » Ibid..  849. 



creased  rfq)idly  and  it  ia  possible  that  those  which  bad  been 
formed  during  Spanish  rule  had  never  been  disbanded.  San- 
dico'a  clubs  for  athletic  exercises  and  mutual  improvem^it 
formed  a  nucleus  for  these  bodies  uid  the  directing  bouds  of 
the  popular  committees  took  up  the  work  of  recruiting,  while 
some  of  the  members  became  officers  of  the  militia  or  san- 
datahan.  On  January  6  the  commander  of  militia  in  Troso, 
Manila,  reported  that  1130  soldiers  had  been  em'olled  by  the 
popular  committee.  On  January  7  Bonifacio  Ardvalo  for- 
warded to  the  head  of  the  central  committee  a  list  of  the 
officers  of  the  battalion  which  had  just  been  organized  in  Sam- 
paloc  for  the  defence  of  their  liberties.  Apparently  about  the 
same  time  J.  Limjap  submitted  to  Sandico  a  project  for 
arming  the  prisoners  in  Bilibid  Prison  with  the  urns  of  the 
American  s(ddier8  quartered  in  the  ZorriUa  Theatre  across  the 
street.     He  said :  — 

'"Jacinto  Limjap  having  been  proclaimed  commander  of 
the  volunteers  of  the  penitentiary,  I  ask  you  to  authorize  the 
creation  of  a  disciplinary  battalion  and  the  provisioQal  appoint- 
ments of  officers  for  600  eandatahan,  or  militia,  ready  to  provide 
themselves  by  force  with  the  American  rifles  in  the  Zonilla 

"He  followed  by  a  statement  of  the  officers  desired.  It 
was  not  difficult  for  him  to  obtain  volunteers  there  to  rob,  to 
bum,  to  rape  and  to  murder.  These  were  the  crimes  for  which 
they  were  serving  sentences.    The  political  priaonera  had  been 

"On  January  18  Sandico  approved  of  the  officers  for  the  first 
battalion  organized  by  the  committees  of  Sampaloc ;  on  January 
27  he  approved  those  of  the  second  battalion.  By  January  22 
two  battalions  had  been  organized  in  Quiapo.  At  least  one 
regiment  of  eight  companies  was  raised  in  Blnondo,  for  on  Jan- 
uary 23  its  commander  forwarded  a  roll  of  the  officers  to  Agui- 
naldo  for  his  approval.  ...  On  January  25  T.  Sandico,  at 
Malolos,  submitted  for  approval  the  names  of  a  number  of  offi- 
cers of  the  territorial  militia  in  the  city  of  Manila.  On  January 
30,  1899,  a  roll  of  four  companies  just  organized  in  Malate  was 
forwarded  approved  by  T.  Sandico,  and  on  the  sune  day  the 
committee  of  Trozo,  Manila,  applied  to  T.  Sandico  for  permis- 
sion to  recruit  a  body  for  the  defence  of  the  country.  The  r^- 
ment  of '  Armas  Blancas '  had  already  been  raised  in  Tondo  and 
Binondo.  It  was  in  existence  there  in  December,  1898,  and 
may  have  been  originally  organized  to  act  against  Spain.  On 
February  2  all  officers  of  the  territorial  militia  in  Manila  reported 



at  Coloocsn,  in  aficorduice  with  orders  of  Sandico,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  receiving  their  commisBionB  and  taking  the  oath  to  the 
flag.  A  man  who  took  part  in  tliis  ceremony  wrote  that  a  multi- 
tude of  men  were  present  in  uniform,  and  that  the  oath  was  ad- 
ministered by  Gen.  Pantaledn  Garcia.  There  is  no  reason  for 
believing  that  this  is  a  complete  statement  of  sandatahan  or- 
ganJEed  in  Manila  by  the  end  of  January,  and  yet  this  statement 
gives  a  force  of  at  least  6330  men.  General  Otis  said  that  this 
force  bad  been  reported  to  him  as  being  10,000  men.  It  is  prob- 
ably true  that  only  a  small  number  of  them  bad  rifles ;  but 
armed  with  long  knives  and  da^ers  they  could  have  inflicted 
much  damage  in  a  sudden  n^ht  attack  in  the  narrow  and 
badly  l^hted  streets  of  Manila.  On  January  9,  1S99,  Agui- 
Daldo  wrote  his  instructions  for  the  sandatahan  of  Mamla. 
Members  of  this  body  were  to  enter  the  houses  of  the  American 
officers  on  the  pretext  of  bringing  them  presents.  Once  in  they 
were  to  kill.  The  sentinels  at  the  gates  of  the  barracks  were  to 
be  approached  by  men  dressed  as  women  and  killed.  The  gates 
of  the  barracks  held  and  as  many  officers  as  possible  treacber^ 
ously  murdered,  the  sandatahan  were  to  rise  throughout  the 
city,  and  by  attacking  in  the  rear  the  United  States  troops  on 
the  outer  line  were  to  aid  in  opening  a  way  for  Aguinaldo's 
force.  To  further  increase  the  confusion  and  perhaps  to  punish 
the  natives  who  bad  not  joined  them,  the  sandatahan  were  to 
fire  the  city. 

•  ••*••• 

"  It  is  a  fair  deduction  from  Luna's  orders  for  an  uprising  in 
Manila,  from  AguiiuJdo's  instructions  for  the  sandatahan, 
from  otiier  documents  amoi^  the  papers  of  the  insurgents  and 
from  what  was  done  in  Manila  on  February  22  that  Aguinaldo 
and  bis  advisers  about  the  middle  of  January,  1899,  drew  up  a 
plan  of  attack  upon  Manila  which  would,  if  carried  out,  have 
infficted  a  severe  blow  upon  the  Americans.  It  was  not  carried 
out,  but  that  was  not  the  fault  of  Aguinaldo  or  of  Luna. 

"  It  is  true  that  the  instructions  were  general ;  but  that  par- 
ticular instructions  were  given  by  Aguinaldo  himself  for  the 
murder  of  General  Otis  is  shown  by  his  note  on  the  back  of  a 
docimient  presented  to  him.' 

"...  And  then  there  was  nothing  abhorrent  to  Aguinaldo 
and  the  men  about  him  in  beginning  a  war  by  the  murder  of 
the  commaading  general  on  the  other  side. 




"...  Asuinaldo  and  all  his  followers  have  declared  that  on 
February  4  the  Americana  attacked  the  unsuspecting  Filipinos 
who  were  using  their  utmost  efforts  to  avoid  a  war.  And  yet 
here  in  Aguiufddo's  own  handwriting  is  the  record  of  the  fact 
that  on  January  10,  1899,  he  ordered  the  murder  of  the  Amer- 
ican commander. 

"The  attack  which  Aguinaldo  was  preparing  to  deliver  upon 
and  in  Muiila  was  not  to  be  a  mere  rud  aucb  as  the  bandits 
of  Cavite  were  in  the  habit  of  making  upon  the  defenceless 
towns.  The  plan  was  a  piece  of  calculated  savagery  in  which 
murder  and  outrage  were  considered  means  to  accomplish  a 
purpose.  The  servants  were  to  kill  their  employers;  organized 
bands,  dressed  in  the  dress  of  civilians,  living  in  the  city  of 
Manila  under  the  government  of  the  Americans,  in  many  cases 
employed  by  the  Americans,  were  to  suddenly  fall  upon  the 
barracks  of  the  American  soldiers  and  massacre  the  inmates; 
all  Americans  in  the  streets  were  to  be  killed,  the  city  was  to  be 
fired  and  its  loot  was  to  be  the  reward  of  loyalty  to  Aguinaldo. 
If  this  plan  had  b^n  carried  out  no  white  man  and  no  white 
woman  would  have  escaped.  The  reinforcements  from  the 
United  States  would  have  arrived  to  find  only  the  smokii^ 
ruins  of  Manila.  Buencamino  had  warned  General  Augustfn 
what  the  fate  of  Manila  would  be  if  taken  by  a  horde  of  Indians 
drunk  with  victory.  That  fate  was  now  deliberately  planned 
for  the  city.  Aguinaldo  planned  to  occupy  the  capitu  not  as 
it  bad  been  occupied  by  the  Americans.  He  planned  to  take 
it  as  Count  Tilly  took  Magdeburg. 

"The  authors  of  this  plan  were  not  savages.  Mabini,  San- 
dico,  and  Luna,  Asiatics  educated  in  Euro[>ean  schools,  were 
men  of  trained  and  subtle  minds.  With  themcruelty  and  assassi- 
nation was  not  a  matter  of  savage  impulse  but  of  deliberate 
calculation ;  with  them  assassination  was  employed  as  an  effec- 
tive addition  to  [wlitical  propaganda,  and  murder  as  an  ulti- 
mate resource  in  political  manceuvres."  ' 

Some  portions  of  Aguinaldo's  instructions  to  the  san- 
datakan  are  particularly  wortJiy  of  perpetuation,  as  they 
illustrate  his  ideas  as  to  the  conduct  which  should  be  ob- 
served by  cultured,  patriotic,  honoxu-able  and  very  humane 
men,  who  were  not  cruel :  — 

"Art.  3.    The  chief  of  those  who  go  to  attack  the  barracks 
should  send  in  first  four  men  with  a  good  present  for  the  Am^- 
'  Taylor,  68-69  AJ. 



can  commfuider.  Immedistely  after  will  follow  four  othera 
who  will  make  a  pretence  of  looldDg  for  the  same  officer  for  some 
reasoii  and  a  larger  group  shall  be  concealed  in  the  corners  or 
houses  in  order  to  aid  the  other  groups  at  the  first  signal.  This 
wherever  it  is  possible  at  the  moment  of  attack. 

"AvT.  4.  They  should  not,  prior  to  the  attack,  look  at  the 
Americans  in  a  threatening  manner.  To  the  contrary,  the 
attack  on  the  barracks  by  the  sandatahan  should  be  a  complete 
surprise  and  with  decision  and  courage.  One  should  go  alone 
in  advance  in  order  to  kill  the  sentinel.  In  order  to  deceive 
the  sentinel  one  of  tbem  should  dress  as  a  woman  and  must 
take  great  care  that  the  sentinel  is  not  able  to  discharge  his 
[Hece,  thus  calling  the  attention  of  those  in  the  barracks.  This 
will  enable  his  companions  who  are  approaching  to  asidst  in  the 
general  attack. 

"Abt.  5.  At  the  moment  of  the  attack  the  sandatahan 
should  not  attempt  to  secure  rifles  from  their  dead  enemies, 
but  shall  pursue,  slashing  right  and  left  with  boloe  until  the 
Am^icans  surrender,  and  after  there  remans  no  enemy  who 
can  injure  them,  they  may  take  the  rifles  in  one  hand  and  the 
ammunition  in  the  other. 

"Abt.  6.  The  officers  shall  take  care  that  on  the  tops  of 
the  houses  along  the  streets  where  the  American  forces  shall 
pass  there  will  be  placed  four  to  six  men,  who  shall  be  prepared 
with  stones,  timbers,  red-hot  iron,  heavy  furniture,  aa  well  as 
boiling  wat«r,  oil  and  molasses,  rags  soaked  in  coal  oil  ready 
to  be  lighted  and  thrown  down,  and  any  other  hard  and  heavy 
objects  that  they  can  throw  on  the  passing  American  troops. 
At  the  same  time  in  the  lower  parts  of  the  houses  will  be  con- 
cealed the  sandatahan,  who  will  attack  immediately.  Great 
care  should  be  taken  not  to  throw  glass  in  the  streets,  as  the 
greater  part  of  our  soldiers  go  barefooted.  On  these  houses 
there  will,  if  possible,  be  arranged,  in  addition  to  the  objects  to 
be  thrown  down,  a  number  of  the  sandatahan,  in  order  to  cover 
a  retreat  or  to  follow  up  a  rout  of  the  enemy's  column,  so  that 
we  may  be  sure  of  the  destruction  of  all  the  opposing  forces. 

"Art.  7.  All  FiU^nnos,  real  defenders  of  their  country, 
shoidd  live  on  the  alert  to  assist  simultaneously  the  inside  at- 
tack at  the  very  moment  that  they  note  the  first  movement 
in  whatever  barrio  or  suburb,  having  assurance  that  all  the 
troops  that  surround  Manila  will  proceed  without  delay  to  force 
the  enemy's  line  and  unite  themselves  with  their  brothers  in 
the  city.  With  such  a  general  movement,  so  firm  and  decided 
against  the  Americans,  the  combat  is  sure  to  be  a  short  one,  and 



I  charge  and  order  that  the  persons  and  goods  of  all  foredgoerB 
ehall  he  respected  and  that  the  American  prisoners  shw  be 
ffeated  well. 

"AsT.  9.  In  addition  to  the  instructionB  given  in  para- 
graph 6,  there  shall  be  in  the  houses  vessels  filled  with  boiling 
water,  tallow,  molasses  and  other  hquids,  which  shall  be  thrown 
as  bombs  on  the  Americans  who  pass  in  front  of  their  houses, 
or  they  cao  make  use  of  syringes  or  tubes  of  bamboo.  In  these 
houses  shall  be  the  sandatahan  who  shall  hurl  the  liquids  that 
shall  be  passed  to  them  by  the  women  and  children. 

"Abt.  10.  In  place  of  bolos  or  da^ers,  if  they  do  not  poB- 
sesB  the  same,  the  sandatahan  can  provide  themselves  with 
lances  and  arrows  with  long  sharp  heads,  and  these  should  be 
shot  with  great  force  in  order  that  they  may  penetrate  well 
into  the  bodies  of  the  enemy,  and  these  should  be  so  made  that 
in  withdrawal  from  the  body  the  head  will  renuun  in  the  flesh. 

"  Art.  12.  .  .  .  Neither  will  you  forget  your  sacred  oath  and 
inunaciilate  banner;  nor  will  you  forget  the  promises  made 
by  me  to  the  eivihzed  nations,  whom  I  have  assured  that  we 
FUilHQOs  are  not  savages,  nor  thieves,  nor  assassins,  nor  are  we 
cruel,  but  on  the  contrary,  that  we  are  men  of  culture  and  pa- 
triotiam,  honourable  and  very  humane."  ' 

Aguinaldo  enjoined  order  on  his  subordinates.* 
The  Filipinos  were  now  ready  to  assume  the  offensive, 
but  d^ired,  if  possible,  to  provoke  the  Americans  into 
firing  the  first  shot.  They  made  no  secret  of  their  desire 
for  confiict,  but  increased  their  hostile  demonstrations 
and  pushed  their  lines  forward  into  forbidden  territory. 
Their  attitude  is  well  illustrated  by  the  following  extract 
from  a  telegram  sent  by  Colonel  Cailles  to  Aguinaldo  on 
January  10,  1899 :  — 

"Most  urgent.  An  American  interpreter  has  come  to  tell 
me  to  withdraw  our  forces  in  Maytubig  fifty  paces.     I  shall 

"  P.  I.  B.,  209-207. 

'  "Above  idl  I  exiMot  th&t  you  will  respeot  the  persons  and  goods 
of  private  persons  of  all  nationalitiefl,  inolnding  the  Chineee ;  that  you 
will  treat  well  the  prisoners  and  grant  life  to  those  of  the  eneniy  who 
Burrendor.  And  that  you  be  on  the  sbarp  lookout  for  those  traitors 
and  enemies  who,  by  robbery,  will  seek  to  max  our  viotory." 



not  draw  back  a  etep,  and  in  place  of  withdrawing,  I  shall  ad- 
v&ace  a  little  farther.  He  brings  a  letter  from  his  general,  in 
which  he  Bpeaks  to  me  as  a  friend.  I  said  that  from  the  day  I 
knew  that  Maqtiinley  (McKinley)  opposed  our  independence 
I  did  not  want  any  deaUngs  with  any  American.  War,  war,  is 
what  we  want.  The  Americana  after  this  speech  went  off 
pale."  '■ 

Aguinaldo  approved  the  hostile  attitude  of  Cailles,  for 
there  is  a  reply  in  his  handwriting  which  reads :  — 

"I  approve  and  applaud  what  you  have  done  with  the 
Americans,  and  zeal  and  valour  always,  also  my  beloved  officers 
and  soldiers  there.  I  believe  that  they  are  playing  us  until 
the  arrival  of  their  reSnforcementa,  but  I  shall  send  an  ultimatum 
and  remain  always  on  the  alert.  —  E.  A.  Jan.  10,  1899."  * 

On  titiis  same  day  Aguinaldo  comnussioned  Feliciano 
Cruz  and  Severino  Quitiongco  to  assassinate  General 

On  January  13  Noriel  and  Cailles  tel^raphed  Agui- 
naldo as  follows:  — 

"We  desire  to  know  results  of  ultimatum  which  you  mention 
in  your  telegram,  and  we  also  wish  to  know  what  reward  our 
Government  is  arran^i^  for  the  forces  that  will  be  able  first  to 
enter  Manila." 

This  telegram  is  indorsed  in  Aguinaldo'a  handwriting : 

"As  to  the  contents  of  your  telegram,  those  who  will  be  the 
heroes  will  have  as  their  rewards  a  hirge  quantity  of  money, 
extraordinary  rewards,  promotaons,  crosses  of  Biak-na-bat6, 
Marquis  of  Malate,  Ermita,  Count  of  Manila,  etc.,  besides  the 
congratulations  of  our  idolizing  country  on  account  of  their 
beh^  patriotic,  and  more,  if  they  capture  the  regimente  with 
thdr  generals,  and,  if  p(»Bible,  the  chief  of  them  ail  who  repre- 
sents our  future  enemies  in  Manila,  which  (lot  ?)  falls  to  you,  or, 
better  said,  to  General  Noriel  and  Colonel  CaiDes. 

"The  ultimatum  has  not  been  sent,  but  it  will  be  within  a 
few  days. 

(Signed)     "E.  A. 
"Malolos,  Jan.  14, 1899."  * 

ip.  I.B.,849.  'Ibid. 

*  For  the  dooument  on  whioh  this  Btatement  Is  baaed  see  p.  733. 

'P.  I.  B..  849. 



On  January  14,  1899,  the  people  at  Aparri  shouted: 
"Death  to  the  Americans,"  and  held  a  review  to  celebrate 
the  rupture  of  friendly  relations  with  the  United  Statra.' 

At  this  time  Aguinaldo  had  a  dream  about  a  victorious 
attack  upon  Manila  and  telegraphed  it  to  some  of  his 
officers.  General  Garcia  replied  from  Caloocan  on 
January  17  that  the  dream  would  come  true  as  soon  as 
the  conflict  with  the  Americans  began.' 

In  January  21,  1899,  Aguinaldo  was  still  not  quite 
ready,  and  ordered  that  the  Filipino  soldiers  in  the  walled 
city  keep  on  good  terms  with  the  Americans,  in  order  to 
deceive  them,  "since  the  hoped-for  moment  has  not  yet 
arrived."  • 

The  Insui^nts  grew  surer  and  siu-er  that  the  Americans 
were  cowards,*  and  openly  boasted  that  when  the  attack 
began  they  would  drive  them  into  the  sea. 

'  Taylor.  81  AJ. 

>  "In  reply  to  your  t«Ieg7am  conoemiiiK  your  dream  of  raitering 
Manila  after  four  hours  of  combat.  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  you 
for  myself  Mid  the  offloers  and  soldiers  under  my  oommand  that  your 
dream  will  oome  true  as  Boon  as  the  oooflict  inth  the  Americans  be- 
pns,  since  we  sh^  advance  at  any  oost."  —  P.  I.  R.,  849. 

'  On  January  21,  1890,  the  commander  of  the  fourth  isone,  Caloo- 
oan,  wired  Aguinaldo  that : 

"Julian  Santo,  oommander  of  the  territorial  militia  of  Troso,  in- 
forms me  that  400  native  soldiers  of  the  Spuiiah  army  ttnday  incor- 
porated in  his  militia.  He  lives  in  the  widled  oity,  and  he  wuits  to 
know  your  opinion  upon  the  present  situation,  since  the  Americana 
want  to  hold  them  aa  prisoners  or  confine  them  in  Bilibid  prison." 

(Indorsed,  handwriting  of  Aguinaldo:)     "Tell  the  Filipino  soldiers 

in  the  walled  city  afBIiated  to  our  cause  that  they  must  keep  on  good 

terms  with  the  Americans,  in  order  to  deceive  them,  and  prevent 

their  oonflning  them,  since  the  hoped-for  moment  has  not  yet  arrived." 

—  P.  I.  B..  849. 

*  On  January  20,  1899,  a  correspondent  wrote  to  one  of  the  In- 
surgents abroad : 

"In  some  places  (in  Manila)  there  have  been  fights  with  bolos  be- 
tween Filipinos  and  Americana  who  wanted  to  tear  down  the  proclama- 
tion of  our  president  while  the  people  defended  it  with  their  bolos. 
They  say  that  it  amuses  them  to  see  the  Americans  run  when  they 
draw  their  knives.  It  b  said  that  some  10,000  servants  have  gone  on 
strike.  Some  Americans  have  already  disappeared  by  the  method 
of  'dukut'  but  it  will  not  be  proper  to  publish  this  in  my  opinion." 
—  P.  LB.,  980.  82. 





On  January  21  General  Otis  wrote  to  Admiral  Dewey 
that;  — 

"The  insurgents  will  not  now  permit  us  to  cross  their  lines 
and  have  been  very  insulting  to  our  officers,  calling  to  them  that 
very  shortly  they  will  give  us  battle.  My  best  information 
is  that  they  have  fully  determined  to  attack  both  outside  and 
within  the  city  before  our  additional  troops  arrive,  and  the 
least  spark  may  start  a  conflagration."  ' 

As  the  date  of  the  proposed  attack  drew  near,  the  work 
of  strengthening  the  Insurgent  positions  around  Manila 
was  pushed  with  all  possible  speed.* 

About  the  middle  of  January  Genra^  Otis  stationed 
the  First  Nebraska  Regiment  upon  the  high  ground  at 
Santa  Mesa  for  sanitary  reasons.  Of  conditions  at  this 
time,  and  of  the  circumstances  leading  to  the  actual  out- 
break of  hostilities  Taylor  says :  — 

"During  the  latter  part  of  January  General  Otis  was  in- 
formed oa  good  insurgent  authority  that  the  insurgents  medi- 
tated an  attack  upon  those  troops,  and  he  was  advised  to  re- 
move them,  as  in  their  exposed  i>osttion  they  would  kill  them  all. 
General  MacArthur,  under  whose  command  the  regiment  was, 

'  Taylor.  AJ.  73. 

*  (Telegram  received  by  E,  Aguinaldo :) 

"To  the  PreeideDt  of  the  Repubtio,  MaloloB,  from  the  Provinoi^ 
Oovemor  of  Manila,  San  Juan  del  Monte,  Jan.  29,  1899,  10.25  A.u. : 
I  yeeterday  visited  the  military  road  in  prooees  of  construction,  Santa 
Ana  to  nneda.  To-morrow  it  wilt  be  suiEoiently  completed  to  permit 
pasaaffe,  and  in  two  days  after  it  will  be  finished.  Considerine  opening 
another  military  road  direct  from  Oaloooan  to  San  Juan.  Deeire 

(Indorsed,  handwriting  of  Aeuinaldo :)  "  Tel^ram  iwwived.  lam 
very  much  satisfied,  and  in  the  name  of  the  government  I  congratulate 
you  and  the  presidents  of  Santa  Ana  and  Pineda  with  their  inhabitants 
for  their  efforts  for  the  public  good.  You  are  authorized  to  open 
another  mihtaiy  road  from  Caloooan  to  San  Juan  del  Monte,  and  I 
want  you  to  endeavor  to  finish  it  this  week,  as  I  am  certain  you  wiU." 
~  P.  I.  R.,  849. 

(Telegram  received  by  E.  A^oaldo :) 

"To  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  Maloloa,  from  San  Juan  dal 
Monte —  Received  Feb.  3,  1S99  from  the  Provincial  Qovemor  Manila : 
Road  marked  out ;  work  b^an  Wednesday.  I  shall  put  forth  every 
effort  to  finish  by  middle  of  the  ooming  week."  —  P.  I.  R.,  849. 



placed  two  guns  in  position  thare,  as  it  was  fully  expected  that 
the  insurgents  would  direct  their  attack  upon  that  point,  as  in 
fact  they  did.  On  February  4,  1899,  the  tents  of  the  lament 
covered  the  ridge,  and  its  outposts  extended  along  the  San  Juan 
EUver,  a  small  stream  which  formed  part  of  the  line  of  delimita- 
tion between  the  Americaos  and  the  insui^ents. 

"For  Bome  days  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  the  pres- 
sure of  the  insurgents  was  coiutant  aloi^  this  position,  so  con- 
Btant  indeed  that  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events  it  indicated 
a  premeditated  purpose  on  the  part  of  some  one  in  the  insurgent 
army  to  force  a  colUsion  at  that  point.  On  February  2  General 
MacArthur,  commanding  the  Second  Division  of  the  Eighth 
Army  Corps,  wrote  to  the  commanding  general  of  the  Filipino 
troops  in  ^e  third  zone  in  front  of  him  that  — 

'"An  armed  party  from  your  command  now  occupies  the 
village  in  front  of  blockhouse  No.  7,  at  a  point  considerably 
more  than  a  himdred  yards  on  my  side  of  the  line,  and  is  very 
active  in  exhibiting  hostile  intentions.  This  party  must  be 
withdrawn  to  your  side  of  the  line  at  once.  From  this  date  if 
the  line  is  crossed  by  your  men  with  arms  in  their  hands  they 
must  be  regarded  as  subject  to  such  action  as  I  may  deem  neces- 

"Colonel  San  Miguel,  who  commanded  at  San  Juan  dd 
Monte,  replied  upon  the  receipt  of  this  commiinication  that  the 
action  of  his  troops  was  fordgn  to  his  wishes  and  that  he  would 
^ve  immediate  orders  for  them  to  retire.  At  about  half  past 
8  on  the  night  of  February  4  a  email  insurgent  patrol  entered 
the  territory  within  the  American  lines  at  blockhouse  No.  7 
and  advanced  to  the  little  village  of  Santol  in  front  of  an  out- 
post  of  the  Nebraska  regiment.  This  was  the  same  point  from 
which  the  insurgents  had  been  compelled  to  retire  on  February  2. 
An  American  outpost  challenged,  and  then  as  the  insurgent 
patrol  continued  to  advance  the  sentinel  Bred,  whereupon  the 
insurgent  patrol  retired  to  blockhouse  No.  7,  from  which  fire 
was  immediately  opened  upon  the  Americans.  This  fire  spread 
rapidly  down  the  American  and  insui^^t  lines  and  both  forces 
at  once  sprang  to  arms."  * 

General  Otis's  aoooimt  of  the  opening  of  active  hostili- 
ties follows :  — 

"On  the  night  of  February  2  they  sent  in  a  strong  detach- 
ment to  draw  3ie  fire  of  our  outposts,  which  took  up  a  position 



immediately  in  froot  and  within  a  few  yaids  of  the  same.  The 
outpost  was  strengthened  by  a  few  tw  our  men,  who  silently 
bore  their  taunts  and  abuse  the  entire  night.  This  was  re- 
ported to  me  by  General  MacArthur,  whom  I  directed  to  com- 
municate with  the  officer  in  command  of  the  insurgent  troops 
Gonoemed.  His  prepared  letter  wae  shown  me  and  approved, 
and  the  re^ly  received  was  all  that  could  be  desired.  However, 
the  ^reement  was  ignored  by  the  insurgents  and  on  the  evening 
of  February  4  another  demonstration  was  made  on  one  of  our 
small  outposts,  which  occupied  a  retired  position  at  least  150 
yards  within  the  line  which  had  been  mutually  agreed  upon, 
ao  insurgent  approaching  the  picket  and  refusing  to  halt  or 
answer  when  challenged.  The  result  was  that  our  picket  dis- 
charged his  piece,  when  the  insurgent  troops  near  Santa  Mesa 
opened  a  spirited  fire  on  our  troops  there  stationed. 

"The  insurgents  had  thus  succeeded  in  drawing  the  fire  of  a 
small  outpost,  which  they  had  evidently  labored  with  all  thwr 
ingenuity  to  accomplish,  in  order  to  justify  in  some  way  their 
premeditated  attack.  It  is  not  believed  that  the  chief  insur- 
gent leaders  wished  to  open  hostilities  at  this  time,  as  they  were 
not  completely  prepared  to  assume  the  initiative.  They  de- 
sired two  or  three  days  more  to  perfect  their  arrangements,  but 
the  real  of  their  army  brought  on  the  crisis  which  anticipated 
their  premeditated  action.  They  could  not  have  delayed  long, 
however,  for  it  was  their  object  to  force  an  issue  before  American 
troops,  then  en  route,  could  arrive  in  Manila."  ^ 

Thus  began  the  Insui^nt  attack,  so  long  and  so  care- 
fully -planned  for.  We  learn  from  the  Instirgent  records 
that  the  shot  of  the  American  sentry  missed  its  mark. 
There  was  no  reason  why  it  should  have  provoked  a  hot 
return  fire,  but  it  did. 

The  result  of  the  ensuing  combat  was  not  at  all  what 
the  Insurgents  had  anticipated.  The  Amaicans  did  not 
drive  very  well.  It  was  but  a  short  time  before  they 
themselves  were  routed  and  driven  from  their  positions. 

Aguinaldo  of  course  promptly  advanced  the  claim  that 

his  troops  had  been  wantonly  attacked.    The  plain  fact 

is  that  the  Insurgent  patrol  in  question  deliberately  drew 

the  fire  of  the  American  sentry,  and  this  was  just  as  much 

'  Taylor,  73  AJ. 



an  act  of  war  as  was  the  firing  of  the  shot.  Whetii^ 
the  patrol  was  acting  under  proper  orders  from  higher 
authority  is  not  definitely  known. 

In  this  connection  the  following  telegram  sent  by  Captain 
Zialcita  from  Santa  Ana  on  February  4, 1899,  at  9.55  p.u., 
to  Major  Gray,  San  Juan  del  Monte,  is  highly  interesting  : 

"I  received  the  telegram  forwarded  from  Malolos.  General 
Ricarte  is  not  here.  I  believe  (that  if  the)  Americans  open  fire 
we  shall  attack.    Will  aak  instructions  (of)  Malolos."  * 

This  looks  as  if  Zialcita  at  least  knew  that  something 
was  to  be  done  to  draw  the  American  fire. 

Aguinaldo's  first  statement  relative  to  the  opening  of 
hostilities  is  embodied  in  a  general  order  dated  Malolos, 
February  4,  1899,  and  reads  in  part  as  follows :  — 

"Nine  o'clock  p.m.,  this  date,  I  received  from  Caloocan  sta- 
tion a  message  communicated  to  me  that  the  American  forces, 
without  prior  notification  or  any  just  motive,  attacked  our 
camp  at  San  Juan  del  Monte  and  our  forces  garrisoning  the 
blockhouses  around  the  outskirts  of  Manila,  causing  losses 
among  our  soldiers,  who  in  view  of  this  unexpected  aggression  and 
of  the  decided  attack  of  the  aggressors,  were  obliged  to  defend 
themselves  until  the  firing  became  general  all  along  the  line. 

"No  one  can  deplore  more  than'  I  this  rupture  of  hostilities. 
I  have  a  clear  conscience  that  I  have  endeavoured  to  avoid  it 
at  all  costs,  using  all  my  efforts  to  preserve  friendship  with  the 
army  of  occupation,  even  at  the  cost  of  not  a  few  humiliations 
and  many  sacrificed  rights. 

"...  I  order  and  conomand:  — 

"1.  Peace  and  friendly  relations  between  the  Philippine 
forces  and  the  American  forces  of  occupation  are  brok^i,  and 
the  latter  will  be  treated  as  enemies,  with  the  limits  prescribed 
by  the  laws  of  war. 

"  2.  American  soldiers  who  may  be  captured  by  the  Philip- 
pine forces  will  be  treated  aa  prisoners  of  war. 

"3.  This  proclamation  shall  be  conmiunicated  to  the  accred- 
ited consuls  of  Manila,  and  to  congress,  in  order  that  it  may 
accord  the  suspension  of  the  constitutional  guarantees  and  the 
resulting  declaration  of  war,"  ' 

'  P.  I.  B.,  20X8.  •  Ibid.,  1090.  6. 



Aguinaldo's  protestations  relative  to  his  efforts  to  avoid 
hostilities  are  absurd,  in  view  of  his  own  instructions  con- 
cerning the  attack  to  be  made  simultaneously  within  and 
without  the  city  of  Manila. 

There  is  other  correapondence  which  throws  light  on  the 

situation  which  existed  inunediately  prior  to  the  outbreak 

of  hostilities.    On  January  25,  1899,  Agoncillo  cabled 

I  from  Washington  to  Apacible  in  Hongkong:    "Recom- 

I  mend  you  await  beginning  American  i^gression,  justifying 

our  conduct  nations."  * 

Apacible  apparently  did  not  take  this  view  of  the  matter, 
for  on  January  31  he  wrote  to  Aguinaldo  that  the  Senate 
in  Washington  would  take  final  vote  upon  the  treaty  of 
peace  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  on  February 
6,  and  said :  — 

"It  is  urgently  necessary  for  America  to  answer  us  immedi- 
ately before  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.  A  confiict  after  the 
ratification  of  the  treaty  would  be  unfavorable  to  us  in  public 
opinion."  * 

Obviously  this  letter  might  be  interpreted  as  a  recom- 
mendation that  hostilities  begin  before  February  6  if 
America  did  not  answer  meanwhile.  It  was  evidently 
well  imderstood  in  Hongkong  that  Aguinaldo's  receipt 
of  Apacible's  letter  might  cause  war  to  begin,  for  on  Feb- 
ruary 3,  1899,  Bray,  anticipating  the  outbreak  of  hos- 
tilities of  the  following  day,  cabled  Senator  Hoar  at  Wash- 
ington as  follows :  — 

"  Receive  caution  news  hostilities  Manila  discredited  here  denied 
Filipino  circles  supposed  political  move  influence  vote  Senate 
to-day  any  case  insignificant  skimush  due  intentional  provo- 
f  "  Brat."  » 

The  extracts  from  the  Insurgent  records  above  quoted 
leave  no  escape  from  the  concludon  that  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  which  occurred  on  February  4, 1899,  had  been 

'  P.  I.  R.,  453.  4.  » P.  I.  R.,  453. 2.  •  P.  I.  B,.  493. 12. 



carefully  prepared  for  and  was  deliberately  preripitated 
by  the  Filipinos  themselves. 
Blount  says :  — 

"It  would  be  simply  wooden-headed  to  affirm  that  they  ever 
expected  to  succeed  m  a  war  with  us."  ^ 

It  may  have  been  wooden-headed  for  the  FHipinos  to 
expect  this,  but  expect  it  they  certainly  did.  We  have 
seen  how  they  held  their  soldiers  in  check  until  after 
Spain  had  been  ousted  from  the  Philippines  by  the  Treaty 
of  Paris  as  they  had  originally  planned  to  do.  It  now  only 
remained  to  carry  out  the  balance  of  t^eir  ori^nal  plan 
to  get  rid  of  the  Americans  in  one  way  or  another. 

General  Otis  states  that "  when  Aguinaldo  had  completed 
his  preparations  for  attack  he  prepared  the  outlines  of  his 
declaration  of  war,  the  full  text  of  which  was  published  at 
Malolos  on  the  eveniug,  and  very  shortly  after,  hostilities 
began.  This  declaration  was  circulated  in  Manila  on  the 
morning  of  February  5."  * 

The  Insurgents  brought  down  upon  themselves  the 
punishment  which  they  received  on  February  4  and  5. 

Bloxmt  has  stated '  that  if  the  resolutions  of  Senator 
Bacon  introduced  on  January  11,  18d9,  had  passed,  we 
never  should  have  bad  any  war  with  the  Filipinos.  The 
resolutions  in  question  concluded  thus : — 

"That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaim  any  diapoeition  or 
intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over 
said  ifilandfl  except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  assert  their 
determination  when  an  independent  government  shall  have 
been  duly  erected  tberdn  entitled  to  recognition  as  such,  to 
transfer  to  said  government,  upon  terms  which  shall  be  reason- 
able and  just,  all  rights  secured  under  the  cession  by  Spain, 
and  to  thereupon  leave  the  govemmeait  and  control  of  the 
islands  to  thdr  people." 

I  must  take  issue  with  Blount  as  to  the  effect  which 

these  resolutdom  might  have  bad  if  passed.    The  Insur- 

1  Blonnt,  p.  190.  *  T^jtIot,  86  AJ«  ■  Blount,  p.  175. 



gents  felt  themselyes  to  be  fully  eompetent  to  bring  about 
such  pacification  of  the  idands  as  they  deemed  necessary. 
At  the  time  the  resolutions  were  presented  in  the  Senate 
their  soldiers  were  strainii^  at  the  leash,  ready  to  attack 
their  American  opponents  upon  the  most  slender  excuse. 
Aguiualdo  himself  could  not  have  held  them  much  longer, 
and  it  is  not  impossible  that  they  got  away  from  him  as 
it  was.  They  would  have  interpreted  the  passage  of  the 
Bacon  resolutions  as  a  further  evidence  of  weakness,  and 
hastened  their  attack.  As  we  have  seen,  "war,  war, 
war"  was  what  they  wanted. 

Blount  has  endeavoured  to  shift  the  responsibility  for 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities  to  the  United  Stetes  by  claim- 
ing that  certain  words  italicized  by  him  in  what  he  calls 
the  "Benevolent  Assimilation  Proclamation"  were  neo- 
essarily,  to  the  Insurgents,  "fighting  words."  The  ex- 
presdons  referred  to  have  to  do  with  the  establishment 
of  United  States  sovereignty  and  the  exercise  of  govern- 
mental control  in  the  Philippine  Islands. 

These  words  were  not  "fighting  words,"  the  Insurgent 
policy  being,  as  I  have  shown  by  the  records,  to  con^der 
the  acceptance  of  a  protectorate  or  of  annexation  in  the 
event  that  it  did  not  prove  possible  to  negotiate  absolute 
independence,  or  probable  that  the  American  troops 
could  be  driven  from  the  islands. 

The  growing  confidence  of  the  Insurgents  in  their  abil- 
ity to  whip  the  cowardly  Americana,  rather  than  any 
fixed  determination  on  their  part  to  push  a  stru^e  for 
independence  to  the  bitter  end,  led  to  their  attack. 



Instjrqent  Rule  and  the  Wilcox-Sarqent  Repobt 

Teos  Good  Book  Bays,  "By  their  fruits  ye  shall  know 
them,  whether  they  be  good  or  evil,"  and  it  seems  proper 
to  apply  this  test  to  the  Insurgents  and  their  government. 

The  extraordinary  claim  has  been  advanced  that  the 
United  States  destroyed  a  republic  in  the  Philippines 
and  erected  an  ohgarchy  on  its  ruins.  Various  writers 
and  speakers  who  have  not  gone  so  far  as  this  have  yet 
maintained  that  Aguinaldo  and  his  associates  established 
a  real,  effective  government  throughout  the  archipelago 
during  the  interim  between  his  retium  and  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  with  the  United  States. 

In  stmunarizing  conditions  on  September  15,  1898, 
Judge  Blount  says : '  — 

"Absolute  master  of  all  Luzon  outside  Manila  at  this  time, 
with  complete  machinery  of  govenunent  in  each  province  for 
all  matters  of  justice,  taxes,  and  police,  an  army  of  some  30,000 
men  at  his  beck,  and  his  whole  people  a  unit  at  his  back,  Agui- 
naldo formally  inaugurated  his  permanent  government  —  per- 
manent as  opposed  to  the  previous  provisional  government  — 
with  a  Constitution,  Congress,  and  Cabinet,  patterned  after 
our  own,*  just  as  the  South  American  republics  had  done  before 
him  when  they  were  freed  from  Spain,  at  Malolos,  the  new 

He  refers  to  our  utter  failure  to  understand  "what  a 
wonderfully  complete  'going  concern'  Aguinaldo's  gov- 
ernment had  become  throughout  the  Philippine  Archi- 
pelago before  the  Treaty  of  Paris  was  sigued."  * 

1  Blount,  p.  98. 

*  The  ooastitution  used  was  most  oertamly  not  patterned  after 
our  own.     See  p.  265. 
•Blount,  p.  in. 



He  bases  his  claim  as  to  the  excellent  state  of  public 
order  in  the  Insurgent  territory  at  this  time  on  a  report  of 
Paymaster  W.  E.  Wilcox  and  Naval  Cadet  L.  R.  Sargent 
of  the  United  States  Navy,  who  between  October  8  and 
November  20,  1898,  made  a  long,  rapid  trip  through 
noriihem  Luzon,  traversing  the  provinces  of  Bulacan, 
Pampanga,  Tarlac,  Pangasinfin,  Nueva  Ecija,  Nueva 
Vizcaya,  Isabela,  Cagayan,  South  Hocos  and  Union,  in 
the  order  named,  thence  proceeding  to  Dagupan  and  down 
the  raihvad  through  Pangasindn,  Tarlac,  Pampanga  and 
Bulacan  to  Manila. 

He  says  that  these  gentlemen  found  the  authority 
of  Aguinaldo's  government  universally  acknowledged, 
the  country  in  a  state  of  perfect  tranquillity  and  public 
order,'  with  profound  peace  and  freedom  from  brigandage 
and  the  like.' 

Now  if  it  be  true  that  A^uinaldo  established  complete 
machinery  of  government  throughout  all  of  Luzon  out- 
side of  Manila  for  all  matters  of  justice,  taxes  and  police, 
so  that  life  and  property  were  safe  and  peace,  tran- 
quillity and  justice  assured,  we  may  well  d^pense  with 
quibbling  as  to  whether  the  proper  name  was  appUed  to 
such  government.     But  did  he  ? 

Let  us  examine  with  some  care  the  history  of  the 
Vfilcox-Sargent  trip,  and  see  if  we  can  gtun  further  light 
from  other  sources  relative  to  the  condition  of  pubUc 
order  in  the  territory  which  they  traversed. 

I  propose,  for  the  most  part,  to  let  the  captured  In- 
surgent records  speak  for  themselves,  as  it  is  fair  to  as- 
sume that  Insurgent  officers  were  at  no  pains  to  repre- 

I  "The  light  Messrs.  Sargent  and  Wiloox  thiov  on  the  then  uni- 
versal aoknowledgfment  of  the  Authority  of  the  Agoinaldo  government 
and  the  perfect  tranquillity  and  public  order  maintained  under  it,  in 
the  Cagayan  valley."  — Blount,  pp.  114-115. 

■  "The  country  in  fact,  ae  Aguinaldo  always  claimed  in  his  proo- 
lamations  of  that  period  seeking  recognition  of  hia  government  by 
the  Powers,  in  a  state  of  profound  peace  and  tranquillity — free  from 
brigandage  and  the  like."  —  Blount,  p.  115. 



Bent  conditions  as  worse  than  they  really  were.  In  view 
of  the  fra^pneutary  charaoter  of  these  records,  we  may  also 
assume  that  the  complete  story  would  be  still  more 
interesting  and  instructive  than  the  one  which  I  have 
been  able  to  reconstruct. 

Messrs.  Sai^ent  and  Wilcox  were  almost  everywhere 
hospitably  received,  and  were  entertained  with  dinners 
and  dances  after  the  inimitable  fashion  of  the  hospitable 
Filipino  everywhere.  They  gained  a  very  favourable 
impression  of  the  state  of  public  order  in  the  provinces 
through  which  they  passed  for  the  reason  that  from  the 
very  start  their  trip  was  strictly  personally  conducted. 
They  saw  exactly  what  it  was  intended  that  they  should 
see  and  very  little  more.  Their  progress  was  several  times 
interrupted  for  longer  or  shorter  periods  without  adequate 
explanation.  We  now  know  that  on  these  occasions  the 
scenery  so  carefully  prepared  in  advance  for  them  had  be- 
come a  Uttle  disarranged  and  needed  to  be  straightened 
up.  Facts  which  I  will  cite  show  that  most  shocking  and 
horrible  events,  of  which  they  learned  nothing,  were  oc- 
curring in  the  territory  through  which  they  passed. 

For  a  considerable  thne  before  their  departure  American 
visitors  had  been  carefully  excluded  from  the  Insurgent 
territory,  but  the  Filipino  leaders  decided  to  let  these  two 
men  go  through  it  to  the  end  that  they  might  make  as 
favourable  a  report  aa  possible.  How  carefully  the  way 
was  prepared  for  American  visitors  is  shown  by  the  fol- 
lowing telegram :  —  „«      „ 

"San  Pedbo,  Macati, 
"July  30,  1898. 
"To  the  Local  Presidente  of  Pasig: 

"You  are  hereby  informed  that  the  Americans  are  going 
to  your  town  and  they  will  ask  your  opinion  [of  what  the  people 
desire.  —  Tr.]  Yon  should  answer  them  that  we  want  a  repub- 
lican goverament.  The  same  answer  must  be  given  through- 
out your  jutisdiction. 

(Signed)    "  Pio  del  Filab, 
"  G«neral  of  the  Second  Zone."  * 
>P.I.  R.,968.  11 





Now  General  Pilar  had  an  uncomfortable  way  of  kill- 
ing  people  who  did  not  obey  his  orders,  and  under  the 
rules  of  the  Insurgent  government  he  was  abundantly 
justified  in  so  doing.  His  suggestions  as  to  what  visiting 
Americans  should  be  told  or  shown  would  be  likely  to  be 
acceded  to.  Certainly  this  seems  to  have  been  the  case 
in  the  present  instance,  for  on  the  same  day  General 
Noriel  reported  as  follows :  ^ — 

"I*rasident  R.  G.,  Bacoor,  from  Gen.  Noriel,  Pineda,  July 
30, 12.10  p.H. :  I  mform  your  excellency  that  some  commiseioQers 
of  the  American  admiral  are  making  investigatione  in  the  region 
around  Pasay  as  to  the  wishes  and  opinion  of  the  people  as  to 
the  government.  To-day  I  received  a  statement  from  some, 
giving  the  answer :  '  Free  government  under  American  proteo- 
torat«  [copy  mutilated,  two  or  three  words  '"'""'"e  here]  the 
President.' " 

Blount  quotes  with  approval  Admiral  Dewey's  state- 
ment made  shortly  after  the  return  of  Wilcox  and  Sargent 
that  in  his  opinion  their  rqrort  "contains  the  most  com- 
plete and  reliable  infonnation  obtainable  in  regard  to  the 
present  state  of  the  northern  part  of  Luzon  Island." ' 
This  was  true. 

The  admiral  might  have  gone  further  and  said  that  it 
contained  practically  the  only  infonnation  then  obtainable 
in  regard  to  conditions  in  the  territory  in  question,  but  as 
I  shall  conclusively  show  it  was  neither  complete  nor 

Judge  Blount  in  describing  the  experiences  of  Mesara. 
Wilcox  and  Sargent  niJively  makes  the  statement  that: 

"The  touristB  were  provided  at  Kosales  by  order  of  Agui- 
naldo  with  a  military  escort, '  which  was  continued  by  relays  all 
the  way  to  Aparri.' "  • 

It  certainly  was  I 

Very  little  Spanish  was  then  spoken  in  Nueva  Vizcaya, 
Isabela  or  Cagayan.    What  opportunity  had  these  two 

> p.  L  B.,  849.  *  Bknint,  p.  108.  '/Md.,  p.  109. 



men,  ignorant  as  they  were  of  the  native  dialects,  to  learn 
the  sinister  facts  as  to  what  had  been  and  was  occurring 
in  the  territory  which  they  visited? 

No  one  can  fail  to  be  delighted  with  Filipino  hospitality, 
which  was  lavishly  bestowed  upon  them  everywhere,  and 
it  is  Gnly  natural  that  they  should  have  reported  favour- 
ably upon  what  they  saw.  It  was  about  tbis  time  that 
an  order  was  issued '  that  fronts  of  buildings  should  be 
whitewashed,  streets  cleaned  and  fences  repaired  with 
a  view  to  showing  every  one,  and  especially  travellers 
through  the  territory  of  the  Insurgents,  that  they  were 
"not  opposed  to  a  good  such  as  a  refined  and  civilized 
people  should  have."  Doubtless  the  report  of  the  two 
men  from  Dewey's  fleet  was  made  in  the  best  of  faith. 
I  will  now  endeavour  to  show  what  were  some  of  the 
actual  conditions  in  the  traritory  through  which  they 


They  first  visited  Bulacan.  They  do  not  mention  hear- 
ing of  the  activities  of  a  Chinaman  named  Ignacio  Paua, 
who  had  been  given  the  rank  of  colonel  by  Aguinaldo  and 
assigned  the  task  of  extorting  contributions  for  the  revolu- 
tion from  his  countrymen.  In  a  letter  to  Aguinaldo 
written  bn  July  6,  1S98,  Paua  states  that  he  has  collected 
more  than  S1,000  from  the  Chinese  of  these  small  towns, 
but  asks  for  an  order  "prohibiting  the  outrages  that  are 
being  committed  against  such  merchants  as  are  not  our 
enemies."  He  further  says,  "When  the  contributions 
from  the  Chinamen  of  all  the  pueblos  shall  have  been 
completed  I  wish  to  publish  a  proclamation  forbidding 
any  injury  to  the  Chinamen  and  any  interference  with 
their  small  business  enterpiises,"  and  adds  that  "the 

'"With  a  view  to  sliovin?  every  one  and  especially  foreignera 
travellinf;  through  the  territory  of  the  Republio,  that  we  are  not  op- 
poeed  to  a  good  suah  aa  a  refined  and  civilized  people  should  have,  the 
fronts  ot  buildings  should  be  whitewashed,  streets  should  be  cleaned 
and  fenoes  repaired."  —  P.  I.  R.,  292.  3. 



natives  hereabouts  themselves  are  the  people  who  are 
comiuittiiig  said  abuses."  ^ 

Apparently  Paua  had  no  objection  to  the  committing 
of  outrages  against  merchants  that  were  the  enemies  of 
the  cause,  nor  does  he  seem  to  have  objected  to  injury  to 
Chinamen  before  contributions  were  completed.  Elis  own 
methods  were  none  too  mild.  On  August  27, 1398,  General 
Ffo  del  Pilar  telegraphed  Aguinaldo  that  five  Insurgent 
soldiers,  under  a  leader  supposed  to  be  Paua,  had  entered 
the  store  of  a  Chinaman,  and  tried  to  kidnap  his  wife,  but 
had  left  on  the  payment  of  $10  and  a  promise  to  pay  S50 
later,  saying  that  they  would  return  and  hang  their  fellow 
countryman  if  the  latter  amount  was  not  forthcoming.* 

Paua  was  later  made  a  general  in  consideration  of  his 
valuable  services  I 

■  "It  would  he  a  great  Batisfaodon  to  me  to  aid  you  with  all  my 
stxenKth ;  and  the  only  thing  that  I  see  to  object  to  is  that  the  Com- 
mandere  and  Oenerab  in  this  province  ore  getting  pretty  dbusive 
toward  our  brethren  and  allow  themselves  to  be  bribed  by  the  TagfUog 
movhanta  ao  aa  to  allow  them  to  enter  Manila  with  their  goods,  which 
is  of  great  aseistanoe  to  our  enemies. 

"  Conoeming  the  ooatributions  wliioh  I  have  collected  from  the  China- 
men, it  amounts  to  more  than  P2,000  here  in  Tambobong,  Meycauayan 
and  Polo  alone ;  and  those  from  the  other  pueblos  have  not  yet  come 
to  see  me.  Furthermore,  I  would  like  an  order  from  you  prohibiting 
the  outragee  that  are  being  committed  against  such  merchants  as  are 
not  our  enemies ;  and  when  the  contributions  from  the  Chinamen  of 
all  the  pueblos  shall  have  been  completed,  I  wish  to  publish  a  proclama- 
tion forbidding  any  injury  to  the  Chinamen  and  any  interference  with 
theb  small  business  enterprises ;  since  this  is  a  disgrace  to  our  govern- 
ment and  to  your  name ;  for  the  natives  of  hereabouts  themselves 
are  the  people  who  are  committing  said  abuses,  and  in  hopes  of  putting 
a  stop  to  them,  I  await  your  decision  at  the  earliest  possible  moment 
concerning  the  proclamation  referred  to."  —  P.  I.  R.,  355.  11. 

*"lAst  night  in  the  place  known  as  Santo  Cristo  (Manila?)  th« 
store  of  J.  Ricafort,  a  Chinaman,  was  entered  by  five  soldiers  of  our 
army  under  an  unknown  commander  supposed  to  be  Colonel  Paua. 
They  tried  to  kidnap  the  wife  of  Ricafort.  At  the  request  of  P.  Qu-cfo 
they  desisted  upon  payment  of  20  pesos  and  the  agreement  that  100 
peaos  would  be  paid  later.  If  this  was  not  done  they  would  return 
and  hang  them.  To  quiet  these  people  I  gave  them  a  pass  to  assure 
their  personal  safety,  and  exacted  at  the  same  time  a  promise  that 
they  should  not  report  the  matter  to  the  Americans.  Paulino  QknUa 
{■  now  at  Pedro  Maoati."  —  P.  I.  R.,  1187.4. 



Our  travellers  next  visited  Pampanga.  Here  they  ap- 
parently overlooked  the  fact  that  Aguinaldo  did  not  have 
"his  whole  people  a  unit  at  his  hack."  The  citizens  of 
Macabebe  seem  not  to  have  approved  of  the  Aguinaldo 
regime,  for  the  Insurgent  records  show  that : — 

"Representatives  of  the  tovns  of  Pampanga  assembled  in 
SaD  Fernando  on  June  26,  1898,  and  under  the  presideucy  of 
General  Marimino.  Hizon  agreed  to  yield  him  complete  'obe- 
dience as  military  governor  of  the  province  and  representative 
of  the  illustrious  dictator  of  these  Philippine  Islands.'  The 
town  of  Macabebe  refused  to  send  any  delegates  to  this 
gatherii^." ' 

It  may  be  incidentally  mentioned  that  Blount  has 
passed  somewhat  hghtly  over  the  fact  that  he  himself 
during  his  army  days  commanded  an  aggregation  of 
sturdy  citizens  from  this  town,  known  as  Macabebe 
scouts,  who  diligently  shot  the  Insurgents  full  of  holes 
whenever  they  got  a  chance.  He  incorrectly  refers  to 
them  as  a  "tribe  or  clan."  ^  It  is  absurd  to  call  them  a 
tribe.  They  are  merely  the  inhabitants  of  a  town  which 
has  long  been  at  odds  with  the  neighbouring  towns  of  the 

Things  had  come  to  a  bad  pass  in  Pampai^  when  its 
head  wrote  that  the  punishment  of  beating  people  in  the 
plaza  and  tying  them  up  so  that  they  would  be  exposed 
to  the  full  rays  of  the  sim  should  be  stopped.  He  argued 
that  such  methods  would  not  lead  the  people  of  other 

>  P.  I.  R.,  223. 

■  "Early  in  the  war  we  had  &Twled  ourselvee  of  a  oertain  tribe,  or 
olan,  known  as  the  Maccabebes,  who  look  nowise  different  from  all  othw 
FilipinoB,  but  who  had,  under  the  Spanish  government,  by  reason  of 
long-standing  feuds  with  their  more  rebellious  neighbours,  come  to  be 
absolutely  loyal  to  the  Spanish  authorities.  When  we  came  they  had 
truisferred  that  loyalty  to  us,  and  had  now  beoome  a  recognized  and 
valuable  part  of  our  military  foroe."  —  Blount,  pp.  333-334. 



natioDB  to  believe  that  the  reign  of  liberty,  equality  and 
fraternity  had  begun  in  the  Philippines.' 

When  it  is  remembered  that  persons  tied  up  and  ex- 
posed to  the  full  rays  of  the  sun  in  the  Philippine  lowlfuida 
soon  die,  in  a  most  imcomfortable  manner,  we  shall 
agree  with  the  head  of  this  province  that  this  custom  has 
its  objectionable  features  I 


While  the  failing  of  Messrs.  Wilcox  and  Sargent  to 
leam  of  the  relatioi^  between  the  Tag&logs  of  Macabebe 
and  their  neighbours,  or  of  the  fact  that  people  were  being 
publicly  tortured  in  Pampanga,  is  perhaps  not  to  be  won- 
dered at  under  the  circumstEuices,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  they 
could  have  failed  to  hear  something  of  the  seriously  dis- 
turbed conditions  in  Tarlac  if  they  so  much  as  got  off  the 
train  there. 

On  August  24  the  commiBsioner  in  charge  of  elections 
in  that  province  asked  for  troops  to  protect  him,  in  holding 
them  in  the  town  of  Urdaneta,  against  a  party  of  two  thou- 
sand men  of  the  place,  who  were  going  to  prevent  them. 

On  September  22  the  secretary  of  the  interior  ordered 
that  the  requirements  of  the  decree  of  June  IS,  establish- 
ing municipal  governments,  should  be  strictly  complied 
with,  as  in  many  of  the  towns  "the  inhabitants  continue 
to  follow  the  ancient  methods  by  which  the  friars  exploited 
UB  at  their  pleasure  and  which  showed  their  great  contempt 
for  the  law." ' 

'  "On  Jul;  28,  1898,  the  head  of  the  provinoe  of  Pampanga  wrote 
that  the  punishment  of  beating  people  in  the  plaza  and  tying  them 
up  BO  that  the;  would  be  exposed  to  the  full  r&ya  of  the  aun  should  be 
stopped.  He  oomplaiDed  that  these  methods  had  been  oorried  so 
far  that  even  people  of  good  social  position  had  been  ao  punished. 
it  was  especially  undesirable  to  employ  aueh  punishments,  as  the 
people  of  other  nations  seeing  them  would  not  believe  that  the  reigo 
of  Uberty,  equality,  and  fiatemity  had  begun  in  the  Philippines." 
—  P.  I.  B..  196.  3. 

'  Taf  lor,  47  AJ. 




Tlie  following  letter  to  Aguinaldo,  from  Juan  Nepomu- 
ceno,  Representative  from  Tarlac,  speaks  for  itself  as  to 
conditions  in  that  province  on  December  27, 1898,  shortly 
after  the  American  travellers  passed  through  it  on  their 
return:  — 

"  I  r^ret  exceedingly  being  compelled  to  report  to  you  that 
since  Sunday  the  25th  instant  scandalous  acts  have  b^n  going 
on  in  the  Province  of  Tarlac,  which  I  represent.  On  the  night 
of  the  Sunday  mentioned  the  entire  family  of  the  Local  Chief 
of  Bamban  was  murdered,  and  his  house  and  warehouse  were 
burned.  Also  the  Tax  Commissioner  and  the  Secretary, 
Fabian  Ignacio,  have  been  murdered.  Last  night  Sefior  Jacinto 
Vega  was  kidnapped  at  the  town  of  Gerona ;  and  seven  travel- 
lers were  murdered  at  O'Donnel,  which  town  was  pillaged,  as 
well  as  the  barrio  of  Matayumtayum  of  the  town  of  La  Paa. 
On  that  day  various  suspicious  parties  were  seen  in  the  town  of 
Panique  and  in  the  same  barrio,  according  to  reliable  reports 
which  I  have  just  received. 

"All  this  general  demoralization  ot  the  province,  according 
to  the  information  which  I  have  obtained,  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  province  is  dissatisfied  with  the  ProvinciiU  Chief,  S^or 
Alfonso  Ramos,  and  with  Major  Manuel  de  Le6n;  for  this  is 
substantiated  by  the  fact  that  all  the  events  described 
occurred  since  last  Sunday,  when  Sefior  Alfonso  Ramos 
retiuTied,  to  take  chai^  of  the  Office  of  Provincial  President, 
after  having  been  detained  for  several  days  in  this  town. 
Wherefore,  I  believe  that  in  order  to  restore  tranquillity  in  the 
province,  consideration  be  given  to  various  documents  that 
have  been  presented  to  the  Government  and  to  the  standing 
Committee  of  Justice;  and  that  there  be  removed  from  office 
Sefior  Alfonso  Ramos,  as  well  as  said  Sefior  Manuel  de  Le6n, 
who  has  no  prest^  whatever  in  this  province.  Moreover 
on  the  day  when  fifty-four  soldiers  of  the  conmiand  deserted, 
he  himself  left  for  San  Fernando,  Pampanga."  • 

On  November  30,  1898,  General  Macabulos  sent 
Aguinaldo  a  telegram  ^  from  which  it  evidently  appears 

>  P.  I.  R.,  944. 

'  "  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  I  have  been  in  ttua  town 
since  yeaterda;  afternoon  issuing,  in  a  proclamation,  conciliatory 
orders  to  the  populaoe  that  the  people  oomprised  in  the  upriaing  must 
present  themselves  and  express  aversion  and  repudiation  of  it,  promis- 
ing them  consideratioa  and  pardon  as  long  aa  they  lay  aside  anas.    la 




J -a 

I  %i 








that  there  was  an  armed  uprising  in  Tarlac  which  he  was 
endeavouring  to  quell  and  that  he  hoped  for  early  success. 
Apparently,  however,  his  efforts  to  secure  tranquilUty 
were  not  entirely  successful,  for  on  December  1$  he 
telegraphed  Aguinaldo  as  follows :  — 

"In  a  telegram  dated  to-day  Lieut.  Paraso,  commaading 
a  detachmeot  at  Camiliu,  informs  me  that  last  night  his  detach- 
ment was  attacked  by  Tulisanes  (robbers).  The  fire  lasted 
four  hours  without  any  casualties  among  our  men.  This  after- 
Doon  received  another  from  the  captain  commanding  said 
detachment,  informing  me  of  the  same,  and  that  nothing  new 
has  occurred.  The  people  of  the  town  await  with  anxiety  the 
result  of  the  charges  they  have  made,  especially  against  the 
local  president  and  the  justice  of  the  peace,  the  original  of  which 
I  sent  to  your  high  authority." ' 

Obviously  the  pohce  machinery  was  not  working  quite 
amoothly  when  a  detachment  of  Insurgent  troops  could 
be  kept  under  fire  for  four  hours  by  a  robber  band,  and 
perhaps  the  attacking  party  were  not  all  "robbers." 
Soldiers  do  not  ordinarily  carry  much  to  steal. 

We  obtain  some  further  information  from  the  following 
telegram  of  December  27,  1898,  sent  by  the  secretary 
of  the  interior  to  the  President  of  the  Revolutionary 
Government: — 

"Most  urgent.  According  to  reports  no  excitement  except 
in  Bangbaog,  Tarlac,  which  at  12  a.u.,  25th,  was  attacked  by 
Tulisanes  [bandits  or  robbers,  —  D.  C.  W.].  The  iocal  presi- 
dente  with  his  patrols  arrested  six  of  them.  On  continuing 
the  pursuit  he  met  in  Talacon  a  party  too  large  to  attack.  At 
7  A.u.  of  the  26th  the  town  was  again  attacked  by  criminals, 
who  killed  the  tax  collector,  and  others  who  burnt  some  houses, 
among  them  that  of  the  local  presidente,  and  his  stables,  in 
which  he  lost  two  horses.    I  report  this  for  your  information."  * 

eomidiaDoe  with  and  following  the  earlier  published  proolamation, 
they  presented  two  (runs  and  innumerable  bolos.  I  hope  aoon  for 
tranquillity  among  the  people  there  through  these  efforts.  I  ask  dis- 
pense with  aasemb^  of  the  Junta.  Cam iun,  November  30,  1898." 
—  P.  I.  R.,  849. 

1  P.  I.  K.,  849.  '  Ibid. 



Evidently  tax  collectors  were  not  popular  in  Tarlac. 

Still  further  light  is  shed  on  the  situation  by  a  tele^itim 
from  the  secretary  of  the  interior  to  Aguinaldo,  dated 
December  28,  1898 :  — 

"According  to  my  information  the  excitement  in  Tarlac 
increases.  I  do  not  think  that  the  people  of  the  province  would 
have  committed  such  barbarities  by  themselves.  For  this 
reason  the  silence  of  General  Macabulos  is  suspicious ;  to  speak 
frankly,  it  encourages  the  rebels.  Some  seven  hundred  of  them, 
with  one  hundred  and  Mty  rifles,  entered  Pafiique,  seized  the 
arms  of  the  police,  the  town  funds,  and  attacked  the  houses  of 
the  people.  I  report  this  for  your  information.  All  necessary 
measures  will  be  taken."  • 

Note  also  the  following  from  the  secretary  of  the  in- 
terior, under  date  of  December  27, 1898,  to  Aguinaldo :  — 

"I  have  just  learned  that  not  only  in  Bangbang,  but  also  in 
Gerona,  Onell,  and  other  places  in  Tarlac,  men  have  been  as- 
saulted by  numerous  Tulisanes,  armed  with  rifles  and  bolos, 
who  are  killing  and  capturing  the  inhabitants  and  attacking 
travellers,  robbing  them  of  everythii^  they  have.  The  President 
shoidd  declare  at  once  that  that  province  is  in  state  of  siege, 
applying  martial  law  to  the  criminals.  That  —  (remainder 
missing)."  * 

The  secretary  of  agriculture  took  a  more  cheerful 
view  of  the  situation.  Under  date  of  December  28 
he  telegraphed  Aguinaldo  as  follows :  — 

"The  events  in  Bangbang,  Tarlac  Province,  according  to  a 
witness  here  worthy  of  credit,  have  arisen  from  an  attempt  to 
procure  vengeance  on  the  local  presidente,  and  robbery  of 
Chinese  shops.  Hence  they  are  without  political  importance. 
The  tax  collector  killed,  and  a  countryman  servant  of  the  local 
presidente  wounded.  They  burnt  two  houses  of  the  local 
presidente,  a  stable,  and  a  warehouse  for  sugar-cane."  * 

Obviously  the  robbery  of  Chinese  shops  and  the  killing  of 
a  few  individuals  was  at  first  considered  by  the  secretary  of 
agriculture  to  be  without  political  impori^nce.     £vi- 

>  P.  I.  R.,  8W.  *  Ibid.  ■  md, 



dently  he  changed  his  mind,  however,  for  on  the  same  day, 
December  28, 1898,  he  telegraphed  Aguinaldo  as  follows  :^ 

"  I  think  it  necessary  to  send  Aglipay  '■  to  quiet  Tarlac. 
Send  for  him.  If  you  desire,  I  will  go  to  Tarlac  to  investigate 
the  causes  of  the  disordeis,  in  order  to  find  a  remedy  for  them."  * 

At  this  stage  of  events  Aguinaldo  was  simmioned  to 
MaloloB  by  a  telegram  from  Mabini  under  date  of  Deceni' 
ber  29,  which  reads  as  follows ;  — 

"Most  urgent.  You  must  come  here  immediately.  Trfas 
is  aick.  We  can  come  to  no  decision  in  regard  to  the  Tarlac 
matter.    Cannot  constitute  a  government  without  you." ' 

The  measures  which  were  actually  taken  are  set  forth  in 
another  tel^p'am  of  the  same  date  from  the  secretaries  of 
war  and  interior  to  Aguinaldo,  which  reads  as  follows :  — 

"We  have  sent  civil  and  military  commissioners  to  Tarlac; 
amoi^  them  the  Director  of  War  and  persons  of  much  moral 
influence,  in  order  to  Btifle  the  disturbances.  The  necessary 
instructions  have  been  given  them  and  full  powers  for  the  pur- 
jwee,  and  as  far  as  possible  to  satisfy  the  people.  Have  also 
sent  there  six  companies  of  soldiers  with  explicit  instructions 
to  their  commander  to  guard  only  the  towns,  and  make  the 
people  return  to  a  peaceful  life,  using  a  policy  of  attraction  for 
the  purpose."  * 

Let  us  hope  that  the  commander  was  able  to  attract 
the  people  with  his  six  companies  of  soldiers,  and  make 
them  return  to  a  peaceful  life. 

Still  further  light  is  thrown  on  the  situation  in  Tarlac 
by  the  following  extract  from  "Episodios  de  la  Revolucion 
Rlipina"  by  Padre  Joaquin  D.  Duran,  an  Augustinian 
priest,  Manila,  1901,  page  71 : — 

"At  that  period  the  Filipinos,  loving  order,  having  been  de- 
ceived of  the  emancipation  promise,  changed  by  the  Katipdnan 
into  crimes  and  attacks  on  the  municipahty  of  the  pueblos,  dis- 

■  Oregorio  Af^paiy,  an  Uooano  Catholic  prieit  vho  beoame  an  aotdve 
Iiuurgent  Iead».  litter  he  abandoned  the  Catholic  faith  and  set 
up  a  new  churoh  which  gained  manr  adherents  in  the  Philippines. 

'  P.  I.  R.,  849.  ■  Ibid.  '  Ibid. 



content  broke  out  in  all  porta,  and,  although  latent  in  some 
provinces,  in  that  of  Tarlac  was  materialized  in  an  ex-sergeant 
of  the  late  Spanish  civil  guard.  A  valorous  and  determined 
man,  he  lifted  up  his  flag  against  that  of  Aguinaldo.  One 
hundred  rifles  were  sufficient  to  terrorize  the  inhabitants  of  s^d 
province,  crushing  the  enthusiastic  members  of  the  revolution- 
ary party.  .  .  .  Having  taken  possession  of  four  towns,  Pe- 
cheche  would  have  been  everywhere  successful  if  ambition 
and  pride  had  not  du^cted  his  footsteps.  In  January,  1899, 
the  Aguinaldista  commander  of  Tarlac  province,  afraid  that 
his  whole  province  would  espouse  the  cause  of  the  sergeant, 
attempted  by  every  means  in  his  power  to  interrupt  his  career, 
not  hesitating  to  avail  himself  of  crime  to  destroy  the  influence 
of  Pecheche  with  the  many  people  who  had  been  incensed  by  the 
Katipdnan  and  had  in  turn  become  firm  partisans  of  the  Guards 
of  Honour. 

"The  Ilocano  Tranquilino  Pagarigan,  local  presidente  at 
that  time  of  Camiling,  served  as  an  admirable  instrument  for 
this  purpose.  .  .  .  Pecheche  was  invited  to  a  solemn  festivity 
organized  by  Tranquilino,  who  pretended  to  recognize  him  as 
his  chief,  and  rendering  himself  a  vassal  by  taking  an  oath  to  bis 
flag.  He  accepted  the  invitation,  and  after  the  mass  which 
was  celebrated  went  to  a  meal  at  the  convent,  where,  after 
the  meal  was  over,  the  members  of  the  K,  K.  K,  surrounded 
Pecheche  and  10  of  his  officetB  and  killed  them  with  bolos  or 
tied  them  and  threw  them  out  of  the  windows  and  down  the 
staircase.  Some  priests  were  held  captive  in  the  building  where 
this  took  place  and  were  informed  of  what  had  taken  place 
immediately  afterwards." 

This  extract  shows  how  easy  it  then  was  for  any  man 
of  determination  to  acquire  a  following,  especially  if 
he  could  dispose  of  a  few  rifles.  It  also  gives  an  excellent 
idea  of  the  methods  employed  by  the  Insurgents  in  dealing 
with  those  who  opposed  their  rule. 

General  Fred  D.  Grant  once  told  me,  with  much  amuse- 
ment, of  an  interesting  experience  during  a  fight  on 
Mt.  Arayat  in  Pampanga.  His  men  took  a  trench  and 
captured  some  of  its  occupants.  Several  of  these  were 
impressed  as  guides  and  required  to  show  the  attacking 
forces  the  locations  of  other  trenches.  At  first  they 
served  unwillingly,  but  presently  became  enthusiastic 



and  rushed  the  works  of  their  quondam  fellow-soldiers  in 
the  van  of  the  American  attack.  Finally  they  begged 
for  gtms.  Grant  added  that  he  could  start  from  Bacolor 
for  San  Fernando  any  morning  with  a  supply  of  rifles 
and  pick  up  volunteers  Plough  to  capture  the  place,  and 
that  on  the  return  trip  he  could  get  enough  more  to 
attack  Bacolor  I 


And  now  we  come  to  Pangasin&n,  the  most  populous 
province  of  Luzon,  and  the  third  in  the  Philippines  in 
munber  of  inhabitants. 

"In  July,  1898,  the  officer  in  Dagupan  wrote  to  the  com- 
mandiug  general  of  Tarlac  Province  that  be  would  like  to  know 
whom  he  was  required  to  obey,  as  there  were  so  many  officials 
of  all  ranks  who  gave  him  orders  that  it  was  impossible  for  him 
to  know  where  he  stood."  ' 

In  a  letter  dated  August  17,  ISOS,  to  Aguinaldo,  Benito 
Legarda  complained  that  a  bad  impression  had  been 
produced  by  the  news  from  Dagupan  that  when  the  In- 
surgents entered  there,  after  many  outrages  committed 
upon  the  inmates  of  a  girls'  school,  every  officer  had 
carried  off  those  who  suited  him.* 

What  should  we  say  if  United  States  troops  entered  the 
town  of  Wellesley  and  raped  numerous  students  at  the 
college,  the  officers  subsequently  taking  away  with  them 
the  yotmg  ladies  who  happened  to  suit  them  7  Yet  things 
of  thia  sort  hardly  caused  a  ripple  in  the  country  then 
xmder  the  Insurgent  flag,  and  I  learned  of  this  particular 
incident  by  accident,  although  I  have  known  Legarda 
for  years. 

I  quote  the  following  general  description  of  conditions 
in  Pangasindn  from  a  letter  addressed  by  Cecilio  Ap6stol 
to  General  Aguinaldo  on  July  6,  1898 :  — 

"You  probably  know  that  in  the  Province  of  Pangasindn, 
of  one  of  the  towns  in  which  your  bumble  servant  is  a  resident, 

» P.  I.  R..  1231.  2.  •  Taylor,  62  AJ. 



the  Spanish  flag  through  our  good  fortune  has  not  flown  here 
for  tho  past  few  months,  since  the  few  Spaniarda  who  lived  here 
have  concentrated  in  Dagupan,  a  place  not  difficult  of  attack, 
aa  is  said. 

"But  this  is  what  is  going  on  in  this  Province :  There  exist 
here  two  Departmental  Governments,  one  calling  itself  that  of 
Northern  Luz6n  and  of  which  Don  Vicente  del  Prado  is  the 
President,  and  the  other  which  calls  itself  that  of  Northern  and 
Central  Luz6n,  presided  over  by  Don  Juliano  Paraiso.  Be- 
sides these  two  gentlemen,  there  are  two  governors  in  the  prov- 
ince ( I)  one  Civil  Political  Military,  living  in  Lingayen,  named 
Don  Felipe  J.  BartolomI,  and  another  living  in  Re^  Guerrero, 
a  town  of  Tajoig,  named  Don  Vicente  Estrella.  And  in  addi- 
tion there  are  a  large  number  of  Administrators,  Inspectors, 
Military  Judges,  G€nerals,  .  .  .  they  cannot  be  counted.  It 
is  a  pandemonium  of  which  even  Christ,  who  permits  it,  cannot 
make  anything.  Indeed,  the  situation  is  insupportable.  It 
reminds  me  of  the  schism  in  the  middle  ages  when  there  were 
two  Popes,  both  legitimate,  neither  true.  Things  are  as  clear 
as  thick  chocolate,  as  the  Spaniards  say.  In  my  poor  opinion, 
good  administration  is  the  mother-in-law  of  disorder,  since  dis- 
order is  chaos  and  chaos  produces  nothing  but  confusion,  that 
is  to  say,  death. 

"I  have  had  an  opportunity,  through  the  kindness  of  a  friend, 
to  read  the  decree  of  that  Government,  dated  June  18th,  of 
the  present  year,  and  the  accompanying  'Instructions  for  the 
government  of  towns  and  provinces.'  Article  9  of  the  said 
decree  says  that  the  Superior  Government  will  name  a  com-' 
missioner  for  each  province  with  the  special  duty  of  establish- 
ing there  the  organization  set  forth  in  the  decree.  Very  well 
so  far:  which  of  the  so-called  Presidents  of  Northern  or  of 
Northern  and  Central  Luzdn  is  the  conunissioaer  appointed  by 
that  government  to  establish  the  new  organization  in  that  prov- 
ince ?  Are  military  commanders  named  by  you  for  Fangasi- 
n&n  ?  I  would  be  very  much  surprised  if  either  of  them  could 
show  his  credentials.  Aside  from  these,  the  fact  remfuns  that 
in  those  instructions  no  mention  is  made  of  Presidents  of  Depart- 
ments, there  is  a  manifest  contradiction  in  their  jurisdictions, 
since  while  one  ceiIIs  himself  president  of  a  Departmental  Gov- 
ernment, of  Northern  Luz6n,  the  other  governs  the  Northern 
and  Central  portion  of  the  Island,  accordLig  to  the  seals  which 
they  use. 

