Skip to main content

Full text of "Recent History Revisited: Analysis and Hindsight ;"

See other formats

Digitized by the Internet Archive 

in 2010 with funding from 

Multicultural Canada; University of Toronto Libraries 

Recent History Revisited: 
Analysis and Hindsight 

David Akers-Jones 

The Criticism which is most often raised about the failings of 
the Colonial Administration - the British administration - is the 
failure to introduce what is generally called "democracy" earlier. 

I found when I had already suggested the title for this talk 
"Recent History Revisited: Analysis and Hindsight", that I had to go 
back to the beginning of Hong Kong's colonial history to trace the 
evolution of what I would prefer to call the introduction of 
representation government. 

Havering and wavering continued about admitting 
representatives of the public into the government of Hong Kong until 
the final years of British rule. It was only then that we had an elected 
Legislature with no appointed members, but even this, because of 
disagreement with China over its composition, finished its term of 
office in 1997 to await fresh elections after the return of sovereignty. 
Why did it take so long? Were the British to blame? 

"One Country Two Systems", "Hong Kong People Ruling 
Hong Kong" - these phrases have been repeated time and time again 
in the past fifteen years until they have almost lost their meaning. 

The first, "one country two systems", describes a situation 
which has been current since the founding of the Colony by the 
British in 1841. The way Hong Kong was administered and its 
political, social and economic systems developed were vastly 
different from that of the rest of China. There were always two 
systems. On the other hand, Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong 
was an objective returned to time and time again over a lengthy 
period. It was not, as commonly thought, first raised by Sir Mark 

46 David Akers-Jones 

Young,* the Governor who in the immediate postwar period, 
proposed the formation of a largely elected Municipal Council. The 
inclusion of representatives of the public in the government was a 
subject much rehearsed, with different emphases at different times, 
almost from the very beginning of the settlement in 1841. It was not 
something which was just overlooked or not proceeded with in a 
deliberate attempt to hang on to the reins of power. Always there was 
a rationale for what was done, although perhaps not always 
acceptable to all shades of opinion. 

Gladstone, in March 1848, summed up the objectives of Great 
Britain in its occupation of Hong Kong, and his words resonate, 
albeit subconsciously, until the year of the final transfer of 
sovereignty in 1997. "That [the occupation of Hong Kong] was 
decided," he said, "on solely and exclusively with a view of 
Commercial interests, and for the benefit of those engaged in the 
Trade with China. As a Naval and Military station, except for the 
security of Commerce, Hong Kong is unnecessary." 1 These words set 
the tone. 

We read of Governor Bonham** in 1849 recommending the 
appointment of representatives of commercial interests to the 
Executive and Legislative Councils so as to "afford opportunities at 
all times of enabling the public generally to make their wishes and 
desires known to the local Government." 2 In 1856 Governor 
Bowring*** writes, "My principal object is to introduce the popular 
element into its government, and to make that element subservient to 
its prosperity, as I have reason to believe its introduction would be 
acceptable to public opinion." 3 Bowring went further to propose 
representation of the foreign and Chinese community. It was the 
middle of the nineteenth century, officials and politicians in Great 
Britain were totally ignorant of what circumstances were like in 
Hong Kong. Both these recommendations were rejected because it 
was thought in Whitehall that they were premature. 

Sir Mark Aitchison Young, Governor, 1941-1947. 
Sir Samuel George Bonham, Governor, 1848-1854. 
Sir John Bowring, Governor, 1854-1859. 

Recent History Revisited 47 

Nevertheless, the Governors kept on trying and in 1880, in 
response to a recommendation from the young and impulsive 
Governor, Pope Hennessy,* the first Chinese voice was heard in the 
Legislative Council when Mr. Ng Choy was appointed. But his 
appointment ran contrary to the opinions of the merchants, lawyers 
and professionals of the expatriate community, who in 1892 made 
representations to the House of Commons over the head of the 
Governor and the Secretary of State that they, and only they, should 
elect members to the Legislative Council, and that the franchise 
should not extend to the Chinese because their sympathies, their 
family interests and traditions, lay with the neighbouring Empire - 
meaning, of course, China. This proposal by the expatriates would 
have meant, in Governor Robinson's words "a small alien minority 
should rule the indigenous majority". The mercantile community, 
Robinson said, "do not settle here, and their only concern in the place 
is to make a competency in it as quickly as possible and then to leave 
it." 4 Their proposals, to his way of thinking and that of the Secretary 
of State, were outrageous and had to be rejected outright. Hong Kong 
should remain a Crown Colony in the firm control of its Officials! 