"And,  neverthelras,  a  person  callii^  himself  the  General 
Administrator  of  the  Treasury  and  the  said  Governor  of  the 



Proviace,  both  of  vibam  Iiv«  in  Tayug,  come  to  this  town  when 
tlie  Spaniards  Tolimtarily  abandoned  it  and  gathered  all  the 
people  of  means,  and  drew  up  an  act  of  election,  a,  copy  of  which 
is  attached.  From  it  you  will  see  how  this  organization  violates 
the  provisionB  of  the  decree  of  the  18th  of  June. 

"Another  item :  They  got  up  a  contract  with  the  people  of 
means  of  this  town,  and  did  the  same  thing  in  the  other  towns, 
in  which  contract  they  exact  from  us  91250  which  they  call 
contributions  of  war  (see  document  No.  2  attached),  .^^ong 
the  doubtful  powers  of  these  gentlemen  is  the  one  to  exact 
these  sums  included?  Have  they  express  orders  from  that 
Government  ? 

"Perhaps  these  blessed  gentlemen  —  they  are  high  flyers 
there  is  no  doubt  about  that,  —  have  struck  the  clever  idea  of 
calling  themselves  generals,  governors,  etc.,  in  order  to  enjoy  a 
certain  prestige  and  to  give  a  certain  color  of  legality  to  their 
acts  —  this,  although  they  don't  know  an  iota  of  what  they  are 
doing.  But  what  I  am  Biae  of,  and  many  other  men  also,  is 
that  there  is  no  order,  that  here  there  is  not  a  single  person  in 
authority  whom  to  obey.  This  superfluity  of  rulers  will  finally 
lead  to  strained  relations  between  them  and  the  towns  of  this 
province  will  end  by  paying  the  piper. 

"But  we  poor  ignorant  creatures  in  so  far  as  the  republican 
form  of  government  is  concerned,  in  order  to  avoid  worse  evils 
took  them  at  their  word,  obeyed  them  like  automatons,  hyp- 
notized by  the  title  of  'Insui^nta'  which  they  applied  to  them- 
selves. But  when  I  had  an  opportunity  to  read  the  said  decree, 
doubts  were  forced  upon  me,  I  began  to  suspect  —  may  God 
and  they  pardon  me  —  that  they  were  tryii^  to  impose  upon  us 
nicely,  that,  shielded  by  the  motto,  'have  ttath  in  and  submit 
to  the  will  of  the  country'  they  came  to  these  towns  'for  busi- 

"In  order  to  dissipate  this  doubt,  in  order  to  do  away  with 
abuses,  if  there  are  abuses,  I  made  up  my  mind  to  send  you 
this  account  of  the  condition  of  things  here.  I  flatter  myself 
that  when  you  learn  of  the  lamentable  situation  of  this  province, 
you  will  soon  deign  to  take  steps  to  establish  order,  because 
thereon  depends  the  tranquillity  of  Pangasin^  and  in  the  end  a 
strict  compliance  with  your  superior  orders. 

"There  will  be  no  limit  to  the  thanks  of  the  people  of  this 
province  if  their  petitions  secure  favourable  consideration  and 
an  immediate  response  from  the  high  patriotism  and  honourable 
standpoint  of  the  Supreme  Dictator  of  the  Philippines."  * 

•P.  I.R.,  77. 



It  will  be  noted  that  the  picture  thus  drawn  by  SeQor 
Ap6stol  differs  in  certain  important  particulars  from  that 
painted  in  such  engaging  coloiu^  by  Judge  Blount. 

In  September,  1S9S,  the  civil  governor  of  Pangasin&n 
had  to  have  an  escort  of  troops  in  passing  through  his 

On  November  20,  1898,  the  head  of  the  town  of  San 
Manuel  wrote  the  provincial  governor  that  his  people 
could  no  longer  support  the  troops  quartered  on  them, 
as  the  adherents  of  the  Katipiian  had  burned  or  stolen 
all  of  their  property.* 

The  sum  total  of  Blount's  description  of  affairs  in 
this,  the  most  populous  province  of  Luz6n,  is  derived 
from  the  narrative  of  Messrs.  Wilcox  and  Sargent  and 
reads  as  follows :  — 

"In  Pangasinan  'the  people  were  all  very  respectful  and 
polite  and  offered  the  hospitality  of  their  homes.' "  • 

Doubtless  true,  but  as  a  summary  of  conditions  per- 
haps a  trifle  sketchy. 

Nueva  Ecija 

Nueva  Ecija  was  the  next  province  visited  by  Wilcox 
and  Sargent.    They  have  failed  to  inform  us  that :  — 

"In  December,  1899,  certain  men  chained  with  being  mem- 
bers of  this  society  [Guards  of  Honour]  were  interrogated  in 
Nueva  £k;ija  as  to  their  purposee.  One  of  those  questioned 
said:  — 

'"That  their  purpose  was  one  day,  the  date  being  unknown 
to  the  deponent,  when  the  Ilocanos  of  Batac  came,  to  rise  up  in 
arms  and  kill  the  Tag&los,  both  private  individuals  and  pubUc 
employees,  excepting  those  who  agreed  to  the  former,  for  the 
reason  that  honours  were  granted  only  to  the  Tag&loe,  and  but 
few  to  the  Ilocanos.'"  * 

Blount  has  assured  us  that  the  Filipinos  were  a  unit  at 
Aguinaldo's  back  and  were  and  are  an  united  people,  and 

» P.  I.  R.,  47.  7.  » Ibid.,  951.  3. 

>  Blonnt,  p.  109.  <  P.  I.  R.,  1006. 





here  are  the  Ilocanos  of  Nueva  Ecija  spoiling  his  theory 
by  remembering  that  they  are  Ilocanos  and  proposing  to 
kill  whom  ?  Not  certain  individual  Filipinos,  who  might 
have  offended  them,  but  the  Tag^ogs  I 

That  there  were  other  troubles  in  Nueva  Ecija  is 
shown  by  the  following  statement :  — 

"On  January  7,  1899,  the  commjasioner  of  AguinaJdo's 
treasury  eent  to  collect  contributions  of  war  in  Nueva  Ecija 
Province  reported  that  the  company  stationed  in  San  Isidro 
had  become  guerillas  under  command  of  its  officers  and  op- 
posed hia  collections,  stating  that  they  were  acting  in  compliance 
with  orders  from  higher  authority." ' 

And  now,  in  following  the  route  taken  by  our  tourist 
friends,  we  reach  Nueva  Vizcaya  and  the  Cagayan  valley. 

» p.  I.  B.,  870.  4. 



iNsmiGBNT  Rule  in  the  Caqatan  Valley 

NtiBVA  VizcATA  is  drained  by  the  Magat  River,  a  branch 
of  the  CagayaD.  While  the  provinces  of  Isabela  and 
Cagayan  constitute  the  Ca^yan  valley  proper,  Blount 
includes  Nueva  Vizcaya  in  the  territory  covered  by  this 
designation,  and  for  the  purpose  of  this  discussion  I 
will  follow  his  example. 

Especial  interest  attaches  to  the  history  of  Insui^ent 
rule,  in  the  Ci^ayan  valley,  as  above  defined,  for  the 
reason  that  Blount  himself  served  there  as  a  judge  of  the 
court  of  first  instance.    He  says ; '  — 

"The  writer  is  perhaps  as  familiar  witli  the  history  of  that 
Cagayan  valley  as  almost  any  other  American." 

He  was.  For  his  action  in  concealing  the  horrible 
conditions  which  arose  there  under  Insurgent  rule, 
with  which  he  was  perfectly  familiar,  and  in  foisting  on 
the  public  the  account  of  Messrs.  Wilcox  and  Sargent, 
as  portraying  the  conditions  which  actually  existed 
there,  I  propose  to  arraign  him  before  the  bar  of  public 
opinion.  In  so  doing  I  shall  consider  these  conditions 
at  some  length.  We  have  much  documentary  evidence 
concerning  them  in  addition  to  that  furnished  by  the 
Insurgent  records,  althoxigh  the  latter  quite  sufficiently 
demonstrate  many  of  the  more  essential  facts. 

In  describing  the  adventures  of  Messrs.  Wilcox  and 
Sargent  in  this  re^on,  Judge  Blount  says :  *  — 

"There  '  they  were  met  by  Simeon  Villa,  military  commander 
of  Isabela  province,  the  man  who  was  chief  of  staff  to  Aguinaldo 

■  Blount,  p.  113.  ■  Ibid.,  p.  111.  *  At  CaHg,  Isabela. 




afterwards,  and  was  captured  by  General  Funaton  along  Tith 
Aguinaldo  in  the  spring  of  1901." 

The  facts  as  to  Villa's  career  in  the  Csgayan  valley 
are  especially  worthy  of  note  aa  they  seem  to  hare  entitled 
him,  in  the  opinion  of  his  Buperiors,  to  the  promotion 
which  was  afterward  accorded  him.  He  was  an  intimate 
friend  of  Aguinaldo  and  later  accompanied  him  on  his 
long  flight  through  northern  Luzon, 

On  August  10,  1S98,  Colonel  Daniel  Tirona,  a  native 
of  Cavite  Province  and  one  of  the  intimates  of  Aguinaldo, 
was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Aparri  in  the  Insurgent  steamer 
FUipinas  and  establish  the  revolutionary  government 
in  northern  Luzon.  In  doing  this  he  was  to  hold  elec- 
tions for  office-holders  under  Aguinaldo's  government 
and  was  authorized  to  approve  or  disapprove  the  reeulta, 
his  action  being  subject  to  subsequent  revidon  by 
Aguinaldo.  His  forces  were  composed  of  four  companira 
armed  with  rifles. 

Tirona  reached  Aparri  on  August  25  and  promptly 
secured  the  surrender  of  the  Spaniards  there. 

He  was  accompanied  by  Simeon  Villa,  the  man  under 
discussion,  and  by  Colonel  Leyba,  who  was  also  very 
close  to  Aguinaldo. 

Abuse  of  the  Spanish  prisoners  began  at  once.  It  is 
claimed  that  the  governor  of  North  Hocos,  who  was 
among  those  captured,  was  grossly  mistreated. 

Taylor  briefly  summarizes  subsequent  events  as 
follows : "  — 

"Whatever  the  treatment  of  the  Spanieh  governor  of  Hocos 
may  really  have  been,  there  is  testimony  to  »iow  that  some  of 
the  other  prisoners,  especially  the  prieata,  were  abused  and  out- 
raged under  the  direction  of  S.  Villa  and  Colonel  Leyba,  both 
of  whom  were  very  close  to  Aguinaldo.  Some  of  the  Spanish 
civil  officials  were  put  in  stocks  and  beaten,  and  one  of  the 
officers  who  had  surrendered  at  Aparri  was  tortured  to  death. 
This  was  done  with  the  purpose  of  extorting  money  from  them, 



for  it  was  believed  that  they  had  hidden  funds  in  place  of  turn- 
ing them  over.  All  the  Spaniards  were  immediately  stripped 
of  everything  they  had.  The  priests  were  subjected  to  a  system- 
atic series  of  insults  and  abuse  under  the  direction  of  Villa 
in  order  to  destroy  their  influence  over  the  people  by  degrad- 
ing them  in  their  eyes.  It  was  for  this  that  they  were  beaten 
and  exposed  naked  in  the  sun;  and  other  torture,  such  aa 
pouring  the  wax  of  burning  candles  into  their  eyes,  was  used 
to  make  them  disclose  where  they  had  hidden  church  vrasels 
and  church  funds.  The  testimony  of  a  friar  who  suffered 
these  outrages  is  that  the  great  mass  of  the  people  saw  such 
treatment  of  their  parish  priests  with  horror,  and  were  present 
at  it  only  through  fear  of  the  organized  force  of  the  Katipdnan." 

Taylor's  statement  is  mildness  itself  in  view  of  the  well- 
established  facts. 

The  question  of  killing  the  Spanish  prisoners,  including 
the  friars,  had  previously  been  seriously  considered,'  but 
it  was  deemed,  wiser  to  keep  most  of  the  friars  alive, 
extort  money  from  them  by  torture,  and  offer  to  liberate 
them  in  return  for  a  large  cash  indemnity,  or  for  political 
concessions.  Day  after  day  and  week  after  week  Villa 
presided  at,  or  himself  conducted,  the  torture  of  ill-fated 
priests  and  other  Spaniards  who  fell  into  his  hands. 
Even  Filipinos  whom  he  suspected  of  knowing  the  where- 
abouts of  hidden  friar  money  did  not  escape. 

The  following  information  relative  to  the  conduct  of 
the  Insurgents  in  the  Cagayan  valley  is  chiefly  taken  from 
a  manuscript  copy  of  "Historia  de  la  Conquiata  de 
Cagayan  por  los  Tagalos  Resolucionarios,"  in  which  the 
narratives  of  certain  captured  friars  are  transcribed 
and  compiled  by  Father  Julian  Malumbres  of  the 
Dominican  Order. 

The  forma!  surrender  of  Aparri  occurred  on  August 
26.  Tirona,  his  officers  and  his  soldiers,  promptly 
pilU^;ed  the  convento.'  The  officers  left  the  Bishop  of 
Vigan  ten  pesos,  but  the  soldiCTS  subsequently  took  them 
away  from  him.    Wardrobes  and  tnioks  were  brokrai 

*  See  p.  731.  ■  The  parsonage,  or  reddenoe  of  the  priest. 



open ;  clocks,  shoes,  money,  everything  was  carried  off. 
Even  personal  papers  and  prayer-books  were  taken  from 
some  of  the  priests,  many  of  whom  were  left  with  ab- 
solutely nothing  save  the  few  remaining  clothe  in  which 
they  stood.^ 

On  the  same  day  Villa,  accompanied  by  Victa  and 
Rafael  Perea,'  went  to  the  convento  and  told  the  priests 
who  were  imprisoned  there  that  their  last  hour  had  come. 
He  shut  all  of  them  e^ccept  the  bishop  and  five  priests  in 
a  room  near  the  church,  then  separated  the  Augustiniana, 
Juan  Zallo,  Gabino  Olaso,  Fidel  Franco,  Mariano  Rod- 
riguez, and  Clemente  Hidalgo,  from  the  others  and  took 
them  into  the  lower  part  of  the  convento  where  he  told 
tiiem  that  he  intraided  to  kill  them  if  they  did  not  give 
him  more  money.  The  priests  told  him  that  they  had 
given  all  they  had,  whereupon  he  had  their  arms  tied 
behind  their  backs,  kicked  them,  struck  them  and 
whipped  them  with  rattans. 

Father  Zallo  was  thrown  on  his  face  and  savagely 
beaten.  Meanwhile  two  shots  were  fired  over  the  heads  of 
the  others  and  a  soldier  called  out  "One  has  fallen," 
badly  frightening  the  priests  who  had  remained  shut  in 
the  room.  Villa  then  returned  with  soldiers  to  this  room, 
ordered  his  men  to  load,  and  directed  that  one  priest  step 
forward  to  be  shot.  Father  Mariano  Ortiz  compUed 
with  this  request,  asking  that  he  be  the  first  victim. 
Villa,  however,  contented  himself  with  threatening  him 
with  a  revolver  and  kicking  and  striking  him  until  he  fell 
to  the  floor.    He  was  then  beaten  with  the  butts  of  guns. 

Father  Jos6  Vazquez,  an  old  man  of  sixty  years,  who 
had  thrown  some  money  into  a  privy  to  keep  it  from  falling 
into  the  hands  of  the  Insurgents,  was  stripped  and  com- 
pelled to  recover  it  with  his  bare  hands,  after  which  he 
was  kicked,  and  beaten  with  rattans. 

Father  Aquilino  Garcia  was  unmercifully  kicked  and 

beaten  to  make  him  give  up  money,  and  this  sort  of 

'  Insurgent  ofBoen. 



thing  contiiiued  until  Villa,  tired  out  with  the  phymca] 
exertion  involved  in  assaulting  these  defenceless  men, 
departed,  leaving  his  uncompleted  task  to  others,  who 
continued  it  for  some  time. 

The  net  result  to  the  Insui^ents  of  the  sacking  of  the 
amvento  and  of  the  tortures  thus  inflicted  was  approxi- 
mately 120,000  gold  in  addition  to  the  silver,  bank  notes, 
letters  of  credit,  jewels,  etc.,  which  they  obtained. 

On  September  5  Villa  had  Fathers  Juan  Recio  and 
Buenaventura  Macia  given  fifty  blows  each,  although 
Father  Juan  was  ill. 

Villa  then  went  to  Lalloc,  where  other  priests  were  im- 
prisoned. On  September  6  he  demanded  money  of  them, 
causing  them  to  be  kicked  and  beaten.  Father  Angel 
was  beaten  in  an  especially  cruel  manner  for  the  appar- 
ent purpose  of  killing  him,  after  which  he  was  thrust 
into  a  privy.  Father  Isidro  Fernandez  was  also  fearfully 
abused.  Stripped  of  his  habit,  and  stretched  face  down  on 
the  floor,  he  was  horribly  beaten,  and  was  then  kicked, 
and  struck  with  the  butt  of  a  revolver  on  the  forehead. 

A  little  later  the  priests  were  offered  their  liberty  for 
a  million  dollars,  which  they  were  of  course  unable  to 
furnish.  Meanwhile  the  torture  continued  from  time 
to  time. 

On  August  30  Tuguegarao  was  taken  by  the  Insurgents 
without  resistance.  Colonel  Leyba  promptly  proceeded 
to  the  convento  and  demanded  the  money  of  the  friars 
as  spoil  of  war.  He  found  only  eight  hundred  pesos  in 
the  safe.  Father  Corujedo  was  threatened  with  death 
if  he  did  not  give  more.  Other  priests  were  threatened 
but  not  tortured  at  this  time.  The  prisoners  in  the  jail 
were  liberated,  but  many  of  them  had  promptly  to  be  put 
back  agfun  because  of  the  disorder  which  resulted,  and 
that  same  evening  Leyba  was  obliged  to  publish  a  notice 
threatening  robbers  with  death. 

At  midnight  on  September  3  Father  Corujedo  was 
taken  from  the  convento  by  Captain  Diego  and  was  again 



asked  for  money.  Replying  that  he  had  no  more  to  give, 
he  was  beaten  with  the  hilt  of  a  sabre  and  stripped  of 
his  habit,  preparatory  to  being  executed.  A  mock  sen- 
tence of  death  was  pronounced  on  him  and  he  was  placed 
facii^  to  the  west  to  be  shot  in  the  back.  Di^^  ordered 
his  soldiers  to  load,  adding, ' '  When  I  count  three  all  fire," 
but  the  fatal  count  was  not  completed.  Three  priests 
from  Alcala  were  given  similar  treatment. 

The  troubles  of  the  priests  imprisoned  at  Tuguegarao 
were  sufficiently  great,  but  they  were  augmented  a 
thoiisand  fold  when  Villa  arrived  on  September  11. 
He  came  to  the  building  where  they  were  imprisoned, 
bearing  a  revolver,  a  sabre  and  a  great  quantity  of  rattans. 
He  ordered  the  priests  into  the  comer  of  the  room  in  which 
they  were  confined,  and  beat  those  who  did  not  move 
quickly  enough  to  suit  him.  He  threatened  them  with  a 
very  rigorous  examination,  at  the  same  time  assuring  them 
that  at  Aparri  he  had  hung  up  the  bishop  until  blood  flowed 
from  his  mouth  and  his  ears,  and  that  he  would  do  the  same 
with  them  if  they  did  not  tell  him  where  they  had  their 
money  hidden.  There  followed  the  usual  rain  of  kicks  and 
blows,  a  number  of  the  priests  being  obliged  to  take  off 
their  habits  in  order  that  they  might  be  punished  more 

Fathers  Calixto  Prieto  and  Daniel  Gonzales,  professors 
in  educational  institutions,  he  ordered  beaten  because  they 
were  friars. 

Fathers  Corujedo  and  Caddedila  were  beaten,  kicked 
and  insulted.  Both  were  gray-hured  old  men  and  the 
latter  was  at  the  time  very  weak,  and  suffering  from  a 
severe  attack  of  asthma.  Father  Pedro  Vincente  was 
also  brutally  beaten. 

The  following  is  the  description  given  by  an  eye-witnesa 
of  conditions  at  Tuguegarao :  — 

"Even  the  Indioa  of  Cagayan  complEuned  and  were  the 
victims  of  lootii^  and  robbery  on  the  part  of  the  soldiery.  So 
lackii^  in  dificipline  and  so  demoralized  was  that  army  that 



according  to  the  confeseisn  of  a  prominent  lilipino  it  was  of 
imperative  necessity  to  disarm  them.'  On  the  other  hand  we 
saw  with  real  astonishment  that  instead  of  warlike  eoldiers 
accustomed  to  battle  they  were  nearly  all  raw  recruits  and 
apprentices.  From  an  army  lacking  in  discipline,  and  lawless, 
only  outrages,  looting  and  all  sorts  of  sav^ery  and  injustice 
were  to  be  expected.  Witnesses  to  their  demoralisation  are, 
a^de  from  the  natives  themselves  who  were  the  first  to  ackno^- 
e^e  it,  the  Chinese  merchants  whose  losses  were  incalculable ; 
not  a  single  store  or  conmiercial  establishment  remained  that 
was  not  looted  repeatedly.  As  to  the  Spaniards  it  goes  with- 
out saying  because  it  is  publicly  known,  that  between  soldiers 
and  officers  they  despoiled  them  to  their  heart's  content,  with- 
out any  right  except  that  of  brute  force,  of  everything  that 
struck  their  fancy,  and  it  was  of  no  avail  to  complain  to  the 
officers  and  ask  for  justice,  as  they  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  such 
compl^nts.  At  Tuguegarao  they  looted  in  a  manner  never 
seen  before,  like  Vandals,  and  it  was  not  without  reason  that 
a  prominent  Filipino  said,  in  speaking  to  a  priest :  'Vandalism 
has  taken  possession  of  the  place.'  These  acts  of  robbery  were 
generally  accompanied  by  the  most  savage  insults;  it  was 
anarchy,  as  we  heard  an  eye-witness  affirm,  who  also  stated 
that  no  law  was  recognized  except  that  of  danger,  and  the 
vanquished  were  granted  nothing  but  the  inevitable  duty  of 
bowing  with  resignation  to  the  iniquitous  demands  of  that 
soulless  rabble,  skilled  in  crime." 

Villa  now  set  forth  for  Isabela.  Meanwhile  the  jailer 
of  the  priests  proceeded  to  steal  their  clothes,  including 
shirts,  shoes  and  even  handkerchiefs.  Isabela  was  taken 
without  resistance  on  September  12.  Dimas  Guzman' 
swore  to  theT>rie8tson  his  life  that  he  would  work  without 
rest  to  the  end  that  all  friars  and  all  Spaniards  mi^t 
be  respected,  but  he  perjured  himself. 

On  September  12  Villa  and  others  entered  the  town  of 
Cabagan  Viejo,  where  Villa  promptly  assaulted  Father 
Segundo  Rodriguez,  threatening  him  with  a  revolver, 
beating  him  immercifully,  insulting  him  in  every  possibte 
way  and  robbing  him  of  his  last  cent.    After  the  bloody 

<  Their  own  oommamd^  so  reported.     See  p.  202. 
)  Shortly  afterward  "elected"  govemor. 


FiLiPiNA  Trained  Nl'rbes. 
This  phatograph  shows  the  mcmbsrs  of  thi>  first  clasa  to  Kraduate  from  the 




scene  was  over  he  sacked  the  eonvenio,  even  takii^  away 
the  priests'  clothes. 

Villa  also  cruelly  beat  a  EWpmo,  Quintin  Agansi,  who 
was  taking  care  of  money  for  masses  which  the  priests 
wished  to  save  from  the  Insurgents. 

After  Father  S^undo  had  suffered  torture  and  abuse 
for  two  hours  he  was  obliged  to  start  at  once  on  a  journey 
to  Auitan.  The  suffering  priest,  after  being  compelled 
to  march  throi^  the  street  shouting  "Vivas  I"  for  the 
Republic  and  Aguinaldo,  spent  the  night  without  a 
mouthful  of  food  or  a  drink  of  water. 

Father  I>eogracia8  Garcia,  a  priest  of  Cabagan  Nuevo, 
was  subjected  to  torture  because  he  had  sent  to  Hongkong 
during  May  a  letter  of  credit  for  (5000  which  belonged  to 
the  Church.  Villa  and  Leyba  entered  his  eonvenio  and 
after 'beating  him  ordered  his  hands  and  feet  to  be  tied 
together,  then  passed  a  pole  between  them  and  had  him 
lifted  from  the  ground,  after  which  two  great  jars  of 
water  were  poured  down  his  nose  and  throat  without 
interruption.*  In  order  to  make  the  water  flow  through 
his  nose  better,  they  thrust  a  piece  of  wood  into  the  nasal 
passives  imtil  it  came  out  in  his  throat.  From  time  to 
time  the  torture  was  suspended  while  they  asked  him 
whether  he  would  tell  the  truth  as  to  where  he  had  con^ 
cealed  his  money.  This  unfortunate  priest  was  so  sure 
he  was  going  to  die  that  while  the  torture  was  in  progress 
he  received  absolution  from  a  fellow  priest.  After  the 
torture  with  water  there  followed  a  long  and  cruel  beating, 
and  the  imhappy  victim  was  finally  thrust  into  a  filthy 

Meanwhile  Father  Calzada  was  assaulted  by  a  group  of 
soldiers  and  badly  beaten,  after  which  he  was  let  down 
into  the  filth  of  a  privy,  first  by  the  feet  and  afterwards 
by  the  head. 

On  the  14th  a  lieutenant  with  soldiers  Altered  the 



corwento  of  Tumauini  and  as  usual  demanded  money 
of  the  occupants,  who  gave  him  $80,  all  they  had  at  the 
time.  This  quantity  not  being  satisfactory,  a  rope  was 
aent  for  and  the  hands  of  the  two  priests  were  tied  while 
they  were  whipped,  kicked  and  beaten.  They  were, 
however,  released  when  Father  Bonet  promised  to  get 
additional  money.  They  had  a  short  respite  until  the 
arrival  of  Villa,  who  still  demanded  more  money  of 
Father  Blanco,  and  failing  to  get  it  for  the  reason  that  the 
father  had  no  more,  leaped  upon  him  and  gave  him  a 
dreadful  beating,  his  companions  joining  in  with  whips, 
rattans  and  the  butts  of  guns.  They  at  last  left  their 
victim  stretched  on  the  groimd  aJmoat  dead.  This 
priest  showed  the  marks  of  his  ill  treatment  six  months 
afterward.  Not  satisfied  with  this,  Villa  gave  him  the 
so-called  "water  cure." 

Meanwhile  his  followerB  had  also  beaten  Father  Bonet. 
Villa  started  to  do  likewise  but  was  too  tired,  having 
exhausted  his  energies  on  Father  Blanco.  While  the 
tortures  were  going  on,  the  convento  was  completely 
sacked.  Father  Blanco's  library  was  thrown  out  of  the 

Villa  entered  Ilagan  on  the  15th  of  September  at  8 
o'clock  at  night.  Hastening  to  the  convenlo,  with  a  com- 
pany of  well-armed  soldiers,  he  had  his  men  surround 
the  three  priests  who  awaited  him  there,  then  summoned 
the  local  priest  to  a  separate  room  and  demanded  money. 
The  priest  gave  him  all  he  had.  Not  satisfied.  Villa 
leaped  upon  him,  kicking  him,  beating  him  and  pounding 
him  with  the  butt  of  a  gun.  Many  of  his  assodates 
joined  in  the  disgraceful  attack.  The  unfortunate  victdm 
was  then  stripped  of  his  habit,  obliged  to  lie  down  and 
received  more  than  a  hundred  lashes.  When  he  was 
nearly  senseless  he  was  subjected  to  torture  by  water, 
being  repeatedly  lifted  up  when  filled  with  water,  and 
allowed  to  fall  on  the  floor.  While  some  were  pouring 
water  down  his  nose  and  throat,  others  spilled  hot  wax 



on  his  face  and  head.  The  torment  repeatedly  rendered 
the  priest  sensetess,  hut  he  was  allowed  to  recover 
from  time  to  time  bo  that  he  might  suffer  when  it  was 

The  tortming  of  this  unhappy  man  lasted  for  three 
hours,  and  the  horrible  scene  was  immediately  succeeded 
by  another  quite  as  bad.  Villa  called  Father  Domingo 
Gampo  and,  after  taking  from  him  the  little  money  that 
he  had,  ordered  him  stripped.  He  was  then  given 
numberless  kicks  and  blows  from  the  butts  of  rifles  and 
150  lashes,  after  which  he  was  unable  to  rise.  There 
followed  the  torture  with  water,  on  the  pretext  that  he 
had  money  hidden  away. 

Meanwhile  the  houses  of  Spaniards  and  the  shops  of 
the  Chinese  were  completely  sacked,  and  the  men  who 
objected  were  knocked  down  or  cut  down  with  bolos. 
Numerous  ^Is  and  women  were  raped. 

On  September  15  Leyba  received  notice  of  the  surrender 
of  Nueva  Vizcaya.  I  quote  the  following  from  the 
narrative  above  inferred  to :  — 

"Delfin's  soldiers^  were  the  most  depraved  ever  seen:  thdr 
thieving  insUocts  had  no  bounds ;  bo  they  had  hardly  entered 
Nueva  Vizcaya  when  they  started  to  give  themselves  up  furi- 
ously to  robbery,  looking  upon  all  things  as  loot ;  in  the  very 
shadow  of  these  soldiers  the  province  was  invaded  by  a  mob  of 
adventurous  and  ragged  persona  from  Nueva  Ecija ;  between 
the  two  they  picked  Nueva  Vizcaya  clean.  When  they  had 
grown  tired  of  completely  shearing  the  unfortunate  Vizcayan 
people,  leaving  them  poverty-stricken,  they  flew  in  small  bauds 
to  the  pueblos  of  Isabela,  going  as  far  as  Angadanan,  giving 
themselves  up  to  unbridled  pillage  of  the  most  unjust  and  dis- 
orderly kind.  Some  of  these  highwaymen  demanded  money 
and  arms  from  the  priest  of  Angadanan,  but  Father  Marciano 
informed  them  'that  it  could  not  be,  as  Leyba  already  knew 
what  he  had  and  would  be  angry.' 

"To  this  very  day  the  people  of  Nueva  Viacaya  have  been 
unable  to  recover  from  the  stupendous  loasea  suffered  by  them 

>  Major  Delfln  oommanded  the  expedition  which  took  Nueva 



as  regards  th«r  wealth  and  industries.  How  many  cursea  did 
they  pour  forth  and  still  continue  to  level  against  the  Katipdnan 
that  brought  them  naught  but  tribulations  1" 

Confirmation  of  these  statements  is  found  in  the  fol- 
lowing brief  but  significant  passage  from  the  Insurgent 
records: — 

"At  the  end  of  December,  1898,  when  the  military  com- 
mander of  Nueva  Vizcaya  called  upon  the  Governor  of  that 
province  to  order  the  police  of  the  towna  to  report  to  him  as 
volunteers  to  be  incorporated  in  the  army  which  was  being 
prepared  for  the  defence  of  the  country,  the  Governor  protested 
agamat  it  and  informed  the  government  that  his  attempt  to 
obtmn  volunteers  was  in  fact  only  a  means  of  disarming  the 
towns  and  leaving  them  without  protection  agfunst  the  soldiers 
who  did  what  they  wanted  and  took  what  they  wished  and 
committed  every  outrage  without  being  punished  for  it  by  their 

The  effect  of  the  surrender  of  Nueva  Vizcaya  on  Leyba 
and  Villa  is  thus  described  by  Father  Malumbres :  — 

"Mad  with  joy  and  swollen  with  pride  Leyba  and  company 
were  like  men  who  travelled  flower-strewn  paths,  crowned  with 
laurels,  and  were  acclaimed  as  victors  in'  all  the  towns  on  their 
road,  their  intoxication  of  joy  taking  a  sudden  rise  when  they 
came  to  believe  themselves  kings  of  the  valley.  It  was  then 
that  their  delirium  reached  ite  brimful  measure  and  their 
treatment  of  those  whom  they  had  vanquished  began  to  be 
daily  more  cruel  and  inhuman.  In  Cf^yan  their  fear  of  the 
forces  m  Nueva  Vizcaya  kept  them  from  showing  such  unquali- 
fiable  excesses  of  cruelty  and  nameless  barbarities,  but  the  tri- 
umph of  the  Katipijnan  arms  in  Nueva  Vizcaya  completely 
broke  down  the  wall  of  restraint  which  somewhat  repressed 
those  sanguinary  executioners  thirsting  to  fatten  untranmielled 
on  the  innocent  blood  of  unanned  and  defenceless  men.  From 
that  melancholy  time  there  began  an  era  of  unheard  of  out- 
rages and  barbarous  scenes,  unbelievable  were  they  not  proved 
by  evidence  of  every  description.  The  savage  acts  committed 
in  Isabela  by  the  inhuman  Leyba  and  Villa  cannot  possibly 
be  painted  true  to  life  and  in  all  their  tragic  detuls.  The 
blackest  hues,  the  most  heartrending  accents,  the  most  vigor- 
ous lai^uage  and  the  most  fulminating  anathemas  would  be 
'  P.  I.  R.,  246.  8. 



a  pale  image  of  the  truth,  and  our  pen  cannot  express  with  true 
atdour  the  terrifying  scenes  and  cruel  torments  brought  about 
by  such  fierce  chieftiuns  on  such  jndefensive  religious.  It 
seems  imposeible  that  a  fleshly  heart  could  hold  so  much  wicked- 
ness, for  these  petty  chiefs  were  veritable  monsters  of  cruelty 
who  surpassed  a  Nero ;  men  who  were  entire  strangers  to  noble 
and  humane  sentiments  and  who  in  f^ipeaiance  having  the 
figure  of  a  man  were  in  refdity  tig^  roaring  in  desperation,  or 
mad  dc^  who  gnashed  their  teeth  in  fury." 

On  September  18  Leyba  continued  hia  inarch,  while 
Villa  remained  behind  at  Ilagan  to  torture  the  prisoners 
who  mi^t  be  brought  in  from  Isabela. 

On  arrival  at  Gamut,  Leyba  at  once  entered  the  con- 
sento  and  as  usual  immediately  demanded  money  from 
the  priests.  Father  Venancio  gave  him  all  he  had.  He 
was  nevertheless  given  a  frightful  whipping,  six  persons 
holding  him  while  others  nuned  blows  upon  him.  A  de- 
termined effort  was  made  to  force  the  priest  to  recant, 
and  when  this  failed  Leyba  leaped  upon  him,  kicking 
and  beating  him.  He  then  ordered  him  thrown  down 
face  uppermost,  and  asked  for  a  knife  with  the  apparent 
intention  of  mutilating  him.  He  did  not  use  the  knife, 
however,  but  instead,  assisted  by  his  followers,  gave  the 
unhappy  priest  another  terrific  beating,  even  standing 
upon  him  and  leaping  up  and  down.  The  priest  was  left 
unable  to  speak,  and  did  not  recover  for  months. 

Later  Leyba  had  torture  by  water  applied  to  Father 
Gregorio  Cabrero  and  lay  brother  Venancio  Aguinaco, 
while  Father  Sabanda  was  savagely  beaten. 

On  the  19th  of  September  Father  Miguel  Garcia  of 
Reina  Mercedes  was  horribly  beaten  in  bis  convento 
by  a  captain  sent  there  to  get  what  money  he  had. 

In  Cauayan,  on  September  20,  Fathers  Perez  and 
Aguirrezabal  were  beaten  and  compelled  to  give  up 
money  by  five  emissaries  of  Leyba,  and  the  latter  priest 
was  cut  in  the'  face  with  a  sabre.  The  convento  was 
sacked.  On  the  25th  Leyba  arrived  and  after  kicking 
and  beating  Father  Garcia  compelled  him  to  give  up 



91700.    He  then  informed  the  priests  that  if  it  were  not 
for  Aguinaldo's  orders  he  would  kill  all  the  Spaniards. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  24th  three  priests  and  a  Spaniard 
named  Soto  arrived  at  Ilagan.  The  following  is  the  state- 
ment of  an  eye-witness  as  to  what  happened ;  — 

"They  led  the  priests  to  the  headquarters  of  the  command- 
ing officer  where  the  tyrant  Villa,  always  eager  to  inflict  suffer- 
ing on  humanity,  awaited  them.  The  scene  witnessed  by  the 
priests  obeisant  to  the  cruel  judge  waa  horrifying  in  the  ex- 
treme. Four  lions  whose  thirst  for  vengeance  was  extreme  in 
all,  threw  themselves,  blind  with  fury,  without  a  word  and  with 
the  look  of  a  basilisk,  upon  poor  Sefior  Soto  pving  him  such 
innumerable  and  furious  blows  on  head  and  face  that  weary 
as  he  was  from  his  past  journey,  the  ill-treatment  received  at 
Angadanan  and  weighted  down  by  years,  he  was  soon  thrown 
down  by  his  executioners  under  the  lintel  of  the  door  getting 
a  terrible  blow  on  the  head  as  he  fell ;  even  this  did  not  satisfy 
nor  tame  down  those  fierce-hearted  men,  who  on  the  contrary 
continued  with  their  infamoiu  work  more  furious  than  before, 
and  their  cruelty  did  not  Sag  on  seeing  their  victim  at  their 
feet.  They  could  have  done  no  worse  had  they  been  SiUpan 
say^es  dancing  in  triumph  around  the  palpitating  bead  cut 
from  the  body  of  some  enemy. 

"The  priests  who  witnessed  this  blood-curdling  scene  trem- 
bled like  the  weak  reed  before  the  gale,  waitti^  their  turn  to 
be  tortured,  but  God  willed  that  cruel  Villa  should  be  cont^tt 
with  the  butchery  perpetrated  upon  unhappy  Sr.  Soto.  Villa 
dismissed  the  priests  after  despoiling  them  of  their  bags  and 
clothes  telling  them,  to  tonnent  them;  'Go  to  the  convento 
until  the  mis^g  ones  turn  up  so  that  I  may  shoot  you  ail 
together.' " 

Leyba  entered  Echague  on  September  22,  promptly 
going  to  the  convento  as  usual  and  demandii^  money  of 
the  priest,  Father  Mata.  Wben  the  latter  had  given  him 
all  he  had,  he  received  three  terrific  beatings  at  the  hands 
of  some  twelve  men  armed  with  whips  and  sticks,  after 
which  Leyba  himself  struck  him  with  his  fist  and  his 
sabre.  He  was  finally  knocked  down  by  a  blow  with 
the  sabre  and  left  disabled.  It  took  six  months  for  him 
to  recover. 



Shortly  after  Leyba's  arrival  in  Nueva  Vizcaya  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  25th,  five  priests  were  summoned  to 
Solano  and  there  abused  in  the  usual  fashion  in  an  effort 
to  extort  money  from  them.  Only  one  escaped  ill 
treatment  and  one  was  nearly  killed. 

Leyba  now  went  to  Bayombong  to  carry  out  the  es- 
tablished programme  with  the  priests.  There  he  found 
Governor  Perez  of  Isabela,  who  had  taken  with  him  cer- 
tain government  moneys  and  employed  them  to  pay  sal- 
aries of  soldiers  and  other  employees.  He  insisted  on  the 
return  of  the  total  amount  and  threatened  to  shoot  Perez 
if  it  was  not  forthcoming.  The  Spaniarda  of  the  vicinity 
subscribed  S700  which  they  themselves  badly  needed  and 
saved  him  from  being  shot.  The  priests  of  Uie  place  were 
then  summoned  to  Leyba's  quarters  and  were  beaten 
and  tortured.  One  of  them  was  thrown  on  the  floor  and 
beaten  nearly  to  death,  Leyba  standing  meanwhile  with 
his  foot  on  the  unfortunate  man's  neck.  Another  was 
given  six  hundred  lashes  and  countless  blows  and  kicks. 
Leyba  stood  on  this  man's  neck  also.  When  the  victim's 
back  ceased  to  have  any  feeling,  his  legs  were  beaten. 
Leyba  terminated  this  period  of  diversion  by  kicking 
Father  Diez  in  the  solar  plexus  and  then  mocking  him 
as  he  lay  gasping  on  the  floor.  That  afternoon  one  of 
the  priests,  so  badly  injured  that  he  could  not  rise  xm- 
aided,  was  put  on  a  horse  and  compelled  to  ride  in  the 
hot  sun  to  Solano. 

Villa  and  Leyba  had  their  able  imitators,  as  is  shown 
by  the  following  description  of  the  torturing  of  Father 
Ceferino  by  Major  Delfin  at  Solano,  Nueva  Vizcaya,  on 
September  27 :  — 

"They  wished  to  give  brave  evidence  of  their  hate  for  the 
friar  before  Leyba  left,  and  show  Mm  that  they  were  as  brave 
as  he  when  it  came  to  oppressing  and  torturing  the  friar.  This 
tragedy  began  by  Jimenez  again  asking  Father  Ceferino  for 
the  money.  The  priest  answered  as  he  had  done  before. 
Then  Jimenez  started  to  talk  in  Tagalog  to  the  commanding 



officer  aad  Burely  it  was  nothing  good  that  he  told  him,  for 
suddenly  Del£u  left  the  bench  aad  darting  fire  from  his  eyea, 
f^  in  blind  fury  upon  the  defenceless  priest ;  what  harsh  words 
he  uttered  in  Tagalog  while  he  vented  Ms  fury  on  his  victim, 
striking  him  with  his  clenched  fist,  slapping  him  and  Idcliing 
him,  I  do  not  know,  but  the  religious  man  fell  at  the  feet  of  his 
furious  executioner  who,  being  now  the  prey  of  the  most  stu- 
pendous rage,  could  scarcely  get  his  tongue  to  stutter  and 
continued  to  kick  the  priest,  without  seeing  where  he  lacked 
him,-  Getting  deeper  and  deeper  in  the  abyss  and  perhaps  not 
knowing  what  he  was  about,  this  petty  chief  made  straight  for 
a  sabre  lying  on  a  table  to  continue  his  bloody  work.  In  the 
meantime  the  priest  had  risen  to  his  feet  and  awuted  with  resig- 
nation new  torments  which  certainly  were  even  worse  than  the 
first,  for  he  gave  him  so  many  and  such  hard  blows  with  the 
sabre  that  the  blade  was  broken  close  to  the  hilt.  This  acci- 
dent so  infuriated  Delfiu  that  he  again  threw  himself  upon  the 
Eriest,  kickiag  him  furiously  and  striking  him  repeatedly  imtil 
e  again  threw  him  to  the  ground,  and  not  yet  satisfied,  his 
vengefulness  led  him  to  throw  himself  upon  his  victim  with 
the  fury  of  a  tiger  after  his  prey,  beating  him  on  the  head  with 
the  hilt  of  the  saber  until  the  blood  ran  in  streams  and  formed 
pools  upon  the  pavement.  The  priest,  more  dead  than  alive, 
shuddered  from  head  to  foot,  and  appeared  to  be  struggling  in 
a  tr^nendous  fight  between  life  and  death;  he  had  hardly 
enough  strength  to  get  his  tongue  to  ask  for  God's  mercy.  At 
this  most  critical  juncture,  and  when  it  seemed  as  if  death  were 
inevitable,  the  martyr  received  absolution  from  Father  Diez, 
who  witnessed  the  blood-curdling  picture  with  his  heart  pierced 
with  grief  at  the  sight  of  the  sufferings  of  his  innocent  brother, 
feeling  as  must  the  condenmed  man  preparing  for  death  who 
sees  the  hours  fiy  by  with  vertiginous  rapidity.  The  blood 
Sowing  from  the  wounds  on  the  priest's  head  appeared  to  in- 
furiate and  blind  the  heart  of  Delfin  who,  rising  from  his  vic- 
tim's body,  sped  away  to  the  armory  in  the  court  house,  seized 
a  rifle,  and  came  back  furious  to  bnun  him  with  the  butt  and 
finish  killing  the  priest ;  but  God  willed  to  free  his  servant  from 
death  at  the  hands  of  those  cannibals,  so  that  generous  Lieu- 
tenant Navarro  interfered,  took  the  rifle  away  from  him  and 
caught  Delfln  by  the  arm,  threatening  him  with  some  words 
spoken  in  Tagalog.  Then  Navarro,  to  appease  Delfin's  anger, 
turned  the  priest  over  with  his  face  to  the  ground  and  gave  him 
a  few  strokes  with  the  bamboo,  and  feigning  anger  and  indigna^ 
tion,  ordered  him  aw^. 




"  il 








"Those  who  witnessed  the  horrible  tragedy,  the  brutality 
of  the  tyrant  and  the  prostration  of  the  friar  were  persuaded 
that  the  latter  would  never  survive  his  martyrdom.  The  reli- 
giouB  man  himself  holds  it  as  a  veritable  portent  that  he  out- 
lived such  a  terrible  trial ;  but  even  this  did  not  satisfy  them  as 
Bubsequently  the  Secretary  f^ain  called  Father  Ceferino  to 
Bubject  him  to  a  further  scrutiny,  as  ridiculous  as  it  was  mali- 
cious, though  it  did  not  go  beyond  words  or  insults." 

Sefior  Perez,  the  governor  of  Isabela,  and  Father 
Diez  were  compelled  to  go  to  Ilagan.  After  they  had 
arrived  there  on  October  2d,  Villa  proceeded  to  torture 
them.  At  the  outset  ten  soldiers,  imdoubtedly  instructed 
beforehand,  beat  the  governor  down  to  the  earth,  with 
the  butts  of  their  guns.  Villa  himself  struck  him  three 
times  in  the  chest  with  the  butt  of  a  gun  and  Father  Diez 
gave  him  absolution,  thinking  he  was  dying.  Father 
Diez  was  then  knocked  down  repeatedly  with  the  butts 
of  guns,  being  made  to  stand  up  promptly  each  time  in 
order  that  he  might  be  knocked  down  again.  Not 
satisfied  with  this,  Villa  compelled  the  suffering  priest  to 
kneel  before  him  and  kicked  him  in  the  nose,  repeating 
the  operation  until  he  left  him  stretched  on  the  floor 
half-senseless  with  his  nose  broken.  He  next  had  both 
victima  put  in  stocks  with  their  weight  supported  by 
thdr  feet  atone.  While  in  this  position  soldiers  beat 
them  and  jumped  onto  them  and  one  set  the  governor's 
beard  on  fire  with  matches.  Father  Diez  was  kept  in 
the  stocks  four  days.  He  was  then  sent  to  Tuguegarao 
in  order  that  personal  enemies  there  might  take  vengeance 
on  him,  Wla  bidding  him  good-by  with  the  following 
words:  "Go  now  to  Tuguegarao  and  see  if  they  will 
finish  killing  you  there."  Sefior  Perez  was  kept  in  the 
stocks  eight  days  and  it  is  a  wonder  that  he  did  not  die. 

Upon  the  25th  of  September  Villa  went  to  the  convento 
in  Ilagan  prepared  to  torture  the  priests,  but  he  succeeded 
in  compelling  a  number  of  them  to  sign  indorsements 
in  his  favour  on  various  letters  of  credit  payable  by  the 
Tabacalera  Company  and  departed  again  in  fairly  good 



htunour,  having  done  nothing  worse  than  strike  one  of 

Later,  however,  on  the  pretext  that  Fathers  Aguado 
and  Labanda  had  money  hidden  away,  he  determined 
to  torture  them  with  water.  The  first  to  be  tortured  was 
Father  Labanda.  Villa  had  him  taken  to  the  prison 
where  the  priest  found  his  two  faithful  Filipino  servants 
who  had  been  beaten  cruelly  and  were  then  hanging  from 
a  beam,  this  having  been  done  in  order  to  make  them  tell 
where  his  money  was. 

He  was  tied  after  the  usual  fashion  and  water  poured 
down  his  nose  and  throat.  During  the  brief  recites 
necessary  in  order  to  prevent  his  dying  outright  he  was 
cruelly  beaten.  They  finally  dragged  him  out  of  the 
prison  by  the  feet,  his  head  leaving  a  bloody  trail  on  the 
stones.  After  he  had  been  taken  back  to  his  companions, 
one  of  the  men  who  had  tortured  him  came  to  beg  his 
pardon,  saying  that  he  had  been  compelled  to  do  it  by 

Father  Aguado  was  next  tortured  in  one  of  the  rooms 
of  the  amoenio.  Villa  finished  the  day's  work  by  an- 
nouncing to  the  band  of  priests  that  he  would  have  them 
all  shot  the  next  day  on  the  plaza,  and  ordering  them  to 
get  ready. 

On  the  20th  the  barbarities  practised  by  this  inliiiTTiflr^ 
fiend  reached  their  climax  in  the  torturing  to  death  of 
lieutenant  Piera.  The  following  description  gives  some 
faint  idea  of  one  of  the  most  diabolical  crimes  ever  com- 
mitted in  the  Philippines  :  — 

"Villa's  cruelty  and  sanguinary  jeering  grew  without  let 
or  hindrance  from  day  to  day ;  it  seemed  that  this  hyena  con- 
tinually cudgelled  his  bruns  to  invent  new  kinds  of  torture  and 
to  jeer  at  the  friars.  On  the  night  of  the  29th  of  September 
the  diabolical  idea  occurred  to  him  of  giving  the  amp  de  grace 
to  the  prestige  of  the  friars  by  making  them  pass  through  the 
streets  of  Ilagan  conducting  and  playing  a  band  of  music. 
He  carried  out  his  nonsensical  purpose  by  calling  upon  Father 
Diograciaa  to  play  the  big  drum,  and  when  this  priest  had 



started  playing  Villa  learned  that  Father  Primo  was  a  musician 
and  could  therefore  play  the  drum  and  lead  the  band  with  all 
BkiU,  so  he  called  upon  Father  Primo  to  come  fonrard,  and  with 
one  thing  and  another  this  ridiculous  function  was  carried  on 
until  the  late  hours  of  the  night. 

"While  these  two  priests  were  serenading  Villa  and  his 
gang,  the  most  dreadful  shrieks  were  heard  from  the  jail, 
accompanied  by  pitiful  cries  that  would  melt  the  coldest  heart. 
The  priests  hearing  these  echoes  of  sorrow  and  pain,  and  who  did 
not  know  for  what  piu'pose  Fathers  Deogracias  and  ^mo  had 
been  separated  from  them,  seemed  to  recognize  the  voices  of 
these  two  priesta  among  the  groans,  believing  them  to  be  cruelly 
tortured ;  for  this  reason  they  began  to  say  the  rosary  in  order 
that  the  Most  Holy  Virgin  might  imbue  them  with  patience 
and  fortitude  in  their  martyrdom.  Great  was  their  surprise 
when  these  priests  returned  sajdng  that  they  had  cont^ted 
themselves  with  merely  making  fun  of  them  by  obliging  them 
to  play  the  big  drum  and  lead  the  band. 

"Although  this  somewhat  tempered  theu*  sorrow,  a  thorn 
remained  in  their  hearts,  fearing  that  the  moving  lamentations 
and  the  mortal  groans  came  from  the  lips  of  some  hapless 
Spaniard.  This  fatidical  presentiment  turned  out  unfortu- 
nately to  be  a  fact.  The  victim  sacrificed  that  melancholy 
night,  still  remembered  with  a  shudder  by  the  priests,  was 
Lieutenant  Salvador  Piera.  This  brave  soldier,  who  had  made 
up  his  mind  to  die  in  the  breach  rather  than  surrender  the  town 
of  Aparri,  was  persuaded  to  capitulate  only  by  the  prayers 
and  tears  of  certain  Spanish  ladies  who  had  been  instructed 
to  do  so  by  a  man  who  should  have  been  the  first  one  to  shoulder 
a  ri8e.  After  having  been  harassed  in  Aparri  he  was  taken 
to  Tugu^arao  at  the  request  of  Esteban  Quinta  or  Isidore 
Maquigat,  two  artful  filibusters  thirsting  to  revenge  themselves 
on  the  Lieutenant,  who  during  the  time  of  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment had  justly  laid  his  heavy  hand  upon  them.  In  the  latter 
part  of  September  they  conducted  hun  on  foot  and  without 
any  consideration  whatever  to  the  capital  of  Isabela.  In  this 
town  he  was  at  once  placed  in  solitary  confinement  in  one  of 
the  rooms  of  the  eoraento  and  allowed  no  intercourse  with 
any  one.  The  sin  for  which  they  recriminated  Piera  was 
his  having  chained  Dimas*  with  being  a  filibuster,  and  their 
revengefulnesa  reached  an  incredible  limit.    The  heartrend- 

'  Dimai  Ouznuui. 



of  wretches  buried  in  the  corwetUo  garden  a  body  stilt  dripinng 
wann  blood  from  the  lipe  of  which  there  escaped  the  feeble 
plaiute  of  anguish  of  a  dying  man." 

The  feeling  of  the  Spaniards  relative  to  this  matter 
ia  well  shown  by  the  following  statement  of  Father 
Malumbres :  — 

"This  horrible  crime  cannot  be  pardoned  by  God  or  man, 
and  is  still  uninvestigated,  crying  to  Heaven  for  vengeance 
with  greater  reason  than  the  blood  of  the  innocent  Abel.  So 
long  as  the  criminals  rem^n  unpimished  it  will  be  s  black  and 
indelible  stigma  and  an  ugly  stam  on  the  race  harbouring  in  its 
midst  the  perpetrators  of  this  imheard-of  sin.  Words  of  repro- 
bation are  not  enough,  justice  demands  exemplary  and  complete 
reparation,  and  if  the  powers  of  earth  do  not  tEike  justice  into 
their  own  handSj  God  will  send  Ore  from  Heaven  and  will  cause 
to  disappear  from  the  face  of  the  earth  the  criminals  and  even 
their  deecendant«.  A  murder  bo  cruel  and  premeditated  can 
be  punished  in  no  other  way. 

"If  the  courts  here  should  wish  to  punish  the  guilty  persoi^ 
it  would  not  be  a  difficult  task ;  the  public  pointe  its  finger  at 
those  who  dyed  their  hands  in  the  blood  of  the  heroic  soldier, 
and  we  shall  set  them  forth  here  echoing  the  voice  of  the  people. 
The  soulless  instigator  was  Dimaa  Guzman.  The  executioners 
were  a  certain  Jos£  Guzman  (aUas  Pepin,  a  nephew  of  Dimas) 
and  Cayetano  P4rez." 

The  matter  was  duly  taken  up  in  the  courts,  and  Judge 
Bloimt  himself  tried  the  cases. 

The  judge  takes  a  very  mild  and  liberal  view  of  tiie 
occurrence.    He  says  of  it : '  — 

"Villa  was  accompanied  by  his  aide.  Lieutenant  Ventura 
Guzman.  The  latter  is  an  old  acquaintance  of  the  author  of 
^e  present  volume,  who  tried  him  afterwards,  in  1901,  for 
playing  a  minor  part  in  the  murder  of  an  officer  of  the  Spanish 
army  committed  under  Villa's  orders  just  prior  to,  or  about  the 
time  of,  the  Wilcox-Sargent  visit.  He  was  found  guilty,  and 
sentenced,  but  later  Uberated  under  Freeident  Roosevelt's 
amnesty  of  1902.  He  was  guilty,  but  the  deceased,  so  the  people 
in  the  Gagayan  Vall^  used  to  say,  in  being  tortured  to  death, 

■Blount,  p.  112. 



got  only  the  same  Bort  of  medicine  he  had  often  administered 
thereaboute.  At  any  rate,  that  waa  the  broad  theory  of  the 
amnesty  in  wiping  out  all  these  old  cases." 

He  adds :  — 

"I  soitenced  both  IXmas  and  Ventura  to  life  imprisomnrait 
for  being  accessory  to  the  murder  of  the  Spanish  officer  above 
named,  Lieutenant  Piera.  Villa  officiated  as  arch-fiend  on 
the  grewsome  occasion.  I  am  quite  sure  I  would  have  hung 
Villa  without  any  compunction  at  that  time,  if  I  could  have 
gotten  hold  of  him.  I  tried  to  get  hold  of  him,  but  Governor 
Taft'fl  attorney-general,  Mr.  Wilfley,  wrote  me  that  Villa  was 
somewhere  over  on  the  mainland  of  Asia  on  British  territory, 
and  extradition  would  involve  application  to  the  London 
Foreign  Office.  The  intimation  was  ^at  we  had  trouble  enough 
of  our  own  without  borrowing  any  from  feuds  that  had  existed 
under  our  predeceesoiB  in  sovereignty.  I  have  understood  that 
Villa  is  now  practirang  medicine  in  Manila.  More  than  one 
officer  of  the  American  army  that  I  know  afterwards  did  things 
to  the  lilUpinos  ahnost  as  cruel  as  ViUa  did  to  that  unhappy 
Spanish  officer.  Lieutenant  Piera.  On  the  whole,  I  think 
President  Roosevelt  acted  wisely  and  humanely  in  wiping  the 
slate.  We  had  new  problems  to  deal  with,  and  were  not  bound 
to  handicap  ourselves  with  the  old  onee  left  over  from  the  Span- 
ish r^pme."* 

But  it  happens  that  thla  was  the  Filipino  regime. 
Piera's  torture  occurred  at  the  very  time  when,  according 
to  Blount,  Aguinaldo  had  "a  wonderfully  complete 
'going  concern'  throughout  the  Philippine  archipelago." 

Furthermore,  it  occurred  in  the  Cagayan  valley  where 
Blount  says  "perfect  tranquillity  and  pubhc  order"  were 
then  being  maintained  by  "the  authority  of  the  Aguinaldo 
government"  in  a  coimtry  which  Messrs.  Wilcox  and 
Sargent,  who  arrived  on  the  scene  of  this  barbarous 
murder  by  torture  four  weeks  later,  found  so  "  quiet  and 

Not  only  was  Blount  perfectly  familiar  with  every 
detail  of  this  damnable  crime,  but  he  must  of  necessity 

>  Blount,  p.  114. 



have  known  of  the  torturing  of  friars  to  extort  money, 
which  preceded  and  followed  it. 

The  following  statement  seems  to  sum  up  his  view  of 
the  whole  matter ;  — 

"It  is  true  there  were  cruelties  practised  by  the  Filipinos 
on  the  Spaniards.  But  they  were  ebullitions  of  revenge  for 
three  centuries  of  tyranny.  They  do  not  prove  unfitness  for 
self-government.  I,  for  one,  prefer  to  follow  the  example  set 
by  the  Roosevelt  amnesty  of  1902,  and  draw  the  veil  ovw  all 
those  matterB."  * 

The  judge  drew  the  veil  not  only  over  this,  but,  as  we 
have  seen,  over  numerous  other  pertinent  matters  which 
occurred  m  this  land  of  "profound  peace  and  tran- 
quillity" just  at  the  time  Wilcox  and  Sargent  were  making 
their  trip.  My  apologies  to  him  for  withdrawing  the 
veil  and  for  maintaining  that  such  occurrences  as  those 
in  question  demonstrate  complete  and  utter  imfitness  for 
self-government  on  the  part  of  those  who  broxight  them 
about  1 

If  it  be  true  that  Blount  knew  more  than  one  officer 
of  the  American  army  who  did  things  to  the  FilipinoB 
aUnost  as  cruel  as  Villa  did  to  Lieutenant  Piera,  why  did 
he  not  report  them  and  have  the  criminals  brought  to 

Such  an  attack  on  the  army,  in  the  course  of  which 
there  is  not  given  a  name  or  a  fact  which  could  serve  as 
a  basis  for  an  investigation,  is  cowardly  and  despicable. 

I  do  not  for  a  moment  believe  that  Blount  speaks  the 
truth,  but  if  he  does,  then  his  failure  to  attempt  to  bring 
to  justice  the  human  fiends  concerned  brands  him  1 

It  has  been  the  fashion  in  certain  quarters  to  make  vile 
allegations  of  this  sort  against  officers  of  the  United  States 
army,  couching  them  in  discreetly  general  terms.  This  is 
a  contemptible  procedure,  for  it  frees  those  who  make  reck- 
less charges  from  danger  of  the  criminal  proceedings  which 
would  otherwise  doubtless  be  brought  against  them. 
■  Blount,  p.  113. 






I  r" 

E  a-s 
3  si 






Od  arrival  at  Ilagan,  the  town  where  Fiera  was  tor- 
tured to  death,  Blount  says '  that  Messrs.  Wilcox  and 
Sargent  were 

"given  a  grand  baile  [ball]  and  fieala  [feast],  a  kind  of  dinner- 
dejicej  we  would  call  it.  .  .  .  From  Ilagan  they  proceeded  to 
ApajTi,  cordially  received  everywhere,  and  finding  the  country 
in  fact,  as  Aguinaldo  always  claimed  in  his  proclamations  of 
that  period,  seeking  recognition  of  his  government  by  the 
Powers,  in  a  state  of  profound  peace  and  tranquillity  —  free 
from  brigandage  and  the  like." 

Within  sight  of  the  banquet  ball,  within  hearing  of 
the  music,  lay  a  lighter  on  which  were  huddled  eighty-four 
priests  of  the  Catholic  Church,  many  of  them  gray-baired 
old  men,  imiocent  of  any  evil  conduct,  who  for  weeks  had 
BuCTered,  mentally  and  plQ^cally,  the  tortures  of  the 

Of  the  events  of  this  evenii^  and  the  foUowii^  day 
Father  Malumbres  says ;  — 

"From  the  river  the  eonverUo  could  be  seen  profusely  illu- 
minated and  the  strains  of  music  could  be  heard,  an  evident 
sign  that  they  were  eqgaged  in  revelry.  This  gave  us  a  bad 
stort,  as  we  came  to  fear  that  Villa  had  returned  from  the 
expedition  undertaken  to  come  up  with  two  Americans  who 
had  crossed  the  Carab&Uo  range  and  were  thinking  of  coming 
down  ae  f ar  as  Aparri.  It  was  late  to  announce  to  Villa  our 
arrival  at  Ilagan,  so  that  we  were  obliged  to  pass  the  night  on 
the  lighter.  In  the  morning  our  boat  was  anchored  in  front  of 
the  pueblo  of  Ilagan,  where  we  were  credibly  informed  that 
Villa  had  returned.  This  accursed  news  made  us  begin  to 
fear  some  disagreeable  incident. 

"  Our  Matias  went  ashore  and  delivered  the  official  communi- 
cation r^arding  our  transfer  to  Villa,  while  we  wuted  impa- 
tiently for  his  decision.  Sergeant  Matias  at  length  returned 
with  ordera  for  our  disembarkation ;  we  put  on  the  best  clothes 
we  had  and  the  rowers  placed  a  broad  plank  between  the  lighter 
and  the  arsenal  and  we  left  our  floating  prison  two  abreast. 
Matias  called  the  roll  and  the  order  to  march,  we  were  eighty- 
four  friars  in  a  long  column  climbing  the  steep  ascent  to  Dagaa. 

>Bloimt,p.  114. 

VOL.  I  — o 



"  When  we  had  arrived  in  front  of  the  building  used  for  head- 
quarters, we  faced  about  in  front  thereof,  and  the  first  thing 
we  saw  in  one  of  the  windowa  were  the  sinister  features  of  Fal- 
aria,  who  with  a  thundering  brow  and  black  look  was  delighting 
himself  in  the  contemplation  of  so  many  priests  smrounded  by 
bayonets  and  filled  with  misery.  Any  other  person  but  Villa 
would  have  melted  on  seeing  such  a  spectacle,  which  could  but 
incite  compassion.  The  two  American  tourists  were  also 
looking  on  at  this  horrible  scene  as  if  stupefied,  but  they  soon 
withdrew  in  order,  perhaps,  not  to  took  upon  such  a  painfu] 
picture.  It  was,  indeed,  heartrending  to  contemplate  therein 
old  gray-haired  men  who  had  passed  their  Uves  in  apostolic 
work  side  by  side  with  young  men  who  had  just  arrived  in  this 
ungrateful  land,  and  many  sick  who  rather  than  men  seemed 
to  be  marble  statues,  who  had  no  recourse  but  to  stand  in  line, 
without  one  word  of  consolation;  therein  figured  some  who 
wore  religious  garb,  others  in  secular  dress  limited  to  a  pair  of 
rumpled  trousers  and  a  cast-oS  coat,  the  lack  of  this  luxurious 
garment  being  replaced  in  some  instances  by  a  native  shirt. 

"For  two  long  hours  we  were  detained  in  the  middle  of  the 
street  under  the  rays  of  a  burning  sun  and  to  the  scandal  of  the 
immense  crowd  which  had  been  gathered  together  to  witness 
the  denouement  of  the  trt^edy.  The  priests  had  hardly  come 
into  the  presence  of  Villa  when  Fathers  Isidro  and  Florentine 
were  called  out  for  the  purpose  of  having  heaped  upon  them  a 
flood  of  insults  and  affronts.  Father  Isidro  was  ordered  by 
Villa  to  interview  Sr.  Sabas  Orros,  who.  Villa  supposed,  would 
wreak  his  revenge  blindly  upon  him,  but  he  was  greatly  mis- 
taken, as  said  gentleman  treated  the  priest  with  great  respect ; 
the  tyrant  remained  talking  to  Father  Florentino  in  the  recep- 
tion room  of  the  headquarters  building,  and  when  it  appeared 
that  such  talk  would  come  to  blows,  the  elder  of  the  Americans 
left  one  of  the  rooms  toward  the  reception  room,  and  the 
scene  suddenly  changing,  Villa  arose  and  addressing  the  priest 
said :  '  I  am  pleased  to  introduce  to  you  an  Am^can  Brigadier- 
Genial,  Mr.  N.'  The  latter  returned  a  cordial  greeting  in 
Spanish  to  the  priest  who  made  a  courteous  acknowledgm^it ; 
after  this  exchange  of  courtesies,  Villa  resumed  his  defamatory 
work,  pouring  out  a  string  of  absurdities  and  infamous  insults 
upon  the  friars,  goii^  so  far  as  to  say  in  so  many  words :  'from 
the  bishop  down  you  are  all  thieves  and  depraved'  he  added 
another  word  which  it  would  be  shameful  to  write  down,  and 
BO  he  went  on  from  one  abyss  to  another  without  r^;ard  to 
reputations  or  the  respect  due  to  venerated  persons. 



"  The  American  let  his  disgust  be  seen  while  ViUa  was  talking, 
and  the  latter  understood  tbeee  protests  and  ordered  the  priest 
to  withdraw,  the  comedy  coming  to  an  end  by  the  American 
ahalfing  hands  with  the  priest  and  offering  him  assistance. 
Villa  would  not  shake  hands  with  him,  as  was  natural,  but  the 
priest  was  able  to  see  that  he  was  confused  when  he  saw  the 
distinction  and  courtesy  with  which  an  American  general  had 
treated  a  helpless  friar.  What  a  narrow  idea  did  the  Americans 
form  of  the  government  of  Aguinaldo,  represented  by  men  as 
savage  and  inhuman  as  Villa  1 

"The  natives  averred  that  the  Americans  referred  to  were 
spies  who  had  come  to  explore  those  provinces  and  were  making 
maps  of  the  strategic  points  and  principal  roads,  bo  that  a  very 
careful  watch  was  kept  upon  them  and  Villa  took  measures 
to  have  them  go  down  the  river  without  landing  at  any  place 
between  Eichague  and  Ilagan.  At  Hagan  they  were  given  an 
entertainment  and  dance.  Villa  being  a  skilled  hand  in  this  sort 
of  thing,  and  a  few  days  later  he  accompanied  them  to  Aparri  • 
without  allowing  them  to  set  foot  on  land.  The  government 
of  Aguinaldo  no  longer  had  everything  its  own  way,  and  secret 
orders  had  been  ^ven  to  have  every  step  of  &e  explorers 
followed.  The  comnmnding  and  other  leading  officers  of  the 
Valley,  supporting  the  orders  of  the  government,  circulated  an 
order  throughout  the  towns  which  read  as  follows :  — 
"'To  ALL  Local  Opficbbs: 

"'You  will  not  permit  any  maps  to  be  made  or  notes  to  be 
taken  of  strate^c  points  by  Americans  or  foreigners ;  nor  will 
you  allow  them  to  become  acquainted  with  the  points  of  de- 
ieace ;  you  will  endeavour  to  report  immediately  to  this  Govotu- 
ment  any  suspicious  persons;  you  will  make  your  investiga- 
tions secretly,  accompanyii^  suspected  persons  and  feigning 
that  their  investigations  are  approved,  and  finally  when  it  shaU 
seem  to  you  that  such  suspected  persons  have  finished  their 
work,  you  will  advise  without  loss  of  time,  in  order  that  their 
notes  may  be  seized.' 

"Despite  this  order  the  Americans  were  able  to  inform  them- 
advee  very  thoroughly  of  the  forces  in  the  Valley  and  its  state 
of  d^ence,  and  lillipinos  were  not  lacking  who  for  a  few  pesos 
would  put  them  abreast  of  all  information  regarding  the  plans 
and  projects  of  Aguinaldo's  government." 

ReUtiTe  to  this  Wilcox-Sargent  trip  Taylor  eays :  — 
>  A  distanee  of  120  miles. 



"In  October  and  November,  1898,  Paymaster  W.  B.  WUcox, 
U.S.N.,  and  Naval  Cadet  L.  R.  Sargent,  U.S.N.,  travelled 
through  Northern  Luzon  from  which  they  returned  with  a 
favourable  impreesion  of  the  government  which  had  been  set 
up  by  Aguinaldo's  agent«. 

"  It  was  realized  by  the  subtle  men  whom  they  met  that  it 
waa  highly  expedient  that  they  should  make  a  favourable  report 
and  accordingly  they  were  well  received,  and  although  constant 
obstacles  were  thrown  in  the  way  of  their  seeing  what  it  was 
not  considered  well  for  them  to  see  yet  the  real  reasons  for  the 
delays  in  their  journey  were  carefully  kept  from  them.  At 
least  some  of  their  letters  to  the  fleet  were  taken,  translated, 
and  sent  to  Aguinaldo,  who  kept  them,  and  constant  reports 
upon  them  and  their  movements  were  made." 

Blount  refers  to  the  fact  that  Mr.  Sargent  tells  a  char- 
acteristic story  of  Villa,'  whose  vengeful  feeling  toward 
the  Spaniards  showed  on  all  occasions. 

It  would  doubtless  have  interested  the  travellers  to 
know  that  the  "robbery"  consisted  in  taking  the  funds 
out  of  the  province  to  save  them  from  falling  into  Villa's 
hands,  and  in  paying  them  to  soldiers  in  Nueva  Vizcaya  to 
whom  money  was  due.  It  would  further  have  interested 
them  to  know  that  this  unfortunate  Spaniard  had  been 
twice  tortured  within  an  inch  of  his  life  by  Villa. 

But  let  us  continue  our  interrupted  narrative :  — 

"The  presence  of  the  Americans  in  Ilagan  soon  freed  us 
from  certain  forms  of  savagery  and  barbarous  intentions  on 
the  part  of  Villa.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  tyrant  was 
constantly  cudgelling  his  brains  to  invent  new  methods  of 
showing  his  contempt  for  the  friars;  at  the  unlucky  time  we 
write  of  he  conceived  the  infamous  plan  of  ordering  a  circular 
enclosure  of  cane  to  be  made,  put  a  pig  into  it  —  we  trust  the 
reader  will  pardon  the  details  ~  with  a  bell  hung  to  his  neck, 
blindfolded  the  priests  and  compelled  them  to  enter  the  enclo- 
sure with  sticks  in  their  hands,  and  in  this  ridiculous  attitude, 

1  "The  former  Spanish  Qovemoi  of  the  ProTinoe  was  of  cotuse  a 
prisoner  in  Villa's  ouatody.  Villa  had  the  ez-Qoromor  brought  in, 
for  the  travellers  to  see  him,  and  remarked,  in  his  presenoe  to  them, 
"This  is  the  man  who  robbed  this  province  of  twenty-five  thousand 
doUars  daring  the  last  year  of  his  oiBoe.'" — Blount,  p.  115. 



obliged  them  to  strike  about  when  the  sound  of  the  bell  appraised 
them  of  the  animal's  proximity;  it  is  obvious  that  the  princi- 
pal purpose  of  the  fiendish  Villa  was  to  have  the  priests  lay 
about  them  in  such  a  way  as  to  deal  each  other  the  blows 
instead  of  the  pig.  The  tyrant  also  had  the  idea  of  making  us 
and  the  other  priests  in  Ilf^an  parade  the  streets  of  that  town 
dancing  and  playing  the  band.  The  wish  to  consummate  bis 
plan  was  not  lacking  but  he  was  deterred  by  the  presence  of 
the  Americans  and  the  arguments  of  Sr.  Sabas  Orros  to  whom 
we  also  owed  the  signal  favour  that  Villa  did  not  take  us  to  our 
prisons  at  Tumauini  and  Gamut  on  foot  and  with  our  clothing 
in  a  bundle  at  our  backs." 

On  October  2  a  banquet  was  fpven  in  Villa's  honour  at 
Bagan  and  the  pleasant  idea  occurred  to  him  to  have  four 
of  the  friars  dance  at  it  for  hia  amusement.  The  people 
of  the  town  put  their  handkerchiefs  before  their  faces 
to  shut  out  the  sight,  and  some  wept.  Father  Campo, 
one  of  the  priests  who  was  obUged  to  dance,  had  great 
ulcers  on  his  legs  from  the  wounds  caused  by  the  cords 
with  which  be  had  been  boimd  when  be  was  tortured  with 
water,  and  was  at  first  unable  to  raise  his  feet  from  the 
floor ;  but  Villa  threatened  him  with  a  rattan  until  he 
finally  did  so.  This  caused  the  sores  on  his  legs  to  burst 
open  so  that  the  bones  showed. 

On  the  3d  of  October  a  ninnber  of  the  friars  were  com- 
pelled to  get  up  a  band  and  go  out  and  meet  Leyba 
with  music  on  his  arrival.  The  people  of  the  towns 
closed  th^  windows  in  disgust  at  the  sight.  A  great 
crowd  had  gathered  to  receive  Leyba,  and  the  priests 
were  compelled  to  dance  in  the  middle  of  the  street,  but 
ibis  agfun  only  caused  disgust.  A  couple  of  priests  were 
then  beaten  in  the  usual  fashion  in  a  private  bouse. 
This  caused  murmuring  even  among  those  of  the  soldiers 
who  were  natives  of  the  Cagayan  valley.  At  the  same 
time  two  other  priests  were  horribly  whipped  in  the 

This  has  been  a  long  story,  but  the  half  has  not  been 
told.    Those   who   escaped   torture   had   their   feelings 



harrowed  by  the  sight  of  the  sufferings  of  their  fellows. 
They  were  constantly  and  grossly  insulted;  were  often 
confined  in  the  most  unsanitary  quarters;  given  poor 
and  insufficient  food  and  bad  water,  or  none  at  all; 
robbed  of  their  clothing;  compelled  to  march  long  dis- 
tances imder  a  tropical  sun  when  sick,  wounded  and 
suffeiii^ ;  obliged  to  do  servants'  work  pubUcly ;  forced 
to  make  a  ridiculous  spectacle  of  themselves  in  the  public 
streets;  ordered  to  recant,  aud  heaven  knows  what 
not  I  " 

The  torments  practised  on  them  had  two  principal 
objects :  to  compel  them  to  give  up  money,  and  to  dis- 
credit them  with  the  common  people.  They  failed  to 
accomplish  this  latter  result.  There  is  abunduit  evidence 
that  the  natives  of  the  Cagayan  valley  clothed  and  fed 
them  when  they  could,  and  wept  over  the  painful  humil- 
iations and  the  dreadful  sufferings  whi(di  they  were 
powerless  to  prevent  or  relieve. 

The  tormentors  were  men  from  distant  provinces,  with 
no  possible  personal  grievances  against  the  priests  whom 
they  martyrized.  Their  action  was  the  result,  not  of  an 
"ebullition  of  revenge  for  three  centuries  of  tyranny" 
as  stated  by  Blotmt,  but  of  insensate  greed  of  gold  and 
d^nnable  viciousness.  I  believe  the  American  people 
will  hold  that  such  cruelities  brand  t^ose  who  practise 
them  as  unfit  to  govern  their  fellows,  or  themselves. 

Lest  I  be  accused  of  basing  my  conclusions  on  ex  parte 
statements  I  will  now  retiun  to  the  Insurgent  record  of 
events  in  the  Cagayan  valley. 

At  the  outset  the  Spanish  officers  of  the  Tabacalera 
Company '  fared  comparatively  well.  In  a  letter  dated 
September  27,  1898,  and  addressed  to  the  secretly  of 
war  of  the  revolutionary  government,  Leyba  says  of 
the  taking  of  Tuguegarao  that  the  only  terms  of  the  sar- 
render  were  to  respect  life.    He  therefore  felt  at  liberty 

>  La  Compailia  General  de  Tabaeoa  de  FUipinas,  a  very  strong  oom- 
merdal  cngaiiiution. 



to  Bfflze  all  the  money  that  the  friars  had  hidden,  "which 
was  acoompliBhed  by  applying  the  stick."  He  adds  that 
they  did  nothing  to  the  agents  of  the  great  Tabacalera 
Company,  then  the  most  powerful  commercial  organiza- 
tion in  the  Islands,  for  the  significant  reason  that  they 
had  fomid  that  its  stock  was  lai^ly  held  by  Frenchmen 
and  feared  trouble.* 

On  December  4,  180S,  Leyba,  concerning  whose  ideas 
as  to  public  order  we  are  already  informed,  wrote  a  most 
illuminating  lett^  setting  for^  the  conditions  which 
had  existed  there.  He  does  not  claim  that  there  had  been 
Octavian  peace ! 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  letter  covers  the 
very  time  during  which  Messrs.  Wilcox  and  Sai^ent 
passed  through  the  Cagayan  valley.  It  paints  a  vivid 
picture  of  conditions,  and  as  the  painter  was  the  ranking 
Insurgent  officer  in  the  valley  dimi^  this  entire  period, 
he  cannot  be  accused  of  hostile  prejudice.  I  therefore 
give  the  letter  in  full :  — 

"ApARM,  December  4, 1898. 
"Do»  Baldouero  Aqdinaldo, 
"  Thb  Sbcbetabt  of  Wab  : 
"Dbar  Sib  and  of  my  Greatest  EersBH:    I  take  the 
libwty  of  addreesing  this  to  you  in  order  to  state  that  owing 
to  the  lack  of  discipline  in  the  soldiers  whom  we  have  brought, 
aiuce  they  are  all  volunteers  and  whom  I  am  not  able  to  reduce 

1  "I  call  your  attention  to  the  faot  that  the  only  tenns  to  the  eiir- 
rander  were  to  respect  life,  and  it  was  for  this  reason  that  I  seized  all 
the  money  they  [i.e.  the  friara,  —  D.  C.  W.I  had  hidden  away,  which 
was  Booompli^ed  by  applying  the  stick.  In  this  capital  I  found 
thirty-^our  thousand  dollars  in  Bilver  and  a  draft  on  the  CompatLia 
Generrf  de  Tabaoos  for  twenty  thousand  dollars  which  can  be  oolleoted 
here.  ... 

"  The  beuw  can  give  you  more  details  ooneerning  the  abuses  com- 
mitted in  this  provineeofVizoaya  by  the  foroes  of  Major  Delfln  EequJzel. 
Also,  I  wish  to  inform  you  that  we  have  done  nothing  to  the  Compafiia 
Genend  de  Tabacoa,  for  we  have  learned  from  their  records  that  much 
of  their  stock  is  held  by  Frenchmen,  and  consequently  we  fear  a  con- 
flict. For  this  reason  we  await  your  orders  on  this  matter.  We  took 
all  the  anna  we  found  in  their  possession,  however."  —  P.  I.  R.,  271.  2. 



to  rigorous  subordinatioD,  for  the  revolution  would  find  itself 
without  soldiers  with  whom  to  win  triumph,  they  committed 
many  abuses  and  misdeed  which,  for  the  lack  of  evidence,  I 
was  not  able  to  punish,  although  I  knew  of  these  abuses  but 
had  no  proof,  and  as  a  lover  of  my  coimtry  and  of  the  prestige 
of  the  Revolutionary  Army,  I  took  care  not  to  disclose  the  secret 
to  any  one,  in  this  way  avoiding  the  formation  of  an  atmosphere 
against  the  cause  of  our  Independence  to  the  grave  injury  of 
us  all.  But  it  happened  that,  in  epite  of  the  good  advice  which 
I  have  given  them  and  the  punishments  which  I  have  given  to 
some  of  the  3d  Company  of  Cauit,  they  did  not  Improve  their 
conduct  but  have  gone  to  the  extreme  of  committing  a  scanda- 
lous robbery  of  20,800  pesos  which  sum  the  German,  Otto 
Weber,  was  taking  to  the  capital,  which  deed  has  caused  me  to 
work  without  ceasing,  without  sleeping  entire  nights,  for  I 
understood  what  a  serious  matter  it  was  to  take  money  from  a 
foreigner.  After  making  many  InquirieB,  it  was  discovered 
that  a  very  large  part  of  the  money  which  reached  the  sum  of 
$10,000,  a  little  more  or  less,  was  buried  under  the  quarters 
which  the  Bald  company  occupied,  this  with  the  sanction  of  all 
the  officers,  it  appears  to  me,  because  it  is  impossible  that  such 
a  sum  could  be  brought  into  a  house  where  so  many  soldiers  are 
living  without  the  Imowledge  of  the  officers. 

"Indignant  at  such  shameful  behaviour,  I  reprimanded  the 
officers  and  preferred  charges  agfunst  the  ones  I  deemed  to 
blame  in  the  matter. 

"Afterwards  I  foimd  out  that  they  had  attempted' to  murder 
me  for  trying  to  find  out  the  originators  of  the  crime.  On 
account  of  this,  and  in  order  to  prevent  a  civil  war  which  would 
have  broken  out  against  the  said  soldiers  if  precautions  had  not 
been  taken,  I  decided  to  disarm  them,  to  the  great  displeasure 
of  the  Colonel  who  was  not  aware  of  my  motives. 

"This  bad  conduct  has  been  copied  by  the  soldiers  of  the 
4th  Company  stationed  in  Ilagan,  and  I  believe  the  Colonel, 
guided  by  my  warning,  will  take  the  same  measures  in  regard 
to  them. 

"As  the  officers  are  the  first  ones  to  commit  abuses  and  mis- 
deeds, it  is  easily  seen  that  the  soldiers  under  their  orders, 
guided  by  them,  will  commit  worse  ones  than  the  chiefs,  and 
as  these  seem  to  lack  the  moral  strength  to  control  and  repri- 
mand them,  I  propose  to  you,  if  it  meets  your  approval,  that 
all  these  soldiers  and  some  of  the  officers  be  returned  to  their 
homes  by  the  steamer  Luzon,  if  there  should  be  atifficient  coal, 
or  In  another  if  you  order  it,  since  they  tell  me  themselves  that 







because  they  are  far  away  from  their  homee  they  do  not  wish 
to  continue  in  the  service  in  this  province.  This  ia  easily 
arranged  as  there  are  now  men  stationed  in  this  province  for 
instnictii^  the  native  volunteers,  many  of  whom  have  been 
students,  and  will  therefore  make  good  officers  and  non-com- 
miesioned  officers,  and  in  this  way  a  battalion  could  be  formed, 
well  disciplined  from  the  beginning  and  disgraceful  things  would 
be  avoided  not  only  towards  the  natives  of  this  province  but 
also  towards  foreigners,  which  is  the  most  important.  Having 
stated  my  case,  I  place  myself  always  at  your  disposal,  request- 
ing you  will  attend  to  this  affair. 

"With  reference  to  the  4th  Company  stationed  in  the  Prov- 
ince of  Isabels,  whose  captun  is  Don  Antonio  Monzon  of 
Panamitan,  there  are  many  complaints  of  thefts  and  assaulte 
committed  by  the  soldiers,  and  in  answer  to  my  questions,  Don 
8ime6n  Adriano  y  Villa,  Major  and  Sanitary  Inspector  and 
doctor  of  this  battalion,  whom  I  have  stationed  there  for  lack 
of  a  competent  person,  tells  me  that  he  has  always  punished 
and  offered  advice  to  officers  and  soldiers  in  order  to  prevent  the 
recurrence  of  thefts  and  assaults,  but  he  has  never  been  able  to 
suppress  them  completely,  because  the  soldiers  are  abandoned 
by  their  officer,  and  because  of  lack  of  example  on  the  part  of 
the  latter ;  they  do  not  understand  that  it  is  a  great  blot  when 
they  commit  these  abuses,  since  when  they  discover  the  goods 
or  house  of  a  Spaniard  they  beheve  they  have  a  right  to  appro- 
priate everything  which  they  encounter. 

"I  have  learned  lately,  that  some  foreigners,  residents  in 
that  province,  among  them  some  employees  of  the  Tobacco 
Factory,  'El  Oriente'  and  of  the  firm  of  Baer  Senior  &  Co., 
who  have  Spanish  employees  in  various  pueblos  of  that  province, 
have  some  very  serious  complaints  to  make  of  assaults  com- 
mitted against  them  prejudicial  to  their  interests;  however, 
I  hope  that  now  with  the  arrival  of  General  Tirona  he  will 
regulate  matters,  although  I  believe  that  this  gentleman  is  not 
sufficiently  energetic  in  proceeding  agunst  the  officers  and 
soldiers,  as  I  have  seen  when  I  reprimanded  and  punished 
them  for  faults  committed  he  has  pardoned  them,  and  it  ap- 
pears that  he  censures  energetic  acts  which  we  must  use  in 
order  to  subject  them  to  rigorous  discipline.  The  same  thing 
happened  when  Major  Sr.  Victa  wished  to  discipline  them ; 
it  appears  that  the  Colonel  reprimanded  him  when  he  punished 
some  soldiers  for  gambling  in  their  quarters,  since,  as  you  know, 
that  gentleman  l^lieves  that  he  who  is  right  is  the  one  who 
comes  to  him  first,  and  who  is  best  able  to  flatter  him. 



"The  ColoDel  has  agreed  with  me  that  bis  first  act  on 
arrival  at  the  province  of  Isabela  should  be  to  disarm  and  take 
all  the  money  he  finds  among  the  soldiers  of  the  4th  Company 
(Panamitan)  in  order  to  serve  as  indemnity  for  the  property 
of  the  fore^eiB  in  case  they  should  make  any  claim. 

"I  request  that  you  send  some  leader  or  officer  in  order  to 
superintend  our  actions,  and  to  lift  the  doubt  which  hangs 
over  the  person  who  has  worked  faithfuUy  and  honourably  m 
the  sacred  cause  of  our  Independence. 

"  I  am  filling  the  position  of  First  Chief  m  the  Port  of  Aparri 
temporarily  on  account  of  the  absence  of  the  Colonel  who  has 
conferred  on  me  all  his  duties  and  power.  After  the  military 
operations  which  were  carried  on  as  far  as  the  last  town  in 
Isabela,  being  tired  and  somewhat  sick,  I  was  put  in  charge 
of  these  military  headquarters,  which  I  found  to  be  very  much 
mixed  up,  the  town,  moreover,  being  desperate  on  account  of 
the  assaults  committed  by  my  predecessor,  Rafael  Perca,  who 
was  appointed  by  the  Colonel,  and  who  was  formerly  2d  C^i- 
tain  of  the  steamer  Filipinos.  After  arriving  and  taking 
charge,  having  received  numerous  complaints  against  him,  I 
had  him  arrested  and  I  found  that  he  had  been  guilty  of  rob- 
bery, imlawful  use  of  insignia,  illegal  marriage,  rape  and  at- 
tempted rape.  I  hold  him  in  custody  only  awuting  the  arrival 
of  the  Colonel  in  order  to  convene  a  court-martial  for  his  trial,  in 
which  the  Colonel  will  act  as  President  and  I  as  Judge  Advocate. 

"With  nothing  more  to  communicate,  I  hope  you  will 
attend  to  my  just  clum  and  send  a  special  delegate  to  investi- 
gate our  acts  and  see  the  truth,  for  perhaps  if  a  statement  comee 
direct  from  me  you  will  not  beUeve  it. 

"I  am  your  ^ectitmate  and  faithful  subordinate,  who  kisses 
3rour  hand, 

(S^ed)    "  J.  N.  Lbtba."  > 

Blount  states  that  conditions  existed  "just  like  this, 
all  over  Luzon  and  the  Visayan  Islands."  *  Unfortunately 
this  was  only  too  true  I 

The  troops  complained  of  by  Leyba  were  made  up  of 
Aguinaldo's  fdlow  townsmen.     They  never  obeyed  any 

•  P.  I.  R.  192.  4. 

■  "I  was  in  tba,t  town,  for  a  smiilar  purpose,  with  Qovemor  Taft 
in  1901,  after  a  bloody  war  whioh  almost  oertoiuly  would  not  have 
ooourred  had  the  Puis  Peaoe  Commisuoa  known  the  conditions  th«D 
existing,  just  like  this,  all  over  Luzon  and  the  Visayan  Islands."  —  Blount, 
p.  116. 



one  else,  and  left  a  trail  of  murder  and  rapine  behind  them. 
Aguinaldo  never  punished  them,  and  from  the  time  when 
one  of  them  tried  to  murder  their  commander  mitil  a 
guard  composed  of  them  murdered  General  Antonio 
Luna  in  June,  1899,  they  are  mentioned  only  with  fear 
and  execration. 

Bloimt  describes  with  enthusiasm  the  establishment 
of  civil  government  in  Cagayan. 

Perhaps  Americans  will  be  interested  in  knowing  who 
was  its  head  and  how  it  worked.  The  "elections"  were 
held  on  December  9,  1898,  and  Dimas  Guzman  was 
chosen  head  of  the  province.  He  was  the  man  subse- 
quently sentenced  to  life-imprisonment  by  Blount,  for 
complicity  in  the  murder  of  Lieutenant  Piera.  In  describe 
ing  his  method  of  conducting  hia  government  he  says 
that  the  people  doubted  the  legality  of  attempts  to  collect 
taxes ;  that  the  abuses  of  heads  of  towns  caused  rioting 
in  the  towns,  in  which  only  Ilocanos  took  part ;  and  that 
he  not  only  did  not  report  these  things  but  contrived  to 
conceal  them  from  foreigners  in  the  province.* 

His  ffulure  to  report  these  troubles  and  disorders  to  his 
government  is  of  interest,  as  Blount  alleges*  that  dif- 

>  "On  aoooimt  of  this  the  vulgar  people  doubted  the  legalit?  of  onr 
aotioDB  in  the  aoUectioa  of  taxes,  aod  ocoordingly  it  became  diffioiilt ; 
and  this,  ooupled  with  the  inv«t€rate  ftbtuea  of  the  hea4ls  of  the  tonus, 
whioli  the  head  of  the  pravinoe  was  not  able  to  perceive  in  time  to 
oheok.  eauaed  a  tumult  in  Eohapie,  which,  owing  to  wise  oounoila 
and  efforts  at  pacification,  was  appe&aed  without  it  being  followed  b; 
Barioufl  oonaeqnenoee ;  but  I  have  no  doubt  that  this  tumult  wai  due 
only  to  the  suggeetions  of  ungovernable  and  passionate  persons  ani- 
mated by  the  spirit  of  taotton,  since  thoee  who  took  part  in  it  were 
all  nooanoa,  no  native  of  Eohague  having  any  hand  in  it.  The  same 
thing  ooeuned  in  Naguilian,  where  the  disorders  were  also  quieted. 
Not  only  did  I  make  no  report  of  all  this  to  the  government  of  the 
republio  on  account  of  the  abnormality  of  the  present  oonditiona,  but 
I  also  sucoeeded  in  ooaoealing  them  from  the  foreigners  here  so  that 
flM7  ihould  not  succeed  in  discovering  the  truth,  which  would  be  to 
the  (wjudioe  of  our  cause."  — Taylor,  42  AJ. 

*  "I  may  add  that  as  judge  of  that  distriot  in  1901-2  there  came 
before  me  a  Qomber  of  oasee  in  the  trial  of  which  the  fact  would  be 
brought  out  ot  this  or  that  differeooe  among  the  local  aathtnitieB  hav- 



ferences  between  the  local  authorities  vere  in  a  number 
of  cases  referred  to  the  Malolos  government  for  settle- 

Blount  says*  that  General  Otis's  reports  were  full  of 
inexcusable  blunders  about  the  Tag&logs  taking  posses- 
sion of  provinces  and  making  the  people  do  things,  and 
cites  the  relations  between  Villa  and  Dimas  Guzman  to 
illustrate  the  error  of  these  allegations. 

He  has  elsewhere  *  referred  to  Villa  as  the  ' '  arch-fiend ' ' 
in  the  matter  of  torturing  the  unhappy  Spaniards  as  well 
aa  the  Filipinos  who  incurred  his  ill-mil.  We  have  seen 
that  Guzman  proved  an  apt  pupil  and  did  credit  to  his 
instructor  in  connection  with  t^e  torturing  of  Lieutenant 
Piera,  but  it  neverthdess  appears  from  Guzman's  own 
statements  that  his  relations  with  the  Insurgent  officers 
and  their  subordinates  involved  some  rather  grave 
difficulties.    Of  Major  Canoy,  for  instance,  he  says : — 

"I  must  add  that  the  said  Major  Canoy  is  such  a  remarkable 
character  that  he  saw  fit  to  give  my  cook  a  beatii^  for  not  tak- 
ing off  his  hat  when  he  met  him.  He  insulted  the  delegate  of 
rents  of  Cabagan  Viejo  for  the  same  reason.  He  struck  the 
head  man  of  the  town  of  Bagabs^  in  the  face.  He  put  some  of 
the  members  of  the  town  council  of  Echague  in  the  stocks,  and 
he  had  others  whipped." ' 

It  was  really  incautious  for  Ciovemor  Guzman  to  com- 
plain of  these  conditions  because  Major  Canoy  and  his 
party  won,  and  the  Governor  had  to  resign. 

But  the  day  of  reckoning  came.    It  was  in  consequence 

ing  been  referred  to  the  Maloloe  Government  for  settlement.  And 
they  always  waited  until  they  heard  from  it."  —  Blount,  p.  115. 

'  "General  Otis's  reports  are  full  of  the  moat  inezousable  blunders 
about  how  'the  Tagals'  took  possession  of  the  various  provinoea  and 
made  the  people  do  this  or  that.  Villa's  relations  with  GuEman  were 
just  about  those  of  a  New  Yorker  or  a  Boatonian  sent  up  to  Vermont 
in  the  days  of  the  American  Revolution  to  help  organize  the  redstanoe 
there,  in  oonjunction  with  one  of  the  local  leaders  of  the  patriot  oanae 
in  the  Green  Mountain  State."  —  Blount,  p.  112. 

■Blount,  p.  114. 

•  TaylOT,  42  AJ. 



of  the  atrocitiee  comimtted  by  the  Tag&log  soldiers  in  the 
Cagayan  valley  that  Captain  Batchelder  was  able  a  little 
later  to  march  practically  unopposed  through  the  prov- 
inces of  Nueva  Vlzcaya,  Isabela  and  Cagayan  with 
one  battalion  of  Americui  negro  troops,  for  whom  he  had 
neither  food  nor  extra  ammunition,  and  that  Tirona 
surrendered  the  Insurgent  forces  in  the  valley  without 
attempting  resistance  I 



Insubgent  RniiB  in  the  Visatas  and  EI£EWHBBE 

Refebrino  to  the  conditions  alleged  to  have  been  found 
by  Sargent  and  Wilcox  in  the  Cagayan  valley,  Blount 

"Had  another  Sargent  and  another  Wilcox  made  a  similar 
trip  through  the  provinces  of  southern  Luz6n  about  this  same 
time,  under  similar  friendly  auspices,  before  we  tiuned  friend- 
ship to  hate  and  fear  and  misery,  in  the  name'  of  Benevolent 
Assimilation,  they  would,  we  now  know,  have  found  «milar 
oonditiona." ' 

So  f ar  aa  concerns  the  provinces  of  Mindoro  and  Pala- 
wan, and  the  great  island  of  Mindanao,  he  dodges  the 
issue,  alleging  the  unimportance  of  Mindoro  and  Pala- 
wan, and  claiming  that  "Mohammedan  Mindanao" 
presents  a  problem  by  itself.  Under  such  generalities 
he  hides  the  truth  as  to  what  happened  in  these  regions. 

Z  agree  with  him  that  there  was  essential  identity  be- 
tween actufd  conditions  in  the  Cagayan  valley  and  those 
which  prevailed  under  Insurgent  rule  elsewhere  in  Luz6n 
and  in  the  Visayas.  I  will  go  further  and  say  that  con- 
ditions in  the  Cagayan  valley  did  not  difTer  essentially 
from  t^ose  which  prevailed  throughout  all  portions  of 
the  archipelago  which  fell  under  Insui^ent  control,  ex- 
cept that  in  several  provinces  captured  friars  and  other 
Spaniards  were  quickly  murdered  whereas  in  the  Cagayan 
valley  no  friar  was  quite  killed  outright  by  torture. 
Those  who  ultimately  died  of  their  injuries  lived  for  some 

Let  m  now  consid^  some  of  the  actual  occurrences  in 

'Blount,  p.  111. 




these  other  provinces,  continuing  to  follow  the  route  of 
our  toimsts  until  it  brings  us  back  to  Manila. 

Souih  llocoi 

The  first  province  visited  by  Messrs.  Wilcox  and  Sar- 
gent after  leaving  Aparri  was  South  Ilocoa.  The  con- 
ditions which  had  prevailed  at  Vigan,  the  capital  of  the 
province,  shortly  before  their  arrival,  are  described  in  a 
letter  signed  "Mariano"  and  addressed  under  date  of 
September  25,  1898,  to  Sefior  Don  Mena  Cris61ogo,  from 
which  I  quote  extracts  :  — 

"Deab  Mena:  I  read  with  a  happy  heart  your  letter  of 
the  3rd  instant,  and  in  answer  I  have  to  say:  — 

"  On  the  22ad  of  August  a  mass  meeting  was  held  for  the 
election  of  the  local  presidente  of  this  town,  and  I  was  elected 
to  the  office;  and  on  the  Ist  instant  the  Colonel  appointed 
me  Provisional  Provincial  President  of  this  province,  so  that 
you  can  imagine  the  position  I  am  in  and  the  responmbilitjes 
which  weigh  on  me. 

"  Your  house  is  occupied  by  the  Colonel,  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  it  is  not  rented. 

"  I  have  here  eleven  friar  prisoners  and  the  damned  priests 
who  escaped  from  here  have  not  as  yet  been  returned,  but  it 
is  known  that  they  are  prisoners  in  Cagayan,  and  as  soon  as 
they  arrive  here  I  will  treat  them  as  they  deserve. 

'  It  is  with  great  r^ret  that  I  have  to  relate  the  events  and 
misfortunes  which  we  have  been  suffering  here  since  the  arrival 
of  the  troops,  as  all  the  detachments  are  supported  by  the 
towns,  and  here  in  the  capital  where  the  commissary  is  estab- 
lished, our  resources  are  exhausted,  owing  to  the  unreasonable 
demands  of  the  commissary,  because  he  never  asks  what  is  only 
just  and  necessary,  but  if  he  needs  provisions  for  200  men,  he 
always  asks  enough  for  1000.  And  notwithstandu^  this, 
the  most  lamentable  and  sad  occurrences  are  taking  place 
almost  daily  in  the  different  barrios,  and  often  in  the  town 
itself;  the  soldiers  are  guilty  of  many  abuses  and  disorderly 
acts,  such  as  rapes  and  miuders,  which  usually  remain  un- 
pimished  by  reason  of  the  real  authors  thereof  not  being  found, 
and  when  they  are  found  and  reported  to  their  commanders, 
the  latter  do  notliing.  One  ni^t  the  house  and  estate  of 
Saiio  llnon  in  Anannam  was  sacked  by  uz  anned  men,  who 



threatened  tiim  and  took  his  money,  hia  wife's  jewela  and  the 
best  horses  he  had.  Thank  God  that  his  family  was  at  the 
time  in  the  capital,  and  it  appears  that  now  the  authois  €i 
this  act  are  being  discovered. 

"  I  am  at  the  present  time  working  with  Father  Aglipay  to 
have  the  forces  stationed  here  replaced  by  our  volunteers 
which  I  am  recruiting,  in  order  to  prevent  in  so  far  as  pc»^ble 
the  frequent  acta  of  barbarity  which  the  former  are  committing 
in  the  province. 

"  When  the  friars  from  Lepanto  arrived  here,  they  were  made 
to  publish  the  following  proclamation :  — 

'  Proclamation.  —  We,  the  friars,  declare  that  all  the  acts 
committed  by  us  against  the  honest  Filipinos  when  we  dis- 
charged our  respective  .offices,  were  false  and  in  contraventioii 
of  the  rights  of  the  Holy  Church,  becaiise  we  only  wished  to 
deceive  and  prejudice  the  honest  inhabitants  of  the  Philippines ; 
for  which  reason  we  now  suffer  what  we  are  suffering,  as  you 
see,  according  to  the  old  adage  that  "  he  who  owes  must  p^." 
And  now  we  inform  all  you  honest  Filipinos  that  we  repent 
for  the  acts  above  referred  to,  which  are  in  contravention  of 
the  laws  and  good  customs,  and  ask  your  pardon.  —  ViQAN, 
September  13,  1898.' 

"All  of  which  I  communicate  to  you  in  order  that  you  may 
form  an  idea  of  what  is  taking  place  here,  and  take  such  steps 
as  may  be  proper  for  the  common  good,  and  especially  for  the 
good  of  tha  town,  hoping  that  with  the  aid  of  your  valuable 
protection  the  abuses  and  disorders  suffered  by  the  residents 
will  be  stopped." ' 

The  province  of  Abra,  noW  a  subproTiDce  of  South 
Hocos,  was  evidently  no  exception  to  the  geaeral  rule, 
for  there  is  on  file  a  letter  to  Aguinaldo  with  twenty-six 
signatures,  protesting  bitterly  against  the  oppression  of 
the  poor,  in  the  effort  to  compel  them  to  contribute  war 
taxes,  complaining  against  the  misuse  of  supplies  gathered 
ostensibly  for  the  soldiers,  and  stating  that  the  petitioners 
will  be  obliged  to  take  refuge  with  the  Igorots  and 
Negritos,  if  not  granted  relief.' 

ip.  I.  R.,974.  3. 

*"Deoemb«^  20,  1808. 
"  To  THE  Honorable  Pbesident  riF  thh  Rbtoltttionabt  Gotebnhbnt. 

"  Th«  undesigned  remdents  of  ttie  barangay  of  D.  Franoisoo  Queru- 
Un  and  D.  Melchor  Balueg,  of  Bnoay,  of  the  [oovinoe  ttf  Abm,  appeal 


BuiLDiHa  THE  BEHonBT  Road. 

In  thiB,  as  in  many  other  places,  it  proved  necessary  to  blast  the  road  out  o( 

the  solid  rock. 




Apparently  the  trouble  grew,  for  on  December  27,  1898, 
the  "Director  of  Diplomacy"  telegraphed  to  Aguinaldo 
concerning  it,  saying :  — 

"Most  urgent.  The  discont^it  in  the  proviucee  of  F&n- 
gasin^B,  Tarlac  and  Yloco  (Ilocoe)  is  increasing.  The  town 
of  Bangbaog  rose  in  revolt  the  25th  and  26th  of  this  month, 
and  killed  a]ft  of  the  civil  officiala.  It  ia  impossible  to  describe 
the  abuses  committed  by  the  military  and  civil  authorities  of 
the  said  provinces.  I  urge  you  to  send  a  force  of  100  men  and  a 
diplomatic  of&cer  to  reestablish  order.     The  matter  is  urgent."  ^ 

I  find  nothing  important  in  the  Insui^rait  records  con- 
cerning conditions  in  La  Union  at  this  time.     Pangaain&n, 

to  you  with  the  utmoat  aubjeotion  from  th^  pUoe  of  reddeiioe  and 
state :  Th»t  their  heads  or  lepresentatives,  D.  FranciBoo  Querub&i 
and  Melohor  Balueg,  respectively,  force  them  to  pay  two  petot  each 
08  a  war  tax,  your  humble  vamals  above  cited  being  hardly  able  to 
earn  their  own  livelihood  and  support  their  families,  and,  notwithstand- 
ing their  labor,  some  of  them  cannot  get  anything  to  eat  without  ap- 
pealing to  the  charity  of  their  richer  neighbours ;  but  notwitha tending 
this  sad  situation,  they  offer  a  peseta  each  as  a  mark  of  gratitude  to 
the  mother  country,  iSlipinas,  but  said  gentlemen,  the  representatives 
mentioned,  have  not  the  slightest  pity  and  worry  ua  to  the  ext«nt 
of  having  kept  us  in  our  houses  a  day  and  a  night  without  anything  to 
eat,  not  even  permitting  us  to  go  out  to  get  a  drink. 

"  We  must  inform  you  that  the  head  of  the  barangay,  D.  Melchor 
Balueg,  when  he  gathers  the  supphea  for  the  troops  stationed  in  his 
town,  said  supplies  conaiBting  of  rice,  pigs,  chickens  and  egge,  uses 
one-half  (J  what  ia  gathered,  and  then  again  orders  his  assiatants  to 

"In  t&ot,  the  undersigned  request  you  to  direct  that  the  pt»eta 
which  they  o9er  be  accepted  and  that  the  said  Don  Frauciaoo  Quffiubin 
and  Don  Melchor  Balueg  be  reUeved  of  their  duties,  in  order  to  put  a 
stop  to  the  abuses  oonstoutVy  committed  by  them ;  and  if  this  be  not 
done,  the  petitioners  will  be  obliged  to  leave  their  homes  and  property 
in  the  town  and  take  up  their  reaidenoee  in  the  mountains  with  the 
Negritos  and  Igorots,  in  order  that  the  othcos  may  remain  in  the 
town  and  live  tranquilly. 

"  This  is  a  grace  which  we  do  not  doubt  we  will  receive  from  you, 
whose  life  may  Qod  preserve  for  many  years. 

"BucAT,  November  12,  1898."  (26  wgnatures) 

(In  blue  penoil  in  the  handwriting  of  Aguinaldo:)  "It  will  be 

"Deo.  20,  1898.  "B.  A." 

—P.  I.  R.,  991.  4. 

»P.I.  R..849. 

VOL.  I  —  F 



Tarlac,  Pampanga  and  Bulacan,  which  were  now  revirated 
by  our  tourists,  have  ak^ady  been  discussed. 

The  Pronnee  of  Manila 

Conditions  in  Manila  Province,  as  distinguished  from 
Manila  City,  left  much  to  be  desired. 

Admiral  Dewey  made  a  statement  applicable  to  the 
territory  adjacent  to  the  city  and  bay  of  Manila  in  a 
cablegram  to  Washington  dated  October  14,  1S98,  which 
reads  as  follows :  — 

"It  is  important  that  the  dispoution  of  the  Philippme 
Islands  should  be  decided  as  soon  as  possible.  .  .  .  Geaeral 
anarchy  prevuls  without  the  limits  of  the  city  and  bi^  of 
Manila.    Natives  appear  unable  to  gfyvem,"  ' 

Of  it  Blount  sajrs :  — 

"In  this  cabl^ram  the  Adnural  most  unfortunately  re- 
peated as  true  some  wild  rumours  then  currently  accepted  by 
the  Europeans  and  Americans  at  Manila  which,  of  course,  were 
impossible  of  verification.  I  say  'unfortunately'  with  some 
earnestness,  because  it  does  not  appear  on  the  face  of  his 
message  that  they  were  mere  rumours.  And,  that  they  were 
whtdly  erroneous,  in  point  of  fact,  has  already  been  cleared 
up  in  previous  chapters,  wherein  the  real  state  of  peace,  order, 
and  tranquillity  which  prevailed  throughout  Liu6n  at  that 
time  has  be^  it  is  beheved,  put  beyond  all  doubt."* 

Blount  seems  here  to  have  overlooked  the  fact  that  the 
admiral  himself  was  in  Manila  Bay  and  in  Manila  City 
at  the  time  he  sent  th^  cablegram.  The  statem^ita  in 
question  were  not  rumom^,  they  were  deliberate  expres- 
sions of  opinion  on  the  part  of  a  man  who  had  first-hand 
information  and  knew  what  he  was  saying. 

They  were  not  the  Admiral's  only  allegations  on  this 
subject.  When  testifying  before  the  Senate  committee 
he  said: — 

"  Admiral  Deioey.  I  knew  that  there  was  no  government  in 
the  whole  of  the  Philippines.  Our  fleet  had  destroyed  the 
>  Blount,  p.  130.  >  Ibid^  pp.  130-131. 



only  government  there  was,  and  there  was  no  othw  government ; 
tha«  waa  a  reign  of  terror  throughout  the  Pbilippmes,  looting, 
robbing,  murdering ;  a  reign  of  terror  throughout  the  i^aoda!^ 

La  Laguna 

Having  brought  our  tourist  friends  safely  back  to 
Manila,  we  must  now  leave  them  there  and  etrike  out  by 
ourselves  if  we  are  to  see  other  provinces. 

La  Laguna  lies  just  east  of  Manila.    Of  it  we  learn  that : 

"Laguna  Province  was  bo  overrun  by  bands  of  robbers 
that  the  head  of  the  pueblo  of  San  Pablo  ordered  the  people 
to  concentrate  in  the  town  to  avoid  their  attacks."  ' 

Hie  proTiDoe  of  Bataan  lies  just  aeroas  the  bay  from 


"On  January  10, 1899,  the  secretary  ci  the  interior  directed 
the  governor  of  Bataan  Province  to  asoertun  the  whereabouts 
of  a  number  of  men  who  had  just  deserted  with  their  rifles 
from  the  commands  there.  He  was  to  appeal  to  their  patiiotr 
iem  and  tell  them  that  if  they  would  but  return  to  thdr  com* 
panies  their  complaints  would  be  attended  to  and  they  would 
be  pardoned."  * 


Zambales  joins  Bataan  on  the  weet  and  north.  On 
November  13,  2898,  Wenoeslao  Vinvegra  wrote  to  Agui- 
naldo  describing  the  state  of  affairs  in  this  province.  From 
his  letter  we  learn  that  two  brothers  named  Teodoro  and 
Doroteo  Pansacula,  claiming  to  be  governor  and  brig- 
adier general  respectively,  who  are  charged  with  aban- 
donment of  their  posts  in  the  field,  disobedience  and  at- 
tempts against  the  union  of  the  Insurgents,  had  been 
committing  all  manner  of  abuses.  They  had  organized 
a  band  of  cut-throats,  anned  with  rifles  and  bolos,  and 

■  P.  I.  R.,  1142.4.  */Ud.,aoa2.3. 



were  terrorizing  the  towns,  committing  robbmee  and 
murders  and  ordering  that  money  be  fumlshed  for  them- 
selves and  food  for  their  men. 

They  were  also  encouraging  the  people  to  disobey  the 
local  authorities  and  refuse  to  pay  taxes,  and  were  pro- 
miL^ting  a  theory,  popular  with  the  masses,  that  the 
time  had  come  for  tiie  rich  to  be  poor  and  the  poor  rich. 

They  had  furthermore  induced  r^idar  Lasurgent  troops 
to  rise  up  in  anns.^ 

From  this  communication  it  would  appear  that  the 
Insui^ent  government  had  not  been  entirely  effective  in 
Zambales  up  to  November  13th,  1898. 

From  other  commimicatious  we  learn  that  the  soldiers 
at  Alaminos  were  about  to  desert  on  November  30th, 
1898 ; '  that  it  was  deemed  necessary  to  restrict  travel 
between  Tarlac,  Pampai^a,  Bataan  and  Zambales  in 
order  to  prevent  robberies  ;■  and  that  on  January  9, 1899, 
the  governor  of  the  province  found  it  impossible  to  con- 
tinue the  inspection  of  a  number  of  towns,  as  many  of 
their  officials  had  fled  to  escape  the  abuses  of  the  miUtary.* 
Conditions  were  obviously  very  serious  in  Zambales  at 
this  time. 

>  P.  I.  R.,  964.  3. 

■  "  On  November  30,  1898,  the  oommAndar  in  Alaminofl,  Zambales 
Itevinoe,  telegraphed  that  hia  soldiers  vere  i^  about  to  desert  as  the 
head  of  Vbe  town  would  not  furniah  rations  or  pay  without  orders  from 
the  Bovemor."  —  P.  I.  R..  2002.  3. 

'  "On  Deoember  22,  Aguinaldo,  in  aooorduioe  with  a  request  from 
the  governor  of  Zambales  Province,  ordered  the  heads  of  the  provinces 
of  Pangasin&n,  Tarlao,  Bataan,  and  Pampanga  to  prohibit  the  people 
of  their  provinces  from  going  to  Zambales  without  passports  signed  by 
them,  stating  the  route  they  were  to  take  in  going  and  returning  and 
the  length  of  time  to  be  spent  in  the  journey.  The  governor  of  Zam- 
bales had  asked  for  this  regulation  in  order  to  .prevent  the  oommission 
of  robberies  in  ZambaJes  and  to  distinguish  persons  justly  subject  to 
suspicion  from  those  of  good  conduct."  —  P.  I.  R.,  266.  3. 

'"On  January  9,  the  governor  of  Zambalee  found  it  impossible 
to  continue  the  inspection  of  certain  towns  of  his  province  and  to 
continue  holding  elections,  as  many  of  the  officials  had  fled  to  escape 
the  exactions  and  abuses  of  the  military  commanders." 

—  P.  I.  R.,  988.  2. 


INSURQENT   rule:   IN  THE   VISAYAB  AND   ElfiEWHERE      213 


Cavite  province  lies  immediately  south  of  Manila 
province  aa  the  latter  was  tiien  constituted.  On  Ai^ust 
24, 1898,  the  secretary  of  war  wired  Aguinaldo  that  two 
drunken  Americans  had  been  killed  by  Insurgent  sol- 
diers.' On  the  same  day  General  Anderson  advised  the 
governor  of  Cavite  that  one  American  soldier  had  been 
killed  and  three  woimded  by  Ms  people,  and  demanded 
his  immediate  withdrawal,  with  bis  guard,  from  the  town.* 
The  governor  asked  Aguinaldo  for  instructions.  Agui- 
naldo replied  instructing  the  governor  to  deny  that  the 
American  had  been  killed  by  Insurgent  soldiers  and  to 
claim  that  he  had  met  death  at  the  hands  of  his  own 
companions.  The  governor  was  further  directed  to  pve 
up  his  life  before  leaving  the  place.* 

In  view  of  the  definite  stat^ent  from  one  of  his  own 
officers  that  the  soldier  in  question  was  killed  by  Filipino 
soldiers,  Aguinaldo's  instructions  to  say  that  he  was 
killed  by  Americans  are  interesting  as  showing  his 

Not  only  were  the  Insurgents  obviously  unable  to  con- 
trol their  own  soldiers  in  Cavite  town  sufficiently  to  pre- 
vent them  from  committing  murder,  but  conditions  in 
the  province  of  the  same  name  left  much  to  be  desired. 

>  "The  Oovemor  of  Cavite  reports  two  drunken  Americans  h&ve 
been  killed  by  our  aoIdierB.  I  tell  him  to  have  an  inrestiKation  immedi- 
atolf  and  report  the  faot  to  the  Amerioan  oommaoder."  —  P.  I.  R.,  849. 

■  "Moat  urgent.  Gen.  Auderwn  informs  me  in  a  letter  that,  'in 
order  to  avoid  the  very  Mrioua  miafortime  of  an  encounter  between 
our  troops,  I  demand  your  immediate  withdrawal  with  your  guard 
from  Cavite.  One  of  my  men  haa  been  killed  and  three  wounded  by 
your  people.'  This  ia  positive  and  does  not  admit  of  explanation  or 
delay.     I  aak  you  to  inform  me  of  your  deoiaion."  —  P.  I.  B.,  849. 

*  "QxN.  RiKQo  i>B  Dioa,  Cavite  :  Telegram  received.  Do  not  leave 
the  post,  and  say  that  you  cannot  abandon  the  city  without  my  orders, 
and  say  that  he  was  not  killed  by  our  soldiers,  but  by  them  themselves 
[the  Americans.  —  D.  C.  W.J,  since  they  were  drunk,  aocordins  to 
your  telegram.  Give  up  your  life  before  abandoning  that  place,  and 
investigate  matters."  —  P.  I.  R.,  849. 



On  December  29,  1898,  the  governor  wired  Aguinaldo 
that  the  town  of  Marigondong  had  risen  in  arms.^ 

It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  land  records  were  destroyed 
in  Cavite.     Of  this  matter  Taylor  says:  — 

"In  Cavite,  in  Cavite  Province,  and  probably  in  most  of 
the  other  provinces,  one  of  the  first  acts  <u  the  insurgents  who 
gathered  about  Aguinaldo  was  to  destroy  all  the  land  titles 
which  had  been  recorded  and  filed  in  the  Spanish  administra- 
tive bureaus.  In  case  the  independence  of  the  Philippines 
was  won,  the  land  of  the  friars,  the  land  of  the  Spaniards  and 
of  those  who  still  stood  by  Spain,  would  be  in  the  gift  of  Agui- 
Q^do  or  of  any  strong  man  who  could  impose  his  will  upon  the 
people.  And  the  men  who  jomed  this  leader  would  be  rich 
m  the  chief  riches  of  the  country,  and  those  who  refused  to  do 
so  would  be  ruined  men." ' 


"The  native  civil  officials  who  took  charge  of  the  govern- 
ment of  Sorsogdn  Province  when  the  Spaniards  abandoned 
it  did  not  think  it  worth  while  to  hoist  the  insurgent  flag  until 
a  force  of  four  companies  arrived  there  to  take  station  early 
in  November,  1898.  The  officer  in  command  promptly  or- 
dered the  Chinamen  in  the  town  of  Sorsog6n,  who  are  prosperous 
people,  to  contribute  to  the  support  of  his  troops.  They 
at  once  gave  him  cloth  for  uniforms,  provisions,  and  10,000 
pesos.  This  was  not  sufficient,  for  on  November  8  Gen. 
Ignacio  Paua,  who  seems  to  have  been  the  insurgent  agent 
in  dealing  with  the  Chinese,  compluned  that  the  troops  in 
SoT8og6n  were  pillaging  the  Chinamen  there.  They  had  killed 
13,  wounded  19,  and  ruined  a  number  c^  others."  ' 

In  January,  1899,  a  correspondent  wrote  Aguinaldo  that 
it  was  verydiffiexilt  to  collect  taxes  as  every  one  was  taking 
what  he  could  lay  hia  hands  on.* 

■  "Urgent.  0«n.  Alvues  telegraphed  that  Riego  de  Dioa  informed 
bim  that  the  tovn  of  Maragondong  had  risen  in  turma  on  aooount  ol 
abuses  committed  by  the  local  President  against  Salvador  Riego, 
This  is  the  reason  the  tovn  took  up  arms.    Will  go  there  to-mortow." 

p  I.  ji.  849. 

•  Taylor,  19  AJ.  •  P.  L  K.,  1067. 4.         *  Taylor,"  95  HB. ' 



Amboa  Camarinea 

On  Septanb^  18, 1898,  Eliaa  Angeles,  a  corporal  of  the 
guardia  civU,  headed  an  uprising  agalost  the  Spaniards. 
The  Spanish  officer  in  command,  and  all  of  his  family, 
were  lolled  by  shooting  up  through  the  floor  of  the  room 
which  they  occupied.  Angeles  then  assumed  the  Utle 
of  Politico-Mihtary-Govemor. 

When  the  Tag&Iog  Vicente  Lucban  arrived  on  his  way 
to  Samar,  he  ordered  Angeles  to  meet  him  at  Ms^arao, 
wiUi  all  his  troops  and  arms,  disarmed  the  troops,  giving 
their  rifles  to  his  own  followers,  marched  into  Nueva 
Caceres  emd  took  possession  of  the  entire  govermnent. 
Aguinaldo  subsequently  made  Lucban  a  general,  and  sent 
him  on  his  way  to  Samar. 

Lucban  was  succeeded  by  another  Tag&log,  "General" 
Guevara,  a  very  ignorant  man,  who  displayed  special 
ability  in  making  collections,  and  is  reported  to  have  kept 
a  lai^  part  of  the  funds  which  came  into  his  possession. 

Colonel  Pefla,  who  called  himself  "Genertd,"  was  one 
of  the  worst  of  the  Tag&log  invaders,  for  they  were  prac- 
tically that.  He  threatened  all  who  opposed  him  with 
death,  and  summarily  shot  at  least  one  man  in  Tigaon. 
That  town  subsequently  rose  against  him,  and  he  was 
badly  cut  up  by  the  Bicols.'  On  getting  out  of  the  hos- 
pital he  was  sent  away. 

The  daughters  of  prominent  families  suffered  at  the 
hands  of  these  villains.  Fefia  abducted  one,  a  son  of 
Guevara  another.  Her  brother  followed  young  Guevara 
and  killed  him.  If  girls  of  the  best  families  were  so 
treated,  how  must  those  of  the  common  people  have 

Braganza  ordered  the  killing  of  all  Spaniards  and 
Chinese  at  Minalabag.  Some  forty-eight  Spaniards  were 

*  The  name  applied  to  the  FUlpinos  of  Amboa  Canurines,  Albay 



Many  Chinese  were  killed  at  Fasacao;  about  thirty 
at  Iiibmanan  by  order  of  Vicente  Ureua  a  Tag41og ;  more 
than  twenty  at  Calabanga. 

Conditions  became  so  unbearable  that  Faustino  Santa 
Ana  gathered  around  him  all  Bicols  who  were  willing  to 
fight  the  Tag^ogs,  but  the  troubles  were  finally  patched  up. 

American  troops  had  httle  difiiculty  'm.  occupying  Ambos 
Camarines  and  other  Bicol  provinces,  owing  to  the  hatred 
in  which  the  T^&logs  were  held. 


Conditions  in  the  important  island  of  Mindoro  may  be 
inferred  from  the  fact  that  it  became  necessary  for  its 
governor  to  issue  a  decree  on  November  10,  1898,  which 
contained  the  following  provisions  among  others :  — 

"2nd.  The  local  presidentes  of  the  pueblos  will  not  permit 
any  one  belonging  to  their  jurisdiction  to  pasa  from  one  pueblo 
to  another  nor  to  another  province  without  the  correspondii^ 
pass,  with  a  certificate  upon  its  back  that  the  taxes  of  its  holder 
have  been  piud. 

"  3rd.  That  from  this  date  no  one  will  be  allowed  to  abs^it 
himself  from  his  pueblo  without  previously  informing  its 
head  who  will  give  him  an  authorization  on  which  will  be 
noted  the  approval  of  the  presidente  of  the  pueblo.  .  .  . 

"  5th.  Persons  arriving  from  a  neighboring  town  or  prov- 
ince in  any  pueblo  of  this  province  wUI  immediately  present 
themselves  before  the  presidente  of  said  pueblo  with  their 
passes.  He  will  withoutcharge,  stamp  them  withhisofficialseal."' 

These  are  peculiar  regulations  for  a  province  which  is 
at  peace,  and  as  Major  Taylor  has  truly  remarked :  — 

"The  form  of  libertiy  contemplated  by  the  founders  of  the 
Philippine  Republic  was  not  considered  incompatible  with  a 
very  considenUDle  absence  of  personal  freedom."  * 

Later,  when  travelUi^  through  Mindoro,  I  was  told  how 
an  unfortimate  legless  Spaniard,  who  had  been  numing 
a  small  shop  in  one  of  the  towns  and  who  was  on  good 
terms  with  his  Filipino  neighbors,  was  carried  out  into 

'  P.  I.  R.,  262.  3.  >  Taylor.  4S  AJ. 









the  plana,  seated  in  a  chair,  and  then  cut  to  pieces  with 
boloB  in  the  presence  of  his  wife  and  children  who  were 
compelled  to  witness  the  horrible  spectacle  1 

On  this  same  trip  Captain  R.  G.  OiOBey,  then  the  Ameri- 
can Governor  of  Mindoro,  told  me  while  I  waa  at  Pina- 
malayan  that  the  people  there  were  greatly  alarmed  be- 
cause a  murderer,  liberated  under  the  amnesty,  had  re- 
turned and  was  prowling  about  in  that  vicinity.  Tim 
man  had  a  rather  unique  record.  He  had  captured  one 
of  his  enemies,  and  after  stripping  him  completely  had 
caused  the  top  of  an  inunense  ant-hill  to  be  dug  off.  The 
unfortunate  victim  was  then  tied,  laid  on  it,  and  the  earth 
and  ants  which  had  been  removed  were  shovelled  back 
over  his  body  until  only  his  head  projected.  The  ants 
did  the  rest  1  Another  rather  unusual  achievement  of 
this  interesting  individual  was  to  tie  the  feet  of  one  of 
his  enemies  to  a  tree,  fasten  a  rope  around  his  neck,  hitch 
a  carabao  to  the  rope,  and  st&rt  up  the  carabao,  thus 
pulling  off  the  head  of  his  victim.  Yet  this  man  and 
others  like  him  were  set  at  liberty  under  the  amnesty 
proclamation,  in  spite  of  the  vigorous  protests  of  the 
Philippine  Commission,  who  thought  that  murd««rs  of 
this  type  ought  to  be  hanged. 

And  now  I  wish  to  disciiss  briefly  an  interesting  and 
highly  characteristic  statement  of  Judge  Blount.  In 
referring  to  conditions  in  the  Visayan  Islands,  he  says :  — 

"Of  course  the  Bouthem  Islands  were  a  little  slower.  But 
as  Luzto  Koee,  so  go  the  rest.  The  rest  of  the  archipelago  is 
but  the  tail  to  the  Luz6n  kite.  Luz6q  contains  4,000,000  of 
the  8,000,000  people  out  there,  and  Manila  is  to  the  Filipino 
people  what  Paris  is  to  the  French  and  to  France.  Luzdn  is 
about  the  use  of  Ohio,  and  the  other  six  islands  that  really 
matter,  are  in  size  mere  little  Connecticuts  and  Rhode  Islands, 
and  in  population  mere  Arizonas  or  New  Mexicos."' 

This  paragraph  is  no  exception  to  the  general  rule  that 

the  statements  of  this  author  will  not  bear  analysis.    One 

•Blotuit,  p.  116. 




of  the  other  six  islands  that  he  says  really  matters  is 
Samar,  Its  area  is  5031  square  miles.  The  area  of 
Rhode  Island  is  1250  square  miles.  The  smallest  of  the 
tax  islands  named  is  Bohol,  with  an  area  of  1411  square 
miles.     It  cannot  be  called  a  little  Rhode  Island. 

As  regards  population,  Arizona  has  122,931.  It  is 
hardly  proper  to  call  either  Fanay  with  a  population  of 
743,646,  Cebu  with  592,247,  NegPOB  with  460,776,  Leyte 
with  357,641,  Bohol  with  243,14$  or  eren  Samar  with 
only  222,690,  a  mere  Arizona,  and  New  Mexico  with 
195,310  is  also  a  bit  behind. 

Luz6n  really  has  an  area  of  40,969  square  miles  and  a 
population  of  3,798,507.*  What  Bloimt  is  pleased  to  call 
"the  tail  to  the  Luz6n  kite,"  is  made  up  as  follows:  — 


AB.A  (Bgnu.  Miu.) 


Samar    . 
Negroa   . 
Panay    . 
Leyte     . 
Cebu      . 
Bohol     . 






Even  so,  the  tul  is  a  trifle  long  and  heavy  for  the  kite, 
but  if  we  are  going  to  compare  Luz6n  with  "the  Southern 
Islands, "  by  which  Blount  can  presumably  only  mean  the 
rest  of  the  archipeU^o,  why  not  really  do  it  7  The  pro- 
cess involves  nothing  more  complicated  than  the  subtrac- 
tion of  its  area  and  population  from  those  of  the  archipel- 
^^  as  a  whole. 

AuA  Ceouiu  Milk) 





Difference     .    . 



*  Aooepting  the  19(3  oeoaiu  figures. 


mamtoENT  rule  m  the  tisatas  and  euewhere   210 

Performing  this  operation,  we  discover  that  the  tail 
would  fly  away  wit^  the  kite,  as  Luz6n  has  less  than  half 
of  the  total  population  and  only  a  little  more  than  a  third 
of  the  total  area. 

To  compare  the  area  or  the  population  of  one  large 
island  with  those  of  individual  small  ones,  in  determining 
the  relative  importance  of  the  former  in  the  eoimtry  of 
which  it  makes  up  a  part,  is  like  comparing  the  area  and 
population  of  a  great  state  with  those  of  the  individual 
coimties  going  to  make  up  other  states. 

Blount  resorts  to  a  similar  questionable  procedure  in 
trying  to  show  the  insignificance  of  Mindoro  and  Palawan. 
There  are  an  island  of  Mindoro  and  a  province  of  Mindoro ; 
an  island  of  Palawan  and  a  province  of  Palawan.  In 
each  case  the  province,  which  includes  numerous  small 
islands,  as  well  as  the  large  one  from  which  it  takes  its 
name,  is  much  larger  and  more  populous  than  is  the  main 
island,  and  obviously  it  is  the  province  with  which  we 
are  concerned. 

Even  if  Blount  wished  to  limit  discusaion  to  the  Chris- 
tian natives  commonly  called  Filipinos,  hig  procedure  is 
still  wholly  unfair.  Of  these  there  are  3,575,001  in  Luz6n 
and  3,412,685  in  the  other  islands.  In  other  words,  the 
Fihpino  population  is  almost  equally  divided  between  the 
two  regions. 

As  he  would  not  have  found  it  convenient  to  discuss 
the  conditions  which  arose  in  Mindanao  under  Insurgent 
rule,  he  attempts  to  show  that  no  political  impor- 
tance attaches  to  them.  In  the  passage  above  quoted 
he  does  not  so  much  as  mention  either  Mindoro  or  Pala- 
wan (Par^ua).  Elsewhere,  however,  he  attempts  to 
justify  his  action  by  making  the  following  statements : — 

"The  political  or  govenimental  problem  being  now  re- 
duced from  3141  islaads  to  eleven,  the  last  three  '  of  the  nine 

'  AgMiTiiJdo  aoniidered  Misdaiuo  important  enough  to  form  one 
of  the  three  federal  states  into  whioh  tie  propoeed  to  divide  the  FhiliiH 



contfuned  in  the  above  table  may  also  be  eliminated  as  fol- 
lows : '  — 

"Mindoro,  the  large  island  just  south  of  the  main  bulk 
of  Luzdn,  pierced  by  the  121st  meridian  of  longitude  east  of 
Greenwich,  is  thick  with  densely  wooded  mountuns  and 
jungle  over  a  large  part  of  its  area,  has  a  reputation  of  being 
very  unhealthy  (malarious),  is  also  very  spu^y  settled,  and 
does  not  now,  nor  has  it  ever,  cut  any  figure  politically  as  a 
disturbing  factor." ' 

Apart  from  the  fact  that  the  political  problem  involved 
in  the  government  of  the  important  islands  which  Blount 
would  thus  leave  out  of  consideration,  is  not  solved  by 
ignoring  it,  certain  of  bis  further  statements  cannot  be 
allowed  to  go  imcorrected. 

The  allegation  that  the  island  has  never  "cut  any  figure 
politically  as  a  disturbing  factor"  is  absurd.  In  the 
Spanish  days  its  forests  furnished  a  safe  refuge  for  evil- 
doers who  were  from  time  to  time  driven  out  of  Cavite 
and  Batangas.  A  large  proportion  of  its  Filipino  inhabit- 
ants were  criminals  who  not  infrequently  organized 
regular  piratical  expeditions  and  raided  towns  in  Masbate, 
Romblon  and  Palawan.  The  people  of  the  Cuyos  and 
Calamianes  groups  lived  in  constant  terror  of  the  Kfindoro 
pirates,  and  tulisanea,'  who  paid  them  frequent  visits. 
I  myself  have  been  at  Calapan,  the  capital  of  the  prov- 
ince, when  the  Spanish  officials  did  not  dare  to  go  without 
armed  escort  as  far  as  the  outskirts  of  the  town  for  fear 
of  being  captured  and  held  for  ransom.  Diuing  con- 
siderable periods  they  did  not  really  pretend  to  exercise 
control  over  the  criminal  Filipinos  inhabiting  the  west 
coast  of  the  island.  Conditions  as  to  pubUc  order  were 
worse  in  Mindoro  than  anywhere  else  in  the  archipelago 
north  of  Mindanao  and  Joi6. 

No  less  absurd  are  Blount's  su^estions  as  to  the  gen- 
eral worthlessness  of  the  island.  There  are  high  moun- 
tains in  its  interior,  and  there  are  great  stretches  of  the 

I  Bloimt,  p.  228.       *  Ibid.,  p.  229.       ■  Bandits,  or  oiganiBed  robben. 



most  fertile  land  in  the  world  along  its  coast.  Its  north- 
em  and  eastern  portions  have  a  very  heavy  and  evenly 
distributed  rainf  ^,  and  are  admirably  suited  to  the  grow- 
ing of  cocoanuts,  hemp,  cacao,  rubber  and  similar  tropi- 
cal products.  In  this  region  rice  flourishes  wonderfully 
without  irrigation.  There  was  a  time  in  the  past  when 
Mindoro  was  known  as  "the  granary  of  the  Philippines." 
Later  its  population  was  decimated  by  constant  Moro 
attacks,  and  cattie  disease  destroyed  its  draft  animals, 
with  the  result  that  the  cultivated  lands  were  abandoned 
to  a  considerable  extent  and  again  grew  up  to  jungle, 
from  which,  however,  it  is  easy  to  redeem  them.  The 
west  coast  has  strongly  marked  wet  and  dry  seasons  sim- 
ilar to  those  at  Manila.  There  is  abundant  water  avail- 
able for  irrigation,  furnished  by  streams  which  never  run 
dry.  Much  of  the  soil  is  rich,  and  will  grow  the  best  of 
sugar  in  large  quantity.  The  forests,  which  now  cover 
extensive  areas,  sboimd  in  fine  woods,  and  produce  rubber 
and  other  valuable  gums.  There  are  outcroppings  of 
lignite  at  numerous  points  on  the  island,  and  in  the  vi- 
cinity of  Mt.  Halcon  is  found  the  finest  marble  yet  dis- 
cov^^  in  this  part  of  the  world.  Gold  is  aiao  present 
in  some  quantity  at  various  places.  In  short,  Mindoro 
is  naturally  one  of  the  richest  islands  in  the  Archipelago. 
If  its  tillable  lands  were  under  high  cultivation,  it  would 
support  half  the  population  of  the  Philippines. 


In  endeavouring  to  show  that  Palawan  is  without  po- 
litical importance  Blount  has  followed  precisely  the  pro- 
cedure which  he  adopted  in  the  case  of  Mindoro.  first, 
he  gives  the  area  and  the  population  of  the  island,  when 
he  should  concern  himself  with  the  province.  The  area 
of  the  island  is  4027  square  miles ;  that  of  the  province, 
5238  square  miles.  According  to  the  1903  census,  the 
popula^on  of  the  island  was  10,918,  while  that  of  the 



province,  which  contains  such  thickly  settled  and  fertile 
islands  as  Cuyo  and  A^taya,  was  30,582.  Of  course,  if 
one  wishes  to  emphasize  the  imimportance  of  Palawan, 
it  is  more  convenient  to  take  the  figures  for  the  island. 
Blount  says :  — 

"  Parfkgua,^  the  long  narrow  island  seen,  at  the  extreme  lower 
left  of  any  map  of  the  archipelago,  extending  northeastrsouth- 
west  at  an  ai^le  of  about  45°,  is  practically  worthlesB,  being 
fit  for  nothing  much  except  a  penal  colony,  for  which  purpose 
it  is  in  fact  now  used."  * 

I  must  deny  the  truthfulness  of  his  statements,  even 
if  we  limit  our  consideration  to  the  island  of  Palawan. 
Only  159  of  its  4027  square  miles  are  utilized  for  a  penal 
colony.  Its  natural  wealth  is  dmply  enormoiis.  It  is 
covered  throiigbout  the  greater  part  of  its  extent  with 
virgin  forest  containing  magnificent  stands  of  the  best 
timber.  Damar,  a  very  valuable  varnish  gum,  is  abun- 
dant in  its  mountains.  Much  of  the  so-called  ' '  Singapore 
cane,"  so  highly  prized  by  makera  of  rattan  and  wicker 
furniture,  comes  from  its  west  coast.  It  is  a  wdl-watered 
island,  and  its  level  plains,  which  receive  the  wash  from 
its  heavily  forested  mountains,  have  a  soil  of  unsurpassed 
futility  in  which  cocoanute  come  to  befunng  in  five  years 
or  even  less.  Incidentally,  the  greater  part  of  the  island 
lies  south  of  the  typhoon  belt.  Matampaya  Sotmd,  situ- 
ated near  its  northwestern  extremity,  is  one  of  the  world's 
great  harbors.  But  should  we  wish  to  rid  ourselves  of 
this  wonderful  island,  I  may  say,  without  violating  any 
official  confidences,  that  there  was  a  time  when  Germany 
would  have  been  more  than  pleased  to  take  it  oS  our 
hands ;  and  indeed  our  Briti^  friends,  who  were  suffi- 
ciently interested  in  it  to  survey  it  some  decades  ago, 
might  posdbly  be  prevailed  upon  to  accept  it  I 

There  are  good  reasons  why  Blount  thought  it  conven- 
ient to  make  it  appear  that  Palawan  was  politically  un- 
■The  old  Spaoiata  name  for  FlftUwao.  *  Blount,  p.  328. 



importaat.  Shortly  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  with 
Spain  the  Filipino  garrison  at  Puerto  Princesa  mutinied, 
and  the  things  which  they  did  were  not  nice.  Among 
others,  they  liberated  the  convicts,  Puerto  Princesa  being 
at  the  time  a  penal  colony,  and  the  latter,  together  with 
some  of  tiie  soldiers,  started  up  the  east  coast  of  the 
island,  leaving  a  trail  of  devastation  in  their  wake.  The 
prosperous  town  of  Tinitian  was  abandoned  as  they 
approached  it,  and  was  so  thoroughly  cleaned  out  by  them 
that  it  has  never  since  been  reoccupied  except  by  a  few 
stragglers.    Other  towns,  including  Tay-Tay,  were  raided. 

On  November  27,  1899,  Aguinatdo's  representative  in 
this  province  wrote  him  that  the  inhabitants  were  pre- 
paring to  kill  all  the  Tag&logs  and  revolt  against  Insur- 
gent rule.'  Later  when  some  of  the  latter  were  anxious  to 
get  the  people  of  one  of  the  northern  settlements  to 
take  them  on  a  short  boat  journey,  these  Visayans  con- 
sented to  give  them  a  lift  only  on  condition  that  they 
first  allow  themselves  to  be  boimd,  and  then  took  them 
out  to  sea  and  threw  them  overboard. 

Another  thing  which  Bloimt  would  have  found  it  in- 
convenient to  discuss  is  the  conduct  of  the  people  of 
Cuyo,  at  one  time  the  capital  of  the  province.  On  this 
island,  which  contains  but  twentynsne  squiu'e  miles,  there 
were  in  1903  no  less  than  7545  inhabitants.  They  hated 
Mid  feared  the  people  of  Mindoro  and  sent  messengers 
to  Hoilo,  after  the  Americans  had  occupied  that  place,  to 
beg  for  a  garrison  of  American  troops,  and  to  say  that  if 
furnished  with  an  American  flag  they  themselves  would 
defend  it.  For  some  reason  they  were  not  given  the  flag, 
Bud  the  sending  of  a  garrison  was  long  delayed.  Having 
grown  weary  of  waiting,  they  made  an  American  flag  of 
their  own,  hoisted  it,  and  when  the  Insurgents  from  Min- 
doro came  intrenched  themselves  and  defended  it.  They 
were  actually  being  besieged  when  the  American  garrison 
finally  arrived.     Here  is  one  more  fact  inconsistent  with 

>  P.  I.  R.,  944. 10. 



the  theory  that  the  Filipino  people  were  a,  unit  at. 
Aguinaldo's  back,  and  of  course  the  easiest  way  to  get 
around  such  an  occurrence  is  to  forget  to  mention  it ! 


And  now  we  come  to  the  great  island  of  Mindanao, 
which  all  but  equals  Luz6n  in  size,  having  an  area  of  36,292 
square  mJles  as  against  the  40,969  of  Luz6n.  Blount's 
first  mention  of  it  is  peculiar. 

In  connection  with  the  words  "  the  other  six  ialan<k 
that  really  matter,"  in  the  passage  above  cited  on  page 
116  of  h^  book,  he  has  inserted  a  foot-note  reading  as 
follows :  — 

"The  BIX  mun  Visayan  Islands.  Mohammedan  Mindanao 
is  always  dealt  with  in  this  book  aa  a  separate  and  distinct 
problem." ' 

But  it  was  hardly  possible  for  him  to  dismiss  this 
great  island,  which  is  a  little  continent  by  itself,  quite  so 
cavalierly  and  I  will  quote  the  more  important  of  his 
further  and  later  stat^ents  regarding  it:  — 

"While  the  great  Mohammedan  island  of  Mindanao,  near 
Borneo,  with  its  36,000  square  miles  of  area,  requires  that  the 
Philippine  archipelago  be  described  as  stretching  over  more 
than  one  thousand  miles  from  north  to  south,  still,  inasmuch 
aa  Mindanao  only  contuns  about  500,000  people  all  told, 
half  of  them  semi-civilized,  the  governmental  problem  it 
presents  has  no  more  to  do  with  the  main  problem  of  whether, 
if  ever,  we  are  to  grsnt  independence  to  the  7,000,000  Chris- 
tians of  the  other  islands,  than  the  questions  that  have  to  be 
passed  on  by  our  Commissioner  of  Indian  AfTtura  have  to  do 
with  the  tariff.  Mindanao's  36,000  square  miles  constitute 
nearly  a  third  of  the  total  area  of  the  Philippine  archipelago, 
and  more  than  that  fraction  of  the  97,500  square  miles  of 
territory  to  a  consideration  of  which  our  attention  is  reduced 
by  the  process  of  elimination  above  indicated.  Turning  over 
Mindanao  to  those  crudely  Mohammedan  semi-civilised 
MoroB  would  indeed  be  'like  granting  self-government  to  an 
1  Blount,  p.  110. 





Apache  reservattoa  under  some  local  chief,'  as  Mr.  Roose- 
velt, in  the  camp^ga  of  1900,  ignorantly  declared  it  would 
be  to  grant  aelf-govemment  to  Luz6n  under  Aguinaldo.  Fur- 
thermore, the  Moroe,  so  far  as  they  can  think,  would  prefer 
to  owe  allegiance  to,  and  be  entitled  to  recognition  as  subjects 
of,  some  great  nation.  Again,  becsusa  the  Filipinos  have  no 
moral  right  to  control  the  Moros,  and  could  not  if  they  irould, 
the  latter  being  fierce  fighters  and  bitterly  opposed  to  the 
thought  of  possible  ultimate  domination  by  the  Filipinos,  the 
most  uncompromising  advocate  of  the  consent  of  the  governed 
principles  haa  not  a  leg  to  stand  on  with  r^ard  to  Mohammedan 
Mindanao.  Hence  I  affirm  that  as  to  it,  we  have  a  distinct 
separate  problem,  which  cannot  be  solved  in  the  lifetime  of 
anybody  now  living.  But  it  is  a  problem  which  need  not  m 
the  least  delay  the  advent  of  independence  for  the  other  four- 
teen fifteenth  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  archipelago  —  all 
Christians  living  on  islands  north  of  Mindanao.  It  is  true 
that  there  are  some  Christian  Filipinos  on  Mindanao,  but  in 
policing  the  Moros,  our  government  would  of  course  protect 
them  from  the  Moros.  If  they  did  not  like  our  government, 
they  could  move  to  such  parts  of  the  islands  as  we  might  per- 
mit to  be  incorporated  in  an  ultimate  Philippine  republic. 
Inasmuch  as  the  300,000  or  so  Moros  of  the  Mohammedan 
island  of  Mindanao  and  the  adjacent  islets  called  Jolo  (the 
'Sulu  archipelago,'  so  called,  'reigned  over'  by  the  sultan  of 
comic  opera  fame)  originally  presented,  as  they  will  always 
present,  a  distinct  and  separate  problem,  and  never  did  have 
anything  more  to  do  with  the  Philippine  insurrection  against 
us  than  their  cousins  and  co-religionista  over  in  near-by  Bor- 
neo, the  task  which  confronted  Mr.  Root  in  the  fall  of  1899, 
to  wit,  the  suppression  of  the  Philippine  insurrection,  meant 
practically  the  subjugation  of  one  big  island,  Luz6n,  contun- 
mg  half  the  population  and  one  third  of  the  total  area  of  the 
archipelago,  and  six  neighbouring  small  ones,  the  Visayan 
Islands."  • 

Now  as  a  matter  of  fact  Mindanao  is  by  no  means 
Mohammedan.  The  Mohammedan  Malays,  called  Moros, 
are  fomid  here  and  there  along  the  western  coast  of  the 
Zamboanga  peninsula  and  along  the  southern  coast  of  the 
island  as  far  as  Davao.  They  also  extend  far  up  the  CotSr 
bate  River  and  occupy  the  Lake  Lanao  region,  but  that 
1  Bltnint,  p.  220. 
vot.  I— Q 




is  all.  The  interior  of  the  island  is  for  the  most  part 
occupied  by  the  members  of  a  number  of  non-Cliristiaii, 
non-Mohammedan  tribes,  while  its  northern  and  eastern 
coasts  are  inhabited  by  Yisayan  Filipinos,  of  whom  there 
are  many  in  Zamboanga  itadi. 

While,  as  Blount  says,  the  Moros  took  no  part  in  the 
insurrection  against  the  United  States,  the  Visayans  of 
Mindanao  did,  and  we  had  some  Uvely  tussles  with  them 
in  Misamis  and  in  Surigao. 

It  is  indeed  unthinkable  that  we  should  turn  Mindanao 
over  to  the  Moros.  Abandonment  of  it  by  us  would  in 
the  end  result  in  this,  as  they  would  take  possession  of 
the  entire  island  in  the  coiu-se  of  time.  Neither  the  other 
wild  tribes  nor  the  Filipinos  could  stand  against  them.  I 
heartily  ag^cee  with  the  conclusion  that  we  must  retain 
this  island  for  many  years  before  we  can  settle  the  prob- 
lems which  it  presents.  It  is  further  true  that  we  might 
retain  it  and  still  grant  independence  to  the  remainder 
of  the  Philippine  Archipelago,  but  if  we  are  to  eliminate 
Mindanao  from  consideration  because  the  Filipinos  have 
no  right  to  control  the  Moros,  of  whom  there  are  in  reality 
only  about  a  hundred  and  fifty-four  thousand^  on  the 
island,  and  could  not  if  they  would,  what  about  Luz6n, 
where  there  are  in  reality  no  less  than  four  hundred 
and  sixty  thousand  non-Christians,^  many  of  whom,  like 
the  Ifugaos,  Bontoc  Igorots,  Kalingas  and  wild  Tii^aos, 
are  fierce  fighters  and  practically  all  of  whom  are  bitterly 
opposed  to  the  thought  of  possible  ultimate  domination 
by  Filipinos,  while  most  of  them  welcome  American  rule  ? 

Have  the  Filipinos  any  more  moral  right  to  control 
them  than  they  have  to  control  the  Moros  ?  Could  they 
control  them  if  they  would  ?  And  has  the  most  uncom- 
promising advocate  of  the  consent  of  the  governed  prin- 
ciple "a  leg  to  stand  on"  in  the  one  case  if  he  lacks  it  in 
the  other  ? 

The  Filipino  politicians  are  not  ready  to  admit  that 
I  Aoccvding  to  the  oensus  ot  1803, 154,700.      ■  See  table  on  p.  051. 



Filipinos  could  not  satisfactorily  govon  Moros  and  have 
even  alleged  that  they  did  so  govern  them  during  the 
period  DOW  under  discussion.     Let  us  examine  the  facts. 

Aguiaaldo  attempted  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
the  Sultan  of  Jol6,  addressii^  him  as  his  "great  and 
powerful  brother,"  '  but  this  brother  does  not  seem  to 
have  received  his  advances  with  enthusiasm,  and  the  other 
brothers  proceeded  to  do  things  to  the  Filipinos  at  the 
first  opportunity. 

Jos£  Roa  in  writing  Aguinaldo  on  January  26,  1899,  of 
conditions  in  the  province  of  Misamis  says : '  — 

"Hardly  had  said  evacuation  of  Iligan  taken  place  on  the 
28th  of  last  month,  when  the  Moros  or  Mohammedans  of  the 
interior,  our  mortal  enemies  since  times  immemorial  on  account 
of  their  religious  fanaticism  which  they  cany  to  extremes,  as 
do  their  co-religionists  in  Europe  and  Asa,  and  on  account  of 
their  objection  to  leading  a  civilized  life,  began  to  harry  the 
town  of  Itigan  which  is  the  nearest  town  to  the  lake  around 
which  is  the  densest  Mora  population.  Due  to  the  prestige 
of  the  local  president  of  that  town,  Scllor  Carloto  Sariol,  and 
the  euei^  that  he  showed,  after  some  days  of  constant  firing 
against  groups  who  descended  upon  the  suburbs  of  the  town, 
he  was  successful  in  having  them  abandon  their  hostile  atti- 
tude and  promise  to  hve  in  peace  and  harmony  with  said 

'  (Contemponu?  copy  in  Spanish.  —  P.  I.  R.,  Books  C-L :) 

"  January  19,  1899. 

"  The  President  of  the  Philippine  Republic  very  cordially  greeta  hie 
great  and  powerful  brother,  the  Sultan  ot  Jolo,  and  makes  known : — 

"That  the  Filipinoa,  after  having  thrown  off  the  yoke  of  foreign 
domination  cannot  f  o^rot  their  brothers  of  Jolo  to  whom  they  are  bound 
by  the  ties  of  race,  interests,  security  and  defense  in  this  region  of  the 
Far  East. 

"The  Philippine  Republic  has  resolved  to  respect  absolutely  the 
beliefs  and  traditions  ot  each  island  in  order  to  establish  on  solid  bases 
the  bonds  of  fraternal  unity  demanded  by  our  mutual  interests. 

"  I  therefore  in  the  name  of  all  the  Filipinos  very  gladly  offer  to  the 
powerful  Sultan  of  Jolo  and  to  all  brothers  who  acknowledge  his  great 
authority,  the  highest  assurance  of  friendship,  consideration  and  es- 

"  Malolos,  January  18, 1899." 


«P.  LR.,  76. 1. 



towns,  this  verbal  agreement  beiii^  participated  in  by  the 
Dattos  of  some  settlements  who  did  not  wish  to  treat  with  the 
Spanish  Government. 

"  Being  acquainted  nevertheless  with  these  people,  we  know 
by  experience  that  the  more  friendly  they  appear,  the  more 
we  must  watch  against  them,  because  as  soon  as  they  find  a 
good  opportunity  they  do  not  ful  to  take  advantage  of  it  to 
enter  the  towns  for  the  purpose  of  sacking  them  and  Udnappii^ 
as  mfuiy  of  their  inhabitants  as  possible  in  order  to  reduce 
them  to  slavery." 

Ifnmediately  after  the  abandonment  of  Cotabato  by  the 
Spaniards  the  Filipino  residents  set  up  a  government 
there.  A  few  days  later  the  Moro  datos,  Fiang,  Ali  and 
Djimbangan,  dropped  in  with  their  followers,  cut  off  the 
head  of  the  FUipino  presidente,  served  a  few  other  leadit^ 
officials  and  citizens  in  the  same  manner,  and  proceeded 
to  set  up  a  government  of  their  own  which  was  the  only 
government  that  the  place  had  prior  to  the  arrival  of  the 
American  troops. 

Date  Djimbai^an  promptly  caused  the  Filipina  women 
of  the  place  to  be  stripped  and  compelled  to  march  before 
him  on  the  public  plaza  in  a  state  of  nudity. 

At  Zamboanga  the  Moros  could  have  taken  the  town 
at  any  time  after  the  Spaniards  left  had  they  desired  to 
do  so.  On  the  arrival  of  the  Americans  Dato  Mandi 
offered  to  take  it  and  turn  it  over  to  them,  but  his  propo- 
sition was  declined. 

He  subsequently  swore  to  an  affidavit  relative  to  condi- 
tions under  Inaiu-gent  rule.    It  reads  as  follows ;  — 

"We  always  had  peace  in  Zamboanga  District,  except 
during  the  revolution  of  the  Filipinos  in  the  year  1899,  when 
for  seven  or  eight  months  there  was  in  existence  the  so-called 
Filipino  Republic.  During  that  time  there  was  much  robbing 
and  killing ;  the  life  of  a  man  was  worth  no  more  than  that  of 
a  chicken ;  men  killed  one  another  for  personal  gain ;  enemies 
fought  one  another  with  the  bolo  instead  of  settling  their  dif- 
ferences before  the  law.  It  was  a  time  of  bloodshed  and  terror. 
There  was  no  justice.  Because  of  this  the  Mores  were  opposed 
to  the  Filipinos.    There  was  conflict  between  the  betts'  class 



of  flliiNuoB  and  the  revolutJonistB,  who  had  gained  control 
of  the  local  government." ' 

Elsewhere  throughout  the  More  territory  those  fW- 
pinoB  who  did  not  promptly  make  their  escape  were  mur- 
dered or  enslaved.  In  short,  the  lion  and  the  Iamb  lay 
down  together,  with  the  Iamb  inside  as  usual. 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  this  first  and  last  attempt  of 
Filipinos  to  govern  Moros  did  not  result  in  complete 

Baldomero  Aguinaldo  made  a  subsequent  attempt  to 
open  communication  with  the  Sultan  of  Jol6,  authorizing 
him  to  establish  in  all  the  rancherias  of  Mindanao  and 
Jol6  a  government  in  accordance  with  a  decree  duly  trans' 
mitted.  The  Sultan  was  requested  to  report  the  result 
of  his  efforts  and  to  give  the  niunber  of  his  forces  with 
their  arms,  and  was  advised  that,  "  if  in  this  war,  which 
I  consider  to  be  the  last,  we  secure  our  independence 
and  with  the  opposition  of  our  brothers  in  that  region, 
with  yourself  at  their  head,  we  are  successful  in  preventing 
the  enemy  from  gaining  a  foothold,  the  grateful  country 
will  always  render  a  tribute  of  hom^e  and  gratitude  to 
your  memory."  *  Curiously,  the  Sultan  seems  to  have 
remained  unmoved  by  the  appeal. 