In 1884 a second Chinese Member was appointed to the 
Legislative Council but in the years that followed similar arguments 
were deployed by the expatriate community, but always the demands 
of this minority to form an oligarchy were rejected. On the other 
hand, neither did the Colonial power believe it was necessary to take 
any measures to hand over power to the indigenous community, 
because there was no demand or agitation from it to participate in 
government. Chinese merchants and their families and workers, no 
doubt, wished only to get on with their business interests and 
employment and regarded themselves still living in a part of China 
and their allegiance was to China. 

These opinions have to be viewed in their historical context 
against the 19 th century background of British Imperial interests, of 
notions of national superiority reinforced by strongly held religious 

Sir John Pope Hennessy, Governor, 1837-1883. 

48 David A kers- Jones 

belief. They have to be seen against the unfolding drama of the 
Western Powers' encroachments and cultural invasion of China and 
their determination to win the trade war and to open up China to 
Western commerce. (A drama whose last act is now being played out 
today with China's application to join the World Trade Organisation 
and the repeated calls for China to open up its markets!) Neither can 
what was thought best for Hong Kong be considered in isolation 
from the decline and fall of the Qing dynasty, the horrifying and 
drawn out terror of the Taiping rebellion and the rise of nationalism. 

Governor Stubbs* in 1920 gave his view of the situation. 
Talking of the Legislative Council he said, "The case of the Colony 
differs from those of such places as Malta and Ceylon in that there is 
no permanent population except to some extent the Chinese, of 
whom the vast majority have never taken the slightest interest in the 
administration of the Government. The Europeans are a migratory 
body... the result of establishing an unofficial majority [i.e. in the 
Legislative Council] would be to substitute Government by a body of 
amateurs whose interests are necessarily those of the moment rather 
than the future, for Government by trained professionals," 5 that is, the 
civil service. 

It was not until two world wars had taken place and the middle 
of the twentieth century that serious attention was once again given 
to the issue of local representation. The end of the Second World 
War marked the crossing of a watershed leading to determination on 
the part of the newly elected Labour Government in Britain to bring 
down the curtain on the Britain Empire. The granting of self- 
government leading to the independence of former colonies became 
the stated objective of the British Government. Hong Kong was not 
left out. Sir Mark Young, the Governor who returned to Hong Kong 
after the war, put forward his proposals for giving the people of Hong 
Kong a greater say in their affairs based upon the creation of a 
Municipal Council. The idea was not new but when previously put 
forward it was alleged, with some justification, that a Municipal 

Sir Reginald Edward Stubbs, Governor, 1919-1925. 

Recent History Revisited 49 

Council whose boundaries were co-extensive with the boundaries of 
the Colony would threaten the very existence and power of the 
Legislative Council. (Did we not see a replay of this argument in the 
legislation to abolish the Municipal Councils in recent times?) Sir 
Mark pressed on, despite misgivings secretly expressed to the 
Colonial Office as to the popular enthusiasm for these reforms, and 
announced his proposal to create an elected Municipal Council. 

Refugees from the mainland flooded in to escape the closing 
stages of the civil war in China. Arguments against the Municipal 
Council proposal were raised by the unofficial members of Executive 
and Legislative Councils while other voices were raised in their 
support by many Chinese organizations. Sir Mark Young who seems 
already to have had "1997" at the back of his mind, reported to 
London that his proposals were greeted with considerable apathy by 
the Chinese community which he ascribed to the fear that the Council 
would become a battleground for political forces, KMT and 
Communist, and that in any case, many Chinese foresaw the return of 
Hong Kong to China and did not wish to involve themselves in 
something which could be judged to be unpatriotic. 

It was time for Sir Mark Young to go and for the arrival of Sir 
Alexander Grantham. The volume of refugees from disturbed 
conditions in China grew at an alarming rate. A small number of 
officials were coping with an almost insurmountable problem. The 
Legislative Council was strengthened by the appointment of a few 
more members and the proposal to create an elected Municipal 
Council with powers which would have threatened its existence, was 
dropped. Looking at those events today, it is difficult to understand 
why Sir Mark Young chose to ignore the threat to Legislative 
Council inherent in his proposals and why he did not propose at least 
some reform of the Legislature. 