>  From  an  official  dooument  on  file  at  Muula. 

*  "  Being  brothers,  the  desoend&nta  of  the  a&me  race  and  of  one  eonl, 
the  same  sun  ahinea  upon  us  and  we  breathe  the  same  air,  so  that  our 
BentimentB  are  also  one,  and  we  aspire  to  the  independence  and  liberty 
of  our  oountiy  in  order  to  secure  its  progreBS  and  place  it  on  a  level  with 
other  oivilized  nations ;  and  with  this  assurance  1  have  taken  the  libert7 
to  address  you  this  letter,  begging  of  you  to  accept  the  commission 
which  in  the  name  of  our  government  I  have  the  honour  to  confer  upon 
you.  Yon  are  autborized  thereunder  to  establish  in  all  the  'Ran- 
cherias' of  Mindanao  and  Jolo,  a  civil  and  military  economic-adminis- 
trative organization,  in  accordanoe  with  the  deorees  which  I  enoloee 
herewith,  and  after  having  established  the  same,  I  request  that  you 
make  a  report  to  our  Honourable  President  of  the  Philippine  Republic, 
%-.  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  of  the  result  thereof  and  of  the  number  of  the 
force  with  their  arms  and  ammunition,  in  order  to  ascertain  whether 
they  would  be  sufQoient  to  prevent  the  invasion  of  the  enemy  and 
whether  there  ia  any  necessity  of  sending  reinforcements  of  arms  to 
Bud  Islands  for  this  purpose.     If  in  this  war,  which  I  oonsider  to  be 




This  tight  Uttle  island  of  1236  square  miles  had  in  1903 
a  Yisayan  population  of  29,451.  Its  people  are  all  Fili- 
pinos, and  are  on  the  whole  rather  an  unusually  orderly 
and  worthy  set.  There  is  no  reason  why  it  should  have 
been  excluded  in  considering  "the  human  problem  in  its 
broader  governmental  aspect,"  whatever  that  may  be,  nor 
can  I  understand  why  Blount  should  have  desired  to  ex- 
clude it  except  that  he  seems  to  have  been  endeavoiuing 
to  exclude  everything  possible  outside  of  Luz6n,  in  order 
to  increase  the  apparent  importance  of  the  Christian 
provinces  of  that  island.  Masbate  should  of  course  be 
taken  into  accoimt  in  connection  with  the  Yisayan  Is- 
lands, of  which  it  is  one. 

The  islands  ordinarily  included  in  the  group  known  as 
"  The  Visayas ' '  from  the  ancient  tribal  name  of  the  civilized 
Filipino  people  who  inhabit  them,  who  are  called  Visayans, 
are  Samar,  Panay,  Negroa,  Leyte,  Cebd,  Bohol,  Masbate, 
Tablas,  Romblon,  Ticao,  Burias,  Siquijor  and  numerous 
smaller  islands  adjacent  to  those  named.  Altib^ou^ 
their  inhabitants  are  all  rated  as  one  people,  they  speak 
a  number  of  more  or  less  distinct  difdects.  Only  Faoay, 
Negros,  Samar,  Tablas  and  Sibuyan  have  non-Christian 
inhabitants,  and  in  the  three  islands  last  named  their 
number  is  so  small  as  to  be  negligible.  In  the  moim- 
tains  of  Panay  and  Negros,  however,  Negritos  are  to  be 
foimd  in  considerable  numbers,  as  are  the  representatives 
of  a  tribe  sometimes  called  Monteses '  and  sometimes 

the  last,  we  secure  our  independenoe,  and  with  the  oppositian  of  our 
brothers  in  that  region,  with  yourself  at  their  head,  we  are  Buocesstul 
in  preventing  the  enemy  from  Ksining  a  foothold,  the  grateful  country 
wiD  always  reader  a  tribute  of  homage  and  gratitude  to  your  memory. 

"  God  iM-eserve  you  many  years. 

"May  31,  1899.  "Baldoukro  Aouinaldo, 

"  Ueut.  0«n.  Superior  P.  M.  Commander  of  Southern  Be^on, 
"To  TBK  HoNOURABLB  Sni/TAN  Raha  Halon." 

—  P.  I.  B.,  810-4. 

>  Spanish  for  "mountain  people." 



Bulddnon.  The  latter  tribal  desj^nation  I  have  thought 
it  best  to  reserve  for  certain  inhabitants  of  northern  Min- 

In  the  Visayas,  Palawan  and  Mindanao  the  government 
of  Aguinaldo  was  established  at  various  places  and  dif- 
ferent times,  without  consulting  or  considering  the  will 
of  the  people.  The  meD  who  went  as  his  delegates  were 
supported  by  armed  forces,  hence  their  authority  was  not 
at  first  questioned,  but  soon  there  arose  murmurii^ 
which  might  easily  have  grown  into  a  war  cry. 

The  attitude  of  the  Visayan  FiHpinos  is  clearly  fore- 
shadowed in  the  following  extract  from  a  letter  dated 
January  14,  1899,  in  which  Mabini  discussed  the  ad- 
visability of  putting  the  constitution  in  force :  — 

"And  even  if  this  change  is  made,  I  iear  that  Negrae  and 
Iloflo  will  form  a  federal  Republic  and  not  one  in  conformity 
with  the  centralized  Republic  provided  for  by  the  Cooatitu- 
tion."  • 

The  action  later  taken  by  Negros  shows  that  there  was 
abundant  reason  for  this  fear. 

As  late  as  February  26,  1899,  the  Insui^ent  govern- 
ment was  still  ignorant  as  to  the  real  conditions  in  N^;ros 
and  MindftTiao.' 

From  a  letter  written  on  March  18,  1899,  to  Apacible 
at  Hongkong,  we  leani  that  Aguinaldo  and  his  followers 
were  even  then  still  uninformed  as  to  events  in  the  Vi- 

>P.  I.  R..512.  A  5. 

>  Estiact  from  a  letter  to  Apacible  of  tbe  Hongkong  junta  dated 
Fehraary  26,  1899  :  — 

"It  is  &1bo  said  that  the  Cantonal  Gov^mnent  of  Negros  has  wished 
to  make  a  treaty  with  the  Amerioana,  some  roembers  of  that  govern- 
ment having  eome  in  Amerioan  transportB  to  oonf  er  with  General  Otis. 
We  are  not  aware  of  the  conditions  of  the  amngement,  beoauae  the 
Negros  people  have  thus  far  not  wished  to  put  themselves  in  oom- 
mnnioatioii  with  us ;  we  oul;  know  by  news  more  or  lees  reliable  that 
the  capitis  of  that  island  has  been  oooupied  by  the  American  foroes 
without  opposition. 

"Of  Mindanao  we  know  absolutely  nothing;  we  also  are  ignorant 
of  what  has  been  the  lot  of  our  agents  in  Amerioa." 



sayan  Zslands.'  In  view  of  these  facts,  how  ridiculous 
become  the  cootentionB  of  those  who  claim  that  the 
Malolos  government  represented  the  archipelago  as  a 
whole.  And  what  shall  we  say  of  the  following  statement, 
remembering  that  the  Treaty  of  Paris  was  signed  De- 
cember 10,  1899? 

"When  the  Treaty  of  Paris  was  mgned,  General  Otis  was  in 
possession  of  Cavite  and  Manila,  with  less  than  twenty  thou- 
sand men  under  his  command,  and  Aguinaldo  was  in  poaees- 
eion  of  practically  all  of  the  rest  of  the  archipelago  with  between 
35,000  and  40,000  men  under  his  command,  armed  with  guns, 
lutd  the  whole  Mlijnno  population  were  in  sympathy  with  the 
anny  of  their  country."  * 

Ultimately,  by  one  means  or  another,  and  chiefly  by 
the  use  of  armed  emissaries,  the  Visayan  Istauds,  with  the 
exception  of  Negros,  were  brought  into  the  Insurgent 

Mabini's  fear  that  Negroa  and  Boilo  would  form  a 
federal  republic  was  not  realized,  but  Negros  set  up  its 
own  government,  applied  to  the  local  commander  of  the 
United  States  forces  for  help,  endeavoured  with  almost 
complete  success  to  keep  out  Tag&log  invaders,  and  pres- 
ently settled  down  contentedly  under  American  rule, 
facta  of  which  Bloimt  makes  no  mention.  On  the  con- 
trary, without  just  cause,  he  includes  this  great  island, 
with  its  4881  square  miles  of  territory  and  its  560,776 
inhabitants,  in  the  area  over  which  he  claims  that  Agui- 
naldo exercised  complete  control. 

At  Iloilo  the  American  troops  encountered  opposition 
when  they  planned  to  land.    Negotiations  had  been  en- 

>  "Of  the  Viaajraa  and  Mindanao  we  know  nothing  positive  aa  yet, 
it  IB  whiBpei«d  that  the  Amerioaiu  have  succeeded  in  oooupying  Negros 
and  Cebfl  against  the  will  of  the  inhabitants.  Hollo  oontinaes  the 
struggle  energetically.  It  does  not  matter  that  they  ooeupy  tempo- 
rarily those  beautiful  islands,  because  Luzdn  will  know  how  to  flght 
for  hersc^  and  the  rest  of  the  islands,  and  will  not  lay  down  anna  with- 
out the  independence  of  the  Philippine  Arolupelago." 

■  Blouat,  p.  140. 





tered  into  with  the  loc^  Filipino  officers,  but  the  latter, 
under  the  influence  of  representatives  whom  Aguinaldo 
had  sent  from  Luz6d,  announced  themselves  as  adher- 
ents of  his  government,  and  when  the  American  troops 
finally  disembarked  fired  the  town  ahead  of  them.  It 
has  been  claimed  that  in  doing  this  they  were  inspired 
by  pure  patriotism,  but  the  facts  shown  by  their  own 
records  present  a  very  different  picture. 
In  writii^  to  Aguinaldo  on  April  8,  1899,  Mabini  says : 

"We  have  received  a  couunimlcation  forwarded  from 
Iloflo,  from  General  Martfo  Delgado  and  Francisco  Soriano, 

Jour  cominiasioner.  Soriano  states  that  the  troops  of  Diocno 
ave  done  nothing  except  commit  excesses  and  steal  money 
during  the  attack  by  the  Americans  upon  the  town  of  Iloflo, 
even  gfAag  so  far  as  to  break  their  guns  by  using  them  as  poles 
to  cany  the  stolen  money  which  they  took  to  C^piz.  It  is 
said  that  these  forces,  besides  being  unwilling  to  fight  the 
Americans,  refuse  to  give  their  guns  to  those  who  do  wish  to 
fight  and  do  not  want  C&piz  to  aid  the  people  of  Iloflo,  who  are 
the  ones  who  support  the  entire  forces,  including  the  troops  of 
Diocno  who  went  there."  * 

This  same  letter  contains  the  following  brief  reference 
to  conditions  in  Cebu  and  Leyte :  — 

"Also  a  native  priest,  Setior  Pascual  Reyes,  has  arrived 
here  from  Cebd,  and  says  that  in  Leyte  General  Lucban  is 
committing  many  abuses  and  that  Colonel  M6jica  is  only  a 
mere  figurehead.  In  Cebti,  he  says,  things  are  also  in  a  chaotic 
condition,  because  the  military  chief,  Magedlum  [Maxilom, 
—  Tr.],  and  the  people  are  not  in  harmony." 

Further  details  as  to  conditions  in  Cebu  are  given  in  a 
letter  to  Aguinaldo  from  the  commissioner  whom  he 
put  in  chaj^e  of  electionB  in  that  island,  who  on  Febru- 
ary 19,  1899,  writes :  '  — 

"Having  arrived  in  this  province  the  8th  of  last  month,  I 
t^  on  the  11th  for  the  northern  pueblos  of  this  Island  to  hold 
the  elections  for  the  ofiSces  ordered  by  the  Superior  Decree  of 
June  18,  last. 



"The  news  spread  Uke  an  electric  spark,  as  in  all  the  pueblos 
I  visited  later  I  found  that  almost  aU  of  the  residents  were  in 
their  homes,  so  that  when  the  elections  were  held  in  the  town 
hall,  all  the  principal  residents  attended,  requesting  me  to 
inform  you  that  they  were  disposed  to  sacrifice  even  their 
dearest  affections  whenever  necessfuy  for  our  sacred  cause: 
they  only  asked  me  to  inform  those  who  hold  the  reins  of 
government  at  the  present  time  in  this  province,  that  some 
steps  be  taken  to  put  a  stop  to  the  arbitrary  acts  which  had 
been  and  still  are  being  committed  by  the  so-called  Captains, 
Majors,  Colonels,  Generals  and  Captains  General,  who  abudi^ 
in  the  most  barefaced  manner  the  positions  they  claimed  to 
hold,  were  depriving  them  of  their  horses  and  their  carabaos, 
or  cattle.  I  promised  them  that  I  would  do  this,  as  I  do  now, 
by  Bending  a  communication  at  once  to  Sres.  Flores  and  Max- 
ilom,  who  are  at  the  head  of  the  provincial  goveniment,  im- 
pressing upon  them  the  fact  that  if  they  continue  to  grant 
ranks  and  titles  to  persons  of  this  character,  as  they  have  done, 
it  would  end  in  the  utter  ruin  of  this  wealthy  province." 

He  adds  that  these  men  did  not  remedy  the  evils  com- 
plained of.  It  would  be  possible  to  cover  in  detail  all  of 
this  and  the  remaining  Insurgent  territory,  and  to  show 
that  Judge  Blount  was  quite  right  in  stating  that  condi- 
tions similar  to  those  encountered  in  Luz6n  arose  there, 
but  the  limitations  of  time  and  space  forbid,  and  I  must 
ask  my  readers  to  accept  on  faith  the  statements  of  Blount 
and  myself  that  such  was  the  case  I 

Taylor  thus  summarizes  the  conditions  which  ultimately 

"The  Insurgent  soldiers  lived  in  their  own  land  as  they 
would  have  lived  in  a  conquered  country.  They  were  quar- 
tered on  the  towns  and  the  towns  had  to  feed  them  whether 
they  would  or  not. 

"Peace  there  was  where  Aguinaldo's  soldiers  had  not  pen- 
etrated, but  there  does  not  seem  to  have  been  progress.  Life 
went  very  well  in  a  long  siesta  in  the  shady  villages  under  the 
pahn  trees,  but  not  only  the  structure  of  the  State,  its  very 
foundations  were  falling  apart.  When  Aguinaldo's  soldiers 
came  they  brought  cruelty  and  license  with  them.  Proud  of 
their  victories  and  confident  in  themselves  they  felt  that  the 
labourers  in  the  fields,  the  merchants  in  the  towns,  were  for  the 



purpose  of  adminiatering  to  their  necessities  and  their  deairea. 
Agmnaldo,  having  seen  this  force  gather  about  him,  was  forced 
to  entreat  it,  to  appeal  to  it ;  he  was  never  strong  enough  to 
enforce  discipline,  even  if  he  cared  to  do  it." 

Aguinaldo  himself  finally  became  disheartened  over 
his  inability  to  maintiun  a  decent  state  of  public  order  in 
the  territory  which  he  claimed  to  govern,  and  in  Decem- 
ber, 1898,  tendered  his  resignation,  giving  among  other 
reasons  odious  favouritism  on  the  part  of  some  of  the 
military  chiefs,  together  with  a  desire  to  enrich  them- 
selves by  improper  means,  such  as  accepting  bribes, 
making  prisoners  a  source  of  gain,  and  decreasing  the 
allowance  of  the  soldiers.  He  said  that  many  soldiers 
had  received  sums  of  money  as  their  share  of  booty,  and 
intimated  that  officers  mmt  have  done  the  same.  He 
made  charges  against  civU  as  well  as  military  officers  and 
ended  by  saying  that  he  retained  the  evidence  for  presen- 
tation when  called  on.' 

>  "The  seoond  reason  for  my  resignation  is  the  pain  oaosed  me  by 
having  still  to  read  u&odc  the  reports  of  our  military  assooiates  that 
in  some  of  the  chiefs,  besides  odious  favouritism,  is  olearly  seen  a  desire 
to  enrich  themselves,  aeoepting  bribes,  makiiig  even  prisoaers  a  means 
of  gain,  and  others  there  are,  above  all  the  oommiasariea,  who  dare 
to  decrease  the  allowanoe  of  the  soldier,  little  enough  already ;  —  I 
throw  the  blame  at  all  this  upon  thoae  who  taught  ub  such  a  custom ; 
oonsequently  I  have  reason  to  hope  that  they  will  ohange  their 

"The  same  cause  of  complaint  I  have  concerning  some  companions 
who  are  diseharging  civil  ofBces,  estfecially  those  who  are  far  from  the 
oversight  of  the  government,  who  put  their  own  welfare  before  the 
common  good,  and  devise  a  thousand  means  to  further  their  own  ends, 
even  to  the  extent  of  gambling.  Where  are  the  police?  Are  they, 
perohanoe,  also  bribed  ?  Pity  money  is  so  ill  spent  1  However,  evw^r 
one  is  obliged  to  know  that  falsehood  will  never  prevail  against  truth, 
and  as  evidence  hereof  many  soldiers  have  confessed  to  the  govern- 
ment as  to  having  received  certain  sums  in  the  share  of  the  booty,  and 
if  we  consider  that  the  latter  who  receive  their  share  have  told  the 
truth,  why  should  those  who  are  present  during  the  putition  of  the 
money  and  receive  nothing,  not  do  so  7  In  this  way  the  eyes  of  some 
that  watv  blinded  are  gradually  opened;  I  confess,  moreover,  that 
the  latter  are  to  be  blamed  less  than  those  la  authority  who  are  so 



Aguinaldo  was  later  persuaded  to  withdraw  his  res^- 
nation.    No  wonder  that  he  wished  to  tender  it  I 

In  referrii^  to  the  report  of  Wilcox  and  Sargent,  Blount 
has  said:  — 

"This  report  was  submitted  by  them  to  Admiral  Dewey 
under  date  of  November  23,  1898,  and  by  h\n\  forwarded  to 
the  Navy  Department  for  its  information,  with  the  comment 
that  it  'in  my  opinion  cont^ns  the  most  complete  and  reliable 
information  obtainable  in  regard  to  the  present  state  of  the 
northern  part  of  Luzon  Island.'  The  Admiral's  iadoraement 
was  not  sent  to  the  Senate  along  with  the  report." ' 

He  thus  gives  it  to  be  understood  that  the  admiral 
beUeved  that  the  report  truthfully  set  forth  the  condi- 
tions which  actually  existed  in  these  provinces,  and  that 
his  indorsement  was  suppressed.  Not  only  was  it  true 
that  this  report  when  rendered  contained  the  most  com- 
plete and  reliable  information  then  available  in  regard 
to  the  existing  state  of  the  northern  part  of  Luzon  Island, 
but  it  contained  the  only  first-hand  information  avail- 
able. The  facts  ultimately  leaked  out  and  led  the  ad- 
miral radically  to  change  his  opinion  as  to  the  conditions 
which  arose  under  Insurgent  rule.  Of  them  he  later 
said:  — 

"There  was  a  sort  of  a  reign  of  terror;  there  was  no  govnn- 
ment.  These  people  had  got  power  for  the  first  time  in  thdr 
lives  and  they  were  ricUng  roughshod  over  the  community. 
The  acts  of  cruelty  which  were  brought  to  my  notice  were 
hardly  credible.  I  sent  word  to  Aguinaldo  that  he  must  treat 
his  prisoners  kindly,  and  he  said  he  would." 

I  believe  that  I  have  fully  demonstrated  the  truth  of 
these  statements.    Blount  was  thoroughly  familiar  with 

"  I  certify  to  the  truth  of  all  the  above-mentioned  evils,  which  miut 
be  eradicated.  I  retain  the  evidence  for  presentation  when  oalled  on, 
BO  that  if  any  of  theread^^  hereof  should  consider  themaelvee  referred 
to  and  should  resent  it,  I  am  ready  to  beg  their  paidon."  —  P.  LB.,  8.  2. 

'  Blount,  p.  108. 



Dewey's  testimony  before  the  Senate  Committee,   in 
which  they  occur,  but  he  did  not  mention  them. 

I  cannot  close  this  discussion  of  Insurgent  rule  without 
quoting  extracts  from  a  remarkable  document  written  by 
Isabelo  Artacho  in  October,'  1899.  It  was  entitled 
"Declaration  Letter  and  Proclamation"  and  was  ad- 
dressed to  the  Filipino  people.  While  it  is  probable 
that  Artacho  was  impelled  to  tell  the  truth  by  hk  hatred 
for  Aguinaldo,  tell  the  truth  he  did,  and  his  rank  and 
standing  entitle  his  statements  to  consideration :  — 

"Study  the  work  of  the  tnBurrection ;  see  if  it  is,  as  is  said, 
the  fwthful  interpretation  of  your  wishes  and  desires. 

"  Go  through  your  towns,  fields,  and  mountains.  Wherever 
you  see  an  insurgent  gun  or  bolo  you  will  find  girls  and  faithful 
wives  violated,  parents  and  brothers  crying  for  the  murder  of 
a  son  or  of  a  brother ;  honest  families  robbed  and  in  misery ; 
villages  burned  and  plundered  for  the  benefit  of  a  chief  or  a 
General;  you  will  see  fresh  and  living  signs  yet  of  those  hor- 
rible crimes  perpetrated  with  the  greatest  cynicism  by  those 
who  call  themselves  your  liberators !  Liberators  because 
they  wear  red  pants,  or  a  red  shirt,  or  cany  on  their  hats  a 
piece  of  red  cloth  or  a  triangular  figure  ! 

"Here,  a  iweadent  stabs  a  man,  perhaps  the  most  honest  of 
the  village,  simply  for  having  implored  mercy  for  a  creature 
arbitrarily  inflicted  with  the  cepo  [an  oblong  square  piece  of 
heavy  wood  divided  into  two  parts,  with  a  lock  at  each  end 
and  nz  or  more  holes  in  the  middle  to  confine  the  feet  of  pris- 
oners] ;  there,  a  dying  man,  suspended  by  the  feet  in  a  cepo, 
raised  from  the  level  of  the  ground,  by  another  president  who 
has  charged  him  with  an  unproved  crime ;  there  a  poor  woman 
falsely  chai^d  and  driven  by  petty  officers  with  their  bayonets 
for  having  objected  to  their  invasion  into  her  house,  or  shop, 
they  being  supposed  to  be,  each,  Justice  itself,  'JusHda,'  and  to 
be  obeyed  as  images  of  the  Gods ;  there,  generals  who  murder 
without  fear,  for  an  inugoificant  motive,  creatures  whose 
members  are  being  mutilated,  or  their  fiesh  cut  in  slices  and 
afterwards  roasted  and  given  them  to  eat;  there,  officers 
braining  a  girl  who  has  refused  to  accede  to  their  sensual 
wishes,  the  lifeless  body  of  the  victim,  pierced  with  shots, 
after  having  been  made  use  of,  is  thrown  into  the  river.  It  ia 
>  Ben&te  Doouments,  Vol.  25,  pp.  282&-2941. 



not  unusual  to  witness  officers  burying  people  alive  in  a  tomb 
prepared  by  the  victim,  by  order  of  the  murderer;  it  is  not 
unusual  to  see  a  Puiwie-Juoge  pointing  a  revolver  at  a  man  who 
is  about  to  give  evidence,  and  threatening  to  brain  him  for 
having  dared  to  ask;  'Why  and  to  whom  am  I  to  declare?' 
And  finally,  on  his  tottering  throne,  you  will  see  the  Magistrate 
of  the  Philippines,  so  called  by  his  worshippers,  with  his  me- 
phistophelian  smite,  disposing  and  directing  the  execution  of 
a  murder,  of  a  plunder,  of  a  robbery,  or  the  execution  of  some 
other  crimes  against  those  who  are  indifferent  or  do  not  care 
to  worship  him,  auch  indifference  being  con^dered  a  crime. 

"Putting  aside  the  many  other  murders,  I  may  mention 
that  one  recently  committed  on  the  person  of  the  renowned 
and  by  many  called  the  worthy  General,  Antonio  Luna,  which 
took  place  just  at  the  entrance  of  the  palace  of  the  Republic 
Preddency,  and  also  the  assassination  at  Kavite  of  the  ever 
remembered  martyr,  Andr^  Bonifacio,  the  founder  of  the 
'Katdpiinan'  Society,  and  the  one  who  initiated  the  Revolution 
of  1896 ;  E^Eunst  the  memory  of  whom  it  has  been  comnutted, 
in  the  proclamation  of  that  falsely  called  Republic,  the  crim- 
inal and  imjust  omission  to  render  the  smallest  manifestation 
of  Filipinos'  feelings  towards  him,  to  prevent  that  same 
might  dislike  his  murderers  I 

"Study  the  ordinances  aqd  constitution  of  this  so-called 
democratic  Government  of  the  Republic,  that  grand  work  of 
the  wise  Filipinos ;  admire  with  me  that  beautiful  monu- 
ment erected  on  a  sheet  of  paper  and  consecrated  to  the  con- 
truest  of  reason  and  labour,  especially  in  connection  with  human 
rights  and  property,  the  basis  for  the  well-being  of  social  life; 
but,  lament  and  deplore  with  me  its  palpable  nullity  when 
brought  to  practice  and  you  will  again  see  that  the  laws  were 
made  for  the  people  and  not  the  people  for  the  laws  I 

"Under  this  republic  called  democratic  it  is  a  crime  to  think, 
to  wish,  to  say,  anything  which  does  not  agree  with  what  the 
8^d  Gods  think,  wish  and  say.  Nobody  and  nothing  is  at- 
tended to,  whilst  those  who  have  your  lives  in  their  hands  must 
be  respected. 

"Under  this  Goverment  there  cannot  be  the  slightest  notice 
taken  of  family,  property,  morality  and  justice,  but  confumon 
and  disorder  appear  everywhere  like  a  dreadful  shadow,  pro- 
duced by  the  ignorance  of  the  subordinate  officers,  and  of  the 
powers  that  be  in  the  villages  and  provinces,  who  are  sup- 
ported by  a  epedal  conmiittee,  or  speciaJ  commissioners  em- 
powered to  impoverish  and  to  ruin  all  and  with  the  right  ot 



diBpoait^  at  their  own  accord,  Ufe,  family  and  individual 
property  without  responsibility  whatsoever  on  their  part. 

"  Let  the  peaceful  annexation  of  the  whole  of  the  Southern 
lelanda  of  Jol6,  Mindanao,  IloOo,  N^ros,  CebiJ  and  others 
where  now  the  American  flag  is  hoisted  and  under  whose 
shadow  tranquillity  and  well-bong  are  experienced,  speak  for 

"  Let  it  speak  for  Itself,  the  proceeding  observed  by  the  whole 
people  of  Imus,  who  were  asking  protection  when  the  American 
troops  took  [>o38essioD  of  the  town  of  fiacoor,  whilst  the  insur- 
gent troops  ^ere  located  were  hostile. 

"  Let  them  speak  for  themselves,  the  protests  against  the 
war  made  by  the  numerous  persons  of  S.  Francisco  de  Malab6n, 
Sta.  Cruz  de  Malab6n,  Perez  Dasmarifias  aad  other  towns, 
before  the  Worthy  Chief  Mariano  Trfas,  who  ultimately 
refused,  with  dignity,  the  high  position  of  Secretary  of  War, 
for  which  rank  he  was  promoted  for  reasons  which  are  not 
worth  publishing  here.  In  fine,  let  it  speak  for  itself,  the 
non-res^tance  shown  by  the  people  of  Old  Kavite  [Kawit], 
Noveleta,  and  Rozaiio  of  the  heroic  province  of  Kavite,  not- 
withstanding the  many  iatrenchments  and  troops  there  lo- 
cated, as  well  as  the  identical  behaviour  observed  by  other 
towns  of  Luzon  provinces  who  are  ready,  to  follow  when  the 
American  troops  are  in  them. 

a  *****  • 

"  In  fact  no  one  would  believe  it,  and  the  Flulippine  people 
are  tired  of  waiting  for  the  day  when  Haring  Gavino  will  shuce 
a  napkin  to  produce  suddenly  horses  vomiting  fire  and  light- 
ning and  troops  of  dangerous  insects;  that  day  in  which 
they  will  witness  the  realization  of  that  famous  telegraphed 
dr^jn  to  the  effect  that  two  hours  after  the  commencement  of 
tiie  war  the  insurgents  will  take  their  breakfast  in  the  Palace 
of  '  Malacafiang, '  their  tiffin  in  the  Senate  House,  and  their  dinner 
on  board  the  Olympia  or  in  Kavite;  that  day  in  which  the 
celebrated  Pequenines  army,  with  their  invisible  Chief-leader, 
will  exterminate  the  American  troops  by  means  of  handfuls  of 
dust  and  sand  thrown  at  them,  which  process,  it  is  said,  has 
caused  the  smallpox  to  the  Americans;  that  day  in  which 
the  Colorum  army  will  capture  the  American  fleet  with  the 
cords  their  troops  are  provided  with,  in  combination  with  a 
grand  intrenchment  of  Tayabas  made  of  husks  of  paddy, 
by  a  Naearene,  who  will  then,  by  merely  touching,  conv^  each 



busk  into  a  Bee  with  a  deadly  sting;  that  df^  in  which  the 
insurgents,  like  their  leadere,  provided  with  hosts  of  flour, 
or  of  paper,  pieces  of  candles  of  the  holy-week  matins,  holy 
water,  pieces  of  consecrated  stones;  of  vestments  belon^ng 
to  a  miraculous  Saint  or  with  some  other  Anting-Anting  or 
talisman  or  amuletos,  will  make  themselves  invuhierable  to 
bullets ;  also  have  power  to  convert  into  any  of  the  four  ele- 
ments, like  those  personages  of  the  Philippine  legends  and 
cometUes,  —  Ygmidio,  Tefioeo,  Florante,  Bamardo,  CarfHO, 

"  Yes,  the  people  of  the  PhiUppines  are  quite  tired  of  wuting 
for  the  predicted  European  conflict,  which  it  is  esid  would 
^ve  them  their  independence ;  if  not,  perhaps,  divide  the 
Islands  as  they  are  now  amongst  cousins,  brothers,  nephews, 
uncles  and  godfathers. 

"  In  the  near  future,  when  we  have  acquired  the  necessary 
political  and  social  education  and  the  habit  of  behaving  justly 
towards  ourselves  and  towards  our  fellow-brothers ;  when  free 
from  all  superstition,  healthy,  strong  and  vigorous,  we  find 
ourselves  capable  of  governing  ourselves,  without  there  being 
the  possibility  of  the  preponderance  of  our  pasaons  in  the 
consideration,  direction,  and  administration  of  the  interests 
of  our  country,  then,  and  only  then,  we  wiU  be  free  1  we  will 
be  independent  I  * 
"  HoNQKONQ,  1st  October,  1899." 

Most  of  the  men  who  perpetrated  the  outrages  I  hare 
detailed  are  alive  to-day,  and  are  powers  in  their  reepectire 
communities.  Simeon  Villa  was  recently  elected  a  mem- 
ber of  the  municipal  board  from  the  south  district  of 
Manila,  but  fortunately  an  American  governor-general 
prevented  him  from  taJdng  his  seat.  Just  prior  to  my 
departure  from  Manila  he  was  appointed,  by  Speaker 
O^efia,  a  member  of  a  committee  on  reception  for 
Govemor^General  Harrison. 

The  kind  of  independent  "government"  these  men  es- 
tablished is  the  kind  that  they  would  agun  establish  if 
they  had  the  chance,*  but  among  the  persons  to  be  tortuzed 

'  p.  I.  R.,  838-2. 

■  la  this  oonneotion  note  Blount's  statement :  — 
"But  we  are  considering  how  much  of  a  goyenunent  th«  FilipinM 
had  in  189S,  b«oauBe  the  answer  is  pertinent  to  what  BOtt  ot  •  soron- 





and  murdered  would  now  be  those  Americans  who  failed  to 
escape  seasonably.  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  such  a 
state  of  affairs  would  come  about  immediately,  but  it  would 
certainly  arise  within  a  comparatively  short  time.  Sooner 
yet  "the  united  Fihpino  people"  would  spht  up  on  old 
tribal  lines,  and  fly  at  each  other's  throats. 

ment  thejr  oould  run  if  permitted  now  or  ftt  aiqr  time  ia  the  future." 
—  BujcHT,  p.  73. 


Did  We  Destbot  a  Republic? 

The  cl^m  has  frequently  been  made  that  the  United 
States  govemment  destroyed  a  republic  in  the  Philippine 
Islands,^  but  some  of  t^e  critics  seem  to  entertain  peculiar 
ideas  as  to  what  a  r^ublic  is.  Blount  states*  that 
Aguinaldo  declined  to  hear  our  declaration  of  indepen- 
dence read  "because  we  would  not  recognize  hia  right  to 
asseri;  the  same  truths,"  and  then  apparently  forgetting 
the  Insurgent  chief's  ^eged  adherence  to  the  principles 
of  this  docimient,  he  lets  the  cat  out  of  the  bag  by  Baying 
that  "the  war  satisfied  \ia  all  that  Aguinaldo  would  hare 
been  a  small  edition  of  Porfirio  Diaz,"  and  would  him- 
self have  been  "  The  Republic."  * 

He  would  doubtless  have  set  up  just  this  sort  of  a 
govemment,  if  not  assassinated  too  soon,  but  it  would 

*  Blount  nttn  to 

"The  death-wammt  of  the  Philipinne  repubUo  sigaed  by  Mr. 
MoEJnle;  on  Septembm  16th."  —  Blookt,  p.  99. 

SpoaJdng  of  Mr.  Boosevelt's  opinion  of  the  piaotioability  of  gnntine 
independenee  to  the  Filipinoa,  he  sayB :  — 

"Tet  it  represented  then  one  of  the  many  ourrent  miaapprehenBioiu 
about  the  Filipinos  whioh  moved  this  great  nation  to  destroy  a  yonng 
republio  set  up  in  a  spirit  of  intelligent  and  greneroaa  emulation  of  our 
own." — BixinNT,  p.  230. 

'  "Here  was  a  man  oluming  to  be  President  of  a  newly  establlBhed 
republic  baaed  on  the  prinoiples  set  forth  in  our  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence, which  republic  had  juet  issued  a  like  Declaration,  and  he 
was  invited  to  come  and  hear  our  declaration  read,  and  declined  be* 
cause  we  would  not  recognize  his  right  to  assert  the  same  truths." 
—  BLontJT,  p.  59, 

■  "The  war  satiafled  ns  all  that  Aguinaldo  would  have  been  a  small 
edition  of  Porfirio  Diaz,  and  that  the  Filipino  republia-that-might-have> 
been  would  have  been,  very  decidedly,  'a  going  conoem,'  although 
Aguinaldo  probably  would  have  been  able  to  say  with  a  degree  of 
accuracy,  as  Diaz  might  have  said  in  Meidao  for  so  many  years,  'The 
Republio  T    I  am  the  Republic' "  —  Bmunt,  p.  292. 



hardly  have  accorded  with  the  principles  of  the  declaration 
o(  independence,  nor  would  it  have  been  exactly  "  a  gov- 
ernment of  the  people,  by  the  people,  for  the  people." 

Blount  truly  says'  that  the  educated  FiUpinos,  ad- 
mittedly very  few  in  number,  absolutely  control  Gie  mae&es. 
He  adds'  that  j^-esidentes  of  puebtiK  are  as  absolute 
bosses  as  is  Murphy  in  Tammany  Hall,  and  that  the  towns 
taken  collectively  constitute  ^e  provinces.  The  first 
statement  is  true,  and  the  second,  which  is  tantamount 
to  a  declaration  that  the  presidentes  control  every  square 
foot  of  the  provinces  and  every  man  in  them,  is  not  so  far 
from  the  truth  as  it  might  be.  I  have  been  old-fashioned 
enough  to  retain  the  idea  that  a  republic  is  "a  state  in 
which  the  sovereign  power  resides  in  the  whole  body  of 
the  people,  and  is  ex^cised  by  representatives  elected 
by  them." 

Blount  labored  under  no  delusion  as  to  Oib  fitness  of 
tiie  common  people  to  govern.* 

'  "The  war  demonatnted  to  the  army,  to  a  Q.  E.  D.,  that  the  Fitt- 
pinoB  are  'capable  of  self-govenunent,'  unleai  th«  kmd  whieh  faappeni 
to  suit  the  geniuB  of  the  Amerioaa  people  is  the  only  kmd  of  govern- 
ment on  earth  that  is  respectable,  and  the  one  pana<3ea  for  all  the  UIb  of 
government  among  men  without  r^ard  to  their  temperament  or  his- 
torieal  antecedents.  The  edoeated  patriotio  FilipinoB  oan  control  the 
massM  of  the  people  in  thar  several  distriots  as  oompletely  as  a  oap- 
tain  ever  oontroUed  a  company."  —  Blocnt,  p.  292. 

*  "  Even  to-day  the  preddente  of  a  pueblo  is  as  absolute  boss  of  his 
town  as  Charles  F.  Murphy  is  in  Tammany  Hall.  And  a  town  or 
pueblo  in  the  Philippines  is  more  thui  an  area  oovered  by  more  or  lees 
contiguous  buildings  and  grounds.  It  is  more  lilce  a  township  in  Maasa- 
ohiuettB,  BO  that  when  you  aooount  govemment^dly  for  the  pueblos  of  a 
given  province,  you  aoooimt  for  every  square  foot  of  that  provinoa 
and  for  every  man  in  it." 

*  "In  there  reviewing  the  Samar  and  other  insurreotions  of  10O5  in 
the  Philippines,  you  And  him  (t.e.  Roosevelt)  dealing  with  the  real  root 
ol  the  evil  with  perfect  honesty,  though  adopting  the  view  that  the 
Filipino  people  were  to  blame  therefcw,  becansa  we  had  plaoed  too  much 
power  in  the  hands  of  an  ignorant  eleet(K«te,  which  had  elected  rasoall; 
otBeiala."  —  Blount,  p.  297. 


"Bat  we  prooeeded  to  ram  down  their  throats  a  preconceived  theoT7 
that  the  only  road  to  sdf-govemment  was  for  an  alien  people  to  step 
"» line  qua  turn."  —  Bu>ONi,p.M6. 



Not  only  did  the  Filipinos  themselves  understaiid 
perfectly  well  that  they  had  no  republic,  but  there  were 
many  of  them  who  were  fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  they 
could  establish  none.  Fernando  Acevedo,  in  writing  to 
General  Pfo  del  Pilar  on  August  8,  1898,  said ; '  — 

"There  could  be  no  republic  here,  even  though  the  Americana 
Bliould  consent,  because,  according  to  the  treaties,  the  Fili- 
pinos are  not  in  condition  for  a  repubUc.  Besides  this,  all 
Europe  will  oppose  it,  and  if  it  should  be  that  they  divide  our 
country  as  though  it  were  a  round  cake,  what  would  become 
of  us  and  what  would  belong  to  us  7" 

I  will  now  trace  the  evolution  of  the  government 
which  Aguinaldo  did  set  up.  In  doing  so  I  follow  Taylor's 
argument  very  closely,  drawing  on  his  unpublished  Ms., 
not  only  for  ideas,  but  in  some  instances  for  the  words  in 
which  they  are  clothed.  I  change  his  words  in  many  cases, 
and  do  not  mean  to  unload  on  hiin  any  responsibility 
for  my  statements,  but  do  wish  to  acknowledge  my  in- 
debtedness to  him  and  at  the  same  time  to  avoid  the  neces- 
sity for  the  continual  use  of  quotation  marks. 

Aguinaldo's  methods  in  establishing  his  repubUc  are 
shown  by  his  order'  that  "any  person  who  fi^ts  for  his 
country  has  absolute  power  to  kill  any  one  not  friendly 
to  our  cause"  and  the  further  order*  prescribing  that 
twdve  lashes  should  be  given  to  a  soldier  who  lost  even 
a  single  cartridge,  while  if  he  continued  to  waste  ammu- 
nition he  should  be  severely  punished.  In  March,  1899, 
workmen  who  had  abandon«i  their  work  in  the  arsenal 
at  Malolos  were  arrested,  returned,  given  twenty-five 
laahes  each  and  then  ordered  to  work.* 

Also:  — 

"Of  Murse  the  ignorant  electorate  we  perpetnited  on  Sanur  u  an 
'expression  of  our  theoretical  views'  proved  that  we  had  'gone  too 
test'  io  conferring  self-government,  or  to  quote  Mr.  Roosevelt,  had  been 
'reposing:  too  much  oonfldsnoe  in  the  self-govemiiig  power  of  a  people,' 
if  to  begin  with  the  rankest  material  for  oonstmoting  &  government  that 
there  was  at  hand  was  to  ofFer  a  fair  test  of  capacity  for  self-govern- 
ment." —  Blodnt,  p.  546.  '  P.  I.  R.,  499.  I  Ex.  134. 

■  Ibid.,  206.  1.  ■  Ibid.,  1124.  2.  *  Ibid.,  204.  6. 



The  news  that  an  American  expedition  was  about  to 
sail  for  the  Philippines  made  hiin  realize  that  he  had  not 
much  more  than  a  month  in  which  to  place  himself  in 
a  portion  in  which  he  would  have  to  be  consulted  and 
assisted,  and  this  he  tried  to  do.  The  arms  he  received 
from  Hongkong  on  May  23  enabled  him  to  begin  an  in- 
surrection, not  as  an  ally  of  the  United  States,  but  on  hia 
own  account.  From  May  21  to  May  24  he  issued  orders 
for  the  uprising  against  Spain.  On  May  24  he  declared 
himself  Dictator  of  the  Philippines  in  a  proclamation 
in  which  he  promised  to  resign  his  power  into  the  hands 
of  a  president  and  cabinet,  to  be  appointed  when  a  consti- 
tutional assembly  was  convened,  which  would  be  as  soon 
as  the  islands  had  passed  into  his  control.  He  further 
announced  that  the  North  American  nation  had  given 
its  disinterested  protection  in  order  that  the  liberty  of  the 
PhiUppines  should  be  gained.^  On  May  25,  1898,  the 
first  American  troops  sailed  from  San  Francisco  for  the 

Aguinaldo  still  had  a  month  in  which  to  seize  enough 
Spanish  territory  to  erect  thereon  what  would  appewr  to 
the  Americans  on  their  arrival  to  be  a  government  of 
Luz6n,  of  which  he  was  the  head.  The  Hongkong 
junta  and  Aguinaldo  himself  intended  to  ask  for  the  recog- 
nition of  th^  government,  but  they  had  first  to  create  it. 
To  obtain  recognition  it  was  necessary  that  the  American 
commander  on  land  should  be  able  to  report  that  wherever 
he  or  his  troops  had  gone  the  country  was  ruled  by 
Aguinaldo  according  to  laws  which  showed  that  the  people 
were  capable  of  governing  themselves. 

As  the  United  States  is  a  republic  it  was  natural  that 
the  directing  group  of  insurgent  leaders  should  decide  upon 
a  republican  form  of  government.  That  form  would 
appeal  to  the  people  of  the  United  States;  the  first 
"Christian  Asiatic  Republic"  was  a  description  which 
would  inevitably  awaken  sympathy  in  that  mother  of 

>  P.  I.  B.,  206.  6. 



republics.  The  idea  was  a  wise  and  subtle  one;  but 
Aguinaldo's  republic  was  merely  an  elaborate  stage-setting, 
arranged  for  the  contemplation  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States. 

By  June  5,  1898,  the  success  of  the  insurgent  arms  had 
been  such  that  Aguinaldo  tdt  that  he  could  throw  down 
the  mask.  He  would  still  be  glad  of  American  assistanoe, 
but  he  felt  himself  strong  enough  to  do  without  it.  He 
saw  that  "there  can  now  be  proclaimed  before  the  FiUpino 
peot^e  and  the  civilized  nations  its  only  aspiration,  namely, 
the  independence  of  this  country,  which  proclamation 
should  not  be  delayed  for  any  ulterior  object  of  this  govern- 
ment "  ^  and  ordered  that  the  independence  of  the  Philip- 
pines should  be  proclaimed  at  his  birthplace,  Cavite 
Viejo,  on  June  12,  1393.  On  that  date  he  formally 
proclaimed  it.  The  provinces  of  Cavite,  Bataan,  Pam- 
panga,  Batai^as,  Bulacan,  Laguna  and  Morong  w&te 
about  to  fall  into  his  hands,  the  Spanish  troops  in  them 
being  besieged,  and  about  to  surrender. 

From  the  same  place  on  June  18,  1898,  Aguinaldo 
promulgated  his  decree  for  the  creation  and  adminis- 
Iration  of  municipalities.*  In  brief,  this  provided  that 
as  soon  as  the  territoiy  of  the  archipelago,  or  any 
portion  thereof,  had  passed  from  the  possession  of 
Spanish  ioTcea,  the  people  in  the  towns  who  were  most 
conspicuous  for  their  intelligence,  social  position  and 
upri^t  conduct  were  to  meet  and  elect  a  town  govern- 
ment. The  heads  of  the  towns  in  every  province  were  to 
elect  a  head  for  the  province  and  his  three  coimsdlors. 
The  provincial  council,  composed  of  these  four  officials, 
with  the  presidente  of  the  capital  of  the  province,  were  to 
see  to  the  execution  in  that  province  of  the  decrees  of  the 
central  government  and  to  advise  and  surest. 

This  provincial  coimcil  was  to  elect  representatives 
for  the  revolutionaiy  congress,  which  was  to  be  charged 
with  submitting  suggestions  to  the  central  government 

'  p.  I.  R.,  674. 1.  »  Ibid.,  206.  3. 



Upon  interior  and  exterior  affairs,  and  was  to  be  heard 
by  the  government  upon  serious  matters  which  admitted 
of  delay  and  discussion. 

Before  any  person  elected  to  office  was  pennitted  to 
dischai^  his  functions,  his  election  was  to  be  approved 
by  the  central  government.  The  military  commanders, 
except  in  time  of  war,  were  to  have  no  jurisdiction  over  the 
civil  authorities.  They  could,  however,  demand  such 
supplies  as  they  might  need,  and  these  could  not  be  re- 
fused. The  government  was  to  appoint  commisaioners 
to  carry  these  regiilations  into  effect. 

On  Jime  20  Aguinaldo  issued  his  regulations  for  the 
government  of  provinces  and  municipahties '  as  supple- 
mental to  the  decree  of  two  days  before.  It  wemt 
mto  the  details  of  government,  under  the  following 
heads:  police,  justice,  taxation  and  registration  of 

On  Jime  23  he  proelaimed  the  establishment  of  a  revolu- 
tionary government,  with  himself  as  "president."  In 
this  capacity  he  had  all  the  powers  of  the  Spanish  gov- 
emo>general,  unhampered  by  any  orders  from  Spain. 
It  is  true  that  the  scheme  provided  for  the  eventual  foi^ 
mation  of  a  republic,  but  it  is  doubtful  if  the  people  who 
drew  it  up  really  Imew  what  that  word  meant.  What 
was  provided  for  in  practice  was  a  strong  and  highly 
oentrahzed  military  dictatorship,  in  which,  under  the 
form  of  election,  provision  was  made  for  the  filling  of  all 
offices  by  men  devoted  to  the  group  which  had  seized 

According  to  this  decree  the  dictatorial  government  was 
in  future  to  be  entitled  the  revolutionary  govenmient. 
Its  duty  was  to  strugf^e  for  the  independence  of  the 
Philippines  in  order  to  estalflsh  a  true  republic.  The  dic- 
tator was  to  be  known  as  the  president  of  the  revolu- 
tionary government.  There  were  to  be  four  secretaries  — 
one  of  fordgn  affairs,  commerce  and  loarine;  one  of 
» P.  I.  B.,  206. 3. 



war  and  public  works ;  one  of  police  and  interior  ordor, 
justice,  education  and  hygiene;  one  of  the  toeasury, 
agriculture  and  n^anufactures.  The  government  could 
increase  the  number  of  secretariee  if  necessary.  They 
were  to  assist  the  president  in  the  despatch  of  business 
coming  under  their  departments. 

In  addition  to  the  president  and  bis  secretari^,  there 
was  to  be  a  revolutionary  congress  composed  of  repre- 
sentatives from  the  provinces  of  the  Philippine  Archi- 
pelago, elected  as  provided  by  the  decree  of  June  18. 
In  case  a  province  was  not  able  to  elect  representatives, 
the  government  would  appoint  them  for  such  province. 
The  congress  was  to  discuss  and  advise,  to  approve 
treaties  and  loans,  and  to  examine  and  approve  the  ac- 
counts of  the  secretary  of  the  treasury.  If  important 
matters  admitted  of  delay,  the  congress  would  be  heard 
concerning  them ;  but  if  they  did  not  admit  of  delay, 
the  president  of  the  government  was  to  act  at  once. 
Projects  of  law  could  be  presented  by  any  representative, 
and  by  the  secretaries  of  the  government. 

A  permanent  committee  of  congress  presided  over  by 
the  vice-president  was  to  be  chosen  by  that  body.  This 
was  to  serve  as  a  court  of  appeal  in  criminal  cases  and  as 
a  coiurt  of  final  jurisdiction  in  cases  arising  between  the 
secretaries  of  the  government  and  provincial  officials. 
The  acts  of  congress  were  not  to  go  into  effect  until  the 
president  of  the  government,  ordered  their  execution. 
He  was  also  to  have  the  right  of  veto. 

This  was  awell-devised  plan  to  secure  control  for  the  cen- 
tra group  about  Aguinaldo.  His  commisdoners,  under  a 
form  of  election  in  which  the  electorswere  carefullyselected 
men,  established  municipid  governments  devoted  to  the 
cause  of  the  revolution.  These  were  to  choose  provincial 
officials  and  members  of  the  congress.  All  elections  were 
subject  to  Aguinaldo's  approval,  and  every  province  was 
imder  the  command  of  a  military  representative  of  his, 
who  could  and  did  call  upon  the  civil  authorities  for 







such  supplies  as  he  deemed  fit.  All  real  power  was  vested 
in  the  central  group,  and  the  central  group  was  composed 
of  Emilio  Aguinaldo  and  his  public  and  private  advisers. 
By  this  time  he  had  gathered  about  him  men  who  were 
trained  in  the  law,  some  of  whom  had  served  the  Spanish 
government  in  various  capacities.  They  were  accustomed 
to  the  methods  that  had  previously  prevailed  under  the 
Spanish  regime,  and  were  now  ready  to  draw  up  con- 
stitutions and  regulations  for  the  new  government. 
Mabini  wrote  the  three  organic  decrees.  Copies  of  them 
were  sent  to  the  foreign  consuls  in  Manila,  and  on  July 
15,  1898  to  Admiral  Dewey. 

Although  the  title  of  "president"  was  assumed  by 
Aguinaldo,  as  more  likely  to  be  favourably  con^dered 
in  the  United  States  than  "dictator,"  the  tendency  of 
his  followers  who  had  not  been  educated  in  Europe  was 
to  speak  of  and  to  regard  him  not  as  a  president,  but  as  an 
overlord  holding  all  power  in  his  hands.  The  people 
did  not  feel  themselves  citizens  of  a  republic,  copartners 
in  an  estate;  they  considered  themselves  subject  to  a 
ruler  who  sometimes  called  himself  president,  and  some- 
times dictator.  Indeed,  there  is  much  to  show  that  if 
Aguinaldo  and  his  followers  had  succeeded  in  their  plans, 
even  the  name  "republic"  would  not  have  been  long 
continued  as  the  title  of  his  government.' 

1  On  July  7,  1S98,  the  eeoretaiy  vi  the  revolutioiiary  junta  in  Min- 
danao, in  writing  to  A^inaldo,  olosed  his  letter  with  the  following 
(onuula :  "  Conuniuid  this,  your  vwsal,  »t  all  hoim  at  the  orders  of 
his  respected  ohid,  on  whom  he  will  new  turn  his  biiok,  and  whom 
he  will  never  forswear.  God  preserve  you,  Captain  General,  many 
yean."  P.  I.  R.,  1080.  1.  Every  now  and  then  we  find  »  queer  use 
of  the  tenn  "  royal  family."  This  seems  to  have  been  oommon  among 
the  mass  of  the  people.  Heads  of  towns  and  men  of  position  often 
used  the  expression  "  royal  orders "  in  speaking  of  the  orders  and 
decrees  issued  by  Aguinaldo.  For  otample,  the  officials  of  Tayug,  a 
town  of  19,000  people  in  Pangasin&n  Province,  certified,  on  October  9, 
189S,  that  they  had  carried  out  the  instructions  for  "  the  establishment 
of  the  popular  government  in  aocordanoe  with  the  royal  decree  of 
June  18,  1898."  — P.  I.  R.,  1188.  1. 

In  October  certun  of  ^luinsldo's  adherents  in  Tondo  wrote  to  him 



AguiiiAldo's  claim  as  to  the  effectivenesB  of  his  govern- 
ment on  Almost  6,  1898,  was  as  follows :  ^  "  The  govern- 
ment of  the  revolution  actually  rules  in  the  provinces  of 
Cavite,  Batangas,  Mindoro,  Tayabas,  Laguna,  Morong, 
Bulacan,  Bataan,  Pampanga,  ^anta  and  besieges  the 
capital,  Manila.  The  most  perfect  order  and  tranquillity 
reign  in  these  provinces,  governed  by  authorities  elected 
by  the  inhabitants  in  conformity  with  the  organic  decrees 
dated  June  18  and  23  last.  Moreover,  the  revolution 
has  about  nine  thousand  prisoners  of  war  who  are  treated 
htmsanely  and  according  to  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare. 
We  can  muster  more  thim  thirty  thousand  men  organized 
as  a  r^ular  army." 

It  may  have  been  that  in  the  majority  of  these  provinces 
municipal  governments,  formed  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  the  decree  of  June  18,  had  been  established  ; 
but  provincial  governments  had  not  been  established  in 
aU  of  them,  and  tranquillity  did  not  reign  in  any  of  them, 

and  proteited  against  the  aots  of  the  local  preeidente,  who,  they  held, 
h&d  not  been  duly  elected  in  aooordaiioe  with  the  proTiBions  of  the 
"  royal  order  "  ot  June  18,  1898.  They  oloeed  their  respeotful  protest 
by  requesting  that  said  royal  order  should  be  obeyed. — Taylor,  AJ.,  63. 

In  1899  an  6fBo«'  of  the  army  in  Union  Province  wrote :  "  In  ac- 
oordanoe  with  the  orders  of  the  seoretary  of  war  of  our  repablioan 
government  of  these  islands,  issued  in  oomplianoe  with  royal  decree, 
article  5.  published  on  March  8."  On  September  1,  1898,  the  local 
preeidente  of  the  town  of  Mangatarem,  writing  to  the  head  of  the 
province,  said  that  he  had  not  furnished  the  estimates  required  because 
the  elections  provided  for  in  "  article  7  of  the  royal  decree  of  the 
superior  government,  dated  June  18  last,"  bad  not  been  approved. 
A  yoang  son  of  a  member  of  Aguinaldo's  cabinet,  writing  to  his  father 
in  September,  1899,  spoke  of  the  "  royal  decree  of  June  IS,  1898." 
—  P.  I.  R.,  1188. 3.  In  Bomblon,  in  August,  1898,  elections  were  held  in 
oomplianoewiththepresoriptionof  the"royaldecreeof  June  18, 1898," 
and  Aguinaldo  approved  them,  apparently  without  oonsidering  that 
this  was  an  anomalous  way  of  describing  a  decree  of  the  dictator  of 
the  so-called  republic.  On  March  7, 1899,  a  general  in  the  revolutionary 
service  stated  that  an  ofQoer  had  been  released  from  arrest  by  a  "  royal 
ordw."  The  attitude  of  mind  which  made  men  speak  of  Agninaldo's 
"royal  ordeia  "  in  1898  did  not  change  when  he  fled  brfore  the  ad- 
vance of  the  United  States  army.  His  orders  remained  rojral  orders. 
They  were  again  and  again  referred  to  in  this  way. 

'  P.  I.  B..  Books  O-l. 



as  they  were  the  scene  of  operations  i^funst  the  Spaztiards. 
There  could  not  well  have  been  nine  thousand  prisoners  in 
his  hands  at  this  time,  as  that  was  claimed  later  when  a 
large  additional  number  of  Spaniards  had  surrendered.  As 
for  the  thirty  thousand  men  oi^amzed  as  a  regular  army, 
there  may  be  a  certain  difference  of  opinion  as  to  what  con- 
stitutes a  regular  army ;  the  men  whosawAguinaldo's  force 
then,  and  who  have  read  the  papers  of  its  leaders,  must  be  of 
the  opinion  that  that  force  was  not  a  regular  army.  Prob- 
^ly  only  Manila  Proyince  bad  a  provincial  government 
on  August  6.  Its  local  presidentes  met  at  Cavite  Viejo  on 
August  3  and  elected  three  members  of  congress  from 
the  province,  and  also  the  members  of  the  provincial 
government.  The  election  took  place  under  the  super- 
vision of  Colonel  Teodoro  Gonzales,  whom  Aguinaldo 
had  appointed  governor  of  Manila  Province  on  August  1. 
He  remained  governor  after  the  election  was  held.  Not 
until  August  17  did  the  local  presidentes  of  Bulacan 
assemble  under  the  presidency  of  the  secretary  of  the 
interior  and  proceed  to  elect  two  members  to  coi^ress 
and  the  members  of  the  provincial  government.  Not 
until  August  20  was  there  an  election  for  the  members 
of  the  provincial  government  of  Cavite  Province.  This 
was  held  ia  the  town  of  Cavite.  Isaac  Fernando  Rios, 
who  was  afterwards  a  member  of  the  Filipino  jimta  in 
Madrid,  was  chosen  a  representative  of  the  proviace; 
but  as  he  wrote  that  he  was  in  favour  of  coming  to 
some  agreement  with  Spain  which  would  permit  the 
development  of  the  Philippines,  without  abandoning  the 
sovereignty  of  that  country,  Aguinaldo  promptly  dis- 
approved his  election  ^  and  ordered  a  new  one  held  for  the 
office  thus  left  vacant.  On  October  2,  1899,  Aguinaldo 
approved  the  result  of  a  new  election  held  there  because 
fotu:  of  the  five  high  officials  of  the  province  had  absented 
themselves,  while  one  of  them  had  died.  Of  the  men 
who  had  so  absented  themselves  one  had  gone  abroad, 
>  P.  I.  B.,  1216. 1. 



while  the  other  three  had  remained  in  Manila  or  Cavite 
under  the  government  of  the  Ujiited  States.^ 

The  people  of  the  provinces  obeyed  the  men  who  had 
arms  in  their  hands.  It  is  not  probable  that  many  of 
them  had  any  conviction  concerning  the  form  of  govern- 
ment which  would  be  beet  for  the  Philippines.  There 
were  no  signs  of  a  spontaneous  desire  for  a  republic. 
Orders  came  from  the  group  about  Aguinaldo,  and  the 
people  accepted  a  dictator  and  a  republic  as  they  accepted 
a  president  and  a  republic,  without  knowing,  and  prob- 
ably without  caring  very  much,  what  it  all  meant,  except 
that  they  hoped  that  taxes  would  cease  with  the  departure 
of  the  friars.  A  determined  and  wellHsrgamzed  minority 
had  succeeded  in  imposing  its  will  upon  an  unorganized, 
heterogeneous,  and  leaderless  majority. 

As  Boon  as  a  province  was  occupied  by  the  Insurgents 
it  was  divided  into  territorial  zooes  within  which  com- 
mand was  exerted  by  military  officers.  On  July  20, 1898, 
Cavite  had  been  divided  into  four  zones,  and  next  day 
Brigadier-General  Artemio  Ricartewas  placed  in  command 
of  the  province,  and  the  first  zone. 

By  July  7  Bulacan  Province  had  been  divided  into  six 
zones,  and  Nueva  Ecija  into  fo\ir  zones,  with  a  separate 
oommander  for  each  zone.  These  men  established  the 
government  prescribed  by  Aguinaldo's  decrees  of  the 
middle  of  June.  Probably  by  the  end  of  July  Aguinaldo's 
municipal  govenunents  had  been  established  in  the  greater 
part  of  the  towns  of  Luz6n.  These  governments  were 
not  established  by  the  mass  of  the  people.  The  mass  of 
the  people  were  not  consulted,  but  they  were  not  in  the 
habit  of  being  consulted  in  such  matters  and  probably 
saw  no  necesdty  for  it  in  this  case.  As  an  evidence  of 
this  we  have  the  fact  that  from  the  beginning  the  acts  of 
election  were  almost  always  drawn  up  in  Spanish,  al- 
though by  far  the  greater  portion  of  the  people  of  the 
archipelago  spoke  only  the  native  dialects. 
»  P.  I.  B.,  1216. 1. 



The  method  of  establisbii^  these  municipal  govern- 
ments employed  in  Cavite  in  June,  1898,  was  continued 
to  the  end  of  Aguinaldo's  rule.  It  was  the  same  in  dif- 
ferent places  and  at  different  times.  Data  obtained 
from  reports  and  documents  written  in  towns  far  removed 
from  each  other  follow.  They  must  be  considered  to- 
gether in  order  to  obtain  an  idea  of  what  this  method 
really  was. 

When  the  Insui^ent  movement  had  progressed  suffi- 
ciently far,  the  leaders  collected  their  adherents  and  ob- 
tuned  recognition  as  the  heads  of  their  provinces  or  dis- 
tricts. For  example,  representatives  of  the  towns  of 
Fampanga  assembled  at  San  Fernando  on  Jime  26,  1898, 
and  under  the  presidency  of  General  Maximo  Hizon 
agreed  to  yield  him  "complete  obedience  as  military 
governor  of  the  province  and  representative  of  the  illus- 
trious dictator  of  these  PhiUppine  Islands."  ^  The  town 
of  Macabebe  refused  to  send  any  delegates  to  this  gather- 
ing. Commissionere,  in  almost  every  case  officers  of 
Aguinaldo's  army,  were  empowered  by  him  to  establish 
the  so-called  republican  government.  Ttey  appointed 
delegates  who  proceeded  to  the  smaller  towns  and  held 
elections;  but  whenever  possible  the  commissioner  of 
Aguinaldo  presided.  In  many  cases  these  delegates 
were  heutenants  of  the  army.  The  commissioners  selected 
the  electors,  for  they  had  all  to  be  "marked  out  by  their 
good  conduct,  their  wealth,  and  their  social  position," 
and  they  had  all  to  be  in  favour  of  independence.  They 
then  presided  at  the  elections,  which  were  viva  voce. 
They  apparently  selected  the  people  to  be  elected,  and 
forwarded  a  record  of  the  proceedings  to  the  central 
government.  The  election  had  to  be  approved  by  the 
dictator  or  president  before  the  successful  candidates 
could  assume  the  duties  of  their  offices.  Later  on,  the 
mihtary  commanders  remote  from  the  seat  of  government 
were  authorized  to  approve  elections  and  install  the 
>  P.  1.  B.,  223. 



successful  candidates,  but  the  records  of  election  had 
even  then  to  be  forwarded  to  the  capital  for  approval, 
the  action  of  the  commissioner  not  being  final. 

The  commissioners  do  not  seem  to  have  been  able  to 
find  many  men  who  had  the  necessary  requisites  for 
electors.  In  the  town  of  Lipa,  Batangas  Province,  with  a 
population  of  forty  thousand  seven  hundred  forty-three, 
at  the  election  held  July  3, 1898,  a  presidente  was  chosen 
for  whom  twenty-five  votes  were  cast.  On  November 
23,  1808,  an  election  was  held  at  Vigan,  Docos  Sur,  for 
a  presidente  to  Hucceed  one  who  had  been  elected  repre- 
sentative in  congress.  One  himdred  and  sixteen  votes 
were  cast.  The  population  of  Vigan  is  nineteen  thousand. 
On  October  5,  1898,  at  Echa^e,  Isabela  Province,  a 
presidente  was  elected  for  whom  fifty-foiur  votes  were 
cast.  The  population  of  Echague  is  fiifty-four  thousand. 
On  October  2,  1898,  at  Cabagan  Nuevo,  Isabela,  one 
hundred  and  eleven  men  voted  out  of  a  population  of 
mxty-two  hundred  and  forty.  On  January  29,  1899, 
the  town  of  Hemani,  in  Sajnar,  elected  its  municipal 
oflBcials  under  the  supervision  of  V.  Lukban.  Fifty- 
four  men  voted.  The  town  has  a  population  of  twenty- 
five  hundred  and  fifty-five. 

The  elections,  so-called,  were  not  always  held  without 
protest.  For  example,  the  town  of  San  Job6,  Batan^s, 
protested  unavailingly  to  Aguinaldo  against  the  result 
of  an  election  held  at  10  P.M.,  in  a  storm  of  rain.  Men 
who  had  been  on  friendly  terms  with  the  Spaniards 
were  usually  excluded  from  all  participation.  If  in  spite 
of  the  precautions  taken  men  were  elected  who  were 
disliked  by  the  commissioner  or  his  supporters,  the 
election  could  be  set  aside  on  the  groimd  that  the  person 
dected  was  not  an  adherent  of  the  revolution. 

The  elections  were  often  held  in  a  sii^ular  manner, 
as  in  the  followii^  case:  ^ — 

"  On  August  20,  1898,  four  men  of  Tondo  appeared  before 
■  P.  I.  B.  1X33. 1. 



Aguinaldo  on  Bacoor  and  announced  that  they  were  represen- 
tatives of  the  people  of  the  district,  who  loved  liberty.  Then 
in  accordance  with  the  directions  of  the  president  of  the  republic 
under  the  supervision  of  the  secretary  of  the  interior,  they  drew 
lots  from  a  hat  to  decide  how  the  offices  of  the  head  of  the  dis- 
trict, delegate  of  police,  delegate  of  the  treasury  and  delegate 
of  justice  were  to  be  distributed.  The  decision  having  heea 
made  in  this  simple  fashion,  Aguinaldo  gravely  approved  the 
election  as  expressing  the  wUl  of  the  people.  Perhaps  it  did, 
for  they  seem  to  have  continued,  at  least  for  a  time,  to  obey 
them.  On  November  14,  1898,  Aguinaldo  again  approved  an 
election  for  local  officials  in  Toudo  which  mce  August  13  had 
been  within  tlie  Ammcan  lines." 

On  At^uat  23  San  Carios,  in  Pangasin&n  ProTince,  a 
town  of  twenty'three  thousand  people,  elected  its  officials 
under  the  new  form  of  government.  The  presidente  chosen 
was  a  well-known  member  of  the  Katipdnan,  and  before 
the  election  was  held  announced  his  intention  of  Willing 
any  one  who  was  chosen  for  the  position  for  which  he  was 
a  candidate.'  He  was  accordingly  elected.  In  spite 
of  this  grave  infonnality,  an  informality  which  formed 
one  ground  for  a  protest  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  people 
of  the  town,  Aguinaldo  approved  the  election. 

On  October  21,  1898,  an  election  was  held  under  the 
eupervision  of  the  military  commander  in  Camarines  for 
the  municipal  officials  of  the  town  of  Yi^.*  The  voting 
was  oral,  and  a  secretary  wrote  down  the  votes  for  the 
two  candidates  under  direction  of  the  commissioner, 
who  finally  annotmced  that  the  candidate  whose  friend 
he  was  had  been  elected,  but  without  stating  how  many 
votes  he  had  received.  This  newly  elected  head  of  the 
town  had  the  town  crier  on  the  following  night  publish 
through  the  streets  an  address  to  the  people,  in  which  he 
thanked  those  who  had  voted  for  him  andwiumed  those  who 
had  not  that  it  would  be  well  for  them  to  beware.  The 
Spanish  law  known  as  the  Maura  Law,  which  regulated  the 
elections  in  the  municipaUties  tmder  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment, provided  for  a  limited  electoral  body,  composed 
_» P.  I.  B.,  1137. 4.  » Ibid.,  R.,  1166. 2. 



largely  of  ex-officials  of  the  mimicipalitiee.  The  chooBmg 
of  an  electoral  body  by  the  military  commander  of  a  dis- 
trict probably  did  not  seem  strange  to  the  people.  The 
provincial  and  mimicipal  officials  were  established  in  office 
by  armed  men,  and  they  were  obeyed  because  they  had 
been  installed  by  armed  men ;  but  it  was  a  form  of  elec- 
tion to  which  people,  as  a  rule,  saw  no  reason  to  object. 
There  were,  however,  in  many  cases  bitter  complaints  of 
the  abuses  committed  by  the  officers  thus  "elected." 

This  form  of  government  spread  with  the  advance 
of  A^uinaldo's  arms.  Municipal  elections  were  held 
in  Tarlac  in  July,  in  Itocoe  Norte  and  Tayabas  in  August, 
in  Benguet  and  the  Batanes  Islands  in  September,  1898, 
in  Panay  in  December,  1898,  and  in  Leyte  and  Samar  in 
January,  1899. 

On  December  27  Antonio  Lima  wrote  that  all  the 
provinces  of  Lus6n,  Mindoro,  Marinduque,  Masbate, 
and  Ticao,  Rombl6n,  part  of  Panay,  the  Bataoes,  and 
Babuyanes  Islands  were  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
insui^nt  government.* 

By  October  7,  1898,  14  of  the  36  provinces  and  dis- 
tricts into  which  Luz6n  had  been  divided  by  the  Spanish 
government  had  civil  govemora.*  These  14  were  Tag£- 
log  provinces  or  provinces  which  the  Tag&Iogs  con- 
trolled. The  other  provinces  were  still  under  military 
rule,  and,  indeed,  even  the  provinces  under  civilians  were 
dominated  by  their  mihtaiy  commanders.  With  the 
manner  of  holding  elections  which  prevailed,  the  governors 
must  have  been  m^i  who  were  in  favour  of  the  military 
party  in  force,  for  otherwise  they  would  not  have  been 

It  is  not  probable  that  the  number  of  provinces  under 
civil  governors  much  increased.  If  in  Pangasinin  Prov- 
ince, where  there  are  many  Tag&logs,  organisations 
opposed  to  the  rule  of  A^uinaldo  could  cause  serious 
disorders,  as  was  the  case,  it  must  have  been  considraed 

>  P.  I.  B.,  31fl.  1.  ■  Ibid.,  3.  33.  » Ibid.,  1022. 3. 





expedient  for  the  success  of  the  attempt  of  the  Tsg&logs, 
who  form  only  a  fifth  of  the  population,  to  dominate 
the  archipelago,  that  all  provinces  in  which  an  effective 
majority  of  the  people  were  not  of  that  tribe,  should  be 
kept  under  military  rule.  The  municipal  governments 
which  had  been  established  in  Luz6n  were  in  the  hands  of 
Aguinaldo'fl  adherents,  or  of  men  who  it  was  hoped  would 
prove  loyal  to  him.  They  were  men  of  the  Spanish- 
speaking  group,  which  has  always  dominated  the  people 
of  the  islands.  They  were  probably  not  as  a  rule  men 
of  means.  Many  of  them,  perhaps  most  of  them,  had 
been  clerks  and  employees  under  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment, and  they  saw  no  reason  for  changing  the  methods 
of  town  administration  which  had  then  been  followed. 
The  municipal  taxes,  the  estimates  for  expenditures,  and 
the  regulations  for  town  government,  were  but  little  modi- 
fied from  those  they  found  in  force.  In  many  ways  such 
changes  as  were  made  were  for  the  worse. 

Once  installed  in  power,  Aguinaldo's  officials  were 
required  to  exercise  over  the  mass  of  the  people  about  the 
same  control  that  had  always  been  exercised  over  them. 
The  governing  group  considered  that  they  were  perfectly 
capable  of  providing  for  the  welfare  of  the  islands,  and 
that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  people  to  obey  them  without 

When  the  insurgent  force  was  increased  in  preparation 
for  war  with  the  Americans  a  large  number  of  municipal 
officials  resigned,  or  attempted  to  do  so.  It  was  not 
easy  for  a  municipal  officii  imder  Aguinaldo's  govern- 
ment to  resign.  A  resignation,  to  be  accepted,  had  to 
be  accompanied  by  the  certificate  of  a  physician  that  the 
person  concerned  was  unfit  to  perform  the  duties  of 
his  office.  Judging  by  the  record,'  an  epidemic  seems  to 
have  attacked  the  municipal  officials  in  January,  1899. 
It  is  probable  that  they  saw  that  war  was  inevitable  and 
that  they  did  not  wish  to  remain  in  charge  of  the  towns 

"  P.  I.  R.,  1200. 

VOL.  1  —  8 



aad  be  responsible  for  providing  for  the  necessities  of 
"the  liberating  army."  In  PangasindiD  in  that  month 
men  could  not  leave  their  barrier  without  obtaining  the 
permission  of  the  headman,  and  in  one  town  men  who  had 
attempted  to  sell  their  property  for  the  purpose  of  going 
to  Manila  were,  on  January  17,  ordered  to  be  arrested 
and  their  conduct  investigated.* 

Aguinaldo,  having  established  himself  at  Malolos,  or- 
dered the  congress  provided  for  in  his  decree  of  June  23, 
1898,  to  assemble  at  the  capital  on  September  15, 1898,  and 
appointed  a  number  of  provisional  representatives  for 
provinces  and  islands  not  under  his  control.*  It  has  often 
been  claimed  that  Aguinaldo's  government  controlled 
at  this  time  the  whole  archipelago,  except  the  bay  and 
city  of  Manila  and  the  town  of  Cavite.' 

Blount  quotes  the  following  statement  from  the  report 
of  the  First  Philippine  Commission :_ — 

"While  the  Spanish  troops  now  rem^ed  quietly  in  Manila, 
the  Filipino  forces  made  themselves  mast^  of  the  entire 
island  except  that  city."  * 

I  agned  that  statement,  and  signed  it  in  good  faith ; 
nevertheless,  it  is  untrue.    The  Filipino  forces  never  con- 

1  P.  I.  R.,  907.  6.  »  P.  I.  R.,  39.  7. 

■  The  following  memonuidum  to  aoaompaoy  a  letter  from  BfAar 
Don  Bixto  Lopez,  Secretary  of  Setlor  Don  Felipe  Agoncillo,  to  the 
Honorable  the  Secretary  of  Stftte,  written  January  6,  1S09,  clearly 
sets  forth  this  claim  : — 

"  Pursuant  to  the  action  of  said  congress  a  detailed  system  of  govern- 
ment has  been  provided  tor  and  is  actually  maintained  in  all  the  por- 
tions of  the  Phihppino  Islands,  except  so  much  of  the  provinces  of 
Manila  and  Cavite  as  is  now  in  the  actual  possession  of  the  American 
Army,  such  excepted  part  contairung  only  about  3  per  cent,  of  the  popn- 
lation  of  the  entire  iflands  and  an  infinitely  amsJlet  proportion  of  their 

"  From  the  fore^ing  it  will  appear  that  the  Philippine  government 
is  now,  as  it  has  been  practically  ever  dnoe  the  I6th  of  June,  1898, 
in  substantiaUy  full  possession  of  the  territory  of  the  people  it  repre- 
senU."— Taylor  Ex.  530  &7  KU.,  Congressional  Record,  June  3, 1902, 
Vol.  ?5,  part  6,  p.  6217. 

•  Blount,  p.  70. 



trolled  the  territory  now  known  aa  Ifugao,  Bontoc,  Ka- 
linga  or  Apayao,  much  less  that  occupied  by  the  N^ritos 
on  the  east  coast  of  Luz6n,  but  this  is  not  all.  There 
exists  among  the  Insurgent  records  a  very  important 
document,  prepared  by  Mabini,  showing  that  when  the 
call  for  the  first  session  of  the  Filipino  congress  was 
issued,  there  were  no  less  than  sixty-one  provinces  and 
commandanciaa,  which  the  Insui^ents,  when  talking 
among  themselves,  did  not  even  claim  to  control,  and 
twenty-one  of  these  were  in  or  immediately  adjacent  to 

■"September,  1896. 

"  AlthouKli  article  11,  Chapter  2,  of  the  Orgajiio  Decree  of  June  23 
(1898)  last,  prescribes  tliftt  the  appointment  of  proviBional  represen- 
tatives of  Congress  be  given  to  persons  who  have  been  bom  or  have 
resided  in  the  provinces  which  they  are  to  represent ;  taking  into  con- 
sideration the  urgent  necessity  that  said  body  enter  upon  its  functions 
immediately,  I  hereby  decree  the  following ;  — 

"  1.  The  following  are  appointed  provisional  Representatives  .  .  . 

"2.  A  meeting  of  Congress  is  called  for  the  15th  instant,  to  be  held 
in  the  town  of  Malolos,  provinoe  of  Bulac&n. 

"3.  The  Secretary  of  the  Interior  shall  take  steps  to  notify  the 
persons  appointed  and  those  elected  by  the  popular  oommanderB  in  the 
provinces  already  occupied  by  the  Revolution,  of  the  call  as  soon  as 

"Giv.  ..." 

(Attached  hereto  is  the  following,  with  the  names  written  in  Mabini's 
handwriting :) 

"September,  1808. 

"Provinoee  not  subject  to  the  Revolutionary  Government  of  the 

Naubs  Clabsks 

Albay  Highest  olaas  2.  Salvador     V.     del 

Rosario  and  Felipe 

Hooob  Norte  do  2.  Josd,  Antonio  Luna 

UocoB  Sur  do  2.  Ignacio     Vill&mor, 

Job6  Aleji 
Isabela  de  Luz6n  Third  oIbbb  1.  Aristdn  Bautista 

Sorsogtfn  do  1.  Jos^  Albert 

Cagay^  do  1.  Pablo  Tecaon 



The  men  who  composed  this  congress  were  among 
the  ablest  natives  of  the  archipelago ;  but  representative 


Nuev»  ViBoayft 

Maabsrto  and  Tioao 

Island  of  Cebfi 

Pol.-Mil.  Govt. 

1.  laidro  Paredes 

1.  Enrique  Mendiola 

Pol.-Mil.  ComandMioia  1.  Alberto   Baireto 

1.  Fernando  Canon 

1.  Le6n  Apaoible 
1.  Mariano  Ooampo 

Island  of  Lejte 
NegTOB  Occidental 

Island  of  Samu 
Antique,    Island    of 


NegTOB  Orients 
Island  of  Bobol 









Lowest  class 

1.  Ledn  Ouerrero 
1.  JosA  Maifa  de  U 

Pablo  Ooampo 
1.  HiptJlito  Magsalin 

1.  Mit^uel  ZaragoEa 
do  1.  Aguedo  Velarde 

do  I.  Juan  Manday  Oa- 

Pol.-Mil.  Comandanoia   1.  Vicente     Oonztflez 
do  1.  Mariana     V.      del 

lstDi8t.Pol.-Mil.Govt.  1.  Pedro  A.  Patemo 
2d  Diat.  do  1.  Maximino  P&terao 

3d  Dist.  do  1.  Benito  Valdfis 

4thDiBt.  do  1.  Tel«8foroChuidian 

5th  Dist.  do  1.  Enrique  Mercaida 

6th  Dist.  do  1.  Juan  Tuason 




inBtitutions  mean  uothing  unless  they  represent  the 
people ;  if  they  do  not,  they  are  a  conscious  lie  devised 
either  to  deceive  the  people  of  the  country  or  foreign 
nations,  and  it  is  not  possible  for  any  system  foimded 
upon  a  lie  to  endure.  A  real  repubUc  must  be  founded  not 
upon  a  few  brilliant  men  to  compose  the  governing  group 
but  upon  a  people  trained  in  self-restraint  and  accus- 
tomed to  govern  by  compromise  and  concession,  not 



BarSe  ia  under  Fol.- 
Mil.  Gk>vt.  ofBahia 

Levao  ia  undet  Pol.- 
Mil.  Comandanoift 
of  Cotlabfttto 


Malabang.  This 
Comuidaaoia  is 
under  the  Military 
Comamdanoi*  of 

Reina  Regento.  This 
Coauuidanoi»  is 
under  the  Pol.- 
Mil.  Govt,  of  Cot- 

Bay  of  Sarang&ni  and 
adjacent  islands 


lalaod  of  Jol6 




Island  of  Parafua 

Marianas  Islands 
Orients  Carolines 
Camarines,     North 
and  South 

1  Diat.  do  1.  Gonxalo  Tuaaon 

l.-Mil.  Comandanoia  1.  Qonzalo  Tuaaon 

Pol.-Mfl.  Comandanoia 

Pol.-Mil.  Comandanoia 
Pol.-Mil.  Govt. 

Pol.-Mil.  Com. 

Pol.-Mil.  QoTt. 

1.  Benito  Legarda 

1.  Felipe  Calderdn. 
1.  Manuel  JArez 
1.  Manuel  Oenato 

Don  TomCa 
Roaario  and 
Cecilio  Hilario 

I,  EztnMt  from  original  in  Spanish,  A.  L.  S., 



by  force.  To  endure  it  must  be  based  upon  a  solid  founda- 
tion of  self-control,  of  self-respect  and  of  respect  for  tiie 
rights  of  others  upon  the  part  of  the  great  majority  of 
the  common  people.  If  it  is  not,  the  government  which 
follows  a  period  of  timmlt,  confusion  and  civil  war  will 
be  a  government  of  the  sword.  The  record  the  Philippine 
republic  has  left  behind  it  contains  nothing  to  confirm 
the  belief  that  it  would  have  endured,  even  in  name,  if 
the  destinies  of  the  islands  had  been  left  in  the  hands  of 
the  men  who  set  it  up. 

The  national  assembly  met  on  the  appointed  day  in 
the  parish  church  of  Barasoain,  Malolos,  which  had 
been  set  aside  for  the  meetings  of  congress.  This  body 
probably  had  then  more  elected  members  than  at  its 
subsequent  meetings,  but  even  so  it  contained  a  large 
number  of  men  who  were  appointed  by  Aguinaldo  after 
consultation  with  his  council  to  represent  provinces  which 
they  had  never  even  seen. 

From  a  "list  of  representatives  of  the  provinces  and 
districts,  selected  by  election  and  appointment  by  the 
government  up  to  July  7,  1899,  with  incomplete  Ust  of 
October  6,  1899"  ^  I  find  that  there  were  193  members, 
of  whom  forty-two  were  elected  and  one  hundred  fifty-one 
were  appointed.  This  .congress  was  therefore  not  an  elec- 
tive body.  Was  it  in  any  sense  representative  ?  llie  fol- 
lowing table,  showing  the  distribution  of  delegates  between 
the  several  peoples,  will  enable  us  to  answer  this  quration. 

In  considering  this  table  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
relationship  given  between  the  number  of  delegates  as- 
signed to  a  given  people  and  the  number  of  individuals  com- 
posing it  is  only  approximate,  as  no  one  of  these  peoples  is 
strictly  limited  to  the  provinces  where  it  predominates. 

I  have  classified  the  provinces  as  Tagfilog,  Visayan, 
etc.,  according  to  census  retiuTis  showing  the  people  who 
form  a  majority  of  their  inhabitants  in  each  case.  * 

'  P.  I.  R..  38.  3. 

■  The  1803  oensuB  returns  are  here  used  for  each  of  the  several  peoples. 



Visayans  .  . 
Tog&logs  .  . 
Ilocaaos  .  . 
Bicols  .  . 
Pangasinins  > 
Zambalatu  . 








It  will  be  noted  that  the  Tag&log  provinces  had 
eighteen  out  of  a  total  of  forty-two  elected  delegates. 
The  Vieayans,  by  far  the  most  numerous  people  in  the 
islands,  id  not  have  one.  The  non-Christian  prov- 
inces had  a  very  disproportionately  large  total  of  del- 
egates, of  whom  four  are  put  down  as  elected,  but  on 
examination  we  find  that  one  of  these  is  from  Lepanto, 
the  capital  of  which  was  an  Ilocano  town ;  one  is  from 
Nueva  Vizcaya,  where  there  is  a  considerable  Cagayan- 
Ilocano  population ;  one  is  from  Benguet,  the  capital  of 
which  was  an  Ilocano  town,  and  one  from  Tiagan, 
which  was  an  Ilocano  settlement.  These  del^;ates 
should  therefore  really  be  credited  to  the  Ilocanos. 

,  If  the  individual  relationships  of  the  several  members 
are  considered,  the  result  is  even  more  striking.  Of  the 
thirty-eight  delegates  assigned  to  the  non-Christian  prov- 
inces, one  only,  good  old  Lino  Abaya  of  Tiagan,  was  a 
non-Christian.  Many  of  the  non-Christian  comandancias 
were  given  a  number  of  del^ates  wholly  disproportionate 
to  their  population,  and  in  this  way  the  congress  was 
stuffed  full  of  Tag&logs. 

Think  of  Filipe  Buencamino,  of  Aguinaldo's  cabinet, 
representing  the  Moros  of  Zamboanga;  of  the  mild, 
scholarly  botanist  Leon  Guerrero  representing  the  MoroSf 



Bagobos,  Macdayas  and  Manobos  of  Davao ;  of  Jos^  M. 
Lerma,  the  unscrupulous  politician  of  the  province  of 
Bataan,  just  across  the  bay  from  Manila,  representing  the 
wild  Moros  of  Cotabato ;  of  Juan  Tuason,  a  timid  Chinese 
mestizo  Manila  business  man,  representing  the  Yacan 
and  Samal  Moros  of  Basilan ;  of  my  good  friend  Benito 
Legfmla,  since  a  member  of  the  Philippine  Commission, 
and  a  resident  delegate  from  the  Philippines  to  the  congress 
of  the  United  States,  representing  the  bloody  Moros  of 
Jolo  [  Yet  they  appear  as  representatives  of  these  several 

Few,  indeed,  of  the  delegates  from  non-Christian  territory 
had  ever  set  foot  in  the  provinces  or  comandandas  from 
which  they  were  appointed,  or  would  have  been  able  to 
so  much  as  name  the  wild  tribe  or  tribes  inhabiting  them. 

I  have  been  furnished  a  list,  made  up  with  all  pos- 
sible care  by  competent  persons,  from  which  it  appears 
that  there  were  eighty-five  delegates  actually  present 
at  the  opening  of  congress,  of  whom  fifty-nine  were 
Tag&logs,  five  Bicols,  three  Pampangans,  two  Visayans,  and 
one  ft  Zambalan.  For  the  others  there  are  no  data  available. 
Yet  it  has  been  claimed  that  this  was  a  representative 
body  I  It  was  a  Tag&log  body,  without  enough  represen- 
tatives of  any  other  one  of  the  numerous  Philippine  peoples 
to  be  worth  mentioning. 

With  a  congress  thus  oi^anized,  Aguinaldo  should  have 
had  no  difficidty  in  obtaining  any  legislation  he  desired. 

The  committee  of  congress  appointed  to  draw  up  a 
constitution  set  to  work  promptly,  and  by  October  16, 1898, 
had  proceeded  so  far  with  their  work  that  Buencamino  was 
able  to  write  to  Aguinaldo  that  while  he  had  been  of  the 
opinion  that  it  would  have  been  best  for  him  to  continue 
as  a  dictator  aided  by  a  committee  of  able  men,  yet  it 
would  now  be  a  blow  to  the  prestige  of  coi^ress  to  susp^id 
its  sessions.  Aguinaldo  noted  upon  this  letter  the  fact 
that  he  did  not  approve  of  a  constitution.* 
'  P.  I.  B.,  485.  1. 





Apparently  early  in  December  the  committee  submitted 
their  project.  In  presenting  it  to  congress  they  said' 

"The  work  whose  resultfl  the  commission  has  the  honour 
to  present  for  the  consideration  of  congress  has  been  large^ 
a  matter  of  selection ;  in  executii^  it  not  only  has  the  French 
constitution  been  used,  but  also  those  of  Belgium,  Mexico, 
Brazil,  Nicaragua,  Coeta  Rica,  and  Guatemala,  as  we  have 
considered  those  nations  as  most  resembling  the  Filipino  people." 

The  most  important  difference  between  this  project  and 
the  actual  constitution  adopted  was  that,  although  the 
project  provided  that  the  Dominican,  Recollect,  Fran- 
ciscan and  Augustinian  friars  should  be  expelled  from  the 
country  and  that  their  estates  should  become  the  property 
of  the  state,  yet  it  recognized  the  CathoUc  religion  as  that 
of  the  state  and  forbade  state  contribution  to  the  sup- 
port of  any  other,  although  it  permitted  the  practice  in 
private  of  any  religion  not  opposed  to  morality,  which 
did  not  threaten  the  safety  of  the  country.  The  govern- 
ment was  authorized  to  negotiate  a  concordat  with  the 
Pope  for  the  regulation  of  the  relations  between  church 
and  state.  A  strong  party  was  in  favour  of  this  recognition, 
but  it  finally  failed  of  adoption,  and  the  constitution  as 
promulgated  provided  for  the  freedom  and  equahty  of 
religion  and  for  free  and  compulsory  education  which 
had  not  been  provided  for  in  the  original  project.  The 
constitution  as  approved  forbade  the  granting  of  titles 
of  nobility,  decorations  or  honorary  titles  by  the  state 
to  any  f^pino.  This  paragraph  did  not  exist  in  the 
original  project,  which  merely  forbade  any  Filipino  to 
accept  them  without  the  consent  of  the  government. 

Mabini,  the  ablest  of  all  Aguinaldo's  advisers,  did  not 
approve  of  the  constitution.  He  himself  had  drawn  up 
a  project  for  a:  constitution  during  Jime,  1898,  but  it 
was  not  accepted  by  the  committee,  the  greater  part  of 
whom  were  Catholics  and  for  that  reason  opposed  to 

'  p.  I.  B.,  40.  1. 



Mabini,  who  was  a  bitter  antagonist  of  that  church. 
And  yet  when  separation  of  chiirch  and  state  was  finally 
provided  for  it  did  not  please  Mabini,  who,  although  he 
was  opposed  to  church  control,  wrote  to  Aguinaldo  ^  that 
the  constitution  as  passed  by  congress  was  not  acceptable 
and  should  not  be  promul^ted  because  the  constitutional 
guarantees  of  individual  liberty  could  not  be  maintained, 
as  the  army  had  to  be  in  control  for  the  time  being,  and 
furthermore  it  was  not  expedient  to  separate  church  and 
state,  as  this  separation  would  alienate  many  of  their 
adherents.  Indml,  there  was  not  much  in  the  constitu- 
tion which  he  thought  ought  to  take  immediate  effect,* 
and  he  wrote  that  congress  was  ill-disposed  toward  him 
because  he  had  refused  to  agree  to  its  promulgation. 
Existing  conditions  were  such  that  he  believed  that  all 
powers  should  be  vested  in  one  person.  He  warned  Agui- 
naldo that  if  the  constitution  were  put  in  force,  he  would 
be  at  the  mercy  of  his  secretaries.  On  January  1,  1899, 
Aguinaldo,  probably  at  the  su^estion  of  Mabini,  proposed 
certain  changes  in  it.' 

Evidently  the  provisions  of  the  coi^titution  did  not 
worry  Aguinaldo  much,  as  is  shown  by  hia  reply  to  the 
request  by  some  of  his  officers  for  information  ae  to  what 
reward  those  who  were  first  in  the  attack  on  Manila 
should  receive.  He  promised  them  such  titles  as  marquis, 
duke,  etc.* 

On  January  2, 1899,  Aguinaldo  announced  the  forma- 
tion of  a  new  cabinet  made  up  as  follows :  Apolinario 
Mabini  president  and  secretary  of  fordgn  affairs ;  Teodoro 
Sandico,  secretary  of  the  interior ;  Mariano  Trias,  secretary 
of  the  treasury ;  Baldomero  Aguinaldo,  secretary  of  war 
and  navy,  and  Gracio  Gonzaga,  secretary  oifomerUo.^  On 
January  4  Mabini  took  the  oath  of  office  as  the  presi- 

'  P.  I.  R.,  377.  13.  '  /MA,  472. 9. 

•  Ibid.,  40. 8.  ,  •  Ibid.,  849.    See  p.  143. 

'  A  geoeral  teim  covering  eduo&tioD,  public  votks,  agriculture  and 



dent  of  the  council  of  government.  This  body  met 
twice  a  week  at  Malolos  on  set  days,  and  at  the  close 
of  its  deliberations  forwarded  to  Aguinaldo  a  statement 
of  the  subjects  discussed  and  the  conclusions  reached  for 
his  decision.  The  prendent  of  the  republic  did  not  pre- 
side at,  or  take  part  in,  its  deliberations. 

On  January  4,  1899,  General  Otis  issued  a  proclamation 
in  which  he  announced  that  the  United  States  had  ob- 
tained possession  of  the  Philippines  and  that  its  govern- 
ment would  beextended  over  the  islands  of  the  archipelago. 
Aguinaldo  replied  next  day  with  one  which,  if  not  intended 
to  be  a  declaration  of  war,  was  at  least  a  warning  that 
hostilities  were  imminent.  This  proclamation  was  carried 
into  Manila  by  his  emissaries  and  posted  up  over  the  one 
issued  by  the  American  commander.  It  was  a  challenge 
to  a  trial  of  strength,  and  Aguinaldo  and  his  advisers 
hastened  their  preparations  for  the  coming  combat. 

The  secretary  of  the  interior  on  the  same  day  sent  an 
order  to  the  heads  of  all  provinces  directing  the  organiza- 
tion of  territorial  militia  to  resist  the  American  invasion, 
and  ordmng  the  heads  of  the  towns  to  hold  meetings  of  the 
people  to  protest  against  the  aggression  of  the  United 
States.  They  were  held  in  accordance  with  these  orders, 
and  records  of  the  proceedings  were  sent  to  Malolos  and 
published  in  the  official  organ  of  the  government  as 
evidence  of  the  feeling  of  the  people.  It  was,  however, 
not  considered  necessary  in  publidiing  them  to  mention 
the  fact  that  they  had  been  held  in  compliance  with  orders. 

On  January  14,  1899,  Mabini  wrote  to  Aguinaldo*  rec- 
ommending changes  in  the  proposed  constitution,  which 
he  still  liked  as  little  as  ever.  He  was  afraid  that  Negros 
and  Panay  would  refuse  to  accept  the  form  of  govern- 
ment it  prescribed.  The  worst  thing  about  it  was  that  the 
Americans  would  be  less  disposed  to  recognize  Aguinaldo's 
government;  for  when  they  saw  the  constitution  they 
would  know,  as  it  made  no  mention  of  them,  that  the 



Filipinos  wanted  independence..  Mabini  thought  that 
it  was  possible  that  the  wording  of  the  constitution  might 
have  been  deliberately  planned  by  members  of  the  congress 
in  favour  of  annexation  to  the  United  States,  so  that  that 
country  would  be  warned,  would  become  more  mistrustful, 
and  would  refuse  to  recognize  Aguinaldo's  government. 
Whatever  the  president  of  the  coimcU  may  have  thought 
about  the  theoretical  advisability  of  a  congress  to  rep- 
resent the  people,  he  foimd  one  much  in  the  way  when 
he  had  obtained  it. 

Buencamino  advised  that  the  constitution  should  be 
approved  and  promulgated ;  one  argument  was  that  the 
congress  had  been  consulted  in  the  matter  of  a  national 
loan,  and  if  it  was  dissolved,  there  could  be  no  loan. 
This  was  apparently  the  only  matter  upon  which  it  had 
been  consulted.^ 

The  constitution  of  the  Philippine  Republic  was  ratified 
at  a  session  of  the  congress  on  January  20, 1899. 

On  January  21,  1899,  Aguinaldo  sanctioned  it  and 
ordered  that  it  diould  be  "kept,  complied  with  and  exe- 
cuted in  all  its  parts  because  it  is  the  sovereign  will  of 
the  Philippine  people."  *  The  constitution  provided 
for  a  government  of  three  coordinate  powers,  executive, 
le^lative  and  judicial.  Whether  it  provided  for  a  form 
of  government  which  would  have  succeeded  in  the  Philip- 
pines was  not  determined  by  actual  experience.  It  was 
never  really  put  in  force  for  war  with  the  United  States 
began  in  two  weeks  and  the  constitution  must  stand  as 
the  expression  of  the  ideas  of  a  certain  group  of  educated 
natives  rather  than  as  the  working  formula  for  the  actual 
conduct  of  the  pohtical  life  of  a  nation.  One  proof  of 
this  is  the  fact  that  not  until  June  8, 1899,  were  Aguinaldo's 
decrees  upon  the  registration  of  marriages  and  upon  civil 
marriage,  dated  June  20, 1898,  revoked,  and  the  provisions 
of  the  constitution  concerning  marriage  put  in  effect.* 

1  P.  I.  B.,  485.  6. 

■  Senate  Document  138,  Fifty-8ixt]i  Congress,  First  Seesion. 

•  P.  I.  R.,  Books  B-6. 



Aguiualdo  had  approved  the  constitution ;  he  had  in- 
formed the  foreign  consuls  and  General  Otis  that  it  had 
been  promulgated  and  become  the  law  of  the  land.  It 
was  not  promulgated.  It  had  not  become  the  law  of 
the  land.  It  served  one  important  purpose.  It  passed 
into  the  hands  of  the  Americans  and  showed  them  the 
ability  and  the  aspirations  of  certain  individuals  of  the 
archipelago,  but  Mabini  and  his  followers  did  not  beheve 
in  its  form  or  in  its  provisions,  and  Mabini  at  least  was 
emphatic  in  his  declarations  that  the  time  had  not  yet  come 
for  it  to  be  put  into  effect.  On  January  24, 1899,  he  wrote 
to  Aguinaldo  that  if  it  should  be  promulgated  it  would  be 
absolutely  necessary  to  give  the  president  the  veto  power, 
and  replace  the  elected  representatives  by  others  appointed 
by  the  government.  If  this  were  not  done  the  president 
would  be  at  the  mercy  of  congress,  and  the  people,  seeing 
that  disf^eement  between  the  executive  government  and 
thecoi^;resswasthe  causeof  its  misfortunes,  would  start  an- 
other revolutionary  movement  to  destroy  both  of  them.^ 

As  long  as  Mabini  remained  in  power  the  constitution 
was  mere  paper.  Its  adoption  was  not  indicative  of  the 
capacity  of  the  people  to  maintain  self-government.  It 
expressed  only  tiie  academic  aspirations  of  the  men  who 
drafted  it.  There  is  not  the  shghtest  evidence  from  any 
previous  or  subsequent  experience  of  the  people  that  it 
would  have  worked  in  practice.  It  was  enacted  for  the 
misleading  of  Americans  rather  than  for  the  benefit  of 
the  Filipinos. 

While  the  government  of  Aguinaldo  was  called  a 
republic,  it  was  in  fact  a  Tag&log  military  oligarchy  in 
which  the  great  mass  of  the  people  had  no  share,  llieir 
duty  was  only  to  give  soldiers  for  the  army  and  labourers 
for  the  fields,  and  to  obey  without  question  the  orders 
they  received  from  the  mihtary  heads  of  their  provinces. 

There  is  no  cause  for  vam  r^rets.  We  did  not  destroy 
a  republic  in  the  PhiUppines.  There  never  was  anything 
'  there  to  destroy  which  even  remotely  resembled  a  republic. 
'  P.  I.  R.,  472.  8. 



The  Conduct  op  the  Wab 

It  is  not  my  intention  to  attempt  to  write  a  history  of 
the  war  which  began  on  February  4,  1899,  nor  to  discuss 
any  one  of  its  eeveral  campaigns.  I  propose  to  limit 
myself  to  a  statement  of  the  conditions  und^  which  it 
was  conducted,  and  a  description  of  the  two  periods  into 
which  it  may  be  divided. 

From  the  outset  the  Insurgent  soldiers  were  treated 
with  marked  severity  by  their  leaders.  On  June  17, 1898, 
Aguinaldo  issued  an  order  to  the  military  chiefs  of  certain 
towns  in  Cavite  providing  that  a  soldier  wasting  ammuni- 
tion should  be  punished  with  twelve  lashes  for  a  first 
offence,  twenty-four  for  a  second,  and  court-martialled 
and  "severely  punished"  for  a  third.' 

'  "To  the  Military  Chiefs  of  tho  tomu  meationed  in  tlie  margin 
[there  is  nothing  in  the  musin.  —  Tr,]  :  — 

"  As  there  are  still  many  soldiers  paying  no  notioe  to  the  order  for- 
bidding the  waste  of  oartridgee,  you  are  required  to  give  a  certain 
amount  of  ammunition  to  each  soldier  and  to  see  every  day  it  there  is 
any  cartridge  roiadng,  and  if  so,  inquire  into  the  reason.  In  order  that 
this  may  be  successfully  carried  out,  I  have  deemed  it  proper  to  pre- 
scribe the  punishment  for  such  offence,  of  which  you  will  inform  the  sol- 
diers under  your  coQunaad,  and  post  this  circular  in  a  prominent  ptooe. 
Said  punishments  ore  as  follows :  — 

"  Art.  1.  A  soldier  found  wasting  ammunition  shall  be  punished 
with  12  lashes ;  in  case  he  commits  the  same  offence  agidn  he  shall  be 
punished  with  24  lashes ;  and  ou  a  further  offeuoe  of  lilce  character  by 
the  same  soldier,  he  shall  be  court-martialled  and  severely  punished. 

"  Abt.  2.  A  Botdior  who  t^os  been  found  short  of  even  one  cartridge 
out  of  the  ammunition  assigned  to  him,  shall  be  punished  with  12  lashes, 
provided  that  he  has  not  previously  been  in  any  engagement. 

"  AsT.  3.  A  soldier  who  has  been  found  with  no  cartridges  by  reason 
of  throwing  them  away  during  an  engagement,  shall  be  court-martialled, 
and  severely  punished. 

"  I  moat  earnestly  recommend  you  to  carefuUy  look  after  your  soldiers 
and  see  that  every  one  is  complying  with  the  for^^oing  order. 

"This  order  should  be  transmitted  from  one  town  to  another  men- 
tioned in  the  mancm,  and  the  last  one  should  return  it  to  this  ofBoe 



On  November  16,  1900,  General  Lacuna  ordered  that 
any  officer  allowing  his  soldiers  to  load  their  rifles  when 
not  before  the  enemy  should  be  liable  to  capital  punish- 
ment,' which  in  practice  was  frequently  inflicted  on  soldiers 
for  very  minor  offences. 

Men  of  means  were  drafted  into  the  ranks  and  thai 
excused  from  service  on  the  payment  of  cash. 

The  soldiery,  quartered  on  the  towns,  committed  end- 
less abuses.  Conditions  were  bad  enough  before  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities,  as  I  have  shown  in  the  chapters 
dealing  with  Insurgent  rule.  They  grew  rapidly  worse 
th^^after,  and  himian  life  became  ^eap  indeed. 

"  The  documents  of  this  period  show  that  the  insui^ent 
troofffi  driven  from  the  front  of  Manila  fell  upon  the  people 
of  the  neighbouring  towns  and  burnt,  robbed,  and  murdered. 
Either  their  officers  lost  all  control  over  them,  or  else  they 
directed  these  outrages.  It  was  not  for  some  days  that  con- 
trol was  r^ained."  * 

with  the  infommtion  that  the  same  has  bean  reoeived  and  oomplied 
with  by  ^ 

"  May  God  fuard  you  many  years. 

"£.  Aquinaldo,  Dictator. 

"Cavitb,  Jnne  17th,  1808."  —P.  I.  R.,  1124.  2. 

'  "November  16, 1900. 

(Stamp)         "I/ACUNA  Brioadk.     HsiAixjrAETEBa. 

"  Majob  Thouas  Taounton  :  Advise  all  offioers  of  this  brigade  that 
be  who  allows  his  soldiers  to  toad  their  riSes  without  being  before  the 
enemy,  shall  be  liable  to  oapital  punishment.  If  the  soldiers  intention- 
ally or  otherwise  Are  their  pieces,  whether  in  the  air  or  at  any  deter- 
mined or  undetermined  person,  said  soldiers  and  the  ofScera  to  whose 
command  they  belong  shall  aJso  be  liable  to  the  same  punishment  aa 
above,  without  further  proooedinKs,  for  the  reason  that  we  are  almost 
in  front  of  the  enemy,  aad  all  the  more  if  the  shots  take  effect  upon  any 
of  the  soldiers  or  chiefs. 

"  Sergeants  and  corporals  shall  also  take  heed  of  the  present  warnings, 
as  they  will  also  be  given  the  same  punishment  if  they  by  abandoning 
their  squads  allow  them  to  oommit  certain  outra^res. 

"  You  will  report  receipt  of  and  compliance  with  this  order. 

"  Ood  preeerve  you  many  years. 

"  General  Headquarters,  November  16, 1900. 

(Signed)  "  Lacttna,  General,  Political-Military  Governor  and  Chief 
of  Operations."  —  P.  I.  R.,  643.  1. 

'  Taylor,  AJ.  86. 



Endless  orders  vreee  issued  by  Aguinaldo  and  other 
high  Insurgent  ofiScers,  prohibiting  rape,  brigandage  and 
robbery,  and  there  was  grave  need  of  them.  Unfortunately 
they  could  not  be  enforced.  Indeed  it  was  often  impos- 
sible to  distinguish  between  Insurgent  soldiers,  who 
removed  their  uniforms  or  had  none,  and  brigands  pure 
and  simple.^ 

Many  men  were  soldiers  at  one  time  and  brigands  at 
another.  Unquestionably  soldiers  and  brigands  some- 
times cooperated.  Garrisons  were  withdrawn  from  towns 
which  did  not  promptly  and  fully  comply  with  the  demands 
of  Insurgent  commanders,*  and  armed  bandits  appeared 
and  plundered  them. 

>"Kabat'am,  Oct.  14th,  1809. 

"Martin   F.  Csloado,   Oenxbal  anc  Poutico-Militakt  Oot- 


"  Ab  a  oonaequeuoe  of  the  frequent  assaults  and  robberiea  oommitted 
by  perHons  wearing  military  unfforms,  and  with  the  determination  to 
eorreet,  with  a  firm  hand,  such  Boandaloua  conduct,  which,  beddes 
oauaing  such  deeds  to  be  laid  at  the  door  of  the  military,  also  makes  it 
easier  for  evil-doers  to  commit  their  misdeeds,  I  have,  at  the  su^estion 
of  the  Councillor  of  Police,  ordered  the  following :  — 

"  1.  Prom  this  date  forward  all  private  citizens  are  abaolutely  pro~ 
hibited  trnm  wearing  miUtary  uniforms. 

"  2.  AU  authorities,  both  civil  and  military,  under  this  Qovemment, 
are  obliged  to  see  to  the  strict  enforcements  of  this  edict. 

"  3.  All  persons  who,  not  being  in  the  military  s^^oe,  are,  after 
the  publication  of  this  edict,  found  wearing  military  uniforms,  and  who 
cannot  show  that  they  are  in  the  milittuy  sra^oe,  will  be  suspected  aa 
evil-doere  and  will  be  sent  to  this  Government  to  be  subjected  to  the 
oorreeponding  ooireotive  me«suree. 

(Signed)    "  Masti'n  Delqado, 


—  P.I.  B..  881.4. 

*  "On  April  10, 1890,  General  Ddgado  wrote  that,  benignity  having 
fMled,  r^rous  methods  would  be  used  to  enforce  ooUeotiona  and  that  if 
the  people  did  not  pay  — 

"  '  I  shaU,  with  great  pain,  see  myself  under  the  necessity  of  with-- 
drawing  all  my  forces  to  the  mountains  and  leaving  them  [the  pueblos) 
to  the  fate  which  God  will  decide  upon,'  which  of  course  meant  that  he 





There  were  some  Insurgent  leaders,  like  Cailles,  who 
suppressed  brigandage  with  a  heavy  hand,^  but  many  of 
them  were  indifTerent,  even  if  not  in  alliance  with  the 
evil  doers. 

The  VisATAa 
Feeling  between  TagAlog  soldiers  and  Visayan  people 
grew  constantly  more  bitter,  and  before  many  months 
had  passed  they  fell  to  killing  each  other.  The  highest 
oflScers  of  the  "Regional  Revolutionary  Government 
of  the  Visayas"   protested   vigorously   to   Aguinaldo,* 

would  leave  them  to  the  meroy  of  the  bandits  who  stood  ready  to 
deeoend  upon  them."  —  F.  I.  R.,  B.,  4. 

"  This  threat  was  not  an  idle  one."  —  Taylor,  67  H8.  E-L. 

>"Santa  Cbtte,  Laquna,  July,  1899. 
"  Hon.  Sr.  Euilio  Aodimaldo.  .  .  . 

"  There  was  a  notorious  bandit  here  who  was  the  terror  of  the  provinoa 
with  his  gBog  i  I  had  him  arreet«d  and  shot  and  the  robberies  ceased. 
Murders  were  being  committed ;  I  had  the  murderers  caught,  shot  one 
of  them,  and  there  were  no  more  murders ;  officers  of  the  reserve  would 
consider  themselves  Idags  in  their  towns,  they  would  shoot  the  local 
prerldenUt  and  commit  other  unlawful  acts ;  I  disarmed  them,  and  tried 
the  most  celebrated  one,  called  Arcadio  Castillo,  alias  Banouoane,  who 
attempted  to  escape  and  was  killed.  With  the  death  of  these  persona 
order  has  been  completely  reestablished  in  this  province.  Several 
had  rifles  that  were  used  oidy  for  robbery  and  after  two  or  three  trials 
all  turned  over  their  rifles,  and  the  arming  of  the  battalion  was  com- 

(Signed}     "Jcan  Caillks." 
—  P.  1.  R.,  7&8. 
*  "Reoional  Bbtolutionabt  OoTBBioraifT  or  thk  Vibatab. 
"OracB  or  THB  Presidbnt. 
"Kabat6ak,  March  16,  1899. 
"  To  TBE  HoMocBABui  Pbbhidbmt  of  thb  Phujpfinb  Rkphblic, 
"  Sbnor  Emiuo  Aocinaldo  r  Faut, 
"Most  Distinocishbd  Prbbident: 

•  •  *  •  •  •  * 

"  In  order  to  avoid  the  distiress  which  the  knovdedge  of  the  abnsee 
whioh  are  already  unbearable,  daily  oommitted  by  the  troops  of  Se&w 
IMocno,  will  cause  you,  this  government  has  hesitated  to  oommunioate 
them  to  you,  but,  as  there  is  almost  a  reign  of  terror  here,  it  feels  that 
it  must  inform  you  of  them  in  order  to  remedy  them.  The  death  of 
private  individuals  and  assaults  oommitted  in  the  towns  are  daily 

VOL.  I  — T 



but  irithout  result.  The  situation  was  entirely  beyond 
his  control. 

On  April  20,  1899,  General  Delgado  issued  an  order 
which  tells  a  edgnificant  story  of  conditions,  and  of  his 
own  weakness  in  dealing  with  them.* 

reported  aa  having  beeo  oonmiitted  by  the  troops  of  Qenenl  Dioono. 
Of  the  numerous  oompuiieB  of  Sefior  Dioono,  only  two  under  the  orders 
of  Oeneral  Ar&neta  %lLt  against  the  enemy,  the  remainder  are  the 
terror  of  the  town  and  it  ia  &  week  einoe  Br.  Dioono  went  to  Capis  with- 
out telling  any  one  what  he  was  going  to  do. 

"  In  view  of  the  facts  pointed  out,  the  soldiers  of  this  General  oonsti- 
tnting  a  constant  danger  to  the  town,  this  government  asks  you  to  order 
Qeneral  Dioono  to  turn  over  his  rifles  to  us  to  kill  Americana  with  and 
to  enable  the  towns  to  reoover  their  former  tranquillity ;  this  govern- 
ment asks  this  of  you,  relying  upon  the  well-known  justice  with  which 
you  act  and  it  wishes  for  you  many  years  of  life  for  our  liberty  and  our 
independence.  ' 

"  Kabatuan,  March  16, 1899. 

(Signed)      "  Jovrro  Ttjsat, 
"  Temporary  PtttideTU. 
(Signed)      "FRAXcieco  Sobiano, 
"  General  Secretary." 
—P.  I.  R.,  52.  5. 
'  "Martin  Delgado  y  Bermejo,  lieutenant  general  and  general  in 
chief  of  the  repabboui  army  of  the  Visayan  Islands. 

"Gemkbal  Hsadocartibb  of  Banta  Barbara, 
"April  20,  1899. 
"  The  existence  of  astate  of  war,  and  the  trying  circnmatanoes  through 
which  the  country  is  now  passing  have  brought  about  a  complete 
change  in  the  order  of  neariy  all  the  pueblos ;  and  I  have  noticed  with 
profound  regret  that  sacking,  robbery,  Bequeetrationa,  and  other 
crimes  highly  dishonourable  to  our  noble  eause,  are  of  daily  ooourrenoe. 
With  a  view  to  preventing  euoh  conduct  in  the  future,  and  in  order  to 
guarantee  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  milituy  district  under  my  command 
the  moat  complete  tranquillity,  I  hereby  decree : 

"1.  That  any  person  or  peraoiiH  who  eorcunit  acts  of  brigandage, 
sequestration,  incendiarism,  rape,  or  other  disturbanoee  of  &  publio 
nature  calculated  to  excite  the  public,  or  which  infringe  individual  or 
property  righta,  shall  be  sever^y  punished  in  accordance  with  military 

"2.  That  all  offenders  who  present  themselves  to  the  Local  or  Mili- 
tary Authorities  within  the  30  days  immediatdy  following  this  date, 
and  who  turn  over  their  arms  and  join  our  forces  and  help  to  fight  other 
outlaws  and  to  defend  the  nation,  will  be  pardoned  for  ttie  crimes  they 
have  committed. 

"3.  That  when  the  period  of  30  daTS  abov«  mentioned  has  paaoed, 



In  Luz6n  General  Trias  of  Cavite  accused  the  soldiwa 

and  citizens  of  his  province  of  committing  "robberies, 
assaults,  kidnappings  and  raimes  which  are  committed 
only  by  barbarous  and  sav^e  tribes."  ^ 

That  very  serious  conditions  promptly  became  general 
is  conclusively  shown  by  the  record  of  Aguinaldo'a  govern- 
ment for  February  24,  1899,  when  it  decided  — 

"that  the  preddent  of  the  council  shall  study  such  measures 
as  will  put  an  end  to  the  continual  discord  and  friction  between 
the  civil  and  military  authorities  of  every  province,  in  order 
that  fatal  consequences  may  be  avoided." 

any  person  taken  in  the  ftot  of  oommittlne  robbery,  or  who  attempts 
to  rob  with  an  (^Kanized  band  of  outlaws,  or  who  steals,  rapes,  or  per- 
forms acta  of  inoendiarism,  or  any  other  criminal  aot,  will  be  summarily 
condemned  to  death  by  a  military  tribunal. 

"  The  Local  Juntas  of  the  various  towns  in  oonjunction  with  citiseiifl 
of  standing  and  the  military  authorities  will  organize  a  vigilance  service 
to  maintain  public  order  and  the  authoritj'  of  tlie  law. 

"  M.  Dbloado." 
—P.  I.  R..  Books  B  4. 

'"February  13,  189B. 

(Id  the  margin :  A  stamp  whioh  says :)  "Philippine  Republic  — 
Headquarters  of  operations  of  the  provinces  of  Southern  Luztfn. 

"It  is  with  great  regret  that  I  have  learned  that  robberies,  assaults, 
kidnapping,  and  other  crimes  whioh  are  oommitt«d  only  by  barbarous 
and  savage  tribes,  are  taking  place  in  our  towns,  without  taking  into 
ooDsideTBtion  that  the  purpose  of  the  insurrection  which  has  given  origin 
to  our  social  r^eneration  is  true  justice,  for  the  reSstablishment  of 
whioh  aHe  lives  and  property  are  being  sacrificed  of  all  who  are  proud 
of  being  called  Filipinos.  These  acts  are  being  committed  without 
restriction  by  oiviHaiis  as  well  aa  soldiers  perhaps  with  the  cooperation 
of  their  respective  chiefs,  to  the  shame  of  the  authority  vested  in  them 
and  to  the  prejudice  of  the  society  to  which  they  unworthily  belong, 
and  even  to  the  integrity  itself  of  the  Republic.  And  in  order  that 
these  barbarous  and  savage  acts  may  disappear  and  that  rigorous  and 
exemplary  punishment  be  meted  out,  I  have  deemed  it  proper  to 
forward  to  you  for  general  information  the  proclamation  of  these 
Headquarters  of  February  12th  last,  whioh  is  as  follows : 

(ffigned)       '_ 

"ToTHXPouTico-MiuTABTCmEForlKrAirrA."    — P.  I.  R.,89&-0. 



With  such  conditions  prevailing  among  the  Filipinos 
themselves,  it  was  to  be  expected  that  the  laws  of  civil- 
ized warfare  would  be  violated  and  that  American  sol- 
diers taken  prisoners  would  sometimes  be  treated  with 
barbarity.  Fla^  of  truce  were  deliberately  violated.' 
American  soldiers  were  trapped,  poisoned  *  and  murdered 
in  other  ways.* 

It  was  promptly  chai^d  in  the  United  States  that 
American  soldiers  were  committing  barbarities,  and  Blount 
has  revived  these  old  tales. 

I  know  personally  that  during  the  early  days  of  the 
war  Insurgent  prisoners  and  wounded  were  treated  with 
the  greatest  humanity  and  kindness. 

A  part  of  the  Insurgent  plan  of  campaign  was  the 
circulation  of  the  most  shocking  statements  concerning 
the  abuses  conmiitted  by  American  soldiers.     I   have 

■  "There  does  not  seem  to  hftve  been  the  faintest  oonoeption  that 
there  was  any  reason  for  not  using  the  white  flag  to  deceive  people  who 
were  foolish  enough  to  believe  that  Aguioaldo  was  going  to  adhere 
to  the  rules  presoribed  for  its  use.  The  writer  in  the  early  spring  of 
1899  onoe  watched  an  insutgent  party  advance  under  a  white  flag 
upon  an  American  line  of  trenches.  When  an  ofQoer  and  a  bugler 
went  forward  to  receive  them  they  threw  down  the  flag  and  imme- 
diately opened  fire  with  the  rifles  which  they  were  then  seen  to  be 
dragging  behind  them."  —  Taylor,  48  HS. 

■  "Such  ammunition  was  not  effective  imless  flred  from  very  close 
quarters,  but  even  its  possession  made  the  guerrillas  stronger  than  the 
people  of  the  country  and  undoubtedly  had  much  to  do  with  securing 
their  eodperation,  not  only  as  bolomen  but  also  in  the  digging  of  the 
pits  which  were  placed  in  the  trails  and  also  set  about  the  towns. 
These  were  required  to  be  oonstructed  by  the  local  authorities.  In  the 
bottom  was  set  a  sharp  spike  of  bamboo,  sometimes  poisoned ;  and  the 
pit  was  cov^«d  with  leaves  and  soil  upon  a  fragile  fnmework ;  so  that 
if  a  man  stood  upon  it  he  would  fall  through  upon  the  spike.  Bows 
were  set  in  the  jungle  with  a  string  set  across  the  trail  so  that  any  one 
stunibling  over  it  would  discharge  a  sharp  bamboo  shaft  with  a  poisoned 
head.  On  September  IS,  1000,  Lukbiui  congratulated  the  people  of 
the  town  of  Katubig  upon  the  effloient  use  they  had  made  of  arrows 
with  the  hea4i8  dipped  in  'dita,'  a  native  poison.     (P.  I.  B.,  502.  8.)" 

— Taylob,  83  HS. 
*  See  also  the  chapter  entitled  "Murder  aa  a  Ooreromeiital  Insti- 



elsewhere  described'  the  fate  that  overtook  Colonel 
Arguelles,  in  part  because  he  told  the  truth  as  to  the 
humane  treatment  by  the  Americans  of  prisoners  and 

Not  only  did  some  of  those  who  did  this  forfeit  their 
lives,  but  newspaper  articles,  military  orders,  and 
proclamations  issued  by  civil  officers  informed  the 
people  that  the  American  soldiers  stole,  burned, 
robbed,  raped  and  murdered.  Especial  stress  was  had 
on  their  alleged  wholesale  violations  of  women,  partly 
to  turn  the  powerful  influence  of  the  women  as  a 
whole  against  them,  and  partly  to  show  that  they  were 
no  better  than  the  Insurgents  themselves,  who  frequently 
committed  rape.' 

1  See  p.  313. 

*  The  following  nevBpftper  BUpplement  printed  in  Tagdlog  for  the 
benefit  of  the  common  people,  ia  tn>ioal  of  this  claas  of  literature,  with 
which  the  country  was  kept  flooded : 

(Ciroular  printed  in  Tagtiog.  P.  I.  B.,  17-6.  Supplement  to 
Heraido  FUi^no. 

"Friday,  24tb  February,  1899. 

"  We  must  consider  ourselves  fortunate  that  the  bad  intentions  of 
North  America  were  found  out  early.  If  we  had  not  foimd  them  out 
by  this  time  we  should  have  been  entrapped.  And  we  should  thank 
Qod  that  they  oommenoed  the  war. 

"  You  ought  to  know  by  this  time  that  these  people  can  teaoh  us 
nothing  good.  What  we  can  leam  from  them  ia  all  evil.  You  must 
admit  the  truth  of  what  they  are  reported  to  do  to  our  brothers  in 
Manila  where  they  rob  the  houses  when  the  dwellers  in  them  ore  out  or 
busy.  Their  evil  inclinations  prevail  over  them  to  such  an  extent  that 
the  houses  most  worthy  of  oondderation  are  not  safe.  They  are  worse 
than  the  wild  people  who  live  in  the  woods,  they  have  not  the  slightest 
idea  of  looking  at  things  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  man  of  honour  nor 
have  they  the  slightest  respect  for  reason,  for  this  does  uot  control  their 
actions  in  the  least.  Witjiout  the  slightest  attention  to  oivihty  th^ 
rush  into  houses  and  if  they  find  the  people  eating,  without  saying 
a  word,  they  take  what  they  want  from  the  table,  put  it  into  thdr 
mouths  and  go  as  they  came. 

"  If  they  find  people  sleeping  or  resting,  taking  the  deflta,  it  makes 
no  difference  to  them  ;  they  go  into  the  most  private  parts  of  the  house 
as  though  they  were  walking  in  the  Btroet. 

"  In  the  shops  they  take  what  pleases  them  and  if  the  owner  wants 
paym«it  they  threaten  him  with  their  rifles. 



These  horrible  tales  were  at  first  believed  even  by  some 
of  the  responsible  Insurant  ofiScers  in  remote  regions,' 
but  all  such  men  soon  learned  the  truth,  which  was  known 
to  most  of  them  from  the  start. 

In  ofiScial  correspondence  between  them,  not  intended 
for  the  public,  orders  were  given  to  \ise  women  as  bearers 
of  despatches  for  the  reason  that  Americans  did  not 
search   them.'    More  significant  yet,   when  conditions 

"One  can  httrdlj  believe  and  my  pen  refuses  to  write  all  (rf  the 
pervOTdty,  and  evil  and  bad  habits  of  these  people. 

"  Their  habita  ajid  manuera  are  a  diBgrooe  to  the  oountry  where  they 
were  boro.  In  no  history  have  such  austoms  and  manners  been  de- 
Boribed  even  in  that  of  the  most  ignorant  people. 

"  They  search  women  who  pass,  feeling  iJl  over  their  bodies,  tak- 
ing from  them  money  and  whatever  else  they  carry  and  if  they  oome 
on  them  in  a  lonely  place  they  atrip  them  naked  after  violating  them 
and  do  not  leave  a  rag  on  them. 

"  Are  these  those  honeet  men  of  whom  we  have  heard  7  Are  these 
the  people  who  were  going  to  teaoh  us  good  habits  ?  Are  these  the 
people  who  were  going  to  guide  us  ?  The  race  which  does  these  things 
is  the  most  hated  one  In  the  world,  it  is  the  race  which  commits  most 
cruelties,  it  is  the  raoe  which  does  not  treat  its  mothor  with  respect ; 
fn  this  raoe  there  is  not  the  slightest  idea  of  personal  dignity,  it  is  a 
race  which  does  not  know  what  honour  is,  which  does  not  possess  the 
slightest  vestige  of  regard  tor  good  raamtere.  Are  these  the  people 
who  are  going  to  protect  us  7  It  is  better  for  us  to  die  at  once  ttum  fall 
into  the  power  of  these  unequalled  malefactors. 

"  i  Down  with  the  bad  men  1 

"  I  Kill  the  Americans  1 1 

"  1  Let  the  people  of  the  United  States  be  exterminated  1 1 1 

"  i  Notice.  —  This  sheet  is  distributed  gratis." 

'  "A  l^ht  upon  the  treatment  of  women  by  these  people  is  given 
by  the  fact  that  after  an  Americsji  detachment  had  captured  Lukban's 
papers  and  family  on  August  18,  and  oame  so  close  to  taking  him  that 
he  was  able  to  recognize  their  guide,  one  of  his  correspondents  wrote 
to  him  that  to  their  surprise  the  women,  who  had  fully  exiwcted  to  be 
abused,  had  been  treated  with  respect  and  given  a  house  to  live  in. 
(P.  I.  R.,  1143.  4.)"  —  Tatloh.  84  H8. 

*  In  a  letter  to  0«neral  Ambrosio  Moxica  from  dated 

March  2.  1900,  occurs  the  foUowing  r  — 

"The  guerillas  quartered  in  the  neighbourhood  must  render  mutual 
assistance  and  keep  up  communication,  so  as  to  get  the  news  as  to  where 
the  enemy  comes  or  goes,  and  the  time  at  which  they  will  pass  certain 
points,  endeavouring  also  to  arrange  that  all  the  guerilla  bands  should 
have  regular  oouriere,  with  you  or  with  general  headquarters,  giving 
advice  daily  of  any  ocouirenoe  aod  oarryiiig  ooirespondenoe.    Tbey 



became  bad  in  the  provinces,  Insm^ent  officers  sent  their 
women  and  children  to  seek  American  protection  in 
Manila  or  elsewhere.  Cartload  after  cartload  of  them 
came  in  at  Angeles,  shortly  after  General  Jacob  H. 
Smith  took  that  place.  Aguinaldo  himself  followed  this 
procedure,  as  is  shown  by  the  followii^  extracts  from 
Villa's  famous  diary : '  — 

"  December  22.  —  It  was  7  a.m.  when  we  arrived  in  Amb&y- 
uan.  Here  we  found  the  women  worn  out  from  the  painful 
journey  they  had  sufTered.  They  were  seated  on  the  ground. 
In  their  facea  were  observed  indications  of  the  ravages  of 
hunger;  but  they  are  always  smiling,  saying  they  would 
prefer  sufferii^  in  these  mountains  to  being  under  the  domin- 
ion of  the  Americana,  and  that  such  sacrifices  are  the  duties 
of  every  patriot  who  loves  hia  country. 

"  We  secured  some  camotes  in  this  settlement,  cooked  them 
immediately,  and  everybody  had  breakfast.  Our  appetites 
were  satisfied. 

"The  honorable  president  had  already  decided  some  days 
before  to  send  all  the  women  to  Manila,  including  his  family, 
and  this  was  his  motive  in  hurrying  his  family  forward  with 

•  •••••« 

"  December  24.  —  We  find  ourselvea  still  in  Talubin.  About 
8  o'clock  this  morning  a  report  came  saying  the  Americans 
had  arrived  at  Bontoc,  the  provincial  capital,  the  nearest 
town  to  Talubin,  and  distant  from  it  two  hours  by  the  road. 
An  immediate  decision  was  made.  The  honourable  president 
told  his  family  and  the  other  women  that  they  should  remain 
in  the  settlement  and  allow  themselves  to  be  caught  by  the 
Americans,  and  he  named  Sefiors  Sytiar  and  Faez  to  remain 
also,  with  the  obligation  of  conducting  the  women  to  Manila. 
As  soon  as  the  arrangement  was  effected,  the  honourable  presi- 
dent prepared  himself  for  the  march.  The  parting  was  a 
very  sad  one  for  himself  and  for  his  family. 

must  select  trustworthy  women  to  carry  oorrespondenoe,  ohuging 
them  to  hide  the  letters  miderneath  their  skirts,  bearing  in  mind  that 
the  Americnns  do  not  search  them ;  and  in  sending  to  the  to'wna  t<x 
srmB  or  food,  the  orders  must  be  sent  by  women  and  for  small  quantities, 
BO  as  not  to  attract  attention."  —  P.  I.  R.,  2035.  3. 

'  Simeon  Villa,  who  accompanied  Aguinnldo  on  hia  long  flight,  kept 
a  somewhat  detailed  aooount  of  events  in  the  form  of  a  diary. 



"  The  hoBourable  presideot  left  Talubin  at  11  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  his  family  and  the  other  women  remuning  behind 
with  two  gentlemen  charged  with  conducting  them  to  Manila."' 

In  this,  as  in  all  other  siinilaT  cases,  the  women  were 
kindly  treated  and  safely  conducted  to  their  destination. 
Aguinaldo  and  his  fellows  knew  the  happy  fate  of  the  mem- 
bers of  his  own  family,  as  is  shown  by  a  later  entry ;  — 

"  February  6.  —  We  have  been  informed  that  the  mother 
and  Bon  of  tiie  honourable  president  are  at  Manila,  living  in 
the  house  of  Don  Benito  L^arda,  and  that  they  reached  that 
capital  long  before  the  wife  and  sister  of  the  honourable  presi- 
dent. We  have  also  learned  that  Srflor  Buencamino,  and 
Tirona,  and  Concepcion  are  prieonerB  of  the  American  author- 
ities in  Manila.  With  reference  to  the  wife  and  sister  of  the 
honourable  president  and  the  two  Leyba  sisters,  it  is  said  that 
they  went  to  Vigan  and  from  there  went  by  steamer  to  Manila."  * 

The  mother  and  son,  accompanied  by  Buencamino, 
had  allowed  themselves  to  be  captured  at  an  earlier  date. 
What  shall  we  say  of  a  leader  who  would  turn  his  mother, 
wife,  sister  and  son  over  to  American  soldiers  for  safe- 
keeping, and  then  continue  to  denounce  the  latter  as 
murderers,  and  violaters  of  women  ?  Aguinaldo  did  just 
this.  That  the  Insurgent  leaders  were  early  and  fully 
aware  of  the  t^tment  accorded  their  wounded  is  shown 
by  the  following  extract  from  a  letter  to  General  Moxica 
of  Leyte,  dated  March  2,  1900,  giving  instructions  as  to 
what  should  be  done  with  woimded  men :  — 

"  If  by  chance  any  of  our  men  are  wounded  on  the  field  or  else- 
where, efforts  must  be  made  to  take  away  the  rifles  and  ammu- 
nition at  once  and  carry  them  away  as  far  as  possible,  so  that 
they  may  not  be  captured  by  the  enemy ;  and  if  the  wounded 
cannot  be  immediately  removed  elsewhere  or  retreat  from  the 
place,  let  them  be  left  there,  because  it  is  better  to  save  the 
arms  than  the  men,  as  there  are  many  Filipinos  to  fill  up  the 
ranks,  but  rifles  are  scarce  and  difficult  to  secure  for  battle ; 
and  besides  the  Americans,  coming  upon  any  wounded,  take 
good  care  of  them,  while  the  rifles  are  destroyed ;  therefore, 

>P.  I.  R.,  869.  *Ibid. 







I  repeat,  they  must  aideavour  to  save  the  anns  rather  than  the 
men." ' 

There  were  some  rare  individual  instancea  in  which  un- 
injured Filipinos  were  treated  with  severity,  and  even  with 
cruelty,  by  American  soldiers.  They  occurred  for  the 
most  part  late  in  the  war  when  the  "water  cure"  in 
mild  form  was  sometimes  employed  in  order  to  compel 
persons  who  had  ^Ity  knowledge  of  the  whereabouts 
of  firearms  to  tell  what  they  knew,  to  the  end  that  the 
perpetration  of  horrible  barbarities  on  the  common  people, 
and  the  assassination  of  those  who  had  sought  American 
protection,  might  the  more  promptly  cease.  Usually 
the  sufferers  were  themselves  bloody  murderers,  who  had 
only  to  tell  the  truth  to  escape  pimishment.  The  men 
who  performed  these  cruel  acts  knew  what  treatment 
was  being  commonly  accorded  to  Filipinos,  and  in  some 
instances  to  their  own  comrades.  I  mention  these  facts 
to  explain,  not  to  excuse,  their  conduct.  Cruel  acts 
cannot  be  excused,  but  those  referred  to  seldom  resulted 
in  any  permanent  injury  to  the  men  who  suffered  them, 
and  were  the  rare  and  inevitable  exceptions  to  the  general 
rule  that  the  war  was  waged,  so  far  as  the  Americans  were 
concerned,  with  a  degree  of  humanity  hitherto  unprec- 
edented tmder  similar  conditions.  The  Insurgents  vio- 
lated every  rule  of  civilized  warfare,  yet  oathbreakera, 
spies  and  men  fighting  in  citizens'  clothes  not  only  were 
not  shot  by  the  Americans,  as  they  might  very  properly 
have  been,  but  were  often  turned  loose  with  a  mere  warn- 
ing not  to  offend  ^ain. 

The  false  news  circulated  to  aid  the  iMurgent  cause 
was  by  no  means  limited  to  such  matters.  Every  time 
their  troops  made  a  stand  they  were  promptly  defeated 
and  driven  back,  but  their  faltering  courage  was  bolstered 
up  by  glorious  tidings  of  wonderful,  but  wholly  imaginary, 
victories  won  elsewhere.     It  was  often  reported  that  many 

'  P.  I.  R.,  2035. 3. 



times  more  Americans  had  fallen  in  some  insignificant 
skirmish  than  were  actu^y  killed  in  the  whole  war, 
while  generals  perished  by  the  dozen  and  colonels  by  the 
thousand.  Our  losses  on  March  27,  1899,  in  fighting 
north  of  Manila,  were  said  to  be  twenty-eight  thousand. 
In  reality  only  fifty-six  Americans  were  killed  in  all 
northern  Luz6n  during  the  entire  month. 

On  April  26,  1899,  the  governor  of  Hoilo  published  the 
following  remarkable  news  items  among  others :  — 

"  Pa  VIA,  April  6th,  1899. 
"The  Liberating  Army  of  the  Visayan  Islands  to  the  Local 
Presidents  of  the  towns  shown  on  the  margin : 

"  Towns:  Santa  Barbara,  Pavla,  Leganes,  Z&rraga,  Duman- 
gas,  Batac  Viejo,  Tuilao,  Batac  Nuevo,  Banate. 

•  ••••** 

"Santa  Ana  taken  by  Americans  bmnii^  town  our  troope 
advancing  to  Roeario  and  Elscolta  Americans  request  parley 
account  death  General  and  officers  and  many  soldiers. 

"At  3  P.U.  of  the  14th  battle  at  Santolan  500  American 
prisoners  who  are  to  be  taken  to  Malolos. 

"At  9.45  P.U.  Commissioner  Lf^una  details  6000  more 
Americans  dead  and  600  prisoners. 

"  Otia  requests  parley,  and  our  representatives  being  present, 
he  tells  them  to  request  peace  and  conditions,  to  which  they 
replied  that  he,  and  not  they,  should  see  to  that,  so  the  parley 
accomplished  nothing. 

"  To-day,  Wednesday,  a  decisive  battle  will  be  fought. 

"Among  the  5000  prisoners  there  are  two  generals.  To- 
morrow 7.15  Pasig  in  our  power.  Americans  little  by  litUe 
leaving  for  Manila. 

"  General  Malbar  to  Provincial  Chief  Batangas. 

"  According  to  reports  by  telegraph  hostilities  have  com- 
menced and  all  at  Santa  Mesa  have  fallen  into  our  hands,  also 
Pasay  and  Maytubig. 

"  American  boat  surrendered  at  Laguna  de  Bay  many  pris- 
oners taken. 

"  General  Ricarte  to  Provincial  Chief  of  Batangas :  Battle 
stopped  by  truce  Japan  and  Germany  intervene  to  learn  who 
provoked  war. 



"  Foreignos  favor  parley  one  Americau  general  and  chiefs 
and  officers  dead." ' 

Santa  Ana  is  a  suburb  of  Manila.  The  Rosario  and 
Eecolta  are  the  main  business  streets  of  the  city. 

Apparently  the  Insurgents  must  have  thought  that 
colonels  were  as  numerous  in  our  army  as  in  theirs,  for 
they  reported  two  thousand  of  them  Idlled  on  February 
6,  1899,  and  threw  in  one  general  for  good  measure.' 

We  learn  from  the  Filipino  Herald  for  February  23, 
1899,  that  on  that  day  the  Filipino  army  captured  and 
occupied  the  suburbs  of  Manila,  while  American  troops 
were  besieged  in  the  outskirts  of  the  city,  at  La  Loma, 
and  in  the  neighboiuing  town  of  Caloocan.' 

"  p.  I.  B..  886.  13. 
■  Exhibit  1233 

(Original  in  Spaniah.     Contempanvy  aapj.     P.  I.  B.,  Books  B.  4.) 
"OamiHAL  HBASQTTAHTBBfl,  Santa  Babbaba,  Feb.  28th,  1899." 
(Litsnl  copy  of  telegram.) 

"  Casualtiea,  Amerioaiu,  on  6tli,  2000  ColoaeU  dead,  one  Qeneral; 
all  ohurchea  converted  Into  faospitalB  full  Amerio&n  wounded ;  total 
Amerioan  oasu&lties  7000  conSjined  by  Qeneral  Fulldn  just  arrived 
from  Malolos ;  says  also  Iloflo  quiet  and  not  taken. 

"A  true  copy 

"By  order  of  Chief  of  Staff.  "Joan  Bslobo." 

'  (Supplement  to  the  Fili-pino  Herald.) 

"  Thursday,  Feb.  23rd,  1899.  —  4  p.u. 

"  The  Filipino  Army  oooupiea  the  suburbs  of  Manila. 

"The  three  oolumns  oommanded  by  Generals  PIo  del  Pilar  and 
IJoerio  and  Col.  Hison  now  occupy  the  suburbs  of  Sampaloc,  San 
Miguel,  San  Sebasti&n,  Binondo,  San  Nicholas  and  Tondo. 

"  The  Cavite  battalion  has  possession  of  the  Cuartel  de  Meido  and 
our  flac  is  now  flying  there. 


"  The  American  troops  now  in  Caloooan  and  La  Loma  to  the  num- 
ber of  over  six  thousand  are  besieged  by  the  oolunms  oommanded  by 
Genenls  Luna,  Ijlanera  and  Qarcfa. 



But  why  continue.  No  tale  concerning  American 
losses  in  the  Philippines  was  too  fantastic  to  be  told  by 
the  leaders  and  believed  by  the  soldiery  and  the  populace. 
The  American  soldiers  were  even  said  to  be  reusing  to 
fight,  and  great  prisons  were  being  constructed  in  order 
properly  to  punish  them. 

General  MacArthur  and  his  entire  staff  were  captured 
before  March  2,  1900,  according  to  a  letter  sent  to  General 
Moxica  of  Lejfte  on  that  date.* 

And  what  of  conditions  in  the  United  States  during 
this  troubled  period  ?  We  learn  from  the  Insm^ent  records 
that  prior  to  January  X5,  1900,  "the  Union  Army"  had 
met  with  a  new  disaster,  as  a  result  of  which  President 
McKioley  tendered  his  res^nation,  being  succeeded  by 
Mr.  Bryan.  Philippine  independence  was  to  be  pro- 
claimed on  February  4,  1899.  On  January  20,  "General 
Otis's  successor,  John  Waterly,  of  the  democratic  party," 
arrived  at  Manila  with  papers  and  instructions  relative 
to  proclaiming  the  Philippine   Republic*     Things  now 


"This  veiy  moment  the  speoial  train  oairying  the  Honourable 
Presideat  has  left  for  C&Ioocan. 

"  Viva  the  iDdepeadent  Philippiaea  1 1 1 

"  Viva  the  unconquerable  Philippine  Army  1 1 1 

"Notioe.     This  sheet  ia  distributed  BTatiB." — P.  I.  R.,  70-6. 

>  "  CNewa.)  The  Amerioan  General,  MaeArthur,  with  hii  entire 
etafl,  was  taken  prisoner  by  our  troops  in  Northern  LuaSn.  Another 
American  Koneral  died  on  the  5th  of  January  last  in  the  North,  who  was 
seriously  wounded  in  an  ambush  or  flght.  When  shot  he  was  a  oolonel, 
but  on  aocount  of  said  fight  be  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  a  general, 
ao  that  later  when  he  died,  he  had  the  benefit  of  that  rank." 

—  P.  I.  B.,  2035.  3. 

>  (Telegrams) 

"WAsmNOTON,  JuLuary  15, 1900,  10  a.k. 
"  (Received,  Cebl!,  January  16,  1900,  11  a.u.) 
"  Cymng  to  a  new  disaster  of  ^e  Union  Army,  MaoKinley  has  ten- 
dered his  resignation  as  President,  Mr.  Bryan  sucoeeding  him. 

"  Peace  promulgated  in  the  Philippines.  Basis  of  the  protectorate 
is  bting  discussed. 

"  Philippine  independence  will  be  proolumed  February  the  ith. 



went  from  bad  to  worse.  The  trouble  between  democrats 
and  republicans  resulted  in  an  insurrection.  Before 
August,  1901,  President  McKinley  had  brought  about 
strained  relations  between  Germany  and  the  United 
States  by  bribing  an  anarchist  to  assassinate  the  German 
Emperor.'  Before  S^tember  15,  1901,  he  had  been 
killed  by  a  member  of  the  Democratic  party,  and  the 
Filipinos  could  acclaim  their  independence.' 

The  first  period  of  the  war,  which  we  may  term  the 
period  of  organized  armed  resistance,  drew  rapidly  to  its 
close,  and  there  followed  the  second  period,  characterized 
by  guerrilla  tactics  on  the  part  of  the  Insurgents. 

On  September  14,  1899,  Aguinaldo  accepted  the  advice 
of  General  Ro  del  Filar,  ex-bandit,  if  indeed  he  had  ever 
ceased  to  rob  and  murder,  and  authorized  this  man, 
whcnn  he  had  been  again  and  again  asked  to  remove,  to 
begin  guerrilla  warfare  in  Bulacan.  Guerrilla  tactics 
were  duly  authorized  for,  and  had  been  adopted  by, 
Insui^ent  forces  everywhere  before  the  end  of  Novembw. 

Of  this  style  of  fighting  Taylor  has  truly  said :  — 

"If  war  in  certain  of  its  aspects  ia  a  temporary  reversion  to 
barbansm,  guerrilla  warfare  is  a  temporary  reversion  to  sav- 
agery. The  man  who  orders  it  assumes  a  grave  responsibility 
before  the  people  whose  fate  is  in  his  hands,  for  senoua  as  is 
the  materifj  destruction  which  this  method  of  warfare  entails, 
the  destruction  to  the  orderly  habits  of  mind  and  thoi^ht 
which,  at  bottom,  are  civilization,  is  even  more  serious.  Rob- 
bery and  brigandage,  murder  and  arson  follow  in  its  wake. 

"Remark'.  —  Tlie  bama  of  ft  protectorate  haa  been  pablished  in 
English. " 

"Manila,  January  20,  1900,  10  a.m. 
"  (Received  at  CebU  on  the  same  day,  at  11  a.m.) 

"  Otia'  BiiooeBBor,  John  Waterly,  of  the  demooratio  party,  has  just 
airived.  He  brings  with  liim  papers  and  instructions  in  regard  to 
proclamation  of  the  Philippine  Republic. 

"  It  is  believed  that  Rev.  Martin,  Bishop  of  Cebil,  will  be  transferred 
to  the  Arohbishopne  of  Manila,  and  Rev.  Kozaleila  to  Spain."  — 
P.  I.  R.,  Books  B-10. 

>  F.  1.  B.,  1193.  2.  *  Ibid.,  2026. 



Gaerrilla  warfare  meaiia  a  policy  of  destruction,  a  p<^^  of 
terror,  and  never  yet,  however  great  may  have  been  the  injury 
caused  by  it,  however  much  it  may  have  prolonged  the  war 
in  which  it  hae  been  employed,  has  it  Becured  a  termination 
favorable  to  the  people  who  have  chosen  it."  ' 

The  case  iinder  distnissioa  furnished  do  exception  to  the 
general  rule. 

Such  semblance  of  discipline  as  had  previously  listed 
among  the  Insurgent  soldiers  rapidly  disappeared.  Con- 
ditions had  been  very  bad  under  the ' '  Republic ' '  and  worse 
during  the  first  period  of  the  war.  During  the  second 
period  they  rapidly  became  unendurable  in  many  r^ons, 
and  the  common  people  were  driven  into  the  arms  of 
the  Americans,  in  spite  of  threats  of  death,  barbarously 
carried  out  by  Insurgent  officers,  soldiers  and  agents  in 
thousands  of  cases.  I  have  described  at  some  lei^th  the 
conditions  which  now  arose  in  the  chapter  on  Murder  as 
a  Governmental  Agency,  to  which  the  reader  is  re- 
ferred for  details.* 

In  the  effort  to  protect  the  towns  which  showed  them- 
selves friendly,  the  American  forces  were  divided,  sub- 
divided and  subdivided  again.  On  March  1,  1901,  they 
were  occupying  no  less  than  five  hundred  two  stations. 
By  December  of  the  same  year  the  number  had  increased 
to  six  hundred  thirty-nine,  with  an  average  of  less  than 
sixty  men  to  a  post.  As  a  result  of  the  protection  thus 
afforded  and  of  the  humane  conduct  of  our  troops,  the 
people  turned  to  us  in  constantly  increasing  munbers. 

It  remfuned  to  stamp  out  the  dying  embers  of  insurrec- 
tion, while  continuing  to  seek  to  protect  those  who  put 
their  trust  in  us.  Further  subdivision  of  the  troops  in 
order  to  garrison  more  points  was  hardly  possible,  but  field 
operations  were  actively  pushed.  One  after  another  the 
Insurgent  leaders  were  captured  or  volimtarily  surrendered. 
Most  officers  of  importance  issued  explanatory  statements 
to  the  people  shortly  after  ^ving  up  active  field  operations, 
1  Taylor,  47  H8.  ■  Beginning  on  pago  730. 



whether  they  surrendered  Tolimtarily  or  were  taken 
prisoners.  Aguinaldo  himself  was  captured  on  March 
23, 1901,  at  Palanan,  the  northernmost  point  on  the  eaet 
coast  of  Luz6n  inhabited  by  civilized  people.  No  place 
in  the  islands,  inhabited  by  Filipinoa,  la  more  completely 
isolated,  and  he  had  long  been  almost  entirely  cut  off  from 
his  followers,  many  of  whom  believed  him  to  be  dead. 
On  April  19,  1901,  he  issued  an  address  to  the  Filipino 
people,  in  which  he  clearly  recognized  the  fact  that  they 
wanted  peace.    He  said :  — 

"Manila.,  April  19,  1901. 
' '  To  the  Filipino  People :  — 

"  I  believe  that  I  am  not  in  error  in  presmning  that  the  un- 
h^py  fate  to  which  my  adverse  fortune  has  led  me  is  not  a 
surprise  to  those  who  have  been  famiUar  day  by  day  with  the 
progress  oi  the  war.  The  lessons  thus  taught,  the  full  meaning 
of  which  has  recently  come  to  my  knowledge,  suggested  to 
me  with  irrerastible  force  that  the  complete  termination  of  hos- 
tilities and  a  taBting  peace  are  not  only  desirable  but  absolutely 
essential  to  the  welfare  of  the  Philippines. 

' '  The  Filipinos  have  never  been  dismayed  by  their  weakness, 
nor  have  they  faltered  in  following  the  path  pointed  out  by 
their  fortitude  and  courage.  The  time  has  come,  however, 
in  which  they  find  theh  advance  along  the  path  impeded  by 
an  iiresifltible  force  —  a  force  which,  while  it  restruns  them, 
yet  enlightens  the  mind  and  opens  another  course  by  presenting 
to  them  the  cause  of  peace.  This  cause  has  been  joyfully 
embraced  by  a  majority  of  our  fellow-countrymen,  who  have 
already  united  around  the  glorious  and  sovereign  banner  of 
the  United  States.  In  this  banner  they  repose  their  trust  in 
the  belief  that  under  its  protection  our  people  will  attain  all 
the  promised  Ubertiea  which  they  are  even  now  beginning  to 

"  The  country  has  declared  unmistakably  m  favor  of  peace ; 
BO  be  it.  Enoi^  of  blood ;  enough  of  tears  and  desolation. 
This  wish  cannot  be  ignored  by  the  men  still  in  arms  if  they 
are  animated  by  no  other  desire  than  to  serve  this  noble  people 
which  has  thus  clearly  manifested  its  will. 

"  So  also  do  I  respect  this  will  now  that  it  is  known  to  me, 
and  after  mature  deliberation  resolutely  proclaim  to  the  world 
that  I  cannot  refuse  to  heed  the  voice  of  a  people  longing  for 
peace,  nor  the  lamentations  of  thousands  of  families  yearning 



to  see  their  dear  ones  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  liberty  promised 
by  the  generosity  of  the  great  American  nation. 

"By  acknowledging  and  accepting  the  sovereignty  of  the 
United  States  throughout  the  entire  Archipelago,  as  I  now 
do  without  any  reservation  whatsoever,  I  believe  that  I  am 
serving  thee,  my  beloved  country.    May  happiness  be  theirs. 

"  EinLio  Aguinaldo.' 
"  Manila,  April  19,  1901." 

This  announcement  of  Aguinaldo,  published  in  Spanish, 
Tagilog  and  English,  undoubtedly  hastened  the  end  of 
the  war,  but  it  did  not  lead  to  immediate  general  sur- 
rendo",  for  as  Taylor  has  very  truly  said : — 

"A  force  like  Aguinaldo's  could  not  be  surreidcred.  It  had 
been  torn  by  internal  dissensions  and  the  bonds  of  discipline 
had  alwaj^  been  very  lax.  It  had  originally  been  held  together 
by  a  lively  expectation  of  the  advantages  to  be  obtained  from 
the  pillage  of  Manila.  That  hope  had  disappeared,  and  the 
leaders  had  become  the  lords  of  life  and  property  each  in  his 
own  province.  It  was  a  force  which  could  disintegrate,  but 
which  could  not  surrender.  Only  armies  can  do  that.  Forces 
over  which  their  leaders  have  lost  all  except  nominal  control 
when  beaten  do  not  surrender.  They  disintegrate  by  passing 
through  the  stages  of  guerrilla  warfare,  of  armed  bands  of 
highwaymen,  of  prowling  groups  of  thieves,  of  stiu^y  beggars 
who  at  opportune  moments  resort  to  petty  larceny."  ■ 

Aguinaldo's  forces  now  passed  through  these  several 
stages.  Some  of  his  more  important  subordinates  had 
previously  been  captured  or  had  surrendered.  Others, 
still  remfdning  in  the  field,  now  acted  on  his  advice,  more 
or  lees  promptly.  A  few  remained  obdurate  for  a  time, 
but  as  a  rule  not  for  long,  and  soon  there  remained  in  the 
field  only  a  very  limited  number  of  real  military  leaders, 
like  General  Malvar  in  Batangas  and  General  Lukban 
in  Samar,  and  a  very  considerable  number  of  bandit 
chiefs,  some  of  whom  had  posed  as  Insurgents.  The  forces 
of  the  latter  were  now  materially  and  rapidly  augmented 
by  men  who  had  been  Insui^;ent  officers  or  soldiers  and 

>  Taylor,  36  OV,  Exhibit  1017.  >  Taylor,  28  HS. 





while  soring  in  this  capacity  had  become  so  enamotnred 
of  a  lawless  life  that  they  were  now  imwilliDg  to  settle 
down  and  work  for  their  daily  bread,  preferring  to  con- 
tinue to  live  ofi  their  long-«ufFering  feUow-countrymen, 
whom  they  robbed  and  murdered  more  mercilessly  than 

The  war  waa  practically  over.  The  insurrection'  had 
failed.  In  my  opinion  no  FiHpino  who  held  out  to  the 
end  for  independence  compared  in  intellectual  power  with 
Mabini,  and  I  deem  his  views  as  to  why  it  failed  worthy 
of  special  attention.  At  the  time  of  his  death,  he  left 
behind  a  memoir  from  which  I  quote  the  following :  — 

"The  revolution  f^ed  because  it  was  poorly  led,  because 
its  head  conquered  his  place,  not  by  meritorious,  but  by  repre- 
hensible actions,  because  in  place  of  supporting  the  men  most 
useful  to  the  people,  he  rendered  them  useless  because  he  was 
jealous  of  them.  Believing  that  the  aggrandizement  of  the 
people  was  nothing  more  than  bis  own  personal  aggrandize- 
ment, he  did  not  judge  the  merits  of  men  by  then-  capacity, 
character,  or  patriotism,  but  by  the  degree  of  friendship  and 
relationship  which  bound  them  to  him;  and  wishing  to  have 
his  favorites  always  ready  to  sacrifice  themselves  for  him, 
he  showed  himself  complajsant  to  their  faults.  Having  thus 
secured  the  people,  the  people  deserted  him.  And  the  people 
having  deserted  him,  he  had  to  fail  like  a  wax  idol  melted  by 
the  heat  of  adversity.  God  forbid  that  we  should  forget  so 
terrible  a  lesson  learned  at  the  cost  of  unspeakable  sufferings."' 