From then on, for almost a period of twenty years, Hong Kong 
was preoccupied with ever-present problems. The start of a never- 
ending housing programme was made when it was realised that the 
refugees were here to stay; the repercussions of the Korean War and 
the chilling atmosphere of the Cold War, which seemed to hold the 

50 David A kers- Jones 

whole world in suspense, spilled over into Hong Kong; the lingering 
political antagonisms following the defeat of the Kuomintang army 
erupted into mob violence in 1956; there was tension across the 
Taiwan Straits and the shelling of Quemoy. These were just some of 
the things which formed the background to our thoughts. In the 
sixties there was a sudden influx of over a hundred thousand illegal 
immigrants who poured over the border against the big wide screen 
of the mountains north of the border. There was drought and long 
queues at standpipes. The worst typhoon in living memory swept 
across Hong Kong leaving a trail of death and destruction. In 1966 
and 1967, there were more riots. It is an understatement to say that 
Hong Kong had more than enough to do. The situation was unstable, 
the community restless, living from hand to mouth in appalling 
conditions and not having put down its roots. It was an atmosphere 
not conducive to elevated thoughts about democracy and political 
reform. As the well-known and astringent commentator Dick Wilson 
said, "It would have been like trying to organise elections on a 
railway station." 

In the sixties, before the riots broke out, the idea had been 
raised to introduce District Officers into the urban area to provide a 
channel of communication and better to coordinate the work of 
government departments. The idea was squashed by conservatives in 
the Administration who saw no need for another layer of 

The Governor, David Crosbie Trench, persisted, and while 
Hong Kong was boiling up for the Star Ferry riots, a Principal 
Assistant Colonial Secretary, W. V. Dickinson, was appointed to lead 
a Working Party on Local Administration. This innocuous and 
cautious title elsewhere would have been called locai government. 
The recommendations of the report 7 were for far-reaching reform: the 
establishment of Regional Councils, which apart from powers 
normally associated with local government, would have had 
executive power in the fields of education, health and welfare. But 
there were four members of the Working Party who had reservations 
about the advisability, for various reasons, of dividing up Hong Kong 
in this way. They suggested a more gradual approach involving 

Recent History Revisited 51 

generalist local District Officers being appointed, with a view 
eventually to the appointment of advisory Regional Councils. The 
wheel has now turned full circle. Our Regional Councils are about to 
be abolished and District Boards are to be elevated to the role of 
District Councils. 

In 1967 the Cultural Revolution spread to Hong Kong with 
widespread disturbances. China was in turmoil, Hong Kong was 
reeling, confidence was at a low ebb. It is not surprising that in the 
anxious years that followed, the Report of the Working Party on 
Local Administration was quietly forgotten. 

The scene shifted to China with ping-pong diplomacy, the visits 
of Nixon and Kissinger, the Shanghai communique and the 
admission of China into the United Nations. Shortly thereafter the 
Chinese Ambassador to the U.N. declared that the question of Hong 
Kong was not a matter for the United Nations Committee on 
Decolonisation but was a matter for China to decide when the time 
was ripe. China was in the throes of the Cultural Revolution and it is 
absurd to think that in those anxious years that Hong Kong could 
have either begun a sensible dialogue with China on political 
development or taken a risk and gone it alone. China's words in the 
United Nations were a sufficient warning as to the way to approach 
this question of the future. 

Following the quiet putting to rest of the Dickinson Report, the 
influence of the district style of administration in the New Territories 
spread to urban Hong Kong and Kowloon. District Officers were 
appointed and District Offices were opened with a window opening 
onto city streets. In the New Territories new towns were becoming 
larger with the only form of representation a Rural Committee 
elected by a small minority of indigenous inhabitants. Beginning in 
1978 Advisory Committees based on each New Territories district, 
were appointed and then extended to Hong Kong and Kowloon. In 
1981, greatly to everyone's surprise, elections took place on a one- 
person one-vote basis for one third of the members of the Boards and 
they were given carte blanche powers to raise, debate and advise on 
any matters affecting the well being of people living in their district. 

52 David A kers- Jones 

For once the Government plans had run ahead of people's 
expectations. Together with this revolutionary step, and in a more 
general way, the system of Advisory Boards and Committees was 
strengthened to cover every aspect of government policy and activity. 
These several hundred committees involving the recruitment of 
several thousand members of the public, survive to this day. A 
process that has been called by Professor Ambrose King of the 
Chinese University, the "administrative absorption of politics." 

The rest is history. Green Paper was followed by White Paper. 
For the Legislative Council, functional constituencies and electoral 
colleges were established. A cautious road map was published setting 
out the way ahead and the reasons for it. There were no strong 
reactions from China except for the authorities there to point out that 
China had not been consulted. China was clearly watching in what 
direction the Colonial Government was moving. 