These  are  by  no  means  the  only  reasons  why  the  rev- 
olution failed,  but  they  foredoomed  it  to  failure. 

The  surrender  or  capture  of  the  more  respectable 
military  element  left  the  unsurrendered  firearms  in  the 
hands  of  men  most  of  whom  were  ignorant,  many  of 
whom  were  criminal,  and  nearly  all  of  whom  were  irre- 
sponsible and  unscrupulous. 

Strict  enforcement  of  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare 
against  them  was  threatened,  but  not  actually  resorted  to. 

■  P.  I.  R..  1021.  6. 
vol-  I.  —  o 



The  situation  was  particularly  bad  in  Batangas. 
General  J.  F.  Bell  was  put  in  charge  there,  and  he  found 
a  humane  and  satisfactory  solution  of  the  existing  difficul- 
ties in  recoDcentration — not  the  kind  of  reconcentration 
which  made  the  Spaniards  hated  in  Cuba,  but  a  measure 
of  a  wholly  different  sort.  This  measure  and  its  results 
have  been  concisely  described  by  Taylor,  as  follows :  — 

"General  Bell  said  he  was  as  anxious  as  any  one  could  be 
to  avoid  making  war  against  those  who  really  wanted  the 
termination  of  hostilities,  and  it  was  his  duty  to  protect  them 
against  the  vengeance  of  others.  Over  and  above  all  these 
considerations  in  importance,  however,  was  the  absolute 
necessity  of  making  it  impossible  for  insurgents  to  procure  food 
by  levying  contributions.  Therefore,  in  order  to  give  those 
who  were  pacifically  inclined  an  opportunity  to  escape  hard- 
ship, as  far  as  possible,  and  preserve  their  food  supply  for  them- 
selves and  their  families,  it  was  determined  to  establish  sones 
of  protection  with  limits  sufficiently  near  all  towns  to  enable 
the  small  garrisons  thereof  to  ^ve  the  people  living  within 
these  zones  efficient  protection  against  ruinous  exactions  by 
insurgents.  He  accordingly,  'in  order  to  put  an  end  to  en- 
forced contributions  now  levied  by  insuigents  upon  the  inhab- 
itants of  sparsely  settled  and  outlying  barnos  and  districts 
by  means  of  intimidation  and  assassination,'  ordered  the 
commanding  officers  of  all  towns  in  the  provinces  of  Batangas 
and  Laguna  to  'immediately  specify  and  establish  plainly 
marked  limits  surroimding  each  town  bounding  a  zone  within 
which  it  may  be  practicable,  with  an  average-sized  garrison, 
to  exercise  sufficient  supervision  over  and  furnish  protection 
to  inhabitants  (who  desire  to  be  peaceful)  against  the  depreda- 
tion of  armed  insurgents.  The  limits  may  include  the  bar- 
rios which  exist  sufficiently  near  the  town  to  be  given  protection 
and  supervision  by  the  garrison,  and  should  include  some 
ground  on  which  live  stock  could  graze,  but  so  situated  that  it 
can  be  patrolled  and  watched.  All  ungarrisoned  towns  will 
be  garrisoned  as  soon  as  troops  become  available. 

"  'Commanding  officers  will  also  see  that  orders  are  at  once 

flven  and  distributed  to  all  the  inhabitants  within  the  juris- 
iction  of  towns  over  which  they  exercise  supervision,  inform- 
ing them  of  the  danger  of  remaining  outside  of  these  limits, 
and  that  unless  they  move  by  December  25  from  outlying  bar- 
rios and  districts,  with  all  their  movable  food  supplies,  includ- 



ing  rice,  palay,^  chickens,  live  stock,  etc.,  to  within  the  limits 
of  the  zone  established  at  their  own  or  nearest  town,  their 
property  (found  outside  of  said  zone  at  said  date)  will  become 
liable  to  confiscation  or  destruction.  The  people  will  be  per- 
mitted to  move  houses  from  outlying  districts  should  they 
desire  to  do  so,  or  to  construct  temporary  shelter  for  them- 
selves on  any  vacant  land  without  compensation  to  the  owner, 
and  no  owner  will  be  permitted  to  deprive  them  of  the  privilege 
of  doing  so.  In  the  discretion  of  commanding  officers  the  prices 
of  necessities  of  existence  may  also  be  regulated  in  the  interest 
of  those  thus  seeking  protection.  As  soon  as  peaceful  condi- 
tions have  been  reestablished  in  the  brigade  these  persons 
will  be  encouraged  to  return  to  their  homes,  and  such  assist- 
ance be  rendered  them  as  may  be  found  practicable.' 

"  It  was  deemed  best  not  to  compel  the  people  to  enter  these 
zones ;  but  they  were  warned  that  unless  they  accepted  that 
protection  their  property,  which  consisted  almost  entirely 
of  food  supplies,  would  become  liable  to  confiscation  or  deetruc- 
tion,  because  it  might  be  impossible  to  determine  whether  it 
belonged  to  hostile  or  peaceful  people.  To  put  an  end  to 
vengeance  by  assassination,  it  was  determined  to  make  use  of 
the  right  of  retaliation  conferred  by  General  Order  100  issued 
by  Pnsident  Lincoln  in  1863.  A  circular  tel^ram  was  pub- 
lished announcing  an  intention  to  retaliate  by  the  execution 
of  prisoners  of  war  in  case  any  more  were  assassinated  by 
insurgoits  for  political  reasons.  It  was  not  found  necessary 
to  do  this.     Assassinations  stopped  at  once. 

"  As  the  campaign  progressed  it  became  more  and  more 
apparent  that  a  large  number  of  poor  people  had  contributed 
through  fear,  for  the  power  of  the  insurgents  to  collect  came 
to  an  end  after  they  had  lost  their  power  of  intimidation. 
The  efficiency  of  the  protection  afforded  in  auch  zones  was  the 
determining  factor  in  forming  the  decision  and  attitude  of 
many  of  the  natives.  The  protection  afforded  was  efficient, 
and  from  time  to  time  many  additional  families  entered  the 
cones.  The  sentiment  for  peace  grew  stronger  steadily  and 
natives  volunteered  assistance  to  Americana  at  every  hand 
and  in  every  town.  When  these  volunteers  were  trustworthy 
they  were  armed  and  sent  out  into  the  mountains  from  which 
they  brought  back  guns,  and  insurgents,  and  hundreds  of  half- 
famished  men,  women,  and  children  who,  released  from  the 
intimidating  influence  of  the  insurgents,  entered  the  zones 
of  protection. 

'  Uohuaked  rioe. 



"The  most  Berious  discomfort  experienced  by  any  one  mthin 
these  areas  was  caused  to  the  mestizo  ruling  group,  whose 
members  bitterly  resented  the  blow  to  their  prest^e  in  being 
treated  like  every  one  else.  They  had  been  accustomed  to 
have  others  work  for  them  and  obey  them  blindly.  To  a 
man  who  could  speak  Spanish  and  who  had  always  been  the 
lord  of  his  barrio,^  the  possibility  of  having  to  cultivate  a  field 
with  his  own  hancte  was  an  unthinkable  and  scandalous  thing. 
These  men  suffered  and  suffered  acutely ;  but  it  was  not  their 
bodies  which  suffered  —  it  was  their  pride. 

"Malvar  surrendered  on  April  16,  1902.  Most  of  the  people 
had  turned  against  their  once  highly  respected  chief,  and 
toward  the  end  several  thousand  natives  of  Batangas  joined 
the  Americans  in  their  determmed  hunt  for  the  fugitive  leader. 
Realization  of  the  fact  that  the  people  were  ^;wist  him  mate- 
rially aided  in  forcing  his  surrender. 

'  General  Bell  had  captured  or  forced  to  surrender  some 
8000  to  10,000  persons  actively  engaged,  in  one  capacity  or 
another,  in  the  insurrection.  These  prisoners  were  rapidly 
released  when  they  had  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance.  By  the 
first  week  of  July  no  political  prisoners  were  held  in  this  region. 
They  had  returned  to  their  homes. 

"  The  policy  of  concentrating  the  people  in  protected  zones 
and  destroying  the  food  which  was  used  for  the  maintenance 
of  guerrilla  bands  was  not  new.  There  had  been  precedents 
even  in  the  United  States.  One  of  these  is  the  order  issued  on 
August  25,  1863,  by  Brigadier-General  Ewing,  commanding 
the  district  of  the  border,  with  headquarters  at  Kansas  City, 
Mo.,  in  which  he  ordered  the  inhabitants  of  a  large  part  of 
three  counties  of  that  State  to  remove  from  their  residences 
within  fifteen  days  to  the  protection  of  the  military  stations 
which  he  had  established.  All  grain  and  hay  in  that  district 
,  was  ordered  to  be  taken  to  those  military  stations.  If  it  was 
not  convenient  to  so  dispose  of  it,  it  would  be  burned  {Rebel- 
'  lion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXII,  Part  II,  p.  473).  Thy 
American  commanders  in  the  Philippines  had  adopted  no  new 
method  of  procedure  in  dealing  with  war  traitors;  they  had, 
however,  effectively  employed  an  old  one. 

"The  insurrection  had  originated  among  the  Tag&logs  and 
had  spread  like  a  conflagration  from  the  territory  occupied 
by  them.  The  fire  had  been  quenched  everywhere  else.  Gen- 
eral Bell  had  now  stamped  out  the  embers  in  the  Tag&log 




"  On  July  2  the  Secretary  of  War  telegraphed  that  the  inaur- 
rection  agunst  the  sovereign  authority  of  the  United  States 
in  the  PhiUppinea  having  come  to  an  end,  and  provincial  civil 
governments  having  been  established  throughout  the  entire 
territory  of  the  archipelago  not  mhabited  by  Moro  tribes,  the 
office  of  military  governor  in  the  archipelago  was  terminated. 
On  July  4,  1902,  the  President  of  the  United  States  issued  a 
proclamation  of  amnesty  proclajming,  with  certain  reserva- 
tions, a  full  and  complete  pardon  and  amnesty  to  all  persons 
in  the  Philippine  Arahipe^o  who  had  participated  in  the 

General  Bell's  motives  and  methods  in  reconcentrating 
the  inhabitants  of  this  troubled  region  have  been  grossly 
misrepresented,  and  he  himself  has  been  sadly  maligned. 
He  is  the  most  humane  of  men,  and  the  plan  which  he 
adopted  resulted  in  the  reestablishment  of  law  and  order 
at  a  minimum  cost  of  htmian  suffering. 

Many  of  the  occupants  of  his  reconcentration  camps 
received  there  their  first  lessons  in  hygienic  living.  Many 
of  them  were  reluctant  to  leave  the  camps  and  return  to 
their  homes  when  normal  conditions  again  prevailed. 

The  number  of  Filipinos  killed  during  the  Batangas 
campaign  was  very  sniall.'  Blount  has  sought  to  make 
it  appear  that  partly  as  an  indirect  consequence  of  war 
there  was  dreadful  mortality  there,  citing  by  way  of  proof 
the  fact  that  the  Coast  and  Geodetic  Atlas,  published 
as  a  part  of  the  report  of  the  first  Philippine  Commission, 
gave  the  population  of  Batangas  as  312,192,  while  the 
census  of  1903  gave  it  as  257,715.^ 

The  report  of  the  United  States  Philippine  Commission 
for  1903  ^ves  the  population  of  Manila  as  221,000,  while 
in  1900  it  had  been  260,000.  Does  this  mean  that  there 
had  been  a  holocaust  in  Manila  ?    Not  at  all.    It  means 

'  153,  ftooording  to  Blount  liimBelf . 

*  "Nor  oan  the  ultimate  responsibility  b^ore  the  bar  of  history  for 
the  avful  fact  that,  acoordisg  to  the  United  States  Coast  and  Oeodetio 
Survey  Atlas  of  the  PhilippineB  of  1899,  the  population  of  Batangas 
province  was  312,192,  and  aooording  to  the  American  Census  of  the 
Philippines  of  1903,  it  was  257,715,  rest  entirely  on  military  shouldera," 
— Blodnt,  pp.  383-384- 



only  that  the  thoiisands  of  FUipinos  who  had  sought  the 
protection  of  the  American  forces  there  during  the  period 
when  they  feared  their  own  soldiers  in  the  provinces  had 
mostly  returned  to  their  homes.  During  the  distmiied 
period  in  Batangas  great  numbers  of  people  took  refuge 
in  other  and  more  peaceful  regions.  Some  of  them 
returned  later ;  others  did  not. 

Blount  further  quotes  a  statement  in  the  1901  report 
of  the  I^vincial  Secretary  of  Batangas  to  the  eSect  that ; 

"The  mortality,  caused  no  longer  by  the  war,  but  by  dis- 
ease, such  as  malaria  and  dysentery,  has  reduced  to  a  little  over 
200,000  the  more  than  300,000  inhabitants  which  in  former 
years  the  province  had."' 

Apart  from  the  fact  that  these  figures,  showii^  a 
mortality  of  a  hundred  thousand  from  disease  alone,  are 
hardly  consistent  with  those  quoted  by  Blount  as  showing 
a  decrease  in  population  during  a  longer  period  of  only 
fifty-four  thousand  four  hundred  and  forty-seven,  it  is  not 
apparent  why  Americans  should  be  charged  with  deaths 
due  to  malaria  or  dysentery,  since  no  systematic  effort 
to  rid  Batangas  of  these  ills  had  ever  previously  been 
made,  and  the  very  thing  which  then  prevented  the 
adoption  of  the  measures  subsequently  so  successfully  put 
forth  to  this  end  was  the  disorderly  conduct  of  the  people 
themselves.  As  a  simple  matter  of  fact,  however,  there 
was  no  such  dreadful  mortahty  from  these  diseases  at 
this  time.  Malaria  has  never  been  especially  bad  in 
this  province,  and  even  cholera,  which  swept  it  d^^^ing 
the  period  in  question  and  is  far  more  readily  commu- 
nicated than  is  dysentery,  caused  only  twenty-three 
hundred  and  ninety-nine  known  deaths. 

In  the  end  peace  was  established  and  prosperity  fol- 
lowed in  its  wake. 

This  result  was  brought  about  in  part  by  the  efficient 
activity  of  the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States  and  in 
part  by  the  efforts  of  the  first  and  second  Philippine 

<  Blount,  p.  597.  >  3ee  Chaptwa  XT  and  XII. 


Mb.  Bbtak  and  Independence 

In  order  to  bring  home  to  some  of  my  Democratic  and 
Anti-Imperialist  friends  the  unreliable  character  of  the 
testimony  of  even  the  very  high  officers  of  the  so-called 
Philippine  Republic,  I  here  quote  certain  extracts  from 
the  Insurgent  records,  showing  the  important  part  played, 
doubtl^  unwittingly,  by  Mr.  William  Jennings  Bryan  in 
Philippine  politics  during  the  war.  '  The  first  of  these  might 
properly  have  been  considered  in  the  chapter  entitled 
"Was  Independence  Promised?"  Others  are  instruc- 
tive in  that  they  show  the  use  made  of  false  news  in  bol- 
stering up  the  Insurgent  cause,  and  mi^t  with  propriety 
have  been  included  in  the  chapter  on  '*  The  Conduct  of  the 
War."  I  have  thought  it  best  to  keep  them  by  themselves. 
Further  comment  on  them  would  seem  to  be  superfluous. 

"On  May  1,1900  (P.  I.  R.,  616. 6),  I.  de  los  Santos  wrote  a 
long  letter  in  Tag£Ll<%  and  cipher  to  Aguinaldo,  in  which  he 
reported  upon  the  progress  of  what  he  would  have  probably 
called  the  diplomatic  campaign.  If  this  letter  is  to  be  believed, 
the  agents  in  the  United  States  of  the  junta  had  been  able 
to  form  relations  which  might  be  of  great  value  to  them.  Santos 
said  in  part :  — 

" '  CommiBaioneni  .  .  .  SetLorea  Kant  (G.  Apacible)  and 
Raff  {Sixto  L6pez)  duly  carried  out  your  last  inatructions  given 
at  T&rlac.  Sefior  Del  Pan,  sailing  by  way  of  Japan,  about  the 
middle  of  October,  and  Sefior  Caney  (G.  Apacible),  Bailing  by 
way  of  Europe  about  the  1st  of  November,  met  in  Toronto 
about  the  middle  of  February  foUowii^.  But  before  the 
arrival  of  Kant,  Raff  had  already  come  from  Hayti  (United 
States)  and  was  able  to  pry  in  upon  our  political  friends  and 
enemies.  When  they  met  each  other  they  continued  the  voy- 
age inct^nito,  as  Raff  had  done  previously,  makii^  themselves 




known  to  a  very  few  people ;  but  later  on,  and  accordii^  to 
the  instructions  carried  by  Caney,  they  made  themselves 
known  to  a  greater  number  of  people,  and  have  succeeded  in 
interviewing  Bryan  who  happened  to  be  in  New  York.  SeQor 
Raff  said  that  Bryan  feared  being  present  at  a  conference,  lest 
he  might  be  called  a  traitor  by  members  of  his  own  party,  and 
also  by  those  of  the  opposite  or  "imperialist"  party,  who  are 
quite  proud  over  the  victories  they  have  gained  against  our 
people  over  there.  Nevertheless,  Raff  was  able  to  be  present 
and  talk  at  some  of  the  anti-imperialist  meetings,  our  poHtical 
friends  introducii^  him  as  a  friend  from  the  committee  (at  Hong- 
koi^)  and  as  an  advocate  of  the  cessation  of  the  war  over  there 
in  order  that  our  sacred  rights  may  be  giveu  consideration  by 
them.  And  as  Bryan  could  not  personally  take  part  in  the 
conference,  he  sent  a  most  trusted  peison,  his  right-hand  man, 
Dr.  Gardner.  The  results  of  the  conference  between  Sefior 
Raff  and  Dr.  Gardner,  the  latter  acting  in  the  name  of  Mr. 
Bryan,  are  as  follows :  — 

'"  Ist.  That  we  may  fight  on,  and  Bryan  will  never  cease 
to  defend  our  sacred  rights.  2nd.  That  we  must  never 
mention  Bryan's  name  in  our  manifestos  and  proclamations, 
lest  the  opposite  party  might  say  he  is  a  traitor.  3rd.  That 
we  are  in  the  right ;  and  hence  he  promised  in  the  name  of 
Bryan  that  if  this  Sefior  Bryan  is  victorious  in  the  prestdeutial 
campaign,  he  will  recognize  our  independence  without  delay. 
Your  honored  self  can  easily  conclude  from  all  the  forgoing 
that  Sefior  Del  Pan,  after  the  receipt  of  these  promises,  concurred 
with  liim;  and  he  returned  to  inform  Sefior  Apacible  about 
the  results  of  the  conference.  So  these  two  studied  over  the 
plan  of  the  pohcy  to  be  adopted  and  carried  out.  I  write  you 
what  their  opinions  are,  viz. :  1st,  that  they  will  reside  there, 
pending  the  outcome  of  the  presidential  contest,  aidii^  the 
propaganda  and  enlivening  it  until  November,  the  date  set 
for  the  desired  thing.  Owing  to  what  Dr.  Gardner  said  aud 
promised  in  the  name  of  Bryan,  some  one  ought  to  stay  there 
in  order  that  Bryan  may  be  approached,  if  he  is  elected,  so  he 
can  sign  the  recognition  of  our  independence ;  and  this  should 
be  done  at  once,  lest  in  his  excitement  over  the  victory  he 
should  foi^et  his  promise.  3rd.  For  carrying  out  the  two 
propo»tJonfi  just  mentioned,  they  request  2000  pounds  sterl- 
ing, that  te  $20,000  in  silver,  to  be  used  for  the  propaganda,  for 
paying  newspapers  and  for  bribing  senators  —  this  last  clause 
is  somewhat  dai^erous  and  impossible.  And  4th,  that  the 
money  must  be  sent  immediately,  and  that  you  should  be 



informed  not  to  mention  the  name  of  Bryan  in  the  manifeBtos 
and  proclamationa. 

'"In  order  to  answer  quickly  and  decisively  that  proposi- 
tion, and  as  I  did  not  have  the  desired  money  here,  I  answered 
ae  follows :  "  Plan  approved ;  for  the  sake  of  economy  we  have 
decided  that  one  of  the  two  retire,  but  before  doing  bo  make 
arrangements,  establish  communications  with  leaders  of 
Bryan's  party,  and  he  who  remains  should  thus  cultivate  the 
relations ;  be  who  is  to  retire  will  locate  himself  in  Paris  near 
SeSor  Katipalad  (Agoncillo)  with  whom  he  will  secretly  t^uss 
political  problems  that  may  arise.  So  he  will  watch  for  the 
opportune  moment  of  Bryan's  election,  in  order  to  go  imme- 
diately to  Hayti  and  formally  arrange  the  contract  with 
Bryan."  ^ 

'"By  the  end  of  1899,  by  the  time  guerrilla  warfare  was  well 
under  way,  by  the  time  that  any  FiUpino  government,  unless 
an  expression  of  the  unfettered  will  of  the  nearest  bandit  who 
can  muster  a  dozen  rifies  may  be  called  a  government,  bad 
ceased  to  exist,  a  stroi^  opposition  to  the  policy  of  the  admin- 
istration had  arisen  in  the  United  States  and  a  demEind  for  the 
recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  Philippines.  The 
junta  in  Hongkong  were  assured  that  the  Democratic  party 
would  come  into  power  in  the  next  elections  and  that  this  would 
mean  the  success  of  the  patriotic  efforte  of  Agutnaldo  and  his 
followers.  The  news  was  good  and  was  forthwith  spread  abroad 
in  "Ebrtracts  from  our  correspondence  with  America,"  "News 
from  our  foreign  agents,"  "News  from  America,"  and  "Trans- 
lations from  the  foreign  press  "  —  circulars  and  handbills  printed 
on  thin  paper  which  were  smuggled  into  the  Philippines  and 
passed  into  the  hands  of  the  guerrilla  leaders  who  could  read 
Spanish.  They  gathered  their  followers  about  them  and  told 
them  that  a  powerful  party  had  arisen  in  America  which  was 
going  to  give  them  all  they  had  ever  asked  for.  They  had  only 
to  fight  on,  for  success  was  certain.  In  America  the  "Anti- 
Imperialists"  were  hanging  the  "Imperialists,"  and  they  should 
continue  to  harry  the  American  adherents  among  the  natives 
of  the  Philippines. 

" '  There  are  a  number  of  these  publications  among  the  papers 
captured  from  the  insurgents,  and  the  adoption  of  this  method 
of  propaganda  seems  to  have  been  nearly  coincidrait  with 
Aguinaldo's  orders  declaring  guerrilla  warfare.    It  does  not 

'  Taylor,  13  KK,  E. 



geem  likdy  that  the  matter  contained  in  them  was  supplied  by 
a  FiUpino,  for  if  it  was  he  assumed  a  general  acquuntance 
among  the  people  with  American  poUtics  and  Americao  methods 
which  they  were  far  from  possessing. 

'"In  theee  publications  the  f^pinos  were  assured  that 
the  Imperialists  were  kept  in  power  only  by  the  lavuh  cao.- 
tributions  of  the  "  truts,"  whatever  they  may  have  beeai ;  but 
the  people  of  the  United  States  were  growing  weary  of  their 
domination  and  were  about  to  return  to  the  true  principles  of 
Washington  and  Jefferson.  The  illustrious  Americana  "Croevy 
Sticcney,  and  Vartridge"  were  all  laboring  for  the  cause  of 
Philippine  independence.  Long  lists  of  American  cities  were 
given  in  which  the  illustrious  orators  Mr.  Crosby  and  Mr. 
Schurts  had  addressed  applauding  crowds  upon  the  necessity 
of  throttling  the  "truts"  because  they  opposed  recognition 
of  the  rights  of  the  Fihpinos.  In  August,  1900,  "  News  from  our 
agents  in  America"  informed  its  readers  that  — 

" ' "  W.  J.  Bryan  has  stated  in  a  speech  that  his  first  act  upon 
being  elected  President  will  be  to  declare  the  indei>^idence  of 
the  Philippines." 

" '  On  June  16, 1900,  Gen.  Riego  de  Dios,  acting  head  of  the 
Hongkong  junta,  wrote  to  Gen.  I.  Torres  (P.  I.  R.,  530),  the 
guemlla  commander  in  Bulac^  Province,  and  assured  him  that 
a  httle  more  endurance,  a  Uttle  more  constancy,  was  all  that 
was  needed  to  secure  the  attainment  of  their  ends.  According 
to  their  advices  the  Democratic  party  would  win  in  the  ap- 
proaching elections  in  the  United  States,  and  —  "  it  is  certain 
that  Bryan  is  the  incarnation  of  our  independence." 

" '  The  number  of  men  opposed  to  the  policy  of  the  adminis- 
tration was  said  to  be  contmually  increasing. 

" '  The  attitude  of  those  who  protect  us  cannot  be  more 
manly  and  resolute :  "  Continue  the  struggle  until  you  conquer 
or  die."  Mr.  Beecher  of  the  League  in  Cincinnati  writes  us : 
"I  shall  always  be  the  champion  of  the  cause  of  justice  and  of 
truth,"  says  Mr.  Winalow  of  the  Boston  League.  "Not  even 
threats  of  imprisonment  will  make  me  cease  in  my  undertak- 
ing," Doctor  Denziger  assures  us.  "I  shall  accept  every  riak 
and  responsibility,"  says  Doctor  Leverson.  "  If  it  is  necessary, 
I  shall  go  so  far  as  to  provoke  a  revolution  in  my  own  country," 
repeats  Mr.  Udell.  It  is  necessary  to  save  the  Republic  and 
democracy  from  the  abyss  of  imperialism  and  save  the  worthy 
Filipinos  from  oppression  and  determination "  is  cried  by  all, 
and  the  sound  of  this  cry  is  ever  rising  louder  and  louder,'  "  ■■ 

>  Taylor,  15  and  16  KE,  E. 



Extract  from  a  letter  of  Papa  Isio'  dated  March  4, 

"I  have  received  from  Luafin  an  order  to  proceed  more 
rapidly  with  my  operations  this  month,  as  Bryan  ordered 
Emilfo  to  keep  the  war  going  vigorously  until  April,  sad  he 
also  sud  that  if  indepeadence  was  not  given  the  Pbiiipptnes  by 
that  time,  he,  Bryan,  and  his  followers  would  rise  in  arms 
against  the  oppressors."  * 

"Tarlac,  Oct.  26,  1899. 
"  To  the  Military  Governor  of  This  City,  and 
To  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior. 
"As  a  meeting  shall  be  held  on  the  morning  of  Sunday  next 
in  the  Presidential  Palace  of  this  Republic  in  return  for  that 
held  in  the  United  States  by  Mr,  Bryan,  who  drank  to  the  name 
of  our  Honourable  President  as  one  of  the  heroes  of  the  worid, 
and  for  the  purpose  of  celebrating  it  with  more  pomp  and  con- 
tributing to  it  the  greater  splendor  with  your  personnel,  I  will 
be  obliged  to  you  if  you  will  please  call  at  this  office  to  confer 
with  me  on  the  matter. 
"God  preserve  you,  etc. 

(Signed)  "  F.  Bubncamino."  * 

In  a  letter  written  by  A.  Flores,  acting  secretary  of 
war,  to  the  military  governor  of  Tarlac  on  October  27, 
1899,  there  occurs  the  following :  — 

"In  the  United  States  meetings  and  banquets  have  been 
held  in  honor  of  our  Honourable  President,  Don  Emilio  Agui- 
naldo,  who  was  pronounced  one  of  the  heroes  of  the  world  by 
Mr.  Bryan,  future  president  of  the  United  States.  The  Ma- 
sonic Society,  therefore,  interpreting  the  unanimous  desires  of 
the  people,  and  with  the  approval  of  the  government,  will  on 
Sunday  the  29th  instant,  organize  a  meeting  or  popular  assem- 
bly in  the  interest  of  national  independence  and  in  honor  of 
Mr.  Bryan  of  the  anti-imperialist  party,  the  defenders  of  our 
cause  in  the  United  States.  The  meeting  will  consist  of  two 
functions ;  first  —  at  nine  a,m.  of  the  29th  the  assembly  will 
convfflie  in  a  suitable  place,  a  national  hymn  will  inaugurate 

■ "  Pope  "  Isio  TTsa  the  last  of  a  series  of  bandit  leaders,  oltumine;  for 
thenudves  miraoulooB  powers,  who  long  infested  the  mountuiiB  of 

^'^i.  B..  ffro.  7.  » P- 1-  R-.  "3*-»- 



the  ^cercisee,  after  which  appropriate  addresees  will  be  de- 
livered: and  Becond  — at  four  p.m.  a  popular  demonstration 
will  take  place  throughout  the  town,  with  bands  of  music 
parading  the  streets;  residente  will  decorate  and  illuminate 
their  houses. 

"Which  I  have  the  pleasure  of  transmitting  to  you  for  your 
information  and  guidance  and  for  that  of  the  troops  under  your 
command." ' 

>  P.  1.  E..  17. 9. 


The  First  Philipfine  Couhission 

I  HATE  elsewhere  mentioned  the  appointmeat  of  the 
First  Philippine  Commission. 

Qn  January  18,  1899,  its  civilian  members  met  at 
Washington  and  received  the  President's  instructions. 

We  were  to  aid  in  "the  most  humane,  pacific  and I 

effective  exteofiion  of  authority  throughout  these  islands, 
and  to  secure,  with  the  least  possible  delay,  the  benefits 
of  a  wise  and  generous  protection  of  life  and  property  to 
the  inhabitants." 

We  were  directed  to  meet  at  the  earliest  possible  day 
in  the  city  of  Manila  and  to  annoimce  by  a  pubUc  procla- 
mation our  presence '  and  the  mission  intrusted  to  US, 
carefully  setting  forth  that  while  the  estabhahed  military 
government  would  be  continued  as  long  as  necessity  might 
require,  efforts  would  be  made  to  alleviate  the  burden  of 
taxation,  to  establish  industrial  and  commercial  pros- 
perity and  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  persons  and  property 
by  such  means  as  might  be  found  conducive  to  those  ends. 

We  were  to  endeavour,  without  interfering  with  the 
military  authorities,  to  ascertain  what  amehoration  in 
the  condition  of  the  inhabitants  and  what  improvements 
in  public  order  were  practicable,  and  for  this  purpose  were 
to  study  attentively  the  existing  social  and  pohtical  state 
of  the  several  populations,  particularly  as  regarded  the 
forma  of  local  government,  the  administration  of  justice, 
the  collection  of  customs  and  other  taxes,  the  means  of 
l-ransportation  and  the  need  of  pubUc  improvements,  re- 
Dorting  through  the  Department  of  State  the  results  of 
Dur  observations  and  reflections,  and  recommending  such 
3xecutive  action  as  might,  from  time  to  time,  seem  to  us 
ffise  and  useful. 




We  were  authorized  to  recommend  suitable  persons  for 
appointment  to  oflBces,  made  necessary  by  personal 
changes  in  the  existing  civil  administration,  from  among 
the  inhabitants  who  had  previously  acknowledged  their 
allegiance  to  the  American  government. 

We  were  to  "ever  use  due  respect  for  all  the  ideals, 
customs  and  institutions  of  the  tribes  which  compose  the 
population,  emphasizing  upon  all  occasions  the  just  and 
beneficent  intentions  of  Uie  United  States,"  and  were 
commissioned  on  account  of  our  "knowledge,  skill,  and 
integrity  as  bearers  of  the  good-will,  the  protection  and 
the  richest  blessings  of  a  Uberating  rather  than  a  conquer- 
ing nation."  ^ 

Nothing  could  be  more  false  than  Blount's  in»nua- 
tion  that  we  were  sent  out  to  help  Otis  run  the  war.* 
There  was  no  war  when  we  started,  and  we  were  ffltpressly 
enjoined  from  interfering  with  the  military  government 
or  its  officers.  We  were  sent  to  deliver  a  message  of  -. 
good-will,  to  investigate,  and  to  recommend,  and  th^« 
our  powers  ended. 

Mr.  Schurman  and  I,  with  a  small  clerical  force,  sailed 
from  Vancouver,  January  31,  1899.     On  our  arrival  at 
Yokohama  we  learned  with  keen  regret  of  the  outbreak  • 
of  hostilities  at  Manila. 

Blount  has  incorrectly  stated  that  President  McIQnley 
had  sent  the  commission  out  when  the  dogs  of  war  were 
already  let  loose.*    The  dogs  of  war  had  not  been  looseci 

'  For  the  full  text  of  these  inBtniotionB,  see  appendix,  p.  075. 

'  ' '  Mr.  McKinley  sent  Mr.  Taf t  out,  in  the  spring  preceding  the  elec- 
tion of  1900,  to  help  General  MaoArthur  run  the  war." — Bi^cnt,  p.  281. 

"The  Taft  Commission  vas  sent  out,  to  'aid'  General  MaoArthur,  as 
the  Schurman  Commission  had '  aided'  General  Otis." — Blount,  p.  289. 

*  "In  February,  1899,  the  doga  ot  war  being  already  let  loose, 
Preudent  McKinley  had  resumed  his  now  wholly  impossible  Benevolent 
Assimilation  programme,  by  sending  out  the  Schurman  Commission, 
which  was  the  prototype  of  the  Taft  ComnuBsion,  to  yeaniingly  explain 
our  intenttona  to  the  insurgents,  and  to  make  clear  to  them  how  unquali- 
fiedly benevolent  those  intentions  were.  The  scheme  was  like  trying  to 
put  salt  on  a  bird's  tail  after  you  have  flushed  him."  —  BLonifT,  p.  217. 



when  we  started,  and  one  of  Hie  main  purposes  in  sending 
us  was  to  keep  Uiem  in  their  kennels  if  possible. 

Aguinaldo  has  made  the  following  statements  in  his 
"Resefla  Verldica" :  — 

"...  We,  the  Filipinos,  would  have  recdved  said  com- 
mission, as  honourable  agents  of  the  great  America/with  demon- 
strations of  true  kindness  and  entire  adhedoD.  The  commia- 
sioners  would  have  toured  over  all  our  provinces,  seeing  and 
observing  at  close  range  order  and  tranquillity,  in  the  whole  of 
our  territory.  They  would  have  seen  the  fields  tiUed  and 
planted.  They  would  have  examined  our  Constitution  and 
public  administration,  in  perfect  peace,  and  they  would  have 
experienced  and  enjoyed  that  ineffable  charm  of  our  Oriental 
manner,  a  mixture  of  abandon  and  solicitude,  of  warmth  and 
of  frigidity,  of  confid^ce  and  of  suspiciousness,  which  makes 
our  relations  with  foreigners  change  into  a  thousand  colours, 
agreeable  to  the  utmost. 

"  Ah  1  but  this  landscape  suited  neither  General  Otis  nor  the 
Imperialists  1  For  their  criminal  intention  it  was  better  that 
the  American  conunisaoners  should  find  war  and  desolation 
in  the  Philippines,  perceiving  from  the  day  of  their  arrival  the 
fetid  stench  emitted  by  the  mingled  corpses  of  Americans  and 
FihpinOB.  For  their  purposes  it  was  better  that  that  gentle- 
man, Mr.  Schurman,  Prudent  of  the  Commission,  could  not 
leave  Manila,  limiting  himself  to  listen  to  the  few  Filipinos, 
who,  having  yielded  to  the  reasonings  of  gold,  were  partisans 
of  the  Imperialists.  It  was  better  that  the  commission  should 
contemplate  the  PbiUppine  problem  through  confiagrations, 
to  the  whiz  of  bullets,  on  the  transverse  light  of  all  the  unchained 
passions,  in  order  that  it  might  not  form  any  exact  or  complete 
opinion  of  the  natural  and  proper  limits  of  said  problem.  Ah  I 
it  was  better,  in  short,  that  the  commission  should  leave  de- 
feated in  not  having  secured  peace,  and  would  blame  me  and 
the  other  Filipinos,  when  I  and  the  whole  FiUpino  people 
anxiously  deared  that  peace  should  have  been  secured  before 
rather  than  now,  but  an  honourable  and  worthy  peace  for  the 
United  States  and  for  the  Fhihpi»ne  Republic."  > 

These  statements,  made  to  deceive  the  public,  make 
interesting  readii^  in  the  light  of  our  present  knowledge  as 
to  the  purposes  and  plans  of  Aguinaldo  and  his  associates. 

"  P.  I.  B.,  1300.  2. 



On  our  arrival  at  Yokohama  we  were  promptly  informed 
by  a  secretary  from  the  United  States  Legation  that  no 
less  a  personage  than  Marquis  Ito  had  been  in  frequent 
communication  with  the  Filipinos  since  1894,  that  they 
had  been  looking  to  him  for  advice  fmd  support,  and 
that  he  had  interested  himself  in  the  present  situation 
sufficiently  to  come  to  the  American  minister  and  offer 
to  go  to  the  Phihppines,  not  in  any  sense  as  an  agent  of 
the  United  States,  but  as  a  private  individual,  and  to  use 
his  influence  in  our  behalf.  His  contention  was  that  the 
then  existing  conditions  resulted  from  misunderstandings. 

He  said  that  Americans  did  not  understand  Asiatics, 
but  he  was  an  Asiatic  himself  and  did  understand  the 
Filipinos,  and  thought  that  he  cotild  settle  the  whole 
affair.  The  minister  had  cabled  to  Washington  for  in- 
structions.    Naturally  the  offer  was  not  accepted.  ■ 

I  was  reminded,  by  this  extraordinary  incident,  of  a 
previous  occurrence.  I  spent  the  month  of  March,  1893, 
in  Tokio  when  returning  from  my  second  visit  to 
the  Philippines,  and  was  kindly  invited  to  inspect  the 
zoSlogical  work  at  the  Imperial  University.  When  I 
visited  the  institution  for  that  purpose,  I  was  questioned 
very  closely  on  the  islands,  their  people  and  their  re- 
sources. The  gentlemen  who  interrogated  me  may  have 
been  connected  with  the  university,  but  I  doubt  it. 

We  reached  Hongkong  on  February  22.  Here  I  had 
an  interview  with  Dr.  Apacible  of  the  junta,  while  Mr. 
Schurman  visited  Canton,  Apacible  told  me  that  the 
Filipinos  wanted  an  independent  republic  under  an  Ameri- 
can protectorate.  Prrased  for  the  details  of  their  desires, 
he  said  that  "the  function  of  a  protector  is  to  pro- 
tect." Further  than  that  he  could  not  go.  I  tried  to 
convince  him  of  the  hopelessness  of  the  course  the  Fili- 
pinos were  then  pursuing  and  of  the  kindly  intentions  of 
my  government,  but  felt  that  I  made  no  impression 
on  him. 

We  arrived  at  Manila  on  March  4,  1899,  too  late  to 



land.  Firebugs  were  abroad.  We  watched  a  number 
of  houses  bum,  and  heard  the  occasional  crackle  of  ri£e 
fire  along  the  line  of  the  defences  around  the  city.  The 
next  morning  there  was  artillery  fire  for  a  time  at  San 
Pedro  Mac&ti.  Everywhere  were  abundant  evidences 
that  the  war  was  on. 

This  left  little  for  us  to  do  at  the  moment  except  to 
inform  ourselves  as  to  conditions,  especially  as  Colonel 
Denby  had  not  yet  arrived,  and  General  Otis  was  over- 
whelmed with  work  and  anxiety. 

I  renewed  my  acquaintance  with  many  old  Filipino 
and  Spanish  friends  and  improved  the  opportunity,  not 
likely  to  recur  in  my  experience,  to  see  as  much  as  possible 
of  the  fighting  in  Uie  field. 

One  day  when  I  was  at  San  Pedro  Mac&ti,  Captain 
Dyer,  who  commanded  a  battery  of  3.2'inch  guns  there, 
suggested  that  if  I  wished  to  investigate  the  effect  of 
shrapnel  fire  I  could  do  so  by  visiting  a  place  on  a  neigh- 
boxuing  hillside  which  he  indicated.  Acting  upon  his  sug- 
gestion, I  set  out,  accompanied  by  my  private  secretary, 
who,  like  myself,  was  clad  in  white  duck.  The  Insurgent 
shai^jshooters  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  devoted  some 
attention  to  us,  but  we  knew  that  so  long  as  they  aimed 
at  us  we  were  quite  safe.  Few  of  their  bullets  came  within 
hearing  distance. 

We  were  hunting  about  on  the  hillside  for  the  place  indi- 
cated by  Captain  Dyer,  when  suddenly  we  heard  ourselves 
cursed  loudly  and  fluently  in  extremely  plain  American, 
and  there  emerged  from  a  neighbouring  thicket  a  very 
angry  infantry  oflBcer.  On  venturing  to  inquire  the  cause 
of  his  most  uncomplimentary  remarks,  I  foimd  that  he  was 
in  command  of  skirmishers  who  were  going  through  the 
brush  to  see  whether  there  was  anything  left  there  which 
needed  shooting  up.  As  many  of  the  Insurgent  soldiers 
dressed  in  white,  and  as  American  civilians  were  not  com- 
monly to  be  met  in  Insurgent  territory,  these  men  had 
been  just  about  to  fire  on  us  when  they  discovered  their 

VOL.  I  — X 



mistake.  We  went  back  to  Manila  and  bou^t  some 
khaki  clothes. 

At  first  my  interest  in  military  matters  was  not  t^ipre- 
ciated  by  my  army  friends,  who  could  not  see  what 
business  I  had  to  be  wandering  around  without  a  gun  in 
places  where  guns  were  in  use.  I  had,  howevra-,  long 
since  discovered  that  reliable  first-hand  information  on 
any  subject  is  Likely  to  be  useful  sooner  or  later,  and  so  it 
proved  in  this  case. 

For  several  weeks  after  we  reached  Manila  there  vaa 
no  active  military  movement ;  then  came  the  inaugura- 
tion  of  the  short,  sharp  campaign  which  ended  for  the 
moment  with  the  taking  of  Malolos.  For  long,  tedious 
weeks  oiu-  soldiers  had  sweltered  in  muddy  trenches, 
shot  at  by  an  always  invisible  foe  whom  they  were  not 
allowed  to  attack.  It  was  anticipated  that  when  the 
forward  movement  b^an,  it  wotild  be  active.  Close 
secrecy  was  maintained  with  regard  to  it.  Captain  Hed- 
worth  Lambton,  of  the  British  cruiser  Powerfvl,  then  lying 
in  Manila  Bay,  exacted  a  promise  from  me  that  I  would 
tell  him  if  I  found  out  when  the  advance  was  to  begin,  so 
that  we  might  go  to  Caloocan  together  and  watch  the 
fighting  from  the  church  tower,  which  commanded  a  mag- 
nificent view  of  the  field  of  operations. 

I  finally  heard  a  fairly  definite  statement  that  our 
troops  would  move  the  following  morning.  I  rurfied  to 
General  Otis's  office  and  after  some  parleying  had  it  con- 
firmed by  him.  It  was  then  too  late  to  advise  Lambton, 
and  in  fact  X  could  not  properly  have  done  so,  as  the 
information  had  been  pven  me  under  pledge  of  secrecy. 
Accompanied  by  my  private  secretary,  Dr.  P.  L.  Sherman, 
I  hastened  to  Caloocan,  where  we  arrived  just  at  dusk, 
having  had  to  run  the  gantlet  of  numerous  inquisitive 
sentries  en  route. 

We  spent  the  night  in  the  church,  where  Gen«^ 
Wheaton  and  his  staff  had  their  headquarters,  and  long 
before  daylight  were  perched  in  a  convrauent  opening  in, 







its  galvamzed  iron  roof,  made  on  a  former  oooasiOD  by  a 
shell  from  Dewey's  fleet. 

From  this  vantage  point  we  oould  see  the  entire  length 
of  the  line  of  battle.  The  attack  began  shortly  after  day- 
light. Near  Caloocan  the  Insurgent  works  were  close  in, 
but  further  off  toward  La  Loma  they  were  in  some  places 
distant  a  mile  or  more  from  the  trenches  of  the  Americans. 

The  general  plan  of  attack  was  that  the  whole  Ameri- 
can line  should  rotate  to  the  north  and  west  on  Caloocan 
as  a  pivot,  driving  the  Insurgents  in  toward  Malabon  if 
possible.  The  latter  began  to  fire  as  soon  as  the  Ameri- 
can troops  showed  themselves,  regardless  of  the  fact  that 
their  enemies  were  quite  out  of  range.  As  most  of  them 
were  using  black-powder  cartridges,  their  four  or  five 
miles  of  trenches  were  instantly  outlined.  The  ground 
was  very  dry  so  that  the  bullets  threw  up  puffs  of  dust 
where  they  struck,  and  it  was  possible  to  judge  the 
accuracy  of  the  fire  of  each  of  the  opposing  forces. 

Rather  heavy  resistance  was  encoimtered  on  the  extreme 
right,  and  the  turning  movement  did  not  materialize  as 
rapidly  as  had  been  hoped.  General  Wheaton,  who  was 
in  command  of  the  forces  about  the  church,  finally  moved 
to  the  front,  and  as  we  were  directly  in  the  rear  of  his  line 
and  the  Insurgents,  as  usual,  overshot  badly,  we  found 
ourselves  in  an  uncomfortably  hot  comer.  Bullets 
rattled  on  the  church  roof  like  hdl,  and  presently  one 
passed  through  the  opening  through  which  Major  Bourns, 
Colonel  Potter,  of  the  engineer  corps,  and  I  were  sticking 
our  heads.  Inmiediately  thereafter  we  were  observed 
by  Dr.  Sherman  making  record  time  on  all  fours  along 
one  of  the  framing  timbers  of  the  church  toward  its 
tower.  There  we  took  up  our  station,  and  thereafter 
observed  the  fighting  by  peeping  throu^  windows 
partially  closed  with  blocks  of  volcanic  tuff.  We  had  a 
beautiful  opportunity  to  see  the  artillery  fire.  The  guns 
were  directly  in  front  of  and  below  us  and  we  could 
watch  the  laying  of  the  several  pieces  and  then  turn  our 



field-glasses  on  the  particular  portions  of  the  Insurgent 
trenches  where  the  projectiles  were  Ukely  to  strike. 
Again  and  again  we  caught  bursting  shells  in  the  fields 
of  our  glasses  and  could  thus  see  their  effect  as  accurately 
as  if  we  had  been  standing  close  by,  without  any  danger 
of  being  perforated  by  shrapnel. 

After  the  Insurgent  position  had  been  carried  we 
walked  forward  to  their  line  of  trenches  and  followed  it 
east  to  a  point  beyond  the  La  Loma  Church,  counting 
the  dead  and  wounded,  as  I  had  heard  wild  stories  of 
tremendous  slaughter  and  wanted  to  see  just  how  much 
damage  the  fire  of  our  troops  had  really  done.  On  om* 
way  we  passed  the  Caloocan  railroad  station  which  had 
been  converted  into  a  temporary  field  hospital.  Here  I 
saw  good  Father  McEinnon,  the  chaplain  of  the  First 
California  Volimteers,  assisting  a  surgeon  and  soaked 
with  the  blood  of  wounded  men.  He  was  one  chaplain 
in  a  thousand.  It  was  always  easy  to  find  him.  One 
had  only  to  look  where  trouble  threatened  and  help  was 
needed.    He  was  sure  to  be  there. 

On  my  way  from  the  railway  station  to  the  trenches  I 
met  a  very  much  excited  officer  returning  from  the  front. 
He  had  evidently  had  a  long  and  recent  interview  with 
Cyrus  Noble/  and  was-  determined  to  tell  me  all  about 
the  fighting.  I  escaped  from  him  after  some  delay,  and 
with  much  difficulty.  Later  he  remembered  having  met 
me,  but  made  a  grievous  mistake  as  to  the  scene  of  our 
encounter,  insisting  that  we  had  been  together  in  "Whea- 
ton's  Hole,"  an  uncommonly  hot  position  where  numerous 
people  got  hurt.  He  persisted  in  giving  a  graphic  account 
of  our  experiences,  and  in  paying  high  tribute  to  my 
coolness  and  courage  under  heavy  fire.  My  efforts  to 
persuade  him  that  I  had  not  been  with  hjni  there  proved 
futile,  and  I  finally  gave  up  the  attempt.  I  wonder 
how  many  other  miUtary  reputations  rest  upon  so  slender 

'  A  bnnd  of  whiakey  tben  muoh  in  use. 



a  foundation  I  This  experience  was  unique.  I  never 
saw  another  officer  under  the  influence  of  liquor  when 
in  the  field. 

At  the  time  that  we  visited  the  Insurgent  trenches, 
not  all  of  our  own  killed  and  wounded  had  been  removed, 
yet  every  wounded  Insurgent  whom  we  found  had  a 
United  States  army  canteen  of  water  at  his  side,  obviouBly 
left  by  some  kindly  American  soldier.  Not  a  few  of  the 
injured  had  been  furnished  hardtack  as  well.  All  were 
ultimately  taken  to  Manila  and  there  given  the  best  of 
care  by  army  surgeona. 

Sometime  later  a  most  extraordinary  account  of  this 
fight,  written  by  a  soldier,  was  published  in  the  Springfield 
Republican.  It  was  charged  that  our  men  had  murdered 
prisoners  in  cold  blood,  and  had  committed  all  maimer 
of  barbarities,  the  writer  saying  among  other  things :  — 

"We  Bret  bombarded  a  town  called  Malabon  and  then 
entered  it  and  killed  every  man,  woman  and  child  in  the  place." 

The  facts  were  briefly  as  follows :  There  was  an  Insur- 
gent regiment  in  and  near  a  mangrove  swamp  to  the  right 
of  this  town.  Whrai  it  became  obstreperous  it  was 
shelled  for  a  short  time  untU  it  quieted  down  agun. 
Kone  of  the  shells  entered  the  town.  Indeed,  most  of 
them  struck  in  the  water.  Our  troops  did  not  enter 
Malabon  that  day,  but  passed  to  the  northward,  leaving 
behind  a  small  guard  to  keep  the  Insurants  from  coming 
out  of  Malabon  in  their  rear.  Had  tiiey  then  entered 
the  town,  they  would  not  have  found  any  women,  chil- 
dren or  non-combatant  men  to  kill  for  the  reason  that  all 
such  persons  had  been  sent  away  some  time  before. 
The  town  was  burned,  in  part,  but  by  the  Insurgents 
themselves.  They  fired  the  church  and  a  great  orphan 
asylum,  and  did  much  other  wanton  damage. 

Being  able  to  speak  from  personal  observation  as  to 
the  occurrences  of  that  day,  I  sent  a  long  cablegram  direct 
to  the  Chicago  Times-Herald  stating  the  facts. 



After  my  return  to  the  United  States,  President  McKin- 
tey  was  kind  enough  to  say  to  me  that  if  there  had  been 
no  other  result  from  the  visit  of  the  first  Philippine  Com- 
mission to  the  islands  than  the  sending  of  that  cablegram, 
he  should  have  considered  the  expense  involved  more 
than  justified.  He  added  that  the  country  was  being 
flooded  at  the  time  with  false  and  slanderous  rumours, 
and  people  at  home  did  not  know  what  to  believe.  The 
statements  of  army  officers  were  discounted  in  advance, 
and  other  testimony  from  some  unprejudiced  source  was 
badly  needed. 

On  April  2, 1890,  Colonel  Denby  arrived,  and  our  serious 
work  began.  The  fighting  continued  and  there  was  little 
that  we  could  do  save  earnestly  to  strive  to  promote 
friendly  relations  with  the  conservative  element  among 
the  Filipinos,  and  to  gather  the  information  we  had  been 
instructed  to  obtain. 

On  April  4,  1899,  we  issued  a  proclamation  setting 
forth  in  clear  and  simple  language  the  purposes  of  the 
Am^can  govenunent.^  It  was  translated  into  Tagfilog 
and  other  dialects  and  widely  circulated.  The  Insuigent 
leaders  were  alert  to  keep  the  common  people  and  the 
soldiers  from  learning  of  the  kindly  purposes  of  the 
United  States.  They  were  forbidden  to  read  the  docu- 
ment and  we  were  rehably  informed  that  the  imposition 
of  the  death  penalty  was  threatened  if  this  order  was 
violated.  In  Manila  crowds  of  Filipinos  gathered  about 
copies  of  the  proclamation  which  were  posted  in  pubfic 
places.  Many  of  them  were  soon  effaced  by  Insurgent 
^ents  or  sympathisers. 

This  document  unquestionably  served  a  very  useful 
purpose.*  For  one  tlfing,  it  promptly  brought  us  into 
much  closer  touch  with  the  more  conservative  Filipinos. 

<  For  the  text  of  this  document  sen  the  Appendix,  p.  977. 

*  In  view  of  the  alleged  attitude  of  Qenenl  Otis  toward  the  work 
of  the  Commission,  the  following  statement  by  him  as  to  the  effect 
of  this  procUmation  is  of  interest ;  — 
Oen^  Otis  said:  "It  was  niuuiimoualy  decided  to  print,  pabliBfa, 



We  soon  established  relations  of  friendlineefi  and  confi- 
dence with  men  like  Arellano,  Tome,  Legarda  and  Tavera, 
who  had  left  the  Malolos  government  when  it  demon- 
strated its  futility,  and  yrere  ready,  to  turn  to  the  United 
States  for  help.  Insurgent  sympathizers  also  conferred 
freely  with  us.  We  were  invited  to  a  beautiful  function 
^ven  in  our  honour  at  the  home  of  a  wealthy  family, 
and  were  impressed,  as  no  one  can  fail  to  be,  with  the 
dignified  betuing  of  our  Filipino  hosts,  a  thing  which  is 
always  in  evidence  on  such  occasions.  We  gave  a  return 
function  which  was  lai^y  attended  and  greatly  aided 
in  the  establishment  of  relations  of  confidence  and  friend- 
ship with  leading  Fihpino  residents  of  Manila. 

The  FihpinoB  were  much  impressed  with  Colonel  Deuby. 
He  was  a  handsome  man,  of  imposing  presence,  with  one 
of  the  kindest  hearts  that  ever  beat.  They  felt  instinc- 
tively that  they  could  have  confidence  in  him,  and  showed 
it  on  all  occasions. 

Meanwhile  we  lost  no  opportunity  to  inform  ourselves 
as  to  conditions  and  events,  conferring  with  Filipinos  from 
varioxis  parts  of  the  archipelago  and  with  Chinese,  Ger- 
mans, Frenchmen,  Balkans,  Austrians,  Englishmen, 
Spaniards  and  Americans.    Among  the  witnesses  who 

post,  and  diBseminate  as  much  as  posrible  among  the  iohabitanta 
under  insurgent  domination  this  addreas,  printine  tb«  same  in  the 
Encliah,  Spaciili,  and  Tagilog  lansuagea.  This  vas  done,  but 
Boaroel;  had  it  been  posted  in  ManOa  tventy-four  hours  before 
it  was  so  torn  and  mutilated  aa  to  be  unreoogni  sable.  It  mfiered 
the  same  fate  aa  the  proclamation  of  January  4,  set  out  in 
pages  113  and  114  of  this  report,  but  it  produeed  a  marked 
benefioiol  influence  on  the  people,  eapeoially  thoae  outside  our 
lines,  as  it  carried  with  it  a  conviction  of  the  United  States'  intentions, 
on  account  of  the  source  from  vhioh  it  emanated,  it  being  an 
expression  from  a  committee  of  gentlemen  espeoially  appointed  to 
proclaim  the  policy  which  the  United  States  would  pursue." 

—  Tatloe,  90  AJ. 
Taylor  adds:  "Theoomnumder  of  one  of  the  regiments  of  sandatahan 
in  Manila  reported  that  he  had  foroed  the  people  of  the  city  to  destroy 
the  prodamationa  liaued  by  the  oommiadon  (P.  I.  R.,  73.  0).  As  he 
found  this  necessary,  the  action  erf  the  people  could  hardly  have  reflected 
their  real  feelings  in  the  matter." 



came  before  us  were  farmers,  bankers,  brokers,  merchiuits, 
lawyers,  physicians,  railroad  men,  shipowners,  educators 
and  public  officiatB.  Certainly  all  classes  of  opinion  were 
represented,  and  when  we  were  called  upon  by  the  Presi- 
dent, a  little  later,  for  a  statement  of  the  situation  we  felt 
fully  prepared  to  make  it. 

Blount  has  charged  that  the  commission  attranpted  to 
interfere  with  the  conduct  of  the  war,  and  cites  a  cable- 
gram from  General  Otis  statii^  that  conferences  with 
Insurgents  cost  soldiers'  lives  in  support  of  this  conten- 
tion. No  conference  with  Insurgent  leaders  was  ever 
held  without  the  previous  knowledge  and  approval  of 
the  general,  who  was  himself  a  member  of  the  commission. 

I^te  in  April  General  Luna  sent  Colonel  Arguelles  of 
his  stafiE  to  ask  for  a  fifteen  days'  suspension  of  hostilities 
under  the  pretext  of  enabling  the  Insurgent  congress  to 
meet  at  San  Fernando,  Pampanga,  on  May  1,  to  discuss 
the  situation  and  decide  what  it  wanted  to  do.  He  called 
on  the  commission  and  ui^ed  us  to  ask  Otis  to  grant  this 
request,  but  we  declined  to  intervene,  and  General  Otis 
refused  to  grant  it. 

Mabini  continued  Lima's  effort,  sending  Arguelles 
back  with  letters  to  Otis  and  to  the  commission.  In  the 
latter  he  asked  for  "an  armistice  and  a  suspension  of 
hostihties  as  sa  indispensable  means  of  arriving  at  peace," 
stating  explicitly  that  the  PhiUppine  government  "does 
not  solicit  the  armistice  to  gain  a  space  of  time  in  which 
to  refinforce  itself." 

The  commission  again  referred  Ai^elles  to  General 
Otis  on  the  matter  of  armistice  and  suspension  of  hostih- 
ties. We  suspected  that  the  statement  that  these  things 
were  not  asked  for  in  order  to  gain  time  was  false, 
and  this  has  since  been  definitely  established. 

Taylor  says ;  — 

"On  April  11  Mabini  wrote  to  G^eral  Luna  (Exhibit  719) 
thaA  Aguinaldo's  council  was  of  the  opinion  that  no  negotia- 
tions for  the  release  of  the  Sfianish  prisoners  should  be  conad- 



ered  iinlesB  the  American  Commisaon  agreed  to  a  suapenmon 
of  hostilities  for  the  purpose  of  treating,  not  only  in  regard  to 
the  prisoners,  but  for  the  purpose  of  opening  negotiationB  be- 
tween Aguinaldo's  government  and  the  American  authorities. 
'"In  arriving  at  this  decidonwe  have  been  actuated  by  the 
desire  to  gain  time  for  our  arsenals  to  produce  sufficient  car- 
tridges, if,  as  would  seem  to  be  probable,  they  persist  in  not 
even  recognizing  our  belligerency,  as  means  for  furthering  the 
recognition  of  our  independence.' "  * 

Arguelles,  on  his  return,  was  instructed  to  ask  Otis 
for  a  — 

"general  armistice  and  suspension  of  hostilities  in  all  the  archi- 
pelago for  the  short  space  of  three  months,  in  order  to  enable 
it  to  consult  the  opinion  of  the  people  concerning  the  govern- 
ment which  would  be  the  most  advantageous,  and  the  inter- 
vention in  it  which  should  be  ^ven  to  the  North  American 
Government,  and  to  appoint  an  extraon^nary  commission  with 
full  powers,  to  act  in  the  name  of  the  Philippine  people."  * 

General  Otis  naturally  again  declined  to  grant  the  re- 
quest for  a  suspension  of  hostilities. 

Little  came  of  the  conference  between  Arguelles  and 
the  commission,  except  that  we  really  succeeded  in  con- 
vincing him  of  the  good  intentions  of  our  government, 
and  th^  promptly  got  him  into  very  serious  trouble,  as 
we  shall  soon  see.  I  took  him  to  a  tent  hospital  on  the 
First  Reserve  Hospital  grounds  where  wounded  Insur- 
gents were  receiving  the  best  of  treatment  at  the  hands 
of  American  surgeons,  and  he  was  amazed.  He  had  been 
taught  to  beheve  that  the  Americans  murdered  prisoners, 
raped  women,  and  committed  similar  barbarities  when- 
ever they  got  a  chwice.  As  we  have  seen,  stories  of  this 
sort  were  industrioiisly  spread  by  many  of  the  Insurgent 
leaders  among  their  soldiers,  and  among  the  common 
people  as  well.  They  served  to  arouse  the  passions  of  the 
former,  and  stirred  them  up  to  acts  of  devilish  brutahty 
which  they  might  perhaps  not  otherwise  have  perpetrated. 

»  Taylor.  96  AJ.  '  ttrid. 



AxgaeHea  told  the  truth  upon  his  return,  and  this,  together 
with  his  suggestion  that  it  might  be  well  to  consider  the 
acceptance  of  the  form  of  government  offered  by  the 
United  States,  nearly  cost  him  his  life.  Relative  to  this 
matter  Taylor  says :  — 

"When  Arguelles  returned  to  the  insurgent  lines,  it  must 
have  been  conadered  that  be  had  said  too  much  in  Manila. 
While  he  had  been  sent  there  to  persuade  the  Americans  to 
agree  to  a  euspennon  of  hostdlitiefl  to  be  consumed  in  endless 
discussion  under  cover  of  which  Luna's  army  could  be  reorgan- 
iaed,  he  had  not  only  failed  to  secure  the  desired  armistice,  but 
had  come  back  with  the  opinion  that  it  might  after  all  be 
advisable  to  accept  the  government  proposed  by  the  Umted 
States.  On  May  22  General  Luna  ordered  his  arrest  and 
trial  for  being  in  favour  of  the  autonomy  of  the  United  States 
in  the  Philippine  Islands.  He  was  tried  promptly,  the  prose- 
cuting  witness  being  another  officer  of  Luna's  staff  who  had 
accompanied  him  to  Manila  and  acted  aa  a  spy  upon  his  move- 
ments (P.  I.  R.,  285.  2).  The  court  sentenced  him  to  dismissal 
and  confinement  at  hard  labor  for  twelve  years.  This  did  not 
satisfy  Luna's  thirst  for  vengeance,  and  he  was  imprisoned  in 
Bautista  on  the  first  floor  of  a  building  whose  second  story 
was  occupied  by  that  officer.  One  night  Luna  came  alone 
into  the  room  where  he  was  confined  and  told  him  that  although 
he  was  a  traitor,  yet  he  had  done  good  service  to  the  cause; 
and  it  was  not  proper  that  a  man  who  had  been  a  colonel  in  the 
army  should  be  seen  working  on  the  roads  under  a  guard.  He 
told  him  that  the  proper  thing  for  him  to  do  was  to  blow  his 
brains  out,  and  that  if  he  did  not  do  it  within  a  reasonable  time 
the  sentinel  at  his  door  would  shoot  him.  He  gave  him  a 
{Hstol  and  left  the  room.  Ai^elles  decided  not  to  kill  him- 
self, but  fully  expected  that  the  guard  would  kill  him.  Shortly 
afterwM'ds  Luna  was  summoned  to  meet  Aguinaldo,  and  never 
returned.  On  September  20,  1899,  his  sentence  was  declared 
null  and  void  and  he  was  r^nstated  in  his  former  rank  (P.  I.  R., 
286.  3,  and  2030.  2)."  ' 

Colonel  Arguelles  has  told  me  exactly  the  same  story. 
For  a  time  it  seemed  as  if  the  views  expressed  by  him 
might  prevail. 



i:  3 




^^  i « 




"According  to  Felipe  BueDcamino  and  acme  others,  the 
majority  of  the  members  of  congress  had  been  in  favour  of  abso- 
lute independence  until  they  saw  the  demoralization  of  the 
officers  and  soldiers  which  resulted  in  the  American  occupation 
of  Maloloa.  In  the  middle  of  April,  1899,  they  remembered 
Arellano's  advice,  and  all  of  the  intelligent  men  in  Aguinaldo's 
government,  except  Antonio  Luna  and  the  officers  who  had 
no  desire  to  lay  down  their  mihtaiy  rank,  decided  to  accept 
the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States.  At  about  the  same  time 
copies  of  the  proclamation  issued  by  the  American  Commis- 
sion in  Manila  reached  them  and  still  further  infiuenoed  them 
toward  the  adoption  of  this  purpose.  By  the  time  congress 
met  in  San  Isidro  on  May  1,  1869,  all  of  the  members  had 
accepted  it  except  a  few  partisans  of  Mabini,  then  president 
of  the  council  of  government.  At  its  Srat  meeting  the  congress 
resolved  to  change  the  policy  of  war  with  the  United  States 
to  one  of  peace,  and  this  change  of  poUcy  in  congress  led  to 
the  fall  of  Mabini  and  his  succeaaon  by  Patemo.  The  first 
act  of  the  new  council  was  the  appointment  of  a  commisaioQ 
headed  by  Felipe  Buencamino  which  was  to  go  to  Manila  and 
there  negotiate  with  the  Anaerican  authorities  for  an  honourable 
surrender." ' 

"Although  Mabini  bad  fallen  from  power,  Luna  and  hia 
powerful  faction  had  still  to  be  reckoned  with.  He  was  Ues 
moderate  than  Mabini,  and  had  armed  adherents,  which  Mabini 
did  not,  and  when  Patemo  declared  his  policy  of  moderation 
and  diplomacy  he  answered  it  on  the  day  the  new  council  of 
government  was  proclaimed  by  an  order  that  all  foreigners 
hving  in  the  Philippines  except  Chinese  and  Spaniards,  should 
leave  for  Manila  within  forty-eight  hours." ' 

Unfortunately  Luna  intercepted  the  Buencamino  com- 
missioo.  Its  head  he  kicked,  cuffed  and  threatened  with 
a  revolver.  One  of  itB  members  was  General  Gr^orio  del 
Pilar.  He  was  allowed  to  proceed,  as  he  commanded  a 
brigade  of  troops  which  mi^t  hare  deserted  had  he  been 
badly  treated,  but  Luna  named  three  other  men  to  go 
with  him  in  place  of  those  who  had  been  originally  ap- 
pointed.^  They  were  Gracio  Gonaaga,  Captain  Zialcita, 
aad  Alberto  Baretto.    They  reached  Manila  on  May  19, 

"  TaylOT,  97  AJ.  •  Ibid. 

•  NominaUy  they  ware  D&med  by  A^uinaldo. 



1899,  and  during  thdr  stay  there  had  two  long  inter- 
viewa  with  the  commission. 

They  said  that  they  had  come,  with  larger  powers  than 
had  been  conferred  on  Arguelles,  to  discuss  the  possibiUty 
of  peace,  the  form  of  ultimate  government  which  might 
be  proposed  in  future,  and  the  attitude  of  the  United 
States  government  toward  needed  reforms. 

Meanwhile,  on  May  4,  we  had  laid  before  the  Preffldent 
a  plan  of  government  informally  discussed  with  Arguelles, 
and  had  received  the  following  reply,  authorizii^,  in  sub- 
stance, what  we  had  suggested :  — 

"Wakhinqton,  May  5, 1899, 10.20  p.m. 
"ScHOEBiAN,  Manila  : 

"Yours  4th  received.  You  are  authorized  to  propose  that 
under  the  military  power  of  the  President,  pending  action  of 
Congress,  government  of  the  Plulippine  IslandB  shall  corndst 
of  a  governor-general,  appointed  by  the  President;  cabinet, 
appointed  by  the  governor-general ;  a  general  advisory  council 
elected  by  the  people ;  the  qualifications  of  electors  to  be  care- 
fully conadered  and  determined ;  the  governor-general  to  have 
absolute  veto.  Judiciary  strong  and  independent;  principal 
judges  appointed  by  the  Preddent,  The  cabinet  and  judges 
to  be  chosen  from  natives  or  Americans,  or  both,  having  regard 
to  fitness.  The  President  earnestly  desires  the  cessation  of 
bloodshed,  and  that  the  people  of  the  Philippine  Islands  at  an 
early  date  shall  have  the  largest  measure  of  local  aelf-govem- 
ment  consistent  with  peace  and  good  order. 

"Hat."  » 

Our  proclamation  of  April  4,  1890,  was  also  taken  up 
at  their  request  and  was  gone  over  minutely,  sentence  by 
sentence.  We  were  asked  to  explain  certain  expresuons 
which  they  did  not  fully  understand. 

They  told  us  that  it  would  be  hard  for  their  army  to 
lay  down  its  arms  when  it  had  accomplished  nothing,  and 
a^ed  if  it  could  be  taken  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States.    We  answered  that  some  of  the  regiments  might 

'  Repent  of   the  Plulippine  Conunisaioii  to  the  Pretident,  Vc^.  I, 

1900,  p.  9. 



be  taken  over  and  employment  on  public  works  be  found 
for  the  soldiers  of  others. 

We  endeavoured  to  arrange  for  an  interview  with 
Aguinaldo,  either  going  to  meet  him  or  assuring  hiin  safe 
conduct  should  he  desire  to  confer  with  us  at  Manila. 

They  left,  promising  to  return  in  three  weeks  when 
they  had  had  time  to  consider  the  matters  under  discus- 
mon,  but  they  never  came  back. 

Shortly  thereafter  there  was  an  odd  occurrence.  Soon 
after  our  arrival  we  had  learned  that  Mr.  Schurman 
was  a  man  of  very  variable  opinions.  He  was  rather 
readily  convinced  by  plausible  arfi^uments,  but  sometimes 
very  suddenly  reversed  his  views  on  an  important 

At  the  outset  Archbishop  Nozaleda  made  a  great  im- 
pression upon  him.  The  Archbishop  was  a  thorough- 
going Spaniard  of  the  old  school,  and  entertained  BOme- 
what  radical  opinions  as  to  what  should  be  done  to  end  the 
distressing  situation  which  existed.  After  talking  with 
him  Mr.  Schurman  seemed  to  be  convinced  that  we 
ought  to  adopt  a  stern  and  bloody  policy,  a  conclusion 
to  which  Colonel  Denby  and  I  decidedly  objected. 

A  little  later  he  made  a  trip  up  the  Fasig  River  with 
Admiral  Dewey  and  others  and  had  a  chance  to  see  some- 
thing of  the  aftermath  of  war.  It  was  not  at  all  pretty. 
It  never  is.  I  was  waiting  for  him  with  a  carriage  at  the 
river  landing  on  his  return  and  had  hard  work  to  keep 
him  away  from  the  cable  office.  His  feelings  had  under- 
gone a  complete  revulsion.  He  insisted  that  if  the  Ameri- 
can people  knew  what  we  were  doing  they  would  demand 
that  the  war  be  terminated  immediately  at  any  cost  and 
by  whatsoever  means,  and  he  wanted  to  tell  them  all 
about  it  at  once.  By  the  next  morning,  however,  thu^ 
fortunately  looked  rather  di£ferently  to  him. 

Mr.  Schurman  acquired  a  working  knowledge  of  the 
Spanish  language  with  extraordinary  promptness.  Shortly 
thereafter  Colonel  Denby  and  I  discovered  that  when 



FilipiiUM  came  to  see  the  commis^on  in  order  to  imput 
infonnation  or  to  seek  it,  he  was  conferring  with  them 
privately  and  sending  them  away  without  our  seeing  them 
at  all. 

Soon  after  we  had  made  our  formal  statement  of 
the  situation  to  the  President,  Mr.  Schurman  had  an 
interview  with  an  Englishman  who  had  been  Uvii^  in 
Insurgent  territory  north  of  Manila,  from  which  he  had 
just  been  ejected,  in  accordance  with  Luna's  order.  This 
man  told  him  all  about  the  mistakes  of  the  Americans  and 
evidently  greatly  impressed  him,  for  shortly  thereafter  he 
read  to  us  at  a  commission  meeting  a  draft  of  a  proposed 
cablegram  which  he  said  he  hoped  we  would  approve. 
It  would  have  stultified  us,  had  we  signed  it,  as  it  involved 
in  effect  the  abandonment  of  the  position  we  had  so 
recently  taken  and  a  radical  change  in  the  policy  we  had 
recommended.  Mr.  Schurman  told  us  that  if  we  did 
not  care  to  sign  it,  he  would  send  it  as  an  expression  of 
bis  personal  opinion.  Colonel  Denby  asked  him  if  his 
personal  opinion  differed  from  his  official  opinion,  and 
received  an  affirmative  reply.  We  declined  to  approve 
the  proposed  cabl^p'am,  whereupon  he  informed  us  that 
if  his  policy  were  adopted,  he  and  General  Aguinaldo  would 
settle  things  without  assistance  from  us,  and  that  other- 
wise he  would  resign.  He  inquired  whether  we,  too, 
would  send  a  cable,  and  we  told  him  certainly  not,  unless 
further  information  from  us  was  requested.  He  sent  his 
proposed  message,  in  somewhat  modified  form,  and  re> 
ceived  a  prompt  reply  instructing  him  to  submit  it  to  the 
full  conunission  and  cable  their  views. 

He  did  submit  it  to  Colonel  Denby  and  myself  at  a 
regularly  called  commission  meeting,  ai^ed  that  in  doing 
this  he  had  obeyed  the  President's  instructions,  and 
vowed  that  he  would  not  show  it  to  General  Otis.  I 
showed  it  to  the  General  myself,  allowing  him  to  believe 
that  I  did  BO  with  Mr.  Schurman's  approval,  and  thus 
avoided  serious  trouble,  as  he  had  been  personally  advised 



from  Washington  of  the  instructions  to  Mr.  Schurman. 
The  General  then  joined  with  Colonel  Denby  and  myaelf 
in  a  cablegram  setting  forth  om*  views,  and  so  this  incident 

Mr.  Schunnaa  did  not  resign,  but  thereafter  we  saw 
very  little  of  him.  He  made  a  hasty  trip  to  the  Visayas 
and  the  Southern  Islands  and  sailed  for  the  United  States 
shortly  after  his  return  to  Manila,  being  anxious  to  get 
back  in  time  for  the  opening  of  the  college  year  at  Cornell. 

Colonel  Denby  and  I  were  instructed  to  remain  at 
Manila,  where  we  rendered  such  assistance  as  we  could 
give,  and  continued  to  gather  information  relative  to  the 
situation,  the  country  and  the  people.  In  this  latter 
work  we  were  given  invaluable  help  by  Jesuit  priests,  who 
prepared  for  us  a  comprehensive  monograph  embodying 
a  very  large  amount  of  valuable  information,  and  furnished 
us  a  series  of  new  maps  as  well.  The  latter  were  subse- 
quently published  by  the  United  States  Coast  and  Geo- 
detic Survey  in  the  form  of  an  Atlas  of  the  Philippines. 

Early  in  September  we  had  a  most  interesting  interview 
with  Sr.  Jos€  de  Luzuriaga,  a  distinguished  and  patriotic 
Filipino  from  western  Negros,  where  American  sover- 
eignty bad  been  accepted  without  resistance.  Up  to 
that  time  it  had  been  possible  for  the  people  of  Negros 
to  keep  out  Tag&log  invaders.  Sr.  Luzuriaga  assured 
us  that  so  long  as  this  condition  continued,  there  would 
be  no  trouble,  and  he  was  quite  right. 

Aguinaldo's  agents  eventually  gained  a  foothold  there 
for  a  short  time,  and  did  some  mischief,  but  it  did  not 
result  very  seriously. 

We  felt  an  especial  interest  in  this  island,  as  General 
Otis  had  asked  us  carefully  to  study  and  to  criticise  a 
scheme  for  its  government  which  had  been  drafted  by 
General  James  F.  Smith,  who  afterward  became  justice 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  PhiUppines,  secretary  of 
public  instruction  and  governor-general  of  the  ishmds, 
and  was  then  in  command  of  the  troops  in  Negros. 



Gen^nl  Lawton  arrived  in  the  Philippines  during  our 
stay.  His  coming  had  been  eagerly  looked  forward  to 
by  the  army.  He  had  sailed  with  the  understanding 
that  he  was  to  be  put  in  charge  of  field  operations.  While 
he  was  at  sea,  influences  were  brought  to  bear  whidi 
changed  this  plan. 