1978 was the year of economic reform in China. In the spring 
of 1979 Sir Murray MacLehose visited Beijing, the first visit by a 
governor since that of Sir Alexander Grantham in the 1950s. By the 
end of the seventies, while land across the border in Shenzhen could 
already be held by people living in Hong Kong for a period of 25 
years, concern was already being expressed in Hong Kong about 
leases of land in the New Territories which would expire in 1997. 
Deng Xiaoping refused to be drawn on the question of the lease and 
Sir Murray returned from Beijing with the famous phrase that our 
businessmen were told to stop worrying, to put their hearts at ease. 
The reaction to this placatory phrase was lukewarm; it lacked detail 
but actually it meant precisely what it said - "Get on with your 
business and stop worrying." From then on, so many things which 
were said for Hong Kong's benefit for those that had ears to hear 
were not listened to, or given the attention which they deserved. 

In 1981 China published her nine point proposals for Taiwan 
and broad hints were given that they could apply equally to Hong 
Kong. A Junior Minister in the Foreign Office was told this in the 
spring of 1982, and Sir Edward Heath was told the same thing more 
substantially two months later. Here were the bones of the formula of 

Recent History Revisited 53 

"one country two systems" and "Hong Kong people ruling Hong 
Kong". But nobody listened. It was not until 1984 that agreement 
was reached with China which, at long last, contained the important 
phrase that Hong Kong could have a "legislature constituted by 
elections" - Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong. 

It took five years to turn the agreement with China into the 
Basic Law and despite well supported views to the contrary, 
decisions were taken in Hong Kong and London in 1988 to ensure 
that when direct elections were introduced they conformed and 
converged with the Basic Law and did not run the risk of being 
overturned at the return of sovereignty, and that the political 
development, so painfully reached, would be dismantled. Agreement 
was reached after hard negotiation, that the Legislative Council to be 
elected in 1995 would remain in office until this year, 1999 - "the 
through train." Five of the thirteen years had already passed and 
precious time was again to pass while the electoral system outlined in 
the Basic Law was turned into Hong Kong legislation. 

Six months before the final signature was put on the Basic Law 
there was serious disorder and turmoil in Beijing and in other cities 
in China. This had a profound effect on people in Hong Kong and 
around the world. The events of June 1989 polarised opinion in Hong 
Kong. They were seen as an aberration, a deviation from the steady 
progress of reforms which had been taking place since the 
assumption of power by Deng Xiaoping, and which had led to the 
growing confidence of Hong Kong's citizens. It was seen as a return 
to darker days. 

Sir David Wilson, who had been Governor for five years during 
this period, was peremptorily recalled at the end of 1991 and given a 
seat in the House of Lords. The last Governor, a politician, arrived in 
1992 and remained until the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997. 

The Last Governor by Jonathan Dimbleby 6 deals at some length 
with the question of the famous letters which the Foreign Ministers 
of Great Britain and China had exchanged before the draft of the 
Basic Law was finalized and Christopher Patten's own book, East 

54 David Akers-J ones 

and West, 1 also reveals the background to these events. It is quite 
clear from their explanations that Mr. Patten only saw the letters on 
the eve of his departure for Beijing. This extraordinary omission on 
the part of all the officials, from the Foreign Secretary downwards, 
who knew about them, beggars belief. But with hindsight there is no 
doubt in my mind that had Mr. Patten known about them, the course 
of events would have been entirely different. 

Director Lu Ping of the Hong Kong and Macao Office had 
invited Mr. Patten to visit Beijing before his arrival, but the invitation 
still stood during the summer of 1992. This invitation was refused by 
Patten who wanted to carry no baggage with him when he arrived in 
Hong Kong, even to the extent of leaving off his plumed hat. The 
obvious follow-up to the letters, if Mr. Patten had read them, was 
either to visit Beijing to open discussion on them or for the Foreign 
Secretary to follow up with more letters of explanation as to how 
they were to be interpreted by the British side, and a dialogue would 
have started. 