It  is  my  film  conviction  that  if  Lawton  had  been  put 
in  command,  the  war  would  have  ended  promptly.  He 
was  awonderful  man  in  the  field.  He  possessed  the  faculty 
of  instilling  his  own  tremendous  enei^y  into  his  officers 
and  men,  whose  privations  and  dangers  he  shared,  thereby 
arousing  an  unfaltering  loyalty  which  stood  him  in  good 
stead  in  time  of  need.  If  there  was  fighting  to  be  done, 
he  promptly  and  thoroughly  whipped  everything  in  ^ht. 
He  punished  looting  and  disorder  with  a  heavy  hand, 
treated  prisoners  and  noncombatants  with  the  utmost 
kindness,  and  won  the  good-will  of  all  Filipinos  with  whom 
he  caxae  in  contact. 

General  MacArthur  was  always  deelarii^  that  the 
Filipinos  were  a  unit  gainst  us  and  that  he  could  never 
get  infoimation  from  them.  General  Lawton  never 
lacked  for  such  information  as  he  needed,  and  constantly 
and  successfully  used  the  Filipinos  themselves  as  messen- 
gers and  for  other  purposes.  I  came  to  know  him  inti- 
mately, and  learned  to  admire  and  love  him  as  did  all 
those  who  had  that  great  privilege. 

For  some  time  I  had  charge  of  his  spies.  Never  have 
men  taken  longer  chances  than  did  the  faithful  few  who 
at  this  time  fiKnished  us  with  information  as  to  ev^its 
in  Insurgent  territory.  Discovery  meant  prompt  and 
cruel  death.  For  a  long  time  Major  F.  S.  Bourns  bad 
performed  the  uncongenial  task  of  directing  the  spies. 
He  was  then  the  chief  health  officer  of  Manila,  and  as 
all  sorts  of  people  were  compelled  to  consult  him  on  sani- 
tary matters,  visits  to  his  office  aroused  no  suspicion. 
He  spoke  Spanish,  and  this  was  imperatively  necessary. 
Our  spies  simply  woiild  not  communicate  results  through 



interpreters.  The  factfi  revealed  by  the  Insui^ent  records 
show  how  right  they  were  in  refusii^  to  do  bo. 

Major  Bourns  eventually  returned  to  the  United  States. 
His  work  was  taken  over  by  an  army  officer,  with  the 
result  that  two  of  our  best  men  died  very  suddenly  in  that 
gentleman's  back  yard.  As  I  spoke  Spanish,  and  as  all 
sorts  of  people  came  to  see  the  commission,  I  was  the  logi- 
cal candidate  for  this  job,  which  I  thereupon  inherited. 

Each  morning,  if  there  was  news,  I  myself  laboriously 
thumped  out  my  notes  on  the  t3T>ewriter,  making  an  orig- 
inal and  one  copy.  The  copy  I  took  at  once  to  General 
Lawton.    The  original  I  took,  later,  to  General  Otis. 

General  Lawton  was  firmly  convinced  that  most  army 
o&cerB  were  imfitted  by  their  training  to  perform  civil 
functions.  He  organized  municipal  governments  with 
all  possible  promptness  in  the  towns  occupied  by  his 
troops,  and  in  this  work  he  requested  my  assistance, 
which  I  was  of  course  glad  to  give.  Sr.  Felipe  Calderon 
drafted  a  simple  provisional  scheme  of  municipal  govern- 
ment which  I  submitted  for  criticism  to  that  most  dis- 
tinguished and  able  of  FiUpinos,  Sr.  Cayetano  Arellano.* 
When  the  final  changes  in  it  had  been  made,  I  accompanied 
General  Lawton  on  a  trip  to  try  putting  it  into  effect. 
We  held  elections  and  estabUshed  municipal  governments 
in  a  number  of  the  towns  just  south  of  Manila,  and  in 
some  of  those  along  the  Pasig  River. 

General  Otis  watched  our  operations  and  their  results 
narrowly,  and  was  sufficiently  well  pleased  with  the  latter 
to  order  General  Kobb^  to  follow  a  similar  course  in 
various  towns  on  or  near  the  railroad  north  of  Manila. 
Kobb6  did  not  profess  ~to  know  much  about  municipal 
government,  and  asked  me  to  go  with  him  and  help  until 
he  got  the  hang  of  the  thing,  which  I  did. 

Thus  it  happened  that  the  first  Philippine  Commission 
had  a  sort  of  left-handed  interest  in  the  first  municipal  gov- 
ernments established  in  the  islands  under  American  rule. 
>  Now  chief  justioe  of  the  I%ilippiiie  SuEffeme  Court. 

TOL.  I — Y 



In  hie  endeavour  to  show  that  the  Commiseion  inter- 
fered with  military  operations,  Blount  has  ascribed  cer- 
tain statements  to  Major  Starr.  He  says :  "...  at  San 
Isidro  on  or  about  November  8,  Major  Starr  said :  'We 
took  this  town  last  spring,'  stating  how  much  our  loss 
had  been  in  so  doing,  'but  partly  as  a  result  of  the  Schur^ 
man  commission  parleying  with  the  Insui^ents,  General 
Otis  had  us  fall  back.  We  have  juat  had  to  take  it 
again.'"  * 

If  Major  Starr  ever  made  such,  a  statement  he  was 
sadly  miMnformed.  General  Lawton  was  the  best  friend 
I  ever  had  in  the  United  States  Army.  I  saw  him  almost 
daily  when  he  was  in  Manila,  and  he  showed  me  the 
whole  telegraphic  correspondence  which  passed  between 
him  and  General  Otis  on  the  subject  of  the  withdrawal 
from  San  Isidro  and  Nueva  Ecij  a,  which  was  certainly  one  of 
the  most  ill  advised  moves  that  any  military  commander 
was  ever  compelled  to  make.  General  Lawton's  tmremit- 
ting  attacks  had  absolutely  demoralized  thelnsurgent  force, 
and  my  information  is  that  when  he  finally  t\imed  back, 
Aguinaldo  and  several  members  of  his  cabinet  were  wait- 
ing, ten  miles  away,  to  surrender  to  him  when  he  next 
advanced,  believing  that  they  could  never  escape  from 
him.  I  have  not  the  tel^raphic  correspondence  before 
me,  but  I  remember  its  salient  features.  Otis  ordered 
Lawton  to  withdraw,  and  Lawton,  convinced  of  the  in- 
advisability  of  the  measure,  objected.  Otis  replied  that, 
with  tile  rainy  season  coining  on,  he  coidd  neither  provi- 
sion him  nor  furnish  him  ammunition.  Lawton  an- 
swered that  he  had  provisionB  enough  to  last  three  weeks 
and  ammimition  enough  to  finish  the  war,  whereupon  Otis 
peremptorily  ordered  him  to  withdraw.  The  Philippine 
Commission  had  no  more  to  do  with  this  matter  than  they 
had  to  do  with  the  similar  order  against  advancing  which 
Otis  sent  Lawton  on  the  day  the  latter  won  the  Zapote 
Kiver  fight,  when  the  Insurgents  were  runnii^  all  over  the 
>  Blount,  p.  230. 





Province  of  Cavite.  Lawton  wanted  to  push  forward 
and  clean  the  whole  place  up.  The  reply  to  his  request 
to  be  allowed  to  do  so  ran,  U  memory  serves  me  well,  as 
follows :  ■ — 

"Do  nothine.  You  have  aoconqtUshed  all  that  was  ex- 
pected of  you.'*^ 

Later  on,  Lawton  and  his  devoted  oflScers  and  men  had 
to  duplicate  the  fierce  campaign  which  had  resulted  in 
the  taidng  of  San  Isidro.  This  made  possible  the  move> 
ment  that  Lawton  had  had  in  mind  in  the  first  instance, 
which  was  made  with  the  result  that  organized  anned 
resistance  to  the  authority  of  the  United  States  promptly, 
ceased  in  northern  Luz6n. 

While  on  this  subject  I  wi{^  to  record  the  fact  that 
shortly  after  his  return  from  the  San  Isidro  campaign 
General  Lawton  asked  me  to  accompany  him  on  a  visit 
to  General  Otis  and  act  as  a  witness.  I  did  so.  In  my 
presence  Lawton  said  to  Otis  that  if  the  latter  would 
^ve  him  two  raiments,  would  allow  him  to  arm,  equip  and 
provision  them  to  suit  himself,  and  would  turn  him  loose, 
he  would  stake  his  reputation  as  a  soldier,  and  his  position 
in  the  United  States  Army,  on  the  claim  that  within  sixty 
days  he  would  end  the  insurrection  and  would  deliver  to 
G^eral  Otis  one  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  dead  or  alive.  The 
general  laughed  at  his  offer.  General  Lawton  asked  me 
some  day  to  make  these  facts  public.  As  life  is  an  un- 
certain thing,  I  deem  it  proper  to  do  so  now.  Personally 
I  am  convinced  that  if  his  offer  hiid  been  accepted  he 
would  have  kept  his  promise. 

On  September  15,  1899,  Colonel  Denby  and  I  sailed 
for  the  United  States,  having  been  recalled  to  Washing- 
ton. Shortly  after  our  arrival  there  the  commission 
issued  a  brief  preliminary  report.  The  winter  was  spent 
in  the  preparation  of  our  final  report,  iriiich  constituted 
a  full  and  authoritative  treatise  on  the  islands,  the 
people  and  their  resources.    Father  Jos6  AIgu€,  the  dis- 



tinguiflhed  head  of  the  Philippine  Weather  Bureau,  was 
called  to  Washington  to  help  ub,  and  gave  us  invaluable 

Our  preliminary  report,  dated  November  2,  1899,  and 
the  first  volume  of  our  final  report,  published  on  January 
31,  1900,  contained  our  observations  and  recommenda- 
tions relative  to  political  matters. 

Mr.  Schurman  has  been  credited  with  saying  in  an 
address  made  on  January  11,  1902 :  "Any  decent  kind  of 
government  of  Filipinos  by  Filipinos  is  better  than  the 
best  possible  govemm^it  of  Filipinos  by  Americans."  ^ 

On  November  2,  1900,  he  signed  the  following  state- 
ment :  *  — 

"Should  our  power  by  any  fatality  be  withdrawn,  the  com- 
misraoii  believe  that  the  government  of  the  Philippines  would 
speedily  lapse  into  anarchy,  which  would  excuse,  if  it  did  not 
necessitate,  the  intervention  of  other  powera  and  the  eventual 
division  of  the  islands  among  them.  Only  through  American 
occupation,  therefore,  is  the  idea  of  a  free,  self-governing,  and 
united  Philippine  commonwealth  at  all  conceivable.  And  the 
indispensable  need  from  the  Filipino  point  of  view  of  main- 
taining American  sovereignty  over  the  archipelago  is  recc%- 
nized  by  all  intelligent  Filipinoe  and  even  by  those  insurgents 
who  deare  an  American  protectorate.  The  latter,  it  is  true, 
would  take  the  revenues  and  leave  us  the  responsibiliiies. 
Nevertheless,  they  recognise  the  indubitable  fact  that  the 
Filipinos  cannot  stand  alone.  Thus  the  welfare  of  the  Fili- 
pinos coincides  with  the  dictates  of  nationaJ  honour  in  forbidding 
our  abandonment  of  the  archipelago.  We  cannot  from  ainr 
point  of  view  escape  the  responsibilities  of  government  which 
our  sovereignty  ent^ls;  and  the  commission  is  strongly  per- 
suaded that  the  performance  of  our  national  duty  will  prove 
the  greatest  bleaalng  to  the  peoples  of  the  PhilipiMne  Islands."] 

More  than  fourteen  years'  experience  in  govenmiental 
work  in  the  Philippines  has  profoundly  impressed  me 
with  the  fundamental  soundness  of  these  conclusions  of 
the  first  Philippine  Commission.  Every  statement  then 
made  still  holds  true. 

>  Blount,  p.  105.       ■  B«port  I%ilippine  CommiaBion,  Vol.  I,  p.  183. 



Thb  Establishment  of  CnrtL  Govxrnhbnt 

The  first  Philippine  Commission  did  not  complete 
its  work  imtil  March,  1900.  By  this  time  conditions 
had  BO  far  improved  in  the  archipelago  that  President 
McKinley  was  prepared  to  initiate  a  movement  looking 
toward  the  establishment  of  civil  government  there.  With 
this  end  in  view  he  appointed  the  following  commission 
of  five  civilians;  William  H.  Taft  of  Ohio,  Dean  C. 
Worcester  of  Michigan,  Luke  E.  Wright  of  Tennessee, 
Henry  C.  Ide  of  Vermont  and  Bemaxd  Moses  of  Cali- 
fornia. Our  appointments  were  dated  March  16,  1900, 
Our  instructions  which  were  full,  are  given  in  the  appendix.^ 
I  was  the  only  member  of  the  first  commission  to  be 
reappointed.  Neither  General  Otis  nor  Admiral  Dewey 
cared  to  serve,  and  indeed  the  professional  duties  of  each 
of  them  rendered  his  appointment  to  the  new  com- 
mission difficult,  if  not  impossible.  Mr.  Schurman  had 
at  one  time  expressed  himself  as  vigorously  opposed  to 
the  idea  of  a  new  commission,  maintainii^  that  the  best 
rraults  could  be  obtained  by  the  appointment  of  a  civil 
governor  with  wide  powers.  It  was  therefore  taken 
for  granted  that  he  would  not  desire  reappointment. 
Colonel  Denby  was  keenly  interested  in  the  work  and 
would  have  been  glad  to  continue  it,  but  he  was  past 
seventy  and  with  his  good  wife  had  then  spent  some  fifteen 
years  in  the  Far  East.  He  doubted  whether  his  strength 
would  be  adequate  to  bear  the  strain  of  the  arduous  task 
which  obviously  lay  before  the  new  commission,  and  Mrs. 
Denby  desired  to  remain  in  the  United  States  where  she 
'  P.  981. 



could  be  near  her  children  from  whom  she  had  been  loi^ 
separated,  so  her  husband  felt  constrained  to  say  that  he 
did  not  wish  to  return  to  the  Philippines. 

I  separated  from  him  with  the  keenest  regret.     He  was 
an  amiable,  tactful  man  of  commanding  ability  and  unim- 
peachable integrity,  actuated  by  the  best  of  motives  and 
loyal  to  the  highest  ideals.     He    constantly    sought  to 
avoid  not  only  evil  but  the  appearance  of  evil.     I  count 
it  one  of  the  great  privil^;^  of  my  life  to  have  beeu  as- 
sociated with  him.    The  one  thing  in  the  book  written 
by  Jam^  H.  Blount  which  aroused  my  ire  was  his  char^ 
acterization    of    Colonel    Denby    as    a    hypocrite.     No 
falser,  meaner,  more  utterly  contemptible  statement  was 
ever  made,  and  when  I  read  it  the  temptation  rose  hot^- 
witbin  me  to  make  pubUc  Blount's  personal  PhilippinetvF 
record,  but  after  the  first  heat  of  anger  had  passed  I-f- 
remembered  what  the  good  old  Colonel  would   haya~{| 
wished  me  to  do  in  such  a  case,  and  forbore. 

The  second  Philippine  commission,  hereinafter  re- 
ferred to  as  "the  commission,"  received  its  instructions 
on  April  7,  1900. 

They  covered  a  most  delicate  and  complicated  subject, 
namely,  the  gradual  transfer  of  control  from  military  to 
civil  authority  in  a  country  extensive  regions  of  which 
were  still  in  open  rebellion. 

In  the  opinion  of  President  McKinley  there  was  no 
reason  why  steps  should  not  be  taken,  from  time  to  time, 
to  inaugurate  governments  essentially  popular  in  their 
form  as  fast  as  territory  came  under  the  permanent  con- 
trol of  our  troops,  and  indeed,  as  we  have  seen,  this  had 
already  been  done  by  the  army.  It  was  provided  that 
we  should  continue  and  perfect  the  work  of  organizing 
and  establishing  civil  governments  already  commenced 
by  the  military  authorities.  In  doing  this  we  were  to 
act  as  a  board  of  which  Mr.  Taft  was  designated  president. 
It  was  contemplated  that  the  transfer  of  authority  from 
miUtaiy  commanders  to  civil  officers  would  .be  gradual, 



and  full  and  complete  cooperation  between  theee  au- 
thorities was  enjoined.  Having  familiarized  oxu^lves 
with  the  conditions  then  prevailing  in  the  islands,  we  were 
to  devote  our  attention  first  to  the  establishment  of  munic- 
ipal governments,  in  which  the  natives  should  be  given 
the  opportunity  to  man^;e  their  local  affairs  to  the  fullest 
extent  and  with  the  least  supervision  and  control  found 
to  be  practicable.  We  were  then  to  consider  the  oi^;ani- 
zation  of  larger  administrative  divisions,  and  when  of 
the  opinion  that  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  islands 
was  such  that  the  central  administration  could  safely 
be  transferred  from  military  to  civil  control  were  to  report 
this  conclusion  to  the  secretary  of  war  with  our  recom- 
mendations as  to  the  form  of  central  government  which 
should  be  established. 

Beginning  with  September  1,  1900,  we  were  authorized 
to  exercise,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  President  and 
the  secretary  of  war,  the  l^islative  power,  which  was 
then  to  be  transferred  from  the  military  governor  to  us 
until  the  establishment  of  civil  central  government,  or 
imtil  C3ongres8  should  otherwise  provide.  We  were 
authorized  during  a  like  period  to  appoint  to  oflSce  such 
officers  imder  the  judicifiJ,  educational,  and  civil  service 
systems,  and  in  the  municipal  and  departmental  govem- 
ments,  as  were  duly  provided  for.  Until  the  complete 
transfer  of  control  the  military  governor  was  to  remain 
the  chief  executive  head  of  the  government  and  to  exercise 
the  executive  authority  previously  possessed  by  him  and 
not  expressly  assigned  to  the  commission  by  the  president 
in  his  instructions.  In  establishing  municipal  governments 
we  were  to  taJce  as  the  basis  of  our  work  those  established 
by  the  mihtary  governor,  xmder  the  order  of  August  8, 
1890,  which  I  had  helped  to  set  up,  as  well  as  those  estab- 
lished imder  the  report  of  a  board  constituted  by  the 
military  governor  by  his  order  of  January  29,  1900,  of 
which  SeBor  Cayetano  Arellano  was  the  president. 

In  the  establishment  of  departmental  or  provincial 



governments  we  were  to  give  special  attention  to  the  then- 
existing  government  of  the  island  of  Negros,  established 
with  the  approval  of  the  people  of  that  island  under  the 
order  of  the  military  governor  of  July  22,  1899. 

We  were  instructed  to  investigate  troubles  growing 
out  of  large  land  holdings,  including  those  of  the  religious 
orders,  and  to  promote,  extend  and  improve  the  system  of 
education  already  inaugurated  by  the  mihtary  authorities, 
giving  first  importance  to  the  extension  of  a  system  of 
primary  education  free  to  all,  which  wotdd  tend  to  fit  the 
people  for  the  duties  of  citizenship  and  the  ordinary 
avocations  of  a  civilized  community.  Instruction  was 
to  be  given  at  first  in  the  native  dialects,  but  full  oppor- 
tunity for  all  of  the  people  to  acquire  English  was  to  be 
provided  as  soon  as  possible.  If  necessity  demanded,  we 
were  authorized  to  make  changes  in  the  existing  system 
of  taxation  and  in  the  body  of  the  laws  tmder  which  the 
people  were  governed,  although  such  changes  were  to  be 
rel^ated  to  the  civil  government  which  we  were  to 
establish  later,  so  far  as  might  be.  Our  instructions  con- 
tained the  following  important  passages :  — 

"  In  all  the  forms  of  govenunent  and  administrative  provi- 
fdous  which  they  are  authorized  to  prescribe,  the  commisdon 
should  bear  in  mind  that  the  government  which  they  are 
establishing  is  designed  not  for  our  satisfaction,  or  for  the 
expression  of  our  theoretical  views,  but  for  the  happinoBs, 
peace  and  prosperity  of  the  people  of  the  Philippine  Islands, 
and  the  measures  adopted  should  be  made  to  conform  to  thdr 
customs,  their  habits,  and  even  th^  prejudices,  to  the  fullest 
extent  consistent  with  the  accomplishment  of  the  indispensable 
requisites  of  just  and  effective  government. 

"At  the  same  time  the  commission  should  bear  in  mind, 
and  the  people  of  the  islands  should  be  made  plainly  to  under- 
stand, that  there  are  certain  great  principles  of  government 
which  have  been  made  the  basis  of  our  governmental  system 
which  we  deem  essential  to  the  rule  of  )aw  and  the  maintenance 
of  individual  freedom,  and  of  which  they  have,  unfortunately, 
been  denied  the  experience  possessed  by  us ;  that  there  are  also 
certain  practical  njes  of  government  which  we  have  found  to 



be  esseDtial  to  the  preeervatioD  of  these  great  principles  of 
liberty  and  law,  and  that  these  principles  and  these  njles  of 
government  must  be  establiahed  and  maintained  in  their 
islands  for  the  sake  of  their  liberty  and  hapjnness,  however 
much  they  may  conflict  with  the  customs  or  laws  of  procedure 
with  which  they  are  familiar. 

"It  is  evident  that  the  most  enlightened  thought  of  the 
Philippine  Islands  fully  appreciates  the  importance  of  these 
principles  and  rules,  and  they  will  inevitably  within  a  short 
time  command  universal  assent.  Upon  every  division  and 
branch  of  the  government  of  the  Philippines,  therefore,  must 
be  imposed  these  inviolable  rules :  — 

"  Tliat  no  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property 
without  due  process  of  law ;  that  private  property  shall  not  be 
taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation ;  that  in  all 
criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right  to  a 
speedy  and  public  trial,  to  be  infonned  of  the  nature  and  cause 
of  the  accusation,  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against 
him,  to  have  compulsory  process  for  obtaining  witnesses  in 
his  favour,  and  to  have  the  assistance  of  counsel  for  his  defence ; 
that  excessive  bail  shall  not  be  required,  nor  excessive  fines 
imposed,  nor  cruel  and  unusual  punishment  inflicted ;  that 
no  person  shall  be  put  twice  in  jeopardy  for  the  same  oEFence, 
or  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a  witness  against 
himself;  that  the  right  to  be  seciu-e  against  unreasonable 
searches  and  seizures  £all  not  be  violated ;  that  neither  slavery 
nor  involuntary  servitude  shall  exist  except  as  a  punishment 
for  crime;  that  no  bill  of  attainder  or  ex-pwt-facto  law  shall 
be  passed ;  that  no  law  shall  be  passed  abridging  the  freedom  of 
speech  or  of  the  press,  or  the  rights  of  the  people  to  peaceably 
assemble  and  petition  the  Government  for  a  redress  of  griev- 
ances 'j  that  no  law  shall  be  made  respecting  the  establishment 
of  rehgion,  or  prohibiting  the  free  exercise  thereof,  and  that 
the  free  exercise  and  enjoyment  of  religious  profession  and 
worship  without  discrimination  or  preference  shall  forever  be 

It  has  been  the  fashion  in  some  quarters  to  sneer  at 
the  last  of  these  paragraphs,  and  to  insinuate,  if  not  to 
charge,  that  President  McKinley  in  his  policy  toward 
the  Phihppine  Islands  was  actuated  by  unworthy  motive. 
Nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth.  From  the 
beginnii^  to  the  end  the  real  good  of  the  several  peoples 



of  the  archipelago  came  first  with  him,  and  no  one  who 
had  the  privilege  of  knowing  him  well  doubts  it.  Thor- 
oi^hly  imbued  with  the  lofty  sentiments  expressed  by  him 
in  our  instructions,  we  set  forth  on  our  loi^  pilgrimage 
to  a  country  where  we  were  to  imdertake  a  heavy  task 
essentially  different  from  tliat  which  had  ever  before 
fallen  to  the  lot  of  any  five  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

On  April  17, 1900,  we  sailed  from  San  Francisco  on  the 
United  States  army  transport  Hancock.  We  were  forty- 
five  strong.  Of  this  goodly  company  only  four  remain 
in  the  Philippines  to-day/  —  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Branagan, 
Mrs.  Worcester  and  myself.  Singularly  enough,  with 
two  exceptions,  all  of  the  others  are  still  aUve  and  at  work. 
Arthur  W.  Ferguson,  prince  of  interpreters,  who  was 
later  appointed  Executive  Secretary,  died  in  the  service 
after  more  than  six  years  of  extraordinarily  faithful  and 
efficient  work.  James  A.  LeRoy,  my  faithful,  able  and 
efficient  private  secretary,  contracted  tuberculosis,  and 
fell  a  victim  to  it  after  a  long  and  gallant  fight. 

At  Honolulu  we  met  with  a  severe  disappointment.  It 
was  of  course  our  duty  to  call  on  Governor  Dole.  We  were 
advised  that  silk  hats  and  frock  coats  must  be  donned  for 
this  visit,  and  it  was  perishing  hot.  We  reached  the  palace 
in  a  reeking  perspiration  and  had  a  long  wait  in  a  siiffocat- 
ing  room.  When  Mr.  Dole  appeared,  he  was  closely 
followed  by  an  attendant  bearing  a  laigie  and  most  at- 
tractive-looking bottle  carefully  wrapped  in  a  napkin, 
and  our  spirits  rose.  But,  ah^l  It  contained  Poland 

At  Tokio  we  had  an  audience  with  the  Emperor  and 
were  received  by  the  Empress  as  well.  In  the  high 
official  who  had  charge  of  tie  palace  where  these  events 
took  place,  I  discovered  an  old  University  of  Michigan 
graduate  who  made  the  occasion  especially  pleasant  for  me. 

We  finally  reached  Manila  on  the  morning  of  June  3. 
Althou^  the  thermometer  was  in  the  nineties,  a  certun 
>  September  15, 1913. 





frigidity  pervaded  the  atmcraphere  on  our  arrival,  which 
General  MacArthur,  the  military  governor,  eeemed  to 
regard  in  the  light  of  an  intrusion. 

He  had  been  directed  to  provide  suitable  office  quarters 
for  ufi.  To  our  amazement  and  amusement  we  found  desks 
for  five  commissioners  and  five  private  secretaries  placed  in 
one  httleroom  inthe Ayuntamiento.^  While  itwas  possible 
to  get  through  the  room  without  scrambling  over  them, 
it  would  have  been  equaUy  possible  to  circle  it,  walking 
on  them,  without  stepping  on  the  floor.  In  the  course 
of  our  first  long  ofiicial  interview  with  the  General,  he  in- 
formed us  that  we  were  "an  injection  into  an  otherwise 
normal  fdtuation." 

He  added  that  we  had  already  mediatized  the  volume 
of  work  that  flowed  over  his  desk.  At  the  moment  none 
of  us  were  quite  sure  what  he  meant,  but  we  found  the 
word  in  the  dictionary.  How  often  in  the  weary  years 
thatwere  to  follow  I  wished  that  someone  would  materially 
mediatize  the  task  which  fell  to  my  lot !  It  was  General 
MacArthur's  honestly  held  and  frankly  expressed  opinion 
that  what  the  Fihpinos  needed  was  "military  govern- 
ment pinned  to  their  backs  for  ten  years  with  bayonets." 
He  later  chained  that  view  very  radically,  and  when 
civil  provincial  governments  were  finally  estabhshed  it  was 
with  his  approval,  and,  in  many  instances,  upon  his  specific 

At  the  outset  some  effort  was  made  to  keep  the  pubUc 
away  from  us.  Word  was  passed  that  we  had  no  au- 
thority, which  was  true  enough,  as  our  legislative  activities 
were  not  to  b^in  until  September  1.  The  ninety  days 
which  intervened  were  very  advantageously  spent  in 
gaining  familiarity  with  the  situation,  which  we  had  no 
difficulty  in  doing.  Plenty  of  people  were  already  weary 
of  military  rule  and  flocked  to  us.  None  of  my  com- 
panions had  ever  before  set  foot  in  the  Philippines,  and 

<  The  building:  where  the  executive  ofioes  of  the  iusul&r  govenunrat 
have  been  located  nnoe  the  Amerioan  oeonpation. 



although  I  had  spent  more  than  four  years  there,  I  still 
had  plenty  to  learn. 

In  this  connection  I  am  reminded  of  an  event  which 
occurred  somewhat  lat^.  While  the  commission  was 
en  route  from  Iloilo  to  Catbalogan  when  we  were  establish- 
ing civil  provincial  governments,  General  Hughes  and 
Mr.  Taf t  became  involved  in  a  somewhat  animated  dis- 
cussion. The  General  displayed  an  accurate  knowledge 
of  facts  which  were  of  such  a  nature  that  one  would 
hardly  have  expected  an  army  office  to  be  familiar  with 
them.  Mr.  Talt  said :  "General,  how  do  you  do  it  ?  You 
have  always  been  a  bxisy  man,  devoted  to  your  profession. 
How  have  you  managed  to  accumulate  such  a  reinarkable 
fund  of  information?"  The  General  smiled  his  rare 
smile  and  replied :  "Governor,  I  will  tell  you.  I  always 
try  to  go  to  bed  at  night  knowli^  a  little  more  than  I  did 
when  I  got  up  in  the  morning."  It  is  a  wise  plan  to 

On  September  1  we  assumed  the  legislative  power, 
otur  first  official  act  beii^  to  appropriate  $2,000,000 
Mexican  for  the  construction  and  repair  of  highways 
and  bridges. 

We  were  impre^ed  with  the  fundamental  necessity  of 
promptly  opening  up  lines  of  land  communication  in 
a  coimtry  which  almost  completely  lacked  them,  and  there 
were  many  poor  people  in  dire  need  of  employment  who 
would  be  rdieved  by  the  opportunity  to  earn  an  honest 
Uving  which  the  inauguration  of  road  construction  would 
afford  them. 

Our  second  act  appropriated  $5000  M^can  for  the 
purpose  of  making  a  survey  to  ascertain  Uie  m(ffit  ad- 
vantageous route  for  a  railroad  into  the  mountains  of 
Benguet,  where  we  wished  to  establish  a  much-needed 
health  resort  for  the  people  of  the  archipelago. 

Seven  days  later  we  passed  an  act  for  the  establish- 
ment and  maintenance  of  an  efficient  and  honest  civil 
service  in  the  Philippine  Islands.    This  measure  was  of 

D,q,i,i.:db,.GoogIe   ■ 


basic  importance.  We  had  stipulated  before  leaving 
Washington  that  do  political  appointees  should  be  forced 
upon  us  under  any  circumstances.  The  members  of  the 
second  commission,  like  their  predecessorB  of  the  first, 
were  firm  in  the  belief  that  national  politics  should,  if 
possible,  be  kept  out  of  the  administration  of  Fhilii^ine 
afFairs,  and  we  endeavoured  to  insure  this  result. 

Our  tenth  act  ai^ropriated  $1500  Mexican  to  be  paid 
to  t^e  widow  of  Salvador  Reyes,  vice-president  of  Santa 
Cruz  in  Laguna  Province,  assassinated  because  of  his 
loyalty  to  the  established  government. 

Our  fifteenth  act  increased  the  monthly  salaries  of 
Filipino  public  school  teachers  in  Manila. 

Our  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  acts  reorganized  the 
Forestry  Bureau  and  the  Mining  Bureau. 

On  October  16  we  appropriated  J1,000,000  United 
States  ciurency,  for  improving  the  port  of  Manila,  where 
thiore  was  uigent  need  of  protection  for  shipping  durii^; 
the  typhoon  season. 

On  December  12  we  passed  an  act  authorizing  the 
establishment  of  local  pohce  in  cities  and  towns  in  the 
PhiUppine  Islands  and  appropriating  $150,000  United 
States  currency  for  their  maintenance. 

Two  days  later  we  passed  a  much-needed.act  regulating 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  within  the  city  of  Manila 
and  its  attached  barrios. 

On  December  21,  we  appropriated  S75,000  United 
States  currency  for  the  construction  of  the  Benguet  Road, 
little  dreaming  how  much  time  would  elapse  and  how 
many  more  dollars  would  be  appropriated,  before  a  ve- 
hicle passed  over  it. 

It  will  be  sufficiently  evident  that  I  cannot  here  give  an 
account  of  the  several  acts  which  we  passed  when  I  say 
that  they  niunber  foiu-  himdred  forty-nine  during  the  first 
year.  We  created  the  administrative  bureaus  of  a  well- 
organized  government,  established  civil  rule  in  numerous 
municipalities  and  provinces,  provided  for  the  necessary 



expenses  of  government,  OTganized  courts  and  refoimed 
the  i  udiciary .  So  important  were  the  results  following  the 
establishment  of  the  Civil  Service  Act  and  the  act  pro- 
viding for  the  organization  of  courts  for  the  Fbilippine 
Islands  that  I  have  devoted  a  chapter  to  each. 

Although  there  were  no  limits  on  our  power  to  enact 
legislation  other  than  those  imposed  by  our  instructiona 
hereinbefore  referred  to,  nothing  was  further  from  our 
desire  than  to  exercise  too  arbitrarily  the  authority  con- 
ferred upon  us. 

Taylor  has  correctly  described  our  method  of  procedure 
in  the  following  words :  — 

"On  September  1,  1900,  the  Commisaion  began  its  I^psla- 
tive  and  executive  duties.  In  perfonning  them  it  adopted  the 
pohcy  of  pasamg  no  laws,  except  in  cases  of  emergency,  without 
publishing  them  in  the  daily  press,  nor  until  after  they  had 
passed  a  second  reading  and  the  public  had  been  ^vea  an 
opportunity  to  come  before  the  Commiasion  and  suggest  objec- 
tions or  amendments  to  the  bills.  Before  enacting  them  they 
were  submitted  to  the  military  governor  for  hia  consideration 
and  comment."  ^ 

The  other  especially  important  events  of  our  first  le^a- 
tive  year  were  the  establishment  of  civil  rule  in  ihe 
municipalities  as  well  as  in  thirty-eight  provinces  and  the 
Bubstitutiou  of  the  mihtary  central  government  by  thegrad- 
ual  creation  of  bureaus  and  the  ultimate  appointment  of  a 
dvil  governor  and  of  five  heads  of  executive  departments. 

On  November  23,  1900,  we  passed  an  act  providing 
for  the  establishment  of  a  civil  government  in  the  province 
of  Benguet,and  thusit  happened  thataprovince  practically 
all  of  whose  inhabitants  were  members  of  a  non-Christian 
tribe  was  the  first  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  civil  rule.  This 
action  grew  out  of  investigations  by  General  Wright  and 
myself  made  when  visiting  Bagulo  during  the  latter  part 
of  July,  which  led  us  to  the  conclusion  that  civil  govern- 
ment could  be  established  in  Benguet  at  any  time  and 
1  Taylor,  18  H3. 



should  be  established  as  soon  as  possible.  In  view  of  the 
rather  primitive  state  of  civilization  of  the  people  for 
whom  we  were  legislating,  a  special  act  adapted  to  local 
conditions  was  passed  providing  for  a  provincial  govern- 
ment and  fixing  a  form  of  government  for  the  several 

On  January  31,  1901,  we  passed  an  act  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  municipal  governments  in  the  Fhihppine  Islands 
which,  with  various  unendments,  is  still  in  effect  and  has 
been  made  applicable  to  all  municipal  corporations  of 
the  Philippines  inhabited  chiefly  by  FiUpinos,  except  the 
city  of  Manila,  the  city  of  Baguio  and  a  few  small  settle- 
ments in  the  so-called  special  government  provinces.^ 

On  Febnia^  6,  1901,  we  passed  a  general  act  for  the 
oi^anization  of  provincial  governments  in  the  Philippine 
Islands.  A  special  act  was  required  to  nmke  it  applicable 
to  any  given  province. 

Having  thus  prepared  for  the  serious  work  of  establish- 
ing civil  government  throughout  the  archipelago  so  fast 
and  so  far  as  conditions  m^t  seem-  to  justify,  we  deter^ 
mined  to  visit  the  several  provinces  and  to  familiarize 
ourselves  with  conditions  on  the  ground  in  each  case 
before  taking  action.  We  invariably  sought  the  opinion 
of  the  military  authorities  as  to  the  fitness  of  the  prov- 
inces under  consideration  for  civil  rule,  and  never 
established  it  except  with  their  approval.  Indeed,  in 
several  cases  we  yielded  to  their  judgment  and  organized 
provinces  which  we  ourselvra  thought  might  better  wait 
for  a  time. 

Our  first  trip  was  to  the  northward  along  the  line  of 
the  Manila-Dagupan  railway,  and  in  the  com"se  of  it 
we  oi^anized  the  provinces  of  Bulacan,  Pampanga,  Tarlac 
and  Fangaain&n. 

On  the  2d  of  March  we  crossed  Manila  Bay  to  Bataan 
and  established  a  civil  provincial  government  there. 

>  This  name  is  applied  to  oertain  provinoea  orgajuEed  under  apeoial 
sots  beoauM  the  nujority  erf  tbeir  inhabitants  are  non-Christiana. 



The  first  provincial  officers  were  necessarily  appointed, 
not  elected.  I  well  remember  the  consternation  which 
Mr.  Taft  created  on  this  trip,  when  in  announcing  the 
appointment  of  a  man  of  strong  character  who  was  much 
disliked  by  some  of  the  people  present,  he  said  that  if 
the  appointee  did  not  behave  well  his  official  head  would 
be  promptly  removed.  Surprise  showed  on  almost 
every  face  in  the  audience.  They  had  become  suffi- 
ciently accustomed  to  the  idea  of  being  beheaded  or 
otherwise  sent  out  of  the  world  by  their  own  people, 
but  had  been  led  to  believe  that  the  Americans  were  a 
htunane  nation,  and  it  took  Mr.  Taft  at  least  five  minutes 
to  explain  his  joke. 

During  the  second  week  in  March  the  commission 
transferred  its  officers  bodily  to  the  United  States  Am^ 
Transport  Sumner  and  started  on  a  long  journey  in  the 
course  of  which  it  visited  and  established  provincial 
governments  in  eighteen  provinces,*  returning  to  Manila 
on  the  3d  of  May. 

This  trip  was  most  interestii^  but  dreadfully  wearing. 
Everywhere  we  were  overwhelmed  by  the  hospitaUty  of 
our  Filipino  friends.  We  arrived  at  some  new  place 
nearly  every  morning,  and  the  programme  in  each  was 
much  the  same.  After  an  early  breakfast  we  hurried 
ashore,  drove  or  walked  about  for  a  short  time  to  see 
what  the  town  was  like,  and  then  attended  a  popular 
meeting  in  its  largest  building,  where  we  held  long  and 
frank  converse  with  the  people  on  local  conditions, 
giving  them  every  opportunity  to  air  their  views,  with 
the  result  that  the  local  orators,  of  whom  there  were 
usually  more  than  a  sufficiency,  had  an  opportunity  to 
bring  their  heavy  guns  into  action.  Then  followed  a  recess 
in  the  course  of  which  we  partook  of  a  very  elaborate 
lunch,  and  when  possible  conferred  privately  with  in- 

*  Tayabu,  Romblon,  Masbate,  Uotlo,  Antique,  Capiz,  Cebt,  Bohol, 
Owridental  Negros,  Oriental  KegrcM,  Leyta,  Albay,  AmboB,  Cama- 
lines,  Sonogon,  Marinduque,  Batangas,  Surigao,  and  MlnuniB. 



fluential  men,  often  learning  things  which  they  did  not 
care  to  tell  us  in  public.  Then  came  another  open  meet- 
ing at  which  the  actual  organization  of  the  province  was 
effected  and  the  officials  were  appointed  and  sworn  in. 
After  this  there  was  a  long  formal  dinner,  with  the  endless 
courses  which  characterize  such  ftmctions  in  the  Philip- 
pines, and  then  came  a  ball  which  lasted  till  the  wee  small 
hours.  When  at  last  we  got  on  board,  tired  out,  our 
steamer  sailed,  and  often  brought  us  to  some  new  place 
by  sunrise. 

In  several  instances  we  did  not  pass  the  act  organizing 
a  given  province  at  the  time  of  our  visit,  but  for  one 
reason  or  another  postponed  action  until  a  later  date. 
We  visited  a  number  of  places  like  Jol6,  Basilan,  Zam- 
boanga,  Cotabato,  Davao  and  Samar,  where  we  had  no 
intention  of  establishing  civil  government,  in  order  to 
ol^erve  local  conditions. 

We  touched  at  Marinduque  on  our  trip  south,  and  foimd 
that  nothing  could  then  be  done  there,  but  the  better 
element  were  anxious  for  a  change,  and  we  promised  them 
that  if  they  would  bring  about  certain  specified  results 
before  our  return  we  would  give  them  a  provincial  govern- 
ment. They  undertook  to  do  so,  and  kept  their  word. 
Needless  to  say  we  also  kept  ours. 

We  had  grave  doubts  as  to  the  advisability  of  estab- 
lishing civil  governments  in  Cebii,  Bohol  and  Batangas. 
In  the  first  of  these  places  the  people  were  siillen  and  ugly. 
In  the  second  there  was  a  marked  disinclination  on  the 
part  of  leading  citizens  to  accept  public  office.  There 
had  been  a  little  scattering  rifle  fire  on  the  outskirts  of 
the  capital  of  the  third  very  shortly  before  our  arrival 
there,  but  the  organization  of  all  these  provinces  was  rec- 
ooamended  by  the  military  authorities,  and  we  decided 
to  try  an  experiment  which  could  do  little  harm,  as  we 
could  return  any  one  of  them  to  military  control  in  short 
order  should  such  a  course  seem  necessary. 

An  effort  has  been  made  to  make  it  appear  that  in 

TOL.  I — I 



organizing  Cebii,  Bohol  and  Batangas,  we  acted  pre- 
mattirely  and  upon  oin:  own  initiative,  thus  complicating 
the  situation  for  the  military  authorities.  I  will  let 
Blount  voice  this  complaint.    He  says  in  part :  — 

"In  his  report  for  1901  Governor  Taft  says  that  the  four 
principal  provinces,  including  Batangas,  which  gave  trouble 
shortly  after  the  civil  government  was  set  up  in  that  year, 
and  hod  to  be  returned  to  military  control,  were  organised 
under  civil  rule  'on  the  recommendation'  of  the  then  com- 
manding general  (MacArthur).  It  certainly  seems  unlikely 
that  the  haste  to  change  from  military  rule  to  civil  rule  came 
on  the  motion  of  the  military.  If  the  Commission  ever  got, 
TO  writing,  from  General  MacArthur,  a  'recommendation' 
that  any  provinces  be  placed  under  civil  rule  while  still  in 
insurrection,  the  text  of  the  writing  will  show  a  mere  Boldierly 
acquiescence  in  the  will  of  Mr.  McKinley,  the  commander- 
in-chief.  Parol '  contemporaneous  evidence  will  show  that 
General  MacArthur  told  them,  substantially,  that  they  w»e 
'riding  for  a  fall.'  In  fact,  whenever  an  insurrection  would 
break  out  in  a  province  after  Governor  Taft'a  inauguration  as 
governor,  the  whole  attitude  of  the  army  in  the  Philippinee, 
from  the  conunanding  general  down  was  'I  told  you  ao. 
They  did  not  say  this  where  Governor  Taft  could  bear  it, 
but  it  was  common  knowledge  that  they  were  much  addicted 
to  damning  'politics'  as  the  cause  of  all  the  trouble."  • 

Prophecy  is  always  dangerous  and  when  unneceBsary 
seems  rather  inexcusable.  I  submit  the  essential  portions 
of  the  record  to  show  exactly  what  we  did  get  from  General 
MacArthur,  and  add  the  suggestion  that  it  was  really 
hardly  essential  that  he  should  make  his  recommendations 
in  writing,  as  he  did,  for  the  reason  that  he  was  a  gentle- 
man and  would  not  have  repudiated  a  verbal  recommenda- 
tion once  made. 

On  February  5,  1901,  Governor  Taft  wrote  General 
MacArthur  a  letter  closing  with  the  following  paragraph : — 

"As  already  conununicated  to  you  the  purpose  of  the  Com- 
mission is  to  make  a  Southern  trip  on  the  23rd  of  F^rusiy, 
or  OS  soon  thereafter  as  practioable,  with  the  idea  of  arran^og 

■  Obviousl;  a  misprint,  pwhaps,  for  "  penual  at."    '  Blount,  p.  380. 







for  provincial  governments  there,  md  I  am  directed  by  the 
ComioisBion  to  request  your  opinion  as  to  the  provinces  in 
which  provincial  governments  may  be  safely  establiBhed. 
It  is  understood  that  Panay,  Romblon,  Tayabas,  and  possibly 
one  or  two  of  the  Camarines  are  ready  for  this.  What  has  been 
said  with  refermice  to  the  Northern  provinces  apphes  to  these, 
but  we  shall  commimicate  with  you  further  as  to  the  Southern 
provinces  wh^i  we  have  been  advised  as  to  the  possibility  of 
secunng  a  steamer." 

On  February  9,  General  MacArthur  gave  the  following 
instructions  to  the  Commanding  General,  Department 
of  the  Visayaa : — 

"The  Military  Governor  desires  that  you  report  to  this 
<^ce  at  the  earliest  date  practicable  the  provinces  in  your 
department  that  may  be  considered  ready  for  the  establish- 
ment of  civil  goventments  therdn  and  in  this  connection  directs 
me  to  say  that  it  should  not  be  considered  as  necessary  that 
complete  pacification  has  been  brought  about  in  a  province 
before  reporting  it  as  ready  for  such  government:  that  tbe 
provincial  civil  governments  to  be  established  will  doubtless 
prove  useful  agents  in  the  further  work  of  pacification." 

On  February  27,  that  officer  reported  that  in  his  opinion 
Hoilo,  Capiz,  Oriental  Negros  and  Occidental  Negros 
were  ready ;  that  Antique  might  be  in  a  few  days,  and 
that  Cebti,  Bohol  and  Leyte  were  not.  These  facts  were 
reported  to  Governor  Taft  by  General  MacArthur  on 
March  4,  and  on  the  sameday  Lieutenant>CoIonel  Crowder 
wrote  to  the  commanding  general  of  the  Visayas :  — 

"The  Military  Governor  directs  me  to  say  that  he  regards 
the  initiation  of  provincial  civil  government  as  an  aid  in  the 
work  of  pacification,  in  which  view  it  is  not  necessary  that  a 
province  should  be  completely  pacified  as  a  condition  to  the 
initiation  of  such  government.  He  has  expressed  to  the  Com- 
mission the  opinion  that  you  may  be  able,  upon  their  arrival 
at  Iloilo,  to  submit  a  supplementary  list  of  provinces  In  which 
it  would  be  advisable  to  establish  at  once  these  govenunents." 

Meanwhile  General  MacArthur  wrote  on  February  13, 
to  Governor  Taft ;  — 



"In  partial  reply  to  your  letter  of  the  5th  uistant  I  have 
the  honor  to  inform  you  that  the  Commanding  General,  De- 
partment of  Southern  Luzon,  reports  but  one  province,  Taya- 
Imb,  aa  ready  at  the  present  time  for  civil  govemia^it.  I  add 
the  provincee  of  L^una,  Batangas  and  Cavite,  believing  that 
the  institution  of  civil  government  in  all  these  provinces  will 
be  in  aBsistance  of  the  military  authorities  in  the  work  of 

General  MacArthur's  communicationB  seem  to  me  to 
show  aomethii^  more  than  ' '  a  mere  soldierly  acquiescence 
in  the  will  of  Mr.  McKinley,"  especially  as  the  President 
had  no  knowledge  of  these  provinces,  and  never  made  any 
recommendation  whatsoever  relative  to  the  establishment 
of  civil  government  there. 

Similarly,  in  establishing  civil  government  in  Cebu 
and  Bohol,  the  commission  acted  on  the  specific  recom- 
mendation of  the  military,  and  rather  against  its  own 
judgment.  There  seemed  no  very  good  reason  for  refus- 
ing to  try  civil  government,  if  the  commanding  general 
wanted  it  tried,  and  when  it  failed,  as  it  promptly  did, 
in  Cebu,  Bohol  and  Batangas,  these  provinces  were 
immediately  returned  to  the  full  control  of  the  military, 
and  left  there  until  conditions  became  satisfactory. 

Having  escaped  the  perils  of  the  deep,  and  the  much 
graver  perils  of  tiie  dinner  table,  during  our  southern 
trip,  we  returned  to  Manila,  wearier,  wiser  and  sadder 
men  than  when  we  started,  for  we  had  learned  much  of 
the  superstitions,  the  ignorance  and  the  obseseions  which 
prevailed  among  the  Filipinos,  and  we  knew  that  many 
of  the  men  who  from  love  of  coimtry  had  accepted  office 
under  ub  had  done  so  at  the  peril  of  their  lives.  We  had 
all  had  an  excellent  opportunity  to  come  to  know  the 
IHipinos.  Their  dignity  of  befuing,  their  courtesy, 
their  friendly  hospitality,  their  love  of  impodng  fimctions, 
and  of  fiestas  and  display,  their  childishness  and  irre- 
sponsibility in  many  matters,  their  passion  for  gambling, 
for  litigation  and  for  political  intrigue,  even  the  loves  and 
the  hatoeds  of  some  of  them,  had  be^  spread  before  us  like 



an  open  book.  It  is  a  fact  that  except  for  the  inhabitanta 
of  Cebu,  Bohol  and  Batangas,  the  people  wanted  what 
we  had  to  give  them  and  were  gratefti]  for  it.  Never 
before  had  they  had  their  day  in  court,  and  they  ap- 
preciated it. 

The  establishment  of  civil  government  throughout  so 
large  a  proportion  of  the  provinces  in  the  islands  would 
have  been  impossible  at  this  time  had  it  not  been  for 
the  helpful  activities  of  the  Federal  Party  organized  on 
December  23,  1900,  by  many  of  the  best  and  most  in- 
fluential f^pinos  in  the  archipelf^  for  the  purpose  of 
aiding  in  the  establishment  of  peace  and  order.  Its 
members  were  tireless  in  their  activities.  They  suc- 
ceeded in  persuading  many  Insui^ent  leaders  to  lay  down 
their  arms,  so  that  a  normal  condition  could  be  restored  in 
territory  which  the  latter  had  previously  harried.  They 
convinced  many  of  the  common  people  of  the  true  pur- 
poses of  the  American  government,  and  In  nxunerous 
other  ways  rendered  invaluable  services. 

The  officers  and  many  of  the  members  and  agents  of 
this  party  were  promptly  sentenced  to  death  by  A|^- 
naldo,  and  many  of  them  were  assassinated ; '  but  the  party 
persisted  in  its  efforts  until  success  was  attfuned. 

During  June  of  1901  Professor  Moses  and  I  made 
a  horseback  trip  through  Pangssin&n,  La  Union,  Benguet, 
Lepanto  and  Ilocos  Sur,  accompanied  by  our  private 
secretaries.  Professor  Moses  was  in  wretched  health 
as  the  result  of  overwork  and  confinement,  and  needed 
out-of-door  exercise. 

I  had  been  intrusted  with  the  drafting  of  legislation 
for  the  government  of  the  non-Christian  tribes,  and  wanted 
to  learn  as  much  about  them  as  possible,  so  that  I  could 
act  intelligently. 

We  started  from  Dagupan  mounted  on  horses  kindly 

furnished  us  by  the  army,  and  escorted  by  four  mounted 

infantrymen.     None  of  us  had  ridden  for  years,  and 

>  For  further  details  see  pp.  746 ;  753. 



army  officers  were  offering  wagers  that  we  would  not  get 
as  far  as  Bagiuo.  At  Mangaldan  a  cavalry  outfit  re- 
placed our  mounted  infantrymen,  and  while  Uie  manbeni 
of  our  new  escort  were  resting  under  the  shade  of  a  tree 
in  the  cemetery,  I  heard  them  voicing  jo3^ul  anticipations 
of  the  easy  time  they  were  to  have  travelling  with  tender- 
feet.  I  made  up  my  mind  to  give  them  some  healthful 
exercise  on  the  trip. 

Having  first  visited  the  work  at  the  lower  end  of  the 
Benguet  Road  and  then  travelled  across  country  in  a 
driving  storm  over  wretched  trails,  we  reached  Bau&ng, 
our  point  of  departure  for  the  interior.  Here  I  called 
the  sergeant  in  charge  and  asked  him  where  were  the  extra 
shoes  for  our  horses.  In  some  confusion  he  confessed 
that  he  had  brought  none,  whereupon  I  read  him  a  homily 
on  the  duties  of  a  cavalryman,  and  sent  the  whole  outfit 
to  San  Fernando  to  get  the  horses  reshod  and  provided 
with  extra  shoes  for  the  trip. 

We  arrived  at  Baguio  in  a  howling  typhoon.  Wh^i  we 
emerged  from  the  hills  into  the  open,  and  our  horses  got 
the  full  sweep  of  the  storm,  they  at  first  refused  to  face  it. 
We  forced  them  into  it,  however,  and  a  few  moments  later 
had  found  refuge  in  the  house  of  Mr.  Otto  Scheerer,  a  hos- 
pitable Grennan.  The  cavalrymen  and  the  horses  got  in 
under  the  building.  It  gave  me  great  joy  to  hear  throuj^ 
the  floor  the  voice  of  the  sergeant  remarking,  with  much 
emphasis  of  the  sort  best  represented  in  print  by  dashes, 
that  if  he  had  known  the  sort  of  a  trip  he  was  starting 
on  he  would  have  been  on  sick  report  the  morning  of 
his  departure. 

We  waited  in  vain  three  days  for  the  storm  to  end  and 
then  rode  on.  Mr.  Scheerer,  who  accompanied  us,  had 
sent  ahead  to  arrange  for  lunch  at  the  house  of  a  rich 
Igorot  named  Acop,  but  when  we  arrived  at  this  man's 
place,  soaked,  cold,  and  hungry,  we  foimd  it  shut  up. 
He  had  not  received  the  message  and  was  away  from  home. 
Investigation  showed  that  our  only  resource  in  the  com- 



missary  line  were  Bome  wads  of  sticky,  unaalted,  boiled 
rice  which  oiir  Igorot  carriers  had  inside  t^eir  hats,  in 
contact  with  their  frowsy  hair.  We  bolted  as  much  of 
this  as  the  Igorots  coiild  spare,  killing  its  rather  high 
flavour  with  cayenne  peppers  picked  beside  the  trail, 
and  continued  our  journey.  In  descending  a  steep  hill 
my  horse  stumbled  and  while  attempting  to  recover 
himself  drove  a  sharp  stone  into  his  hoof  and  turned  a 
complete  somersault,  throwing  me  over  his  head  on  to 
the  rocks.  When  I  got  him  up  he  was  dead  lame,  and 
I  walked  the  rest  of  the  way  to  Ambuklao,  where  we 
arrived  just  at  sunset. 

This  once  prosperous  little  Igorot  hamlet  had  been 
burned  by  the  Spaniards,  for  no  apparent  reason,  during 
their  flight  from  the  province  in  1906,  and  we  found  only 
two  houses  standing.  They  were  naturally  crowded. 
I  was  30  dead  with  fatigue  that  I  threw  my  saddle  on  the 
ground,  and  using  it  as  a  pillow,  lay  down  in  a  couple  of 
inches  of  water  and  fell  sound  asleep.  Later  the  Igorots 
vacated  one  of  the  houses,  and  placed  it  at  our  disposal. 
I  spent  the  greater  part  of  the  night  in  a  contest  with  an 
old  Igorot  woman,  who  for  the  commendable  purpose  of 
keying  us  warm  tended  a  smoky  pitch-pine  fire,  and  shut 
the  door,  which  afforded  our  only  means  of  ventUation, 
every  time  I  dropped  asleep.  Awakened  by  the  stifling 
smoke  I  would  open  it  again,  but  as  soon  as  I  dozed  she 
would  shut  it.  I  finally  solved  the  problem  by  lying 
down  with  my  head  sticking  out  of  the  door. 

The  next  day  was  bright  and  clear.  We  rested  until 
noon,  drying  out  our  belongings  meanwhile,  and  then 
continued  our  journey,  visiting  the  Igorot  settlements  on 
the  Agno  River  and  those  in  southern  Lepanto  and  finally 
reaching  Cervantes,  the  capital  of  that  sub-province. 
The  Igorots  of  Benguet  and  Lepanto  received  us  with  the 
utmost  friendliness,  and  when  not  in  danger  of  breaking 
our  necks  by  falling  over  the  edgM  of  the  wretched  trails, 
we  greatly  enjoyed  our  trip. 



At  CervanteB  we  were  met  by  a  delegation  of  Bontoc 
Igorots,  who  b^^ed  us  to  vMt  thdr  country,  and  we 
were  just  preparing  to  do  so  when  we  received  a  tel^ram 
recalling  tis  to  Manila  to  be  present  at  the  inai^uration 
of  Mi.  Taft  aa  civil  governor.  During  our  absence 
the  commission  had  established  provincial  governments 
in  Bizal,  Cavite  and  Nueva  Ecija.  Mr.  Taft  was  in- 
ai^urated  on  July  4,  1901.  Thenceforth  he  exercised 
control  over  the  provinces  where  civil  government  had 
been  establiBhed,  while  the  mihtary  governor  continued 
in  charge  of  each  of  the  remaining  provinces  until  it 
was  duly  organized  and  transferred  to  civil  control. 

In  August,  1901,  the  conmiission  s^ed  on  a  tour  of 
the  remaining  northern  provinces,  visiting  La  Union, 
DocoB  Sur,  Abra,  nocos  Norte,  Cf^ayan,  Isabela  and 
Zambalee  in  the  order  named,  and  establishing  a  govern- 
ment in  each.  On  the  trip  to  Abra  those  members  of  the 
commission  not  previously  accustomed  to  roughing  it 
in  the  islands  were  given  a  novel  experience,  for  we  went 
up  the  Abra  River  on  bamboo  rafts.  However,  a  ver- 
itable ship  of  state  had  been  prepared  for  Governor  Taft, 
and  no  one  suffered  any  great  discomfort. 

At  Vigan,  the  capital  of  Ilocos,  we  narrowly  escaped 
drowning  in  the  surf  wh^i  returning  to  our  steamer.  For 
a  time  oiur  good  viray '  with  some  twenty  oarsmen  was 
unable  to  make  headway  through  the  rolling  waves.  It 
broached  to,  nearly  filled  with  water,  and  struck  the 
bottom  heavily  several  times.  Some  of  the  men  quit 
rowing  and  began  to  pray,  whereupon  General  J.  F.  Bell, 
who  was  sitting  in  the  stem,  rose  to  his  feet,  and  shouted 
at  them  until  they  became  more  afraid  of  him  than  c^ 
the  sea,  and  pulled  for  dear  life  until  we  were  out  of  danger. 
Upon  arrived  at  the  ship  we  watched  with  interest  the 
progress  of  other  boats  tlm)ugh  the  surf,  and  were  alarmed 
to  see  the  men  in  one  madly  divesting  themselves  of  their 
clothing.  When  it  finally  came  alongside  its  occupants 
*  A  native  suif  boat. 



made  flying  leaps  for  the  gangway,  and  we  discovered 
that  a  great  hole  had  been  knocked  in  Its  bottom,  and  that 
raincoats,  ordinary  coats,  and  trousers  had  been  jammed 
into  this  opening  in  order  to  keep  the  rapidly  sinldng 
craft  afloat  for  a  few  moments. 

In  the  Cagayan  valley  we  had  a  taete  of  real  tropical 
heat.  Never  have  I  serai  a  man  suffer  more  than  did 
Mr.  Taft  at  Ilagan  on  the  day  when  we  established  a  pro- 
vincial government  for  Isabela,  and  the  night  that  fol- 
lowed still  lingers  in  my  memory.  The  air  was  suffocating. 
My  bed  was  in  a  comer.  I  dragged  it  out  between  a 
window  and  a  door  and  threw  both  wide  open.  Still  I 
could  not  sleep.  Slipping  off  my  pajamas,  I  seated  myself 
on  the  broad  window  sill.  The  heat  was  intolerable.  I 
poured  water  over  myself  and  resumed  my  seat  in  the 
window.  The  water  would  not  evaporate.  I  sat  there 
until  morning,  as  I  coidd  not  endure  the  heat  lying  down. 

Such  conditions  are  unknown  throughout  the  greater 
part  of  the  archipelago,  where  cool  sea  breezes  temper  the 
heat  at  all  times.  In  the  Cagayan  valley  an  immense 
plain  is  bordered  by  ranges  of  hi^  mountains  to  the  east 
and  the  west.  They  seem  to  shut  off  both  monsoons  to 
a  considerable  extent,  and  there  very  trying  heat  is  by 
no  means  unusual. 

On  September  1,  1901,  the  first  day  of  the  second  year 
of  actu^  service  of  the  commisaion,  a  complete  central 
civil  government  was  established.  Commissioner  Wright 
waa  appointed  secretary  of  commerce  and  police ;  Com- 
missioner Ide,  secretary  of  finance  and  justice;  Com- 
missioner Moses,  secretary  of  public  instruction,  and  I 
myself  secretary  of  the  interior.  The  commission  was 
strengthened  by  the  addition  of  three  Filipino  members : 
Sefior  Benito  Legarda,  Seftor  Jos€  R.  de  Luzuiiaga,  and 
Dr.  T.  H.  Pardo  de  Tavera,  all  of  whom  were  men  of 
exceptional  ability  and  had  rendered  distii^piished  service 
in  the  establishment  of  peace  and  order. 

Exc^t  for  the  addition  of  one  more  Filipino  on  July 



6, 1908,  the  organization  of  the  commissioii  has  remained 
unchanged  up  to  the  present  time,  although  there  have 
been  numerous  changes  in  its  personnd.  The  task  which 
lay  before  it  was  to  enact  a  code  of  laws  adapted  to  the 
peculiar  conditions  existing  in  the  Philippines,  and  this 
was  indeed  a  herculean  undertaking.  Its  members 
laboured  unremittingly.  Governor  Taft  and  General 
Wright  were  towers  of  strength  in  the  early  days.  The 
rest  of  us  did  what  we  could,  and  I,  for  one,  am  very  proud 
of  the  result.  Certainly  no  one  can  ever  claim  Uiat  the 
commission  was  not  industrious.  Before  it  finally  ceased 
to  be  the  legislative  body  of  the  islands  it  had  passed  some 
eighteen  hundred  acts.  Obviously,  as  it  is  not  my  pur^ 
pose  to  write  an  encyclopedia  of  law,  I  cannot  discuss 
them  in  detail,  and  must  content  myscjf  with  here  barely 
mentioning  a  few  of  the  more  important  results  obtained, 
leaving  the  mqre  detfuled  discussion  of  some  of  thract  for  ' 
later  chapters. 

In  general,  it  may  be  said  that  the  additional  bureaus 
necessary  for  the  work  of  the  Insular  government  were 
created,  and  ^ven  proper  powers.  Civil  govemm^it 
was  gradually  extended  to  the  entire  archipelago.'  The 
criminal  code  was  amended  and  supplemented  by  the 
passage  of  new  laws.  The  administration  of  justice  was 
reorganized  and  reformed.*  An  efficient  native  insular 
police  force  was  organized,  and  an  admirable  state  of 
public  order  brought  about.*  The  health  service  was 
extended  to  the  provinces,  and  health  conditions  w&ce 
greatly  improved  throughout  the  islands.*  B^^o  was 
made  accessible  and  became  both  the  summer  capital 
and  a  health  resort  for  the  people  of  the  islands.'  The 
scientific  work  of  the  government  was  coordinated,  and 
efiSciency  and  economy  in  its  performance  were  insured.* 

Primary  and  secondary  schools  were  established  through- 
out  the  islands,   supplemented   by  trade  schools,  and 

'  See  Chapters  XXI-XXIV.  '  Chap.  XV.  '  Chap.  XIV. 

'  Chap.  XVI.  '  Chap.  XVII.  '  Chap.  XVIII. 


OuyfrrTLm  Ckhtbai.  School  Bdiuhno. 

Modern  Cbntbai.  School  Buildino. 

TUa  atnioture  u  typical  of  the  better-class  school-houses  constructed   under 

American  rule. 




a  nonnal  school  at  Manila.^  Legislation  was  enacted, 
and  submitted  to  the  President  and  to  Coi^^ress,  coTerii^ 
the  disposition  of  public  lands.*  The  pxirchase  of  ex- 
tensive estates  belonging  to  catain  reUgious  orders,  and 
the  sale  of  their  holdings  therein  to  tenants,  was  pro- 
vided for.'  Fairly  adequate  l^pslation  for  the  protection 
and  development  of  the  forest  resources  of  the  islands 
was  enacted.*  Means  of  communication  by  land  and 
sea  w^e  greatly  improved,  and  the  development  of  com- 
merce was  thus  stimulated.'^ 

It  is  a  noteworthy  fact  that  all  of  these  things  were 
done  with  a  per  capita  taxation  of  about  $  2.24  I 

Another  fundamentally  important  aid  to  the  commercial 
development  of  the  islands  was  afforded  by  a  radical  ref- 
ormation of  the  currency. 

The  islands  under  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  had  their 
own  distinct  silver  coinage  in  peso,  media  peso,  peeeta 
aod  media  peseta  pieces. 

In  1878  the  Spanish  government,  hoping  to  check  the 
heavy  exportation  of  gold  currency  from  the  Philippines, 
passed  a  law  prohibiting  the  importation  of  Mexican 
dollars,  but  allowed  the  Mexican  dollars  then  in  the  islands 
to  continue  to  circulate  as  legal  tender. 

When  the  American  troops  arrived,  there  were  in  cir- 
culation the  Spanish-Philippine  peso  and  subsidiary 
silver  coins ;  Spanish  pesos  of  different  mintinga ;  Mexican 
peeos  of  different  mintings ;  Hongkong  dollars,  fractional 
silver  coins  from  different  Chinese  countries,  and  copper 
coins  from  nearly  every  country  in  Uie  Orient.  Although 
a  law  had  been  passed  prohibiting  the  introduction 
of  Mexican  dollars  into  the  islands,  they  were  being 
constantly  smugged  in.  Fluctuations  in  the  price  of 
silver  affected  the  value  of  the  silver  coins,  and  the  money 
in  common  use  was  in  reality  a  commodity,  worth  on  any 
given  day  what  one  could  get  for  it.    These  conditions 

■  See  Ctiapter  XIX.  *  Chap.  XXX.  '  Cbajt.  XXX. 

*  Chap.  XXXI.  •  Chap.  XXXH. 



affected  most  disastrously  the  business  interests  of  the 
islands.  Merchants  were  forced  to  allow  very  wide 
mftrgins  in  commercial  transactions,  because  they  did 
not  know  what  their  goods  would  actually  cost  them  in 
local  currency  upon  arrival.  The  most  important  busi- 
ness of  the  local  banks  was  in  reahty  that  of  exchange 
brokers  and  note  shavers.  They  hammered  the  exchange 
rate  down  and  bought  silver,  then  boosted  the  rate 
skyward  and  sold. 

The  American  army  brought  in  a  large  amoimt  of  gold, 
but  this  did  not  remain  in  circulation  long,  as  it  was  ex- 
ported by  the  different  business  concerns,  or  hoarded. 

United  States  silver  money  had  a  limited  circulation 
during  the  early  days  of  American  occupation,  but  it 
passed  at  less  than  its  true  value.  An  effort  was  made 
imder  the  military  administration  to  keep  the  ratio  of 
exchai^  at  two  to  one  by  the  purchase  from  the  public 
of  all  United  States  currency  offered  at  that  rate  to  the 

For  a  long  time  the  banks  refused  to  carry  private 
accounts  in  United  States  currency,  but  when  it  was 
offered  for  deposit  it  was  changed  into  Mexicans  with 
a  heavy  charge  for  the  transaction,  and  an  account  opened 
in  Mexican  currency  to  the  credit  of  the  depositor.  If 
the  depositor  afterward  desired  to  get  United  States 
currency,  he  gave  a  check  for  it  at  the  then  existii^  rate 
of  exchange.  Such  conditions  were  intolerable,  and  the 
commission  passed  an  act  making  it  an  offence  to  refuse 
to  accept  for  deposit  the  currency  of  the  sovereign  power, 
but  tUs  did  not  remedy  the  fundamental  difficulty. 
There  came  a  heavy  slump  in  the  price  of  silver.  The 
Insular  government  lost  a  very  liu-ge  sum  because  of  the 
decrease  in  value  of  its  silver  coin. 

Mr.  Charles  A.  Conant  had  been  brought  from  the 
United  States  to  make  a  report  on  the  feasibility  of  pro- 
viding an  Americfm  coinage  for  the  islands.  He  rec- 
ommended that  the  unit  of  value  should   be  a  peso, 



equivalent  to  fifty  cents  United  States  currency.  Con- 
jpress,  by  an  act  passed  July  1,  1902,  vested  general  au- 
thority over  the  coinage  in  the  Philippine  government, 
but  the  conunission  decided  not  to  take  action  until  more 
specific  authority  could  be  obtained  from  Congreea,  as 
the  proposed  reform  was  radical,  and  it  was  very  important 
that  the  new  currency  should  at  the  outset  command  the 
confidence  so  essential  to  its  success. 

After  long  discussion,  Congress  authorized,  by  an  act 
passed  March  2,  1903,  a  new  currency  system  based  on 
a  theoretical  peso  of  12.9  grains  of  gold  900  fine,  equivalent 
to  one-half  of  a  United  States  gold  doUar.  The  cir- 
culating medium  was  to  be  the  Philippine  silver  peso, 
which  was  to  be  legal  tender  for  all  debts,  public  and  pri- 
vate, and  its  value  was  to  be  maintained  on  a  parity  with 
the  theoretical  gold  peso.  For  this  purpose  the  creation 
of  a  gold  standfud,  or  gold  reserve  fund,  was  provided  for, 
and  this  fund  was  to  be  maintained  and  could  be  used 
for  no  other  purptffie. 

Considerable  difficulty  was  experienced  in  introducing 
the  new  currency  into  the  islands.  The  banks  at  first 
failed  to  ^ve  any  assistance  to  the  government.  The 
business  men  of  Manila,  and  especially  the  Chinese,  dis- 
coimted  the  new  Philippine  peso,  because  it  did  not 
contain  as  much  silver  as  did  the  Mexican  dollar.  They 
were  quickly  brought  to  time,  and  given  to  understand 
where  they  stood  if  they  discredited  the  currency  of  the 

The  Spanish  Philippine  coios  and  the  Mexican  coins 
in  circulation  were  collected  by  the  treasmy  and  ex- 
ported to  the  San  Francisco  mint,  where  they  were  re- 
minted  into  new  coins  of  the  weight  and  fineness  prescribed 
by  law. 

The  establishment  of  a  gold  standard  ftmd  to  main- 
tain the  parity  between  the  gold  and  silver  dollar  was 
quickly  effected  by  the  sate  of  exchange  on  the  United 
States  in  accordance  with  the  established  law,  at  a  cost 



eetimated  to  be  the  same  as  the  transportation  of  the  gold 
coin  itself. 

The  army,  by  direction  of  the  secretary  of  war,  ceased 
to  pay  in  United  States  money,  and  its  paymasters  were 
given  credit  at  the  Insular  Treasury,  where  they  obtained 
the  necessary  funds  in  Philippine  currency. 

The  government  also  authorized,  in  addition  to  the 
coinage  of  silver,  the  issuance  of  paper  money  in  two, 
five,  and  ten  peso  notes.  All  of  the  coins  and  bills  were 
readily  interchangeable  with  the  United  States  coins  in 
common  use,  the  dollar  being  worth  two  pesos,  the  half 
dollar  one  peso,  the  twenty-five  cent  piece  a  half  peso, 
the  ten-eent  piece  a  peseta,  the  five-cent  piece  a  media 
peseta  and  the  cent  two  centavos. 

Unf  ortxmately  the  silver  value  of  the  new  peso  was  such 
that  when  the  price  of  silver  again  rose,  its  bullion  value 
was  greater  than  its  money  value,  and  in  consequence 
coins  of  this  denomination  were  hoarded  and  exported. 
It  proved  necessary  to  prohibit  their  deportation,  and  to 
issue  new  coins  of  less  bullion  value,  but  this  was  the  only 
really  serious  difficulty  attending  a  fundamental  reform 
which  put  the  currency  on  a  sound  basis.  The  ordinal 
p^os  were  recoined  and  a  handsome  profit  made  on  the 

No  one  who  has  not  Uved  in  a  country  where  the 
circulating  medium  is  constantly  fluctuating  in  value  can 
fully  appreciate  the  enormous  benefit  conferred  on  the 
Philippine  Islands  by  this  important  reform. 

Another  reform  of  far-reaching  importance  was  the 
readjustment  of  the  burden  of  taxation  so  that  it  should 
bear  Ughtly  on  the  necessities  of  life,  and  heavily  on  its 
luxuries.  This  was  a  complete  reversal  of  the  scheme 
which  we  found  in  force,  imder  which  wheat  fiour  and 
kerosene  oil  paid  very  heavy  import  duties  while  c^ars 
and  champagne  were  lightly  taxed.  , 

We  imposed  export  taxes  on  certain  products  of  the 
country.    Such  tfuies  are  objected  to  by  many  political 



economists,  but  were  approved  of  by  the  Filipinos,  who 
strongly  opposed  the  imposition  of  a.  logical  and  very 
necessary  personal  tax  to  provide  funds  for  the  con- 
struction and  maintenance  of  highways  and  bridges.  It 
is  usually  wise,  when  practicable,  to  obtain  funds  for 
necessary  governmental  piurposes  by  the  imposition  of 
taxes  which  are  willingly  paid. 

1^.  Taft  resigned  the  governorship  of  tbe  Philippines 
to  become  secretary  of  war,  his  resignation  taking  effect 
'January  31,  1904.  He  had  performed  a  monumental 
work  for  the  Filipinos,  and  for  htunanity  at  large,  during 
his  years  of  service  In  the  islands,  and  carried  with  him 
the  good  will  of  most  of  the  people  whom  he  had  so 
faithfully,  efficiently  and  self-sacrifioingly  served.  He  had 
at  one  time  very  gravely  impaired  his  health  by  hard  work, 
and  when  the  opportunity  came  to  satisfy  a  lifelong 
ambition  by  accepting  appointment  as  a  Justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  he  had  passed  it  by, 
in  order  to  perform  his  duty  to  the  people  of  the  Philippine 
Islands.  As  secretary  of  war,  and  as  President  of  the 
United  States,  he  availed  himself  of  every  opportimity 
which  these  high  offices  afforded  to  help  the  Fihpinos,  and 
to  increase  the  prosperity  of  their  coimtry.  They  have  had 
no  better  friend,  and  no  other  friend  whom  they  have 
ever  had  has  b^n  so  useful  to  them.  One  more  proof 
of  his  real  greatness  is  afforded  by  the  fact  that  to-day, 
after  being  reviled  by  many  Filipino  poUticians  whom  he 
befriended,  who  have  succeeded  to  a  large  degree  in 
making  the  common  people  of  the  Philippines  consider 
him  their  enemy,  his  interest  in  the  people  of  the  Islands 
is  as  keen,  and  his  eagerness  to  help  them  is  as  great, 
as  in  the  early  days  when  they  acclaimed  him  their 

General  Luke  £.  Wright,  a  democrat  of  Memphis, 
Tennessee,  was  appointed  by  President  Roosevelt  civil  gov- 
ernor in  Mr.  Taft's  place.  He  rendered  his  country  and 
the  Filipinos  most  distioguiahed  service.     It  is  one  thing 



to  build  up  a  great  govemment,  with  numerous  political 
appointments  at  one's  disposal,  and  anotlier  to  stand  by 
and  keep  it  running  smoothly  and  efficiently,  when  a  lot 
of  disappointed  politicians,  who  have  seen  their  last  hope 
of  political  preferment  go  a-^imjnering,  are  throwing 
sand  into  the  bearings  of  the  machine.  This  latter  class 
had  begun  to  plot  against  Governor  Taft  before  his 
resignation  took  effect,  but  their  machinations  were 
rendered  fruitless  by  the  wave  of  regret  ndsed  by  his 
coming  departure. 

They  now  devoted  themselves,  with  a  good  deal  of 
success,  to  injiuing  Governor  Wright,  who  declined  to  be 
dictated  to,  in  the  matter  of  appointments,  by  the  Federal 
Party,  and  aroused  the  ire  of  many  poliUcians  by  occa- 
sioually  tdling  the  Fihpinos  impalatable  but  wholesome 
and  necessary  truths  relative  to  their  fitness  for  immedi- 
ate independence. 