We all know that the Drafting Committee of the Basic Law was 
kept hanging about Guangzhou until the last letter had been delivered 
to the Chinese Foreign Minister and then, only then, was the draft of 
the Basic Law passed for approval by the National People's Congress. 
In other words the letters provided an important input into the Basic 

Ignorant of the letters, the Governor proceeded to draft his 
proposals with officials in Hong Kong who had also not seen the 
letters - Mike Hanson, Leo Goodstadt and Michael Sze. The 
proposals were shown to the Chinese side shortly before they were 
due to be delivered in the Legislative Council. Director Lu Ping 
warned the Governor not to go ahead with them, while Mr. Patten, 
still not knowing about the letters, went ahead determinedly. The 
Chinese side reacted predictably. The agreements in the letters had 
been totally ignored by the British side. Letters between Foreign 
Ministers, next to letters between Prime Ministers, are the last link in 
the chain and have to mean what they say - "agreement" means 
"agreement". When Mr. Patten arrived in Beijing his reception and 

Recent History Revisited 55 

his reaction when he was confronted by the letters were entirely to be 

Subsequently to set aside the letters as not being legally binding 
was equally extraordinary. Thereafter there were fruitless and bitter 
exchanges, long attempts at negotiation to try to find a way out. Both 
sides stuck to their positions and the results are well known. 

Predictably, the passage of the Legislation and the election of 
the Legislative Council led inevitably to the dismissal of the Council 
in 1997 and the appointment of a Provisional Council. Things might 
have been quite different if only those letters had come to the surface 
earlier, or if Governor Wilson had continued in office. But hindsight 
is an easy art to practice. 

Those last five years with agreement on the elections in place, 
and the "through train" approved by both sides was an opportunity 
for Hong Kong to work more closely with the Mainland authorities 
and to get to know China. I had envisaged the Governor and his 
principal officials travelling frequently to China establishing the 
framework and channels for future co-operation. Regrettably, this did 
not happen. The determination of the Governor, with the support of 
the British government, to exploit areas in the Basic Law, which 
were not spelt out in detail, to change understood and established 
systems from what was intended by them, and to set aside a serious 
exchange of letters between the two Foreign Ministers as not being 
legally binding, resulted in the first and last visit of Mr. Patten, as 
Governor, to Beijing taking place in 1992. From then on the level of 
serious exchange between Hong Kong senior officials and their 
counterparts in China, was less than there had been in the ten years 
immediately after the Cultural Revolution. 

I have tried, at some length, to provide an apologia, a defence, 
for the failure of the Hong Kong Government with the support of the 
British Government, not to introduce democracy, an elected 
Government, earlier than was done. Perhaps there were occasional 
windows of opportunity when a jump start might have been possible, 
but even this has to be viewed against well-researched and 

56 David Akers- J ones 

documented apathy and indifference in the community for political 
development and I believe, considering the severe handling by the 
Central Peoples' Government of the reforms introduced by the last 
Governor, Christopher Patten, it can be said with some certainty that 
any changes introduced before the Basic law was in place and 
without China's blessing, would have had no chance of survival. 

After the successful achievement in 1984 of an agreement about 
our future which left thirteen years to prepare for the change of 
sovereignty, the estrangement of the two governments and the 
fruitless discussions which took place during the last five years of 
colonial Hong Kong, were particularly disappointing, and 
preoccupation with political development beginning as long ago as 
1980 caused the government to fail to stand back and examine the 
wider picture. 

From the earliest beginning of the Colony, the role of the 
Government, while not defined, was to provide administration, a 
public service and public security for those who came here to trade 
and to settle. Unlike other colonies with a settled indigenous 
population, from the point of view of the early European settlers, 
there were two communities, the small Chinese settlement in the west 
of Hong Kong island and themselves. The two communities lived 

Hong Kong grew in population and prospered, but this ethos 
remained and when such things as electricity, tramways, gas, ferries, 
telephones, bus companies, were required, it was left to the private 
sector to provide them. Hong Kong discovered privatisation before 
the word was found lurking in the lexicon. This hands-off approach 
persisted in other areas - education, medicine and welfare services - 
particularly in provision for the growing Chinese population and led 
to the creation of the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, and later to the 
building of mission schools and many welfare facilities by charitable 
organisations. Remember that it was only in 1971 that primary 
education became compulsory and a few years of secondary 
education some years later. 

Recent History Revisited 57 

Government administration was small and has been, and is 
today, much praised for its efficiency and the excellence if its civil 
service. The economy grew, and because it grew there was no need 
to depart from a low level of taxation and increasing revenue from an 
expanding economy. A wide range of fees and charges and revenue 
from the sale of land, allowed the Government, and I generalise, 
largely to operate its medical, educational and social services, 
through subventions to non-government agencies. 