General  Wright,  whose  title  had  been  changed  from 
governor  to  governor-general  on  February  6,  1905,  went 
on  leave  diuing  the  latter  put  of  that  year,  fully  expect- 
ing to  return  and  resume  his  work  in  the  Philippines,  but 
the  islands  were  not  to  see  him  again.  He  resigned, 
effective  April  1,  1906,  to  become  United  States  Ambas- 
sador to  Japan.  In  my  opinion,  the  acceptance  of  his 
resignation  at  this  time  was  one  of  the  gravest  mistakes 
ever  made  in  the  Philippine  policy  of  the  United  States. 
The  islands  were  deprived  of  the  services  of  a  very  able 
and  distii^uuhed  man,  thoroughly  conversant  with  their 
needs,  who  had  the  courage  of  his  convictions,  and  whose 
convictions  were  thoroughly  sound. 

Certain  Filipino  politicians  openly  boasted  that  they 
had  secured  his  removal,  and  they  and  their  ilk  were  en- 
couraged to  put  forth  new  and  pernicious  efforts.  Had 
General  Wright  returned  to  the  islands  much  of  the  po- 
litical unrest  from  which  they  have  since  suff^ed  would 
have  been  avoided.  He  was  beloved  by  his  associates, 
who  fdt  a  sense  of  personal  loss  when  they  learned  that 



the  places  which  had  known  him  in  The  Philippines  would 
know  him  no  more. 

He  was  succeeded  for  the  brief  period  of  five  and  a  half 
months  by  Judge  Henry  C.  Ide,  vice-governor  and  secre- 
tary of  finance  and  justice,  who  had  performed  his 
duties  while  he  was  on  leave.  Judge  Ide  was  a  repubh- 
can,  from  Vermont.     He  resigned  on  September  19, 1906. 

He  was  succeeded  by  General  James  F.  Smith,  a  dono- 
crat  from  California,  who  had  come  to  the  islands  as  a 
colonel  of  volunteers,  and  had  won  promotion  because  of 
his  valuable  services  in  the  Visayas,  and  more  especially 
in  the  idand  of  N^ros,  where  he  had  earned  the  good  will 
of  the  Filipinos  by  his  tact  and  kindness.  Later  he  bad 
served,  unwillingly,  as  head  of  the  Manila  custom  house. 

He  was  subsequently  made  a  justice  of  the  supreme 
court  of  the  Philippines.  A  lawyer  by  profession,  he 
had  resigned  this  position  with  regret  to  accept  appoint>' 
ment,  on  January  1,  1903,  as  secretary  of  public  instruc- 
tion. He  did  not  desire  the  governor-generalship  and 
made  a  strong  but  unsuccessful  effort  to  avoid  accepting 
the  position,  which  he  finally  took  from  a  sense  of  duty. 
He  was  a  good  lawyer,  with  a  big  heart,  and  a  keen  insight 
into  human  nature.  He  thorou^y  understood  the 
Filipinos,  and  he  made  an  excellent  governor-general. 
It  was  during  his  term  of  office  that  the  Philippine  Le^s- 
lature,  composed  of  an  upper  appointive  house,  the 
Philippine  Commission,  and  a  lower  elective  house,  the 
Philippine  Assembly,  met  for  the  first  time  on  October  16, 

I  devote  a  separate  chapter*  to  the  Phihppine  Legis- 
lature and  its  work,  so  need  not  discuss  it  here.  Suffice 
it  to  say  that  such  success  as  attended  the  work  of  this 
body  during  its  inaugund,  first  and  special  sessions,  was 
very  largely  due  to  the  tactful  influence  of  Governor- 
General  Smith,  who  gave  the  speaker  of  the  assembly 
much  valuable,  friendly  counsel,  and  kept  the  two  houses 
■  Chapter  XXVII. 
VOL.  I  —  2  a 



working  in  comparative  harmony.  Having  strug^ed 
through  one  session  of  the  lepslature,  Governor-General 
Smith  felt  at  liberty  to  resign.  He  greatly  desired  to 
leave  the  Philippine  government  service  and  return  to 
the  practice  of  his  profession.  His  resignation  was  re- 
luctantly accepted,  about  a  year  after  he  had  tendered  it, 
and  he  left  the  service  on  November  10,  1909. 

He  was  succeeded  by  Vice-Governor  W.  Cameron 
Forbes,  a  repubUcan  from  Massachusetts,  who  had 
accepted  appointment  as  secretary  of  commerce  and 
police  on  June  15,  1904.  A  man  of  independent 
means,  Mr.  Forbes  entered  the  public  service  only  be- 
cause of  the  opportunity  for  greater  usefulness  which 
was  thus  afforded  him.  He  brought  to  bear  on  the 
problems  which  confronted  him  as  secretary  of  com- 
merce and  police  intelligence  and  ability  of  a  very  h^ 
order.  Wide  practical  experience  in  the  management 
of  large  business  interests  had  admirably  fitted  him  to 
improve  the  o]^;anization  and  increase  the  efficiency  of  the 
insular  police  force,  and  to  mature  and  carry  out  plans 
for  bettering  means  of  communication  and  otherwise 
facilitating  and  stimulating  the  normal,  healthful  com- 
mercial development  of  the  islands.  I  have  devoted 
several  chapters  to  the  discussion  of  the  results  accom- 
plished along  these  lines,'  and  will  not  attempt  here  to 
enumerate  them. 

Like  all  of  his  predecessors,  he  brought  to  the  office 
of  governor-general  mature  experience  gained  on  the 
groimd,  having  been  in  the  service  more  than  five  years 
at  the  time  of  his  promotion. 

As  governor-general,  he  not  only  retained  his  keen 
interest  in  the  large  problems  which  had  previously 
engaged  his  attention,  and  laboured  imceasingly  and  most 
successfully  in  the  performance  of  the  duties  of  his  new 
office,  but  took  an  especial  interest  in  the  development 
of  the  summer  capital,  and  in  the  work  for  the  non- 
>  Chaptera  XIV,  XXII,  XXIII  and  XXIV. 






Christian  peoples  of  the  islands,  devoting  a  muoh  greater 
amount  of  time  and  attention  to  familiarizing  himself 
with  the  needs  of  this  portion  of  the  population  than  had 
ever  previously  been  given  to  it  by  any  governor-general. 
He  visited  the  Moros  and  the  Bukit^ons  in  the  south, 
and  the  Negritos,  the  Benguet  Igorots,  the  Lepanto 
Igorots,  the  Bontoc  Igorots,  the  IloDgots,  the  Ifugaos, 
the  Kahngas,  and  both  the  wild  and  the  civilized  Tingians, 
in  the  north,  repeatedly  inspecting  the  several  sub* 
provinces  of  the  Mountain  Province. 

Through  his  generosity  in  making  proper  grounds 
available,  public  interest  in  outdoor  sports  was  greatly 
stimulated  at  Manila  and  at  Baguio,  while  his  own 
participation  in  polo,  baseball  and  golf  was  a  good  example 
to  Americans  and  Filipinos  alike,  in  a  country  where 
vigorous  outdoor  exercise  is  very  necessary  to  the  physical 
development  of  the  yoimg  and  the  preservation  of  the 
healthof  the  mature.  Hewas  a  true  friend  of  the  Filipinos, 
whom  he  genuinely  liked  and  was  always  ready  to  assist. 
His  personal  influence  wasa  powerful  factor  intheauccess  of 
the  very  important  work  carried  on  at  the  Philippine  Normal 
School  and  the  Philippine  Training  School  for  Nurses. 

During  his  term  of  office  the  prosperity  of  the  islands 
increased  by  leaps  and  bounds,  public  order  became  better 
than  ever  before  in  their  history,  and  the  efficiency 
of  the  civil  service  reached  its  maximum.  No  other 
governor-general  ever  drew  so  heavily  on  his  private 
means  in  promoting  the  pubhc  good,  and  it  was  the 
irony  of  fate  that  he  should  have  been  accused,  by 
certain  irresponsible  anti-imperiahsts,  of  using  his  pubOo 
office  to  promote  his  private  interests.  Near  the  end  of 
his  administration  grossly  and  absurdly  false  charges 
were  made  gainst  him  on  the  floor  of  the  House  by 
Representative  TTilliam  A.  Jones.  As  their  falsity  has 
been  conclusively  and  finally  shown,'  I  will  not  here  lend 
impori;ance  to  them  by  repeating  them.  No  official 
*  Reply  to  J<met,  Famiddet,  Manila,  1913. 



has  ever  given  any  countiy  a  cleaner  admiiiistration  than 
Governor-General  Forbes  gave  the  Philippines. 

It  was  his  fortune  to  be  in  office  at  the  time  of  the  change 
in  the  national  administration  of  the  United  States. 
Aft^  continuing  to  serve  for  months  with  no  ogn  from 
Washington  as  to  whether  his  resignation  was  desired,  he 
was  advised  by  the  Chief  of  the  bureau  of  insular  affairs 
that  the  appointment  of  Mr.  Francis  Burton  Harrison, 
idio  is  a  Tammany  Hall  democrat,  as  his  succeesor  had 
been  sent  to  the  Senate,'  and  three  days  after  its  confinna- 
tion  received  a  curt  request  for  his  resignation  to  be 
effected  in  a  week  and  a  day.  He  was  aim  requested  to 
employ  servants  for  Mr.  Harrison.  Spaniards  who  read 
on  the  public  streets  newspapers  which  printed  this 
message  were  seen  to  tear  them  up  and  stamp  on  the 
pieces  I  Our  Spanish  friends  are  accustomed  to  expect 
courtesy  in  connection  with  the  removal  of  faithful  and 
efficient  public  servants. 

All  other  governors-general  had  taken  the  oath  of 
office  at  Manila.  Mr.  Harrison  took  it  at  Washington 
on  September  2, 1913.  He  is  the  first  American  governor 
of  the  islands  who  has  entered  upon  his  high  duties  with- 
out previous  experience  in  the  country  which  he  is  to 
govern,  and  he  has  as  y«t  displayed  little  inclination  to 
profit  by  the  experience  of  either  Filipino  or  American 
administeative  insular  officials  of  high  rank.  It  is  too 
soon  to  discuss  any  feature  of  his  adniinistration  other 
than  his  attitude  toward  the  civil  service,  which  I  take  up 
elsewhere,'  and  I  can  only  ejqjress  the  hope  that  when  he 
has  gained  that  knowledge  which  can  come  only  throu^ 
personal  observation  on  ^e  ground,  he  will  grow  to  be  a 
wise,  strong,  conservative  official. 

The  estabhshment  of  civil  government  in  the  Fhihppine 
Islands  under  American  rule  was  a  gradual  evolution  up 
to  the  time  of  the  assumption  of  control  by  Govemoi^ 
General  Harrison. 

'  See  pp.  376-77. 



I  will  not  attempt  to  follow  in  detail  all  of  its  aucceasive 
stages,  but  in  closing  this  chapter  will  endeavour  briefly 
to  summarize  the  results  obtained  up  to  that  time. 

The  Philippines  now  have  two  delegates  to  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States  appointed  by  the  legislature  in 
accordance  with  the  provision  of  Section  8  of  the  Act  of 
Congress  of  July  1,  1902.    Both  are  Filipinos. 

The  rankii^  executive  officials  of  the  insular  govern- 
ment are  a  governor-geQeral,  a  secretary  of  the  interior, 
a  secretary  of  finance  and  justice,  a  secretary  of  com- 
merce and  police  and  a  secretary  of  public  instruction. 
AH  of  these  officers  are  appointed  by  the  Premdent,  subject 
to  confirmation  by  the  Senate.  The  secretary  of  finance 
and  justice  is  a  Filipino;  the  other  secretaries  of  de- 
partments are  Americans. 

There  is  a  legislature  composed  of  two  houses  known 
respectively  as  the  Philippine  Commission  and  the 
Fhihppine  Assembly.  The  Philippine  Commission  is 
composed  of  nine  members ;  five  are  the  governor 
general  and  the  four  secretaries  of  department  ex  officio, 
and  four  are  appointed  by  the  President  subject  to  con- 
firmation by  the  Senate.  Four  of  the  members  are 
Filipinos  and  five  are  Americans.' 

The  Philippine  Assembly  is  composed  of  eight-one 
elected  members,  all  of  whom  are  Filipinos.  They 
represent  thirty-four  of  the  thirty-nine  provinces  into 
which  the  uvhipelago  is  divided.  The  two  houses  of 
the  legislature  have  equal  powers.  Neither  has  any 
special  privil^e  in  the  matter  of  initiating  legiBlation, 
and  affirmative  action  by  both  is  required  in  order  to 
pass  it.  The  Moro  Province,  the  Mountain  Province 
and  the  provinces  of  Nueva  Yizcaya  and  Agusan 
are  not  represented  in  the  assembly,  nor  are  they 
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  PhiUppine  Legislature. 
The  Philippine  Commission  alone  has  legislative  juris- 
diction over  them,  their  population  being  largely  com- 
■  Undw  the  new  regime  these  flguree  have  been  reversed. 



posed  of  Moros,  or  members  of  other  non-Christiui 

The  provinces  may  be  divided  into  regularly  organized 
provinces  governed  under  the  provincial  government  act, 
and  specially  oi^anized  provinces,  which  include  the  More 
Province,  the  Mountain  Province  and  the  provinces  of 
Mindoro,  Palawan,  Agusan  and  Nueva  ViBCaya,  of  which 
the  first  is  governed  under  a  special  law  and  the  remainii^ 
four  are  governed  under  a  different  one  known  as  "The 
Special  Provincial  Government  Act." 

Regularly  organized  proviaces  have  a  governor  and 
a  treasurer.  The  governor  is  elected,  and  the  treasurer 
is  appointed  by  the  governor-general  with  the  approval 
of  the  commission.  These  two  oflicials,  with  another 
known  as  the  third  member,  constitute  a  provincial 
board.  The  third  member  is  elected.  As  the  Filipinos 
usually  elect  to  office  men  from  among  their  own  people, 
practically  all  of  the  elective  provincial  officers  are 
Filipinos,  as  are  ten  of  the  appointive  officers,  it 
having  been  the  policy  to  appoint  Filipinos  whenever 

Regularly  organized  provinces  are  divided  into  munici- 
palities which  elect  their  own  officers  and  control  their 
own  afffurs  for  the  most  part.  Provincial  treasurers 
have  intervention  in  municipal  expenditures,  which  are 
approved  in  advance  for  each  fiscal  year,  and  municipal 
officers  may  be  removed  for  misconduct  by  the  governor- 

All  o&.(xira  of  the  six  special  government  provinces  are 
appointed  by  the  govemor-^neral  with  the  approval 
of  the  commission. 

There  are  four  regularly  organized  municipalities  in 
these  provinces,  but  the  remainder  of  their  territory  is 
divided  into  townships,  which  elect  their  own  officers, 
except  their  secretary-treasurers,  who  are  appointed  by 
the  provincial  governor;  and  into  rancherias  or  settle- 
ments, with  all  of  their  officials  appointed  by  the  pro- 



vincial  governor.  This  latter  form  of  local  government 
is  confined  to  the  more  primitive  wild  people. 

The  judiciary  is  independent.  The  details  of  its  or- 
ganization will  be  found  in  Chapter  XV. 

Three  of  the  seven  justices  of  the  supreme  court,  in- 
cluding the  chief  justice,  are  Filipinos,  as  are  approx- 
imately half  of  the  judges  of  the  courts  of  first  instance 
and  practically  all  justices  of  the  peace. 

At  the  close  of  the  fiscal  year  endii^  June  30,  1913, 
71  per  cent  of  the  employees  in  the  clasafied  civil  service 
of  the  islands  were  Filipinos  painstakingly  trained  for 
the  positions  to  which  they  had  been  appointed. 

I^or  to  the  American  occupation,  the  FiUpinos  had 
practically  no  intervention  in  the  government  of  their 

The  chai^^  introduced  in  the  twelve  years  since  the 
establishment  of  civil  government  began  are  of  a  sweeping 
and  radical  nature.  For  reasons  hereinafter  fully  set  forth, 
I  believe  they  have  been  somewhat  too  sweeping,  and  too 
radical.  At  all  events,  it  is  now  certainly  the  part  of 
wisdom  carefully  to  analyze  their  results  before  going 

X  deem  the  subject  of  the  establishment  of  civil  govern- 
mental control  over  the  non-Christian  tribes  of  the 
Philippines  worthy  of  special  consideration.* 

>  See  Cawpten  XX-XXIV. 



The  Philippine  Citil  Sbbtics 

Before  the  Philippine  Commission  left  Washington,  a 
clear  understanding  was  reached  with  the  President  and 
secretary  of  war  to  the  effect  that  no  pohtical  appointee 
whatsoever  should  under  any  circumstances  be  forced 
upon  us.  After  arrival  at  Manila  early  attention  was 
given  to  the  drafting  of  a  civil  service  act  by  Mr.  Taft, 
who  was  forttmate  in  having  the  assistance  of  Mr.  Frank 
M.  Kiggins,  chief  of  the  examining  division  of  the  United 
States  Civil  Service  CommlBsion.  The  passage  of  this 
act  and  its  strict  enforcement  led  to  very  favourable  com- 
ment in  the  United  States.  In  his  first  umual  message 
President  Roosevelt  said :  — 

"It  ia  important  to  have  this  system  obtain  at  h<Hne,  but  it 
is  even  more  important  to  have  it  r^dly  appUed  in  our  insular 

"The  merit  gystem  is  simply  one  method  of  securing  honest 
and  efficient  administration  of  the  government,  and  in  the  long 
nm  the  sole  justiEcation  of  any  type  of  government  liee  in  its 
proving  iteelf  both  honest  and  efficient." 

Secretary  Root  also  gave  us  his  fullest  auppwrt,  calling 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  law  which  we  had  passed 
was  of  a  very  advanced  type,  and  that  under  such  cir- 
cumstances as  confronted  us,  the  securing  of  the  best  men 
available  should  outweigh,  and  indeed  practically  exclude, 
aJI  other  considerations. 

Our  action  met  with  the  xmqualified  approval  of  or- 
ganizations which  especially  interest  themselves  in  the 
maintenance  of  clean  and  efficient  public  service,  such 
as  the  Cambridge  (Massachusetts)  Civil  .Service  Reform 



Association  *  and  the  National  Civil  Service  Reform 
League,  whose  committee  on  civil  service  in  depen- 
dencies spoke  in  very  high  terms  of  existing  conditions 
in  the  Philippines.' 

In  its  first  annual  report  the  Civil  Sra^ce  Board  called 
attention  to  some  of  the  more  important  provisions  of 
the  Act  in  the  following  words :  — 

"Competitive  examinationa  must,  whenever  practicable, 
be  held  for  original  entrance  to  the  service,  and  promotions  of 
employees  must  also  be  baaed  upon  competitive  examinations, 
in  which  the  previous  experience  and  efficiency  of  employees 
shall  be  given  due  consideration.  The  examinations  for  en- 
trance to  the  service  must  be  held  in  the  United  States  and  in 
the  Philippine  Islands,  and  applicants  are  required  to  be  tested 
in  both  English  and  Spanish. 

"Disloy^ty  to  the  United  States  of  America  as  the  supreme 
authority  io  the  Islands  is  made  a  complete  disquahfication  for 
holding  office,  and  every  applicant  for  admission  to  the  service 
must,  before  being-  admitted  to  examination,  take  the  oath  of 
loyalty.  By  an  amendment  to  the  Civil  Service  Act  on  Jan- 
uary 2S,  1901,  it  is  further  declared  that  all  persons  in  arms 
against  the  authority  of  the  United  States  in  the  PbiUppiQe 
Idande,  and  all  persons  aiding  or  abetting  them,  on  the  first 
day  of  April,  1901,  shall  be  ineligible  to  hold  office. 

"A  minimiim  age  limit  of  eighteen  years  and  a  maximum 
age  limit  of  forty  years  are  fixed  for  those  who  enter  the  lowest 
grades  in  the  service.    This  avoids  the  difficulty  and  embarrasa- 

>  "The  merit  s^tem  has  received  renewed  support  from  President 
BooMvelt  in  his  administration,  and  by  the  exteDsion  of  civil  service 
throngAout  the  nation,  as  well  as  in  our  new  possessions.  The  Philip- 
pine servioe  is  reported  to  be  very  satisfactory,  and  efforts  are  being 
made  for  the  extension  and  larger  development  of  regulations  in  Porto 

■  "From  the  Preddent  down,  every  official  charged  with  a  duty 
tovobing  the  government  of  our  dependencies  is  imbued  with  a  pro- 
(oimd  sense  of  duty,  and  adequate  realization  of  the  situation  and  the 
imperative  neoesdty  of  an  unselfish,  patriotic  execution  of  the  laws  and 
reffnlationa  in  the  interest  of  the  highest  welfare  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
dependendes.  With  this  state  of  affaira,  the  establishment  of  the 
mMit  system  in  them  on  an  enduring  basis  should  follow  ae  a  matter 
of  course.  It  will  be  the  aim  of  this  Committee  to  aid  in  every  possible 
way  in  extending  and  improving  the  system,  and  to  that  end  to  give 
to  the  whole  subject  oareful  and  detailed  study." 




"From  its  aervice  records  the  Board  is  required  to  compile 
atmutJly,  for  publication  on  January  1,  a  roster  of  tiie  officers 
and  employees  under  the  Philippine  Government. 

"Applications  from  employees,  classi&ed  and  unclassified, 
for  accrued  and  sick  leave  for  more  than  two  days  must  be  made 
on  a  form  prescribed  by  the  Board  and  forwarded  to  it  for  veri- 
fication of  service  record  and  previous  leave  granted  and  for 
recommendation  before  final  action  is  taken  by  the  Civil  Gov- 
ernor or  Secretary  of  Department." 

These  extracts  from  official  reports  clearly  show  that 
the  act  was  indeed  of  a  very  advanced  type,  and  if  hon- 
estly enforced  would  of  necessity  lead  to  tiie  establish- 
ment and  maintenance  of  "an  efficient  and  honest  civil 
service,"  for  which  purpose  it  was  enacted. 

In  1905  the  insular  govKrmnent  dispensed  with  boards 
as  administrative  agencies,  and  in  accordance  with  this 
general  policy,  a  bureau  of  civil  service  with  a  director 
at  its  head  was  substituted  for  the  Civil  Service  Board, 
thus  securing  greater  adniinistrative  efficiency  and  in- 
creased economy. 

At  first  the  Civil  Service  Act  applied  to  comparatively 
few  positions,  as  only  a  few  bureaus  and  offices  had  been 
created,  but  as  the  government  was  organized  and  grew, 
the  different  bureaus  and  offices  were  placed  in  the  classi- 
fied service,  the  acts  organizing  them  leaving  in  the  un- 
classified service  positions  to  which  in  the  judgment  of 
the  commission  the  examination  requirements  of  the 
act  should  not  apply.  Ultimately  these  requirements 
were  made  applicable  to  the  treasurers  of  ail  mtmici- 
palities  and  to  all  positions,  including  teachers,  in  the 
executive  and  judicial  branches  of  the  central  govern- 
ment, the  provincial  governments,  and  the  governments  of 
the  cities  of  Manila  and  Baguio,  except  a  few  specifically 
excepted  by  law,  which  for  the  most  part  are  unclassified 
or  exempt  in  almost  all  governments,  national,  state  and 
municipal,  having  civil  service  laws.  None  of  the  states 
of  the  Union  has  such  a  widely  extended  classification  of 
its  civil  service. 



With  the  exception  of  the  positions  specifically  placed 
in  the  unclassified  service  by  law  and  of  appointaients 
made  by  the  Philippine  Commission,  all  positions  in  the 
Philippine  civil  service  are  classified  and  must  be  filled  by 
appointees  who  have  passed  civil  service  examinations. 
Neither  the  governor-general  nor  the  Bureau  of  Civil 
Service  can,  by  the  promulgation  of  civil  service  rules, 
or  in  any  other  manner  whatever,  transfer  any  position 
from  the  classified  to  the  tmclassified  service  or  except 
from  examination  any  position  in  the  classified  service. 
Under  moat  of  the  civil  service  laws  of  the  United  States 
the  President  or  the  governor  of  the  state  has  authority 
to  transfer  positions  from  the  non-claseified  or  exempt«i 
class  to  the  competitive  classified  civil  SOTvice  or  vice 
versa,  these  powers  sometimes  leading  to  manipulation 
of  the  civil  service  rules  for  political  purposes. 

In  the  Phihppines,  where  emergencies,  such  as  cholera 
epidemics,  sometimes  lead  to  the  employment  of  large 
bodies  of  temporary  employees  without  examination, 
when  the  emergency  has  passed  the  temporary  employees 
have  always  been  discharged ;  and  no  employee  has  ever 
received  classification  without  examination  on  account 
of  temporary  service.  This  is  in  marked  contrast  to 
the  practice  in  the  United  States,  where  large  bodies  of 
employees  taken  on  for  temporary  service  due  to  emet^ 
genciee,  such  as  the  war  with  Spain,  are  not  infrequently 
blanketed  into  the  classified  service  without  examination. 

In  its  last  annual  report  the  board  recommended  that 
a  number  of  official  positions  in  the  unclassified  service 
be  placed  in  the  classified  service,  and  gave  as  a  reason 
therefor  that  such  action  would  "add  to  the  attractive- 
ness of  the  classified  service  by  increasing  the  oppor- 
tunities therein  for  promotion  to  responsible  positions." 
This  recommendation  was  adopted  by  providing  that  all 
vacancies  in  the  positions  of  heads  and  assistant  heads  of 
bureaus  or  offices  and  of  superintendents  shall  be  filled  by 
promotion,  with  or  without  examination,  in  the  discie- 



tioD  of  the  civil  gomnor  or  proper  head  of  a  department, 
of  persons  in  the  classified  dvU  service,  if  competent 
persons  are  found  therein. 

This  provision  is  an  important  and  distinguishing 
feature  of  the  PhiUppine  Civil  Service  Act.  The  federal 
civil  service  has  none  comparable  with  it.  It  is  of  ^lecial 
value  in  that  it  induces  young  men  of  exceptional  ability 
and  training  to  enter  the  lower  grades,  for  they  have  the 
certainty  that  faithful  and  efficient  work  will  in  the  end 
earn  for  them  the  highest  poBitions. 

On  February  25,  1909,  the  director  of  civil  service 
made  the  following  statement  with  respect  t<r  the  ob- 
servance of  the  law  :  — 

"A  careful  study  of  Act  5  and  all  acts  amendatory  thereof 
frill  show  that  there  baa  be^t  no  change  in  the  policy  adopted 
by  the  Conunisfflon  at  the  outset  to  ^end  the  claseiEed  ser- 
vice as  widely  as  possible  and  to  fill  by  promotion  all  the  higher 
positions  bo  far  as  practicable.  The  provision  requirii^  the 
higher  positions  to  be  filled  by  promotion  so  far  as  practicable 
has  always  been  regarded  by  the  Philippine  Commission,  by 
this  Bureau,  and  by  others  interested  in  obtaining  the  beet 
poedble  government  service  in  the  Philippines  as  one  of  the 
most  important  providons  of  the  Civil  Service  Act.  It  has 
been  faithfully  observed  by  all  Governors-General.  .  .  .  With 
the  exception  of  the  positions  of  Governor-General  and  Secre- 
taries of  Departments,  the  Philippine  Civil  Service  Act  requires 
the  highest  positions  in  the  executive  civil  service,  namely, 
chiefs  and  assistant  chiefs  of  Bureaus  and  Offices,  to  be  filled 
by  promotion  from  the  entire  service  in  all  cases  except  when 
in  the  opinion  of  the  appointing  power  there  is  no  person  com- 
petent and  available  who  possesses  the  qualifications  required, 
and  this  provision  has  be^  faithfully  observed  heretofore." 

The  enforcement  of  the  law  by  the  commission  has 
received  the  followii^  commendation  from  'the  executive 
committee  of  the  National  Civil  Service  Reform  League : — 

"We  have  further  to  note  with  satisfaction  the  course  of  the 
PhiUppine  Commission,  by  which,  if  it  be  persevered  in,  the 
merit  system  will  be  established  in  the  Islands  of  that  archi- 
peli^  at  least  as  thoroughly  and  consistently  as  in  any  d^»rt- 



meat  of  gOTemment,  Federal,  State,  or  Mtinicipal,  m  the 
Union.  'Hus  must  be,  in  any  case,  regarded  bb  a  gratifying 
recognition  of  sound  principles  of  admmistration  on  the  part 
of  the  Commisdon,  and  justifies  the  hope  that,  within  the  Umita 
of  their  jurisdiction  at  least,  no  repetition  of  the  scandals  of 
post-belliun  days  will  be  tolerated." 

Up  to  the  time  of  the  appointment  of  GoverDor-GreneTal 
Harrison  the  provi^ons  of  the  Civil  Service  Act  and  rules 
were  firmly  supported  by  all  of  the  governors-general 
and  secretaries  of  departments,  and  the  annual  reports 
of  the  governor-general  uniformly  expressed  sat^fao- 
tion  with  their  practical  operation.  Mr.  Taft  was  always 
an  enthusiastic  supporter  of  the  merit  system. 

Governor-General  Forbes  in  his  inaugural  address  made 
the  following  statements :  — 

"It  ia  necessary  that  the  civil  service  should  be  r^dly  main- 
tEuned  and  its  rules  carefully  observed.  One  very  distinguished 
Fihpino  has  recently  been  appointed  to  administrative  control 
of  one  of  the  most  important  departments  of  the  Government, 
equal  in  rank  to  any  executive  position  in  the  Islands  with  the 
exception  of  the  Eixecutive  head.  In  the  executive  branch  of 
the  Government,  the  IHipinization  of  the  service  must  steadily 
continue.  As  vacancies  occur  Fihpinos  will  be  gradually  sub- 
stituted for  Americans  as  rapidly  as  can  be  done  without  posi- 
tive detriment  to  the  service.  At  the  same  time,  care  will  be 
taken  to  provide  a  suitable  career  for  honest  and  capable 
Americans  who  have  come  out  here  in  good  faith.  They  should 
know  that  during  good  behavior  and  efficient  performance  of 
their  duty  they  are  secure  in  their  positions,  and  that  when 
they  desire  to  return  to  the  United  States  an  effort  will  be  made 
to  place  them  in  the  civil  service  at  home. 

"I  want  no  better  men  than  the  present  officers  and  em- 
ployees of  the  Government,  Americans  and  Filipinos.  They 
compare  favorably  with  any  set  of  men  I  have  ever  seen  both  as 
regards  abiUty  and  fidehty  to  duty." 

Under  the  operation  of  the  Civil  Service  Act  the  pro- 
pori^ion  of  Filipinos  employed  has  increased  from  49  per 
cent,  in  1903,  to  71  per  cent  in  1913,  aa  is  shown  by  the 
following  table :  — 




Filipinos  in  the  Sbkvicb 




1903    . 



1904    . 



1906    . 




1907    . 



1908    . 



1909    . 



1910    . 



1911    . 







For  the  first  few  years  after  the  establishment  of  the 
government  large  numbers  of  Americans  were  appointed, 
as  there  were  comparatively  few  Fihpino  candidates  with 
the  necessary  educational  qualifications.  During  the 
last  two  years,  89  per  cent  of  the  persons  appointed  in 
the  islands  have  been  Filipinos. 

There  has  been  a  great  increase  in  the  number  of  Fili- 
pinos entering  the  civil  service  examinations  in  English. 
Ten  years  ago  97  per  cent  of  those  examined  took  their 
examinations  in  Spanish,  while  during  last  year  89  per 
cent  of  those  examined  took  examinatioim  in  English, 
the  total  number  so  examined  being  7755.  Ahnost  all 
appointees  for  ordinary  clerical  work  are  now  FilipinoB, 
but  the  supply  of  bookke^>ers,  stenographers,  civil  en- 
gineers, physicians,  veterinarians,  surveyors,  chemists, 
bacteriologists,  agriculturists,  horticulturists,  constabu- 
lary officers,  nurses,  electricians,  mechanical  engineers, 
and  other  scientific  employees  is  still  insufficient  to  meet 
the  demands  of  the  service.    Only  one  Filipino  has  passed 

>  No  data,  for  1906  avMlabte. 



the  stenographer  examinatioD  in  English  dnce  the  or^n- 
ization  of  the  government,  and  it  is  necessary  each  year 
to  bring  many  American  stenographers  from  the  United 
States.  A  few  Filipinos  pass  each  year  the  junior  steno- 
grapher examination '  and  are  able  to  fill  some  of  the 
positions  which  would  formerly  have  required  the  ap- 
pointment of  Americans. 

The  salaries  paid  to  executive  officials,  chiefs  of  bureaus 
and  offices,  chief  clerks,  and  chiefs  of  divisions  equal  in 
many  instances  those  paid  to  officials  occupying  similar 
positions  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  government. 

In  the  legislative  branch  the  speaker  receives  $8000 
per  annum.  Members  of  the  Philippine  Commisaott 
without  portfolios  receive  $7500  per  annum.  Members  of 
the  Philippine  Assembly  receive  $15  a  day  for  each  day 
in  which  the  assembly  is  in  session. 

In  the  executive  branch  secretaries  of  departments 
receive  $15,500  per  annum  each,  including  $5000  recdved 
by  them  as  members  of  the  Philippine  Commission.  The 
executive  secretary  receives  $9000  per  annimi.  The 
salaries  of  other  bureau  chiefs  range  from  $2500  per 
annum  to  $7500. 

The  justices  of  the  Philippine  Supreme  Court  recdve 
$10,000  per  annum.  Judges  of  courts  of  first  instance 
receive  from  $4500  to  $5500. 

The  following  extracts  from  an  article  by  the  chairman 
of  the  Philippine  Civil  Service  Board  ^ve  information 
with  respect  to  salaries  in  the  FhiUppLne  Islands,  as  com- 
pared with  salaries  paid  in  surrounding  British  and  Dutch 
colonies :  — 

"The  saJariee  paid  officials  in  all  branches  of  the  sorice  of 
the  Straits  Settlements  are  generally  lower  than  those  pud  in 
the  Philippine  civil  service.  In  this  connection,  however,  it 
is  only  just  to  state  that  the  population  and  extent  of  the 
territory  tinder  British  control,  and  the  expenses  of  living,  are 
less  thui  in  the  PhiUppinee,  while  the  difficulty  ctf  the  prob- 

>  Eigjit  passed  iMt  tmt. 



teiDB  to  be  solved  is  not  bo  great.  The  salaries  pud  to  Datives 
who  fill  the  lower  grade  positions  in  the  civil  service  of  the  Phil- 
ippine Islands  are  three  and  four  times  as  great  as  the  salaries 
pud  to  natives  in  similar  classes  of  work  in  the  civil  service  of 
the  British  Malay  colonies. 

"A  study  of  the  colonial  civil  service  of  the  Dutch  in  the 
islands  of  Java  and  Madura  gives  us  somewhat  differ^it 
results.  ,  ,  . 

"The  matter  of  salaries  is  peculiarly  interesting.  The 
comparison  made  above  of  the  compensations  received  by  the 
high  officials  in  the  civil  service  of  the  Tfagli^ih  colonies  and  by 
those  in  the  Philippines  does  not  hold  good  when  applied  to  the 
Dutch  in  Java.  In  fact,  the  salary  of  the  Governor-General  of 
Java  is  somewhat  remarkable  in  contrast  with  that  of  the  Civil 
Governor  of  the  Philippines.  As  is  well  known,  the  latter 
receives  $20,000,  while  the  salary  of  the  Govemor-Oreneral  ^ 
Java  amounts  to  132,000  gulden  or  something  over  (53,000. 
The  American  official  is  given,  in  addition,  free  transportation 
on  all  official  investigations  and  free  use  of  the  governor's 
palace,  but  not  the  cost  of  maintenance.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Dutch  governor  is  granted  51,000  gulden  (about  $21,500) 
as  personal  and  household  expenses  and  travel  pay. 

"The  general  secretary  of  the  government  receives  24,000 
gulden  (19648),  as  compared  with  the  executive  secretary  of 
the  Philippine  government,  whose  salary  is  $7500.*  Hie 
seven  heads  of  departments  in  the  Javanese  service  each  re- 
ceive a  like  compensation  of  24000  gulden.  The  Raad,  or 
Council,  of  the  Dutch  colonial  government  is  composed  of  a 
vice-pr^ident  and  four  members  —  the  former  receiving  about 
$14,500,  the  latter  slightly  over  $11,500  each.  In  the  Phil- 
ippine government  the  executive  functions  of  heads  of  depart- 
ments are  exercised  by  four  members  of  the  legislative  body, 
each  of  whom  receives  $10,500  for  his  executive  services  and 
$5000  for  his  legislative  duties.  Without  going  further  into 
detful,  the  conclusion  is  evident  that  all  officials  of  high  rank 
are  much  better  paid  in  the  Dutch  service.  When  a  compari- 
son is  made  between  the  chief  clerks  and  other  office  employees 
of  middle  grades  —  not  natives  —  the  salaries  are  seen  to  be 
about  the  same  in  the  two  countries. 

"All  natives  in  positions  of  lower  grades,  however,  in  the 
Philippine  Islands  fare  better  than  their  Malay  brethren,  either 
in  the  Straits  Settlements  or  in  the  East  Indies."  —  (Second 
Annual  Report  of  the  Philippine  Civil  Service  Board,  pp.  60, 61.) 

'  He  now  reoedvee  $9000. 




"Inference  in  salaries  for  subordiaate  pojritioiiB  in  the 
British  and  Dutch  colonial  servicce  and  the  Philippine  service 
are  distinctly  in  favour  of  Bubordiaate  employees  in  the  Philip- 
pine service;  only  the  higher  officials,  after  \<mg  experience, 
in  the  British  colonial  service  receive  larger  salaries  than  oorre- 
spending  officials  in  the  Philippine  service ;  the  leave  of  absence 
and  other  privileges  for  the  Philippine  service  are  not  leas 
liberal  than  for  other  colonial  services."  —  (Report  of  tbe 
Philippine  Commissioa  for  1905,  p.  74.) 

The  entrance  aalaries  of  Am^cans  brought  to  the 
islands  are  considerably  in  excess  of  tbe  entrance  Balaries 
received  on  appointment  to  the  civil  service  in  the  United 

The  following  table  shows  tbe  Tninimnm  entrance 
salaries  given  to  Americans  appointed  in  the  United 
States  to  the  United  States  civil  service,  as  shown  by 
the  manual  of  examinations  of  the  United  States  Civil 
Service  Commission  for  the  fall  of  1913,  and  to  Ameri- 
cans appointed  in  the  United  States  to  the  Philippine 
Civil  Service :  — 

Aid  (Surveyor) 
Civil  Engweer ,  . 
Forester,  assistant 
Scientific  Assistant, 
(Agricultural  InHpector), 
Physician  .  .  . 
Printer  .... 
Stenographer  .  . 
Trained  Nurse .    . 

Teacher  .... 



600  Board, 
quarters  and  laundry 

$  900 



600  and  laondiy 

The  following  cases  taken  from  the  official  rosters 
show  some  promotions  to  the  highw  positions  in  the 
service  of  employees  who  entered  the  lower  ranks  of  the 
classified  service :  — 



S8  done  by  a  pupil  in  one  of  the  Manila  city  sohooU. 




A  clerk  who  entered  the  service  m  1899  at  S1800  p^ 
annum  waa  appointed  in  1903  an  assistant  chief  of  bureau 
at  $3000  per  annum  and  in  1908  executive  secretary  at 
$9000  per  annum.  A  teacher  appointed  in  1899  at  $720 
per  annum  was  appointed  a  chief  of  an  office  at  $4000 
per  annum  and  in  1912  a  jut^  at  $4600  per  annum. 
A  teacher  who  entered  the  service  in  1901  at  $1200  p^ 
aimimi  was  in  1909  appointed  a  chief  of  a  bureau  at  $6000 
per  annum.  A  teacher  who  entered  the  service  in  1904  at 
$1000  per  annum  was  appointed  in  191 1  an  assistant  chief 
of  a  bureau  at  $6000  per  annum.  A  clerk  who  entered 
the  service  in  1901  at  $1200  per  annum  was  appointed  in 
1909  an  assistant  chief  of  the  executivebureau  at  $3750  per 
annum  and  in  1912  a  chief  of  a  bureau  at  $6000  per  annum. 
A  stenographer  who  entered  the  service  in  1903  at  $1400 
per  annum  was  in  1908  appointed  an  assistant  chief  of  a 
bureau  at  $5000  per  annum.  A  transitman  who  entered 
the  service  in  1905  at  $1400  per  annum  waa  in  1913  ap- 
pointed an  assUtant  chief  of  a  bureau  at  $4500  per  an- 
num. An  accountant  who  entered  the  service  in  1901 
at  $1800  per  annimi  was  in  1907  appointed  an  assistant 
chief  of  a  biireau  at  $3750  per  annum  and  in  1909  a  chief 
of  a  bureau  at  $6000  per  annum.  A  hiw  clerk  who  en- 
tered the  service  in  1904  at  $1800  per  annum  was  in  1913 
appointed  judge  at  $4500  per  annum.  In  no  service  any- 
where has  promotion  depended  more  directly  on  demon- 
strated ability,  and  in  many  instances  it  has  been  rapid. 

Young  men  hving  two  in  a  room  may  obtain  room  and 
board  in  boarding  hoiises  in  Manila  at  a  rate  as  low  as 
$35  per  month  each.  In  the  Young  Men's  Christian 
Association  buildii^,  a  large  reinforced  concrete  structure 
with  readily  room,  gymnasium,  and  a  good  restaxirant, 
the  charge  for  two  in  a  room  is  $10.25  each.  Board  costs 
$27.50,  a  total  of  $37.75.  The  expenses  for  clothing  in 
Manila  are  less  than  in  the  United  States,  as  white 
elothii^  is  worn  the  whole  year  and  white  duck  suits 
may  be  obtained  for  about  $3  each.    The  e}q)enses  for 



latmdiy  amount  to  about  $5  a  month.  The  necessity 
of  employing  a  muchacho  ^  is  nil,  in  the  case  of  an  un- 
muried  employee  who  boards.  Servants  are  far  cheaper 
and  better  in  the  Philippines  than  in  the  United  States. 

In  a  discussion  of  the  salaries  paid  in  the  Philippine  civil 
service  the  question  of  the  leave  allowed  should  be  con- 
sidered. Classified  employees  who  receive  an  annual 
salary  of  $1000  or  more  per  annum  may  be  granted 
twenty-eight  days'  leave  per  annum  to  cover  absences 
from  duty  due  to  illness  or  oth^  causes.  If  not  taken  dur- 
ing the  calendar  year  in  which  it  is  earned  or  in  January 
or  February  of  the  succeeding  year,  it  is  forfeited.  Em- 
ployees tiding  vacation  leave  during  the  months  of 
December,  January,  February  and  March  may  take 
fifty-MX  days,  coirespondii^  to  two  years  of  sa^ce,  at 
one  time,  and  may  thus  get  time  to  visit  Australia, 
Japan,  China,  and  neighbouring  countries. 

In  addition  to  vacation  leave  an  employee  whose  salary 
is  $1000  or  more  but  less  than  S1800  per  annum  is  entitled 
to  thirty  days'  accrued  leave  per  annum,  and  an  employee 
whose  salary  is  $1800  per  anmim  or  more  is  entitled  to 
thirty-five  days'  accrued  leave  per  annum.  Accrued  leave 
may  accumulate  for  not  more  than  five  years  of  service. 

All  classified  employees  are  entitled  to  vi^t  the  United 
States  or  foreign  countries  once  in  every  three  years, 
receiving  in  addition  to  their  accrued  leave,  one  year's 
vacation  leave,  allowance  of  actual  travel  time  at  half 
pay  not  to  ^ceed  sixty  days,  and  return  travel  expenses 
from  place  of  residence  in  the  United  States,  or  from  port 
of  embarkation  in  a  foreign  cotmtry  to  Manila,  on  the 
completion  of  two  years  of  service  after  date  of  return. 
An  employee  entitled  to  thirty-five  days'  accrued  leave  p^ 
annimi  who  visits  the  United  States  after  having  rendered 
three  years  of  service  recdves  a  total  of  two  himdred 
thirteen  days'  accrued  leave,  vacation  leave,  and  half-pay 
travel  time.  If  he  postpones  his  visit  till  he  has  com- 
>  Mal«  Bervaot^ 



pleted  five  years  of  service,  he  receives  a  total  (rf  two 
hundred  ninety-one  days'  accrued  leave,  vacation  leave 
and  travel  time.  An  employee  entitled  to  thirty  days' 
accrued  leave  per  anntmi  who  visits  the  United  States 
after  three  years  of  service  receives  a  total  of  one  hun- 
dred ninety-four  days'  leave  and  half-pay  travel  time,  and 
if  he  postpones  his  visit  until  he  has  rendered  five  years 
of  service,  he  receives  a  total  of  two  hundred  fifty-nine 
days'  leave  and  travel  time. 

It  will  be  seen  that  these  are  very  liberal  allowanoee. 
An  employee  receiving  $1200  at  the  end  of  two  years  of 
service  may  spend  eight  weeks  of  vacation  leave  visiting 
Japan  or  other  surrounding  countries,  and  at  the  end  of 
an  additional  year's  service  he  may  visit  hia  home  in  the 
United  States  with  six  and  a  third  months'  absence  on 
full  and  half  pay  and  with  his  expenses  from  his  home  to 
Manila  payable  two  years  after  his  return,  and  during  every 
three  years  of  his  service  he  may  have  the  same  privil^es. 

The  law  also  provides  that  if  an  employee  is  wounded  or 
injured  in  the  performance  of  duty,  he  may  have  a  total 
of  six  months*  leave  on  full  pay  in  addition  to  any  ac- 
crued leave  to  his  credit. 

Employees  who  have  rendered  satisfactory  service  and 
resign  after  three  or  more  years  receive  in  a  lump  sum  all 
accrued  leave  due  and  thirty  days'  half  salary.  For  ex- 
ample, an  employee  who  has  rec^ved  S1800  per  annxmi 
and  has  served  five  years  without  taking  any  leave  in  ex- 
cess of  the  four  weeks'  vacation  leave  allowable  annually 
would  draw  tl025  were  he  to  redgn. 

The  school  sessions  amount  to  forty  weeks  per  annum 
and  the  school  vacations  to  twelve  weeks  per  atmiun.' 
Teachers  receive  an  annual  salary  and  draw  full  pay 
during  vacations  as  well  as  during  school  sessions.  Every 
third  year  they  are  allowed  to  visit  the  United  States  or 
foreign  countries  with  an  allowance  of  sixty  days'  half-pay 
travel  time  in  addition  to  the  ten  weeks'  long  vacation, 
'  Two  weekB  aX  ChriBtniM  and  ton  weeks  in  April,  May  and  June. 



and  on  completing  two  years  of  service  after  return  to  the 
islands  they  are  entitled  to  their  travelling  expfflisee  from 
place  of  reddence  in  the  United  States  to  Manila  or  from 
port  of  embarkation  in  a  foreign  country  to  Manila. 

It  is  interesting  to  compare  these  provisions  with  the 
regulations  governing  leave  of  absence  in  the  British 
colonial  service ; — 

(1)  There  ie  no  distinction  between  sick  leave  and  ordinaiy 
leave,  the  leave  of  abBence  on  account  of  sickness  being  charged 
again^  the  ordinary  leave  allowable. 

(2)  There  are  two  classes  of  leave :  vacation  leave  on  full 
pay  and  half-pay  leave. 

(3)  The  vacation  leave  amounts  to  three  months  every 
two  years,  and  must  be  taken  during  the  two  years,  as  it  does 
not  accumulate. 

(4)  The  half-pay  leave  amounts  to  two  months  for  each 
year  of  service,  but  cannot  be  taken  until  after  a  po-iod  of  aix 
years'  resident  service  in  the  Colony,  except  in  cases  of  serious 
indisposition  supported  by  medical  certificate,  or  of  "lu^ent 
private  affairs,"  the  nature  of  which  must  be  stated  to  the 
governor.  In  either  case,  the  governor  and  council  must  be 
satisfied  that  the  indulgence  is  indispensable. 

Half  pay  in  African  and  Asiatic  colonies  may  accumulate  for 
twelve  years'  service  — i.e.  twenty-four  months'  half-pay  leave. 

(5)  After  the  exhaustion  of  all  vacation  leave  and  half-pay 
leave,  an  advance  of  six  months'  half-pay  leave  may  be  made 
on  special  grounds  ("urgent  private  affairs"  or  illness  supported 
by  a  medical  certificate),  the  advance  being  charged  aj^dnst 
leave  accruing  subsequently. 

(6)  For  the  purpose  of  visiting  home,  an  officer  may  be 
granted  the  vacation  leave  due  him  (which  is  never  more  than 
three  months)  on  full  pay,  and  his  accumulated  half-pay  leave, 
to  commence  at  the  expiration  of  his  vacation  leave. 

(7)  Judicial  and  education  officers  do  not  receive  the  vacation 
leave  described  in  paragraph  3  above,  the  vacation  of  courts 
and  schools  being  considered  equal  to  this,  but  they  do  receive 
the  half-pay  leave  described  in  paragraph  i,  and  may,  when 
visiting  home  on  half-pay  leave,  receive  full  pay  during  any 
ordinary  vacation  of  the  court  or  school. 

It  will  be  noted  that  although  officers  in  the  British 
colonial  service  are  allowed  much  longer  periods  of  ab- 


THE  phuipfine  civil  SEBTICB  375 

senoe,  the  greater  part  of  their  absence  is  on  half  pay  and 
the  total  money  value  of  the  leave  allowable  in  the  British 
colonial  service  and  in  the  Philippine  civil  service  is  about 
the  same.  As  officers  naturally  prefer  to  be  on  full  pay 
instead  of  half  pay  while  on  leave,  the  provision  of  the 
Phihppine  law  is  in  their  interest ;  it  is  also  in  the  interest 
of  the  service,  as  the  periods  of  the  absence  from  duty 
are  not  so  prolonged. 

The  Philippine  Civil  Service  Law  is  now  about  to  be 
put  to  its  first  really  severe  test  as  a  result  of  the  change 
in  the  national  administration.  Heretofore  those  whose 
duty  and  privilege  it  has  been  to  enforce  it  have  been  in 
the  most  full  and  hearty  sympathy  with  its  purposes. 
President  McKinley  was  from  the  outset  definitely  com- 
mitted to  the  widest  apphcation  of  the  merit  s^item  to 
appointments  in  the  Philippines.  Mr.  Roosevelt  and 
Mr.  Taft  firmly  supported  that  system,  as  has  each  suc- 
ceeding governor-general  up  to,  but  not  including,  Mr. 
Harrison,  who  is  as  yet  an  unknown  quantity. 

It  is  interesting,  however,  to  note  that  on  the  day  fol- 
lowii^  his  arrival  there  was  a  demand  for  the  instant 
resignation  of  Mr.  Thomas  Gary  Welch,  a  ffuthful  and 
Sclent  employee  of  the  government,  who  had  been  for 
nearly  ten  years  in  the  service,  whose  position  was  desired 
for,  and  immediately  given  to,  Mr.  Stephen  Bonsai.  That 
gentleman  had  been  appointed  at  Washington  a  member 
of  the  Mimicipal  Board  of  Manila  immediately  after 
Mr.  Harrison's  confirmation  as  govemor-genenil.  It 
is  not  recorded  that  Mr.  Bonsai  rendered  any  valuable 
service  to  the  city  on  the  voyage,  or  durii^  the  twenty- 
four  hours  of  his  occupancy  of  his  municipal  post  sub- 
sequent to  his  arrival  [  Nor  does  it  appear  that  he 
passed  any  examination  before  his  early  promotion. 

Following  cloeely  upon  the  removal  of  Mr.  Welch  came 
a  demand  for  the  resignation  of  Captfun  Charlee  H. 
Sleeper,  Director  of  Lands,  who  was  unquestionably  one 
of  the  ablest  and  most  efficient  of  the  bureau  chiefs. 



He  had  earned  the  ill-Trill  of  the  politieos  by  iosistiiig 
that  persoDB  authorized  to  make  public  land  surveys,  or 
other  surveys  on  which  claims  of  title  as  against  the 
government  were  to  be  based,  should  know  enough  about 
surveying  to  make  one  correct  survey  when  given  an 
opportunity  practically  to  demonstrate  their  abihtiea 
under  very  favourable  conditions.  He  had  also  incurred 
the  dislike  of  influential  caciques  by  defending  the  occu- 
pants of  small  holdings  on  friar  estates  from  the  rapacity 
of  thar  rich  nd^bours,  and  by  protecting  free-patent 
appUcants  and  homesto^ers  when  large  landowners 
opposed  their  applications  in  order  to  prevent  their 
securing  land,  so  that  they  might  the  more  easily  be 
held  as  peon  labourers. 

He  bad  started  in  his  bureau  a  practical  school  for 
Filipino  surveyors  which  was  trtuning  really  well-quali- 
fied candidates  for  positions  desired  by  the  poUticiaos 
for  themsdves  or  their  incompetent  friends. 

Last,  but  not  least,  he  had  helped  to  upset  the  plans  of 
the  men  primarily  responsible  for  the  so-called  "friar 
lands  investigation"  conducted  by  the  House  Committee 
on  Insular  Affairs,  which  cost  the  United  States  govern- 
ment a  very  large  sum,  and  resulted  in  demonstrating 
his  uprightness  and  the  efficiency  of  his  administration. 

Mr.  John  R.  Wilson,  the  assistant  director  of  lands, 
was  absent  at  the  moment,  but  his  resignation  was  de- 
manded on  the  day  of  his  retiun.  He  too  was  an  active, 
efS.cient,  upright  man. 

Both  of  these  removals  were  political  acts,  pure  and 
simple.  Sr.  Manuel  Tinio  was  appointed  Director  of 
Lands.  He  is  a  bright  young  Ilocano  of  good  character, 
who  had  become  a  "general"  in  the  Insurgent  army  at 
twenty-one  years  of  a^.  He  is  unfit  to  hold  the  place, 
because,  as  he  has  himself  frankly  s^d,  he  knows  nothing 
^x>ut  the  work.  He  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  admin- 
istering $7,000,000  worth  of  friar  lands,  and  the  whole  pub- 
lie  domain  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  with  such  minor 



duties  as  the  checlaaating  of  the  machmations  of  numer- 
ouB  wealthy  Filipinos  who  seek  fraudulently  to  acquire 
great  tracte  through  fraudulent  claims  to  unperfected 
titles  and  by  other  improper  means. 

While  in  Honolulu,  en  route  to  Manila,  Mr.  Harrison 
gave  out  an  interview,  which  I  am  credibly  informed  he 
has  since  confirmed  in  substance.  It  contained  the  fol- 
lowing statement:  — 

"For  years  I  have  been  of  the  minority  in  Congress  and 
have  seen  the  Democr&te  kicked  about,  trampled  upon,  and 
otherwise  manhandled  by  Republicans,  so  that  I  must  confess 
it  now  gives  me  a  saturnine  pleasure  to  see  the  Democrats  in 
a  position  to  do  the  same  thing  to  the  Republicans." 

His  early  official  acts  after  arrival  at  Manila  confirmed 
the  beUef  that  this  was  indeed  the  spirit  in  which  he  was 
facing  the  grave  respondbilities  wluch  there  confronted 

It  is  beyond  doubt  or  cavil  that  high  ideals  heretofore 
have  prevailed  in  the  Philippine  Civil  Service.  Are  they 
now  to  be  substituted  by  the  methods  of  the  ward  poUti- 

In  its  report  for  1901  the  Phihppine  Comroisdon  said : — 

"The  civil  service  law  has  been  in  operation  since  our  last 
report,  and  we  see  no  reason  to  change  our  conclusion  oa  to  the 
al»olute  necessity  for  its  existence,  and  strict  enforcement. 
Without  this  law  American  government  in  these  Islands  is, 
in  our  opinion,  foredoomed  to  humiliating  failure." 

I  signed  that  report.  I  have  not  since  seen  any  reason 
to  change  n^  mind. 



The  Phiuppinb  Constabulart  and  PnBUC  Ohdbe 

DuBiNO  the  last  thirty  years  of  Spanish  rule  in  the 
Philippines  evil-doers  were  pursued  and  apprehended 
and  public  order  was  maintained  chiefly  by  the  guardia 
eivU.  At  the  time  of  its  oi^Miizatioii  in  1858  this  body 
had  a  ffln^e  dividon.  By  1880  the  number  had  been 
increased  to  three,  two  for  Luz6n  and  one  for  the  Visayan 

The  guardia  civil  was  organized  upon  a  military  basis, 
its  officers  and  soldiers  being  drawn  from  the  regular  army 
of  Spain  by  selection  or  upon  recommendation.  De- 
tachments were  distributed  throughout  the  provinces  and 
were  commanded  accordii^  to  their  size  by  commissioned 
or  non-conmiissioned  officers.  Central  offices  were  located 
in  district  capitals ;  company  headquarters  were  stationed 
in  provincial  capitals,  and  detachments  were  sent  to 
places  where  they  were  deemed  to  be  necessary. 

Under  ordinary  conditions  they  rendered  service  as 
patrols  of  two  men  each,  but  for  the  purpose  of  attacking 
large  bands  of  outlaws  one  or  several  companies  were 
employed  as  occasion  required. 

The  guardia  eivU  bad  jurisdiction  over  all  sorts  of 
violations  of  laws  and  mtmicipal  ordinances.  They 
made  reports  upon  which  were  based  the  appointments 
of  municipal  officers,  the  granting  of  licenses  to  cany 
firearms,  and  the  determination  of  the  loyalty  or  the 
disloyalty  of  individuals. 

They  were  vested  with  extraordinary  powers.    Offences 
against  them  were   tried   by  coiirts-martial,  and  were 
construed  as  offences  against  sentinels  on  duty.    Penalties 
were  therefore  extremely  severe. 



Officers  of  the  guardia  civil  on  leave  could  by  their 
own  initiative  assume  a  status  of  duty  with  the  full  powers 
and  responsibilities  that  go  with  command.  This  is 
contrary  to  American  practice,  imder  which  only  dire 
emergency  justifies  an  ofBcer  in  assuming  an  official 
status  unless  he  is  duly  assigned  thereto  by  competent 

The  guardia  civil  could  arrest  on  suspicion,  and  while 
the  Spanish  Government  did  not  directly  authorize  or 
sanction  the  use  of  force  to  extort  confessions,  it  was  not 
scrupulous  in  the  matter  of  accepting  confessions  so 
obtsdned  as  evidence  of  crime,  nor  was  it  quick  to  punish 
members  of  the  gttardia  civil  charged  with  mistreatment 
of  prisoners. 

Reports  made  by  the  ffuardia  civil  were  not  questioned, 
but  were  accepted  without  support  even  in  cases  of  the 
killing  of  prisoners  alleged  to  have  attempted  to  escape, 
or  of  men  evading  arrest. 

This  method  of  eliminating  without  trial  citizens 
deemed  to  be  undesirable  was  applied  with  especial  fre- 
quency in  the  suppression  of  active  brigandt^e,  and 
latterly  during  the  revolution  against  Spain.  Prisoners 
in  cluu^  of  the  ffuardia  civU  were  always  tied  elbow  to 
elbow.  They  knew  full  well  that  resistance  or  flight  was 
an  invitation  to  their  guards  to  kill  them,  and  that  this 
invitation  was  hkely  to  be  promptly  accepted. 

In  the  investigation  of  crime  the  members  of  this  or- 
ganization arrested  persons  on  suspicion  and  compelled 
them  to  make  revelations,  true  or  false.  Eye-witnesses 
to  the  commission  of  crime  were  not  needed  in  the  Spanish 
courts  of  that  day.  The  confession  of  an  accused  person 
secured  his  conviction,  even  though  not  made  in  the 
presence  of  a  judge.  Indirect  and  hearsay  evidence  were 
accepted,  and  such  things  as  writs  of  habeas  corpus  and 
the  plea  of  double  jeopardy  were  unknown  in  Spanish 

The  gttardia  civil  could  rearrest  individuals  and  again 



charge  them  with  crimes  of  which  they  had  already 
heen  acquitted.  I  have  been  assured  by  reliable  Filiimio 
witDcssea  that  it  was  common  during  the  latter  days  of 
Spaniah  sover^gtity  for  persons  who  had  made  themselves 
obnoxious  to  tiie  government  to  be  invited  by  non- 
commissioned officers  to  take  a  walk,  which  was  followed 
either  by  their  complete  disappearance  or  by  the  subse- 
quent discovery  of  their  dead  bodies. 

It  naturally  resulted  that  the  members  of  the  guardia 
dtU  were  r^jarded  with  detestation  and  terror  by  the 
people,  but  their  power  was  so  absolute  that  protest 
rarely  became  public.  The  one  notable  exception  wss 
furnished  by  Dr.  Risal's  book  entitled  "Noh  Me 
Tangere,"  which  voiced  the  complaints  of  the  Filipinos 
f^ainst  them.  There  is  not  a  vestige  of  doubt  that 
hatred  of  them  was  one  of  the  principal  causes  of  the 
insurrection  against  Spain. 

In  1901  the  American  government  organized  a  rural 
police  force  ui  the  Philippines.  It  was  called  the  Philip- 
pine constabulary.  The  insurrection  was  then  drawing 
to  a  close,  but  there  were  left  in  the  field  many  guerilla 
bands  armed  and  tmiformed.  Their  members  sought 
to  excuse  their  lawless  acts  under  the  plea  of  patriotism 
and  opposition  to  the  forces  of  the  United  States.  In 
many  provinces  they  combined  with  professional  bandits 
or  with  rehgious  fanatics.  Various  "popes"  arose,  like 
Papa  Isio  in  Negros.  The  Filipinos  had  become  accus- 
tomed to  a  state  of  war  which  had  continued  for  neariy 
six  years.  Habits  of  peace  had  been  abandoned.  The 
once  prosperous  haciendas  were  in  ruins.  War  and  pesti- 
lence had  destroyed  many  of  the  work  animals,  and  those 
which  remained  continued  to  perish  from  disease.  A^tic 
cholera  was  sweeping  throu^  the  archipelago,  and  con- 
sternation and  disorder  followed  in  its  wake. 

Under  such  circumstances  the  organization  of  a  rural 
police  force  was  imperatively  necessary.  Unfortunately 
the  most  critical  situation  which  it  was  to  be  called  upon 





to  meet  had  to  be  faced  at  the  very  outset,  when  both 
officers  and  men  were  inexperienced  and  before  adequate 
discipline  could  be  estabhahed. 

The  law  providing  for  its  establiahment  was  drawn  by 
the  Honourable  Luke  E.  Wright,  at  that  time  secretary 
of  commerce  and  police  and  later  destined  to  become 
governor-genera!  of  the  Philippines  and  secretary  of 
war  of  the  United  States. 

It  was  intended  that  the  constabulary  shoxild  accom- 
plish its  ends  by  force  when  necessary  but  by  sympathetic 
supervision  when  possible,  suppressing  brigandage  and 
turning  the  people  towards  habits  of  peace.  The  fact 
was  clearly  bome  in  mind  that  the  abuses  of  the  gvardia 
civil  had  not  been  forgotten  and  the  new  force  was  de- 
signed to  meet  existing  conditions,  to  allay  as  rapidly 
as  possible  the  existing  just  rancour  against  the  similar 
oi^anization  established  under  the  Spanish  r€^me,  and 
to  avoid  the  evils  which  had  contributed  so  much  toward 
causing  the  downfall  of  Spanish  sovereignty.  The  law 
was  admirably  framed  to  achieve  these  ends. 

The  officers  of  the  constabulary  were  selected  chiefly 
from  American  volunteers  recently  mustered  out  and 
from  honourably  discharged  soldiers  of  the  United  States 
army.  Some  few  Filipinos,  whose  loyalty  was  above 
suspicion,  were  appointed  to  the  lower  grades.  This 
number  has  mnce  been  materially  augumented,  and 
Btmie  of  the  ori^nal  Filipino  appointees  have  risen  to  the 
rank  of  captain. 

It  was  inevitable  that  at  the  outset  there  should 
be  abuses.  The  organization  was  necessarily  bom  at 
work ;  there  was  no  time  to  instruct,  to  formulate  regu- 
lations, to  wait  imtil  a  satisfactory  state  of  discipline  had 
been  brought  about.  There  were  not  barracks  for 
housing  the  soldiers;  there  were  neither  uniforms,  nor 
arms,  nor  ammunition.  There  was  no  system  for  ra- 
tioning the  men.  All  of  these  things  had  to  be  provided, 
and  they  were  provided  through  a  natural  evolution  of 



practical  processes,  cryBtalUzing  into  form,  tested  by  the 
duties  of  the  day.  The  oi^anization  which  grew  up  was  a 
true  survival  of  the  fittest,  both  in  personnel  and  in 
methods.  The  wonder  is  not  that  some  abuses  occurred, 
but  that  they  were  so  few ;  not  that  there  were  occasional 
evidences  of  lack  of  efficiency,  but  that  efficiency  was  on 
the  whole  so  hi^  from  the  beginning. 

The  several  provinces  were  made  administratiTe  tmits, 
the  commanding  officer  in  each  being  de^gnated  as 
"senior  inspector."  The  men  who  were  to  serve  in  a 
given  province  were  by  preference  recruited  there,  and  a 
d^>arture  was  thus  made  from  the  usual  foreign  colonial 

In  1905  l^e  total  force  was  fixed  at  one  hundred  com- 
panies with  a  nominal  strength  of  two  officers  and  fifty 
men  each.  Under  special  conditions  this  rule  may  be 
departed  from,  and  the  mze  of  the  companies  or  the  number 
of  officers  increased. 

Each  province  is  divided  by  the  senior  inspector  into 
sections,  and  the  responsibility  for  patrol  work  and  general 
poUcing  rests  on  the  senior  company  officer  in  each  station. 
The  provinces  are  grouped  into  five  districts,  each  com- 
manded by  an  assistant  chief  who  exercises  therein  t^e 
authority,  and  performs  the  duties  appropriate  to  the 
chief  for  the  entire  Philippines.  The  higher  adminis* 
trative  positions  have  always  been  filled  by  detailing 
regular  officers  of  the  United  States  army. 

The  constabulary  soldiers  are  now  neatly  uniformed, 
anned  with  Kn%  carbines  and  wdl  disciplined.  They 
show  the  effect  of  good  and  regular  food  and  of  syst^natic 
exerdse,  their  physical  condition  b^g  vastly  superior 
to  that  of  the  average  Filipino.  They  are  given  regular 
instruction  in  thdr  military  duties.  It  is  conducted  in 

Tlte  Philippine  constabulary  may  be  defined  as  a  body 
of  armed  men  with  a  military  organization,  recruited 
from  among  the  people  of  tiie  islands,  officered  in  part 



by  Americans  and  in  part  by  Filipinos,  and  employed 

primarily  for  police  duty  in  connection  with  the  establish- 
TOEXit  and  maintenance  of  public  order. 

Blount's  chapterson  the  administrations  of  Taft,  Wright 
and  Smith  embody  one  proloi^ed  plaint  to  tiie  effect 
that  the  oi^anization  of  the  constabulary  was  prranature, 
and  that  after  the  war  proper  ended,  the  last  smoiddering 
embers  of  armed  and  organized  insurrection  should 
have  been  stunped  out,  and  the  brigandage  which  had 
existed  in  the  Philippines  for  centuries  should  have  been 
dealt  with,  by  the  United  States  army  rather  than  by 
the  constabulary. 

Even  if  it  were  true  tbat  the  army  could  have  rendered 
more  effective  service  to  this  end  than  could  have  been 
expected  at  the  outset  from  a  newly  otganized  body  of 
Filipino  soldiers,  tiie  argument  agadiut  the  organization 
and  use  of  the  constabulary  would  in  my  opinion  have 
been  by  no  means  conclusive.  It  is  our  declared  policy 
to  prepare  the  Filipinos  to  establish  and  maintain  a 
stable  government  of  their  own.  The  proper  exercise  of 
police  powers  is  obviously  necessary  to  such  an  end. 

From  tiie  outset  we  have  sacrificed  efficiency  in  order 
that  our  wards  mi^t  gain  practical  experience,  and 
might  demonstrate  their  ability,  or  lack  of  ability,  to 
perform  necessary  governmental  fimctions.  Does  any 
one  cognizant  of  the  situation  doubt  for  a  moment  that 
provincial  and  mimicipal  affairs  in  the  Philippine  Islands 
would  to-day  be  more  efficiently  administered  if  pro- 
vincial and  municipal  officers  were  appointed  instead  of 
being  elected  ?  Is  any  one  so  foolish  as  to  imagine  that 
the  sanitary  regeneration  of  the  islands  would  not  have 
progressed  much  more  rapidly  had  highly  trained  American 
health  officers  been  used  in  place  of  many  of  the  badly 
educated  and  comparatively  inexperienced  Filipino 
physicians  whose  services  have  been  utilized? 

Nevertheless,  in  the  concrete  case  tmd^  discussion  I 
dissent  from  iha  claim  that  more  satisfactory  results 



could  have  been  obtained  by  the  use  of  American 

The  army  had  long  been  supreme  in  the  Philippinee. 
Every  function  of  government  had  been  perfonned 
by  Its  officers  and  men,  if  perfonned  at  all.  Our 
troops  had  been  combating  an  elusive  and  cruel  enemy. 
If  they  were  human  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  they  still 
harbored  animosities,  bom  of  these  conditions,  toward 
the  people  with  whom  they  had  so  recently  been  fitting. 
Had  thework  of  pacification  been  then  turned  overto  them 
it  would  have  meant  that  often  in  the  locahties  in  whidk 
they  had  been  fighting,  and  in  dealing  with  the  men 
to  whom  they  had  very  recently  been  actively  opposed 
in  armed  conJBict,  they  would  have  been  call^  upon  to 
perform  tasks  and  to  entertain  feelings  radically  dUfoent 
from  those  of  the  preceding  two  or  three  years. 

A  detachment,  marching  through  Leyte,  found  an 
Amwican  who  had  disappeared  a  short  time  before 
crucified,  head  down.  His  abdominal  wall  had  been 
carefully  opened  so  that  his  intestines  might  hang  down 
in  his  face. 

Another  American  prisoner,  found  on  the  same  trip,  had 
been  buried  in  the  ground  with  only  his  head  projecting. 
His  mouth  had  berai  propped  open  with  a  stick,  a  trail 
of  sugar  laid  to  it  through  the  forest,  and  a  handful  thrown 
into  it. 

Millions  of  ante  had  done  the  rest. 

Officers  and  men  ^o  saw  such  things  were  thereby 
fitted  for  war,  rather  than  for  ordinary  police  duty. 

The  truth  is  that  th^  had  seen  so  many  of  them 
that  th^  continued  to  see  them  in  imagination  when 
tiiey  no  longer  existed.  I  well  remember  when  a  general 
officer,  directed  by  his  superior  to  attend  a  banquet  at 
Manila  in  which  Americans  and  Filipinos  joined,  came 
to  it  wearing  a  big  revolver  ! 

Long  after  Manila  was  quiet  I  was  obliged  to  get  out 
of  my  carriage  in  the  rain  and  darknees  half  a  dozen 



times  while  driving  the  length  of  Calle  Real,  and  "ap- 
proach to  be  recognized ' '  by  raw  ' '  rookies, "  each  of  whom 
pointed  a  loaded  rifle  at  me  while  I  did  it.  I  know  that 
this  did  not  tend  to  make  me  feel  peaceable  or  happy. 
In  my  opinion  it  was  wholly  xmnecessary,  and  yet  I  did  not 
blame  the  army  for  thinking  otherwise. 

After  the  war  was  over,  when  my  private  secretary, 
Mr.  James  H.  LeRoy,  was  one  day  approaching  Maloloa, 
he  was  sternly  commanded  by  a  sentiy  to  halt,  the  com- 
mand being  emphasized  as  usual  by  presenting  to  his 
attention  a  most  unattractive' view  down  the  muzzle  of 
aKrag.  He  was  next  ordered  to  "salute  the  S^,"  which 
he  finally  discovered  with  difficulty  in  the  distance,  after 
beingtold  whereto  look.  The  army  way  is  right  and  neces- 
sary in  war,  but  it  makes  a  lot  of  bother  in  time  of  peace  ! 

This  was  not  the  only  reason  for  failing  to  make  more 
extensive  use  of  American  soldiers  in  police  duty.  A 
veteran  colonel  of  United  States  cavaby  who  had  just 
read  Judge  Blount's  book  was  asked  what  he  thought  of 
the  claim  therein  made  that  the  army  should  have  done 
the  police  and  pacification  work  of  the  Phihppines.  His 
reply  was :  — 

"How  long  would  it  take  a  regiment  of  Filipinos  to  catch 
an  American  outlaw  in  the  United  States  ?    Impossible  I " 

Another  army  officer  said :  — 

"Catching  Filipino  outlaws  with  the  Army  is  like  catching 
a  flea  in  a  twenty-acre  field  with  a  traction  engine." 

There  is  perhaps  nothing  bo  demoralizing  to  regular 
troops  as  employment  on  police  duty  which  requires  them 
to  work  singly  or  in  small  squads.  Discipline  speedily 
goes  to  the  dogs  and  instruction  becomes  impossible. 

Successful  prosecution  of  the  work  of  chasing  ladrones  in 
the  Phihppines  requires  a  thoroufdi  knowledge  of  local 
topography  and  of  local  native  dialects.  Spanish  is  of 
use,  but  only  in  dealing  with  educated  Filipinos.    A 

VOL.  I —  2  0 



knowledge  of  the  Fjlipino  himself;  of  hia  habits  of 
thoi^t ;  of  his  attitude  toward  the  white  man ;  and 
toward  the  lUustrado,  or  educated  man,  of  his  own  race ; 
ability  to  enter  a  town  and  speedily  to  determine  the 
relative  importance  of  its  leading  citizens,  finally  centring 
on  the  one  man,  always  to  be  found,  t^o  runs  it,  whether 
he  holds  pohtical  office  or  not,  and  also  to  enlist  the 
sympathy  and  cooperation  of  its  people ;  all  of  these 
things  are  essential  to  the  successful  handling  of  brigand- 
age in  the  Philippines,  whether  such  brigandage  has,  or 
lacks,  political  significance. 

The'  following  parallel  will  make  clear  some  of  tiie 
reasons  why  it  was  determined  to  use  constabulary 
instead  of  American  soldiers  in  policing  the  Philippines 
from  the  time  the  insurrection  officially  ended :  — 

Ukitbd  States  Abmt  Phiuppinb 

Soldier     costs     per     aDDum    Soldier     costs     per      annum 
11400.     (Authority:  Adju-        $363.50. 
taut  Goieral  Heistand  in 

American  soldiers  come  from    Constabulary  soldiers  are  en- 
America,  listed  in  the  province  where 
they  are  to  serve. 

Few  American  soldiers  speak    AH  constabulary  soldiers  speak 
the  local  dialects.  local  dialecte. 

Few  American  soldiers  speak    All  educated  constabulary  sol- 
any  Spanish.  diers  speak  Spanish. 

American  soldiers  usually  have  Constabulary  soldiers,   native 

but   a  slight  knowledge  of  to   the   country,   know   the 

local  gec^aphy  and  topog-  geography  and  topography 

raphy.  of    their    respective    prov* 

Few  American  soldiers  have  The  Filipino  soldier  certainly 

had   enough    contact  with  knoira  his  own  kind  bett^ 

Filipinos     to     understand  than    the    American    does. 





The  American  soldier  uses  a 
ration  of  certain  fixed  com- 
ponents imported  over  sea. 
(A  ration  is  the  day's  al- 
lowance of  food  for  one 

The  American  ration  costs 
24.3  cents  United  States 
cmrency  (exclusive  of  cost 
of  traosportatiott  and  han- 
dlii^).  Fresh  meat  requir- 
ing ice  to  keep  it  is  a 
principal  part  of  the  Ameri- 
can ration.  To  supply  it 
requires  a  regular  system  of 
transport  from  the  United 
States  to  Manila  and  from 
thence  to  local  ports,  and 
wagoD  transportation  from 
ports  to  inland  stations. 

The  American  soldier  is  at  no 
pains  to  enliet  the  sympathy 
and  cooperation  of  the  peo- 
ple; and  his  methods  of 
discipline,  habits  of  life,  etc., 
makd  it  practically  impos- 
sible for  him  to  giun  them. 

Before  preparing  the  forgoing  statement  relative  to 
the  reasons  for  using  Philippine  constabulary  soldiera 
instead  of  soldiers  of  the  United  States  army  for  police 
work  during  the  period  in  question,  I  asked  Colonel  J.  G. 
Harbord,  assistant  director  of  ihe  constabulary,  who 
has  served  with  that  body  nine  years,  has  been  its  acting 
director  and  is  an  officer  of  the  United  States  army,  to  fpve 
me  a  memorandum  on  the  subject.  It  is  only  fair  to  him 
to  say  that  I  have  not  only  followed  very  closely  the  line 
of  argument  embodied  in  tiie  memorandum  which  he  was 
good  enough  to  prepare  for  me,  but  have  in  many  instances 
used  his  very  words.    The  parallel  columns  are  his. 

The  constabulary  soldier  is 
rationed  in  cash  and  buys 
the  food  of  the  country