There was not the driving motive of looming independence, as 
in other colonies, to uproot a system which was working well and to 
prepare it for a different future. The future, it was rightly said, was 
not going to be different. The system would go on as before and there 
would be a smooth transition. And so there was. Everyone has said 
so. But that driving motive of independence in other colonies led 
inevitably to rather more introspection and innovation in their 
governments than perhaps was evinced or thought necessary in Hong 
Kong. We thought intensely and brought about improvements to the 
"one system" but not about "one country" and the significance of the 
revolution, and I use the word deliberately, which was evolving in 
China, following the reforms of 1978. 

It is said that a Chinese member of the Joint Liaison Group 
asked why the large map of Hong Kong on the wall of the Joint 
Liaison Office showed a blank yellowing space to the north of 
Shenzhen River where there was already a population of a few 
million people living, a stone's throw from Hong Kong. There was 
no indication that we were part of China. China was like the terra 
incognita shown on early maps of the world. 

The much used phrase of positive non-intervention, which was 
used to describe the Government's attitude to industry and commerce, 
provided it operated within the framework of the law, was applied in 
respect to other aspects of our society. How else can it be argued, 
when a few years before the return of sovereignty, when we were 
trumpeting Hong Kong's character as an international city, only to 
discover that the knowledge of English in the population generally, 
of the international language of international commerce, and 

58 David A kers- Jones 

communication between nations, after one hundred and fifty years of 
colonisation, was extremely poor? How else to explain the present 
lack of scientists, when they are so desperately needed, to launch us 
into the world of information technology and the present rather 
desperate attempts being made to catch up? How else to explain 
that there was really no serious attempt to introduce Putonghua into 
our school curriculum? 

The building of the new towns and development of support 
infrastructure was one of the great achievements of the seventies and 
early eighties, and we continued with this work but we now found 
that infrastructure development has lagged behind the demands of a 
population, whose expansion has been known for a long time. Were 
we slow, too, not to realise the need to stop pouring untreated sewage 
into the harbour? 

Lord MacLehose, Governor from 1971 to 1982, shook the 
Administration - and I was part of it - out of a complacency into 
which it had fallen. Reform of the civil service took place. He told 
Hong Kong to clean up its act, to clean Hong Kong and fight crime 
and corruption. But in the later years of his governorship 
MacLehose's preoccupation was with the large political question 
hanging over our future. There were changes to the Administration 
but they were by way of amendment, alteration, expansion and 
improvement on existing systems rather than the more fundamental 
question of how well we were prepared for the post-colonial era and 
for the challenges of a rapidly changing world. 

With the benefit of hindsight I would venture to say that some 
of today's difficulties could have been avoided if we had not been 
too mesmerised by our success and prosperity, if we had looked at 
our vulnerability, sought out our weak spots and shortcomings and 
had a little more foresight. The great benefit bestowed by hindsight is 
to learn from your mistakes. 

Recent History Revisited 59 

To end, it is appropriate to quote from these comforting Taoist 
lines of T. S. Eliot: 

In order to arrive at what you are not 

You must go through the way in which you are not, 

And what you do not know is the only thing you know 

And what you own is what you do not own 

And where you are is where you are not. 

(From the Four Quartets) 


1. Great Britain. Colonial Office. Original Correspondence: Hong Kong 1841-1951, Series 
129 (C0129)/13. "Secretary W. E. Gladstone to Governor Davis dispatch of 7 March 1848". 
See Steve Tsang ed., A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Government and Politics (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995) p.l 19. 

2. CO 129/28. "Governor Bonham to Secretary Lord Grey, dispatch 22, 26 February 1948". 
See ibid., p. 59. 

3. C0129/55. "Governor Bowring to Secretary H. Labouchere, dispatch 49, 26 March 
1856". See ibid, p 61 

4. C0129/256. "Governor Robinson to Secretary Lord Ripon, confidential dispatch of 6 
December 1892". See ibid., pp.72-3. 

5. C0129/462. "Governor Stubbs to Secretary Viscount Milner, confidential dispatch of 
29 July 1920". See ibid., p.80. 

6. Jonathan Dimbleby, The Last Governor: Christ Pattern and the Handover of Hong 
Kong (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1997). 

7. Christ Patten, East and West: the Last Governor of Hong Kong on Power, Freedom and 
the Future (London: MacMillan, 1998). 

8. For a full account of this Report, see A. Trevor Clark, "The Dickinson Report: An 
Account of the Background to. and Preparation of, the 1966 Report of the Working Party on 
Local Administration", Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 37, 
(1998) pp. 1-17.